Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559
Case details
Citation
105 U.S. 559
Full caption
Packet Company v. Catlettsburg.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Packe t Comp any v . Catle ttsb urg .
1. A town situate upon navigable waters may, without infringing the Constitution of the United States, erect wharves, collect reasonable wharfage proportioned to the tonnage of vessels, and forbid them, under a penalty, to land within the corporate limits at any point other than the public wharf or landing. 2. The ordinances of the town of Catlettsburg (infra, p. 560), adopted pursuant to
the power conferred by its charter, are not unconstitutional, and this case shows no such abuse of that power as entitles the complainant to relief. 3. Congress has not prescribed the rules touching the landing and departure of
vessels, wharfage, and other matters relating thereto, which are enforced at points upon the navigable waters of the country where the amount of commerce requires them ; and if they may be justly regarded as regulations of commerce, they are such as the States may respectively adopt, until that body deems it expedient to act.
Appe al from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. David Stuart Hounshell for the appellant.
There was no opposing counsel.
Mr . Just ice Mill er delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a suit in chancery brought by the Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy, and Pomeroy Packet Company against the Board of Trustees of the Town of Catlettsburg.
The bill is very in artificially drawn, and its allegations very imperfectly present some of the questions which, by the brief of counsel, it is supposed to have raised. It alleges the complainant to be a corporation, owning a large number of steamboats engaged in the navigation of the Ohio River, and making frequent landings at the public wharf of the town of Catlettsburg, on the Kentucky side of that .river. That upon each of said landings they were subjected to an illegal tax proportioned to the tonnage of each of said boats, amounting, between Jan. 1, 1870, and April 30, 1877, to an aggregate sum of $5,092. Parts of the ordinance of the town under which this tax was collected, and of the statute of Kentucky supposed to authorize the ordinance, are set out in the bill. This ordinance is alleged to be void as a regulation of commerce, and as laying a p. 560duty of tonnage forbidden by section ten of the first article of the Constitution. The bill then alleges that the tax is excessive and beyond a reasonable charge for the use of the wharf by the boats of the complainant, and that the amount already collected exceeds the cost of erecting and preserving the wharf.
An amended bill was also filed, which does not materially affect the matters in issue.
The thirty-first section of the act of. the Kentucky legislature of Jan. 28, 1868, incorporating the town of Catlettsburg, authorizes the board of trustees “ to erect, make, and repair wharves and docks, and to regulate and fix the rate of wharfage thereat; tq regulate the stationing or anchoring of vessels or boats or rafts within the town limits, and the depositing freight or lumber on the public wharves.”
The ordinances of the town complained of are the following, enacted Feb. 23, 1871: —
“ The following rates are established as charges upon steamboats and other water-crafts landing at the public landing of Catlettsburg, Ky.: On transient steamboats, $1 for every landing ; on the largest-sized regular packets, over 100 tons, custom-house measure, $1 for each landing; and on all steamboats under 100 tons burthen, fifty cents for each landing; for all store-boats or trading-boats, $1 for each landing, and if they remain more than one day, fifty cents per day for each day they remain; and for each wharf-boat used for the purpose of wharfage and commission, $10 per month.”
And another, adopted by said board of trustees May 5, 1873, in the following words: —
“ That the public landing on the Ohio River, between Division and Main Streets, is hereby appointed and established as a steam-boat landing, and all steamboats arriving at the town of Catlettsburg shall land at the wharf situate as aforesaid between Division Street and Main Street, and at no other point within the corporate limits of the town of Catlettsburg, except by the written consent of the wharfmaster of said town.
“ That for any violation of the foregoing section the owners, controllers, or masters of any boat so violating shall be jointly and severally liable to pay a fine of $10 for each offence, which may be recovered by warrant in the name of the Commonwealth of p. 561Kentacky, for the use of the Board of Trustees of the town of Catlettsburg.
“It is hereby made the duty of the wharfmaster to enforce this ordinance, and to report and prosecute all violations thereof.”
The prayer of the bill is for an injunction restraining the defendants from the collection of all taxes from the complainant's boats while landing at the natural and unimproved shore of the Ohio River, and at points other than the improved landing of the defendants, between Division and Main Streets, and from the collection of all excessive taxes while landing at any point within the corporate limits, and from the enforcement of the ordinance requiring them to land at the defendants’ improved wharf, between Division and Main Streets; and the original bill prayed a decree for the sums improperly exacted of complainant.
