Knepper v. Sands, 194 U.S. 476 (1904)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Knepper v. Sands, 194 U.S. 476 (1904)
Full caption
KNEPPER v. SANDS.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 31, 1904
KNEPPER v. SANDS.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR TH EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
No. 233. Submitted April 19,1904.—Decided May 31,1904.
Section 4 of the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556, for the adjustment forfeited railroad grants providing for issuing patents under t e con tions specified for lands sold by the grantee company to pure a good faith, has no reference to any unearned lands purchase a date of the act from a company to which they had never "ee? Ceregt ¡n or patented, although such company might have acquired an in them had it completed its road. Nor can one who pure ase
lands from a grantee company whose grant was made by Congress through the State in which its road was to be built, be regarded as a purchaser in good faith, within the meaning of the act of 1887, when the purchase was made after the passage of the act and after the State had, by legislative enactment, resumed its title to the lands and then relinquished them to the United States on account of the failure to complete its road.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. I. S. Strubble for appellant.
Mr. John H. King and Mr. M. B. Davis for appellee.
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.
This cause is before us upon questions certified by the Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
The controlling facts in the extended statement sent up by the Judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals, as the basis of the questions propounded, are these:
By an act approved May 12, 1864, c. 84, Congress made a grant of lands to the State of Iowa for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad from Sioux City to the south line of Minnesota at such point as the State might select—the lands to be held subject to the disposal of its Legislature, or that purpose only. Upon the completion of each section of ten consecutive miles of road it became the duty of the cretary of the Interior to issue to the State patents for one undred sections for the benefit of the constructing company;
So °n’ Un^ road was completed, when the whole of e ands granted were to be patented “to the State for the uses aforesaid, and none other.” 13 Stat. 72, §§ 1, 2, 3.
f the road was not completed within ten years from the acceptance of the grant by the constructing company, then Stat and n°f patented were to “revert to the with" ^G- PurPose curing the completion of the road in such time, not exceeding five years, and upon such p. 478terms as the State should determine—the lands not in any manner to be disposed of or encumbered except as the same were patented under the provisions of the act, and upon the failure of the State to complete <the road within five years after the above ten years then the lands undisposed of were to “revert to the United States.” § 4.
The State accepted the grant, April 3, 1866, upon the conditions prescribed by Congress, and authorized the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company, a Minnesota corporation, to construct the road. The company entered upon the work of construction, and completed only five sections of ten miles each, receiving the full amount of land to which it was entitled by reason of such construction.
In consequence of the failure of the railroad company to complete the construction of the road, the State declared by an act approved March 16, 1882, that, in respect of all lands and rights to land granted or intended to be granted to that company, they “are hereby absolutely and entirely resumed by the State of Iowa, and that the same be and are absolutely vested in said State as if the same had never been granted to said company.” Before the passage of that act the State, through its executive officers, ascertained by computation that the railroad company had received conveyances for all lands it was entitled to receive under the terms of the grant, and that the State then held legal title to 85,457.41 acres pertaining to the grant, no part of which had then or ever since been earned by the company. The land in question here was a part of those unearned lands.
Subsequently, by an act which took effect April 2, 188, the State relinquished to the United States all its right, title and interest in the lands which by the above act of 1882 were declared vested in the State.
The land here in dispute, being section 9, township 9 > north of range 42, west of the fifth principal meridian, in O’Brien County, Iowa, was open and unoccupied when e above act of April 2, 1884, was passed. In 1885 Sands sett e p. 479upon it, erected thereon a house, and made improvements with a view of establishing a homestead in accordance with the laws of the United States. He has continuously since resided upon the land, claiming it as a homestead. Shortly after he settled upon it he made application to enter it as a homestead, but his application was rejected; for what reason rejected, does not appear. •
Later, by an act approved March 3, 1887, Congress provided for the adjustment of land grants made by Congress to aid in the construction of railroads, and for the forfeiture of unearned lands. 24 Stat. 556, c. 376.
