Del., Lackawanna & W.R.R. Co. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928)

No. 147. Argued January 6, 9, 1928.—Decided February 20, 1928. The railroad company constructed a driveway over its station grounds to connect with the streets of the town. The railroad and the town agreed that the driveway should be kept open and that the town should exercise upon the station grounds, etc., all necessary police powers for the regulation of traffic and for the enforcement of the railroad’s rules and regulations. The railroad granted a p. 183cabman exclusive right to solicit passengers and baggage in the station grounds and to park his vehicles in the driveway. The town (claiming the right so to do under the contract) declared the space so assigned by the railroad a public hackstand and prohibited parking elsewhere. Other cabmen thereupon entered the grounds and used that space. The railroad objected on the ground that its property was being taken for municipal purposes without compensation. Held:

Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the ordinance are repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment because they take petitioner’s p. 184property without due process of law. It is not necessary, in order to render the ordinance vulnerable to constitutional attack, that it must in terms or effect authorize an absolute conversion of property, so long as it affects the free use and enjoyment of the property or the power of disposition at the will of the owner. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166; Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393; Great Northern Rwy. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340.

Nor does the contract between Welsh and the railroad company militate against the power of the town to pass p. 187an ordinance to establish a cab stand as a regulation of traffic. Thompson's Express Co. v. Mount, 91 N. J. Eq. 497; Donovan n . Pennsylvania Co., supra; Welsh v. Morristown, 98 N. J. L. 630, distinguishing Thompson's Express Co. v. Mount, supra. See also, Emerson v. Town of McNeil, 84 Ark. 552; St. Paul v. Smith, 21 Minn. 364; Lindsey v. Mayor of Anniston, 104 Ala. 257; Seattle^. Hurst, 50 Wash. 424; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79; Ex Parte Barmore, 174 Cal. 286; Ex Parte Maynard, 98 Tex. Cr. Rep. 204.

The Morris and Essex Railroad Company owns the railroad and petitioner operates it as lessee in perpetuity. September 24, 1912, an agreement was made between the town and the companies providing for the elevation of the tracks in order to eliminate certain grade crossings. The agreement was fully performed. The tracks run north and south through station grounds of somewhat irregular shape containing about four acres. The main station building is on the west side of the tracks and on the east side there is a platform roofed over, called the shelter house. The town agreed to lay out and construct a new street extending to the station grounds on the east side of the tracks. The companies agreed to “dedicate any lands owned by them necessary for the laying out of such new street.” Petitioner constructed and maintains driveways within its grounds, one of which passes under the tracks along the north boundary and thence south parallel to the tracks and near the east side of the shelter p. 189house to the south boundary of the grounds where it connects with the new street. It was agreed that: “Said driveway shall be kept open at all times for passengers, pedestrians . . . and . . . vehicular traffic to and from the station grounds on the easterly side of said Railroad and for the use of those now having rights of egress to Morris Street in Saw Mill Lane, but this contract shall not be construed as a dedication of said driveway as a public highway.” It was further agreed “ that the Town may and shall exercise all necessary police powers in and upon the station, station grounds, approaches and driveways, for the purpose of regulating foot and vehicular traffic at said station, and for the enforcement of the rules and regulations of the Railroad Companies in respect thereto.”

The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the track elevation agreement authorized the town to establish a public hack stand on the driveway in the station grounds. The principal purposes of that agreement was to eliminate grade crossings; regulation of traffic to and from the station was incidental. The town has not acquired by purchase or eminent domain any part of petitioner’s land or the right to establish a public hack stand there. It is not claimed that the agreement expressly authorizes the town to make such an appropriation of petitioner’s land. And there is nothing from which such a grant may be implied. The intention of the parties is plainly expressed. There is an express dedication by,the companies of their lands within the new street opened by the town outside the station grounds. But, there being no such purpose in respect of land within the grounds, the agreement declares p. 192“ this contract shall not be construed as a dedication of said driveway as a public highway.” There is no room for construction. And, even in the absence of that clause, the facts disclosed by the record are not sufficient to raise a presumption of dedication. Wood v. Hurd, 34 N. J. L. 87.

