Case details
Bluebook Citation
Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360
Full caption
Van Wyck v. Knevals.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Van Wyck v. Knevals.
1. Subject to the exceptions therein mentioned, the act of July 23, 1866, c. 212, granted, for the use and benefit of the St. Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company, the odd-numbered sections of public land within a prescribed distance on each side of the proposed road. The company duly filed in the office of the Secretary of the Interior a map showing the definite location of the line of the road. Held, that the grant was in proesenti, and attached to those sections as soon as the map was so filed. No valid adverse right or title to any part of them could be acquired by a subsequent settlement or entry.
2. On the failure of the company to complete the work, a forfeiture of the grant, if it resulted therefrom, can be enforced only by the United States through judicial proceedings, or the action of Congress. A third party cannot set it up to validate his title, nor avail himself of the fact that the company, in constructing, deviated from the original line, if the lands which he claims are within the prescribed distance from it and the road as built.
3. After the company had filed with the Secretary of the Interior its map of definite location, a party entered a portion of the sections covered by the grant, and a patent therefor was issued to him by the United States. Held, that the patent created a cloud upon the company’s right and title, and furnishes ground for equitable relief.
4. Quaere, Where Congress conferred upon a railway company created by a State authority to construct its road within an organized Territory, can the latter, when admitted into the Union as a State, impose any impediment to the full enjoyment by the company of all the rights resulting from the exercise of that authority.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.
The first section of the act of Congress of July 23, 1866, c. 212, is as follows: “ That there is hereby granted to the State of Kansas, for the use and benefit of the Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company, the same being a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Kansas, to construct and operate a railroad from Elwood, in Kansas, westwardly via Marysville, in the same State, so as to effect a junction with the Union Pacific Railroad, or any branch thereof, not further west than the one hundredth meridian of west longitude, every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for ten sections in width on each side of said road to the point of intersection. But in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the line or route of said road is definitely fixed, sold any section or any part thereof, granted as aforesaid, or that the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement has attached to the same, or that the same has been reserved by the United States for any purpose whatever, then it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to cause to be selected for thé purpose aforesaid, from the public lands of the United States nearest to tiers of sections above specified, so much land in alternate sections or parts of sections designated by odd numbers as shall be equal to such lands as the United States have sold, reserved, or otherwise appropriated, or to which the rights of pre-emption or homestead settlements have attached as aforesaid; which lands thus indicated by odd numbers and selected by direction of the Secretary of the Interior as aforesaid shall be held by the State of Kansas for the use and purpose aforesaid.”
There are several provisos to this section which have no bearing upon the matters involved in this suit.
The third section provides that the lands granted “shall mure to the benefit of said company as follows : When the governor of the State of Kansas shall certify that any section of ten consecutive miles of said road is completed in good, substantial, and workmanlike manner as a first-class railroad, then the Secretary of the Interior shall issue to the said company patents for so many sections of said land hereinbefore granted [p. 362] 362 Van Wyck v. Knevals. [Sup. Ct.
as lie opposite to and coterminous with the said completed sections, and when certificates of the governor aforesaid shall be presented to the Secretary of the completion, as aforesaid, of each successive section of ten consecutive miles of said road the said Secretary shall in like manner issue to said company patents for the said sections of said lands as aforesaid for each of said sections of road until said road shall be completed: Provided, that if said railroad company or its assigns shall fail to complete at least one section of said road each year from the date of its acceptance of the grant provided for in this act, then its right to the lands for said section so failing of completion shall revert to the government of the United States: Provided further, that if said road is not completed within ten years from the date of the acceptance of the grant hereinbefore made, the lands remaining unpatented shall revert to the United States.”
The fourth section declares, “that as soon as the said company shall file with the Secretary of the Interior maps of its line designating the route thereof, it shall be the duty of the said Secretary to withdraw from the market the lands granted by this act in such manner as may be best calculated to effect the purposes of this act and subserve the public interest.”