The first section of that act provided for the immediate adjustment, in accordance with the decisions of this court, of each of the railroad land grants which then remained unadjusted. The second section provided for the recovery by the United States of the title to lands erroneously certified or patented by the United States to or for the use or benefit of any company claiming by, through or under grant from the United States, to aid in the construction of a railroad. That section made it the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to demand from such company a relinquishment or reconveyance to the United States of all such lands, whether within granted or indemnity limits, and, if the demand was not complied with, then it became the duty of the Attorney General to institute suit against the company. The third section provided that homestead or preemption entries of wa fide settlers which were found to have been erroneously cancelled might be perfected, upon compliance with the public and laws and certain conditions and the settler reinstated m. is rights. If the settler did not renew his application wit in a reasonable time, to be fixed by the Secretary of the nterior, then all such unclaimed lands were to be disposed under the public land laws—according a priority of right fide purchasers of the unclaimed lands, if any, and if ere e no such purchasers, then to bona fide settlers residing thereon. 6
Opinion of the Court. 194 U. 8.
The fourth section, upon the construction of which the present case mainly depends, is in these words: “ § 4. That as to all lands, except those mentioned in the foregoing section, which have been so erroneously certified or patented as aforesaid, and which have been sold by the grantee company to citizens of the United States, or to persons who have declared their intention to become such citizens, the person or persons, so purchasing in good faith, his heirs or assigns, shall be entitled to the land so purchased, upon making proof of the fact of such purchase, at the proper land office, within such time and under such rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, after the grants respectively shall have been adjusted; and patents of the United States shall issue therefor, and shall revert back to the date of the original certification or patenting, and the Secretary of the Interior, on behalf of the United States, shall demand payment from the company, which has so disposed of such lands, of an amount equal to the government price of similar lands; and in case of neglect or refusal of such company to make payment as hereafter specified, within ninety days after the demand shall have been made, the Attorney General shall cause suit or suits to be brought against such company for the said amount: Provided, That nothing in this act shall prevent any purchaser of lands erroneously withdrawn, certified or patented as aforesaid from recovering the purchase money therefor from the grantee company, less the amount paid to the United States by such company as by this act required. . . 24 Stat. 556, c. 376.
As showing the nature of the title of the State under the act of 1864, reference may here be made to a suit brought by the United States against the Sioux City and St. Pam Railroad Company, under which company, as will presently appear, the appellant claims. By the final decree in that case the title of the United States was quieted as to certain lands situated in Dickinson and O’Brien Counties, and claime by the railroad company under the act of 1864. In e p. 481opinion in that case, which was decided here October 21, 1895, the court said: “Another contention is, that upon the issuing of the patents of 1872 and 1873 to the State for the use and benefit of the railroad company the title vested absolutely in the company, and the lands were thereby freed from restraints of alienation, from conditions subsequent, or from liability to forfeiture. In support of this contention reference is made to Bybee v. Oregon & California Railroad, 139 U. S. 663, 674, 676, 677; Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360; Wisconsin Central Railroad v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496; Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241; St. Paul & Pacific Railroad v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 139 U; S. 1, 6. But these are cases, as an examination of them will show, in which the grant was directly to the railroad company, or in which the act of Congress required that the patents for lands earned should be issued, not to the State for the benefit of the railroad company, but directly to the company itself. In the case now before us the statute directed patents to be issued to the State for the benefit of the company. So that, until the State disposed of the lands, the title was in it, as trustee, and not in the railroad company. Schulenberger v. Harriman, 12 Wall. 44, 59; Lake Superior Ship Canal &c. Co. v. Cunningham, 155 U. S. 354. See also McGregor &c. Railroad v. Brown, 39 Iowa, 655; Sioux City & St. Paul Railroad v. Osceola County, 43 Iowa, 318, 321. In the case last named the Sioux City Company was relieved from the payment of taxes upon some of the lands patented to the State for its benefit, upon the ground that the legal title was in the State, and the lands for that reason were not taxable. The question is altogether different rom what it would be if patents to these lands had been issued, er if the State had conveyed them directly to that company.” ^wax City &c. Railroad v. United States, 159 U. S. 349, 363.
was there adjudged that the railroad company had received 2,004.89 acres more than, in any view of its rights, 8 °uld have been awarded to it.
After the decision of that case the Secretary of the Interior, vol. cxciv—31« p. 482under date of November 18, 1895, published a circular, in which he declared the land here in controversy and other like land subject to disposal by the Land Department. This was after the above application by Sands to enter this land as a homestead.
