Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larabee, 234 U.S. 459 (1914)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larabee, 234 U.S. 459 (1914)
Full caption
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. LARABEE.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
June 22, 1914
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v.
LARABEE.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.
No. 135. Argued December 15, 16, 1913.—Decided June 22, 1914.
A State cannot burden the right of access to this court, nor does the power of the State extend to regulating proceedings in this court.
A state court has not, nor can a statute of the State give it, the power to assess as against one party to a suit in this court a sum for attorneys’ fees for services rendered in this court as against another party to the suit, when such assessment is not authorized by the law of the United States or by the rules of this court.
A writ of error from this court to review the judgment of a state court and the supersedeas authorized by the Judiciary Act are Federal and not state acts.
A state court, when so authorized by the laws of the State, has the power to award actual damages for business losses which are suffered by reason of the acts sought to be controlled or enjoined in the suit after the allowance by this court of a writ of error and supersedeas, including reasonable attorneys’ fees in the proceedings in the state court. Quaere, whether the state court can award punitive damages. The existence of the right to sue on a supersedeas bond does not imply an exclusion of the right to sue under an existing general and applicable law for proper and reasonable damages.
A classification which is based on the distinction between that which is ordinary and that which is extraordinary is reasonable and not repugnant to the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment which only restrains acts regulating judicial procedure so transcending the limits of classification as to cause them to conflict with the fundamental conceptions of just and equal legislation. A state statute imposing reasonable attorneys’ fees in actual mandamus proceedings against the party refusing to obey a peremptory writ is not repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment either because it does not apply to other proceedings or because it is not reciprocal. The classification is not unreasonable; and so held as to the statute to that effect of Kansas involved in this case and as herein applied.
85 Kansas, 214, reversed.
A dispute as to a small charge for demurrage having arisen between the Missouri Pacific Railway Company and p. 460the Larabee Flour Mills Company, the Railway Company to enforce payment, suspended the rendering of a certain class of switching service which it had previously regularly performed for the Mills Company. The latter on September 15, 1906, commenced in the Supreme Court of Kansas mandamus proceedings to compel the continuance of the service. After a response to an alternative rule and a hearing on the eighth of December, 1906, the court granted a peremptory mandamus. 74 Kansas, 808. At the close of the opinion there was the following memorandum (p. 822):
“The court has authority to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for any damage it has sustained (Gen. Stats. 1901, sec. 5193). The plaintiff is given ten days in which to file a claim for damages, stating separately the character and amount of each item. The defendant is given ten days after notice of the filing of the claim in which to except to any items which it may deem not recoverable. The court will then pass upon the exceptions, if any be taken, and make orders respecting a hearing.”
Some days thereafter a claim of damages was filed enumerating fifteen items. The first eight concerned various business losses alleged to have been occasioned by the suspension of the service, such as decrease in the output of the mill, increased cost of hauling, etc., etc. Four of the claims on these subjects aggregated $4907.39, and four stated no amount but reserved the right to make a future claim for losses in case the litigation should be prolonged and the resumption of the service postponed. The remaining six items, with one exception, related to small expenses alleged to have been incurred in the mandamus suit. One of them, however, the fourteenth, made a charge of $2500 “to cash paid and plaintiff’s agreement to pay Waters & Waters attorneys’ fees in this case.” The fifteenth item reserved the right to make a charge for future p. 461legal services “if this case is taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, whatever such services may be worth.” A few days after this claim was filed, on December 24, 1906, a writ of error was issued from this court to the judgment in mandamus and a bond to operate as a supersedeas was approved. About two years thereafter, on January 11, 1909, the case was decided in this court and the judgment below was affirmed. 211 U. S. 612.
After the mandate went down, leave was given to file an amended claim for damages and on the same day a Commissioner was appointed to hear the testimony concerning it and report. The amended claim was filed. It was divided into three general classes, first, damages asserted to have arisen from loss of business, etc.; second, damages claimed as the result of the expenses and outlay for the suit; third, cost incurred or anticipated, occasioned by the hearing of the claim. The first, that is, the business losses, was embraced in separate items substantially following the order of the original claim, that is, it was based on alleged loss of output, increased cost of operation, etc., etc. The amounts of many of these items were larger as they covered the time from the discontinuance of the service up to the filing of the amended claim. The aggregate of the .claims was $18,921.90 as compared with $4907.39 made at the time of the first claim. The second, the expenses of the suit, was greatly changed. Leaving out two insignificant items, as amended the claim was in substance as follows:
The claim for $2500 paid or to be paid to Waters & Waters for personal services was changed to read, “For the reasonable value of the services of Waters & Waters to bring this action and to attend to the same in the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, the sum of....................................... .......... $ 2,500.00
“Tenth: For the reasonable value of the services of Waters & Waters in this case in the Supreme Court of the United States, the sum of................................................................ $40,000.00
“Eleventh: For cash paid out for printed briefs in the State and United States Supreme Court, the sum of............................................ 93.50
“Twelfth: For the reasonable value of the professional services of John F. Switzer, attorney at law, employed to assist Waters & Waters in the Supreme Court of the United States, the plaintiff in the best judgment of the partners composing said firm, deeming it necessary after considering the momentous and far-reaching controversy made, urged and argued in the Supreme Court of the United States and which controversy it could not avoid, the sum of...................................... 3,000.00
“Thirteenth: For the reasonable value of the professional services of the firm of Rossington & Smith, attorneys at law, also employed to present the case of the plaintiff in the Supreme Court of the United States, the plaintiff in the best judgment of the partners composing said firm, deeming it necessary, after considering the momentous and far-reaching controversy made, urged and contended for in the Supreme Court of the United States, and which controversy it could
30,000.00
not avoid, the sum of......................................
“Fourteenth: For the railroad fare, hotel bills and reasonable expenses of W. H. Rossington and J. G. Waters in attending on the United States Supreme Court in April, 1908, the sum of $250 each and making a
500.00
total of...............................................................
“Fifteenth: For the railroad fare, hotel bills and reasonable expenses of Charles Blood Smith and J. G. Waters in attending on the Supreme Court in October, 1908, the sum of................................. 480.60
“Sixteenth: For the costs due the plaintiff in the Supreme Court of the United States, the sum of......................................................... 148.25 ”
The 17th, 18th, and 19th items embraced small items of traveling and other expenses of the parties and some of their attorneys. In the items of court expenses the difference between the original claim was substantially this, that the claim had grown from about $2800 for attorneys’ fees in the state court when the original claim in damages was filed to a sum in excess of $75,000.00, all of which increase resulted from charges made for professional services rendered in this court in connection with the trial of the case. The remaining items of the third class related to expenses incurred under the reference to the Commissioner before whom the case was pending with a reservation of the right to make future charges for such purpose when the reference was completed.
