Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U.S. 497 (1902)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U.S. 497 (1902)
Full caption
TULLOCK v. MULVANE.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 3, 1902
TULLOCK v. MULVANE.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.
No. 59. Argued October 25, 28,1901.—Decided March 3,1902.
The propositions in this case involving Federal questions were duly raised below.
Previous to the bringing of the suit in the state court upon the bond, by stipulation filed in the equity cause in the United States court, upon which an order of the court was entered, the bill of complaint had been dismissed as to all the defendants but Mulvane, and it was expressly agreed that all demand for relief by way of specific performance should be withdrawn. The Circuit Court of Appeals correctly decided that the necessary effect of this agreement was to withdraw from the case all controversy on the subject of the injunction. As by the stipulation Mulvane had not waived any rights of action by reason of damages caused by the injunction, if any, but on the contrary his rights were expressly saved, and as the stipulation was made the basis of an order of the court which had the necessary effect to dismiss from the cause all the grounds upon which alone the rightfulness of the injunction could have been asserted, we think there was a final decision, within the import of the condition of the bond, that the injunction ought not to have been granted.
The claim of immunity from liability for attorney’s fees as one of the elements of damage under the injunction bond presented a Federal question, which was incorrectly decided by the court below in holding that it was proper to award the amount of such fees in enforcing the bond.
A bond given in pursuance of a law of the United States is governed, as to its construction, not by the local law of a particular State, but by the principles of law as determined by this court, and operative thoughout the courts of the United States.
George P. Wescott and Samuel Hanson were complainants in a bill in equity which was filed, on January 13, 1893, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, oab Mulvane and various other persons and corporations were made defendants to the bill. The principal relief sought was to compel the specific performance of a contract alleged to have een entered into between the complainants and Mulvane for e sale by the latter and purchase by the former of all the cap-1 stock of the Topeka Water Supply Company, a Kansas cor-
Vol. clxxxiv —32 p. 498poration, also a defendant to the suit. Incidentally it was sought to annul a purported sale of the waterworks plant to another of the defendants, the Topeka Water Company, a Kansas corporation, which it was asserted had been organized by Mulvane. The bill also sought to prevent the Topeka Water Company from encumbering the plant with a mortgage which, it was averred, was about to be executed, and to restrain the issuing and negotiation of bonds proposed to be secured by such mortgage and the sale or disposition of stock of both the Topeka Water Supply Company and the Topeka Water Company. The members of a copartnership, styled Coffin & Stanton, doing business in the city of New York, whom it was charged were offering to the public for sale the bonds so proposed to be issued, were likewise joined as defendants in the bill.
On February 13,1890, the court ordered a temporary injunction to issue, as prayed, upon the giving of an approved bond. Two days later, however, it was ordered that instead of a bond the complainants “ may deposit with the clerk of this court the sum of $75,000 in cash, and that said deposit shall stand fora bond for all damages from the commencement of this suit until the further order of the court, whereby said complainants will be obligated and bound to pay to the defendants all costs and damages aforesaid, if it shall be finally held that said injunction or restraining order was improvidently granted.”
On April 4, 1890, upon a hearing, the court sustained a motion which had been filed on behalf of Coffin & Stanton to dissolve the temporary injunction. The dissolution was pre i cated upon the ruling that an indispensable party had not been made a defendant and could not be made without ousting e jurisdiction of the court, because such party defendant an e plaintiffs were citizens of the same State. .
Thereafter, on June 3,1890, by leave of court, a formal bon was substituted for the cash deposit which had been ma e tm der the order of the court previously stated. A. J. 11 ° and W. M. D. Lee were the sureties. The bond recited order for an injunction, the subsequent permission to epo cash in lieu of a bond, the making of such cash deposi, withdrawal of the deposit with the sanction of the cour p. 499the condition that a bond be executed. The fact that the injunction had been in the meanwhile dissolved by the court was also recited. The condition of the bond is reproduced in the margin.1
In October, 1890, pursuant to a stipulation made between complainants and certain of the defendants, filed in the cause, the bill was dismissed as to all the defendants except Mulvane, and so much of the bill as sought a specific performance of the alleged contract between complainants and Mulvane was withdrawn. By the stipulation the defendants who were dismissed from the cause expressly waived all right of action upon the injunction bond or otherwise, by reason of the allowance of the temporary injunction.
On September 26, 1892, upon the hearing of the cause as between complainants and Mulvane, the bill was dismissed. The case was then appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court decided the appeal on the assumption that the question for decision was whether, in view of all the circumstances attending the making of the agreement between complainants and Mulvane, it was one which a court of equity could specifically enforce. The court observed that the cause had evidently been argued and disposed of in the court below on the theory that under the stipulation, even though the right to have specific performance had been waived, nevertheless damages might be assessed by a court of equity as for a reach of the contract, if the court was of opinion that the ap-
Now, therefore, if the said George P. Wescott and Samuel Hanson sa pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Joab Mulvane, the Topeka C SuPPly Company, the Topeka Water Company, William Edward o n, Walter Stanton, Charles H. Jackson, and Charles F. Street, partners oing business under the firm name and style of Coffin & Stanton, and the eith^'0 Trusl' Company, and to each of them, all damages which they, or so ^em’ have already sustained or may at any time sustain by reais -° th6 granllnS or issuing of said restraining order, or the granting and said'Hg said temporary injunction, if it shall be finally decided that
restraining order or said temporary injunction ought not to have been 8eve t fi°r Withdrawing fro™ the hands of the clerk the said sum of the Q ^r+Ve ^°usand dollars deposited in lieu of the bond as required by othov°^r be 8iven, then the above obligation shall be null and void;
wise shall be and remain in full force and effect.”
pellants were, at the time the bill was filed, entitled to specific performance. Assuming, then, the regularity of this procedure, and its power as an equity court to execute the agreement, the court reviewed the evidence, and held that the complainants were not at the time the bill was filed entitled to the specific performance of the contract, for the reason that they had never put the defendant Mulvane in default by tendering him the sum which he was entitled to receive under the contract of sale, to enforce which the bill had been filed. The court further observed :
“ It is assigned for error that the Circuit Court erred in dissolving the temporary injunction as well as in dismissing the bill on the ground heretofore stated. As the first of these assignments was somewhat pressed on the argument, it becomes necessary to say, and we think is all sufficient to say, that the appellants cannot be heard to complain in this court of the order dissolving the temporary injunction after voluntarily withdrawing so much of their bill as sought a specific performance of the alleged contract. An injunction could only be awarded as an incident to that species of equitable relief, and when the allegations and the prayer of the bill looking to that form of relief were withdrawn, the injunction necessarily shared the same fate.”