Subsequently, on the 10th of March, 1896, Sands renewed his application for the land in question as a homestead. That application was contested in the local land office by the present appellant, who asserted a right to the land in virtue of a purchase of it from the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company on June 21, 1887, and in virtue of the provisions of the fourth section of the above adjustment act of March 3, 1887. She had never resided upon the land in controversy or cultivated the same or in any manner attempted to comply with the homestead laws of the United States for the purpose of obtaining a title under them. This contest was determined at the local office in favor of Sands—that office finding that he had, by virtue of his settlement of and continued residence upon and cultivation of the land, and by full compliance with the homestead laws of the United States, become entitled to a patent. That decision was confirmed by the Commissioner of the Land Office. But upon appeal to the Secretary of the Interior the decisions of the local land office and of the Commissioner were reversed, and Sands’ application to enter the land as a homestead was rejected. Thereupon the present suit was commenced by Sands, charging that the officers of the General Land Office, proceeding under the decision of the Secretary, were about to issue or had issued a patent to the present appellant solely by virtue of her alleged purchase on June 21, 1887, from the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroa Company, after the passage of the adjustment act of March, 1887, and in virtue of its fourth section. Sands, alleging t such action, if taken, would be unlawful and contrary to aw, prayed that the Commissioner be required to accept his proo s showing settlement upon and continuous cultivation o land for the period of five years or more, and that the pa p. 483194 U. S. Opinion of the Court.
to appellant Knepper be either declared null and void, or for a decree declaring that she holds the legal title in trust for him.
Such is the case made by the statement by the Judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals, who propound to this court the following questions:
“First. In view of the provisions of the act of Congress of May 12, 1864, by virtue of which the land in controversy was granted to the State of Iowa, did the action which was subsequently taken in manner and form aforesaid by the Governor and Legislature of the State of Iowa operate as a final adjustment of the grant, so far as the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company was concerned, and, by virtue of its being so adjusted, exempt or except the grant in question from the provisions of the adjustment act of March 3, 1887?
“Second. In view of the terms of the granting act of May 12, 1864, and the action subsequently taken in manner and form aforesaid by the State of Iowa, acting through its Governor and Legislature, can Elmira Knepper, the appellant, be esteemed a purchaser in good faith or a bona fide purchaser of the land in controversy, within the meaning of the fourth section of the adjustment act of March 3, 1887, as against ohn A. Sands, the appellee, who was in the open possession of the land in controversy and had erected valuable improvements thereon, in manner and form aforesaid, when said purchase was made?”
We have seen that the appellant claims an interest in the ands here in question in virtue of a purchase made by her from e railroad company, June 21, 1887, after the passage of the a justment act of March 3, 1887. But what interest had the company at that time in these particular lands constituting ^’^7.41 acres of unearned lands, no part of w c the company earned or could have earned except on ccount of road actually constructed by it. For such road as had constructed, lands had been conveyed to it, ere never was a moment, according to the record, when company could have rightfully demanded from the State p. 484a conveyance or patent for the lands here in dispute or for any of the unearned lands. The legal title to the lands granted by the act of 1864 was, first in the United States, next in the State, (Sioux City &c. Railroad Co. v. United States, above cited,} but never in the company until a conveyance to it by the State. The State could only have conveyed lands to the company in consideration of constructed road; and subject to that condition the company undertook to construct the road. When it abandoned the work of construction it lost the right to claim lands except for such road as it had previously constructed. The State therefore properly resumed, as by the act of 1882 it did resume, after the company’s default, such title to the unearned lands as it had before authorizing the company to construct the road. The State after thus resuming the title could have used the unearned lands to aid in the construction of that portion of the road which the railroad company failed to construct. But it did not do so, and hence by the act of April 2, 1884,—eighteen years after it accepted, in 1866, the grant of 1864 and the completion of the road having been abandoned—the State, by statute, formally relinquished to the United States all its right, title and interest in the unearned lands pertaining to the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company. This statute was perhaps unnecessary, as by the act of 1864 the title to the unearned lands granted by that act was to revert to the United States after the expiration of fifteen years from the acceptance of the grant without the completion of the road. But the relm quishment by the State saved the necessity, if there was^ necessity, of formal proceedings, legislative or judicial, by e United States to reinvest itself with full title. Thus t e title to the unearned lands was put back into the United States. So that when the adjustment act of 1887 was passed, the tie of the United States to the unearned lands, including particular lands here in dispute, was complete and perec No interest then remained in the State or in the railroa co^ pany requiring an adjustment; for, as stated, the State p. 485relinquished all its claim, and the railroad company had received all the lands it was entitled to demand for constructed road. When, therefore, Congress made provision in the fourth section of the act of 1887 for the protection of those who in good faith had purchased from any “grantee company,” to whom lands had been erroneously certified or patented, it could not have intended to refer to purchases made from the railroad company, after that act took effect, of lands originally certified or patented to the State and not to the railroad company, and the legal title to which was in the United States at the date of the passage of the act. A chief purpose of the act of 1887 was to declare forfeited unearned lands and restore them to the public domain, and not to give third parties and speculators an opportunity to purchase such lands from companies which had defaulted in the work of construction, and to whom the State had never conveyed, and thereby obtain a preference over actual settlers in possession. The policy of the Government has always been favorable to actual settlers. As late as Ard v. Brandon, 156 U. S. 537, it was said that “ the law deals tenderly with one who, in good faith, goes upon the public lands, with a view of making a home thereon.” See also Northern Pacific Railroad n. Amacker, 175 U. S. 564; Moss v. Dowman, 176 U. S. 413; Rector v. Gibbon, 111 U. S. 276; Nelson v. Northern Pacific Railway, 188 U. S. 108, 123.