The court below held, on demurrer to the original bill, that there could be no recovery in this suit for the amount illegally exacted and paid, because an action at law was the appropriate and adequate remedy for that purpose, and in that the court was probably right.
If, however, the bill presents no ground for the injunction prayed, the prayer for recovery of a moneyed decree becomes
immaterial. *
The framer of the bill seems to have labored under a misapprehension of the nature of the transaction in calling the demands made of the complainant taxes. We can see nothing in the ordinances intended to impose a tax upon anybody. The bill, as we have said, is not very clear in its statements of the manner in which this money was paid or collected. It must, however, have been paid for the use of defendants’ wharf or improved landing-place, in which case it is complained of as an excessive charge, or it must have been paid as a penalty for landing at other points than between Division and Main Streets in violation of the ordinance. In neither case is there anything in the nature of a tax.
The effort of the pleader undoubtedly is to bring the case within the constitutional prohibition of a tax upon tonnage.
If, however, the trustees of the town had a right to compensation for the use of the improved landing or wharf which they vo l . xv. 36 p. 562had made, it is no objection to the ordinance fixing the amount of this compensation that it was measured by the size of the vessel, and that this size was ascertained by the tonnage of each vessel. It is idle, after the decisions we have made, to call this a tax upon tonnage. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577 ; Packet Company v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 ; Packet Company v. St. Louis, 100 id. 423; Gruy n . Baltimore, id. 434.
Still less ground exists for holding that the penalties imposed for a refusal to obey the rules for places of landing, and the orders of the wharfmaster on that subject, are taxes on tonnage.
Nor is there any room to question the right of a city or town situated on navigable waters to build and own a wharf suitable for vessels to land at, and to exact a reasonable compensation for the facilities thus afforded to vessels by the use of such wharves, and that this is no infringement of the constitutional provisions concerning tonnage taxes and the regulation of commerce. See cases above cited.
There remains to be considered the validity of the ordinance which forbids the landing of vessels, except by the permission of the wharfmaster, at any other point within the town than between Division and Main Streets, and the question of excessive charges for the use of the wharf.
There can be no doubt that the rules which govern the landing and departure of vessels at points situated on navigable waters may seriously affect them in their business of navigation and transportation, and in some sense such rules are regulations of commerce.
On the other hand, the necessity is obvious of the existence in each port, where vessels as large as steamboats land at the shore and deposit their cargoes on the banks of navigable streams, of some authority to prescribe the places where this may be done, the time of doing it, and the points at which they may discharge cargo, both as relates to the streets, shores, houses of the town, and other vessels landing at the same time.
The protection of the shore of the sea or bank of a river on which a town is situated is a necessity to the town, and the washing and crumbling of the bank from the agitation of the waters, made by the landing of large steamers, demand that such regulations should exist.
Small vessels, without steam, rafts, flat-boats, keel-boats, loaded to their very utmost capacity, and liable to be sunk by. the waves which accompany the landing of large steamboats, have the same right to land at the shore that steamers have, and they have a right to protection against their powerful competitors for trade. This can best be secured by appropriate regulations prescribing places for the landing of each, and in some instances placing the matter under the control of a wharfmaster or other officer, whose duty it shall be to look after it.
Such rules and regulations and such an officer exist in every place where the number of the inhabitants or the amount of the water-borne commerce justifies or requires it. The necessity for the existence of this power cannot be doubted.
We are not aware that in any instance Congress has attempted to exercise it. If it be a regulation of commerce under the power conferred on Congress by the Constitution, that body has signally failed to provide any such regulation. It belongs also, manifestly, to that class of rules which, like pilotage and some others, can be most wisely exercised by local authority, and in regard to which no general rules, applicable alike to all ports and landing-places, can be properly made. If a regulation of commerce at all, it comes within that class in which the States may prescribe rules until Congress assumes to do so. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 ; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 ; Crandall v. State of Nevada, 6 id. 35 ; Pound v. Turek, 95 U. S. 459.
