St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893)
Full caption
ST. LOUIS v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 6, 1893
ST. LOUIS v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH
COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.
No. 94. Argued December 16,1892. — Decided March 6,1893.
In this case it appears by the bill of exceptions that there was an application at the close of the trial for an instruction that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the sum claimed, which was refused and exception taken, and this is held to present a question of law for the consideration of this court, although there were no special findings of fact.
When the trial court, in a case where some facts are agreed and there is oral testimony as to others, makes a ruling of law upon a point not affected by the oral testimony, this court may consider it notwithstanding the fact that there was only a general finding of facts.
A municipal charge for the use of the streets of the municipality by a telegraph company, erecting its poles therein, is not a privilege or license tax.
A telegraph company has no right, under the act of July 24, 1865, c. 230, 14 Stat. 221, to occupy the public streets of a city without compel! sation.
This case presents no question of estoppel.
Whether such tax is reasonable is a question for the court.
On February 25, 1881, the city of St. Louis passed an ordinance, known as ordinance No. 11,604, authorizing any telegraph or telephone company duly incorporated according to law, doing business or desiring to do business in the city of St. Louis, to set its poles, pins, abutments, wires and other fixtures along and across any of the public roads, streets and alleys of the city, subject to certain prescribed regulations. Sections six, eight and nine read as follows:
“ Seo. 6. Every telegraph or telephone company doing business in this city shall keep on deposit with the treasurer the sum of fifty dollars, subject to the order of the street commissioner, to be used by him in restoring any sidewalk, gutter, street or alley pavement displaced or injured in the erection, alteration or removal of any pole of such company, when said company refuses or fails to make such restoration to the satisfaction of such commissioner. Any company failing to make such deposit within thirty days after the passage of this ordinance, or within five days after commencing business, if a new company, or which shall fail to make good the amount when any portion of it has been expended as herein provided, within five days after notice so to do has been sent by the street commissioner, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and punished as hereinafter provided.”
“ Seo. 8. Any company erecting poles under the provision of this ordinance shall, before obtaining a permit therefor from the board of public improvements, file an agreement in the office of the city register permitting the city of St. Louis to occupy and use the top cross-arm of any pole erected, or which is now erected, for the use of said city for telegraph purposes free of charge.
“Seo. 9. Nothing contained in this ordinance shall be so construed as to in any manner affect the right of the city in the future to prescribe any other mode of conducting such wires over or under its thoroughfares.”
On March 22, 1884, another ordinance, known as ordinance No. 12,733, was passed. This ordinance was entitled “An ordinance to amend ordinance number 11,604,” etc., and p. 94amended that ordinance by adding certain sections, of which section 11 reads as follows:
“Sec. 11. From and after the first day of July, 1884, all telegraph and telephone companies, which are not by ordinance taxed on their gross income for city purposes, shall pay to the city of St. Louis, for the privilege of using the streets, alleys and public places thereof, the sum of five dollars per annum for each and every telegraph or telephone pole erected or used by them in the streets, alleys and public places in said city.”
This section continued in force and was incorporated into and became a part of an ordinance of the city, entitled “ An ordinance in revision of the ordinances of the city of St. Louis, and to establish new ordinance provisions for the government of said city,” approved April 12, 1887, and numbered 14,000, the section being in said revised ordinance known as section 671 of article 8 of chapter 15.
The Western Union Telegraph Company being one of the companies designated in section 671, not taxed on its gross income for city purposes, and failing to pay the sum of five dollars per annum for each telegraph pole, as required by said section, on April 7,1888, there was filed in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis a petition, setting forth these various ordinances, alleging that the telegraph company had during the three years last past held, owned and used in the streets and public places of the city of St. Louis 1509 telegraph poles, and praying to recover the sum of $22,635 therefor. This suit was removed by the telegraph company to the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, and on February 16, 1889, an amended answer was filed by the company, admitting its use of the streets of the city of St. Louis as charged, and that it was not taxed on its gross income for city purposes, but denying the validity of the said ordinance, and the authority of the city to pass it. It also set up as defences that it was a corporation chartered, created and organized under the laws of the State of New York ; that it owned, controlled and used lines of telegraph in various parts of the United States, which p. 95oonnected with its lines in the city of St. Louis; that on the 5th of June, 1867, it duly filed with the Postmaster General of the United States a written acceptance of the restrictions and obligations required by law under and in accordance with the act of Congress of the United States, approved July 24, 1866, entitled “ An act to aid in the construction of telegraph lines and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal, military and other purposes,” and that it had ever since been subject to and complied with the terms of such act; that the streets and public places of the city of St. Louis were established post roads of the United States, under and in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the authorized rules and regulations of the officers and departments of the United States, made, passed and adopted in pursuance of said laws; that it has constructed, operated and maintained its lines of telegraph in the city of St. Louis under and by virtue of the authority of said acts of Congress; that while the city of St. Louis claims compensation from the defendant in the sum of five dollars per annum on account of each and every telegraph pole in the streets, alleys and public places in the city, yet in fact the said sum so assessed and sought to be recovered from it is a privilege or license tax for the privilege of carrying on its business in the city of St. Louis; and that its assessment and attempted enforcement and collection are in violation of article I, section 8, paragraphs 3 and 7, of the Constitution of the United States.
The defendant also alleged that it had complied with all the terms of ordinance No. 11,604; and, further, that during the time set forth in the petition all its property within the city of St. Louis was assessed in pursuance of law for the purpose of taxation by the State and city, and that it had paid all taxes levied thereon; and, still further, that the ordinance set forth imposed upon defendant a burden and tax additional to the taxes regularly assessed upon the property of defendant, without any corresponding or special advantage to the defendant; and that, in so far as it attempted to exact five dollars per annum for each pole, it was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive and void. ' The case was tried by the court p. 96without a jury, and on June 17, 1889, a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant, the court holding that the burden imposed was a tax, and imposed in such form that it could only be regarded as a privilege or license tax, which the city had no authority to impose. 39 Fed. Rep. 59. To reverse such judgment, the city sued out a writ of error from this court.
J/r. IF. C. Marshall for plaintiff in error.
Mr. John F. Dillon, (with whom was Mr. Rush Taggart on the brief,) and Mr. Elenious Smith, (with whom were Mr. Charles TF. Wells, Mr. Willard Brown and Mr. George IL Fearons on the brief,) for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Brewer, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
At the threshold of the case we are met with the objection that there are no special findings of facts, and that, therefore, our inquiry is limited to questions arising upon the pleadings, or upon rulings made by the court during the progress of the trial. We have had occasion in a recent case, coming from the same court, to consider to what extent our inquiry may go in a case tried by the court without a jury, in which there are no special findings of facts, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to consider that question at length. Lehnen v. Dickson, ante, 71.