The company accepted the act, and filed, March 25, 1870, with the Secretary of the Interior a map of the line of its road which the directors had approved on the 21st of that month. The Secretary sent it to the Commissioner of the General Land-Office with the following letter: —
“Department of the Interior,
“Washington, D. C., March 26, 1870.
“ Sir, — I transmit herewith a map of the definite location of the line of road of the Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company from Elwood, in Kansas, via Marysville, in said State, to a connection with the Union Pacific Railroad at the southwest comer of section 36, in township 9 north, of range 16 west, in the State of Nebraska.
“You will instruct the proper local officers to withhold from sale or other disposal all odd-numbered sections falling within the limits of twenty miles on each side of the line of road. j “In thus directing the land to be withdrawn conformably to the [p. 363] fourth section of the act of July 23,1866,1 deem it proper, in order to avoid any misapprehension as to the views of the department, to state that this order is made without prejudice to any existing adverse rights, whether individual or corporate, if such there be, and does not include any lands ‘heretofore reserved to the United States by any act of Congress or in any other manner by competent authority for the purpose of aiding in any object of internal improvement, or for any other puipose whatsoever.’
“In case of such reservation there is granted to the company only a right of way for one hundred feet on each side of its line of road, subject to the approval of the President of the United States.
“ The right of the company to construct its road within the limits of the State of Nebraska may hereafter be the subject of controversy ; in that event, nothing contained in this order will preclude the consideration of the question as to such right should it arise in a form to require the action of the department.
“Very respectfully, your ob’t servant,
“J. D. Cox, SecretaryJ*
On the 8th of the following month the Commissioner forwarded to the land-officers at Beatrice, Nebraska, a map showing the line of such location and of the ten and twenty mile limits of the grant. He instructed these officers to withdraw from sale, location, pre-emption, or homestead entry all the odd-numbered sections falling within those limits. His letter was received on the 15th of that month, and the lands supposed to be covered by the grant were then withdrawn. The company built sections of the road from time to time, each in due time completed, and the requisite certificate filed with the Secretary of the Interior. It made a junction with the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad at Hastings, Nebraska, July 15, 1872; but never at any point on the Union Pacific, unless the said Burlington road is a branch thereof. It was constructed substantially on the line delineated on the map, and ran through Thayer and Nuckolls Counties, which are within the district of lands subject to sale at Beatrice. But, at a point about one mile east of the lands in controversy in this suit and about seventy-five miles east of Hastings, it departed from that line; at a point opposite those lands it was built from forty to sixty rods from that line, and from that [p. 364] point to Hastings it deflected from the line from one to three miles. The lands in dispute are within ten miles of the road as built and of the line delineated on the map. The company, April 1, 1873, filed its articles of incorporation in the office of the Secretary of State of Nebraska, but did not otherwise attempt to comply with the laws of that State in respect of foreign railroad corporations extending their roads into that State. The lands in controversy were entered at the Beatrice land-office, April 13, 1870, by Van Wyck, who received a patent for them, bearing date Nov. 15, 1871.
Knevals, who had acquired from the company all its right to those lands, filed his bill against Van Wyck in the court below, where a decree was rendered declaring that the company, by the construction of its road and the notice given to the Secretary of the Interior, was entitled to a patent to the lands in controversy; that Van Wyck received the patent therefor and the title which it conveyed, in trust for the company and not otherwise, and that at the commencement of the suit he held them in trust for the complainant, to whom it was further decreed that he convey them.
Van Wyck thereupon appealed.
Mr. E. E. Brown for the appellant.
Mr. James M. Woolworth for the appellee.
Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court.