Intermediate the dismissal of the bill by the Circuit Court and the affirmance of the decree of dismissal by the Court of Appeals, Mulvane, on November 5,1892, institute the present action in the state district court of Shawnee County, Kansas, against A. J. Tullock and W. M. D. Lee, the sureties upon the injunction bond above referred to. In this action recovery was sought for the sum of $75,000 as damages sustaine by reason of the injunction. Service was not made upon ee, however, and the action was prosecuted solely against Tu oc • An answer was filed, which consisted of a general denia an a plea that the action was prematurely brought because o e pendency of the appeal in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The action in the state court was tried to a jury. eca of the ruling by the trial judge, in excluding evidence as o e penditures for attorneys’ fees in procuring the dissolution o p. 501injunction, Mulvane prosecuted error, and the judgment entered by the trial court was held by the Supreme Court of Kansas to be erroneous because of such ruling. 58 Kansas, 622.
A new trial was thereupon had in the lower court. At this trial, on the offer by Mulvane, the plaintiff, of evidence tending to show payments made by him for attorneys’ fees, such evidence was objected to as follows:
“ The defendant further objects because it appears that this bond was given in a proceeding in the Federal court, and under the law of the United States governing the liability of parties for damages on bonds or in such proceeding in Federal courts attorneys’ fees are not included.”
At the close of all the evidence, the court allowed the respective parties to amend their pleadings. The petition was amended, among other particulars, by setting out specifically the sum of asserted damage resulting from the payments alleged to have been made by Mulvane to various attorneys in resisting the allowance and procuring the dissolution of the injunction. In the amendment of the answer it was specifically pleaded that the sums paid to the attorneys by Mulvane were not elements of damage embraced within the terms of the injunction bond, if such bond was construed and enforced according to the rules applicable in the courts of the United States as expounded by the Supreme Court of the United States. It was asserted that the bond must be measured by the principles controlling in the court where it was given, and that to hold otherwise would deprive the surety of the protection of the law of the United States, in contemplation of which he had contracted.
After the amendments and in negation of requests for instructions to the jury made by the plaintiff, the defendant asked e court to charge in substance as follows: 1. That as by the con ition of the bond liability could not arise until it had been .n y determined by the United States court, that the injuncion ought not to have been granted, the sureties upon the bond were discharged from liability by the effect of the stipulation wh cause the injunction had been granted, ere y it resulted that a final determination by the court p. 502'502 OCTOBER TERM, 1901.
Counsel for Parties.
whether the injunction ought not to have been granted was by consent of parties prevented. 2. If the stipulation had not the effect thus claimed, then at the time the action on the bond was commenced an appeal was pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States from the judgment rendered in the cause, wherein the injunction had been allowed and the bond given, and that the action upon the bond was premature. In addition, the immunity which had been previously asserted, arising from the rule governing in the courts of the United States on the subject of attorneys’ fees was, in view of the pleadings and the prior proceedings in the case, reiterated by a request for an instruction that no attorneys’ fees could be recovered on the bonds. All the requests of the defendant having been denied and the court having charged the jury to the contrary, a verdict was returned in the sum of $25,000, of which it may be inferred that about the sum of $20,000 was for payments which Mulvane asserted he had made on his own behalf to the attorneys who had represented his interest in resisting the allowance of and procuring the dissolution of the injunction, albeit that most of the attorneys to whom the payments in question were made were likewise attorneys of record for the other defendants who had specifically in the stipulation waived all claims of damages growing out of the injunction. From the judgment rendered on the verdict of the jury the cause was carried to the Supreme Court of Kansas, and in that court it was affirmed. 61 Kansas, 650. The opinion of the court in effect considered and disposed of the claims of alleged Federal right which have been previously referred to, and hold them to be untenable. To this judgment of affirmance error was prosecuted and the cause is here for review.
JZr. W. H. Rossington for plaintiff in error. Blood Smith and Mr. Clifford Misted were on his brief.
Mr. N. M. Loomis for defendant in error. Mr. A. L- " liams was on his brief.
Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The assignments of error, though, fourteen in number, are reducible to three propositions.
1. A contention that as the bond provided for a liability only in case it was finally decided that the injunction was wrongfully granted, no recovery could be had upon the bond, because the stipulation between the complainants and certain of the defendants had the effect of rendering it impossible to have a final determination in the courts of the United States whether the injunction ought originally to have been granted.
2. A claim on the part of the defendant that as the bond for injunction was executed under the order of a court of equity of the United States, and therefore by an authority exercised under the United States, and as liability was only to arise when it had been finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted, action on the bond could not be brought pending an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States, and the final determination by that court of the controversy.
3. An assertion that as, by the settled rule of the courts of equity of the United States, attorneys’ fees were not an element of damage covered by the terms of an injunction bond given in such court, recovery of such fees on such bond was not within the purview of the bond when construed with reference to and by the light of the authority under which the bond was given.
It is urged by the defendant in error that these contentions involve no Federal question and that if they do they were not sufficiently set up in the lower courts, and therefore this court as no jurisdiction to review them. We dispose at once of the contention that if the propositions involve Federal questions t ey were not duly raised below, by referring to the statement w ich we have made of the case, whereby it appears that the contentions were raised below by the pleadings, by the objections to evidence and by the requests for instructions, and in-ee as so raised were expressly considered and directly passed upon y both the trial court and the Supreme Court of the o Kansas, which latter fact in and of itself suffices to present the Federal question, even if it had been otherwise p. 504ambiguously raised on the record, which is not the case. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648.
In determining whether these Federal questions are involved, we shall for the moment take it for granted that the premises upon which such asserted questions rest are well founded, and if under such hypothesis we find that there is jurisdiction it will then be our duty to put such assumption out of view and determine the merits of the contentions.
Whilst apparently the propositions involve several distinct assertions of Federal right, in their ultimate analysis they reduce themselves to one and the same contention; that is, that a bond given for an injunction in an equity cause in a court of the United States is to be construed with reference to the liability administered in the courts of the United States on that subject as settled by this court. That this fundamental proposition embraces all the contentions would seem to be clear, when it is borne in mind that the controversy as to the stipulation and as to the pendency of the cause in the Circuit Court of Appeals assert both the generic right of the defendant to have the obligations under the bond measured and determined by the law prevailing in the courts of the United States and the claim as to the attorneys’ fees propounds but the same right as to one of the elements of damage which it was asserted the bond embraced. Whilst the unity of the propositions is thus demonstrable, as in the court below and in argument they have been separately treated and different considerations have been assumed to apply to them, we shall consider the propositions separately.
We embrace the first two contentions under one heading, as follows:
First. Did the claim that there had been nobreach of the condition of the bond beca/ase of the stipulation filed in the cause in which the bond was given and because of the pendency oftiufp peal in the Circuit Court of Appeals present Federal questions, and, if yes, were they well founded ? . .
