Wadley S. Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915)

state court to a statute of the State, holds that the statute of Georgia involved in this case gives power to the State Railroad Commission to require a railroad to treat all connecting carriers alike in regard to payment of freight in advance or on delivery, and the only question p. 652here is whether an order requiring a railroad company to cease demanding payment in advance from one carrier and not from another violates the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the particular section which authorizes an order of a state railroad commission may not provide for a hearing, if the state court has construed that section as part of the law establishing the commission and which does require hearings, that section is not unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying an opportunity to be heard; and so held as to the Georgia Railroad Commission Law. An order of the Georgia State Railroad Commission, requiring a railroad to desist from demanding freight in advance on merchandise received from one carrier while it accepts merchandise of the same character at the same point from another carrier without such prepayment, being otherwise legal, is not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Adrian , Georgia, a station on the Wadley Southern Railway, is 10 miles from Rockledge, where the road connects with the Macon & Dublin R. R., and 27 miles from Wadley, where it connects with the Central of Georgia Railway. In consequence of this connection with both roads, goods could be shipped from Macon to Adrian, over either route. It was, however, to the interest of the p. 653235 U. Si Statement of the Case.

likewise true between carrier and its connections. But there is a conflict in the authorities as to how far this common-law right has been modified by those statutes, which, while not requiring absolute uniformity, do prohibit unjust discrimination. On the one hand, it is argued that the carrier has the right to make connections, establish joint routes and through rates for the purpose of facilitating and increasing its business. As an incident of this right it is said that the carrier may enforce the common-law rule and accept goods with or without the. prepayment of freight, its decision being determined by the relation between the two companies, the amount of business interchanged, the solvency of the carrier against which the balance generally exists, the latter’s promptness in settlement, and other like matters which, while aiding some of the carriers, do not increase the rates charged to the shipper in whose interest the laws against discrimination have been passed. Among the cases which hold that such difference in treatment is not an unjust discrimination, prohibited by statute, is Gulf, Col. &c. Ry. v. Miami Steamship Co., 86 Fed. Rep. 407. There the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, under the Interstate Commerce Law, a common carrier might demand prepayment from one connection and not from another. Cf. Atchison &c. R. R. v. Denver &c. R. R., 110 U. S. 667. A different view of the question has been taken by other courts (Adams Express Co. v. State, 161 Indiana, 328), including the Supreme Court of Georgia, which, in the present case, held that the statute, requiring railroads to furnish customary facilities for the interchange of freight empowering the Commission to prevent unjust discrimination, authorized that body to pass an order directing the Wadley Southern Railroad to discontinue the practice of requiring the Macon & Dublin Railroad to prepay freight to Adrian, while making no such demand from the Central Railway. This construction of the state statute is binding vol . ccxxxv—42 p. 658here and leaves for consideration the question as to whether such an order violated the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

4. The Wadley Southern insists, however, that even if the Commission had the power to make the order, the judgment imposing a fine of SI,000 for its violation should nevertheless be set aside for the reason that the statute—authorizing so enormous a penalty as $5,000 a day for violating lawful orders of the Commission—operated to prevent an appeal to the courts by the carrier for the purpose of determining whether the order was lawful and, therefore, binding; or arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore invalid. In support of this contention it p. 660cites Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 163; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53.

This contention would have been well founded if this and other hearings of a like nature before the Commission had resulted in orders which had the characteristics of a final judgment. But this was not so, for they were not conclusive. Chicago &c. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 458. Their lawfulness was treated by the Georgia court in the present case as open to inquiry, when the Company was sued for the penalty. The question of their validity was also open to inquiry, in equity proceedings, in the state court, where they would have been set aside if found to be arbitrary and unreasonable, or to have violated some statutory or constitutional right. Railroad Commission v. Louis. & Nash. R. R., 140 Georgia, 817 (6a), 836; State of Georgia v. Western & Atlantic R. R., 138 Georgia, 835; Southern Ry. v. Atlanta Sand Co., 135 Georgia, 35, 50. Such orders were also subject to attack in the Federal courts on the ground that the party affected had been unconstitutionally deprived of property. Louis. & Nash. R. R. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 313 and cases cited. And this right to a judicial determination exists whether the deprivation is by a rate statute—passed without a hearing (as in the Young and Consolidated Gas Cases'); or by administrative orders of a Commission made after a hearing (as in the Garrett Case, supra). For rates made by the General Assembly or administrative orders made by a Commission are both legislative in their nature (Garrett Case, supra; Grand Trunk R. R. v. Indiana Railroad Com- p. 661235 U. 8. Opinion of the Court.