The Railway Company objected to the various items in the amended claim as follows: To those covering the business losses, decrease of output, increased expenses, etc., etc., besides denying that the suit was the proximate cause of the losses represented by the alleged claims and asserting their speculative nature, it was specially charged that in so far as they included items arising after the allowance of the writ of error from this court and the giving of the supersedeas bond they were not within the cognizance of the court but were matters alone of Federal competency within the jurisdiction of this court. So far as the claims for alleged outlay and expenses including attorneys’ fees in the state court were concerned, it was a eged that there was no right to recover them because p. 464the only authority under which they could be allowed was a statute of the State of Kansas relating to mandamus proceedings and that such statute as construed by the court of last resort of the State was repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because under such construction a right was given by the statute to a plaintiff in mandamus to recover attorneys’ fees as damages, while no reciprocal right in case of success was given to a defendant and no such right was given to litigants generally. Coming to the alleged right to recover attorneys’ fees for services rendered on the writ of error in this court and the other items, such as briefs, traveling expenses, hotel bills, etc., etc., it was expressly charged that under the statutes of the United States the effect of the writ of error from this court and the supersedeas was to deprive the state court of all authority over such expenses and that moreover u Under such statutes and laws of the United States, this Court has no power, authority or jurisdiction to consider the claim and demand for damages on account of attorneys’ fees for services rendered in such proceedings in error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the Supreme Court of Kansas; and for the further reason that, if the said plaintiffs were entitled to any damages, their application therefor should be made to the Supreme Court of the United States, or in an independent proceeding brought on the supersedeas bond so approved and allowed as a supersedeas by the Chief Justice of this state. . • • and because, further, to allow such claim would be violative of the Constitution of the United States, and especially the Fourteenth Amendment thereof, which prohibits any state from denying to any person, company or corporation the equal protection of the laws, and prevents any state from depriving any person, company or corporation of its property without due process of law; and because of such Judiciary Act (of the United States) . . this court p. 465is deprived of all jurisdiction to consider or determine any such question or element of damage in a proceeding of this kind; and because, further, the Supreme Court of the United States, in affirming the judgment of this court . . . allowed to said plaintiffs, on account of attorneys’ fees, the sum of $20.00 and assessed the same against the said defendant. . .
After proof and hearing the Commissioner made an elaborate report stating fully what he conceived to be the facts and the law of the case. On the subject of the various claims made for the allowance of damages for a charge of fees for professional services rendered in the Supreme Court of the United States, the Commissioner made the following statement:
“I find, that no agreement has ever been had between the Mill Company and any of the attorneys as to the amount of their compensation; that neither of the attorneys has at any time entered on his books a charge against the Mill Company for services rendered; nor have they informed the Mill Company of the amount intended to be charged; nor have they determined in their own minds any definite amount intended to be charged.
‘I find, that the attorneys will claim the full amount, and will accept whatever amount that shall be determined by this Court in this proceeding to be a reasonable compensation for their services in the case and allowed as part of the damages.
I further find, that it is mutually understood between the Mill Company and the attorneys named that whatever amount is recovered in this proceeding on account of fees and expenses of counsel will be paid by the Mill Company to and accepted by the attorneys as a full discharge of the liability to them.”
The conclusions of the Commissioner as to the amounts to be allowed as damages under the three classes of claims were as follows:
VOL. CCXXXIV—30 .
As to the first class, he reduced the claim for business losses, increased expenses, etc., etc., from $18,921.90 to.............................................. $ 5,658.10
As to the amount claimed as due because of the professional services of Waters & Waters in the state court the sum claimed was allowed in full................................................................... 2,500.00
As to the items for professional services rendered in the Supreme Court of the United States, including hotel bill, etc., the amount was reduced from about $75,000 to................. 11,480.00
Under the third class three small items were allowed relating to the expenses of the parties in Kansas and concerning the reference to the Commissioner...................................................... 376.00
Total..................$20,014.10
Both parties excepted to the report of the Commissioner on various grounds and after a hearing the Supreme Court sustained his action and affirmed his report. 85 Kansas, 214.
Mr. B. P. Waggener for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Charles Blood Smith and Mr. Joseph G. Waters, with whom Mr. John C. Waters and Mr. John F. Switzer were on the brief, for defendant in error.
Mr. Chief Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
Both before the Commissioner and to the court where the report of the Commissioner was acted on the propositions under the Constitution and laws of the United States upon which the railway company relied, were pressed and overruled and the rightfulness of having so done is the p. 467question here for decision. But first we notice a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. It is difficult to grasp the ground upon which it rests. In one aspect it would seem to assert that there is no jurisdiction because the Federal rights which were passed upon below were correctly decided. But this obviously goes to the merits. In the only other possible aspect it would seem that the motion proceeds upon the theory that the Federal rights which were decided below were so obviously rightly decided that the contention of error concerning them is too frivolous to sustain jurisdiction, a view which is supported by a statement in the argument for the motion that of course there would be jurisdiction if it appeared that the judgment below “under the color and sanctity of the law inflicted exceptional and unjust exactions.” But taking the most favorable view for the motion and assuming ¿hat it proceeds upon the only ground upon which it can possibly be said to rest, that is, the frivolousness of the errors relied upon, we pass from its consideration since upon such hypothesis we think on the face of the record the contention is so clearly unsound as to require no further notice.
The Federal errors relied upon concern three subjects: The allowance of business losses, etc.; the award of a sum for attorneys’ fees in the state court up to and including the writ of error from this court and the supersedeas; and the grant of an amount for attorneys’ fees agreed or supposedly agreed to be paid for professional services rendered in this court on the writ of error and traveling expenses and hotel bills allowed for the same purpose. The three involve different considerations and hence we consider them separately. We come first to test the question as to attorneys’ fees in this court, as it is the most important and far reaching since it involves considerations of the gravest importance going to the entire structure of our system of government, based as it is upon an absolute p. 468denial of any power whatever in the court below to deal with the subject while the other two contentions at best challenge power but relatively or partially.
First. The question of the power of the court to make the allowance for professional services rendered in this court on the former writ of error.