It may not, we think, be doubted that a bond for injunction in an equity court of the United States given under the or er of such court is a bond executed in and by virtue “ of an au or p. 505ity exercised under the United States.” Rev. Stat. sec. 709. Certainly, the courts of the United States derive all their powers from the Constitution and laws of the United States, and their authority is therefore exercised thereunder. Being then an obligation entered into by virtue of such authority, the conclusion cannot be escaped that the defence specially set up that no liability on the bond could arise until the court of the United States in which the controversy was pending had finally determined that the injunction should not have been granted, was the assertion of an immunity from liability depending on an authority exercised under the United States, and therefore necessarily involved the decision of a Federal question. To state the result which must necessarily flow from a contrary deduction is sufficient of itself to demonstrate the unsoundness of the reasoning by which the non-Federal nature of the question can alone be upheld. For it is clear that if it be true that the bond given m a Federal court of equity on the granting of an injunction is not to be construed with reference to the rules of law applicable to such bonds in such court, then there can be no certain general rule by which to determine the liability of the obligors upon the bond. Their responsibility would be one thing in a court of the United States and a different thing in the courts of the various States, which would imply that the parties did not contract with reference to any definite rule of liability. Indeed, the argument conduces to a conclusion which necessarily cripples the power of the court under whose order an injunction ond is executed. It is settled that such court has the inherent right to set the bond aside and to determine in its discretion w ether recovery could be had upon it. Russell v. Farley, 105 . 433. And yet if the liability upon the bond when given can e measured in courts other than the court requiring the execution of the bond, by a wholly different rule of liability rom t at which obtained in the court which had ordered the
°f the bond, it must follow that although the latter court ecreed that the injunction had rightfully issued, yet in an miaht UP011 the injunction bond in another forum the sureties e ma(Ie to respond in damages without hope of redress.
re erence to some of the decided cases concerning what p. 506constitutes a claim of immunity arising from an authority exercised under the United States, will serve at once to refute the contention that no Federal question is here presented.
In Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130, the question for decision was whether a state court had given due effect to a decree of a court of the United States, and it was asserted that the contention that it had not presented no Federal question. Speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, the court said (p. 134):
“ Where a state court refuses to give effect to the judgment of a court of the United States rendered upon the point in dispute, and with jurisdiction of the case and the parties, a question is undoubtedly raised which, under the act of 1867, may be brought to this court for revision. The case would be one in which a title or right is claimed under an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the title or right so set up. It would thus be a case arising under the laws of the United States, establishing the Circuit Court and vesting it with jurisdiction; and hence it would be within the judicial power of the United States, as defined by the Constitution; and it is clearly within the chart of appellate power given to this court, over cases arising in and decided by the state courts.”
In Factors' & Traders' Insurance Company v. Murphy, 111 U. S. 738, a court of the United States sitting in bankruptcy had ordered a sale of real property of the bankrupt free from encumbrances. The property was purchased at the sale on behalf of lienholders. Subsequently one who possessed a lien on the property at the time the order was entered and sale made, brought suit in a state court of Louisiana to foreclose such lien, claiming that she had not been a party to the bankruptcy proceedings, and that her lien Was unaffected by the sale. The defendant, in whose name title had been taken, while averring that the plaintiff was interested in the purchase at the sale made under the order of the United States court, insisted that the lien of the mortgage of plaintiff had been extinguished bj such sale. The state court having decreed in favor of plaint' , a writ of error was prosecuted from this court. In reversing the judgment of the state court, it was said (p. 741):
« Counsel for defendant in error deny the jurisdiction of this court and move to dismiss the writ. But it is apparent that the only controversy in the case relates to the effect to be given to the sale under the order of the District Court of the United States, to sell the mortgaged property free from incumbrance. Both parties assert rights under this order and sale. Plaintiffs in error assert that the sale as made was valid, and, being sold free from incumbrances, extinguished Mrs. Murphy’s lien as well as others. Defendant asserts that it had the effect of discharging all other liens but hers, and thus gave her the exclusive, paramount lien on all the property so sold. Both the parties, therefore, rely upon rights under Federal authority, and as the right of plaintiff in error was denied by the court the writ of error lies.”
In Avery v. Popper, 179 U. S. 305, the two cases last above referred to were approvingly cited, and the rule was declared to be that where a controversy in the state court presented a contention as to the validity or proper construction of an order or decree rendered by a court of the United States, a Federal question was presented reviewable by this court (p. 314).
In Crescent Li/ce Stock Company v. Butcher£ Union, 120 U. S. 141, the facts were briefly these: Under a bill filed in a Circuit Court of the United States, a temporary injunction had been allowed after hearing, and a bond had been given under an order of the court, the injunction was perpetuated by the Circuit Court on the final hearing. The case was appealed to this court, and the decree of the Circuit Court was reversed. Suit was brought in a court of the State of Louisiana upon the injunction bond given in the Federal court, against the principal and surety in solido and against the principal alone, to recover damages for the malicious prosecution of the injunction suit in the Federal court. It was claimed by the defendants that the final decree of the Circuit Court of the United States, although subsequently reversed by this court, constituted probable cause, and therefore there -could be no recovery on the alleged cause of action for malicious prosecution. Both the state trial court by way of instructions to the jury and the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided that the decree of the Circuit Court of the p. 508United States did not constitute probable cause, because prior to the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States a contrary view to that which the Circuit Court adopted had been announced by the highest court of the State of Louisiana. The jurisdiction of this court to review the controversy was challenged upon the very grounds now relied upon, and the court said (p. 146):
“ It is argued by counsel for the defendant in error that this does not embrace any Federal question; that the effect to be given to a judgment or decree of the Circuit Court of the United States sitting in Louisiana by the courts of that State is to be determined by the law of Louisiana, or by some principle of general law as to which the decision of the state court is final; and that the ruling in question did not deprive the plaintiffs in error of ‘ any privilege or immunity specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States.’ But this is an error. The question whether a state court has given due effect to the judgment of a court of the United States is a question arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.”
In Meyers v. Block, 120 U. S. 206, the case came to this court on error to a state court, and involved the correctness of the construction by that court of the terms of an injunction bond given in a court of the United States. This court treated the matter of jurisdiction as one of course, held that the parties signing the bond must be presumed to have been cognizant of the order under which the bond was given, and to have contracted in reference thereto, and that the bond should be read in the light of the order, and the court applied to the interpretation of the bond its own views of the applicable principles of law.
The cases of Neva York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren, 92 U. S. 286; Provident Savings Society v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635; Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U. S. 571, an others of like character, do not conflict with the rule which we apply in this cause, and which was expounded in the cases to which we have previously referred. This results when it is observed that none of the cases just above referred to involve p. 509the construction or effect of a law of the United States or a judgment, decree or order or other act done under and by virtue of the authority of a court of the United States or a claim of immunity thereunder.
The contention as to the prematurity of the suit presenting then a Federal controversy, the question is, was the claim of prematurity well founded ?