Under the guise of regulation, the town cannot require any part of the driveway to be used in a service that p. 195petitioner is under no duty to furnish. And, as petitioner’s duty here involved is confined to the business of carrying passengers by railroad, the declaration of the ordinance that the specified part of the driveway “ is hereby designated and established as an additional public hack stand ” clearly transcends the power of regulation. To compel the use of petitioner’s land for that purpose is to take it without compensation in contravention of the constitutional safeguard here invoked. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340, 346. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U. S. 71.

The Railroad presented this alternative to the town: “Either grant to Welsh licenses sufficient in number to enable him to supply the needs of all passengers arriving at the station, or submit to a denial to such passengers of p. 197the facilities customary on leaving the station.” To escape from that dilemma the town first resorted to the means upheld by the New Jersey courts in the Welsh case. It prohibited all parking on the driveway, and located a public taxi-stand on a public street adjacent thereto. While this provided a service adequate so far as the number of vehicles was concerned, it proved unsatisfactory in other respects. The taxi-stand was several hundred feet distant from the shelter house; was not easily visible therefrom; and was difficult of access in inclement weather. The town then passed the ordinance which gave rise to the present suit. It undertook to establish near the station door a public taxi-stand on the Railroad’s land. That it clearly had no right to do; for the contract between it and the Railroad had not made the driveway a public street. Obviously a railroad’s property cannot be taken without compensation for a purpose unconnected with its rail transportation. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340, 346; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U. S. 71. A public taxi-stand is such an unconnected purpose. It would be open to use by cabs which do not serve the patrons of the Railroad, as well as those which do. In establishing this public taxi-stand, the town exceeded its powers. Enforcement of this ordinance was properly enjoined. And since the individual defendants must base their claims on the ordinance, the injunction against them also was proper. Compare Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279; Thompson’s Express & Storage Co. v. Mount, 91 N. J. Eq. 497.

In these days, the ability of the traveller to obtain conveniently, upon reaching the street door of the station, a taxicab to convey him and his hand-baggage to his ultimate destination, is an essential of adequate rail transportation. The duties of a rail carrier are not necessarily limited to transporting freight and passengers to and from its stations. It must, in connection with its stations, provide adequately for ingress and for egress. And if it does not itself provide the facilities essential for the convenient removal of freight and passengers from the station, it may be required to let others provide them. That a railroad’s obligations may be extended beyond its rails, is settled by numerous decisions of this Court. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 21-22; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334; Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 615; Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Ochs, 249 U. S. 416; Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 249 p. 199U. S. 422. A State may require a railroad to construct stations. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53. It may compel the building of a crossing for the convenience of shippers in removing freight. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 265 U. S. 70, 74. Its power to require adequate provision for carrying passengers to their ultimate destination rests on the same basis. Compare Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 26.

The Lackawanna Railroad recognized the importance of proper cab service. It undertook to provide it by the contract with Welsh. But Welsh was in no position to furnish adequate service. He had only three licensed cabs. The Railroad answers that Welsh agreed by his contract with it to supply as many cabs as were needed and that, but for the refusal of the town to grant him more licenses, he would have supplied the requisite number. The town was not obliged to issue additional licenses to Welsh. Its refusal to do so was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The ground of its refusal was that the granting of additional licenses would ruin the business of the established cabmen who had long been engaged in serving its inhabitants, and thus would impair the cab service of the general public throughout the town. The principle on which the town acted is one that is general in motor vehicle regulation today.1 It is one that has been p. 200approved by this Court. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266, 277; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co., 213 U. S. 45, 52. Compare Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 145; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. n . Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 599-600.

passing upon applications for certificates of convenience and necessity, and by courts in reviewing their orders, although there is not a specific direction in the statute. In the following cases the orders of commissions granting certificates of convenience and necessity were set aside on the ground that it did not sufficiently appear that existing facilities were inadequate: West Suburban Transportation Co. v. Chicago & West Towns Ry. Co., 309 Ill. 87; Choate v. Commerce Commission, 309 Ill. 248; Superior Motor Bus Co. v. Community Motor Bus Co., 320 Ill. 175; Cooper v. McWilliams & Robinson, p. 201182 Opinion of Bra nd eis , J.