There can be no doubt that tested by the general principles of law controlling in this court, by the statutes of the United States relating to the subject or the rules of this court concerning the same, the award for the attorneys’ fees in question was absolutely unwarranted. We do not stop to review and expound the settled line of authority demonstrating this result because it would be wholly superfluous to do so as the principles have been so long the settled rule of conduct in this court and are so elementary as to require not even a reference to the cases. Some of the cases, nevertheless, we cite: Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 372; Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211, 230-231; Tulloch v. Mulvane, 184 U. S. 497, 511, et seq. Indeed, this view is not disputed in the argument at bar and was not questioned in the court below, since the court placed its action in making the allowances in question, not upon the supposed authority of any act of Congress nor of any practise of this court or rule thereof sustaining the same nor upon any principle of general law, but solely upon the theory that a state statute gave the power to make the allowances. Nothing could make this view clearer than does the following statement taken from the opinion of the court below (Syllabus—5): “The damages in mandamus proceedings comprehended by Section 723 of the Code (Gen’l. Stat. 1909, Sec. 6319) are the injuries sustained as the natural and probable consequences of the wrongful refusal to comply and the expense reasonably and necessarily incurred m compelling compliance with the alternative writ, including reasonable attorneys’ fees in this court and in the Supreme p. 469Court of the United States.” And in addition the view of the court below is aptly illustrated by the following passage from the report of the Commissioner answering the claim of the Railway Company as to the effect of the writ of error from this court and the giving of the supersedeas and the resulting authority of this court over the cause under the statutes of the United States—a passage which the court below expressly adopted and made a part of its opinion (p. 221):
“Upon this objection I conclude:
“1. That the jurisdiction of this court in mandamus is the creation of the constitution and the statutes of the State of Kansas.
“2. That this court is the sole judge of what that constitution and those statutes provide.
“3. That the jurisdiction of this court in mandamus over persons within its jurisdiction cannot be affected by act of Congress.
“4. That the Judiciary Act does not and was not intended to affect the jurisdiction of this court.
“5. That the jurisdiction of this court in mandamus attaches upon the issuance of the alternative writ, and the subject-matter of the proceeding being the awarding a peremptory mandamus, that jurisdiction continues unabated, not only until the writ is awarded, but also until the writ is issued and obedience to it enforced.
“6. That the alternative writ is a command of the performance of specified and prescribed duties; and return to the writ is a refusal to perform the duties prescribed; the judgment awarding a peremptory ^mandamus is a conclusive adjudication that such refusal was wrongful, and the act of the court compelling compliance with the command of the alternative writ.
“7. That the damages comprehended by the Kansas statute are the injuries sustained as the natural and probable consequences of the wrongful refusal to comply p. 470and the expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred in compelling compliance with the command of the alternative wri,t.
“8. That the allowance of the writ of error did not operate to remove the suit from the Supreme Court of the State into the Supreme Court of the United States; its only effect was to bring up the record for purposes of review.
“9. The allowance of the writ of error did not operate as a supersedeas; the taking the supersedeas bond brought about the supersedeas. The taking the bond, and the supersedeas itself, in so far as it can be conceived of as a substantial act, was the action of the Supreme Court of Kansas.”
We observe in passing, that the views concerning the Judiciary Act and the effect of the writ of error from this court and the relevant statutes of the United States which were expounded in this passage are not required to be reviewed because they are not necessarily involved in the decision below since that decision did not rest upon them but was based upon the operative effect of the state statute, and hence the views expressed as to the United States statutes in the passage quoted must have been adopted simply because they were considered to be illustrative of the principle by which the state statute was made to control. We, therefore, without in the slightest degree admitting their correctness even for argument’s sake, pass the conclusions as to the statutes of the United States expressed in the passages of the report and shall not recur to them except in so far as under the principle of noscitur a sociis we may find it convenient to do so as illustrating the fundamental and destructive error embodied in the conclusion of the court as to the operative power of the state statute.
The question is then, Was the court below right in holding that it had the power because the Kansas statute so authorized to assess as against one party to a suit in the
Supreme Court of the United States a sum for attorneys’ fees for services rendered in that court as against another party to the suit although such assessment, as we have seen, was not authorized by the law of the United States but was in conflict with the settled rule in the Supreme Court of the United States? It seems superfluous to put the question since its very statement conveys of necessity a negative answer. For how on the face of the question, consistently with the most elementary principles of our constitutional system of government can it be possibly assumed that a state statute could be made operative in the Supreme Court of the United States to the disregard of its settled rule of procedure and of the principles which had guided its conduct from the beginning, directly sustained by express rule adopted under the sanction of Congress?
We might well go no further, but in view of the importance of the subject we briefly advert to one or more of the obvious consequences which would arise from maintaining the principle. It would follow, of course, that the right to freely seek access to the Supreme Court of the United States would cease to exist, since it would be in the power of the States to burden that right to such a degree as to render its exercise impossible. How better could this be illustrated than by the case before us, that is, by the necessary implication that there would have been power in the court below if it had deemed it just to do so, to award the claim which was made for $75,000 attorneys’ fees for services rendered in this court! Indeed, in the argument at bar it was freely conceded that it may well have been that the mainspring which caused the adoption of the statute relied upon was the deterrent influence which it would produce in the prosecution of writs of error to this court. Thus the argument proceeds:
The Railway Company refuses to obey; judgment is had against it; it still refuses, it seeks delay; it initiates p. 472a writ of error in this court. By this method it makes the suit expensive. ... It was just this situation that the legislature of Kansas intended to correct. . . .”
And the far-reaching operation of the principle by which the state statute could alone have been made to produce the result attributed to it by the court below is illustrated by the legal conclusions of the operation and effect of the statutes of the United States stated in the report of the Commissioner which was adopted by the court as expressed in the passage which we have previously quoted. This is the case since the views thus sanctioned are necessarily illustrative of the mental atmosphere by which alone it could have been possible to conceive that the state power extended to regulate the proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States to the disregard of the express provisions of the act of Congress. A*view which is not an over-statement when it is observed that among other things the conclusion which was below sustained was that the writ of error from this court and the supersedeas authorized by the act of Congress were not Federal but purely state acts. And, moreover, it was concluded that the exertion by the Supreme Court of the United States under the Constitution and laws of the United States of the power to bring up a case from the state court in order to review it and to grant a supersedeas in order to make that right effective, operated to leave the state court in possession of the case and only to move the record, hence creating a residuum of state power which as to such case gave authority to the state court to regulate, certainly as to attorneys’ fees, the proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States.
We shall reason no further, and shall content ourselves with pointing out that in substance and effect the absolute want of foundation for the contention here made has been in express terms foreclosed. For instance, at this term in Harrison v. St. Louis & San Francisco R- R;
232 U. S. 318, a statute of the State of Oklahoma which burdened or impeded the right of free access to the courts of the United States was held to be repugnant to the Constitution and the destructive effect of such legislation upon our institutions was pointed out. And light on the subject is afforded by a consideration of the ruling in Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U. S. 497. See also Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Waff. 445, 453; Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96, 102-103.