It is enough to say that in this case there was, as appears by the bill of exceptions, an application at the close of the trial for a declaration of law, that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the sum claimed, which instruction was refused, and exception taken ; and this, as was held in Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 125, presents a question of law for our consideration. Further, there was, as also appears in the bill of exceptions, an agreement as to certain facts, which though not technically such an agreed statement as is the equivalent of a special finding of facts, yet enables us to approach the consideration p. 97of the declaration of law with a certainty as to the facts upon which it was based. It is true that, in addition to these agreed facts, there was some oral testimony, but as it appears from the opinion of the court that it made a distinct ruling upon a proposition of law not at all affected by the oral testimony, and which in its judgment was decisive of the case, we cannot avoid an inquiry into the matter thus determined. We, therefore, pass to a consideration of such questions as are distinctly presented and clearly involved.
And, first, with reference to the ruling that this charge was a privilege or license tax. To determine this question, we must refer to the language of the ordinance itself, and by that we find that the charge is imposed for the privilege of using the streets, alleys and public places, and is graduated by the amount of such use. Clearly, this is no privilege or license tax. The amount to be paid is not graduated by the amount of the business, nor is it a sum fixed for the privilege , of doing business. It is more in the nature of a charge for the use of property belonging to the city — that which may properly be called rental. “ A tax is a demand of sovereignty ; a toll is a demand of proprietorship.” State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 278. If, instead of occupying the streets and public places with its telegraph poles, the company should do what it may rightfully do, purchase ground in the various blocks from private individuals, and to such ground remove its poles, the section would no longer have any application to it. That by it the city receives something which it may use as revenue, does not determine the character of the charge or make it a tax. The revenues of a municipality may come from rentals as legitimately and as properly as from taxes. Supposing the city of St. Louis should find its city hall too small for its purposes, or too far removed from the centre of business, and should purchase or build another more satisfactory in this respect; it would not thereafter be forced to et the old remain vacant or to immediately sell it, but might derive revenue by renting its various rooms. Would an ordinance fixing the price at which those rooms could be occupied e in any sense one imposing a tax? Nor is the character of
VOL. CXLVIH—7
the charge changed by reason of the fact that it is not imposed upon such telegraph companies as by ordinance are taxed on their gross income for city purposes. In the illustration just made in respect to a city hall, suppose that the city, in its ordinance fixing a price for the use of rooms, should permit persons who pay a certain amount of taxes to occupy a portion of the building free of rent, that would not make the charge upon others for their use of rooms a tax. Whatever the reasons may have been for exempting certain classes of companies from this charge, such exemption does not change the character of the charge, or make that a tax which would otherwise be a matter of rental. Whether the city has power to collect rental for the use of streets and public places, or whether, if it has, the charge as here made is excessive, are questions entirely distinct. That this is not a tax upon the property of the corporation, or upon its business, or for the privilege of doing business, is thus disclosed by the very terms of the section. The city has attempted to make the telegraph company pay for appropriating to its own and sole use a part of the streets and public places of the city. It is seeking to collect rent. While we think that the Circuit Court erred in its conclusions as to the character of this charge, it does not follow therefrom that the judgment should be reversed, and a judgment entered in favor of the city. Other questions are presented which compel examination.
Has the city a right to charge this defendant for the use of its streets and public places ? And here, first, it may be well to consider the nature of the use which is made by the defendant of the streets, and the general power of the public to exact compensation for the use of streets and roads. The use which the defendant makes of the streets is an exclusive and permanent one, and not one temporary, shifting and in common with the general public. The ordinary traveller, whether on foot or in a vehicle, passes to and fro along the streets, and his use and occupation thereof are temporary and shifting. The space he occupies one moment he abandons the next to be occupied by any other traveller. This use is common to all members of the public, and it is a use open equally to citizens p. 99of other States with those of the State in which the street is situate. But the use made by the telegraph company is, in respect to so much of the space as it occupies with its poles, permanent and exclusive. It as effectually and permanently dispossesses the general public as if it had destroyed that amount of ground. Whatever benefit the public may receive in the way of transportation of messages, that space is, so far as respects its actual use for purposes of a highway and personal travel, wholly lost to the public. By sufficient multiplication of telegraph and telephone companies the whole space of the highway might be occupied, and that which was designed for general use for purposes of travel entirely appropriated to the separate use of companies and for the transportation of messages.
We do not mean to be understood as questioning the right of municipalities to permit such occupation of the streets by telegraph and telephone companies, nor is there involved here the question whether such use is a new servitude or burden placed upon the easement, entitling the adjacent lot owners to additional compensation. All that we desire or need to notice is the fact that this use is an absolute, permanent and exclusive appropriation of that space in the streets which is occupied by the telegraph poles. To that extent it is a use different in kind and extent from that enjoyed by the general public. Now, when there is. this permanent and exclusive appropriation of a part of the highway, is there in the nature of things anything to inhibit the public from exacting rental for the space thus occupied ? Obviously not. Suppose a municipality permits one to occupy space in a public park, for the erection of a booth in which to sell fruit and other articles; who would question the right of the city to charge for the use of the ground thus occupied, or call such charge a tax, or anything else except rental ? So, in like manner, while permission to a telegraph company to occupy the streets is not technically a lease, and does not in terms create the relation of landlord and enant, yet it is the giving of the exclusive use of real estate, for which the giver has a right to exact compensation, which 18 in the nature of rental. We do not understand it to be
-AV Opinion of the Court.
V questioned by^ counsel for the defendant that, under the cons^ution i^rT laws of Missouri, the city of St. Louis has the ^yT'ull c^&iol of its streets, and in this respect represents the r public in relation thereto.
It is claimed, however, by defendant, that under the act of Congress of July 24, 1866, c. 230, 14 Stat. 221, and by virtue of its written acceptance of the provisions, restrictions and obligations imposed by that act, it has a right to occupy the streets of St. Louis with its telegraph poles. The first section of that act contains the supposed grant of power. It reads: “ That any telegraph company now organized., or which may hereafter be organized under the laws of any State in this Union, shall have the right to construct, maintain and operate lines of telegraph through and over any portion of the public domain of the United States, over and along any of the military or post roads of the United States which have been or may hereafter be declared such by act of Congress, and over, under or across the navigable streams or waters of the United States: Provided, That such lines of telegraph shall be so constructed and maintained as not to.obstruct the navigation of such streams and waters, or interfere with the ordinary travel on such military or post roads.” By sec. 3964, Rev. Stat. U. S.: “The following are established post roads: . . . All letter-carrier routes established in any city or town for the collection and delivery of mail matters.” And the streets of St. Louis are such “letter-carrier routes.” So also by the act of March 1, 1884, 23 Stat. 3: “ All public roads and highways, while kept up and maintained as such, are hereby declared to be post routes.”