The principal question for determination in this case is, When does the grant made to Kansas by the act of Congress of July 23, 1866, c. 212, for the use and benefit of the St. Joseph and Denver Railroad Company in the construction of a railroad from Elwood in that State, to its junction with the Union Pacific Railroad, or a branch thereof, take effect so as to cut off the right of pre-emption from subsequent settlers on the land ? The grant is similar in its main features to numerous other grants of land made by Congress in aid of railroads, and contains the same limitations, or, rather, exceptions to it. It differs from some of the grants in that it is made to the State, and not directly to the company to be benefited. The act of Congress, however, provides, notwithstanding the designation of the State as grantee, that patents for the land shall [p. 365] Oct. 1882.] Van Wyck v. Knevals. 365
be issued directly to the company upon the completion of every ten consecutive miles of the road. The grant is of ten alternate sections, designated by odd numbers, on each side of the proposed road, subject to the condition that if it appear, when the route of the road is “ definitely fixed,” that the United States have sold any section or a part thereof, or the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement has attached, or the same has been reserved by the United States for any purpose, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause an equal quantity of other lands to be selected from odd sections nearest those designated in lieu of the lands appropriated, which shall be held by the State for the same purpose. . The grant is one in prcesenti, except as its operation is affected by that condition; that is, it imports the transfer, subject to the limitations mentioned, of a present interest in the lands designated. The difficulty in immediately giving full operation to it arises from the fact that the sections designated as granted are incapable of identification until the route of the road is “ definitely fixed.” When that route is thus established the grant takes effect upon the sections by relation as of the date of the act of Congress. In that sense we say that the grant is one in prcesenti. It cuts off all claims, other than those mentioned, to any portion of the lands from the date of the act, and passes the title as fully as though the sections had then been capable of identification. Nor is this operation of the grant affected by the fact that patents of the United States are subsequently, upon the certificate of the governor, to be issued by the Secretary of the Interior directly to the company and not to the State. This is only a mode of divesting the State of her trust character and of passing the legal title held by her to the party' for whose benefit the grant was made. The legal title under the grant goes to the State, but the equitable right vests in the company. The State cannot dispose of the lands; she simply holds them for the use and benefit of the company, the act of Congress providing how her trust shall be discharged and the legal title be conveyed to the company. The act says that the land granted “ shall inure to the benefit of the said company as follows,” and then proceeds to declare that when the governor of the State shall certify that a section of the road of ten consecu- [p. 366] '366 Van Wyck v. Knevals. [Sup. Ct.
tive miles is completed “ in a good; substantial, and permanent manner as a first-class railroad,” the Secretary of the Interior shall issue to the company patents for the sections of land granted which lie opposite to and coterminous with the completed road, and that similar patents shall issue upon a like certificate upon the completion of every successive section of ten miles. It matters not, so far as subsequent settlers are concerned, in what manner the title, which has passed out of the United States, is transferred to the company from the State. When the route of the road is “definitely fixed,” no parties can subsequently acquire a pre-emption right to any portion of the lands covered by the grant. The right of the State and of the company is thenceforth perfect as against subsequent claimants under the United States.
The inquiry then arises, When is the route of the road to be considered as “ definitely fixed ” so that the grant attaches to the adjoining sections ? The complainant in the court below, who derives his title from the company, contends that the route is definitely fixed, within the meaning of the act of Congress, when the company files with the Secretary of the Interior a map of its lines, approved by its directors, designating the route of the proposed road. On the other hand, the defendant, — the appellant here, — who acquired his interest by a subsequent entry of the lands and a patent therefor, contends that the route cannot be deemed definitely fixed, so that the grant attaches to any particular sections and cuts off the right of entry thereof until the lands are withdrawn from market by order of the Secretary of the Interior, and notice of the order of withdrawal is communicated to the local land-officers in the districts in which the lands are situated.
