Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57 (1930)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57 (1930)
Full caption
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. CRAIL, DOING BUSINESS AS P. McCOY FUEL COMPANY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 24, 1930
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. CRAIL, DOING BUSINESS AS P. McCOY FUEL COMPANY.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
No. 75. Argued January 10, 1930.—Decided February 24, 1930.
1. Under the Cummins Amendment and the common law of compensatory damages, the amount which a coal dealer is entitled to recover from a rail carrier for failure to make delivery of part of a car-load shipment of coal, is the full actual loss at point of destination. P. 63. 2. Where the shortage was capable of replacement and was, in fact, replaced in the course of the dealer’s business from purchases made in car-load lots at wholesale market price without added expense, the recovery is measured by the wholesale price, including any profit over cost at the mine plus freight, and not by the retail market price, which includes costs of delivery to retail customers
Argument for Petitioner. 281 U. S.
not incurred by the dealer and a retail profit not earned by him by any contract of re-sale. Pp. 63-65. 31 F. (2d) 111, reversed.
Certiorari, 279 U. S. 833, to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed a judgment of the District Court, 21 F. (2d) 831, against the Railroad Company in an action for non-delivery of coal. See also 2 F. (2d) 287; 13 id. 459.
Mr. Edward C. Craig, with whom Messrs. Edwin C. Brown and R. V. Fletcher were on the brief, for petitioner.
If respondent be paid the market value of the coal in car at destination he will be compensated for loss of what he would have had if contract of shipment had been performed. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 97; Hicks n. Guinness, 269 U. S. 71; Southern Pacific Co. v. Damell-Taenzer Co., 245 U. S. 531; United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U. S. 341, at pp. 343, 344.
The respondent did not buy this coal separate and apart from its being a part of the carload of coal. He did not buy any particular quantity. He bought a carload of coal which happened to contain so much coal.
The measure of damages is the difference between the market value of a car of coal delivered in accordance with the contract and the market value of the car as it was in fact delivered. Barry v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 56 Utah 69.
In cases of damage to a carload of, for example, perishables, where the carrier’s breach consists of failure to transport the shipment safely, the measure of damages and rule of computation are generally stated by the courts to be the difference between the fair, reasonable destination value of the carload in the condition in which it should have been delivered, i. e., undamaged, and the fair, [p. 59] 57 Argument for Respondents.
reasonable destination value of the carload in the condition in which it was delivered. In such cases plaintiff’s “full actual loss, damage or injury” is invariably and properly computed by taking the difference between carload values, as such. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Texas Packing Co., 244 U. S. 31, 37; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591, 616-7; Peterson v. Case, 21 Fed. 885, 891.
The fundamental thing in all breach of contract cases is not that plaintiff be paid the value of what is not delivered or lost, but that he be made whole. The primary thing is compensation to him for his loss; the secondary thing is the value of what was lost. The latter is only one method of arriving at the former.
Respondent if allowed to recover more than the market value of the coal in the car will be more than compensated for the loss suffered.
This case is but a case of a breach of contract and the damages are those which will compensate for the “full actual loss, damage or injury to such property.” Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U. S. 540; Wehle v. Haviland, 69 N. Y. 448, 451.
See the cases cited in the dissenting opinion below and in the case of Brown Coal Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 196 Iowa 562.
*
Mr. Stanley B. Houck, with whom Mr. W. Yale Smiley was on the brief, for respondents.
The measure of damages for the loss in transit of a part of a shipment is the value of what has been lost at the time and place at which it should have been delivered, with interest, less the transportation charges, if they have not been paid. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 97; Leominster Fuel Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 258 Mass. 149; Crutchfield & Woolfolk v. Hines, 239 Mass. 84; Woonsocket M. & P.
Argument for Respondents. 281 U. S.
If the commodity lost in transit be a staple which, like coal, is produced for sale and consumption, not for retention and long use, the only inquiry to be made in reckoning its value is its worth as an article of sale. If it be shown that at the destination, at the time the remainder of the shipment arrived there, there was a market in which like coal in like volume was openly bought and sold, the price current in such market will be regarded as its fair market value and likewise the measure of just compensation for its loss. Cliquot’s Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 125, 142; Muser v. Magone, 155 U. S. 240, 249; Murray v. Stanton, 99 Mass. 348; Stanford v. Peck, 63 Conn. 486, 493; United States n. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341.
The market value at destination of the quantity of coal lost is the amount it would have been necessary for the shipper to pay in the open market, at the time and place of delivery, for such a quantity and kind of coal as the carrier failed to deliver as agreed. Wendnagel n. Houston, 155 Ill. App. 664; United States v. New River Collieries Co., supra.