It is a misconception, however, to suppose that the franchise or privilege granted by the act of 1866 carries with it the unrestricted right to appropriate the public property of a State. It is like any other franchise, to be exercised in subordination to public as to private rights. While a grant from one government may supersede and abridge franchises and rights held at the will of its grantor, it cannot abridge any property rights of a public character created by the authority of another sovereignty. No one would suppose that a p. 101Iranchise from the Federal government to a corporation, State or national, to construct interstate roads or lines of travel, transportation or communication, would authorize it to enter upon the private property of an individual, and appropriate it without compensation. No matter how broad and comprehensive might be the terms in which the franchise was granted, it would be confessedly subordinate to the right of the individual not to be deprived of his property without just compensation. And the principle is the same when, under the grant of a franchise from the national government, a corporation assumes to enter upon property of a public nature belonging to a State. It would not be claimed, for instance, that under a franchise from Congress to construct and operate an interstate railroad the grantee thereof could enter upon the state-house grounds of the State, and construct its depot there, without paying the value of the property thus appropriated. Although the state-house grounds be property devoted to public uses, it is property devoted to the public uses of the State, and property whose ownership and control are in the State, and it is not within the competency of the national government to dispossess the State of such control and use, or appropriate the same to its own benefit, or the benefit of any of its corporations or grantees, without suitable compensation to the State. This rule extends to streets and highways ; they are the public property of the State. While for purposes of travel and common use they are open to the citizens of every State alike, and no State can by its legislation deprive the citizens of another State of such common use, yet when an appropriation of any part of this public property to an exclusive use is sought, whether by a citizen or corporation of the same or another State, or a corporation of the national government, it is within the competency of the State, representing the sovereignty of that local public, to exact for its benefit compensation for this exclusive appropriation. It matters not for what that exclusive appropriation is taken, whether for steam railroads or street railroads, telegraphs or telephones, the State ,nay if it chooses exact from the party or corporation given such exclusive use pecuniary compensation to the general pub- p. 102lie for being deprived of the common use of the portion thus appropriated.
This is not the first time that an effort has been made to withdraw corporate property from state control, under and by virtue of this act of Congress. In Western Union Telegraph Company v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530, the telegraph company set up that act as a defence against state taxation, but the defence was overruled. Mr. Justice Miller, on page 548, speaking for the court, used this language: “ This, however, is merely a permissive statute, and there is no expression in it which implies that this permission to extend its lines along roads not built or owned by the United States, or over and under navigable streams, or over bridges not built or owned by the Federal government, carries with it any exemption from the ordinary burdens of taxation. While the State could not interfere by any specific statute to prevent a corporation from placing its lines along these post-roads, or stop the use of them after they were placed there, nevertheless the company receiving the benefit of the laws of the State for the protection of its property and its rights is liable to be taxed upon its real or personal property as any other person would be. It never could have been intended by the Congress of the United States in conferring upon a corporation of one State the authority to enter the territory of any other State and erect its poles and lines therein, to establish the proposition that such a company owed no obedience to the laws of the State into which it thus entered, and was under no obligation to pay its fair proportion of the taxes necessary to its support.”
If it is, as there held, simply a permissive statute, and nothing in it which implies that the permission to extend its lines along roads not built or owned by the United States carries with it any exemption from the ordinary burdens of taxation, it may also be affirmed that it carries with it no exemption from the ordinary burdens which may be cast upon those who would appropriate to their exclusive use any portion of the public highways.
Again, it is said that by ordinance No. 11,604 the city p. 103contracted with defendant to permit the erection of these poles in consideration of the right of the city to occupy and use the top cross-arm of any pole for its own telegraph purposes, free of charge; and in support of that proposition the case of New Orleans v. Southern Telephone Telegraph Co., 40 La. Ann. 41, is cited. But in that case it appeared that the telephone company had set its poles and constructed its lines under and by virtue of the grant made by the ordinance, and hence the conditions named therein were held part of the contract between the city and the telephone company, which the former was not at liberty to disregard. As stated in the opinion, page 45 : “ Obviously, upon the clearest considerations of law and justice, the grant of authority to defendant when accepted and acted upon, became an irrevocable contract, and the city is powerless to set it aside or to interpolate new and more onerous considerations therein. Such has been the well-recognized doctrine of the authorities since the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518.” The same principle controlled the cases of Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; Kansas City v. Corrigan, 86 Missouri, 67; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50.
But the difficulty of the application of that doctrine in this case is that there is nothing to show that a single pole was erected under or by virtue of ordinance No. 11,604. The only statement in the agreed facts is that they were erected prior to July 1, 1884. If we turn to the oral testimony, there is nothing tending to show that any were erected after the 25th of February, 1881, the date of the passage of ordinance No. 11,604. On the contrary, that testimony shows that the company had been engaged in the telegraph business in the city of St. Louis for 15 years or more prior to 1881. There is nothing, either, in the agreed facts, as to the use of the top cross-arm of any poles by the city of St. Louis, and the testimony tends to show that they were so used prior to 1881.
Whatever, therefore, of estoppel might arise if anything had been done by the telegraph company under the ordinance to change its position, as the case now stands none can be invoked, and all that can be said of the ordinance is that, in
.Opinion of the Court.
its application to the facts as they appear, there is simply a temporary matter of street regulation, and one subject to change at the pleasure of the city. It is unnecessary, however, to consider these matters at length, for on a new trial the facts in respect thereto can be more fully developed. It is true that in cases tried by the court, where all the facts are specifically found or agreed to, it is within the power of this court, in reversing, to direct the judgment which shall be entered upon such findings. At the same time if for any reasons justice seems to require it, the court may simply reverse and direct a new trial. Indeed, this has been done, under special circumstances, in cases where there were no finding's of facts or agreed statement, or where that which was presented was obviously defective. Graham v. Bayne, 18 How. 60; Flanders v. Tweed, 9 Wall. 425.