Previous to the bringing of the suit in the state court upon the bond, by stipulation filed in the equity cause in the United States court, upon which an order of the court was entered, the bill of complaint had been dismissed as to all the defendants but Mulvane, and it was expressly agreed that all demand for relief by way of specific performance should be withdrawn. We think that the Circuit Court of Appeals correctly decided that the necessary effect of this agreement was to withdraw from the case all controversy on the subject of the injunction. As by the stipulation Mulvane had not waived any rights of action by reason of damages caused by the injunction if any, but on the contrary his rights were expressly saved, and as the stipulation was made the basis of an order of the court which had the necessary effect to dismiss from the cause all the grounds upon which alone the rightfulness of the injunction could have been asserted, we think there was a final decision, within the import of the condition of the bond, that the injunction ought not to have been granted. As respects the argument that by reason of the execution of the stipulation, the sureties upon the injunction bond were absolutely discharged, because thereby a final determination of the rightfulness of the allowance of the injunction was prevented, we think it obvious , at the sureties when executing the bond did so, subject to the nght of the complainants in good faith to dismiss their bill, or to make a stipulation such as that we have referred to, which was in effect the equivalent of the dismissal of the bill in so far as all equitable relief was concerned. We are thus brought to consider the second contention, which is,
Second. *Did the claim of immunity from liability for atwneys fees, as one of the elements of damage under the injuncn bond, present a Federal guestion; and if yes, was it p. 510correctly decided by the court below that it was proper to a/uoard the amount of such fees in enforcing the bond ?*
The first branch of this question has already been disposed of by the reasons given and authorities cited in the consideration of the proposition previously passed upon. It is insisted, however, that such is not the case, because whilst it is true the courts of the United States exercise their authority under the Constitution and laws of the United States, that, as there is no express statutory authority regulating injunction bonds, therefore in determining the measure of liability on them no claim of immunity arising from an authority exercised under the United States can arise. But this is a mere form of restating the contention we have already disposed of. The test is not the particular source, 01 form by which the authority of the United States has been conferred or is exerted, but whether such authority existed and was exercised and an immunity is claimed under it.
Besides, by express provision of the Revised Statutes (sec. 617) proceedings of the courts of the United States in equity causes are subject to regulation by this court, with power to modify and change such rules. And rule No. 90, promulgated under the authority thus conferred, provides as follows:
“ In all cases where the rules prescribed by this court or by the Circuit Court do not apply, the practice of the circuit court shall be regulated by the present practice of the High Court of Chancery in England, so far as the same may be reasonably applied consistently with the local circumstances and local conveniences of the district where the court is held, not as positive rules, but as furnishing just analogies to regulate the practice.”
And it is by the force and effect of this rule that the equi y courts of the United States exercise their power with respect to the exaction of security when granting writs of injunction. Russell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 433. ,
It follows that proceedings in courts of equity of the Uni e States are regulated by rules promulgated by this court e riving their force from statutory authority, and the argumen which we have just considered, even if it were not erroneous, p. 511would be inapposite. The jurisdiction to review being then established, it remains only to consider whether the attorneys* fees were properly allowed by the court below as an element of damages on the bond. That they were not, is settled.
In Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Swayne, said (p. 230):
“ The decree of the court below was preceded by the report of a master, which the decree affirmed and followed. Upon looking into the report we find it clear and able, and we are entirely satisfied with it, except in one particular. We think that both the master and the court erred in allowing counsel fees, as a part of the damages covered by the bonds.
“ In Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306, decided by this court in 1796, it appeared ‘ by an estimate of the damages upon which the decree was founded, and which was annexed to the record, that a charge of $1600 for counsel fees in the courts below had been allowed.’ This court held that it1 ought not to have been allowed.’ The report is very brief. The nature of the case does not appear. It is the settled rule that counsel fees cannot be included in the damages to be recovered for the infringement of a patent. Tesse n. Huntingdon, 23 How. 2 (64 IT. S. XVI. 479); Whittemore v. Cutter, 1 Gall. 429 ; Stimson v. The Railroads, 1 Wall. Jr. 164. They cannot be allowed to the gaining side in admiralty as incident to the judgment beyond the costs and fees allowed by the statute. The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 378 (75 U. S. XIX. 463).
In actions of trespass where there are no circumstances of aggravation, only compensatory damages can be recovered, and they do not include the fees of counsel. The plaintiff is no more entitled to them, if he succeed, than is the defendant if the plaintiff be defeated. Why should a distinction be made between them ? In certain actions ex delicto vindictive damages may be given by the jury. In regard to that class of cases this court has said: ‘It is true that damages assessed by way of example may indirectly compensate the plaintiff for money ex-pen ed in counsel fees, but the amount of these fees cannot be a en as the measure of punishment or a necessary element in its infliction.’ Bay v. Woodworth, 13 How. 370, 371.
“ The point here in question has never been expressly decided by this court, but it is clearly within the reasoning of the case last referred to, and we think is substantially determined by that adjudication. In debt, covenant and assumpsit damages are recovered, but counsel fees are never included. So in equity cases, where there is no injunction bond, only the taxable costs are allowed to the complainants. The same rule is applied to the defendant, however unjust the litigation on the other side, and however large the expensa litis to which he may have been subjected. The parties in this respect are upon a footing of equality. There is no fixed standard by which the lionoror rium can be measured. Some counsel demand much more than others. Some clients are willing to pay more than others. More counsel may be employed then are necessary. When both client and counsel know that the fees are to be paid by the other party there is danger of abuse. A reference to a master, or an issue to a jury, might be necessary to ascertain the proper amount, and this grafted litigation might possibly be more animated and protracted than that in the original cause. It would be an office of some delicacy on the part of the court to scale down the charges, as might sometimes be necessary.
“We think the principle of disallowance rests on a solid foundation, and that the opposite rule is forbidden by the analogies of the law and sound public policy.”
It is strenuously urged, however, and this was in effect the view taken by the court below, that although the rule against allowing attorneys’ fees in actions on injunction bonds was thus settled by this court adverse to the right to recover such fees, as the local law was to the contrary, the injunction bond given in the Federal court must be enforced, not by the law of the forum in which it was given, but according to the rule o the local law. This proposition, again, hovrever, but embodies the contention that the question of the allowance of attorneys fees involved no Federal question, which has already been dis posed of. For if it be true, and it undoubtedly is, that the giv ing of such a bond was an act done pursuant to an authority exercised under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it must follow that the bond so taken is to be interpreted wit p. 513reference to the authority under which it was given and the principles of jurisprudence controlling such authority, and not by the local law. To hold the contrary, as we have previously pointed out, would be but to declare that although the power conferred by Congress upon this court to adopt equity rules is controlling, nevertheless the interpretations of the rules and the limitations which arise from a proper construction of them, as expounded by this court and enunciated in its decisions, are without avail. And this yet further points out the fallacy involved in the contention that the lower court, in passing upon the issues, decided merely a question of general law involving no Federal controversy. Now it is at once conceded that the decision by a state court of a question of local or of general law involving no Federal element does not as a matter of course present a Federal question. But where on the contrary a Federal element is specially averred and essentially involved, the duty of this court to apply to such Federal question its own conceptions of the general law we think is incontrovertible. Avery v. Popper, 179 U. S. 305, 315. . Whilst in the absence of authority the foregoing considerations suffice to dispose of the case, it is also effectually concluded by authority. Bein v. Heath, 12 How. 168. In that case, as in this, it was insisted that the local law should have been applied in construing and enforcing an injunction bond given in a court of the United States. But the court, in negativmg the contention, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taney,
Now, there is manifest error in subjecting the parties to an injunction bond, given in a proceeding in equity in a court o t e United States, to the laws of the State. The proceeding
Circuit Court of the United States in equity is regulated y t e laws of Congress, and the rules of this court made unT d 6 au^0r^y °f an a°k Congress. And the ninetieth th 6 r.e.C^ares that, when not otherwise directed, the practice of e igh Court of Chancery in England shall be followed, e eighth rule authorizes the Circuit Court, both judges con^ing, to modify the process and practice in their respective nets. But this applies only to forms of proceeding and vol. clxxxiv—33 p. 514mode of practice, and certainly would not authorize the adoption of the Louisiana law, defining the rights and obligations of parties to an injunction bond. Nor do we suppose any such rule has been adopted by the court. And if it has, it is unauthorized by law, and cannot regulate the rights or obligations of the parties.