Second. The power of the court below to award damages for the business losses which were suffered after the allowance of the writ of error and the supersedeas.
The contention is that the power did not exist since the effect of the writ of error and the supersedeas was to remove the case to this court and therefore deprive the court below of the right to consider any act causing damage done after the prosecution of the writ of error and the supersedeas. But conceding in the fullest degree the asserted effect of the supersedeas, that effect ceased with the affirmance of the judgment by this court and therefore necessarily opened the way for the court below to consider and determine how far the alleged illegal conduct of the Railway Company had entailed damages and consequent responsibility. Conceding further that the bond for supersedeas embraced such acts and the resulting damages therefrom and therefore there was a right to sue on the bond, again the deduction is a non sequitur because the right to resort to the bond did not imply an exclusion of the right to sue under the general law to recover damages if the election was made to follow that course. Of course, as there is nothing in this case even suggesting that the award of damages for acts done pending the writ of error in this court was so excessive as to justify the extreme inference that punishment for invoking the right to resort to this court was inflicted, we need not consider the rule which would be applicable in such a contingency.
Third. The power of the court below to award damages for attorneys’ fees for services rendered in the state court.
The attorneys’ fees were allowed by the court below in virtue of a statute which gave such power in case of mandamus proceedings. The construction of this statute which was adopted was not original in this case but was an application of an interpretation of the statute previously affixed to it, and indeed which was made prior to the commencement of the mandamus proceedings in question. {Carney v. Neeley, 60 Kansas, 672; McClure n. Scates, 64 Kansas, 282.) The contention is that as the statute exceptionally allows attorneys’ fees in mandamus proceedings against one refusing to obey the peremptory writ of mandamus and does not allow them in other cases, it contravenes the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is void. But it is not open to controversy that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to deprive the States of their power to establish and regulate judicial proceedings and that its provisions therefore only restrain acts which so transcend the limits of classification as to cause them to conflict with the fundamental conceptions of just and equal legislation. The proposition here relied upon therefore comes to this: that there is not such a distinction between the extraordinary proceeding by mandamus and the ordinary judicial proceedings as affords a ground for legislating differently concerning the two. But when thus reduced to its ultimate basis, the proposition answers itself, since it cannot be formulated without demonstrating its own unsoundness. If more were needed to be said, it would suffice to direct attention to the distinction which must obtain between that which is ordinary and usual and that which is extraordinary and unusual. Or, to state it otherwise, to call attention to the difference between the duty to perform a ministerial act concerning which there is room neither for the exercise of judgment or discretion p. 475and the right on the other hand to bring into play, judgment and discretion as prerequisites to the performance of an act of a different character, and the distinction which justifies the classification made by the statute also answers the argument that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated because the allowance of attorneys’ fees was not reciprocal Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642. The ruling in the case last cited also serves to demonstrate the want of merit in the contention that the question here presented is governed by Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150.
Again we deem it necessary to observe that the opinion here expressed is confined to the case before us. We do not therefore imply that the reasoning here applied would be controlling in a case where although the name mandamus was preserved, in substance and effect, the distinction between that writ in an accurate sense and ordinary procedure would have disappeared.
It follows from what we have said that error was committed in the court below in allowing the items of damages for attorneys’ fees, traveling expenses, etc., in the Supreme Court of the United States, and that from a Federal point of view there was no error in the judgment below to the extent that it awarded the damages complained of and allowed a claim for attorneys’ fees for services rendered in the state court. And to give effect to these conclusions the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
And it is so ordered.
INTERMOUNTAIN RATE CASES.1
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COMMERCE COURT.
Nos. 136, 162. Argued October 18,21, 22,1912.—Decided June 22,1914.
Prior to the amendment of June 18, 1910, § 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce lodged in the carrier the right to exercise a primary judgment, subject to administrative control and ultimate judicial review, concerning the necessity and propriety of making a lower rate for the longer than the shorter haul, thus giving the carrier power to exert its judgment as to things of a public nature; but the amendment withdrew that right of primary judgment and lodged it in the Interstate Commerce Commission to be exercised on request and after due investigation and consideration of the public interests concerned and in view of the preference and discrimination clauses of §§ 2 and 3 of the act.
The long and short-haul provisions of § 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended by the act of June 18, 1910, are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States as a delegation of power to the Interstate Commerce Commission beyond the competency of Congress. • If a statute is constitutional, this court must be governed by it and its plain meaning; with the wisdom of Congress in adopting the statute this court has nothing to do.
In Louis. & Nash. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, this court decided that a general enforcement of the long and short-haul clause of the Act to Regulate Commerce would not be repugnant to the Constitution, and will not now reconsider and overrule that decision. The Commerce Court had jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission involved in these cases and which refused the request of carriers to put in force rates requested by them.
Under § 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by the act of June 18, 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to make an order, such as that involved in these cases, permitting a
Socket title of these cases: No. 136, United States of America, Interstate Commerce Commission et al., v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company et al. No. 162, United States of America, Interstate Commerce Commission et al., v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company et al.
lower rate for the longer haul but only on terms stated in the order, establishing zones for the intermediate points and relative percentages upon which proportionate rates should be based. 191 Fed. Rep. 856, reversed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the long and short-haul provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended by the act of June 18, 1910, and the validity of an order made in pursuance thereof by the Interstate Commerce Commission, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Attorney General Wickersham and Mr. Assistant to the Attorney General Fowler, with whom Mr. Blackburn Esterline, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, was on the brief, for the United States.
Mr. P. J. Farrell for the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. Charles Donnelly, Mr. F. W. M. Cutcheon and Mr. F. C. Dillard for appellees.
Mr. Rush C. Butler, Mr. William E. Lamb, Mr. Stephen A. Foster and Mr. Cornelius Lynde filed a reply brief on behalf of the Chicago Association of Commerce.
Mr. Joseph N. Teal for Portland Chamber of Commerce. Mr. J. B. Campbell for the City of Spokane.
Mr. William A. Glasgow, Jr., for Giroux Consolidated Mines Co.
By leave of court, Mr. Alfred P. Thom filed a brief in behalf of certain interested parties.
Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
We shall seek to confine our statement to matters which are essential to the decision of the case. The provisions of § 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce dealing with what ls known as the long and short-haul clause, the power of p. 478carriers because of dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions to deviate from the exactions of such clause and the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission in relation to such subjects were materially amended by the act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 547. Following the form prescribed by the Commission after the amendment in question, the seventeen carriers who are appellees on this record made to the Interstate Commerce Commission their “application for relief from provisions of fourth section of Amended Commerce Act in connection with the following tariffs.” The tariffs annexed to the applications covered the whole territory from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast and the Gulf of Mexico, including all interior points and embracing practically the entire country, and the petition asked the Interstate Commerce Commission for authority to continue all rates shown on the tariffs from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast and from the Pacific coast to the Atlantic seaboard and to and from interior points lower than rates concurrently in effect from and to intermediate points. It was stated in the petition: “This application is based upon the desire of the interested carriers to continue the present method of making rates lower at the more distant points than at the intermediate points; such lower rates bemg necessary by reason of competition of various water carriers and of carriers partly by water and partly by rail operating from Pacific coast ports to Atlantic seaboard ports; competition of various water carriers operating to foreign countries from Pacific coast ports and competition of the products of foreign countries with the products of the Pacific coast; competition of the products of Pacific coast territory with the products of other sections of the country; competition of Canadian rail carriers not subject to the Interstate Commerce Act; competition of the products of Canada moving by Canadian carriers with the products of the United States; rates established via p. 479the shorter or more direct routes, but applied also via the longer or more circuitous routes.” After full hearing the Commission refused to grant unqualifiedly the prayer of the petition but entered an order permitting in some respects a charge of a lower rate for the longer haul to the Pacific coast than was asked for intermediate points provided a proportionate relation was maintained between the lower rate for the longer haul to the Pacific coast and the higher rate to the intermediate points the proportion to be upon the basis of percentages which were fixed. For the purposes of the order in question the Commission in substance adopted a division of the entire territory into separate zones which division had been resorted to by the carriers for the purposes of the establishment of the rates in relation to which the petition was filed. Refusing to comply with this order the carriers commenced proceedings in the Commerce Court praying a decree enjoining the enforcement of the fourth section as amended on the ground of its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States and of the order as being in any event violative of the amended section as properly construed. An interlocutory injunction was ordered. The defendants moved to dismiss and on the overruling of the motions appealed from the interlocutory order, the case being No. 136. Subsequently upon the election of the defendants to plead no further a final decree was entered and appealed from, that appeal being No. 162.
It suffices at this moment to say that all the contentions which the assignments of error involve and every argument advanced to refute such contentions, including every argument urged to uphold on the one hand or to overthrow on the other the action of the Commission, as well as every reason relied upon to challenge the action of the court or to sustain its judgment, are all reducible to the following propositions:
(a) The absolute want of power of the court below to p. 480deal with the subject involved in the complaint because controversies concerning the fourth section of the Act to Regulate Commerce of the nature here presented were by an express statutory provision excluded from the cognizance of the court below, (b) That even if this be not the case the action of the Commission which was complained of was purely negative and therefore not within the cognizance of the court because not inherently justiciable. (c) That correctly interpreting the fourth section the order made by the Commission was absolutely void because wholly beyond the scope of any power conferred by the fourth section as amended, (d) That even if in some respects the order of the Commission was within the reach of its statutory power there was intermingled in the order such an exertion of authority not delegated as to cause the whole order to be void, (e) That the order of the Commission was void even if the fourth section be interpreted as conferring the authority which the Commission exerted, since under that assumption the fourth section as amended was repugnant to the Constitution.
All the propositions, even including the jurisdictional ones, are concerned with and depend upon the construction of the fourth section as amended, and we proceed to consider and pass upon that subject and every other question in the case under four separate headings: 1, The meaning of the statute; 2, Its constitutionality; 3, The jurisdiction of the court; 4, The validity of the order in the light of the statute as interpreted.
1. The meaning of the statute.
We reproduce the section as originally adopted and as amended, passing a line through the words omitted by the amendment and printing in italics those which were added by the amendment, thus at a glance enabling the section to be read as it was before and as it now stands after amendment.
“Sec. 4. That it shall be unlawful for any common p. 481carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or of like kind of property, ■under ■3-ubst-antially similar circumstances and conditioner for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line or route in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance, or to charge any greater compensation as a through route than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions of this Act; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this Act to charge or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance: Provided, however, That upon application to the Interstate Commerce Commission appointed’under the provisions-of-this Aet, such common carrier may in special cases, after investigation -by the Commission, be authorized by the Commission to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property; and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated common carrier may be relieved from the operation of this section of-this Act: Provided, further, That no rates or charges lawfully existing at the time of the passage of this amendatory Act shall be required to be changed by reason of the provisions of this section prior to the expiration of six months after the passage of this Act, nor in any case where application shall have been filed before the Commission, in accordance with the provisions of this section, until a determination of such application by the Commission.
“Whenever a carrier by railroad shall in competition with a water route or routes reduce the rates on the carriage of any species of freight to or from competitive points, it shall not be permitted to increase such rates unless after hearing by the Interstate Commerce Commission it shall be found that such proposed increase rests upon changed conditions other than the elimination of water competition.”
VOL. CCXXXIV—31
Before considering the amended text we state briefly some of the more important requirements of the section before amendment and the underlying conceptions of private right, of public duty and policy which it embodied, because to do so will go a long way to remove any doubt as to the amended text and will moreover serve to demonstrate the intent of the legislative mind in enacting the amendment.
Almost immediately after the adoption of the Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887 (February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379), the Interstate Commerce Commission in considering the meaning of the law and the scope of the duties imposed on the Commission in enforcing it, reached the conclusion that the words “under substantially similar circumstances and conditions” of the fourth section dominated the long and short-haul clause and empowered carriers to primarily determine the existence of the required dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions and consequently to exact in the event of such difference a lesser charge for the longer than was exacted for the shorter haul and that competition which materially affected the rate of carriage to a particular point was a dissimilar circumstance and condition within the meaning of the act. We say primarily because of course it was further recognized that the authority existing in carriers to the end just stated was subject to the supervision and control of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the exertion of the powers conferred upon it by the statute and especially in view of the authority stated in the fourth section. In considering the act comprehensively it was pointed out that the generic provisions against preference and discrimination expressed in the second and third sections of the act were all-embracing and were therefore operative upon the fourth section as well as upon all other provisions of the act. But it was pointed out that where within the purview of the fourth section it had lawfully resulted that p. 483the lesser rate was charged for a longer than was exacted for a shorter haul such exaction being authorized could not be a preference or discrimination and therefore illegal. In re Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 1 I. C. C. 31. These comprehensive views announced at the inception ' as a matter of administrative construction were subsequently sustained by many decisions of this court, and to the leading of such cases we refer in the margin.1 We observe, moreover, that in addition it came to be settled that where competitive conditions authorized carriers to lower their rates to a particular place the right to meet the competition by lowering rates to such place was not confined to shipments made from the point of origin of the competition, but empowered all carriers in the interest of freedom of commerce and to afford enlarged opportunity to shippers to accept, if they chose to do so, shipments to such competitive points at lower rates than their general tariff rates: a right which came aptly to be described as “market competition” because the practice served to enlarge markets and develop the freedom of traffic and intercourse. It is to be observed, however, that the right thus conceded was not absolute because its exercise was only permitted provided the rates were not so lowered as to be non-remunerative and thereby cast an unnecessary burden upon other shippers. East Tenn. &c. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 181 U. S. 1. As the statute as thus construed imposed no obligation to carry to the competitive point at a rate which was less than a reasonable one, it is obvious that the statute regarded the rights of private ownership and sought to impose no duty conflicting therewith. It is also equally clear that in permitting the carrier
1Ird. Com. Comm. v. Balt. & Ohio Railroad, 145 U. 8. 263; Cinn., N. 0. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. Int. Com. Comm., 162 U. S. 184; Texas & Pac. Railway v. Int. Com. Comm., 162 U. S. 197; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648; East Tenn. &c. R. Co. v. Int. Com. Comm., 181 U.S. 1.