Another matter is discussed by counsel which calls for attention, and that is the proposition that the ordinance charging five dollars a pole per annum is unreasonable, unjust and excessive. Among other cases cited in support of that proposition is Philadelphia v„ Western Union Tel. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 615, in which an ordinance similar in its terms was held unreasonable and void by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. We think that question, like the last, may be passed for further investigation on the subsequent trial. Prima facie, an ordinance like that is reasonable. The court cannot assume that such a charge is excessive, and so excessive as to make the ordinance unreasonable and void; for, as applied in certain cases, a like charge for so much appropriation of the streets may be reasonable. If within a few blocks of Wall Street, New York, the telegraph company should place on the public streets 1500 of its large telegraph poles, it would seem as though no court could declare that five dollars a pole was an excessive annual rental for the ground so exclusively appropriated ; while, on the other hand, a charge for a like number of poles in a small village, where space is abundant and land of little value, would be manifestly unreasonable, and might be so excessive as to be void. Indeed, it may be observed, in p. 105the line of the thoughts heretofore expressed, that this charge is one in the nature of rental; that the occupation by this interstate commerce company of the streets cannot be denied by the city; that all that it can insist upon is, in this respect, reasonable compensation for the space in the streets thus exclusively appropriated; and it follows in the nature of things that it does not lie exclusively in its power to determine what is reasonable rental. The inquiry must be open in the courts, and it is an inquiry which must depend largely upon matters not apparent upon the face of the ordinance, but existing only in the actual state of affairs in the city.
We think that this is all that need be said in reference to the case as it now stands. For the reasons given, the judgment is
Reversed and the case remandedfor a new trial.
Mr. Justice Brown dissenting.
The tax in this case cannot be considered, and does not purport to be a tax upon the property of the defendant. The gross disparity of the tax to the value of such property is of itself sufficient evidence of this fact — the total valuation of all of defendant’s property in the city of St. Louis in 1884, as fixed by the state board of equalization, being but $17,- 064.63, while the tax of $5 upon 1509 poles amounted to 87545, or more than 44 per cent of the entire value of the property.
If it be treated as a tax upon the franchise then it is clearly invalid within the numerous decisions of this court, which deny the right of a State or municipality to impose a burden upon telegraph and other companies engaged in interstate commerce for the exercise of their franchises. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69; Harmon v. City of Chicago, 147 U. S. 396 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339.
If this tax be sustainable at all it must be upon the theory adopted by the court that the municipality has the right to
• tax the company for the use of its streets. While I have no doubt of its right to impose a reasonable tax for such use, the tax must be such as to appear to have been laid bona fide for that purpose. It seems to me, however, that the imposition of a tax of $5 upon every pole erected by the company throughout the entire municipality is so excessive as to indicate that it was imposed with a different object. In the city of St. Louis alone the tax amounts, as above stated, to $7545. A similar tax in the city of Philadelphia amounted to $16,000, while the facts showed that, at the most, only $3500 per year was required to cover every expenditure the city was obliged to make upon this account. Philadelphia v. W. U. Tel. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 615. A like tax imposed by every city through which the defendant company carries its wires would result practically in the destruction of its business. While, as stated in the opinion of the court, $5 per pole might not be excessive if laid upon poles in the most thickly settled business section of the city, the court will take judicial notice of the fact that all the territory within the boundaries of our cities is not densely populated, that such cities include large areas but thinly inhabited, and that a tax which might be quite reasonable if imposed upon a few poles would be grossly oppressive if imposed upon every pole within the city. In my opinion the tax in question is unreasonable and excessive upon its face, and should not be upheld. The fact that it was nominally imposed for the privilege of using the streets is not conclusive as to the actual intent of the legislative body. As was said by this court in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 458 : “ It is a just and well-settled doctrine established by this court, that a State cannot do that indirectly which she is forbidden by the constitution to do directly. If she cannot levy a duty or tax from the master or owner of a vessel engaged in commerce graduated on the tonnage or admeasurement of the vessel, she cannot effect the same purpose by merely changing the ratio, and graduating it on the number of masts, or of mariners, the size and power of the steam engine, or the number of passengers which she carries. We have to deal with things, and we eannot change them by changing their names.”
The tax in question seems to me to indicate upon its face that it was not imposed bona fide for the privilege of using the streets, but was intended either as a tax upon the franchise of the company, or for the purpose of driving its wires beneath the ground. While the latter object may be a perfectly legitimate one, I consider it a misuse of the taxing power to seek to accomplish it in this way. I am, therefore, constrained to dissent from the opinion of the court.
VIRGINIA v. PAUL.
ORIGINAL.
No. 7. Original. Submitted January 30,1893.—Decided March 6, 1893.
Under section 613 of the Revised Statutes, the jurisdiction of the state court is not taken away, until a petition for removal is filed in the Circuit Court of the United States, and a writ of certiorari or of habeas corpus cum causa issued by the clerk of that court, and served upon the
state court or its clerk.
A prosecution of a crime against the laws of a State, which must be prosecuted by indictment, is not commenced, within the meaning of section 643 of the Revised Statutes, before an indictment is found; and cannot be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States by a person arrested on a warrant from a justice of the peace with a view to his commitment to await the action of the grand jury.
Mandamus lies in behalf of a State to compel the remanding to one of its courts of a criminal prosecution there commenced, and of which the Circuit Court of the United States has assumed jurisdiction, at the defendant’s suggestion, without due proceedings for removal. Mandamus does not lie to review an order on a writ of habeas corpus, under sections 751-753 of the Revised Statutes, discharging a prisoner from commitment under authority of a State, on the ground of his being in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States.
This was a petition by the Commonwealth of Virginia to this court for a writ of mandamus to the Honorable John Paul, District Judge of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, and holding the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, to command him to remand p. 108to the county court of Smyth County in Virginia an indictment against Joseph H. Carrico for the murder of James M. Nelson, found by the grand jury of the county, and by them returned into the county court, and of which the Circuit Court of the United States had assumed jurisdiction; and also to command him to restore the body of Carrico to W. D. Wilmore, the jailor of the county, from whose custody he had been taken upon a writ of habeas corpus issued by said judge.
Annexed to the petition was a copy of the record of the District Court of the United States in the proceedings for a habeas corpus, as well as a copy of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States in the proceedings concerning the indictment.