“ And when an injunction is applied for in the Circuit Court of the United States sitting in Louisiana, the court may grant it or not, according to the established principles of equity, and not according to the laws and practice of the State in which there is no court of chancery, as contra-distinguished from a court of common law. And they require a bond, or not, from the complainant, with sureties, before the injunction issues, as the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may deem it proper for the purposes of justice. And if, in the judgment of the court, the principles of equity require that a bond should be given, it prescribes the penalty and the condition also. And the condition prescribed by the court in this case, but which wTas not followed, is the one usually directed by the court.
“ In proceeding upon such a bond, the court would have no authority to apply to it the legislative provisions of the State.”
Indeed, the principles announced in Bein v. Heath were in effect but the reiteration of the doctrine previously established by this court, that a bond given in pursuance of a law of the United States was governed, as to its construction, not by the local law of a particular State, but by the principles of law as determined by this court, and operative throughout the courts of the United States. Cox v. United States, 6 Pet. 172; Duncan’s Heirs v. United States, 7 Pet. 435.
It follows from what we have stated that there was error committed in allowing the recovery of attorneys’ fees as an element of damage upon the bond in question.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas must Vere versed, and the case remanded to that court for furt r proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, and it m s 0 ordered.
Fulleb, C. J., II a re an and Brown, JJ.} dissenting.
Mk. Justice Harlan, with whom concurred The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brown, dissenting.
This was an action in one of the courts of the State of Kansas upon an injunction bond executed in a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas—the condition of the bond being that the obligors would pay or cause to be paid to the obligees and to each of them, “alldamages which they, or either of them, have already sustained, or may at any time sustain, by reason of the granting and issuing of said restraining order, or the granting and issuing of said temporary injunction, if it shall be finally decided that said restraining order or said temporary injunction ought not to have been granted.”
There was a verdict and judgment against Tullock, one of the sureties in the bond. Mulvane, the plaintiff, being dissatisfied with the amount of the verdict and the rulings of the trial court, prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Kansas, where the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for another trial. Mulvane v. Tullock, 58 Kansas, 622. That court said (p. 632):
That counsel fees are recoverable as damages upon an injunction bond has been the uniform holding of this court from t e beginning, and this appears to be the view taken by most of the courts of the country. Underhill n. Spencer, 25 Kansas, 71;
ofborow v. Shaffer, 28 Kansas, 71; Loofborow n. Shaffer, 29 Jansas, 415; Nimocks v. Welles, 42 Kansas, 39; 10 Am. & Eng. ucy. of Law, 999, and cases cited. It appears, however, that ere are some decisions of the Federal courts to the contrary, o lng t at the obligation of an injunction bond imposes no is w i^e °^^or f° Pay the attorney’s fees if the injunction rongfully obtained. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dallas, 306; bond0 5 V Wall. 211. It is contended that, as the ?atio WaS ^1Ven.^n a case i*1 one of the Federal courts, the oblithos n interpreted in accordance with the decisions of Snnro cou^s- The claim is that the rules and decisions of the declarer °UI>t United States have the force of legislative ions; that they enter into, and become a part of, the
Fuller, C. J., Harlan and Brown, JJ., dissenting.
contract of the sureties, who can only be held liable for such consequences as are the direct result of the breach and were within their contemplation at the time the bond was executed. No statute, however, prescribed the conditions of the bond nor limited the extent of liability thereon. It is true that it was within the general equitable power of the Federal court to prescribe the conditions upon which the injunction should issue. It could have granted an injunction without requiring a bond, or it might, in its discretion, have imposed such terms as it saw fit as a condition of granting the injunction. It did require the giving of a bond, and the bond was executed in accordance with the order of the court. The bond executed is in the ordinary form; is in the nature of a contract; and the liability of the obligors depends, not on the Federal Constitution or a Congressional act, but on the proper interpretation of the bond itself. In the absence of a statute fixing the measure of damages or limiting the recovery, we think the bond should be viewed in the light of an independent contract, and is to be interpreted by the general principles of the common law. It is not a mere incident of the injunction proceeding, nor can this, which is an ordinary action at law, be regarded as auxiliary to the proceeding in the Federal court. Being an independent contract, actionable in any state court where service upon the sureties can be obtained, the interpretation of the forum applies. As the action on the bond could be brought in the state court and, in e, the present action could not have been brought in any ot er it cannot be said that the sureties contracted with reference o the view of the law taken by the Federal courts. They kne that the obligation was enforceable in the courts o e a of which the plaintiff and defendants were all residents, a that the highest court of that State had consistently e counsel fees were recoverable upon an injunction on • the bond was given in a Federal court, where a i eren of interpretation obtains, has not been deeme to a state court in determining the liability upon sue n. suit was brought thereon. Mitchell v. Hawley, a 301; Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad v. Shepley, 1 M • PF-
Fuller, C. J., Harlan and Brown, JJ., dissenting.
254; Wash. v. Lackland, 8 Mo. App. 122; Aiken v. Leathers, 40 La. Ann. 23; Corcoran v. Judson, 24 N. Y. 106.”
In addition to Corcoran v. Judson, 24 N. Y. 106, cited by the state court, see Coates v. Coates, 1 Duer, 664; Edwards v. Bodine, 11 Paige, 223, and Sedgwick on Damages, 177; also, Barton v. Fisk, 30 N. Y. 166, 171; Behrens v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333, 342; Ford v. Loomis, 62 Iowa, 566, 588; Cook n. Chapman, 41 N. J. Eq. 152, 154 ; Noble v. Arnold, 23 Ohio St. 264, 270; Morris v. Price, 2 Blackf. 457; Derry Bank n. Heath, 45 N. H. 524; Ryan v. Anderson, 25 Ill. 372 ; Garrett v. Logan, 19 Alabama, 344.
At the second trial Mulvane obtained a verdict and judgment which embraced his counsel fees in the injunction suit, and that judgment having been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kansas, (61 Kansas, 650,) it is sought to have it reviewed by this court, under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, upon the ground that by the action of the Supreme Court of Kansas the plaintiff in error, Tullock, was denied an “ immunity ” belonging to him under an “ authority exercised under the United States.” The immunity so claimed is that he, Tullock, was erroneously held to be liable for the attorneys’ fees which the obligee in such bond paid or became bound to pay in or about obtaining or dissolving the injunction in the suit in the Federal court.