There is probably not a city or large town in the United States, situated on a navigable water, where ordinances, rules, and regulations like those of the town of Catlettsburg are not made and imposed by authority derived from State legislation, and the long acquiescence in this exercise of the power, and its absolute necessity^ are arguments almost conclusive in favor of its rightful existence.
We are of opinion that there is nothing in the ordinances of the town of Catlettsburg complained of, authorized as they clearly are by the statute of Kentucky, which is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
But while the authority to make such regulations may exist p. 564in the trustees of that town, it must be conceded that an oppressive abuse in the exercise of that power may present a case in which the proper court could give relief. If, for instance, while forbidding all boats to land elsewhere than at a designated and limited part of the shore, that space was too small to permit the landing at the same time of vessels whose business required it; or if, having assumed the obligation of providing appropriate and sufficient wharf accommodations and forbidden boats to land at any other place, there was in fact no proper landing-place provided, a court would find some remedy for such oppressive and arbitrary conduct.
But nothing in this bill implies that the landing-place pointed out by the ordinance .is insufficient in dimensions or wanting in proper means of accommodating the business of the vessels using it.
So, also, while the statute authorizes the trustees to establish the rates of wharfage, if the sum demanded for that service is so far beyond a reasonable compensation for the use of the city’s wharf as to be oppressive, and an abuse of the power thus conferred, the courts could in some way give appropriate relief, and it is this part of appellant’s case which presents the only difficult question for our consideration.
We do not feel justified, however, on the allegations of this bill, in reversing the order of the Circuit Court, sustaining a demurrer to it, for several reasons.
In the first place, the bill is manifestly founded on the idea of the unconstitutionality of these ordinances, and an injunction is asked to restrain defendants from interfering with the landing anywhere within the city limits of appellant’s boats, and in general from enforcing the obnoxious ordinances. There is, it is true, a prayer to restrain them from the collection of all excessive taxes while their boats are landing within the corporate limits; but what is excessive or what is reasonable is not shown, and, as we have already said, the money collected is not taxes in any sense whatever.
In the next place, the bill does not show how or why the sums paid for the use of the wharf, or for landing at other places, is excessive. The one reason for so charging which is given is evidently fallacious; namely, that the town has already p. 565raised enough money from the use of the wharf to pay for its construction and preservation.
The compensation which either the city or private owner of a wharf is entitled to receive is not to be based exclusively on a reimbursement of the cost of the wharf, and no such criterion can govern in the matter.
The ordinance establishing these rates and penalties is given in the bill, and has been copied in this opinion. It is by no means apparent that they are excessive. When it is considered that the wharf needs constant repair and care; that the compensation of a wharfmaster, who must be always ready to locate the vessels and collect the charges, is to be paid; and that the character and extent of the improvements are not shown, it would seem that something more than characterizing those rates as excessive is needed to invoke the restraining power of a court of equity. It is not alleged that they are oppressive, or an abuse of the power confided to the trustees. No statement is made of what would be reasonable in the premises, and, consistently with the bill, the charge may be so little in excess of a just compensation as not to call for equitable relief.
There is no hindrance to trying this question in an action at law, where the verdict of a jury or the judgment of the court in one or two cases would establish what is reasonable under the circumstances; and this being once established by the appropriate tribunal, the court of equity could restrain the excess.
We concur with the circuit judge, that no such case of oppressive use or clear’ abuse of the power properly conferred on the trustees in regard to wharfage charges is alleged by this bill as to justify the interposition of a court of equity.
Decree affirmed.
PACKING COMPANY CASES.
Pac kin g Comp any v . Pro vis ion Company ; Same v . Beef - Cannin g Comp any ; Same v . Same .
1. Reissued letters-patent No. 6370, bearing date April 6,1875, granted to William
J. Wilson “ for improvements in processes for preserving and packing cooked meat,” are void, all the elements therein described being old, and the aggregation of them bringing out no new product, nor any old product, in a cheaper or otherwise more advantageous way. 2. The first and third claims of reissued letters-patent No. 7923, bearing date
Oct. 23, 1877, granted to John A. Wilson “ for improvement in sheet-metal cases,” are void for want of novelty.
The first case is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, and the second and third are appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois.
By stipulation of the parties these cases were argued together as one case.