5. As statutes establishing Railroad Commissions and providing penalties for violations of legislative orders are of recent origin the cases discussing the subject are p. 662comparatively few. See Mercantile Trust Co. v. Tex. & Pacif. Ry., 51 Fed. Rep. 529 (4), 549 (14-15) (1892); Louis. & Nash. R. R. v. McChord, 103 Fed. Rep. 216, 225 (1900); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 183 U. S. 79, 101 (1901); Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. Rep. 150, 154 (1906); Ex parte Wood, 155 Fed. Rep. 190 (1907); Consolidated Gas Co. v. New York, 157 Fed. Rep. 849 (1907); Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53 (1909); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S. 196, 207 (1910) (building spur tracks); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340, 349 (1913); Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wisconsin, 193 (15, 16); Coal & Coke Ry. v. Conley, 67 West Va. 129, 132, and the present case of Wadley Southern Ry. v. State of Georgia, 137 Georgia, 497.

These cases do not proceed upon the idea that there is any want of power to prescribe penalties heavy enough to compel obedience to administrative orders, but they are all based upon the fundamental proposition that under the Constitution penalties cannot be collected if they operate to deter an interested party from testing the validity of legislative rates or orders legislative in their nature. Their legality is not apparent on the face of such orders but depends upon a showing of extrinsic facts. A statute therefore which imposes heavy penalties for violation of commands of an unascertained quality, is in its nature, somewhat akin to an ex post facto law since it punishes for an act done when the legality of the command has not been authoritatively determined. Liability to a penalty for violation of such orders, before their validity has been determined, would put the party affected in a position where he himself must at his own risk pass upon the question. He must either obey what may finally be held to be a void order, or disobey what may ultimately be held to be a lawful order. If a statute could constitutionally impose heavy penalties for violation of command^ p. 663of such disputable and uncertain legality the result inevitably would be that the carrier would yield to void orders, rather than risk the enormous cumulative or confiscatory punishment that might be imposed if they should thereafter be declared to be valid.

It was in the light of the fact that the penalty was p. 664imposed for charging other than those statutory rates, whose reasonableness was a matter of doubt and uncertainty, that this court in the Young Case, speaking through Mr. Justice Peckham, pointed out that a law which in terms or by the operation of deterrent penalties made statutes or orders of a Commission conclusive as to the sufficiency of rates would be unconstitutional. He summed up the discussion as follows (209 U. S. p. 147): “It may therefore be said that when the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the Company and its officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is the same as if the law in terms prohibited the Company from seeking judicial construction of laws which deeply affect its rights.” Like views were expressed as to the invalidity of the heavy penalties involved in Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53. But the penalty provisions were separable and their invalidity did not defeat the balance of the statute (54).

In Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340,349, the p. 665235 U. S. Opinion of the Court. '

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Bonnet v. Vallier, 136 Wisconsin, 193 (15, 16), for the same reason, held a penalty statute void which imposed cumulative fines for p. 666failing to comply with indefinite and uncertain regulations as to the construction of tenement houses.