There’ can be no quibble about the statutory liability being for the full, actual loss, damage or injury. Neither can there be any real doubt that where the property lost has a readily ascertainable market value at the proper time and place, that value is the measure of full, actual loss, damage, or injury. Such is the holding of this court in United States v. New River Collieries Co., supra. In that case also, this court answers petitioner’s argument about the justness of a recovery at $13.00 per ton by holding that “the lower courts rightly held that market [p. 61] bl Argument for Respondents.
prices prevailing at the times and place of the taking constitute just compensation.”
Where the law has established a rule for measuring damage for breach of contract, such as loss in transit by a carrier, the parties are conclusively presumed to contemplate a measurement of such a loss by that rule. 1 Sedgwick on Damages (9th ed.) § 40, p. 45; 1 Sutherland on Damages (4th ed.), § 105, p. 367; Brown Nt Chicago, M. de St. P. Ry. Co., 54 Wis. 342.
In determining the value of the commodity which has been lost, the inquiry is limited to the time when the shipment from which the loss occurred was delivered at destination. It is improper to inquire into later events such as whether plaintiff in error was under any necessity of making replacement, or did in fact replace, or that he was a coal dealer, making purchases in carload lots from time to time as his necessity required, which purchases included coal of the kind and quality here in question, of which, on the arrival of the carload from which the loss occurred, he had sufficient for his needs until the arrival of the next carload of the same kind which should be purchased, etc.. Stone n. Codman, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 297, 300; Olds v. Mapes-Reeve Construction Co., 177 Mass. 41, 44; Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Co., 245 U. S. 531, 534.
The simple market value, not its component parts nor the sources from which it is derived nor its other concomitants, shall measure such damages. The Rossend Castle, 30 Fed. 462; The Erroe, 17 Blatchf. (C. C.) 16, Fed. Cas. 4522; Moelring v. Smith, 7 Ind. App. 451; Waggoner Undertaking Co. v. Jones (Mo.), 114 S. W. 1049. • •
Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney, W. F. West, S. R. Prince, A. W. Blackman, F. M. Rivinus, Charles E. Miller,
Opinion of the Court. 281 U.S.
M. K, Rothschild, W. E. Kay, F. G. Dorety, George A. Kingsley, C. W. Wright, E. E. McInnes and Joseph M. Bryson, by special leave of Court, filed a statement and suggestions in support of the petition for certiorari, on behalf of certain railroad companies, as amici curiae.
Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case certiorari was granted May 27, 1929, to review a ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upon the measure of damages recoverable in a suit brought under the Cummins Amendment of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1197, as amended 41 Stat. 494 [49 U. S. C., § 20(11),] against a rail carrier for failure to deliver a part of an interstate shipment of coal.
Respondent, plaintiff below, a coal dealer in Minneapolis, purchased, while in transit, a carload of coal weighing at shipment 88,700 pounds. On delivery at destination, the respondent’s industrial siding, there was a shortage of 5,500 pounds. At the time of arrival, respondent had not resold any of the coal. It was intended to be, and was, added to his stock of coal for resale, but the shortage did not interfere with the maintenance of his usual stock. He lost no sales by reason of it, and purchased no coal to replace the shortage, except in carload lots. In the course of his business, respondent could and did, both before and after the present shipment, purchase coal of like quality in carload lots of 60,000 pounds or more, delivered at his siding, at $5.50 per ton, plus freight. The market price in Minneapolis for like coal sold at retail in less than carload lots was $13.00 per ton, including $3.30 freight.
The case was twice tried. On the first trial, the District Court gave judgment for the wholesale value of the coal not delivered. 2 F. (2d) 287. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that it should have been for the retail value of the coal. 13 F. (2d) 459. Upon [p. 63] retrial, the District Court gave judgment accordingly, 21 F. (2d) 831, which was affirmed below. 31 F. (2d) 111.
By the Cummins Amendment the holder of a bill of lading issued for an interstate rail shipment is entitled to recover for failure to make delivery of any part of the shipment without legal excuse, “ the full actual loss, damage or injury to such property ” at point of destination. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 97.
It is not denied that a recovery measured by the wholesale market price of the coal would fully compensate the respondent, or that the*retail price, taken as the measure of the recovery allowed below, includes costs of delivery to retail consumers which respondent did not incur, and a retail profit which he had not earned by any contract of resale. But respondent contends, as was held below, that the established measure of damage for non-delivery of a shipment of merchandise is the sum required to replace the exact amount of the shortage at the stipulated time and place of delivery, which, in this case, would be its retail value, and that convenience and the necessity for a uniform rule require its application here.