We are of opinion that the position of the complainant is the correct one. The route must be considered as “ definitely fixed ” when it has ceased to be the subject of change at the volition of the company. Until the map is filed with the Secretary of the Interior the company is at liberty to adopt such a route as it may deem best, after an examination of the ground has disclosed the feasibility and advantages of different lines. But when a route is adopted by the company and a map designating it is filed with the Secretary of the Interior [p. 367] Oct. 1882.] Van Wyck v. Knevals. 367
and accepted by that officer, the route is established; it is, in the language of the act, “ definitely fixed,” and cannot be the subject of future change, so as to affect the grant, except upon legislative consent. No further action is required of the company to establish the route. It then becomes the duty of the Secretary to withdraw the lands granted from market. But if he should neglect this duty, the neglect would not impair the rights of the company, however prejudicial it might prove to others. Its rights are not made dependent upon the issue of the Secretary’s order, or upon notice of the withdrawal being given to the local land-officers. Congress, which possesses the absolute power of alienation of the public lands, has prescribed the period at which other parties than the grantee named shall have the privilege of acquiring a right to portions of the lands specified, and neither the Secretary nor any other officer of the Land Department can extend the period by requiring something to be done subsequently, and until done, continuing the right of parties to settle on the lands as previously. Otherwise, it would be in their power, by vexatious or dilatory proceedings, to defeat the act of Congress, or at least seriously impair its benefit. Parties learning of the route established — and they would not fail to know it — might, between the filing of the map and the notice to the local land-officers, take up the most valuable portions of the lands. Nearness to the proposed road would add to the value of the sections and lead to a general settlement upon them.
This view of the law disposes of the claim of the defendant. A map designating the route of the proposed road, made by the engineers of the company after careful surveys, and adopted by its directors, was filed on the 25th of March, 1870, with the Secretary of the Interior, who accepted it, and on the 26th of that month transmitted it to the Commissioner of the General Land-Office, with directions to instruct the proper local officers to withhold from sale, or other disposition, the odd-numbered sections within the limits of twenty miles on each side of the route. On the 8th of April following, the Commissioner forwarded a copy of the map to the register and receiver of the land-office at Beatrice, in Nebraska, but it was not received by them until the 15th of that month. On the 13th the [p. 368] 368 Van Wyck v. Knevals. [Sup. Ct.
defendant entered at that office the land in question, at private entry, and paid the government price therefor. In November of the following year a patent for it was issued to him. His entry, as thus seen, was after the map had been filed and the route “definitely fixed,” and the grant had attached to the adjoining odd sections. It could, therefore, initiate no rights to the land, and the subsequent patent issued upon that entry conferred no valid title to the defendant as against the company or parties claiming under it.
The defendant having failed to establish the validity of his own title, attacks the right of the company to the lands covered by the grant, alleging that the company never completed the construction of the entire road for which the grant was made ; that after filing its map with the Secretary of the Interior it changed, for part of the distance, the route of the road, and that it never complied with the conditions of the laws of Nebraska for the extension of its road within the limits of that State.
We do not deem these objections, when considered with the facts on which they are based, as having any force. There is to them a ready and conclusive answer. Assuming that the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad, with which the company’s road connected, was not, as averred by the complainant, a branch of the Union Pacific Railroad, and that, therefore, the company's proposed road was not entirely, completed, the fact remains that the company constructed a portion of the proposed road, and that portion was accepted as completed in the manner required by the act of Congress. Patents for some of the adjoining sections were accordingly issued to the company, and a right to all of them, not specially reserved by the condition of the grant, vested in it. So far as that portion of the road which was completed and accepted is concerned, the contract of the company was executed, and as to the lands patented, the transaction on the part of the government was closed and the title of the company perfected. The right of the company to the remaining odd-numbered sections adjoining the road completed and accepted, not reserved, is equally clear. If the whole of the proposed road has not been completed, any forfeiture consequent thereon can be asserted only by the grantor, the
United States, through judicial proceedings, or through the action of Congress. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44. A third party cannot take upon himself to enforce conditions attached to the grant when the government does not complain of their breach. The holder of an invalid title does not strengthen his position by showing how badly the government has been treated with respect to the property.
As to the alleged deviation of the road constructed from the route laid down in the map, admitting such to be the fact, the defendant is in no position to complain of it; the lands in controversy are within the required limit, whether that be measured from one line or the other. A deviation of the route without the consent of Congress, so as to take the road beyond the lands granted, might, perhaps, raise the question whether the grant was not abandoned ; but no such question is here presented. The deviation within the limits of the granted lands in no way infringed upon any rights of the defendant.