We are of opinion that the fourth section of the adjustment act of 1887 has no reference to any unearned lands purchased after the date of that act from a company to whom they had never been certified or patented, although, if it had kept its engagement with the State and completed the road, in due nne, it could have acquired an interest in them; and that, as e State by legislative enactment, had resumed the title it acquired from the United States, and afterwards relinquished 1 s interest to the United States—all before the passage of the aCt appellant could not, within the meaning e act, and after its passage, have become a purchaser in faith of the lands here in dispute. The sale by the rail-
Syllabus. 194 U. S.
road company to the appellant was a sale of something it did not possess, a mere device to bring its purchaser within the provisions of the adjustment act of 1887 when that act was never intended to apply to such a case.
We, therefore, answer the second question in the negative, and omit as unnecessary any answer to the first one.
It will be so certified.
BINNS v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA.
Nos. 196, 266. Submitted April 6,1904.—Decided May 31,1904.
While it may not be within the power of Congress by a special system of license taxes to obtain, from a Territory of the United States, revenue for the benefit of the Nation as distinguished from that necessary for the support of the territorial government, Congress has plenary power, save as controlled by the provisions of the Constitution, to establis a government of the Territories which need not necessarily be the same in all Territories and it may establish a revenue system applicable sole y to the Territory for which it is established. . , The fact that the taxes are paid directly into the treasury of the Unit
States and are not specifically appropriated for the expenses of the em tory, when the sum total of all the revenue from the Territory including the taxes does not equal the cost and expense of maintaining the gove ment of the Territory, does not make the taxes unconstitutiona satisfactorily appear that the purpose of the taxes is to raise revenu in that Territory for the Territory itself. „ , i The license taxes provided for in § 460, Title II, of the Alaska Pen ® ’ I are not in conflict with the uniformity provisions ot § o 01 I the Constitution of the United States. f
The general rule that debates of Congress are not appropriate sour^ information from which to discover the meaning of the langua statutes passed by that body does not apply to the examination reports of committees of either branch of Congress with a view o mining the scope of statutes passed on the strength of sue Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 464.
194 U. S. Statement of the Case.
Section 460 of Title II of the Alaska Penal Code, act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1253, 1336, as amended by the act of June 6, 1900, entitled “An act making further provision for a civil government for Alaska, and for other purposes,” 31 Stat. 321, 330, reads “that any person or persons, corporation or company prosecuting or attempting to prosecute any of the following lines of business within the District of Alaska shall first apply for and obtain license so to do from a District Court or a subdivision thereof in said district, and pay for said license for the respective lines of business and trade as follows, to wit: . . . Transfer companies, fifty dollars per annum.”
Section 461 provides: “That any person, corporation or company doing or attempting to do business in violation of the provisions of the foregoing section, or without having first paid the license therein required, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,” etc.
Section 463: “That the licenses provided for in this act shall be issued by the clerk of the District Court or any subdivision thereof . . . duly made and entered: . . . Provided, That ... all moneys received for licenses by
• • • under this act shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be covered into the Treasury of the United States, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.”