This contention ignores the basic principle underlying common law remedies that they shall afford only compensation for the injury suffered, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 492; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., supra, 100; Robinson v. Harman, 1 Exch. 850, 855; Sedgwick, Damages (9th Ed.), 25; Sutherland, Damages (4th Ed.,) § 12; Williston on Contracts, § 1338, and leaves out of account the language of the amendment, which likewise gives only a right of recovery for “ actual loss.” The rule urged by respondents was applied below in literal accordance with its conventional statement. As so stated, when applied to cases as they usually arise, it is a convenient and accurate method of arriving at an amount of recovery which is [p. 64] compensatory. As so stated, it would have been applicable here if there had been a failure to deliver the entire carload of coal, since the wholesale price, at which a full carload could have been procured at point of destination, would have afforded full compensation, Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., supra; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. American Coal Co., 28 Ga. App. 95; Wendnagel v. Houston, 155 Ill. App. 664; Lake Erie, etc. R. R. Co. v. Frantz, 85 Ind. App. 569; Cutting v. Grand Trunk Ry., 13 Allen 381; Crutchfield & Woolfolk v. Director General of R. R., 239 Mass. 84; Smith v. N. Y. 0. & Western Ry. Co., 119 Mise. Rep. (N. Y.) 506; Yazoo de M. V. R. Co. v. Delta Grocer Co., 134 Miss. 846; Chicago, R I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Broe, 16 Okla. 25; Roth Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 142 Tenn. 52; Quanah A. & P. Co. v. Novitt, 199 S. W. 496 (Tex. Civ. App.), or, in some circumstances, if respondent had been under any constraint to purchase less than a carload lot to repair his loss or carry on his business, for in that event the measure of his loss would have been the retail market cost of the necessary replacement. Haskell v. Hunter, 23 Mich. 305, 309. But in the actual circumstances the cost of replacing the exact shortage at retail price was not the measure of the loss, since it was capable of replacement and was, in fact, replaced in the course of respondent’s business from purchases made in carload lots at wholesale market price without added expense.
There is no greater inconvenience in the application of the one standard of value than the other and we perceive no advantage to be gained from an adherence to a rigid uniformity, which would justify sacrificing the reason of the rule, to its letter. The test of market value is at best but a convenient means of getting at the loss suffered. It may be discarded and other more accurate means resorted to if, for special reasons, it is not exact or otherwise [p. 65] not applicable. See Wilmoth v. Hamilton, 127 Fed. 48, 51; Theiss v. Weiss, 166 Pa. St. 9, 19; Pittsburg Sheet Mfg. Co. v. West Penn Sheet Steel Co., 201 Pa. St. 150; Williston on Contracts, §§ 1384, 1385. In the absence of special circumstances, the damage for shortage in delivery by the seller of fungible goods sold by quantity is measured by the bulk price rather than the price for smaller quantities, both at common law, see Morgan v. Gath, 3 H. & C. 748; Avery v. Wilson, 81 N. Y. 341, and under § 44 of the Uniform Sales Act. Likewise, we think that the wholesale market price is to be preferred as a test over the retail when in circumstances like the present, it is clearly the more accurate measure, Brown Coal Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 196 Iowa 562; see State v. Smith, 31 Mo. 566; Wendnagel n. Houston, supra, 666, 667; Wood Co. N. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 320 Ill.
341. Compare Heidritter Lumber Co. v. Central R. R. of N. J., 100 N. J. Law, 402, Leominster Fuel Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 258 Mass. 149, cited as supporting the conclusion of the court below In these cases it does not clearly appear whether the consignee suffered special damage by reason of the shortage, measured by the retail price, or whether he did or could replace it at the wholesale price in the ordinary course of business.
The court below thought that the fact that the award to respondent of the expense and profit, included in the retail price to consumers, did not militate against the rule it applied, for the reason that the wholesale price, as is often the case where market price is the measure of loss, likewise included a profit over mine cost plus freight. But respondent had done every act and incurred every expense prerequisite to procuring delivery at destination. Any profit included in its market value at the stipulated time and place of arrival was, therefore, appropriately included in the measure of his loss. In this respect it is
98234°—30----- 5
Syllabus. 281 U. S.
distinguishable from the expense and prospective profit not actually incurred or earned by respondent, represented by the retail price. See Central of Georgia R. R. Co. v. American Coal Co., supra; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Delta Grocer Co., supra, 146. Compare Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Hansford, 125 Ky. 37; Smith v. N. Y. 0. & Western Ry. Co., supra; Quanah A. & P. Co. v. Novitt, supra.
Reversed.