Can this court review the action of the state court upon any such a question ? Is it true that the alleged “ immunity” arises from an “ authority exercised under the United States ? ”
In Avery v. Popper, 179 U. S. 305,314, 315, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Brown, said : “ With respect to writs of error rom this court to judgments of state courts in actions between purchasers under judicial proceedings in the Federal courts and parties making adverse claims to the property sold, the true e to be deduced from these authorities is this: That the writ Fed ^le validity or construction of the judgment of the eral court, or the regularity of the proceedings under the
execution, are assailed ; but if it be admitted that the judgment 1^v and those proceedings were regular, that the purchaser t e title of the defendant in the execution, and the issue es to the title to the property, as between the defendant
Fuller, C. J., Harlan and Brown, JJ., dissenting.
in the execution or the purchaser under it, and the party making the adverse claim, no Federal question is presented—in other words, it must appear that the decision was made against a right claimed under Federal authority, in the language of Rev. Stat. § 709.” Again: “ This was a question either of local law or of general law. If of local law, of course the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas is binding upon us. If of general law, as it involves no Federal element, it is equally binding in this proceeding, since only Federal rights are capable of being raised upon writs of error to state courts. Conceding that, if the question had arisen on appeal from a Circuit Court of the United States, we might have come to a different conclusion, it by no means follows that we can do so upon a writ of error to a state court, whose opinion upon a question of general law is not reviewable here.”
Surely this case does not involve a Federal immunity simply because the bond in suit was taken under the authority of the Circuit Court of the United States. If it does, then this court erred in its decision in Provident Savings Society v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635, (reaffirmed in many subsequent cases,) in which it was contended that a suit upon a judgment rendered by a Federal court necessarily involved questions arising under the laws of the United States. That contention was overruled. This court, speaking by Mr. Justice Bradley, said: “ What is a judgment, but a security of record showing a debt due from one person to another ? It is as much a mere security as a treasury note, or a bond of the United States. If A brings an action against B, trover or otherwise, for the withholding of such securities, it is not therefore a case arising under the laws of t e United States, although the whole value of the securities e pends upon the fact of their being the obligations of the Uni e States. So if A have title to land by patent of the United ta and brings an action against B for trespass or waste, commit by cutting timber, or by mining and carrying away precious ores, or the like, it is not therefore a case arising under t e of the United States. It is simply the case of an ordinary ng of property sought to be enforced. A suit on a judgmen nothing more, unless some question is raised in the case (as mi
Fuller, C. J., Harlan and Brown, JJ., dissenting.
be raised in any of the cases specified), distinctly involving the laws of the United States—such a question, for example, as was ineffectually attempted to be raised by the defendant in this case. If such a question were raised, then it is conceded it would be a case arising under the laws of the United States.”
In Blackburn n. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U. S. 571, it was held that the judgment of the Supreme Court of a State could not be reviewed simply because the case involved a contest between rival claimants of a mine under certain sections of the Revised Statutes. To the same effect are Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad Co. n. Bell, 176 U. S. 321; De Lamar’s Mining Co. n. Nesbitt, 177 U. S. 523; Shoshone Mining Co. v. Butter, 177 U. S. 505.
There is no question in this case as to the validity of any authority exercised under the United States. The only question is as to the rights of one party and the liabilities of the other party under an ordinary injunction bond. What those rights and liabilities are cannot be determined by reference to the Constitution or any statute of the United States. Nor has any rule been adopted by the Circuit Court of the United States limiting the legal effect of the words of the bond or declaring what damages should be covered by it. Of course, if Congress had enacted a statute prescribing the form of injunction bonds, and directing what liabilities should arise thereon against the obligors, that statute would control. But no such statute has been passed, and the question is left to be determined by the principles of general law.
Reference has been made to Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211, m support of the proposition that the question presents an immunity ” which exists under Federal authority. That case was brought in a Circuit Court of the United States. It does ecide that attorneys’ fee should not be allowed in a suit on “‘junction bonds. But there is in the opinion no hint even that e decision as to what damages can be allowed in such a suit rests upon a Federal ground. . On the contrary, the court, after C1hng some authorities, says that “ the principle of disallowance FdJ8 On a i°un(iation, and that the opposite view is for-1 en by the analogies of the law and sound policy.”
Fuller, C. J., Harlan and Brown, JJ., dissenting.
We have been referred also to Equity Rule 90 of this court, which declares that “ the practice of the Circuit Court shall be regulated by the present practice of the High Court of Chancery in England, so far as the same may be reasonably applied consistently with the local circumstances and local convenience of the district where the court is held, not as positive rules, but as furnishing just analogies to regulate the practice.” I cannot perceive that this rule has any pertinency, as it relates merely to practice, and not to the principles of law by which the rights and obligations of parties to injunction bonds are determinable.
Bein v. Heath, 12 How. 168, 178, has been cited as showing that in allowing attorneys’ fees the state court invaded a Federal right. That was a suit in the Circuit Court of the United States on an injunction bond taken in the same court. The trial court determined the case according to a statute of Louisiana defining the rights and obligations of the parties. This court held that “in proceeding upon such a bond, the court would have no authority to apply to it the legislative provisions of the State. The obligors would be answerable for any damage or cost which the adverse party sustained, by reason of the injunction, from the time it was issued until it was dissolved, but to nothing more. They would certainly not be liable for any aggravated interest on the debt, nor for the debt itself, unless it was lost by the delay, nor for the fees paid to the counsel for conducting the suit.” Absolutely nothing is to be found in the opinion of the court sustaining the proposition that the rights and obligations of the parties to an injunction bond are determinable upon any principle of a Federal nature. The court referred to the 90th and 8th Equity rules, as furnis ing authority for the taking of injunction bonds, but took care to say that those rules relate only to “ forms of proceeding an mode of practice,” and not to “ the rights and obligations o parties to injunction bonds.” And what was said in that case touching the rights and obligations of parties to injunction bonds was an expression of the views of the state court as the general principles of law applicable m such cases. apparent from the extract given in the opinion of the cou
Fuller, C. J., Harlan and Brown, JJ., dissenting.
from the opinion in Bein v. Heath. In Heyers v. Block, cited in the opinion in this case, 120 U. S. 206, 211, the court said that there was no question “ as to the power of a court of equity to impose any terms in its discretion as a condition of granting or continuing an injunction.” Bussell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 433. Consequently the terms being prescribed, their meaning, in the absence of a statute, depends upon general, not Federal law.
Cases have been cited which show that this court can reexamine the final judgment of the highest court of a State which fails to give due effect to a judgment, decree or order of a court of the United States. But such cases have no pertinency to the present discussion; for in the present case the state court did not disregard any judgment, decree or order of the Federal court. It did nothing more than enforce its views as to the rights and obligations of parties under a bond theretofore taken in a suit in a Federal court.
Beyers v. Block, cited in the opinion, shows that our jurisdiction in that case was maintained solely because the case involved the question whether the injunction bonds there in suit were in conformity with the order of the Federal court in which they were taken.