This point is brought out in the statement of the Brief of the Attorney General and counsel for the State, wherein it is said that “the safeguards thrown around persons and corporations affected by this [penalty statute] are such as to rob it of the charge of imposing such enormous and grossly excessive penalties as to render it unconstitutional. In the first place, such persons and corporations are entitled to a hearing before the Commission [a contention already discussed]. And, in the second place, provision is made for the institution of suits against the Railroad Commission of Georgia when its acts are illegal or unconstitutional (Civil Code of Georgia, 1911, § 2625).” From an examination of that section of the Code it is quite clear that it recognizes the right to a judicial review p. 667of administrative orders. Until it has been given a contrary construction by the state court, it must be here construed in such a way as to leave it valid and as conferring that sort of right which furnishes the adequate and available remedy which meets the requirement of the Constitution. Any other construction would not only impute to the legislature an intent to deny the equal protection of the law and to permit the carrier to be deprived of property without due process of law, but it would operate to nullify the penalty section as a whole. Giving then § 2625 that construction which makes it constitutional and it appears that the laws of Georgia gave to the Wadley Southern R. R. Co. the right tota judicial review of the order of March 12, 1910, by a suit against the Commission.

“ It is doubtless true that the State may impose penalties such as will tend to compel obedience to its mandates by all, individuals or corporations, and if extreme and cumulative penalties are imposed only after there has p. 668been a final determination of the validity of the statute, the question would be very different from that here presented.”

Coal & Coke Ry. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 132, contains a very full discussion of the subject. In that case the statute imposed a penalty for charging rates other than those prescribed in a legislative act, which, however, was altogether silent upon the subject of a judicial review as to the reasonableness of the rates. The court recognized that if that silence was to be construed into a denial of the right to a hearing in court the penalty provision would be void. It held however that the failure of the penalty statute to say anything about the right of review could not be construed into a denial of that right. That conclusion, and the further holding that penalties could not accrue while the question of the validity of the rates was being determined in appropriate judicial proceedings instituted in a Court of Equity for that purpose, is specially applicable here. For the Georgia Code, instead of being silent on the subject, contains a section which punishes a violation of “lawful orders,” and another provision, in the same Chapter, which expressly contemplates that proceedings p. 669235 U. S. Syllabus.

Even if the action were removable, the requirements of the removal statute were not complied with. This case does not fall under Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135; Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5; Steamship p. 671Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, but under Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430; Crehore v. Ohio &c. Ry., 131 U. S. 240.

This action, brought by Clark against the Railway Company, was commenced in January, 1912, in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the then Territory of Arizona. It was based upon the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, as amended April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291. The complaint alleged that while defendant was engaging in commerce between the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico as a common carrier by railroad, and while plaintiff was employed by defendant in such commerce, he sustained certain personal injuries through the negligence of defendant and its employés, for which he claimed damages in the amount of $40,000. After the action was commenced, and on February 14, 1912, the Territory of Arizona became a State, and the further proceedings (improperly, it is said), were conducted in the District Court of the United States for the District of Arizona. In that court plaintiff filed a first and a second amended complaint, and defendant, having unavailingly moved to strike the latter from the files, upon grounds not necessary to be specified, answered upon p. 673the merits, without interposing any objection to the jurisdiction of the court. A trial by jury was had, resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and this was removed by defendant’s writ of error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where the judgment was affirmed (207 Fed. Rep. 817). The present writ of error was then sued out.

The second matter requiring mention is the alleged error of the trial court in excluding the evidence of two p. 675physicians called by defendant for the purpose of testifying to the results of a personal examination of plaintiff shortly after he received the injuries for which damages were claimed. The trial court based the rulings upon an Arizona statute (R. S. 1901, § 2535, subdivision 6), which reads as follows:

A material part of the injury complained of was the loss of the sight of plaintiff’s left eye, and because this was set forth in the pleadings, and upon the trial plaintiff testified personally in regard to his injuries, mentioning the loss of sight and pain in the eye, and called as a witness a nurse who attended him after the accident, and who testified as to the condition of the eye, it is insisted that plaintiff in effect consented to the examination of the physicians with respect to his condition. The argument is that the statute was intended to protect persons in the confidential disclosures that may be necessary in regard to their physical condition, but was not intended to close the bps of physicians where the patient voluntarily publishes the facts to the world. In support of this, plaintiff in error cites two cases from the New York Court of Appeals, Morris v. New York &c. Ry., 148 N. Y. 88, and Capron v. Douglass, 193 N. Y. 11. But the New York statute 1 is materially different from that of Arizona. p. 676The purpose of the latter enactment is very clearly expressed in its language. Without the consent of the patient, the physician’s testimony is excluded with respect to two subjects: (a), any communication made by the patient with reference to any physical or supposed physical disease, and (b), any knowledge obtained by personal examination of such patient. And this privilege is waived, according to the terms of the proviso, only in the event that the patient offers himself as a witness and voluntarily testifies “with reference to such communications.” We would have to ignore the plain meaning of the words in order to hold, as we are asked to do, that the testimony of other witnesses offered by the patient, or the testimony of the patient himself with reference to other matters than communications to the physician, or any averments contained in the pleadings but not in the testimony, amount to a waiver of the privilege. The enactment contemplates that the physician receives in confidence what his patient tells him and also what the physician learns by a personal examination of the patient. It contemplates that the patient may testify with reference to what was communicated by him to the physician, and in that event only it permits the physician to testify without the patient’s consent

The express object is to exclude the physician’s testimony, at the patient’s option, respecting knowledge p. 677235 U. 8. Opinion of the Court.

It is a mistake, we think, to regard the patient’s disclosures—whether verbal or physical—as voluntary in the full sense; they are believed by him to be necessary for the restoration of health or the preservation of life or limb. But, at least, if he has command of his mind and memory, the patient may somewhat control the extent of his disclosures by word of mouth, and may be able afterwards to testify respecting them; while, if he submits himself to a physical examination at the hands of the physician, he cannot know in advance the nature or extent of what the physician will learn, cannot confine the disclosure to the present ailment or injury, and cannot afterwards testify respecting its results, excepting as the physician may p. 678inform him of them. And, in many cases, the physician may, with perfectly proper motives, withhold from the patient the results of the physical examination and his deductions therefrom.

The framer of the Act was careful to choose language that recognizes the distinction between (a) communications made by the patient and (b) knowledge obtained by the doctor through a personal examination of the patient. The New York statute, which, so far as we have observed, was the first to establish a privilege with respect p. 679to the knowledge gained by a physician while attending a patient in a professional capacity, recognizes no such distinction. Nor does it define with precision what conduct on the part of the patient shall constitute a waiver of the privilege. Hence the courts of that State deemed themselves at liberty to determine this question upon general principles, derived from the supposed policy of the law. Not only, therefore, are the decisions of the courts of that State, and of other States having statutes formed upon the same model, valueless as guides to the meaning of the statute here in question, but the very fact that the Legislature of Arizona departed from the form of the New York statute indicates that it did so because it had a different purpose to express. We are unable to see anything that would justify us in refusing judicial recognition to a distinction thus laid hold of by the lawmaking body in defining the extent and conditions of the privilege.

As I read the Arizona statute it was framed not to accomplish, but to prevent, such a result. We have not been referred to any construction of it by either the territorial or state court, and we must construe it for ourselves. To my mind, its meaning is that if the patient voluntarily testifies as to his physical condition at the time of the examination, he cannot shut out his physician’s testimony as to the same subject. To reach the contrary p. 681235 U. S. Hugh es and Day , JJ., dissenting.

No. 302. The Unite d States Fidelity & Guaranty Comp any of Baltimore , Md ., Plaintif f in Error , v . Fred H. Poet ker , Receiver , etc . In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana. Motion to dismiss or affirm or place on the summary docket submitted October 13, 1914. Decided October 26, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of p. 684(1) First National Bank v. Estherville, 215 U. S. 341, 346; Rogers v. Clark Iron Co., 217 U. S. 589; May v. Illinois, 232 U. S. 720; (2) McCorquodale v. Texas, 211 U. S. 432, 437; Consolidated Turnpike v. Norfolk &c. Ry., 228 U. S. 326, 334; City of Lewiston v. Chamberlain, 234 U. S. 751. Mr. Charles Martindale for the plaintiffs in error. Mr. Frank S. Roby and Mr. Ward H. Watson for the defendant in error.