CARLEY & HAMILTON, INC., et al. v. SNOOK, CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
COTTINGHAM et al. v. SAME.
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.
Nos. 86 and 267. Submitted January 9, 1930.—Decided February 24, 1930.
1. Fees exacted by the California Motor Vehicle Act for the registration of specified classes of motor vehicles used for intrastate transportation of passengers for hire and of property, the revenue from which fees is applied by the Act to the support of the State Division of Motor Vehicles and to the construction and maintenance of public roads, held exactions made in the exercise of the state taxing power for the privilege of operating such vehicles over public highways, expended for state purposes, and not in conflict with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 71.
2. There is nothing in the Federal Constitution which requires a State . to apply such fees for the benefit of those who pay them. P. 72. 3. The proposition that, although the fees are not per se disproportionate to the privilege of operating over all the highways of the State, owners are entitled to licenses limiting the operation of their motor vehicles to a few highways which they wish to use (e. g. to streets in particular cities) upon payment of correspondingly reduced fees, is not supported by any constitutional principle. P. 72. [p. 67] 66 Counsel for Parties.
4. Owners of motor vehicles operated wholly or principally within the limits of California cities may not escape payment of the registration fees exacted by the Motor Vehicle Act upon the ground that they already pay the fees imposed by the cities, since the imposition of two taxes by different state statutes upon the same subject matter does not transgress the due process clause if the imposition of the total tax by a single statute would not do so. P. 72.
5. The California Motor Vehicle Act, in imposing graduated registration fees on described classes of motor vehicles used for the transportation of passengers for hire or of property, exempts vehicles weighing, when unladen, less than 3,000 lbs. Held not violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or of the similar provision of § 21, Art. I, of the California Constitution. P. 72.
6. The legislature may graduate such fees according to the propensities of the vehicles to injure the public highways, and may exempt those with respect to which it finds this tendency to be slight or non-existent. P. 73.
7. These registration fees are not “ tolls ” within the meaning of § 9 of the Federal Highway Act, providing ‘'that all highways constructed or reconstructed under the provisions of this Act shall be free from tolls of all kinds.” P. 73.
Affirmed.
Appeals from decrees of the District Court of three judges dissolving temporary injunctions and dismissing the bills in two suits against California officials, to enjoin them from enforcing provisions of the state Motor Vehicle Act with respect to the imposition and collection of certain registration fees for motor vehicles.
Messrs. W. R. Crawford and Edwin C. Ewing, with whom Mr. J. F. Vizzard was on the brief, submitted for Carley & Hamilton, Inc., et al., appellants.
Messrs. W. R. Crawford and Henry Hotchkiss, with whom Mr. J. F. Vizzard was on the brief, submitted for Cottingham, et al., appellants.
Messrs. U. S. Webb, Attorney General of California, and William F. Cleary, Deputy Attorney General, with [p. 68] whom Alberta Belford was on the brief, for Snook, appellee.
Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are appeals under § 266 of the Judicial Code, from final decrees of District Courts of three judges for the Northern District of California. Each, on motion to dismiss the complaint, dissolved a temporary injunction, dismissed the complaint and upheld the constitutionality of § 77 (b) and (c) of the Motor Vehicle Act of California, 1923 California Statutes, c. 266, as amended, 1927 California Statutes, c. 844. Section 36 (a) requires every motor vehicle operated upon the public highways of the state to be registered. Under § 77 (a) an annual fee of $3.00 is exacted for the registration of all motor vehicles. By subsections (b) and (c), printed in the margin so far as relevant,1 a graduated license or registration fee, payable [p. 69] in advance, is exacted for registration of motor vehicles used for transportation “ of passengers for hire or for transportation of property.” The duty of enforcing the Act is committed to the appellee, the Chief of the Division of Motor Vehicles, who is required to deposit the fees collected in the state treasury to the credit of the 11 motor vehicle fund.” After deductions for the support of the Division of Motor Vehicles, the fund is required to be expended, one-half by paying it over to the counties, to be used by them in the construction and maintenance of public roads, the other half for the maintenance of state roads.
1
Sec. 77. Registration fees, (a) A registration fee of three dollars shall be paid to the division for the registration of every motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer, except for those which are exempted in this act, and such fee shall be paid at the time application is made for registration. (b) In addition to the registration fee specified in subdivision (a) of this section, there shall be paid for the registration of every electric passenger motor vehicle a registration fee of ten dollars, and for the registration of every electric motor vehicle designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of passengers for hire, or for the transportation of property, there shall be paid fees according to the following schedule: For each such vehicle weighing when unladen, less than six thousand pounds.............................................................. $50.00 For each such vehicle weighing, when unladen, six thousand pounds or more, but less than ten thousand pounds....................................................................................... 70.00 For each such vehicle weighing, when unladen, ten thousand pounds or more..........................................................90.00 (c) The following registration fees in addition to the registration fee specified in subdivision (a) of this section, shall be paid for the registration of vehicles, including trailers and semitrailers, designed?
