Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U.S. 53 (1904)

The Supreme Court of the State, by a decision which has not been overruled, modified or criticised, has once decided upon the merits against the attempt to compel the plaintiff in error to establish and maintain a station at Emmons. In the former proceeding the relator attempted to justify its order for the establishment of the station, under two statutes, viz: (1) Under the section 388, Gen. Stat, of 1894, and (2) under chapter 94, Gen. Laws of 1897; the former defines the powers and duties of the general railroad and warehouse commission. It undoubtedly confers ample power and authority upon that body, to require the establishment and maintenance of stations, in p. 54proper cases, and the court so held; but also held that this was not a proper case.

It does not make the establishment and maintenance of the proposed station, dependent upon the reasonableness of the p. 56requirement, or the necessity for the station. It is not due process of law. Its enforcement takes the appellant’s property, without due process of law, and deprives it of the equal protection of the laws, and is therefore violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Railroad Company v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 327.

The plaintiff in error has no interest to assert that General Laws of 1901, chapter 270, is unconstitutional because it might p. 57be construed so as to cause it to violate the Constitution. Its right is limited solely to the inquiry whether in the case which it presents, the effect of applying the statute is to deprive it of its constitutional rights. Castello v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674.

In many jurisdictions statutory regulations as to the p. 58establishment and erection of depots at proper places along the route of the road have been sustained as a proper exercise of police power. Commonwealth v. Eastern R. R. Co., 103 Massachusetts, 254; R. R. Commissioners v. Portland, etc., R. R. Co., 63 Maine, 269; State v. New Haven R. R. Co., 37 Connecticut, 153; State v. Wabash, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Missouri, 144; San Antonio, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 7$ Texas, 264; State v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 722.

The commission simply required the plaintiff in error to p. 59construct its station of the size and dimensions which the statute requires shall be built under the circumstances.

“ It takes the property of this respondent arbitrarily and p. 60unnecessarily, for public use, without just compensation, and is, therefore, violative of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

“ Mr. Associate Justice Lovely having been of counsel for the village in the former proceeding, was disqualified from sitting at the hearing of this appeal, and the cause was necessarily argued and submitted to the four remaining members of the court. We assume that the Laws, 1901, chapter 270, which in express terms requires railway companies to build and maintain depots or station houses in all villages through which their roads may pass, is in itself valid legislation, and not open to the objection that it is not within the legislative power to enact such a law. With this assumption no dispute has arisen over a construction of the act, to the effect that all incorporated villages within this State located on railway lines are prima facie entitled to depots. The commissioners have the power to order the erection and maintenance of depot buildings unless it is made to appear that such an order would be so unreasonable in its terms as to actually result in depriving the company proceeded against of its property without due process of law. The change made by the statute of 1901 simply affects or shifts the burden of proof, for prior to its enactment the burden was on the municipality to establish the reasonableness and necessity of a depot therein, while now a railway company appearing before the commissioners, or trying its case on appeal to the District Court, bears the burden of showing that such a requirement is not called for, and that p. 61the building and maintenance of a depot in the village is unnecessary and unreasonable.

It is difficult to deal with the motion on account of the uncertainty of the contentions of plaintiff in error. In its answer in the District Court it directly attacks the statute. In this court its contentions are not so sweeping and we are left in doubt by its opening and reply briefs whether the statute as construed by the Supreme Court is objected to or only its p. 62application under the facts of the case. However, as the statute was directly attacked in the answer the motion to dismiss is denied, and we will consider whether the grounds of objection to the statute are substantial and sufficient.

“ But there is no doubt of the power of the commissioners, under the general railroad and warehouse commission act, to require a railroad company to provide a suitable depot and passenger waiting room at any place, incorporated or unincorporated, where public necessity or convenience reasonably requires it to be done. But this power is neither absolute nor arbitrary. The facts must be such, having regard to the interests, not only of the particular locality, but also of the public at large and of the railroad company itself, as to justify the commissioners, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion and judgment, in ordering the railway company to provide a depot and passenger station at the place in question. Counsel for the relators admit this. The only evidence being the report of the commissioners themselves, we must refer to it to ascertain whether the facts therein stated reasonably justified their order requiring the railroad company to provide and p. 63maintain a depot and station at Emmons. The statute provides that, ‘ Upon the trial of said cause [before the court, as in this case, to enforce the order of the commissioners] the findings of fact of said commission as set forth in its report shall be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated.’ G. S. 1894, § 399.”

“ The power of the State to require the construction and maintenance of stations at proper points is not questioned. We concede it. The power to require an unnecessary and wholly useless expenditure of money, in the construction and p. 64maintenance of stations where they are not needed, is denied. That is the whole case.”

“That there is a suitable location for a depot or station house upon respondent’s right of way at the point referred to and described in the order of the board of railroad and p. 65warehouse commissioners herein, which order is hereto attached. That it is necessary for the accommodation of the citizens of Emmons and vicinity, and the public at large, and public necessity requires that the respondent railroad company build and maintain a suitable station house at the said village of Emmons for the accommodation of the public transacting business with the respondent at that point.”

The construction contended for is reasonable and just. It is not only within the spirit of the act of 1902 and the treaty p. 68of 1894 but within the letter thereof. It is a much narrower construction of the act and treaty, than the construction of section 6 of the act of 1884 adopted in Lau Ou Bew, 144 U. S. 47. It is not as narrow as that in United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 467. As to due process of law and definitions applicable to this case, see Davidson n . New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 107; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635. This clause cannot be given any wider scope. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 227.

Bail should be allowed upon these appeals (a) under the statutes; (b) by virtue of numerous precedents; and (c) in the p. 69exercise of the inherent power of the court. Matter of Ah Tai, decided November 16, 1903, in U. S. District Court for Massachusetts, and cases cited.