Certior ari , 273 U. S. 682, 683, to decrees in admiralty rendered by the Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing decrees of the District Court, 295 Fed. 372; 7 F. (2d) 893, in three consolidated cases in admiralty by libels in personam, brought against the Fleet Corporation by the present respondents to recover the value of goods shipped p. 203by them on a vessel owned by the United States and operated by the Corporation, which was wrecked and lost after an alleged deviation from the agreed voyage.

The remedy provided by the Suits in Admiralty Act is available in all cases ex delicto as well as ex contractu; in all cases in personam as well as in rem, Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675; whether such operation is in the government’s “ sovereign capacity as a war measure,” as in the case of the TFesi Aleta, or “for the purpose of advancing the trade of its people,” p. 204The Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562, “ for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce,” Merchant Marine Act, 1920, c. 250 § 1, 41 Stat. 988. In either case, the vessels “ are public ships in the same sense that warships are.” The Pesaro, supra.

Without exception, the lower courts have held that the Suits in Admiralty Act does not provide an exclusive remedy. Thus: actions for breach of maritime contracts; Fleet Corp’n v. Texas Mills, 12 F. (2d) 9; Wright & Co. v. Fleet Corp’n, 285 Fed. 647; Bellbuckle-Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. U. S. & Australasia S. S. Co. de Fleet Corp’n, 217 N. Y. S. 883; Dietrich n . Fleet Corp’n, 9 F. (2d) 733; suits in admiralty in personam for cargo damage; Fleet Corp’n n . Banque-Russo, etc., 286 Fed. 918, affirming 266 Fed. 897 and 281 Fed. 886; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Fleet Corp’n, 15 F. (2d) 600; Marshall Hall Grain Co. v. Fleet Corp’n, 14 F. (2d) 141; Smith N. Fleet Corp’n, 2 F. (2d) 390; for personal injuries to p. 207seamen; Stewart v. Fleet Corp’n, 7 F. (2d) 676; Wallace v. Fleet Corp’n, 5 F. (2d) 234; Fleet Corp’n v. O’Shea, 5 F. (2d) 123; Lembeck v. Fleet Corp’n, 9 F. (2d) 558; actions against the United States under the Tucker Act, arising out of maritime contracts; Markle v. United States, 8F. (2d) 90; Bennett-Day Importing Co. v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 83; Sutherland n . United States, 1924 A. M. C. 1578; The Barge Peerless, 2 F. (2d) 395; Hidalgo Steel Co. v. Moore & McCormick, 298 Fed. 331; or for salvage services or upon maritime contracts; Prince Line, Ltd. n . United States, 61 Ct. Cis. 632; Venezuela Meat Export Co. n . United States, 58 Ct. Cis. 76.

These are consolidated libels in personam, brought in admiralty by the respondents against the Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation in the Federal District Court for Northern California, in October, 1922, and November, 1923, to recover the value of goods shipped by them in December, 1919, and January, 1920, from San Francisco to ports in Wales and Holland, on the West Aleta, a merchant vessel owned by the United States and operated by the Fleet Corporation.1 The libels alleged that the vessel deviated from the agreed voyage, passing the destined ports without entering and proceeding on a voyage to a port in Germany, and that in the course and by reason of such deviation the vessel stranded upon an island in the North Sea and became a total loss, with all p. 209her cargo. The Fleet Corporation filed exceptions to the libels on the ground, among others, that they were filed more than one year after the Suits in Admiralty Act2 had gone into effect, and that by and under the provisions of that Act and particularly § 5 thereof the alleged causes of action were barred. These exceptions were overruled. 295 Fed. 372. The Fleet Corporation then answered, relying on the liberties clause in the bills of lading, denying that there had been any deviation, and alleging that the loss was caused by risks and perils for which it was not liable under the bills of lading and the Harter Act.3 The District Court, on the hearing, finding that there had been an unauthorized deviation and that the suits were not barred or affected by the Suits in Admiralty Act, entered decrees in favor of the libelants for the value of the goods, with interest at the rate of 7 per cent. 7 F. (2d) 893. These were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that there had been an unwarranted deviation and that the Suits in Admiralty Act was not applicable, since its purpose was to substitute an action in personam for one in rem, and no suit in rem could have been brought as the vessel had been wrecked off the coast of a foreign country and was a total loss. 12 F. (2d) 721.