Under §§51 and 153 (c), operation of a motor vehicle for which the registration fees have not been paid is a
used or maintained primarily for the transportation of passengers for hire or for the transportation of property, according to the following table, except that the fees specified in this subsection need not be paid for electric vehicles.
When such vehicles are equipped wholly with pneumatic tires:
For each such vehicle weighing, when unladen, three thousand pounds or more, but less than six thousand pounds................................................................................... $15.00
For each such vehicle weighing, when unladen, six thousand pounds or more, but less than ten thousand pounds and limited under the. provisions of this act to a total weight, including vehicle and load, not exceeding twenty-two thousand pounds............................................. 40.00
For each such vehicle weighing, when unladen, ten thousand pounds or more and limited under the provisions of this act to a total weight, including vehicle and load, not exceeding twenty-two thousand pounds.............. 50.00
For each such vehicle weighing, when unladen, six thousand pounds or more and entitled under the provisions of this act to a total weight, including vehicle and load, in excess of twenty-two thousand pounds.. 70.00
When such vehicles are not equipped wholly with pneumatic tires there shall be paid in addition to the fees specified in subdivision (a) of this section fees according to the weight thereof unladen amounting to twice the fees set forth in the foregoing table. [p. 70] misdemeanor, punishable by fine of not more than $500, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. By § 81, fees not paid for thirty days after they become due are doubled. Their payment is secured by a lien upon the vehicles required to be registered, enforcible by seizure and sale.
Incorporated cities in California may enact ordinances requiring license fees for the operation of motor vehicles used in transporting passengers for hire, and property, within city limits. Constitution of California, Art. XI, §§ 11, 12; § 145 Motor Vehicle Act. It is conceded that all California cities have passed ordinances imposing such registration fees, varying from $5 to $42 per motor vehicle, in addition to those scheduled in § 77, and that 75% of the fees collected under these ordinances are applied to the maintenance of streets in cities.
The appellants in both suits are owners of motor vehicles of various types, described in § 77 (b) or (c), which appellants in No. 86 operate exclusively over highways within the limits of incorporated cities, and which appellants in No. 267 operate over highways principally within but partly without city limits. Both complaints assail the validity of the Act under the Constitution of California and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The bill in No. 86 was filed December 29, 1928. Its allegations, admitted by the motion to dismiss, are that the appellants will be required to pay license fees for the ensuing year on or before January 31st, 1929, in order to use their motor vehicles upon streets of incorporated cities, and to avoid the destruction of their business and irreparable loss by the seizure and sale of their motor vehicles and the imposition of the penalties of the Act, which appellee threatens to enforce. See Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140.
Appellants insist that the registration fees imposed by § 77 (b) and (c) are in effect tolls for the use of the [p. 71] highways maintained by the state, see Matter of Application of Schuler, 167 Cal. 282, 290; Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 21, 29, and as they pay the license tax imposed by the cities for the use of city streets, the exaction of the additional “ tolls ” with respect to highways outside of cities, which appellants in No. 86 do not use and which the appellants in No. 267 use less than the city streets, is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This argument is based upon cases in this Court arising, not under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the commerce clause of the Constitution, where the tax assailed was levied by a state on interstate carriers and purported to be exacted for their use of the state highways. In such cases this Court must ascertain whether a forbidden burden is imposed on interstate commerce. For that purpose it may inquire whether the tax bears some reasonable relation to the use of the state facilities by the carrier. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163; Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 246; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160; Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554.
But we are now concerned only with the use of motor cars in intrastate commerce, and, in any case, not the precise name which may be given to the money payment demanded, but its effect upon the persons paying it, is of importance in determining whether the Constitution is infringed. Whatever other descriptive term may be applied to the present registration fees, they are exactions, made in the exercise of the state taxing power, for the privilege of operating specified classes of motor vehicles over public highways, and expended for state purposes. Such fees, if covered into the state treasury and used for public purposes, as are general taxes, obviously would not offend against the due process clause. Nor can we see that they do so the more because the state has designated the particular public purposes for [p. 72] which they may be used. There is nothing in the Federal Constitution which requires a state to apply such fees for the benefit of those who pay them. See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 280.