The bills of complaint were filed by the Wilson Packing Company, Arthur A. Libbey, Archibald McNeil, and Charles P. Libbey, and they charge the Chicago Packing and Provision Company, the St. Louis Beef-Canning Company, and the other defendants with the infringement of several reissued letters-patent of the United States, of which the complainants are the assignees and owners.
Only two of these letters are relied on. First, reissued letters-patent No. 6370, granted to William J. Wilson, dated April 6, 1875, upon an application filed April 2, 1875, “for improvements in processes for preserving and packing cooked meat;” and, second, reissued letters-patent No. 7923, granted to John A. Wilson, dated Oct. 23, 1877, upon an application filed Oct. 15, 1877, for “ improvement in sheet-metal cases.” The bills were dismissed on final hearing, and the complainants appealed.
The original patent to William J. Wilson bears date March 31, 1874. The specification is as follows: —
“Be it known that I, Wm. J. Wilson, of Chicago, in the county of Cook, and State of Illinois, have invented certain new and useful p. 567improvements in processes for preserving and packing cooked n*eats, and I do hereby declare that the following is a full, clear, and exact description thereof.
“ The nature of my invention consists in a process for packing cooked meats for transportation in a compressed form, while heated with cooking, into an air-tight package, so as to preserve the meat in its integrity and retain all the natural juices and nutritious qualities of the meat.
“ In carrying out my invention, the meat is first cooked thoroughly at a temperature of 212° Fahrenheit, so that all the bone and gristle can be removed, and the meat yet retain its natural grain and integrity. The meat is then in proper condition for eating, and is wholesome and palatable. A measured quantity of this cooked meat is then, while yet warm with cooking, pressed by any suitable apparatus into a previously prepared box or case, with sufficient force to remove the air and all superfluous moisture, and make the meat form a solid cake. The box or case is then closed air-tight upon the meat.
“ The meat is thus packed and compressed in its natural state, — that is, without disintegration or desiccation, — and it retains all the juices and nutritious qualities of the meat, the compression only removing the superfluous moisture. The meat thus put up is available at all times, even when cooking is impracticable, as it is already cooked before it is packed. It is more economical, as it is compressed and reduced in weight one-half from the uncooked weight, being free from bone and gristle, and put up in a compact, portable shape for transportation, rendering the usual expensive cooperage unnecessary. Besides this, there is a great saving in the cost of transportation. A barrel containing two hundred pounds uncooked meat weighs, gross, three hundred and twenty pounds, meat, salt, brine, and barrel, while by my process it would weigh only one hundred and. ten pounds, gross, making a saving in cost of freight alone of nearly two-thirds.
“ The box or case may be made of wood or metal, or both combined, of any suitable form or shape, and of any desired dimensions.”
The claim is thus stated : —
“ 1. The within-described process for packing cooked meats for transportation, by compressing the same into an air-tight package, so as to preserve the mea% in its integrity, and retain all the p. 568natural juices and nutritious qualities of the meat, substantially as set forth.
“ 2. As a new article of merchandise, cooked meat put up in solid form, in its natural state, without disintegration or desiccation, in hermetically sealed packages, as set forth.”
The differences between the specification and claim of the reissued and those of the original patent of William J. Wilson are these: First, the second clause of the specification of the reissued patent omits the words “ while heated with cooking” contained in the corresponding clause of the original; second, “preferably ” in the third clause of the specification is inserted before “ while yet warm tcith cooking ; ” third, the first claim of the reissued patent omits “ while heated with cooking,” contained in the first claim of the original patent. In all other respects the specifications and claims are identical. Therefore his patents are the same, except that the reissue covers the process of packing the meat cold if preferred, while the original requires that it shall be packed while warm with cooking.
There is nothing in either patent in regard to the boiling or to any preliminary corning or curing of the meat.
On Oct. 26, 1880, while the cases were pending below, and after the testimony-in-chief of the defendants had been taken, the patentee and the complainants filed in the Patent Office a disclaimer of the word “ preferably ” where inserted in the specification of the reissued patent, and also of any process described and claimed by which meat in any other than a warm or heated condition is to be compressed into the packages.