In TV F. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U. S. 287, which was brought here from the highest court of Virginia, it was said : “ The case, therefore, having been presented to the court below or decision upon principles of general law alone, and it nowhere appearing that the Constitution, laws, treaties or executive procamations of the United States were necessarily involved in the decision, we have no jurisdiction.” In United States v. Thomp-
93 U. S. 586, which came here from the highest court of aryland, and in which suit the United States was a party, seeking payment of a debt it held against an insolvent partnership, e court said: “ It is not contended that this decision is repugnant to the Constitution, or any law or treaty of the United ^ates; but the argument is, that, as the check of McFreely & popper was not paid, it did not pay their debt. Whether this Stat °r.no^ d°es n°b depend upon any statute of the United s> but upon the principles of general law alone. We have
Fuller, C. J., Harlan and Brown, JJ., dissenting.
many times held that we have no power to review the decisions of the State courts upon such questions. Bethel v. JDemaret, 10 Wall. 537; Delmas v. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 666 ; Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U. S. 287; Rockhold v. Rockhold, 92 U. S. 130.” In San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U. S. 268, referring to the question as to the effect of an alcalde grant of the pueblo title, and which was decided by the Supreme Court of California, it was said: “ This does not depend on any legislation of Congress, or on the terms of the treaty, but on the effect of the conquest upon the powers of local government in the pueblo under the Mexican laws. That is a question of general public law, as to which the decisions of the state court are not reviewable here. This has been many times decided.”
Let it be observed that the jurisdiction of the state court, as between the parties and as to the subject-matter, is not disputed. The question before it was as to the extent of the liability of the sureties in the injunction bond. The decision of that question did not depend, in any degree, upon the Constitution or statutes of the United States. It depended entirely upon the meaning of the words of the bond, and the principles of law applicable to such an instrument. It was manifestly, therefore, a question of general law as distinguished from Federal law. Upon such a question the state court was entitled to give effect to its own views. The question could not become a question of Federal law by reason alone of the fact that the bond was executed under the authority of the Circuit Court; for, as already said, neither the order under which the bond was taken, the validity of the bond nor the authority of the court was disputed. Nor could it become a Federal question because of any decision by this court in cases theretofore decided between other parties. Sup pose this court had not, prior to the trial of this case, express any opinion upon that question of general law. Could it then have been contended that the judgment complained of denied any Federal immunity ? If not, then the Federal immunity now claimed arises entirely from the failure of the state court to ta e the same view of a question of general law which this court too in prior cases between other parties. There has been a wi ® difference of opinion between this court and some of the s a
Fullee, C. J., Hablan and Beown, JJ., dissenting.
courts upon certain questions of general law. But it has never been supposed that any one has such a vested interest in the views of this court upon questions of general law that he may complain of the refusal of a state court to accept those views as denying him an “ immunity ” existing or belonging to him, in virtue of an “ authority exercised under the United States.” In Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. Plainview, 143 U. S. 371, 390, which came to this court from the highest court of Minnesota, it was said: “ The fact that the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the present cases, did not acquiesce in the correctness of the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States, did not constitute a Federal question. Neither the Constitution of the United States nor any act of Congress guarantees to a suitor that the same rule of law shall be applied to him by a state court which would be applied if his citizenship were such that his suit might be brought in a Federal court.”
Or, suppose two actions were brought in the Federal court (there being diversity of citizenship in each case) one on an injunction bond executed in a Circuit Court of the United States, and the other upon a like bond executed in a state court. What would be the ruling as to the measure of damages? Would the court disallow counsel fees in the first case and allow them in the second case where the highest court of the State had established the principle that counsel fees could be recovered ? Each branch of the latter question must, upon the principles of the opinion just delivered, be answered in the affirmative. But they cannot be so answered without placing the decisions of the courts upon a question of general law, on the same basis as a legislative enactment prescribing the measure of damages in suits on injunction bonds.
Being unable to assent to the principle that a Federal immuni y arises when a state court, in determining a question not involving the Constitution or laws of the United States nor the validity of an authority exercised under the United States, reaches a conclusion upon a question of general law different rom that announced in prior cases by this court and denying our authority to compel a state court to disregard its own views p. 524upon a question of general law, I am constrained to dissent from the opinion and judgment.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice Brown concur in this opinion.
MONROE v. UNITED STATES.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
. No. 98. Submitted January 14,1902.—Decided March 10,1902.
The approval of the Chief of Engineers was necessary to the legal consummation of the contract in this case.
A final reviewing and approving judgment was given to the Chief of Engineers, by a covenant so expressed as to constitute a condition precedent to the taking effect of the contract.
The contract was not approved, and the legal consequence of that cannot be escaped.
The appellants brought suit against the United States in the Court of Claims for the sum of $25,485.89, for expenses incurred and for damages. The latter consisted of losses suffered by them by the breach of a contract entered into by the United States through W. S. Marshall, Captain in the Corps of Engineers. The contract was made in pursuance of an advertisement made by the United States, inviting proposals for constructing a canal to be known as the Illinois and Mississippi Canal, upon the terms, conditions and specifications set forth in an ex i i which was attached to and made a part of the petition.
The contract contained the following clause: “ This contrac shall be subject to approval of the Chief of Engineers, nite States Army.” There was no averment that the contract a been so approved, and the United States demurred. e ® murrer stated: “ Not only does the contract itself, a copy o w i is attached as above, fail to show that the same was ever approve by the Chief of Engineers, U. S. A., but the testimony in p. 525case fully and conclusively shows, and the same is not denied by the claimant, that said contract has never been approved by the said Chief of Engineers, U. S. A., in any manner whatsoever.”
It was prayed that the petition “ be quashed and the action be dismissed accordingly.”
The action of the court is expressed in the following order: “Allowed in part and judgment for defendants on findings of fact filed.”
As a conclusion of law from the findings the court ordered the petition dismissed and a formal judgment was entered accordingly. 35 Court of Claims Rep. 199. This appeal was then taken.
The findings of fact are as follows:
On or about the 25th of May, 1892, the United States through W. S. Marshall, a Captain in its Corps of Engineers, advertised for proposals for constructing a canal to be known as the Illinois and Mississippi Canal. The claimants submitted a bid to do certain parts of the work. The bid was accepted by Captain Marshall, acting under an authority contained in a letter from the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army.
“On the 20th day of July, 1892, Captain Marshall forwarded to claimants the formal contract, annexed to and forming part of the petition, and bonds to be executed within ten days thereafter, all which claimants fully executed and returned to the said engineer on the 28th day of July, 1892, which formal contract was duly signed by Captain Marshall. The form of the contract had been prepared by the Chief of Engineers and forwarded to Captain Marshall for use in such cases.
Immediately upon receiving notice of the acceptance of their said bid claimants began preparation for the commencement of said work. They shipped their plant from Portsmouth, hio, to Rock Island, Ill.; rented and furnished a boat and had t e same taken to Rock River, in the vicinity of the work, to e used as a boarding house for men employed on the work; uilt stables for their teams; hired men and teams; purchased a arge amount of plant, consisting of shovels, plows, scrapers an the like, and generally equipped themselves in a proper p. 526manner to expeditiously perform the work, and commenced the work with men and teams about the 1st day of August, 1892.
