S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)

3. A South Carolina statute prohibits use on the state highways of motor trucks and “semi-trailer” motor trucks wider than 90 inches or heavier, including load, than 20,000 Ibs. A fédéral court enjoined its enfor cernent on specified highways as to vehicles engaged in Interstate commerce. It found that much of the interstate motor-truck traffic normally passing over these highways would be barred from the State if the restrictions were enforced, and concluded, that, in the light of their effect upon interstate commerce, the restrictions were unreasonable. To reach this conclusion, the court weighed conflicting evidence and made its own déterminations as to the weight and width of motor trucks commonly used in interstate traffic and the capacity of the specified highways to accommodate such traffic without injury to them or danger to their users. It found, among other things, that interstate carriage by motor truck has become a national industry; that a very large proportion of the trucks used in interstate transportation are 96 inches wide and of gross weight, when loaded, of more than 10 tons; that the specified highways constitute a connected System, improved with the aid of fédéral money grants, as a part of a national System; that not gross weight but wheel or axle weight, is the factor to be considered in the préservation of concrète highways; that the vehicles used in interstate commerce are so designed and the pressure of their weight is so distributed by their wheels and axles that gross loads of more than 20,000 Ibs. can be carried over concrète roads without damage to the surface; that the highways in question could sustain without injury a wheel load of from 8000 to 9000 Ibs. or an axle load of double those weights; that the weight limitation of the statute, especially as applied to semi-trailer motor trucks, is unreasonable as a means of preserving the highways and has no reasonable relation to safety of the public using them; and that the width limitation of 90 inches is unreasonable when applied to standard con- p. 179177 Statement of the Case.

The district court of three judges, after hearing evidence, ruled that the challenged provisions of the statute hâve not been superseded by the Fédéral Motor Carrier Act, and adopted as its own the ruling of the state Suprême Court in State ex rel. Daniel v. John P. Nutt Co., 180 S. C. 19; 185 S. E. 25, that the challenged provisions, being an exercise of the state’s power to regulate the use of its highways so as to protect them from injury and to insure their safe and economical use, do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. But it held that the weight and width prohibitions place an unlawful burden on Interstate motor traffic passing over specified highways of the state, which for the most part are of concrète or a concrète base surfaced with asphalt. It accordingly enjoined the enforcement of the weight provision against Interstate motor carriers on the specified highways, and also p. 182the width limitation of 90 inches, except in the case of vehicles exceeding 96 inches in width. It exempted from the operation of the decree, bridges on those highways “not constructed with sufîicient strength to support the heavy trucks of modem traffic or too narrow to accommodate such traffic safely,” provided the state highway department should place at each end of the bridge proper notices warning that the use of the bridge is forbidden by trucks exceeding the weight or width limits and provided the proper authorities take the necessary steps to enforce the law against such use of the bridges. The case cornes here on appeal under § 266 of the Judicial Code.

It also found that the gross weight of vehicles is not a factor to be considered in the préservation of concrète highways, but that the appropriate factor to be considered is wheel or axle weight; the vehicles engaged in interstate commerce are so designed and the pressure of their weight is so distributed by their wheels and axles that gross loads of more than 20,000 pounds can be carried over concrète roads without damage to the surface; that a gross weight limitation of that amount, especially as applied to semi-trailer motor trucks, is unreasonable as a means of preserving the highways; that it has no reasonable relation to safety of the public using the highways; and that the width limitation of 90 inches is p. 184unreasonable when applied to standard concrète highways of the state, in view of the fact that ail other States permit a width of 96 inches, which is the standard width of trucks engaged in interstate commerce.

a State régulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within, hâve been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though Congress p. 185it did not forestall ail state action affecting Interstate commerce. Ever since Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, and Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, it has been recognized that there are matters of local concern, the régulation of which unavoidably involves some régulation of Interstate commerce but which, because of their local character and their number and diversity, may never be fully dealt with by Congress. Nothwithstanding the commerce clause, such régulation in the absence of Congressional action has for the most part been left to the States by the decisions of this Court, subject to the other applicable constitutional restraints.

Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when the régulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on législation where it affects adversely some interests within the state. See Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 315; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 731; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 683; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U. S. 285, 294; cf. Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 464; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 205; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 499. p. 186fact aimed at Interstate commerce, or by its necessary operation is a means of gaining a local benefit by throwing the attendant burdens on those without the state. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 498; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622, 626.3 It was to end these practices that the commerce clause was adopted. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 438-439; Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, supra; State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 280; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, 289, 297-298; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 IL S. 566, 574; Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U. S. 217 ; Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 522; II Farrand, Records of the Fédéral Convention, 308; III id. 478, 574, 548; The Federalist, No. XLII; 1 Curtis, History of the Constitution, 502; Story on the Constitution, § 259. The commerce clause has also been thought to set its own limitation upon state control of Interstate rail carriers so as to preclude the subordination of the effîciency and convenience of Interstate traffic to local service requirements.4

Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate interstate commerce, may détermine whether the p. 190burdens imposed on it by state régulation, otherwise permissible, are too great, and may, by législation designed to secure uniformity or in other respects to protect the national interest in the commerce, curtail to some extent the state’s regulatory power. But that is a legislative, not a judicial function, to be performed in the light of the Congressional judgment of what is appropriate régulation of interstate commerce, and the extent to which, in that field, state power and local interests should be required to yield to the national authority and interest. In the absence of such législation the judicial function, under the commerce clause as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, stops with the inquiry whether the state législature in adopting régulations such as the présent has acted within its province, and whether the means of régulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought. Sproles v. Binford, supra; Stephenson v. Binjord, 287 U. S. 251, 272.

Here the first inquiry has already been resolved by our decisions that a state may impose non-discriminatory restrictions with respect to the character of motor vehicles moving in interstate commerce as a safety measure and as a means of securing the economical use of its highways. In resolving the second, courts do not sit as législatures, either state or national. They cannot act as Cbngress does when, after weighing ail the conflicting interests, state and national, it détermines when and how much the state regulatory power shall yield to the larger interests of a national commerce. And in reviewing a state highway régulation where Congress has not acted, a court is not called upon, as are state législatures, to détermine what, in its judgment, is the most suitable restriction to be applied of those that are possible, or to choose that one which in its opinion is best adapted to ail the diverse interests affected. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 695. When the action of a législature is p. 191within the'scope of its power, fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness, wisdom and propriety are not for the détermination of courts, but for the legislative body, on which rests the duty and responsibility of decision. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 30; Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, 365; Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 451 ; Hadacheck v. Sébastian, 239 U. S. 394, 408-414; Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 530; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 388; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U. S. 325, 328; Standard OU Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 584. This is equally the case when the legislative power is one which may legitimately place an incidental burden on Interstate commerce. It is not any the less a legislative power committed to the states because it affects inter-, state commerce, and courts are not any the more entitled, because Interstate commerce is affected, to substitute their own for the legislative judgment. Morris v. Duby, supra, 143; Sproles v. Binford, supra, 389, 390; Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, 399, 400; Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. R. Co., 181 U. S. 248, 257; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 152; New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31, 42, 43.

Since the adoption of one weight or width régulation, rather than another, is a legislative not a judicial choice, its constitutionality is not to be determined by weighing in the judicial scales the merits of the legislative choice and rejecting it if the weight of evidence presented in court appears to favor a different standard. Cf. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 299. Being a legislative judgment it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the législature unless facts judicially known or proved preclude that possibility. Hence, in reviewing the présent détermination we examine the record, not to see whether the findings of the court below are supported by evidence, but to ascertain upon the whole p. 192record whether it is possible to say that the legislative choice is without rational basis. Standard Oil Co. v. Mar ys ville, supra; Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 263; s. c. 11 F. Supp. 599, 600. Not only does the record fail to exclude that possibility, but it shows affirmatively that there is adéquate support for the legislative judgment.