On the same day they filed a disclaimer of any interpretation or legal construction of the specification of the reissued patent broader than is conveyed by the words, “the meat is first cooked thoroughly by boiling it in water, so that all the bone and gristle can be removed and the meat yet retain its natural grain and integrity.”
The claim was thus restored to what it was originally, except in the original patent it is limited by the second disclaimer to the packing of meat cooked by boiling. As amended by the disclaimers the claim of the reissued patent is as follows : —
First, The within-described, process of packing, for transportation, meats cooked by boiling, by compressing the same while heated with cooking into an air-tight package, so as to preserve the meat in its integrity, and retain the natural juices and nutritious qualities of the same.
“ Second, As a new article of manufacture, meat cooked by boiling, put up while heated with cooking, so as to form a solid cake in the package in its natural state, without disintegration or desiccation, in hermetically sealed packages, as set forth.”
It will be seen that the invention, after the disclaimers were made, is a process consisting of the following elements: —
1. The thorough cooking of the meat by boiling in water at a temperature of 212° Fahrenheit, and the removing of the bone and gristle.
2. The pressing of the meat while warm with cooking into a box or case with sufficient force to remove the air and superfluous moisture, so as to make the meat form a solid cake.
3. The closing of the box or case air-tight upon the meat.
It also covers the product of this process as described in the second claim.
The defence sets up want of novelty, and avers that the process described in the reissued letters-patent of William J. Wilson is also described in prior English, French, and American patents, which are specified, and that it was practised by many persons whose names and residences are given, at various dates prior to his application.
The specification in John A. Wilson’s letters-patent declares that the “ invention relates to hermetically sealed cans used in packing meats or other articles, and it consists in a pyramidal-shaped can having rounded corners, and both ends slightly flaring to form shoulders against which the head or end pieces rest.
Figure 1 is a perspective view of the can. Figure 2 is a transverse vertical section of the same, reversed.
“ a represents the body of my can made in the form of a truncated pyramid with rounded corners, and with any desired number
of sides, though I prefer to make it with four sides. Both ends of the body are made slightly flaring so as to form interior shoulders of offsets a, against which the heads B and C are to rest. The edges of these heads are turned outward, as shown, a, b, and the p. 570flaring edge d of the end of the can is turned over the flange 5, and the three thicknesses of metal pressed together by machinery, with or without solder, so as to make air-tight joints.”
“ In packing cooked meats it is done by means of a plunger through an aperture in the large head B, which opening is afterwards hermetically sealed by means of a cap or plate D.
“The can is to be opened at the larger end at or near the shoulder a by means of a suitable can-opener, so that when the can is reversed a slight tap on the smaller head C will cause the solidly packed meat to slide out in one piece, so as to be readily sliced as desired.”
The claims which are in controversy in this case are the first and third, which are as follows :—
« A can for packing food, hermetically sealed, and constructed of pyramidal form, with rounded corners, and offset ends to support the heads, said heads being secured as shown and described.”
“ 3. An improved article of manufacture, solid meat compressed and secured within a pyramidal case or can, so that said can forms a solid mould for the meat, and permits its discharge as a solid cake, substantially as described.”
The cases were argued by Mr. William Henry Clifford and Mr. John N. Jewett for the appellants, and by Mr. Lewis L. Coburn and Mr. John W. Noble for the appellees.
Mr . Just ice Woods , after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The patent granted to William J. Wilson does not specify p. 571what kind of box or case was required, nor what kind of meat was to be used in its processes, whether corned or fresh, nor in what manner or by what process it was to be compacted in the case or box, provided sufficient force was used to remove the air and all superfluous moisture and make the meat form a solid cake, nor the degree of warmth necessary in the meat when it wTas put in the case or box. Neither does it state the method by which the case is to be sealed up. It is simply required to be “ closed air-tight upon the meat,” the air having first been excluded from the case by cramming the latter full of meat.
The patent, therefore, apparently covers only the process of cooking meat by boiling, and while it is still warm pressing it compactly in cases and sealing it up air-tight.
The second disclaimer of Wilson is a substantial admission that his patent only covers the process in which the boiling of the meat is one of the elements. That is to say, any one may pack cooked meat for transportation by compressing it while heated with cooking into air-tight hermetically sealed packages, so as to preserve it in its integrity and retain all its natural juices and nutritious qualities, substantially as set forth in the patent, and not infringe the patent, provided he does not cook the meat by boiling. If any other method of cooking the meat should be adopted, there would be no infringement.