As to the want of compliance with the conditions imposed by the laws of Nebraska, allowing railroad companies organized in other States to extend and build their roads within its limits, it is sufficient to say that when the grant was made to the company Nebraska was a Territory, and it was entirely competent for Congress to confer upon a corporation of any State the right to construct a road within any of the Territories of the United States. The grant of land and a right of way for the construction of a road to a designated point within the Territory was sufficient authority for the company to construct the road to that point. It may be well doubted whether the State subsequently created out of the Territory could put any impediment upon the enjoyment of the right thus conferred. As we said in Railroad Company v. Baldwin, “ it could do so only on the same terms that it could refuse a recognition of its own previously granted right, for in such matters the State would succeed only to the authority of Congress over the Territory.” 103 U. S. 426, 428. It does not appear from anything before us that the State has ever attempted to interfere with the road or the company for its delay in filing its articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State, or in complying with other provisions of law. And it hardly need be added that
vol. xvi. 24 [p. 370] 870 Van Wyck v. Knevals. [Sup. Ct.
any such interference would not operate to divest the company of its title to lands granted by the United States.
It follows from what we have said, that when the defendant made his entry of the lands in controversy, and obtained a patent therefor, the title had passed from the United States, and consequently no right could be conferred upon him. Still, the patent gave color of title, and because of its issue the officers of the Land Department have refused to give a patent to the company embracing the lands, holding, as may be inferred, the view for which the defendant contends, that his right to enter them continued until notice of the order of the Secretary directing their withdrawal from market was received by the local land-officers. The existence of the patent, therefore, embarrasses the assertion of the complainant’s rights; that is, it prevents him from obtaining a strictly legal title which would enable him to recover possession, of the premises by an action at law. The existence of the patent also creates a cloud upon the title of the land. Every instrument purporting by its terms to convey land from the original source of title, however invalid, creates a cloud upon the title, if it require extrinsic evidence to show its invalidity. Pixley v. Huggins, 15 Cal. 128.
The existence of the patent, therefore, under these circumstances, furnishes ground for equitable relief. That relief, however, should properly be limited to a decree declaring the equity of the complainant, the invalidity of the title of the defendant, and enjoining him from the assertion of any claim to the property under the patent; but inasmuch as no objection is taken to the form of the decree as entered, which requires the defendant to execute a conveyance of the premises to the complainant, and as the execution of such a conveyance, amounting in fact to a release of his claim to the property, will accomplish all that could be legally effected, it is not considered necessary to order a modification of it. The decree is accordingly
Affirmed. [p. 371] Oct 1882.] Ex parte Curtis. 371
Ex parte Curtis.
The sixth section of the act of Aug. 15,1876, c. 287, prohibiting, under penalties therein mentioned, certain officers of the United States from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other officer money or property or other thing of value for political purposes, is not unconstitutional.
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The sixth section of the act of Aug. 15,1876, c. 287, entitled “ An Act making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the government,” provides “ that all executive officers or employés of the United States not appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, are prohibited from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other officer or employé of the government, any money or property or other thing of value for political purposes ; and any such officer or employé who shall offend against the provisions of this section, shall be at once discharged from the service of the United States; and he shall also be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not exceeding five- hundred dollars.”
Curtis, the petitioner, an employé of the United States, was indicted in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, and convicted under this act for receiving money for political purposes from other employés of the government. Upon his conviction he was sentenced to pay a fine, and stand committed until payment was made. Under this sentence he was taken into custody by the marshal, and on his application a writ of habeas corpus was issued by one of the justices of this court in vacation, returnable here at the present term, to inquire into the validity of his detention. The important question presented on the return to the writ so issued is whether the act under which the conviction was had is constitutional.
The case was argued by Mr. Edwin B. Smith in favor of the petition, and by The Solicitor- General in opposition thereto.