The construction contended for by the Government would be imputing to Congress intention to work gross hardship in the matter of requiring imprisonment pending appeals inconsistent with its subordination of these statutes by the act of 1902, to Art. 4 of the treaty of 1894, conferring upon Chinese persons for the protection of their persons and property all the rights of the most favored nation, and besides would be of more p. 70than doubtful constitutionality as involving imprisonment as distinguished from mere brief detention, incidental to deportation. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 368; In re Qwong Wo, 13 Fed. Rep. 229, 233; In re Ah Chong, 2 Fed. Rep. 733, 737; In re Parrot, 1 Fed. Rep. 481, 498; Wong Wing n . United States, 163 U. S. 228; United States v. Wong Dep Ken, 57 Fed. Rep. 206; In re Lintner, 57 Fed. Rep. 587.

The minors should not have been deported. It was error p. 71to exclude the certificate of United States Commissioner, the genuineness whereof was admitted and which was relied upon to show an adjudication made after due hearing in 1897, by a United States Commissioner to the effect that the defendant was a citizen of the United States by birth.

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the character of the testimony was for the most part perfunctory and formal; that it utterly failed to support with any conclusiveness p. 73193 U. S. Argument for the United States.

These are appeals from judgments of the United States District Court confirming decisions of a commissioner, and adjudging that the appellants be removed from the United States to China. Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U. S. 193. The commissioner decided that each of the appellants was a Chinese laborer found without certificate of residence as required by law within the United States, and was not entitled to remain within the United States. The facts may be summed up as follows: The appellants were arrested in July, 1902, when working in laundries, they all having failed to produce certificates of residence when called upon to do so by the Chinese inspector. At the hearing before the commissioner they offered testimony of witnesses other than Chinese that they were residents of the United States on May 5,1892. Ah How and Chu Do put in evidence that they were not laborers. Yung Lee offered evidence of illness, which he contended made him unable to procure his certificate. Chu Do offered parol evidence that he was born in the United States, and therefore was a citizen, and also that he was a minor during the time allowed by the statute for obtaining a certificate. Lew Guey offered similar evidence and a certificate of another United States commissioner of a hearing before him and an adjudication that Lew Guey had the right to remain in the United tates by reason of being a citizen thereof. The United tates offered no evidence beyond the facts stated above. The ground of appeal common to all the cases is that §§ 3 p. 76and 6 of the act of May 5, 1392, 27 Stat. 25, have been repealed. By § 3 any Chinese person arrested under the provisions of the act shall be adjudged to be unlawfully within the United States, unless he shall establish by affirmative proof to the satisfaction of the judge or commissioner his right to remain. Of course, if the burden of proof was on the appellants, the commissioner and judge might not be satisfied by the affirmative evidence produced. We are not asked to review the finding of fact. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States 149 U. S. 698, 714, 715. But it is argued that this section is done away with by § 1 of the act of April 29, 1902, c. 641, 32 Stat. 176, continuing all laws then in force, “ so far as the same are not inconsistent with treaty obligations.” It is said that the section is inconsistent with Article 4 of the treaty of December 8, 1894, 28 Stat. 1210, agreeing that Chinese laborers, or Chinese of any other class, either permanently or temporarily residing in the United States, shall have for the protection of their persons and property all rights that are given by the laws of the United States to citizens of the most favored nation, excepting the right to become naturalized citizens. It is pointed out that the treaty of 1894 with Japan and the treaty of 1859 with Paraguay give the rights and privileges of native citizens to the subjects of those countries in access to the courts and in the defence of their rights, and it is said that the law as to the burden of proof cuts down those privileges and rights. The section has been upheld, however, by this court, since the treaty, and after the passage of the act. Chin Bale. Kan v. United States, 186 U. S. 193, 200; United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U. S. 213. It is not repealed by the laws of 1902. The clause of the treaty had a different object, and in view of the difficulties encountered in such an investigation, it could not have been supposed to promise that special measures theretofore taken should not be continued in force for the purpose of ascertaining the very question whether the laborers were lawfully residing in the United States or not. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 730. But it is enough to say that the treaty itself, in Article 5, expressly refers to the act of 1892 as p. 77amended by the act of 1893, and states that the Chinese o-overnment will not object to the enforcement of those acts.

As to the testimony that two of the appellants were merchants during the period of registration, all that appears is that the commissioner did not believe it. We cannot go outside the record of the specific case for the purpose of inquire ing whether the decision was induced by some view of the law which may be open to argument. The same may be said as to the parol testimony as to the age of two of the appellants and their birth in this country. But we may add that it p. 78by no means follows from the decision in United States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, 176 U. 8. 459, that the minor children of laborers, old enough to do work, are not required to have certificates. The language of the statute certainly is broad enough to include them and does not indicate a division by local laws with regard to coming of age. The principle applicable to the admission into this country of the wife and children of a certificated merchant is not the principle applicable to such a case. As to the certificate of the United States commissioner, offered by Lew Guey, it was merely a written statement by the commissioner that a person of that name was brought before him on the usual charge, and was adjudged to have the right to remain in the United States by reason of being a citizen. Apart from the possibility that the commissioner in the present hearing was not satisfied of the identity of the party, such a statement is not the certificate of evidence required by the act of 1892, and is not evidence of a judgment. United States n . Lew Poy Dew, 119 Fed. Rep. 786. The evidence that Yung Lee was disabled by sickness from obtaining a certificate did not satisfy the commissioner. We cannot say as matter of law that he was bound to be satisfied by the testimony of Yung Lee himself that he was so disabled.