to judge primarily of the competitive conditions and to meet them at election the statute lodged in the carrier the right to exercise a primary judgment concerning a matter of public concern broader than the mere question of the duty of a carrier to carry for a reasonable rate on the one hand and of the right of the shipper on the other to compel carriage at such rate, since the power of primary judgment which the statute conferred concerned in a broad sense the general public interest with reference to both persons and places, considerations all of which therefore in their ultimate aspects came within the competency of legislative regulation. It was apparent that the power thus conferred was primary, not absolute, since its exertion by the carrier was made by the statute the subject both of administrative control and ultimate judicial review. And the establishment of such control in and of itself serves to make manifest the public nature of the attributes conferred upon the carrier by the original fourth section. Indeed that in so far as the statute empowered the carrier to judge as to the dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions for the purpose of relief from the long and short-haul clause it but gave the carrier the power to exert a judgment as to things public was long since pointed out by this court. Texas & Pac. Railway v. Interstate Com. Comm., 162 U. S. 197, 218.
With the light afforded by the statements just made we come to consider the amendment. It is certain that the fundamental change which it makes is the omission of the substantially similar circumstances and conditions clause, thereby leaving the long and short-haul clause in a sense unqualified except in so far as the section gives the right to the carrier to apply to the Commission for authority “to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of persons or property” and gives the Commission authority from time to time “to prescribe the extent to which such designated common carrier may p. 485be relieved from the operation of this section.” From the failure to insert any word in the amendment tending to exclude the operation of competition as adequate under proper circumstances to justify the awarding of relief from the long and short-haul clause and there being nothing which minimizes or changes the application of the preference and discrimination clauses of the second and third sections, it follows that in substance the amendment intrinsically states no new rule or principle but simply shifts the powers conferred by the section as it originally stood; that is, it takes from the carriers the deposit of public power previously lodged in them and vests it in the Commission as a primary instead of a reviewing function. In other words, the elements of judgment or so to speak the system of law by which judgment is to be controlled remains unchanged but a different tribunal is created for the enforcement of the existing law. This being true, as we think it plainly is, the situation under the amendment is this: Power in the carrier primarily to meet competitive conditions in any point of view by charging a lesser rate for a longer than for a shorter haul has ceased to exist because to do so, in the absence of some authority, would not only be inimical to the provision of the fourth section but would be in conflict with the preference and discrimination clauses of the second and third sections. But while the public power, so to speak, previously lodged in the carrier is thus withdrawn and reposed in the Commission the right of carriers to seek and obtain under authorized circumstances the sanction of the Commission to charge a lower rate for a longer than for a shorter haul because of competition or for other adequate reasons is expressly preserved and if not is in any event by necessary duplication granted. And as a correlative the authority of the Commission to grant on request the right sought is made by the statute to depend upon the facts established and the judgment of that body in the exercise of a sound p. 486legal discretion as to whether the request should be granted compatibly with a due consideration of the private and public interests concerned and in view qf the preference and discrimination clauses of the second and third sections.
2. The alleged repugnancy of the section as amended to the Constitution.
But if the amendment has this meaning it is insisted that it is repugnant to the Constitution for various reasons which superficially considered seem to be distinct but which really are all so interwoven that we consider and dispose of them as one. The argument is that the statute as correctly construed is but a delegation to the Commission of legislative power which Congress was incompetent to make. But the contention is without merit. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364; United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177. We do not stop to review these cases because the mere statement of the contention in the light of its environment suffices to destroy it. How can it otherwise be since the argument as applied to the case before us is this: that the authority in question was validly delegated so long as it was lodged in carriers but ceased to be susceptible of delegation the instant it was taken from the carriers for the purpose of being lodged in a public administrative body? Indeed, when it is considered that in last analysis the argument is advanced to sustain the right of carriers to exert the public power which it is insisted is not susceptible of delegation, it is apparent that the contention is self-contradictory since it reduces itself to an effort to sustain the right to delegate a power by contending that the power is not capable of being delegated. In addition, however, before passing from the proposition we observe that when rightly appreciated the contention but challenges every decided case since the p. 487passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887 involving the rightfulness of the exertion by a carrier of the power to meet competition as a means of being relieved from the long and short-haul clause of the fourth section before its amendment. While what we have already said answers it, because of its importance we notice another contention. As the power of carriers to meet competition and the relation of that right to non-competitive places may concern the fortunes of numberless individuals and the progress and development of many communities, it is said, to permit authority to be exerted concerning the subject without definite rules for its exercise will be to destroy the rights of persons and communities. This danger, the argument proceeds, is not obviated by declaring that the provisions of the second and third sections as to undue preference and discrimination apply to the fourth section since without a definition of what constitutes undue preference and discrimination, no definite rule of law is established but whim, caprice or favor will in the nature of things control the power exerted. And it is argued that this view is not here urged as the mere result of conjecture, since in the report of the Commission in this case it was declared in unequivocal terms as the basis of the order entered that the statute vested in the Commission a wide and undefined discretion by virtue of which it became its duty to see to it that communities and individuals obtained fair opportunities, that discord was allayed and commercial justice everywhere given full play. Let it be conceded that the language relied upon would have the far-reaching significance attributed to it if separated from its context, we think when it is read in connection with the report of which it but forms a part, and moreover when it is elucidated by the action taken by the Commission there is no substantial ground for holding that by the language referred to it was entitled to declare that the fourth section as amended conferred the p. 488uncontrolled exuberance of vague and destructive powers which it is now insisted was intended to be claimed. In any event, however, we must be governed by the statute and its plain meaning. After all has been said the provisions as to undue preference and discrimination, while involving of course a certain latitude of judgment and discretion are no more undefined or uncertain in the section as amended than they have been from the beginning and therefore the argument comes once more to the complaint that because public powers have been transferred from the carriers to the Commission, the wrongs suggested will arise. Accurately testing this final result of the argument it is clear that it exclusively rests upon convictions concerning the impolicy of having taken from carriers, intimately and practically acquainted as they are with the complex factors entering into rate making and moreover impelled to equality of treatment as they