Under this statute, plaintiff in error was prosecuted and convicted in the District Court for the District of Alaska, econd Division. This conviction has been brought to this court on writ of error, and the question presented is whether t e statute is in conflict with section 8 of Article I of the institution of the United States, which reads: “ The Congress s all have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and xcises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence an general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imPosts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”
Argument for the United States. 194 U. S.
Mr. J. C. Campbell and Mr. W. H. Melson for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Purdy for the United States:
The power to impose these license fees is not derived from the general power of taxation provided for in Article I, section 8, of the Constitution, but from the plenary power “to dispose of and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.” Art. IV, § 3, par. 2. The exercise of such power is therefore not subject to the provisions limiting the general power of taxation as to apportionment and uniformity.
It is unnecessary to ascertain or attempt to define the precise political relations existing between the Territory of Alaska and the Federal Government. That Alaska is territory belonging to the United States is settled beyond controversy, and that Congress has plenary powers, national and municipal, Federal and state, over all the Territories, so long as they remain in a territorial condition. American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542; Benner v. Porter, 9 How. 235, 242, Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 193; National Bank v. Yankton County, 101 U. S. 129, 133; Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. 8. 15, 44; Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 42, 43, McAlister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 181; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. 8. 244, Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197.
The particular law here under discussion was enacted by Congress as a needful regulation for the government of tha Territory.
The license fees imposed by this law are a part of a .pen» code, and in the nature of police regulations, which, in judgment of Congress, are necessary for the governmen o the Territory of Alaska by reason of its social conditions. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365; Ficklcn v. Shelby County, 145 U. S. 1, 23; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.&- 113.
194 U. S. Argument for the United States.
The licensing of persons to sell liquor is not an exercise of the taxing power of the State to raise revenue, but of the police power for the regulation and restriction of a dangerous business; it follows that the adjustment of fees for the license is not governed by the constitutional provisions requiring equality and uniformity of taxation. Black on Intoxicating Liquors; Thomason v. State, 15 Indiana, 449. See also Black on Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 108, 109, 179, and cases there cited; Lovingston v. Board of Trustees, 99 Illinois, 564.
The Constitution requires uniformity of taxation, but does not require uniformity of police supervision. The power of Congress to adapt its police regulations, or, to use the term of the framers of the Constitution, its “needful regulations,” to the peculiar conditions and needs of each separate Territory seems clear. The framers wisely avoided any attempt to create uniformity where uniformity was impossible. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 292.
Congress has the power to license various trades and occupations in the Territories independently of and apart from the power to tax, and the mere fact that revenue is derived as an incident to the exercise of such power will not operate to characterize the license fee as a tax. For the distinction between a license which grants authority to engage in a particular business, thus conferring a privilege, and a tax granting no such authority, see the License-Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462. As to the revenue feature, see Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St. 63.
Congress could not make these licenses uniform throughout the United States.
If taxes at all, these license fees are local taxes imposed by ongress as the legislature of Alaska, and paid into the Treasury o the United States as the only treasury of Alaska, and obviously intended to meet the expenses of governing that territory.
The only legislative body in Alaska is Congress, and simi-ar y the only executive in Alaska is the national executive p. 490acting through its local appointees. Alaska has no distinct treasury and no officer known as treasurer.
Admitting, for the purpose of the argument, that these license fees are local taxes imposed by Congress in the Territory of Alaska and appropriated by Congress to the support of the General Government, such a law would be constitutional under the plenary power of Congress to govern the Territories. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 299.
Mr. Justice Brewer, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The contention of plaintiff in error is that the license tax is an excise, that it is laid and collected “to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States,” because by section 463 it is provided that “all moneys received for licenses . . . under this act shall ... be covered into the Treasury of the United States,” that it is imposed only in Alaska, and is not “uniform throughout the United States.”
It is unnecessary to consider the decisions in the Insular cases, for, as said by Mr. Justice White in his concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 335: “Without referring in detail to the acquisition from Russia of Alaska, it suffices to say that that treaty also contained provisions for incorporation and was acted upon;” and by Mr. Justice Gray, in his concurring opinion (p. 345): “The cases now before the court do not touch the authority of the United States over the Territories, in the strict and technical sense, being those which lie within the United States, as bounded by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Dominion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico, and the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii; but they relate to territory, in the broader sense, acquired by the United States by war with a foreign State.”