The patentee and the complainants, it appears, were induced to make this disclaimer by the evidence introduced by the defendants in this case, especially the patent of A. S. Lyman, dated June 22, 1869, “for an improved mode of preparing and pressing roast meat in a condensed and concentrated form,” and it amounts to an admission that they could not sustain the process covered by their patent, except as applied to boiled meats.
We are clearly of opinion that a change in the mode of cooking the meat from broiling, roasting, or steaming to boiling, all the other parts of the process remaining unchanged, cannot be called invention, and does not entitle the party who suggests the change to a patent for the process. “ All improvement is not invention, and entitled to protection as such. Thus p. 572to entitle it, it ought to be the product of some exercise of the inventive faculties, and it must involve something more than what is obvious to persons skilled in the art.” Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U. S. 112. See also Rubber-Tip Pencil Company v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498; Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248; - Stimpson v. Woodman, 10 Wall. 117.
If meat cooked by roasting or steaming, and put up in a given mode, formed a valuable article of commerce, the cooking of the meat in other ways, as, for instance, by boiling, would naturally occur to any one engaged in the business of packing such food for the market.
But we think there is nothing new in the process covered by the patent under consideration. Clearly, all its separate elements are old and well known, and have been long used. This is not controverted. The evidence shows that the process of boiling meat, packing it while warm in cans, and sealing it air-tight, had long been used before the original application of Wilson. There is, it is true, much conflict in the evidence, but, taken all together, it leaves no doubt in our minds that the process of cooking meat, lobsters, and other articles of food by boiling, and, while warm from the cooking, compacting them in cans, which are then sealed up air-tight, was practised in many places and for many years before his application.
Complainants, however, insist that there are two elements in their process which, taken in connection with the others above mentioned, form a combination never used before the date of his patent.
The first of these is the subjecting of the cases, after they are packed and sealed air-tight, to what is known as the Appert process. This consists of placing in hot water the cans, after they have been filled and sealed up, and thereby heating them. They are then removed and punctured, and the heated air and gases in the cans are allowed to escape. The puncture is immediately closed by a drop of solder.
The contention is that all this is made a part of the process covered by the Wilson patent, by the description of the new article of merchandise covered by the second claim as “ cooked meat ” “ in hermetically sealed packages.” It is insisted that the term “ hermetically sealed packages ” implies among those p. 573dealing in canned goods, that the packages have been subjected to the Appert process.
We think that this is an unwarrantable stretch of the meaning of that claim. The article of merchandise which it covers is produced by the process disclosed by the specification and first claim. The second claim expressly states that it covers cooked meat put up in solid form, &c., “ in hermetically sealed packages, as set forth.”
Recurring to the specification and first claim, we are not left in doubt about what, as there set forth, is the process of sealing the cases or cans hermetically. The invention is declared to consist in a process for packing cooked meats into an air-tight package. The method of doing this is thus described: “ A measured quantity of this cooked meat is, while yet warm with cooking, pressed by any suitable apparatus into a previously prepared box or case with sufficient force to remove the air and all superfluous moisture and make the meat form a solid cake. The box or case is then closed air-tight upon the meat.” The process is simply to exclude the air from the case by filling it compactly with cooked meat still warm, so that the cover, when applied, will rest on the meat, and then closing the case by fitting on the cover air-tight.
There is no suggestion here of anything further to be done to make the package a hermetically sealed one. The process described leaves it hermetically sealed. There is no hint that the Appert process is to be subsequently applied as a part of the process covered by the patent. On the contrary, that idea is excluded by the terms of the second claim, “ hermetically sealed, as set forth.”
It is further contended by the appellants that the process disclosed by the patent includes the cooking of the meat to be canned by plunging it into water already heated to the boiling-point. That is, the process of cooking is commenced by placing the meat in water already heated up to 212° Fahrenheit. By this method of cooking, it is said that the meat is preserved in its integrity, and all its natural juices and nutritious qualities are retained.