That Act, whose main provisions are set forth in the margin,4 was approved and went into effect on March 9, p. 2101920—several months after the alleged causes of action had arisen and more than a year before the libels were brought. It provided that no vessel owned by the United States or any corporation in which the United States or its representatives own the entire outstanding capital stock, or in the possession of or operated by or for the United States or such corporation, should be subject to arrest or seizure by judicial process, § 1; that where such vessel was employed as a merchant vessel and a proceed-

“ Sec. 3. That such suits shall proceed and be heard and determined according to the principles of law and . . rules of practice obtaining in like cases between private parties. A decree against the United States or such corporation may include costs of suit, and when the decree is for a money judgment, interest at the rate of 4 per centum per annum . . or at any higher rate which shall be stipulated. . If the libelant so elects in his libel the suit may proceed in accordance with the principles of libels in rem wherever it shall appear that had the vessel . . been privately owned and possessed a libel in rem might have been maintained. Election so to proceed shall not preclude the libelant in any proper case from seeking relief in personam in the same suit. Neither the United States nor such corporation shall be required to give any bond or admiralty stipulation on any proceeding brought hereunder. Any such bond or stipulation heretofore given in admiralty causes by the United States . . or the United States p. 211Shiping in admiralty could be maintained if it were privately owned or operated, a libel in personam might be brought against the United States or such corporation, as the case might be, § 2; and that suits based on causes of action arising prior to the Act should be brought within one year after it went into effect, § 5.

The Act not only authorizes libels in personam to be brought in admiralty against the United States or the designated corporations on causes of action arising out of the possession.or operation of merchant vessels, §§ 1, 2, but fixes the venue in such suits, § 2;—requires service on the United States or the corporation to be made upon the United States attorney, with notice to the Attorney General, § 2;—applies to the suits the principles of law and rules of practice obtaining in like cases between private parties, § 3;—limits the rate of interest which may p. 213be included in a money decree against the United States or the corporation, to 4 per cent, unless otherwise stipulated, § 3;—exempts the United States or the corporation from the giving of any bond or admiralty stipulation, and provides that those previously given in any admiralty cause shall be canceled upon the assumption of liability by the United States, § 3 ;—requires suits based on causes of action that had arisen before the Act to be brought within one year after it goes into effect, and all other suits within two years after the cause of action arises, § 5 ;—directs that the final judgments rendered in the suits, as well as those in previous admiralty causes in which the United States assumes liability, shall be paid by the accounting officers of the United States out of money in the Treasury, for which an appropriation is made, §§ 3, 8;—requires the Attorney General to report to each session of Congress all final judgments rendered against the United States or the corporation;—and specifically repeals “the provisions of all other Acts” inconsistent with the Act, § 13.

The Act plainly relates to causes of action which had previously arisen,6 as well as to those subsequently arising. It provides a remedy in admiralty for adjudicating and satisfying all maritime claims arising out of the possession or operation of merchant vessels of the United States and the corporations, in which the obligation of the United States is substituted for that of the corporations. To that end it furnishes a complete system of administration, applying to the United States and the corporations alike, by which uniformity is established as to venue, service of process, rules of decision and procedure, rate of interest, and periods of limitation ; and not only provides that the p. 214judgments against the corporations, as well as those against the United States, shall be paid out of money in the Treasury, but repeals the inconsistent provisions of all other Acts.