The record of the District Court set forth the following proceedings : On December 18, 1891, in vacation, Carrico presented to Judge Paul a petition, addressed to him as “Judge of the United States Circuit Court,” alleging “ that, on December 12,1891, one Kirk, a justice of the peace of Smyth County, Virginia, issued his warrant in the name of the Commonwealth of Virginia, addressed to constable Scott of the said county, commanding him to arrest your petitioner, and bring his body before said justice for wilfully, premeditatedly and of malice aforethought, killing and murdering one James M. Nelson, in the said county of Smyth, on December 11, 1891; and upon said warrant the said constable Scott did arrest your petitioner, late on Saturday evening, December 12, 1891, and delivered him to W. D. Wilmore, the jailor of Smyth County, Virginia; and your petitioner is now confined in the jail of Smyth County, at Marion, awaiting a trial before said justice upon the said charge of murder.” The petition further alleged that no murder was committed, but that the killing was done by the petitioner in self-defence, in the performance of his duty as a deputy of the marshal of the district, acting by and under the authority of the internal revenue laws of the United States, and in attempting to arrest Nelson while violating those laws by having in his possession and selling illicit ardent spirits. “ In view of these facts, under section 643 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,” the petition prayed that “said p. 109cause may be removed from the jurisdiction of the said Kirk, justice of the peace of said county of Smyth, and from the county court of said county, to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, for trialthat a writ of habeas corpus cum causa might be awarded, and a duplicate thereof delivered to the clerk of the county court, and that by virtue thereof the marshal of the district or one of his deputies might take the body of the petitioner into his custody, to be dealt with in the cause according to law, and according to the order of the Circuit Court, or of a judge thereof in vacation ; and, “ upon the removal of said prosecution, that a copy of the record and proceedings before said justice and by said constable ” might be brought into the Circuit Court. The petition was verified by the oath of the petitioner, taken before a U nited States commissioner on December 12; and annexed to it was a certificate of counsel of the same date, in the form required by said section of the statutes.
Upon that petition, and on the same day, Judge Paul made an order, entitled “ In the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, in vacation,” and signed by him as District Judge, granting a writ of habeas corpus in common form to the jailor, returnable before him on December 23, at Abingdon.
On December 19, that petition was filed, and the order granting the writ of habeas corpus recorded, in the clerk’s office of the District Court, and the writ was issued accordingly, tested by Judge Paul as judge of the District Court, and under its seal.
On December 22, the writ of habeas corpus, as appeared by the marshal’s return thereon, was executed by delivering copies thereof to the jailor, and to the clerk of the county court.
On December 23, at a special term of the District Court, held at Abingdon, the jailor brought in the body of Carrico; and returned that the causes of his detention were a warrant of commitment, a copy of which, marked Exhibit A, was annexed to and made part thereof, “and the proceedings of the county court of Smyth and Commonwealth of Virginia, marked Exhibit B, and made part and parcel of this return.”
The only exhibit annexed to the jailor’s return was marked Exhibit A, and was as follows :
“ Virginia, Smyth County, to wit: To William Scott, constable of said county, and to the keeper of the jail of said county:
“ These are to command you, the said constable, in the name of the Commonwealth of Virginia, forthwith to convey and deliver into the custody of the keeper of said jail, together with the warrant, the body of Joseph EL Carrico, charged before me, John J. Kirk, a justice of the said county, on the oath of R. W. Nelson, with a felony by him committed, in this, that the said Joseph H. Carrico, on the 11th day of December, 1891, in the said county, feloniously and of his malice did kill and murder one James M. Nelson; and you, the said keeper of the said jail, are hereby required to receive the said Joseph H. Carrico into your jail and custody, that he may be examined for the said offence by the county court of the said county, and him there safely keep until he shall be discharged by due course of law. Given under my hand and seal this, the 14th day of December, 1891.
“John J. Kirk, J. P.”
The prisoner was thereupon admitted to bail with sureties for his appearance on January 8, 1892, and the case was continued to that day, and again to January 9, when the jailor was permitted by the court to amend his return by adding Exhibit B, therein referred to, which was a transcript of an indictment against Carrico for the murder of Nelson, returned into the county court by a grand jury of the county on December 21, and of an order made the same day by that court, directing that Carrico, who had been removed to the jail of another county for safekeeping, be conveyed by the sheriff to the jail of Smyth County, that he might be tried in the county court on the indictment. This transcript appeared to have been certified by the county clerk on January 7, and was endorsed by the clerk of the District Court of the United States as filed in that court on May 17, 1892.
The case was continued from January 9 to January 12,
VIRGINIA v. PAUL. Ill
when the District Court, held by Judge Paul, made the following order:
“ In this cause, the court having heard the testimony introduced on behalf of the petitioner, as well as that introduced on behalf of the respondent, W. D. Wilmore, sheriff of Smyth County, Virginia, and the arguments of counsel for the petitioner and respondent, and it appearing to the court that the petitioner is in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and is held in custody contrary to law by the jailor of Smyth County, Virginia, and that he has a right to have removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia the prosecution pending against him in the county court of Smyth County, Virginia: It is therefore ordered that the petitioner be recognized in the sum of one thousand dollars for his appearance before the Circuit Court for this district on the first day of the next regular term thereof, to answer the indictment found against him by a grand jury of the county court of Smyth County, Virginia.” Thereupon Carrico entered into a recognizance accordingly. The record set forth the testimony introduced at that hearing, as well as the opinion then delivered, and published in 51 Fed. Rep. 196.
On May 14, 1892, the jailor moved the District Court to amend its order of January 12, so as to allow him an appeal to this court; and to certify that the question of the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear and determine the writ of habeas corpus in the manner it did was alone involved and to be reviewed. The motion was granted, upon the grounds that the order of January 12, taking the petitioner from the custody of the respondent, and holding him to answer to the indictment in the United States Court, was a final order, from which the respondent might appeal to this court, as if it had been an order for the absolute discharge of the prisoner from his custody; and that the writ of habeas corpus was not merely ancillary to the petition for the removal, under section 643 of the Revised Statutes, of the prosecution of Carrico by the State of Virginia, but was a distinct and different proceeding, in a different court, and under a different statute, and p. 112was not issued by the clerk, as provided in that section, but by the District Judge, and on December 18, 1891, “ whereas,” the judge said, “ the petition for removal, as shown by record evidence used in the discussion of this motion, was not filed in the clerk’s office of the Circuit Court until December 19, 1891.” His opinion on this motion is in the record, and is published in 51 Fed. Rep. 200. The appeal from the order of January 12 does not appear to have been prosecuted.