It had been theretofore held by this court in Steamer Coquitlam v. United States, 163 U. S. 346, 352, that “Alaska is p. 491one of the Territories of the United States. It was so designated in that order (the order assigning the Territory to the Ninth Judicial Circuit) and has always been so regarded. And the court established by the act of 1884 is the court of last resort within the limits of that Territory.” Nor can it be doubted that it is an organized Territory, for the act of May 17, 1884, 23 Stat. 24, entitled “An act providing a civil government for Alaska,” provided: “That the territory ceded to the United States by Russia by the treaty of March thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and known as Alaska, shall constitute a civil and judicial district, the government of which shall be organized and administered as hereinafter provided.” See also 31 Stat. 321, sec. 1.
We shall assume that the purpose of the license fees required by section 460 is the collection of revenue, and that the license fees are excises within the constitutional sense of the terms. Nevertheless we are of opinion that they are to be regarded as local taxes imposed for the purpose of raising funds to support the administration of local government in Alaska.
It must be remembered that Congress, in the government of the Territories as well as of the District of Columbia, has plenary power, save as controlled by the provisions of the Constitution, that the form of government it shall establish is not prescribed, and may not necessarily be the same in all the Territories. We are accustomed to that generally adopted for the Territories, of a quasi state government, with executive, legislative and judicial officers, and a legislature endowed with the power of local taxation and local expenditures, but ongress is not limited to this form. In the District of Columia it has adopted a different mode of government, and in as a still another. It may legislate directly in respect to । e. .oc^ a^a^rs of a Territory or transfer the power of such gis ation to a legislature elected by the citizens of the Terriof7h Pr°vided in the District of Columbia for a board ree commissioners, who are the controlling officers of the 18 nc • It may entrust to them a large volume of legislative p. 492power, or it may by direct legislation create the whole body of statutory law applicable thereto. For Alaska, Congress has established a government of a different form. It has provided no legislative body but only executive and judicial officers. It has enacted a penal and civil code. Having created no legislative body and provided for no local legislation in respect to the matter of revenue, it has established a revenue system of its own, applicable alone to that Territory. Instead of raising revenue by direct taxation upon property, it has, as it may rightfully do, provided for that revenue by means of license taxes.
In reference to the power of Congress reference may be had to Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, in which it was held that “it is within the constitutional power of Congress, acting as the local legislature of the District of Columbia, to tax different classes of property within the District at different rates;” and further, after referring to the case of Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, it was said (pp. 407, 408):
“The power of Congress, legislating as a local legislature for the District, to levy taxes for district purposes only, in like manner as the legislature of a State may tax the people of a State for state purposes, was expressly admitted, and has never since been doubted. 5 Wheat. 318; Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S. 541; Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687. In the exercise of this power Congress, like any state legislature unrestricted by constitutional provisions, may at its discretion wholly exempt certain classes of property from taxation, or may tax them at a lower rate than other property.”
In view of this decision it would not be open to doubt that, if the act had provided for a local treasurer to whom these local taxes should be paid and directed that the proceeds be used solely in payment of the necessary expenses of the government of Alaska, its constitutionality would be clear, bu the contention is that the statute requires that the procee s of these licenses shall be paid into the Treasury of the Unite States, from which, of course, they can only be taken under p. 493an act of Congress making specific appropriation. In fact, all the expenses of the Territory are, in pursuance of statute, paid directly out of the United States Treasury. Act of June 6, 1900, Title I, sections 2 and 10, 31 Stat. 322, 325; Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 960, 987; April 28, 1902, 32 Stat. 120, 147, and February 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 882. True, there are some special provisions for revenues and their application. Thus, the fees for issuing certificates of admission to the bar and for commissions to notaries public are to be retained by the secretary of the district and “kept in a fund to be known as the District Historical Library Fund” and designed for “establishing and maintaining the district historical library and museum,” act of June 6, 1900, Title I, sec. 32, 31 Stat. 333, and municipal corporations are authorized to impose certain taxes for local purposes. Title III, sec. 201, 31 Stat. 521. By section 203, fifty per cent of all the license moneys collected within the limits of such corporations are to be paid to their treasurers to be used for school purposes. By subsequent legislation, 31 Stat. 1438, it is provided that if the amount thus paid is not all required for school purposes the District Court may authorize the expenditure of the surplus for any municipal purpose. And by the same statute it is also provided that fifty per cent of all license moneys collected outside municipal corporations and covered into the Treasury of the United States shall be set aside to be expended for school purposes outside the municipalities. By still later legislation, (although that was enacted after the commencement of this prosecution, 32 Stat. 946,) the entire proceeds of license taxes within the limits of municipal corporations are to be paid to the treasurer of the corporation, for school and municipal purposes.