A corollary of this contention is that although the fees are not per se disproportionate to the privilege of operating over all the highways of the state, appellants are nevertheless entitled to receive licenses limiting the operation of their motor cars to the few highways which they wish to use, upon payment of correspondingly reduced fees. But no constitutional principle is suggested, and we know of none, which would enable a licensee thus to regulate the extent of the privilege granted or to assail an otherwise valid tax upon it merely because a reduction of the privilege and the tax would better suit his convenience or his pocketbook.
The objection that the appellants should not be required to pay the challenged fees because they are already paying the city license tax is but the familiar one, often rejected, that a state may not, by different statutes, impose two taxes upon the same subject matter, although, concededly, the total tax, if imposed by a single taxing statute, would not transgress the due process clause. See Swiss Oil Corporation v. Shanks, 273 U. S. 407, 413; St. Louis, Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 367, 368; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 58; Fort Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532, 533.
Only a word need be said of appellants’ contention that the exemption of all vehicles weighing less than 3,000 pounds, although their loaded weight may be much more than vehicles not exempt, infringes the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the similar § 21 of Art. I of the State Constitution.2 That the legislature [p. 73] may graduate the fees according to the propensities of the vehicles to injure or to destroy the public highways, and may exempt those with respect to which this tendency is slight or nonexistent, cannot be doubted. We may not assume that vehicles weighing less than 3,000 pounds, with loads which they usually carry, are not of this class, or that vehicles weighing more than 3,000 pounds with their accustomed burden added do not have this tendency. It is for the legislature to draw the line between the two classes. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 300, 301; Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329, 331; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 62; Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322; Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122, 125; Franchise Motor Freight Assn. v. Seavey, 196 Cal. 77, 81; In re Schmolke, 199 Cal. 42, 48; cf. Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467, 484; Packard v. Banton, supra; Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 123.
2
“ . . . Nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.”
These conclusions are decisive of the like questions raised in No. 267. An additional objection raised in that suit is that the registration fees under § 77 are “ tolls ” prohibited by the Federal Highway Act, 42 Stat. 212, under which the state has received grants of federal aid for the construction and reconstruction of highways. Section 9 of the Federal Highway Act provides “ that all highways constructed or reconstructed under the provisions of this Act shall be free from tolls of all kinds.”
The present registration fees cannot be said to be tolls in the commonly accepted sense of a proprietor’s charge for the passage over a highway or bridge, exacted when and as the privilege of passage is exercised. See Huse n. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 548; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288, 293; St. Louis n. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U. S. 92, 97. The fact that registration fees are imposed generally upon al! residents who use motor vehicles within the state, without reference to any
Syllabus. 281 U. S.
particular highways or to the extent or frequency of the use, and that, as in California, they are not exacted of non-resident automobilists passing through the state (1923 California Statutes, c. 266, § 47,) marks them as demands of sovereignty, not of proprietorship, and likens them to taxes rather than tolls. The fact that they may have been held justified, in other connections, because of their similarity to “ tolls for the use of highways ” affords no basis for saying that the present fees are prohibited tolls within the meaning of the Federal Highway Act.
Such fees were a common form of state license tax before the Federal Highway Act was adopted in 1921. That act contemplated the continued maintenance by the States of state highways, constructed with federal aid, the expense of which must necessarily be defrayed from revenues derived from state taxation. It cannot be supposed that Congress intended to procure the abandonment by the states of this well recognized type of taxation without more explicit language than that prohibiting tolls found in § 9. Judgments in both cases
Affirmed.
OHIO ex rel. BRYANT v. AKRON METROPOLITAN PARK DISTRICT et al.
OHIO ex rel. WADSWORTH v. ZANGERLE et al.
APPEALS FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
Nos. 237 and 238. Argued February 27, 28, 1930.—Decided March 12, 1930.
1. An Ohio statute empowers the probate judge of any county, upon petition and after notice and hearing, to establish a park district, if he finds the proceedings regular and that the district will be conducive to the general welfare, and thereupon to appoint a board of park commissioners of the district. It empowers the board, so appointed, to acquire lands within the district for the conservation of its natural resources, and to that end to create parks, parkways [p. 75] 74 Statement of the Case.
and other reservations and develop, improve and protect the same in such manner as they may deem conducive to the general welfare; to lay assessments upon specially benefited lands in proportion to, and not exceeding, the special benefits conferred by the development or improvement; to levy limited taxes upon all taxable property within the district; and to adopt regulations for the preservation of good order within and adjacent to such parks and reservations and of property and natural life therein, violation of which regulations shall constitute a misdemeanor. It further provides for annexing additional territory to a district through probate court proceedings in the county embracing the additional territory, and for the levying of additional taxes for the use of a district when authorized by the electors of the district at an election to which the question is submitted by the board. The board is empowered to issue bonds in anticipation of the collection of such levy for the purpose of acquiring and improving lands. Held that no substantial federal question is presented by a contention that the statute, in delegating legislative power to the probate court and the non-elective commissioners, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 79.