must be by the law of self interest operating upon them as a necessary result of the economic forces to which they are subjected, and having lodged the power in an official administrative body which in the nature of things must act, however conscientiously, from conceptions based upon a more theoretical and less practical point of view. But this does not involve a grievance based upon the construction or application of the fourth section as amended but upon the wisdom of the legislative judgment which was brought into play in adopting the amendment, a subject with which we have nothing in the world to do. It is said in the argument on behalf of one of the carriers that as in substance and effect the duty is imposed upon the Commission in a proper case to refuse an application, therefore the law is void because in such a contingency the statute would amount to an imperative enforcement of the long and short-haul clause and would be repugnant to the Constitution. It is conceded in the argument that it has been directly decided by this court that a general enforcement p. 489of the long and short-haul clause would not be repugnant to the Constitution (Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503), but we are asked to reconsider and overrule the case and thus correct the error which was manifested in deciding it. But we are not in the remotest degree inclined to enter into this inquiry, not only because of the reasons which were stated in the case itself but also because of those already expounded in this opinion and for an additional reason which is that the contention by necessary implication assails the numerous cases which from the enactment of the Act to Regulate Commerce down to the present time have involved the adequacy of the conditions advanced by carriers for justifying their departure from the long and short-haul clause. We say this because the controversies which the many cases referred to considered and decided by a necessary postulate involved an assertion of the validity of the legislative power to apply and enforce the long and short-haul clause. How can it be otherwise since if this were not the case all the issues presented in the numerous cases would have been merely but moot, affording therefore no basis for judicial action since they would have had back of them no sanction of lawful power whatever.
3. The jurisdiction of the court.
The argument on this subject is twofold: (a) that as by the act creating the Commerce Court (June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539) that court was endowed only with the jurisdiction ‘‘now possessed by circuit courts of the United States and the judges thereof” and provided that nothing contained in this act shall be construed as enlarging the jurisdiction now possessed by the circuit courts of the United States or the judges thereof, that is hereby transferred to and vested in the commerce court” and as new powers were created by the subsequent amendment of the fourth section, therefore the Commerce Court had no jurisdiction. But we pass any extended discussion of p. 490the proposition because it is completely disposed of by the construction which we have given to the amended section since that construction makes it clear that the effect of the amended fourth section was not to create new powers theretofore non-existing, but simply to redistribute the powers already existing and which were then subject to review. The argument affords another manifestation of the tendency to which we have already directed attention in this case to seek to maintain and aggrandize a power by insisting upon propositions which, if they were accepted, would raise the gravest question as to the constitutional validity of the asserted power, a question which we need not at all consider in view of the want of foundation for the exercise of the power claimed in the light of the plain meaning of the act to the contrary which we have already pointed out.
(b) The second contention as to jurisdiction yet further affords an illustration of the same mental attitude, since it rests upon the assumption that the order of the Commission refusing to grant the request of the carrier made under the fourth section was purely negative and hence was not subject to judicial inquiry. The contention therefore presupposes that the power which from the beginning has been the subject of judicial review by the mere fact of its transfer to the Commission was made arbitrary. Besides, the proposition disregards the fact that the right to petition the Commission conferred by the statute is positive and while the refusal to grant it may be in one sense negative,, in another and broader view it is affirmative since it refuses that which the statute in affirmative terms declares shall be granted if only the conditions which the statute provides are found to exist. It is of course true as pointed out in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad, 215 U. S. 452, 470, and since repeatedly applied that findings of fact made by the Commission within the scope of its administrative p. 491duties must be accepted in case of judicial review, but that doctrine, as was also pointed out, does not relieve the courts in a proper case from determining whether the Constitution has been violated or whether statutory powers conferred have been transcended or have been exercised in such an arbitrary way as to amount to the exertion of authority not given, doctrines which but express the elementary principle that an investiture of a public body with discretion does not imply the right to abuse but on the contrary carries with it as a necessary incident the command that the limits of a sound discretion be not transcended which by necessary implication carries with it the existence of judicial power to correct wrongs done by such excess. And without pausing to particularly notice it, we observe in passing that what has just been said is adequate to meet the contention that as violations of the fourth section were made criminal no power existed to enjoin an order of the Commission made under that section because the consequence would be to enjoin criminal prosecution. The right which as we have seen the act gives to test the validity of orders rendered under the fourth section is not to be destroyed by a reference to a provision of that section. The two must be harmoniously enforced.
4. Thè validity of the order in the light of the statute as interpreted.
The order is in the margin.1 The main insistence is p. 492that there was no power after recognizing the existence of competition and the right to charge a lesser rate to the competitive point than to intermediate points to do more than fix a reasonable rate to the intermediate points, that is to say, that under the power transferred to it by the section as amended the Commission was limited to
1
FOURTH SECTION ORDER NO. 124. In the matter of the applications, Nos. 205, 342, 343, 344, 349, 350, and 352, on behalf of the Transcontinental Freight Bureau, by R. H. Countiss, agent, for relief from the provisions of the fourth section of the act to regulate commerce as amended June 18,1910, with respect to rates made from eastern points of shipment which are higher to intermediate points than to Pacific coast terminals. COMMODITY RATES. . These applications, as above numbered, on behalf of the Transcontinental Freight Bureau, ask for authority to continue rates from east-mediately west of Cockbum Island, in Lake Huron; passes westerly through the Straits of Mackinaw; southerly, through Lake Michigan to its southern boundary; follows the west boundary of Transcontinental Group C to Paducah, Ky.; thence follows the east side of the Illinois Central Railroad to the southern boundary of Transcontinental Group C; thence follows the east boundary of Group <C to the Gulf of Mexico. Zone No. 3 embraces all territory in the United States lying east of Line No. 2 and north of the south boundary of Transcontinental Group C, and on and west of Line No. 3, which is the Buffalo-Pittsburg line from Buffalo, N. Y., to Wheeling, W. Ya., marking the western bound-not exceed the rates on the same commodities from the same points of origin to the Pacific coast terminals by more than 7 per cent from points m Zone No. 2,15 per cent from points in Zone No. 3, and 25 per cent from points in Zone No. 4. The commission does not hereby approve any rates that may be established under this authority, all such rates being subject to complaint, investigation, and correction if they conflict with any other provisions of the act. Sy the commission: [seal ] Judson C. Clements, Chairman;
em points of shipment which are higher to intermediate points in Canada and in the States of Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho, California, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, and other States east thereof, than to Pacific coast terminals.