The copy of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States, annexed to the petition for a mandamus, was of the proceedings at the regular May term 1892 of that court, at Abingdon, held by Judge Paul, in the case entitled “ Commonwealth of Virginia v. Joseph H. Carrico, Indictment for murder from Smyth County court;” and began, under date of Saturday, May 14, with the following memorandum:
“Be it remembered that heretofore the said Joseph H. Carrico presented a petition for the removal of the case aforesaid, and herein charging him with the murder of James M. Nelson, from the county Court of Smyth County, Virginia, to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon, Virginia, (and for a writ of habeas corpus,) to the Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia; and upon return of W. D. Wilmore, jailor of Smyth County, Virginia, and upon the hearing of the evidence and arguments of counsel, an order was entered in the said District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, on January 12, 1892, removing the said prosecution of the Commonwealth of Virginia v. Joseph H. Carrico into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, in the Fourth Circuit, at Abingdon, Virginia, for further proceedings and trial; and said indictment, with the endorsements thereon, is in the words and figures following, viz : ”
Then followed a copy of the indictment, with the endorsement “a true bill,” by the foreman of the grand jury, and also endorsed as “ a transcript from the record,” by the clerk of the county court. The record of the Circuit Court further showed that on May 14 the attorney general of Virginia and
Counsel for Petitioner.
the county attorney came in, and that the prisoner appeared, as required by his recognizance, was arraigned upon the indictment, pleaded not guilty, was tried by a jury, and on Monday, May 16, found guilty of voluntary manslaughter; and that on May 17 the court, upon his motion, set aside the verdict and granted a new trial, continued the case to the next term, and admitted him to bail upon his own recognizance.
Upon motion of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the first day of this term, and before any further proceedings were had in the Circuit Court, this court gave leave to file the petition for a mandamus, and granted a rule to Judge Paul to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue as prayed for.
The judge, in his return to the rule, referred to the petition for removal and for a writ of habeas corpus, and the proceedings concerning the habeas corpus and those upon the indictment, as appearing in the copies of records annexed to the petition for a mandamus; set forth the grounds of his action substantially as in his opinions above mentioned; and specifically stated that the writ of habeas corpus was issued, not under section 643 of the Revised Statutes, but under section 753, which authorizes the writ when a prisoner “ is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States.”
It was alleged in the petition for a mandamus, and in the brief for the petitioner, and was not denied in the judge’s return, or in the brief of his counsel, that when the case of the indictment was called for trial in the Circuit Court of the United States, a motion was made by the Commonwealth of Virginia to remand the case to the county court, because the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction over the crime charged in the indictment, and because the removal of the prosecution from the county court was not authorized by law, but was contrary to the constitution and laws of Virginia, and to the Constitution and laws of the United States; and that this motion was denied by the Circuit Court.
J/ir. R. Taylor Scott, Attorney General of the State of Virginia, for the petitioner.
vol. cxLvin—8
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury opposing.
Mb. Justice Gray, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The prosecution and punishment of crimes and offences committed against one of the States of the Union appropriately belong to the courts and authorities of the State, and can be interfered with by the Circuit Court of the United States so far only as Congress, in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United States, has expressly authorized either a removal of the prosecution into the Circuit Court of the United States for trial, or a discharge of the prisoner by writ of habeas corpus issued by that court or by a judge thereof. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313; Da/vis v. South Carolina, 107 U. S. 597; In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 672, 673.
In the case at bar, Joseph H. Carrico, having been arrested under a warrant from a justice of the peace of the county of Smyth on a charge of murder, was discharged by the District Judge on writ of habeas corpus from the commitment under state process; and having afterwards been indicted by the grand jury of the county for that offence, and committed by order of the county court for trial upon the indictment, the prosecution against him was assumed to have been removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for trial, and was there tried.
The State of Virginia, by petition for a writ of mandamus, questions the validity both of the removal and of the discharge, and it will be convenient to consider the two separately, beginning with the removal.
It is contended by the respondent that the prosecution was rightly removed into the Circuit Court of the United States under section 643 of the Revised Statutes, (the constitutionality of which was affirmed in Tennessee v. Dan)is, and in Da/vis v. South Carolina, above cited,) authorizing the removal into the Circuit Court of the United States for trial of “any p. 115civil suit or criminal prosecution ” “ commenced in any court of a State against any officer appointed under or acting by authority of any revenue law of the United States, now or hereafter enacted, or against any person acting under or by authority of any such officer, on account of any act done under color of his office, or of any such law, or on account of any right, title or authority claimed by such officer or other person under any such law.”
It is important, therefore, to consider whether the conditions of that section have been complied with.
By that section, it is only when the suit or prosecution has been “ commenced in any court of a State,” and “ at any time before the trial or final hearing thereof,” that it “may be removed for trial into the Circuit Court,” “ upon the petition of such defendant to said Circuit Court, and in the following manner: ” The petition must set forth the nature of the suit or prosecution, and be verified by affidavit, and supported by certificate of counsel. It “shall be presented to the said Circuit Court, if in session, or if it be not, to the clerk thereof at his office, and shall be filed in said office.” “ The cause shall thereupon be entered on the docket of the Circuit Court, and shall proceed as a cause originally commenced in that court.” The clerk of the Circuit Court is required, when the case is commenced in the state court otherwise than by capias, to issue a writ of certiorari to the state court for the record; and, when it is commenced by capias, to “ issue a writ of habeas corpus cum causa, a duplicate of which shall be delivered to the clerk of the state court or left at his office by the marshal; ” “ and thereupon it shall be the duty of the state court to stay all further proceedings in the cause, and the suit or prosecution, upon delivery of such process, or leaving the same as aforesaid, shall be held to be removed to the Circuit Court, and any further proceedings, trial or judgment therein in the state court shall be void.”
he removal of the case out of the jurisdiction of the state court and into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of t e United States takes place, without any order of the Circuit onrt, as soon as the state court, by the service upon it, or
upon its clerk, of the appropriate process, whether certiora/ri or habeas corpus cum causa, has notice of the filing of the petition in the Circuit Court. But it is only after such formal notice has been given, that the jurisdiction is transferred from the state court to the national court. The proceedings under this section differ from those under section 641, in which the petition for removal is required to be filed in the state court, and is of itself notice to that court, and therefore, “ upon the filing of such petition, all further proceedings in the state court shall cease,” and, if the petition shows a sufficient ground for removal, the case is in legal effect removed. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 316. But under either section the jurisdiction of the state court is not taken away until it has notice, in one form or other, of the petition for removal; under section 641, by the petition filed in that court; under section 643, by notice from the clerk of the Circuit Court of the petition there filed.
The records of the District Court and of the Circuit Court, copies of which are annexed to the petition for a mandamus, present a curious and complicated condition of things, in which some of the confusion may be owing to the facts, that not only is the District Judge a judge of either court, but that in the Western District of Virginia both courts are held at the same times and places and have the same clerk. Rev. Stat. §§ 572, 609, 622, 658; Act of September 25,1890, c. 922, 26 Stat. 474.