2. Section 2 of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, providing that “no law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court without a concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the Court of Appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void,” held not violative of the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 79.
3. It is well settled that questions arising under the guaranty to every State of a republican form of government (Const. Art. IV, § 4,) are political,—for Congress and not for the courts. P. 79. 4. The right of appeal is not essential to due process, provided that due process has already been accorded in the tribunal of first instance. P. 80.
5. The equal protection clause is not violated by diversity in the jurisdiction of the several courts of a State as to subject matter or finality of decision if all persons within the territorial limits of the respective jurisdictions of the state courts have an equal right in like cases under like circumstances to resort to them for redress. P. 81.
120 Oh. St. 464, affirmed.
Appeals from judgments of the Supreme Court of Ohio, affirming, as a result of a divided court and a [p. 76] provision of the State Constitution (Art. IV, §2,) judgments of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Ohio Park District Act in two suits brought by taxpayers to restrain its enforcement. The appeals were also directed to orders of the court below overruling motions to vacate its judgments of affirmance and to enter judgments of reversal.
Messrs. Frederick A. Henry and Luther Day, with whom Mr. George D. Hile was on the brief, for appellants.
Messrs. Chester L. Dinsmore, Frederick W. Green, Joseph A. H. Myers and William A. Spencer were on the brief for the Akron Metropolitan Park District et al., appellees.
Messrs. Frederick W. Green, Newton D. Baker, William C. Boyle and Thomas M. Kirby were on the brief for Zangerle et al., appellees.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two cases were argued together and present substantially the same questions. Each suit was brought in the state court by a taxpayer attacking the validity of the Park District Act of the State (General Code of Ohio, secs. 2976-1 to 2976-10i; 107 0. L. 65-69, 108 0. L., pt. 2, 1097-1100). The one suit related to the Park District Board of the Akron District, and the other to that of the Cleveland District, and in each suit the taxpayer sought an injunction against the Park Boards, respectively, together with the auditor of the county where the Board revenues and disbursements are handled, from expending public moneys, or incurring obligations requiring such expenditure, and from taking any other official action on behalf of the district. The statute was assailed as being in violation of the constitution of the State and also of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The [p. 77] validity of the act was sustained by the Court of Common Pleas, and by the Court of Appeals, of the counties where the suits were brought. On error proceedings from these judgments, the cases were heard together in the Supreme Court of the State, and that court was divided in opinion, two of the justices holding the statute to be valid, and five of them being of the contrary view. Section 2 of Article IV of the constitution of Ohio provides that “ no law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court without a concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the Court of Appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void.” Accordingly, in these suits, the judgments in favor of the defendants were affirmed by the Supreme Court and, thereupon, motions were made in that court to vacate the judgments and to enter judgments of reversal. It was then alleged that the above-mentioned provision of the constitution of the State was in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution in that it denied to citizens of Ohio due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, and also that the provision was repugnant to Section 4 of Article IV of the Federal Constitution assuring to every State a republican form of government. The Supreme Court of the State overruled the motions, and from the judgments of affirmance, and the orders denying the motions to vacate, appeals have been taken to this Court.
The grounds for attack, under the Fourteenth Amendment, on the validity of the Park District Act relate to the organization and powers of the Park District Boards. The act provides for the presentation to the probate judge of the county of a petition for the establishment of the proposed district and, after notice and hearing, the probate judge, with or without diminishing or altering, but without enlarging, the suggested boundaries, is to enter an order creating the district, provided he finds the [p. 78] proceedings to be regular and that the creation of the district will be conducive to the general welfare. The probate judge is then to appoint three commissioners who are to constitute the Board of Park Commissioners of the district, being a body politic and corporate. The Board thus constituted is to have power to acquire lands within the district for the conservation of its natural resources and, to that end, may create parkways, parks and other reservations of land, and develop, improve and protect the same in such manner as they may deem conducive to the general welfare. The Board is authorized to lay assessments upon specially benefited lands in an amount not exceeding, and in proportion to, the special benefits conferred by the development or improvement. The Board is also authorized to levy taxes upon all taxable property within the district in an Amount not in excess of one-tenth of one mill upon each dollar of the assessed value of the property in the district in any one year, subject, however, to the combined maximum levy for all purposes otherwise provided by law. On further petitions, and on the determination by the Park Board of the advisability of the annexation of additional territory, whether located within or without the county in which the district is created, the probate court of the county within which the additional territory is located, in proceedings similar to those originally instituted, may provide for such annexation. The Board is also authorized to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for the preservation of good order within and adjacent to the parks and reservations of land under their jurisdiction and of property and natural life therein. The violation of such by-laws, rules or regulations constitutes a misdemeanor. The Board may submit to the electors of the district the question of levying additional taxes for the use of the district, declaring the necessity of such levy, the purpose for which the taxes are to be used, the annual rate proposed and [p. 79] the number of consecutive years that such rate shall be levied. If a majority of the electors voting upon the question favor the levy, such taxes shall be levied accordingly, provided the rate submitted to the electors at any one time shall not exceed one-tenth of one mill annually upon each dollar of valuation. The Board is empowered to issue bonds, in anticipation of the collection of such levy, for the purpose of acquiring and improving lands.