Full investigation of the matters and things involved in these petitions, in so far as they concern westbound commodity rates, having been had,
It is ordered, That for the purposes of the disposition of these applications, the United States shall be divided into five zones, as described in the following manner:
(The transcontinental groups hereinafter described are as specified in R. H. Countiss, agent’s, transcontinental Tariff I. C. C. No. 929.)
Zone No. 1 comprises all that portion of the United States lying west of a line called Line No. 1, which extends in a general southerly direction from a point immediately east of Grand Portage, Minn.; thence southwesterly, along the northwestern shore of Lake Superior, to a point immediately east of Superior, Wis.; thence southerly, along the eastern boundary of Transcontinental Group F, to the intersection of the Arkansas and Oklahoma State line; thence along the west side of the Kansas City Southern Railway to the Gulf of Mexico.
Zone No. 2 embraces all territory in the United States lying east of Line No. 1 and west of a line called Line No. 2, which begins at the international boundary between the United States and Canada, p. 493imascertaining the existence of competition and to authorizing the carrier to meet it without any authority to do more than exercise its general powers concerning the reasonableness of rates at all points. But this proposition is directly in conflict with the statute as we have construed it and with the plain purpose and intent manifested by its enactment. To uphold the proposition it would be necessary to say that the powers which were essential to the vivification and beneficial realization of the authority transferred had evaporated in the process of transfer and hence that the power perished as the result of the act by which it was conferred. As the prime
ary of Trunk Line Freight Association territory; thence follows the Ohio River to Huntington, W. Va.
Zone No. 4 embraces all territory in the United States east of Line No. 3 and north of the south boundary of Transcontinental Group C.
Zone No. 5 embraces all territory south and east of Transcontinental Group C
It is further ordered, (1) That those portions of the above-numbered applications that request authority to maintain higher commodity rates from points in Zone No. 1 to intermediate points than to Pacific coast terminals be, and the same are hereby, denied, effective November 15, 1911; (2) that petitioners herein be, and they are hereby, authorized to establish and maintain, effective November 15, 1911, commodity rates from all points in zones numbered 2, 3, and 4, as above defined, to points intermediate to Pacific coast terminals that are higher to intermediate points than to Pacific coast terminals; provided, that the rates to intermediate points from points in zones numbered 2, 3, and 4 shall p. 494object of the transfer was to vest the Commission within the scope of the discretion imposed and subject in the nature of things to the limitations arising from the character of the duty exacted and flowing from the other provisions of the act with authority to consider competitive conditions and their relation to persons and places, necessarily there went with the power the right to do that by which alone it could be exerted, and therefore a consideration of the one and the other and the establishment of the basis by percentages was within the power granted. As will be seen by the order and as we have already said for the purpose of the percentages established zones of influence were adopted and the percentages fixed as to such zones varied or fluctuated upon the basis of the influence of the competition in the designated areas. As we have pointed out though somewhat modified the zones as thus selected by the Commission were in substance the same as those previously fixed by the carriers as the basis of the rate-making which was included in the tariffs which were under investigation and therefore we may put that subject out of view. Indeed, except as to questions of power there is no contention in the argument as to the inequality of the zones or percentages or as to any undue preference or discrimination resulting from the action taken. But be this as it may, in view of the findings of the Coinmission as to the system of rates prevailing in the tariffs which were before it, of the inequalities and burdens engendered by such system, of the possible aggrandizement unnaturally beyond the limits produced by competition in favor of the competitive points and against other points by the tariff in question, facts which we accept and which indeed are unchallenged, we see no ground for saying that the order was not sustained by the facts upon which it was based or that it exceeded the powers which the statute conferred or transcended the limits of the sound legal discretion which it lodged in p. 495the Commission when acting upon the subject before it.
It results that the Commerce Court in enjoining the order of the Commission was wrong and its decree to that end must therefore be reversed and the case be remanded to the proper District Court with directions to dismiss the bill for want of equity.
Reversed.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, ET AL., v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ET AL., v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.
appeal from the united states commerce court.
Nos. 137,163. Argued October 18, 21, 22, 1912.—Decided June 22,1914.
Decided on authority of preceding case.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Attorney General Wickersham and Mr. Assistant to the Attorney General Fowler, with whom Mr. Blackburn Esterline, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, was on the brief, for the United States.
Mr. P. J. Farrell for the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. Charles Donnelly, Mr. F. W. M. Cutcheon and Mr. F. C. Dillard for appellees.
Mr. Rush C. Butler, Mr. William E. Lamb, Mr. Stephen A. Foster and Mr. Cornelius Lynde filed a reply brief on behalf of the Chicago Association of Commerce.
Mr. Joseph N. Teal for Portland Chamber of Commerce.
Mr. J. B. Campbell for the City of Spokane.
Mr. William A. Glasgow, Jr., for Giroux Consolidated Mines Co.
By leave of court, Mr. Alfred P. Thom filed a brief in behalf of certain interested parties.
Mr . Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
The eleven carriers who are appellees on this record filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission applications to be relieved from the long and short-haul clause of § 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended by the act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 547. After full hearing the Commission entered an order granting in certain respects the relief prayed but establishing a proportionate relation to be maintained between the lower rate for the longer haul and the higher rate for the shorter haul upon the basis of percentages which were fixed with reference to defined zones. The carriers refused to obey the order and filed their bill in the Commerce Court to enjoin its enforcement. An interlocutory injunction was ordered. The defendants moved to dismiss and on the overruling of the motions appealed from the interlocutory order, that case being No. 137. Subsequently upon the election of the defendants not to plead further, a final decree was entered and appealed from, that appeal being No. 163.
These cases are governed by the opinion in Nos. 136 p. 497and 162 just decided. They were tried in the court below with the other cases, were decided by the same opinion, and, although different localities are involved, the questions presented are identical, and for the reasons given in the other cases, Nos. 136 and 162, the decree must be reversed and remanded to the proper District Court with directions to dismiss the bill for want of equity.
Reversed.