Mr. Chief Justice Waite, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The act is not one to prohibit all contributions of money or
372 Ex parte Curtis. [Sup-. Ct.
property by the designated officers and employés of the United States for political purposes. Neither does it prohibit them altogether from receiving or soliciting money or property for such purposes. It simply forbids their receiving from or giving to each other. Beyond this no restrictions are placed on any of their political privileges.
That the government of the United States is one of delegated powers only, and that its authority is defined and limited by the Constitution, are no longer open questions; but express authority is given Congress by the Constitution to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers that are delegated. Art. 1, sect. 8. Within the legitimate scope of this grant Congress is permitted to determine for itself what is necessary and what is proper.
" The act now in question is one regulating in some particulars the conduct of certain officers and employés of the United States. It rests on the same principle as that originally passed in 1789 at the first session of the first Congress, which makes it unlawful for certain officers of the Treasury Department to engage in the business of trade or commerce, or to own a sea vessel, or to purchase public lands or other public property, or to be concerned in the purchase or disposal of the public securiI ties of a State, or of the United States (Rev. Stat., sect. 243) ;
and that passed in 1791, which makes it an offence for a clerk in the same department to carry on trade or business in the funds or debts of the States or of the United States, or in any kind of public property (id., sect. 244) ; and that passed in 1812, which makes it unlawful for a judge appointed under the authority of the United States to exercise the profession of counsel or attorney, or to be engaged in the practice of the law (id., sect. 713) ; and that passed in 1853, which prohibits every officer of the United States or person holding any place of trust or profit, or discharging any official function under or in connection with any executive department of the government of the United States, or under the Senate or House of Representatives, from acting as an agent or attorney for the prosecution of any claim against the United States (id., sect. 5498) ; and that passed in 1863, prohibiting members of Congress from practising in the Court of Claims (id., sect. 1058) ; [p. 373] and that passed in 1867, punishing, by dismissal from service, an officer or employé of the government who requires or requests any workingman in a navy-yard to contribute or pay any money for political purposes (id., sect. 1546) ; and that passed in 1868, prohibiting members of Congress from being interested in contracts with the United States (id., sect. 3739); anti another, passed in 1870, which provides that no officer, clerk, or employé in the government of the United States shall solicit contributions from other officers, clerks, or employés for a gift to those in a superior official position, and that no officials or clerical superiors shall receive any gift or present as a contribution to them from persons in government employ getting a less salary than themselves, and that no officer or clerk shall make a donation as a gift or present to any official superior (id., sect. 1784). Many others of a kindred character might be referred to, but these are enough to show what has been the practice in the Legislative Department of the government from its organization, and, so far as we know, this is the first time the constitutionality of such legislation has ever been presented for judicial determination.
The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of enactments has been to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service. Clearly such a purpose is within the just scope of legislative power, and it is not easy to see why the act now under consideration does not come fairly within the legitimate means to such an end. It is true, as is claimed by the counsel for the petitioner, political assessments upon officeholders are not prohibited. The managers of political campaigns, not in the employ of the United States, are just as free now to call on those in office for money to be used for political purposes as ever they were, and those in office can contribute as liberally as they please, provided their payments are not made to any of the prohibited officers or employés. What we are now considering is not whether Congress has gone as far as it may, but whether that which has been done is within the constitutional limits upon its legislative discretion.
A feeling of independence under the law conduces to faithful public service, and nothing tends more to take away this [p. 374] 374 Ex parte Curtis. [Sup. Ct.