At the outset it should be noted that underlying much of the controversy is the relative merit of a gross weight limitation as against an axle or wheel weight limitation. While there is evidence that weight stresses on concrète roads are determined by wheel rather than gross load weights, other éléments enter into choice of the type of weight limitation. There is testimony to show that the •axle or wheel weight limitation is the more easily enforced through resort to weighing devices adapted to ascertaining readily the axle or wheel weight. But it appears that in practice the weight of truck loads is not evenly distributed over axles and wheels; that commonly the larger part of the load—sometimes as much as 70 to 80%—rests on the rear axle and that it is much easier for those who load trucks to make certain that they hâve complied with a gross load weight limitation than with an axle or wheel weight limitation. While the report of the National Conférence on State and Highway Safety, on which the court below relied, suggested a wheel weight limitation of 8,000 or 9,000 pounds, it also suggested that a gross weight limitation might be adopted and should be subject to the recommended wheel limitation. But the conférence declined to fix the amount of gross weight limitation, saying: “In view of the varying conditions of traffic, and lack of uniformity in highway construction in the several States, no uniform gross-weight limitations are here recommended for general adoption throughout the country.” The choice of a weight limitation based on convenience of application and conséquent lack of p. 193need for rigid supervisory enforcement is for the législature, and we cannot say that its preference for the one over the other is in any sense arbitrary or unreasonable. The choice is not to be condemned because the législature prefers a workable standard, less likely to be violated than another under which the violations will probably be increased but more easily detected. It is for the législature to say whether the one test or the other will in practical operation better protect the highways from the risk of excessive loads.

There is little in the record to mark any controlling distinction between the application of the gross load weight limitation to the motor truck and to the semi-trailer motor truck. There is testimony which is applicable to both types of vehicle, that in case of accident the danger from the momentum of a colliding vehicle increases with gross load weight. The record is without convincing evidence of the actual distribution, in practice, of the gross load weight over the wheels and axles of the permissible types of semi-trailer motor trucks, but this does not enable us to say that the législature was without substantial ground for concluding that the relative advantages of a gross load over a wheel weight limitation are substantially the same for the two types, or that it could not hâve concluded that they were so nearly alike for regulatory purposes as to justify the adoption of a single standard for both, as a matter of practical convenience. Even if the législature were to accept appellees’ assumption that net load weights are, in practice, evenly distributed over the wheels supporting the load of a permissible semi-trailer so that with the statutory gross p. 195load limit the load on the rear axle would be about 8,000 pounds it might, as we hâve seen, also conclude that the danger point would then hâve been reached in the case of some 1,200 miles of concrète state roads constructed without a center joint.

These considérations, with the presumption of constitutionality, afford adéquate support for the weight limitation without reference to other items of the testimony tending to support it. Furthermore, South Carolina’s own expérience is not to be ignored. Before adoption of the limitation South Carolina had had expérience with higher weight limits. In 1924 it had adopted a combined gross weight limit of 20,000 pounds for vehicles of four wheels or less, and an axle weight limit of 15,000 pounds. In 1930 it had adopted a combined gross weight limit of 12^ tons with a five ton axle weight limit for vehicles having more than two axles. Act No. 721, 33 Stat. 1182; Act No. 685, 36 Stat. 1192, 1193. In 1931 it appointed a commission to investigate motor transportation in the state, to recommend législation, and to report in 1932. The présent weight limitation was recommended by the commission after a full considération of relevant data, including a report by the state engineer who had constructed the concrète highways of the state and who advised a somewhat lower limitation as necessary for their préservation. The fact thàt many States hâve adopted a different standard is not persuasive. The conditions under which highways must be built in the several States, their construction and the demands made upon them, are not uniform. The road building art, as the record shows, is far from having attained a scientific certainty and précision, and scientific précision is not the criterion for the exercise of the constitutional regulatory power of the States. Sproles v. Binford, supra, 388. The législature, being free to exercise its own judgment, is not bound by that of other législatures. It would hardly be contended p. 196that if ail the States had adopted a single standard none, in the light of its own expérience and in the exercise of its judgment upon ail the complex éléments which enter into the problem, could change it.