The petition for removal, praying also for a writ of habeas corpus cum causa, was evidently framed under section 643 of the Revised Statutes, and was addressed to the District Judge as “Judge of the United States Circuit Court;” and it is said, in his opinion delivered on allowing an appeal to this court from his order of January 12 upon the habeas corpus, that “ the petition for removal, as shown by record evidence used in the discussion of this motion, was not filed in the clerk’s office of the Circuit Court until December 19,1891. 51 Fed. Rep. 202..
But that record evidence, all of which is in the record now before us, shows only that the petition was filed in the clerks p. 117office of the District Court on that day, being the same day on which the order granting the writ of habeas corpus was recorded in, and the writ issued from, that office. Indeed, the very ground assigned by the judge in his opinion, just referred to, for allowing an appeal from his order on the habeas corpus, was that the writ of habeas corpus issued by him was not ancillary to the petition for a removal, nor issued by the clerk of the Circuit Court as provided in that section; his return to this petition for a mandamus expressly states that it was not issued under section 643, but under section 753: and the memorandum, inserted at the beg-inning- of the record of the proceedings in the Circuit Court on the indictment, describes that order as an order of the District Court, removing the prosecution of the Commonwealth of Virginia against Carrico into the Circuit Court.
The single petition, addressed to Judge Paul as Judge of the Circuit Court, and praying for a removal of the cause into that court, and for a writ of habeas corpus cum causa to complete the removal, (which, so far as appears on the records of either court, was the only petition, either for a removal or for a habeas corpus,) appears to have been treated by the judge as if it had been, or had included, two separate petitions ; the one a petition for an ordinary writ of habeas corpus, under section 753, which might be granted by the District Court or District Judge; the other a petition for a removal of the cause, under section 643, which could only be addressed to and filed in the Circuit Court.
If the petition for removal had been duly filed in the Circuit Court of the United States, and a writ of habeas corpus cum causa had been duly issued by the clerk of that court, and served on the clerk of the county court, no order of removal would have been necessary. If the petition was not so filed, and. neither such a writ of habeas corpus, nor a writ of certiorari to bring in the record, was so issued and served, no order, even of the Circuit Court, for the removal of the cause, could have any effect. In any aspect, the District Court had no authority to order the prosecution to be removed into the Circuit Court.
The inference appears to be inevitable that the only foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Circuit Court over this indictment was a petition filed in the District Court and orders made and recorded in that court; and that no petition for removal was ever filed in the clerk’s office of the Circuit Court, and no writ of certiorari or habeas corpus cum causa was ever issued by the clerk, as clerk of that court, and served on the state court, as required by section 643 of the Revised Statutes, in order to take away the jurisdiction of the state court.
But there is a more serious objection to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Circuit Court of the United States over the indictment found in the state court.
By the law of Virginia, murder or other felony must be prosecuted by indictment found in the county court; and a justice of the peace, upon a previous complaint, can do no more than to examine whether there is good cause for believing that the accused is guilty, and to commit him for trial before the court having jurisdiction of the offence. Virginia Code of 1887, §§ 3990, 4016, 3955-3971.
The petition for removal, which was sworn to on December 12, 1891, alleged that Kirk, a justice of the peace of Smyth County, had that day issued his warrant to a constable to arrest the petitioner and bring him before the justice on a charge of the murder of Nelson, and that the petitioner had been arrested by the constable on that warrant, and was now confined in the county jail, as the petition alleged, “awaitinga trial before said justice upon the said charge of murder,” which can only mean an examination before the justice with a view to a commitment to await the action of the grand jury; and prayed that “ said cause ” might be removed from the jurisdiction of the justice and of the county court into the Circuit Court of the United States for trial, and, “upon the removal of said prosecution, that a copy of the record and proceedings before said justice and by said constable ” might be brought into the Circuit Court.
When that petition was signed and sworn to, there had been no proceedings, except before the justice of the peace and by p. 119the constable ; there was no case pending in the county court, and the justice had not even committed the prisoner to await the action of that court; and no indictment was found, or other action taken, in the county court, until after the petition had been filed in the Federal court.
By the terms of section 643, it is only after “ any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any court of a State,” and “ before the trial or final hearing thereof,” that it can “ be removed for trial into the Circuit Court next to be holden in the district where the same is pending,” and “ shall proceed as a cause originally commenced in that court.”
Proceedings before a magistrate to commit a person to jail, or to hold him to bail, in order to secure his appearance to answer for a crime or offence, which the magistrate has no jurisdiction himself to try, before the court in which he may be prosecuted and tried, are but preliminary to the prosecution, and are no more a commencement of the prosecution, than is an arrest by an officer without a warrant for a felony committed in his presence.
We are aware that under this section the opposite view has prevailed in some cases in the Circuit Courts. Georgia v. Port, 4 Woods, 513; Georgia v. Bolton, 11 Fed. Rep. 217; North Carolina v. Kirkpatrick, 42 Fed. Rep. 689. But the only authorities there cited, which afford any color for that conclusion, were English decisions that the preliminary arrest upon the warrant of a justice of the peace took a case out of the statute of limitations, defining the time after the commission of the offence within which “ the prosecution shall be commenced.” Rex v. Willace, 1 East P. C. 186; The Queen v. Brooks, 1 Denison, 217; & G. 2 Car. & K. 402. The question whether the government has taken such action, as will stop the running of a statute of limitations, is quite different from the question when a prosecution can be deemed to be commenced, within the meaning of the acts of Congress authorizmg removals from the state courts into the courts of the United States for trial.
A grand jury, whether of the State or of the United States, 18 empanelled and sworn to inquire into and present offences p. 120against that government only, under whose authority it is summoned. Story on the Constitution, § 1784. The grand jury summoned and empanelled under the authority of a State is the only appropriate body to inquire into any offence against the State, and to find or to ignore an indictment therefor. The duty of the grand jury attending a court of the United States is limited to inquiring into and presenting offences against the laws of the United States, and its proper advisers in matters of law are the court and the attorney of the United States.
In a criminal case removed from the state court into the Circuit Court of the United States after indictment found, the Circuit Court of the United States tries the case upon the accusation presented by a grand jury of the State, and framed with the assistance of the law officers of the State. Tennessee, v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 271.
But if a person arrested to await the finding of an indictment may remove the case before an indictment is found, the accusation is not framed and presented by the officers and the grand jury of the State whose criminal law has been violated, but by the officers and grand jury of another government; and the Circuit Court of the United States has not only to try the defendant, but also to charge its own grand jury as to the accusation against him on behalf of the State; and this too in a case in which the very ground of removal into the Circuit Court is the defendant’s suggestion that he needs the protection of the Constitution and laws of the United States against the prosecution by the State.