feeling than a dread of dismissal. If contributions from those in public employment may be solicited by others in official authority, it is easy to see that what begins as a request may end as a demand, and that a failure to meet the demand may be treated by those having the power of removal as a breach of some supposed duty, growing out of the political relations of the parties. Contributions secured under such circumstances will quite as likely be made to avoid the consequences of the personal displeasure of a superior, as to promote the political views of the contributor, — to avoid a discharge from service, not to exercise a political privilege. The law contemplates no restrictions upon either giving or receiving, except so far as may be necessary to protect, in some degree, those in the public service against exactions through fear of personal loss. This purpose of the restriction, and the principle on which it rests, are most distinctly manifested in sect. 1546, supra, the re-enactment in the Revised Statutes of sect. 3 of the act of June 30, 1868, c. 172, which subjected an officer or employé of the government to dismissal if he required or requested a workingman in a navy-yard to contribute or pay any money for political purposes, and prohibited the removal or discharge of a workingman for his political opinions; and in sect. 1784, the re-enactment of the act of Feb. 1, 1870, c. 63, “to protect officials in public employ,” by providing for the summary discharge of those who make or solicit contributions for presents to superior officers. No one can for a moment doubt that in both these statutes the object was to protect the classes of officials and employés provided for from being compelled to make contributions for such purposes through fear of dismissal if they refused. It is true that dismissal from service is the only penalty imposed, but this penalty is given for doing what is made a wrongful act. If it is constitutional to prohibit the act, the kind or degree of punishment to be inflicted for disregarding the prohibition is clearly within the discretion of Congress, provided it be not cruel or unusual. *
If there were no other reasons for legislation of this character than such as relate to the protection of those in the public service against unjust exactions, its constitutionality would, in our opinion, be clear; but there are others, to our minds, equally [p. 375] Oct. 1882.] Ex parte Curtis. 375
good. If persons in public employ may be called on by those in authority to contribute from their personal income to the expenses of political campaigns, and a refusal may lead to putting good men out of the service, liberal payments may be made the ground for keeping poor ones in. So, too, if a part of the compensation received for public services must be contributed for political purposes, it is easy to see that an increase of compensation may be required to provide the means to make the contribution, and that in this way the government itself may be made to furnish indirectly the money to defray the expenses of keeping the political party in power that happens to have for the time being the control of the public patronage. Political parties must almost necessarily exist under a republican form of government; and when public employment depends to any considerable extent on party success, those in office will naturally be desirous of keeping the party to which they belong in power. The statute we are now considering does not interfere with this. The apparent end of Congress will be accomplished if it prevents those in power from requiring help for such purposes as a condition to continued employment.
We deem it unnecessary to pursue the subject further. In our opinion the statute under which the petitioner was convicted is constitutional. The other objections which have been urged to the detention cannot be considered in this form of proceeding. Our inquiries in this class of cases are limited to such objections as relate to the authority of the court to render the judgment by which the prisoner is held. We have no general power to review the judgments of the inferior courts of the United States in criminal cases, by the use of the writ of habeas corpus or otherwise. Our jurisdiction is limited to the single question of the power of the court to commit the prisoner for the act of which he has been convicted. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604.
The commitment in this case was lawful, and the petitioner is, consequently,
Remanded to the custody of the marshal for the Southern District of New York.
376 Ex parte Curtis. [Sup. Ct.
Mr. Justice Bradley dissenting.
I cannot concur in the opinion of the court in this case. The law under which the petitioner is imprisoned makes it a penal offence for any executive officer or employé of the United States, not appointed by advice of the Senate [an unimportant distinction, so far as the power to make the law is concerned], to request, give to, or receive from any other officer or employé of the government any money, or property, or other thing of value, for political purposes ; thus, in effect, making it a condition of accepting any employment under the government that a man shall not, even voluntarily and of his own free will, contribute in any way through or by the hands of any other employé of the government to the political cause which he desires to aid and promote. I do not believe that Congress has any right to impose such a condition upon any citizen of the United States. The offices of the government do not belong to the Legislative Department to dispose of on any conditions it may choose to impose. The legislature creates most of the offices, it is true, and provides compensation for the discharge of their duties: but that is its duty to do, in order to establish a complete organization of the functions of government. When established, the offices are, or ought to be, open to all. They belong to the United States, and