But outside of these special matters there are no provisions °or collecting revenue within the Territory for the expenses ° j he territorial government other than these license taxes charges of a similar nature. According to the informa-10n furnished by the officers of the Treasury Department, p. 494as shown in the brief of counsel for the Government, all the revenues of every kind and nature which can be considered as coming from Alaska are not equal to the cost and expense of administering its territorial government. How far we are at liberty to rely upon this information, which was not presented upon the trial of this case, or how far we can take judicial notice of the facts as shown by the records of the Treasury Department, need not be determined, for if an excess of revenue above the cost and expense of administering the territorial government must be shown to establish the unconstitutionality of the license taxes the fact should have been shown by the plaintiff in error. The presumptions are that the act imposing those taxes is constitutional, and anything essential to establish its invalidity which does not appear of record or from matters of which we can take judicial notice must be shown by the party asserting the unconstitutionality.
The question may then be stated in this form: Congress has undoubtedly the power by direct legislation to impose these license taxes upon the residents of Alaska, providing that when collected they are paid to a treasurer of the Territory and disbursed by him solely for the needs of the Territory. Does the fact that they are ordered to be paid into the Treasury of the United States and not specifically appropriated to the expenses of the Territory, when the sum total of these and all other revenues from the Territory does not equal the cost and expense of maintaining its government, make them unconstitutional? In other words, if, under any circumstances, Congress has the power to levy and collect these taxes for the expenses of the territorial government, is it essential to their validity that the proceeds therefrom be kept constantly separate from all other moneys and specifically and solely appropriated to the interests of the Territory? We do not thin that the constitutional power of Congress in this respec depends entirely on the mode of its exercise. If if satisfactorily appears that the purpose of these license taxes is raise revenue for use in Alaska, and that the total revenue p. 495derived from Alaska are inadequate to the expenses of the Territory, so that Congress has to draw upon the general funds of the Nation, the taxes must be held valid. That the purpose of these taxes was to raise revenue in Alaska for Alaska is obvious. They were authorized in statutes dealing solely with Alaska. There is no provision for a direct property tax to be collected in Alaska for the general expenses of the Territory. The entire moneys collected from these license taxes and otherwise from Alaska are inadequate for the expenses of that Territory. So far as we may properly refer to the proceedings in Congress, they affirm that these license taxes are charges upon the citizens of Alaska for the support of its government. While it is generally true that debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body, United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 318, yet it is also true that we have examined the reports of the committees of either body with a view of determining the scope of statutes passed on the strength of such reports. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 464. When sections 461 and 462 were under consideration m the Senate the chairman of the Committee on Territories, m response to inquiries from Senators, made these replies:
The Committee on Territories have thoroughly investigated the condition of affairs in Alaska and have prepared certain licenses which in their judgment will create a revenue sufficient to defray all the expenses of the government of the erritory of Alaska. . . . They are licenses peculiar to t e condition of affairs in the Territory of Alaska on certain mes of goods, articles of commerce, etc., which, in the judg^ent of the committee, should bear a license, inasmuch as ere is no taxation whatever in Alaska. Not one dollar of axes is raised on any kind of property there. It is therefore ra*Se revenue some kind, and in the judgment e Committee on Territories, after consultation with promient citizens of the Territory of Alaska, including the governor
Counsel for Plaintiff in Error. 194 U. S.
and several other officers, this code or list of licenses was prepared by the committee. It was prepared largely upon their suggestions and upon the information of the committee derived from conversing with them.” Vol. 32, Congressional Record, Part III, page 2235.
While, of course, it would have simplified the matter and removed all doubt if the statute had provided that those taxes be paid directly to some local treasurer and by him disbursed in payment of territorial expenses, yet it seems to us it would be sacrificing substance to form to hold that the method pursued, when the intent of Congress is obvious, is sufficient to invalidate the taxes.
In order to avoid any misapprehension we may add that this opinion must not be extended to any case, if one should arise, in which it is apparent that Congress is, by some special system of license taxes, seeking to obtain from a Territory of the United States revenue for the benefit of the nation as distinguished from that necessary for the support of the territorial government.
We see no error in the record, and the judgment is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the decision of this case.