It was insisted by the taxpayers, plaintiffs in the state court, that these statutory provisions involved an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the probate court and to the nonelective park commissioners. We do not consider it necessary to consider at length this objection, or the other points sought to be made against the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment, as, in view of the repeated decisions of this Court, we do not find any substantial Federal question presented. Houck v. Little River Drainage District, 239 U. S. 254, 262; Orr v. Allen, 245 Fed. 486, 248 U. S. 35; Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U. S. 522.
The question with respect to the validity, from a Federal standpoint, of the provision of the state constitution that no law shall be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the State without a concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the Court of Appeals declaring a law unconstitutional, was not raised in these suits until after the judgments of affirmance by the Supreme Court. But it is insisted that the point could not have been taken earlier, as in advance of the affirmance on a vote of the minority the question would have been speculative. Hence, it is said that the Federal question was raised at the earliest opportunity. (Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U. S. 317, 320.) Assuming that the Federal question is thus brought here, we find it to be without merit.
As to the guaranty to every State of a republican form of government (Sec. 4, Art. IV), it is well settled that the [p. 80] questions arising under it are political, not judicial, in character and thus are for the consideration of the Congress and not the courts. Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118; O’Neill v. Learner, 239 U. S. 244, 248; State of Ohio ex rel. Davis n. Hildebrant, Secretary of State of Ohio, 241 U. S. 565; Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 234.
As to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is sufficient to say that, as frequently determined by this Court, the right of appeal is not essential to due process, provided that due process has already been accorded in the tribunal of first instance. McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687; Pittsburgh, etc. Railway Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 427; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 508; Rogers n. Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 435; Standard Oil Company of Indiana n. State of Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 286. The opportunity afforded to litigants in Ohio to contest all constitutional and other questions fully in the Common Pleas Court and again in the Court of Appeals plainly satisfied the requirement of the Federal Constitution in this respect and the State was free to establish the limitation in question in relation to appeals to its Supreme Court in accordance with its views of state policy.
In invoking the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is argued that the result of the application of the provision of the state constitution may be that the same statute may be held constitutional in a case arising in one county, and unconstitutional in another case arising in another county. This point is obviously not of importance in relation to the question of the validity of the Park District Act under the Federal Constitution, as the Act of Congress makes appropriate provision for the hearing and determination by this Court of such a question where a Federal right has been passed upon by the highest court of the State in which a [p. 81] decision could be had. But it is said that, from the standpoint of the state constitution, the statute may operate unequally. It is unnecessary to comment on this point so far as the mere inconvenience which may be caused by possible conflicts is concerned. It is urged that the situation has been described as deplorable by the Supreme Court of the State {Board of Education v. Columbus, 118 0. S. 295) but it is not for this Court to intervene to protect the citizens of the State from the .consequences of its policy, if the State has not disregarded the requirements of the Federal Constitution. In the present instance, there has been as yet no conflict of decision. The provision of the state constitution which is attacked is one operating uniformly throughout the entire State. The State has a wide discretion in respect to establishing its systems of courts and distributing their jurisdiction. It has been held by this Court that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by diversity in the jurisdiction of the several courts of a State as to subject matter or finality of decision if all persons within the territorial limits of the respective jurisdictions of the state courts have an equal right in like cases under like circumstances to resort to them for redress. A State “may establish one system of courts for cities, and another for rural districts, one system for one portion of its territory, and another system for another portion.” Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 30, 31. Different courts of appeal may be set up for different portions of the State. Id., p. 33. It is thus well established that there is no requirement of the Federal Constitution that the State shall adopt a unifying method of appeals which will insure to all litigants within the State the same decisions on particular questions which may arise. Missouri v. Lewis, supra; Pittsburgh etc. Railway Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 427; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 597-599.
Judgments affirmed.
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