not to Congress; and every citizen having the proper qualifications has the right to accept office, and to be a candidate therefor. This is a fundamental right of which the legislature cannot deprive the citizen, nor clog its exercise with conditions that are repugnant to his other fundamental rights. Such a condition I regard that imposed by the law in question to be. It prevents the citizen from co-operating with other citizens of his own choice in the promotion of his political views. To take an interest in public affairs, and to further and promote those principles which are believed to be vital or important to the general welfare, is every citizen's duty. It is a just complaint that so many good men abstain from taking such an interest. Amongst the necessary and proper means for promoting political views, or any other views, are association and contribution of money for that purpose, both to aid discussion and to disseminate information and sound doctrine. To deny [p. 377] Oct. 1882.] Ex parte Curtis. 377
to a man the privilege of associating and making joint contributions with such other citizens as he may choose, is an unjust restraint of his right to propagate and promote his views on public affairs. The freedom of speech and of the press, and that of assembling together to consult upon and discuss matters of public interest, and to join in petitioning for a redress of grievances, are expressly secured by the Constitution. The spirit of this clause covers and embraces the right of every citizen to engage in such discussions, and to promote the views of himself and his associates freely, without being trammelled by inconvenient restrictions. Such restrictions, in my judgment, are imposed by the law in question. Every person accepting any, the most insignificant, employment under the government must withdraw himself from all societies and associations having for object the promotion of political information or opinions. For if one officer may continue his connection, others may do the same, and thus it can hardly fail to happen that some of them will give and some receive funds mutually contributed for the purposes of the association. Congress might just as well, so far as the power is concerned, impose, as a condition of taking any employment under the government, entire silence on political subjects, and a prohibition of all conversation thereon between government employés. Nay, it might as well prohibit the discussion of religious questions, or the mutual contribution of funds for missionary or other religious purposes. In former times, when the slavery question was agitated, this would have been a very convenient law to repress all discussion of the subject on either side of Mason and Dixon’s line. At the present time any efficient connection with an association in favor of a prohibitory liquor law, or of a protective tariff, or of greenback currency, or even for the repression of political assessments, would render any government official obnoxious to the penalties of the law under consideration. For all these questions have become political in their character, and any contributions in aid of the cause would be contributions for political purposes. The whole thing seems to me absurd. Neither men’s mouths nor their purses can be constitutionally tied up in that way. The truth is, that public opinion is oftentimes like a pendulum, swinging [p. 378] 878 Ex parte Curtis. [Sup. Ct.
backward and forward to extreme lengths. We are not unfrequently in danger of becoming purists, instead of wise reformers, in particular directions; and hastily pass inconsiderate laws which overreach the mark they are aimed at, or conflict with rights and privileges that a sober mind would regard as indisputable. It seems to me that the present law, taken in all its breadth, is one of this kind.
The legislature may, undoubtedly, pass laws excluding from particular offices those who are engaged in pursuits incompatible with the faithful discharge of the duties of such offices. That is quite another thing.
The legislature may make laws ever so stringent to prevent the corrupt use of money in elections, or in political matters generally, or to prevent what are called political assessments on government employés, or any other exercise of undue influence over them by government officials or others. That would be all right. That would clearly be within the province of legislation.
It is urged that the law in question is intended, so far as it goes,' to effect this very thing. Probably it is. But the end does not always sanctify the means. What I contend is, that in adopting this particular mode of restraining an acknowledged evil, Congress has overstepped its legitimate powers, and interfered with the substantial rights of the citizen. It is not lawful to do evil that good may come. There are plenty of ways in which wrong may be suppressed without resorting to wrongful measures to do it. No doubt it would often greatly tend to prevent the spread of a contagious and deadly epidemic, if those first taken should be immediately sacrificed to the public good. But such a mode of preventing the evil would hardly be regarded as legitimate in a Christian country.
I have no wish to discuss the subject at length, but simply to express the general grounds on which I think the legislation in question is ultra vires. Though as much opposed as any one to the evil sought to be remedied, I do not think the mode adopted is a legitimate or constitutional one, because it interferes too much with the freedom of the citizen in the pursuit of lawful and proper ends. If similar laws have been passed before, that does not make it right. The question is, whether
Oct. 1882.] Geekié v. Kirby Carpenter Co * 379
the present law, with its sweeping provisions, is within the just powers of Congress. As I do not think it is, I dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court.
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