No. 564. Atlant ic Coast Lumber Corpo rati on , Plaint iff in Error , v . O. G. Mins hew . In error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted October 19, 1914. Decided p. 686October 26, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Consol. Turnpike v. Norfolk &c. Ry., 228 U. S. 596, 599-600; Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U. S. 102; Ennis Water Works v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652, 658. Mr. P. A. Willcox for the plaintiff in error. Mr. J. J. Darlington for the defendant in error.

No. 26. C. J. Rixey , an Insane Person , by C. J. Rixey , Jr ., Appell ant , v . Robert H. Cox , Sergeant of t he City of Alexandria , Va . Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia. Submitted October 26, 1914. Decided November 2,1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction upon the authority of (1) Farrell v. O’Brien, 199 p. 688U. S. 89, 100; David Kaufman & Sons Co. v. Smith, 216 U. S. 610; Cassidy v. Colorado, 223 U. S. 707; (2) In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 632; Compagnie Française &c. v. Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380, 393; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25-27. Mr. John L. Jeffries and Mr. Jas. R. Caton for the appellant. Mr. J. Garland Pollard and Mr. Christopher B. Garnett for the appellee.

No. 33. Will iam Rabb , Plainti ff in Error , v . The State of Louis iana . In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Submitted for the defendant in error October 30, 1914. Decided November 2, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction, upon the authority of Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361; Kansas City Star Co. v. Julian, 215 U. S. 589; Adams v. Russell, 229 U. S. 353; Holden Land Co. v. Inter-State Trading Co., 233 p. 689U. S. 536. No brief filed for the plaintiff in error. Mr. R. G. Pleasant for the defendant in error.

No. 23. Peopl e of the State of Illi nois , Suing by the Canal Commis sioners , Plaintif fs in Error , v . Pitt sburgh , Fort Wayne & Chicago Rail wa y Com - pany et al . In error to the Supreme Court of the State vol . ccxxxv—44 p. 690of Illinois. Argued October 29, 1914. Decided November 9, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361; Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93; Yazoo & Miss. R. R. v. Brewer, 231 U. S. 245, 249; Holden Land Co. v. Interstate Trading Co., 233 U. S. 536, 541. Mr. William Ritchie and Mr. Samuel B. King for the plaintiffs in error. Mr. Timothy J. Scofield, Mr. Frank J. Loesch, Mr. Charles F. Loesch and Mr. James Stillwell for the defendants in error.

No. 264. Edward S. Gard , Plaintif f in Error , v . The People of the State of Illinois . In error to the p. 692Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted November 9, 1914. Decided November 16, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon thé authority of Gring v. Ives, 222 U. S. 365, 370; Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U. S. 102; Ennis Water Works v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652, 658. Mr. James Hartnett for the plaintiff in error. Mr. Patrick J. Lucey and Mr. Lester H. Strawn for the defendants in error.

No. 90. William R. Cowan , Plaintif f in Error , v . The People of the State of Illino is ex rel . John E. W. Wayman , State’s attorney. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. Argued November 13, 1914. Decided November 30, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction, upon the authority of Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Brown, 187 U. S. 308, 314; Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U. S. 102, 107; Consol. Turnpike v. Norfolk &c. Ry., 228 U. S. 596, 599, 600. See Shedd v. People, 217 U. S. 597. *Mr. Harry S. p. 693Mecartney for the plaintiff in error. Mr. Patrick J. Lucey and Mr. L. H. Strawn* for the defendant in error.

No. 424. John F. Doyle and John F. Doyle , Jr ., Individually and as Copartne rs , Trading as John F. Doyle & Son , Appellants , v . George J. Schmidheis er , Truste e , etc . Appeal from the United States Circuit p. 694Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Motion to dismiss submitted November 30, 1914. Decided December 7, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Holden v. Stratton, 191 U. S. 115; Duryea Power Co. v. Sternbergh, 218 U. S. 299; Pennsylvania v. York Silk Manufacturing Co., 232 U. S. 718. Mr. John P. Connolly for the appellants. Mr. Otto Wolff, Jr., for the appellees.