We think that the plan of beginning this process of cooking, by putting the meat in water already heated to the boiling- p. 574point, is not set forth in the specification or claims. The conditions that they prescribe would just as well be filled by placing the meat in cold water which is then heated to the boiling-point, and allowing the meat to remain in it until cooked thoroughly. No person, on reading them, could extract the idea that there was any advantage to be gained by heating the water to the boiling-point before placing the meat in it to be cooked, or that any such method was in the mind of the inventor. This part of the process is clearly an afterthought, and not intended by him to be covered by his patent when he applied for it. It is evident that the part now under consideration is nowhere described in the specification in full, clear, and exact terms, as required by law. On the contrary, it is not described at all.
The Appert process, and the cooking of meats by plunging them into water already heated to the boiling-point, may be of great advantage to the canned meats put up by the complainants, and their alleged superiority to the products of other parties may be attributed to these practices. But the trouble with complainants’ case is that these elements are not included in the process disclosed by the patent which they allege is infringed by the defendants.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that there is nothing new in the process described in the patent. All the element^ of the process are old. They are merely aggregated, and the aggregation brings out no new product, nor does it bring out any old product in a cheaper or otherwise more advantageous way. This disposes of the first claim of the patent under consideration. If that claim cannot stand, it follows that the second claim, which is for the product made by the employment of the prodess described in the first claim, is also invalid.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the patent is void for want of invention and for want of novelty in the process described therein.
We shall next consider that branch of the case which rests on the letters-patent to John A. Wilson for improvements in metallic cans for containing cooked meats.
The defences set up to this branch of complainants’ case are, p. 575that the devices covered by the patent are not new, and that the defendants do not infringe.
The evidence clearly shows that none of the defendants use cans “ with offset ends to support the heads, said heads being secured as shown and described ”■ in the patent. The cans which they use are made by turning a flange of the head down over the outside of the shell of the can, and fastening the head in place with solder. This method of fastening the heads and bottoms of the cans was practised by Gibbie and Perl before the date of Wilson’s application for his patent. It was also described in the fifth addition of the French patent of Emile Peltier, dated April 1, 1859.
All, therefore, that is left to consider is whether the shape of the can described in the patent is new, and whether the defendants use it.
The shape of the can described in the patent is pyramidal, with round corners, and with four or more sides.
It is admitted on the record by counsel for the complainants that, prior to the date of the Wilson patents, conical tin cans were made and used for canning alimentary substances, and sealed air-tight.
If it be conceded that the change of a conical can to a pyramidal can, with rounded corners, involves invention, the complainants are met with distinct and unequivocal evidence that cans used for containing preserved food, and closed air-tight, having fpur or more sides and pyramidal in form, with rounded corners, were mentioned in the fifth addition to the patent of Emile Peltier, before referred to, and that the machinery for making them was therein described.
The cans used by the defendant the St. Louis Beef-Packing Company, and by the defendants Robert D. Hunter and others, and the Chicago Packing and Provision Company, are all included in the descriptions of the Peltier patent. The defence of want of novelty set up by the defendants against the first claim of the patent must therefore prevail.
What has been said leaves nothing for the third claim of the patent to rest on.
There is nothing new either in the shape, construction, or material of his cans. There is in the record abundant evidence p. 576that, long before the date of his patent, cooked meat was packed in cans, so that they served as a mould for the meat, and the meat formed a solid cake. The use of a pyramidal can, which was old, for the purpose of receiving the meat cake, which was also old, involved no invention.
The use of vessels with flaring sides, as receptacles and moulds for edible substances, is as old as the art of cookery.
Our conclusion is that both the first and third claims of the patent are void for want of novelty.
The result of the views expressed is that the action of the court below dismissing the bills of complaint was right.
Decrees affirmed.
Note . — Packing Company v. Clapp, appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, was argued at the same time with the cases disposed of in the foregoing opinion, and by the same counsel. It involved the validity of both claims of the reissued patent of William J. Wilson, and the first and third claims of the reissued patent of John A. Wilson. Upon these questions the opinions of the judges of the court below were divided, and a decree dismissing the bill was thereupon entered in accordance with the opinion of the presiding judge.
Mr . Justi ce Woods , in giving the opinion of the court, remarked, that the views expressed in the foregoing cases disposed of this case.
Decree affirmed.