We cannot believe that such was the intention of Congress in the statutes enacted to secure a fair and impartial trial between the State seeking to vindicate its public justice, on the one hand, and a defendant claiming the protection of the Constitution and laws of the United States, on the other. t
In any case falling within the purview of the acts of Congress, the defendant is adequately protected against danger of unlawful oppression from the courts or authorities of the State, by the right to remove it into the Circuit Court of the United States, as soon as a prosecution has been commenced p. 121against him; and by the right to apply to any court or judge of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus under sections 751—753, whenever he “is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States.”
The true rule on this subject, as it appears to us, was forcibly and accurately expressed by Mr. Justice Grier, in a case removed from the court of quarter sessions of Bucks County in the State of Pennsylvania, before indictment found, into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under the act of Congress of March 3, 1863, c. 81, § 5, (12 Stat. 756,) since incorporated in section 641 of the Revised Statutes, and which, though differing from the statute now in question in requiring the petition for removal to be originally filed in the state court, yet, in substantial accord with this statute, provides that, “ if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or shall be commenced in any state court against any officer, civil or military, or against any other person,” for any such act as is therein described, done by virtue or under color of authority of the United States, the defendant may file a petition “ for the removal of the cause for trial at the next Circuit Court of the United States to be holden in the district where the suit is pending.” Mr. Justice Grier, after quoting these words, ordered the case to be remanded to the state court, for the following reasons: “ The petition of the defendants brings their case fully within the provisions of this section, but the removal is premature. The prosecution has not been commenced in the state court. A warrant has been issued by a justice of the peace, and the defendants have been arrested preparatory to the commencement of a prosecution in the state court, but the attorney for the Commonwealth has not sent a bill to the grand jury. We do not know, therefore, whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania intends to prosecute the defendants for the alleged offence, or whether the grand jury will find a bill, without which the prosecution cannot be said to be ‘ commenced in the state court.’ The act contemplates the removal of a prosecution ‘ pending ’ that a ‘ trial ’ may be had in the Circuit Court. If the attorney of the United States were required to send a p. 122bill of indictment before a grand jury of the United States court for a breach of the peace of the State, it would present a truly anomalous proceeding. Yet without it there would be no case to try in the Circuit Court. If a bill of indictment ’ had been found in the state court, it would have presented such a case; but, until this is done, there is no case pending in the court of Bucks County, which can be removed to this court for trial.” Commonwealth v. Artman, 3 Grant, 436; 6Y. G. 5 Phila. 304.
It appearing upon the face of the petition for removal, as well as by the copies of records laid before this court, that no prosecution had been commenced in the state court, within the meaning of section 643 of the Revised Statutes, when the petition for removal was drawn up and sworn to, nor even when it was filed in the Federal court, the prosecution subsequently commenced by the presentment of an indictment in the state court was never lawfully removed into the Circuit Court of the United States ; for, in all cases of removal from the state courts, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States rests and depends upon the statements made in the petition for removal, and verified by the oath of the petitioner. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 316; Crehore v. Ohio & Mississippi Railway, 131 U. S. 240; Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 571, 590.
The result is that the Circuit Court of the United States has, without authority of law, assumed jurisdiction of an indictment found in the courts of the State of Virginia for a crime against the laws of the State, and that the State is entitled to have the prosecution remanded to its courts to be there dealt with according to law. For aught that appears on this record, the State is not bound to commence or to carry on the prosecution in the courts of another government, but is entitled to resume its own rightful jurisdiction and authority, and to try the offender in its own courts. If the case should be allowed to proceed in the Circuit Court of the United States, and should finally result in an acquittal of the charge, in whole or in part, the State could not have a writ of error to review the judgment. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S.
310. A stronger case for issuing a writ of mandamus can hardly be imagined. The writ may be directed to the judge who has unlawfully assumed jurisdiction of the prosecution; and no previous motion to him to remand the case was necessary. The case is governed in every particular by Virginia n. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 316, 323, 324.'
If any delay on the part of the State, in a case of this kind, could justify a denial of the writ of mandamus, no unreasonable delay is here shown. So far as appears by the copies of records submitted to us by both parties, the Circuit Court of the United States first took jurisdiction of the indictment on Saturday, May 14, 1892. It is alleged by the petitioner, and not denied by the respondent, (although the fact does not appear of record,) that on that day a motion to remand the case to the state court was made by the State, and denied by the Circuit Court. The accused was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter on Monday, May 16, the very day on which October term 1891 of this court was finally adjourned. On the next day, the District Judge set aside the verdict, continued the case to October term 1892 of the Circuit Court, and admitted the accused to bail on his own recognizance. On the first day of the present term of this court, and before any further proceedings in the Circuit Court, the State applied to this court for leave to file the petition for a mandamus.
The necessary conclusion is that the State of Virginia is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to remand the indictment and prosecution against Carrico to the county court in which the indictment was found.
The matter of the discharge of the prisoner by the District Judge upon the writ of habeas corpus may be more briefly disposed of. If that writ had been a writ of habeas corpus cum, causa, issued by the clerk of the Circuit Court, as ancillary to a removal of the prosecution into that court, under section 643, the remanding of the cause would carry with it the right to the custody of the prisoner. But being, as appears by the records annexed to the petition for a mandamus, as well as by the return to the rule to show cause, an ordinary writ of habeas corpus, issued by the District Judge upon the ground
Syllabus.
that the prisoner was in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, the question whether good cause was shown for his discharge was to be judicially determined by the judge, in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in him by sections 751-753 of the Revised Statutes. His determination might have been reviewed, on the facts as well as the law, by appeal. Rev. Stat. §§ 763-766; Acts of March 3,1885, c. 353, 23 Stat. 437; March 3, 1891, c. 517, §§ 5, 6, 26 Stat. 827, 828; In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; Horner v. United States, 143 U. S. 570, 576. But it cannot be reviewed or controlled by writ of mandamus. Ex parte Schwab, 98 U. S. 240; Ex parte Perry, 102 U. S. 183; Ex parte Horgan, 114 U. S. 174; Ex parte Morrison, 147 U. S. 14, 26.
It follows that, as to the discharge on the writ of habeas corpus, no order can properly be made upon this petition; but that, for the reasons above stated, there must be a
Writ of mandamus to rema/nd the indictment and prosecution of the Commonwealth of Virginia against Joseph II. Carrico to the county court of Smyth County.