“ On the 6th day of August, 1892, without fault on their part and while the work was progressing, claimants were stopped by the United States and their contract abrogated against their consent, and the work that they had contracted to do readvertised, for the alleged reason that by the act of August 1, 1892, no work could be prosecuted by the United States without a stipulation in the contract binding the contractor not to permit his workmen to labor more than eight hours per day, and the United States refused to permit claimants to continue the work either under the terms of the contract or under the terms of the law of August 1,1892, but immediately, and against the protest of claimants, readvertised and let the said work to other parties.
“ In the prosecution of said work under said contract, prior to the abrogation thereof on August 6, 1892, claimants expended the sum of $678.21, which has not been paid to them.
“ By reason of the abrogation of said contract claimants lost the following sums expended and were deprived of the following profits which they would have made in the execution of said work:
“ Expenses incurred............................................... $ 678 21 “Profits if they had been permitted toperform.. .7150 00’
Jfr. John C. Fay for appellants.
Air. Assistant Attorney General Pradt and Air. Fra/nldin IT. Collins for appellees.’
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.
We agree with counsel that the question in the case is a nar row one. It is not denied that the approval of the Chief o Engineers was necessary to the legal consummation of the con tract. It is, however, insisted that the approval was not required to be formally expressed, but could and did consist o p. 527acts preceding the written instrument, though the latter contained the terms and covenants of the parties. In other words, it is contended that the advertisement, claimants’ bid made undercompetition, which was submitted to the Chief of Engineers, who, after some correspondence with the engineer in Chicago in relation thereto, had in writing directed it to be accepted, the preparation of the formal contract on a blank furnished by the Chief of Engineers, its execution by both the officer in charge and the claimants, in due form and in strict accordance with the provision of section 3744 of the Revised Statutes, constituted an approval.
We are unable to assent to this view. It is the final written instrument that the statute contemplates shall be executed and signed by the parties, and which shall contain and be the proof of their obligations and rights. And it was such written instrument that was to be approved by the Chief of Engineers. The approval was to be a future act. The provision of the contract was: “This contract” (that is, the instrument to which the contracting officer and the claimants attached their signatures and seals) “ shall be subject to approval of the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army.” The approval, therefore, did not consist of something precedent, but was to consist of something subsequent. That which preceded was inducement only, and contemplated an instrument of binding and remedial form, and hence to contain covenants imposing o ligations and giving rights and remedies, containing provisions for the time of performance and the manner of it; provisions for changes and for extra work—indeed, of the pro-visons which prudence and necessity require and those which e statutes of the United States might require. And the final
rio t to see that this was done, the parties agreed, should be evo yed on the Chief of Engineers, and it was not satisfied
y prior instructions. In other words, a final reviewing and
^Uc^men^ was given to the Chief of Engineers, and given by a covenant so expressed as to constitute a condiena taking effect of the contract. If the covtive’t h mean that, it was idle. Construed as prospec-
’1 a natural purpose. The engagement of the parties p. 528did not end with the bid and its acceptance. The performance of the work was to be secured, and the final judgment of what was necessary for that, as we have already said, was to be given by the Chief of Engineers.
The case of United States v. Speed, 8 Wall. 78, cited by appellants, is not apposite. In that case the facts were that the Secretary of War, through the Commissary General, “authorized Major Simonds, at Louisville, in October, 1864, and during the late rebellion, to buy hogs and enter into contracts for slaughtering and packing them to furnish pork for the army. On the 27th of October, Simonds, for the United States, and Speed, made a contract by which the live hogs, the cooperage, salt and other necessary materials, were to be delivered to Speed by the United States, and he was to do the work of slaughtering and packing. The contract was agreed to be subject to the approval of the Commissary General of Subsistence. No advertisements for bids or proposals were put out before making the contract, nor did the contract contain a provision that it should terminate at such times as the Commissary General of Subsistence should direct. After the contract was made, Simonds wrote—as the facts were found under the rules, by the Court of Claims, to be—to the Commissary General, informing him substantially of its terms; but no copy of it nor the contract itself was presented to the Commissary General for formal approval. The Commissary General thereupon wrote to Simonds, expressing his satisfaction at the progress made, and adding: ‘ The whole subject of porkpacking at Louisville is placed subject to your direction under the advice of Colonel Kilburn.’ ”
After reciting those facts this court said by Mr. Justice Miller: “We are of the opinion that, taking all this together, it is a finding by the court as a question of fact that the contract was approved by that officer; and inasmuch as neither the instrument itself nor any rule of law prescribes the mode in whic this approval shall be evidenced, that a jury would have been justified in finding as the court did.”
In United States v. Speed, therefore, the acts which were e to constitute an approval of the contract relied upon were p. 529subsequent to the contract, and referred to it. In the case at bar it is stated in the opinion of the Court of Claims that after the contract was signed it was mailed “ to the Chief of Engineers in Washington for his approval,” and that “ it was immediately disapproved and returned to the officer (engineer in charge at Chicago) with instructions to readvertise the work.”
The declaration, in the opinion of the Court of Claims, that the contract was disapproved, is asserted to be incorrect by claimants, and the findings are quoted to show that the contract was abrogated, not disapproved. That is undoubtedly the expression of the finding, but its meaning is manifest. An order to the officer in charge to abrogate the contract was certainly a very definite and unmistakable disapproval of it. At any rate, there was no approval of it, and that was a necessary condition to its final effect and obligation.
It is further urged that the terms of the contract were not disapproved, and that the action of the Chief of Engineers was “for the alleged reason that by the act of August 1, 1892, no work could be prosecuted by the United States without a stipulation in the contract binding the contractor not to permit his workmen to labor more than eight hours per day.” It may be assumed that the Chief of Engineers considered that the contract took effect by his approval, and that if he approved it he would incur the penalties of the statute. . But however that may be, the reasons for his action is not open to our inquiry. The contract was not approved, and how can the legal consequence of that be escaped ? We could not have compelled the approval of the contract, and we cannot treat it as approved an adjudge rights as upon the performance of a condition which was not performed.
This case has some features of hardship. They are, however, exp ained and somewhat lessened by the facts stated in the 0P(<qn.n ^ourt Appeals. It is there stated: . The contract bears date the 19th July, 1892. It provides n rms that the contractors ‘ shall commence work on or before e st day of August, 1892,’ but it appears by evidence aliunde p. 530rections; that it was not finally mailed for signature until the 27th of July, 1892, and that it was not signed by the contractors until some day between the 27th of July and the 1st of August, 1892. On the faith of the agreement executed by the contracting officer, but without his knowledge or direction, the contractors proceeded to make ready for their work and, indeed, performed, to some extent, incurring thereby a loss of $678.21.”
*
e instrument was not mailed to the conttactors for sigature until the 20th July, 1892; that it was returned for cor-vol. clxxxiv —34
And further, that “ the work was done without the knowledge or direction of the officer in charge, and no benefit resulted thereby to the defendants” (United States).
Judgment affirmed.