No. 83. State of Missouri ex rel . St . Joseph Water Company , Plai nti ffs in Error , v . The City of Seatt le . p. 695In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. Submitted December 2, 1914. Decided December 14, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of (1) Thomas v. Iowa, 209 U. S. 258, 262, 263; Bowe v. Scott, 233 U. S. 658, 663,664; (2) Kansas City Star Co. v. Julian, 215 U. S. 589; Consolidated Turnpike v. Norfolk &c. Ry., 228 U. S. 326, 334; City of Lewiston v. Chamberlain, 234 U. S. 751. Mr. John E. Dolman for the plaintiff in error. Mr. Vinton Pike for the defendant in error.

No. 518. Max G. Cohen , Petit ioner , v . The Unite d States . October 19, 1914. Petition for a writ of p. 697certiorari to the United Stat.es Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. Thomas Mannix and Mr. Frederic D. McKenney for the petitioner. The Attorney General, The Solicitor General and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Wallace for the respondent.

No. 633. The Lagonda Manuf actur ing Comp any , Petition er , v . Elli ott Comp any . October 19, 1914. p. 698Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. J. E. Bowman, Mr. Border Bowman, Mr. Paul A. Staley and Mr. Charles Neave for the petitioner. Mr. George H. Parmelee and Mr. Clarence P. Byrnes for the respondent.

No. 666. Marie H. Kelly , Petition er , v . Illinois State Trust Company . November 2, 1914. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Mr. William p. 702jS. Oppenheim and Mr. Harrison Musgrave for the petitioner. Mr. Lindorf 0. Whitnel for the respondent.

No. 677. Florence S. Bache , Petition er , v . The Unite d State s . November 30, 1914. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Customs p. 703Appeals denied. Mr. Henry Wollman for the petitioner. The Attorney General and The Solicitor General for the respondent.

No. 674. Mahlon Groo , Petit ioner , v . Charl otte Anita Whitney . December 7, 1914. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of p. 704Columbia denied. Mr. Wm. M. Lewin for the petitioner. No appearance for the respondent.

No. 714. Porter L. Paylor , Peti tione r , v . The Unite d States . December 14,1914. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia denied. Mr. Daniel W. Baker and Mr. Thos. C. p. 705Bradley for the petitioner. No brief filed for the respondent.

VOL, ccxxxv—45 p. 706Pierson and Mr. Allan McCulloh for the petitioner. Mr. George C. Holt and Mr. Alvin C. Cass for the respondent.

No. 739. The Unite d States , Petition er , v. Mrs . Rudolph H. Theurer et al . January 11, 1915. p. 707Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. The Attorney General and The Solicitor General for the petitioner. Mr. Henry P. Dart for the respondents.

No. 210. Henry H. Fay et al ., Plain tif fs in Error , v. The Unite d State s . In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. October 13, 1914. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity to law, per stipulation of coun-» sei, and on motion of Mr. Solicitor General Davis for the p. 7087G8 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

No. 24. Alois B. Renehan et al ., Appell ants , v . Tina Haff ner Retsch . Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico. October 23, 1914. Dismissed with costs on motion of counsel for the appellants, and cause remanded to the Supreme Court of the p. 712State of New Mexico. Mr. A. B. Renehan for the appellants. Mr. T. B. Catron for the appellee.

No. 60. Jehu H. Clenda niel , Plainti ff in Error , v. Honorabl e Henry C. Conrad , Ass ocia te Judge of the State of Dela ware , et al . In error to the Supreme p. 713Court of the State of Delaware. November 2, 1914. Dismissed with costs pursuant to the fifteenth rule. Mr. Jas. L. Wolcott for the plaintiff in error. Mr. J. J. Darlington and Mr. Robert H. Richards for the defendants in error.