New Orleans & Ne. R.R. Co. v. Nat'l Rice Milling Co., 234 U.S. 80 (1914)
Case details
Citation
234 U.S. 80
Full caption
NEW ORLEANS & NORTHEASTERN RAILROAD CO. v. NATIONAL RICE MILLING CO.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 25, 1914
Majority
Van Devanter (Justice)
NEW ORLEANS & NORTHEASTERN RAILROAD
CO. v. NATIONAL RICE MILLING CO.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.
No. 615. Argued February 27, 1914.—Decided May 25, 1914.
Where the judgment of a state court rests upon an independent ground not only adequate to sustain it but in entire harmony with an asserted Federal right, there is no denial of that right in the sense contemplated by § 237 of the Judicial Code, and the writ of error will be dismissed.
Where the initial carrier sets up the Carmack Amendment and also denies negligence, but the state court finds from conflicting evidence that the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the connecting carrier, the judgment rests on that finding as an independent ground, and this court has not jurisdiction.
A party is entitled to the benefit of all the testimony in the case from whatever source it comes; and, although having the burden of proof, need not prove any fact otherwise established.
Writ of error to review 132 Louisiana, 615, dismissed.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of a state court within § 237, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. J. Blanc Monroe, with whom Mr. John K. Graves and Mr. Monte M. Lemann were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:
The sole issue in the case is not merely an issue of fact; nor is the Federal question frivolous.
The judgment of the lower court does not rest upon a question of general law, broad enough to sustain it, so that the decision of the Federal question is unnecessary.
In support of these contentions, see Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Maryland, 20 Wall. 643; Creswill v. Grand Lodge, 225 U. S. 246; Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658; Elam v. St. Louis &c. R. R. Co., 93 S. W. Rep. 851; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592; International R. R. Co. v. Gergman, 64 S. W. Rep. 999; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Albers Com. Co., 223 U. S. 573; Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79; Mackay v. Dillon, 4 How. 421 ; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589; Memphis R. R. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; Schlemmer v. Buffalo &c. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 1; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255; Terre Haute v. Indianapolis &c. Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 579.
Mr. W. Catesby Jones, with whom Mr. Gustave Lemle and Mr. Arthur A. Moreno were on the brief, for defendant in error.
Mr . Justice Van De vante r delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action to recover the value of two cars of rice destroyed by fire in August, 1908, while being transported over connecting railroads from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Charleston, South Carolina. The rice was shipped upon through bills of lading issued by the initial carrier and was destroyed while in the second carrier’s custody at Old Hamburg, South Carolina. The two cars, with others vol . ccxxxiv—6 p. 82containing quicklime, were side-tracked in the yard at that place awaiting further movement towards their destination. The yard adjoined the Savannah River, which was then almost out of its banks and steadily rising as a result of extraordinary rains and cloudbursts extending up the river and its tributaries one hundred miles. The waters continued to rise, spread over the yard to a considerable depth, and ultimately reached the quicklime, thereby causing the cars to burn and destroying the rice. The cars had been in the yard about sixteen hours when the fire started. The action was against both carriers, and it was alleged in the petition, which based the right of recovery upon the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, 595, c. 3591, § 7), that the loss of the rice was caused by the negligence of the second carrier, and that the two carriers were jointly liable. Issue was joined, and, after a trial, the district court of the parish rendered a judgment against the carriers jointly and in solido, which the Supreme Court of the State at first reversed and then, after a rehearing, affirmed. 132 Louisiana, 615; 61 So. Rep. 708. The carriers sued out this writ of error, basing their right so to do upon a claim that by the judgment of affirmance they were denied a right or immunity asserted under a
law of the United States.
A motion to dismiss was presented along with the merits, and we think it is well taken.
The bills of lading contained these stipulations:
“This company or other carriers over whose line the property may pass, shall not be held responsible for loss or damage [unless through proved carelessness or negligence of their employés] resulting . . . from heat, cold, fire, flood, storms, mobs or other causes not subject to the car tier’s control.
“Neither this company nor any of its connecting car riers shall be liable for any damage to, or destruction o p. 83said property by fire, unless such damage or destruction shall result directly and exclusively from their negligence or that of their employés, and unless such negligence shall be affirmatively established by the owner of said property.”
In the Supreme Court of the State the carriers contended that, under the combined operation of the Carmack Amendment as interpreted in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, the stipulations in the bills of lading, and the common-law rule applied in Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176, and other cases,1 they were entitled to exoneration upon showing that the rice was destroyed by the extraordinary flood, unless it also was shown that the second carrier contributed to the loss by negligently failing to take reasonable precautions to avoid it when the rising waters gave warning of the danger; and it was particularly urged as a part of this contention that the burden was upon the plaintiff to show such negligence, and not upon the carriers to show the absence of it. But the court, although disapproving the latter phase of the contention and thinking the carriers were charged by the law of Louisiana with the burden of showing that there was no negligence, did not rest its judgment upon that ground. On the contrary, it examined the evidence, which comprehensively covered the subject, to ascertain whether, upon the hypothesis that the contention of the carriers was sound, they were liable, and from that examination it found as matter of fact that the second carrier had negligently permitted the cars of rice to remain within the influence of the rising flood and in immediate proximity to the quicklime when ordinary prudence required that they be moved to a place of safety; and that this was
1 Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 272, 280, 281, 283; Transportation Co. v. owner, 11 Wall. 129, 133; Cau v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 194 U- 8,427,432.
made an independent ground of the judgment is shown by the court’s extended discussion of the evidence and by the following excerpts from its opinion:
“A close reading of the evidence compels the conclusion that there was not sufficient forethought on the part of the officers in charge of the railroad yards. We have seen that the river was rising rapidly on the morning of the 26th of August. Some of the witnesses testified that by 7 o’clock it had covered the switch tracks, and yet nothing was done to protect property. Leisurely enough, the employes went about their business and gave very little concern to the rising waters. Those who did attempt to save property (if what they did can be considered in that light) displayed very little activity, beginning at 8 o’clock, taking out a few cars and leaving others in the Old Hamburg yards. That is all they did. These yards were submerged by water to a height above the floor of the cars. The question arises: Was it possible, before the waters reached their greatest height, to move the cars to a safer place than where they were hauled to on the morning of the 26th of August; that is, to the Old Hamburg yards? We have noted, before 8 o’clock or 8.30 o’clock a. m., not the least attempt was made to move the cars out of the yard where they had been placed. Mr. Benson, inspector of the Southern Railway Company, testified that on the morning of the 26th of August, he reported at the Hamburg yard at 7 o’clock to go to work, and at that time the water had just reached the rail in front of the block office. There were a crew and an engine in the yard. Why were they not put at work at that time to save the freight?
“Another witness, the night operator, renders it still more evident that it was possible to move the train in the morning, for he says that when he went to work the yard was entirely free from water on the 26th of August in the morning. An attempt was made to rescue the cars between 8 and half past 8 o’clock a. m. It failed. They p. 85went too late to rescue these cars. There had been ample time to save them. (132 Louisiana, p. 643.)
********
“These floods were frequent, and yet defendant remained indifferent, and even sent its cars to the lowest places on the yard, where they were permitted to remain without making a serious and timely attempt to take them away.
“From all this evidence we are led to the inference, which we think is positive, that there was negligence. A little timely activity would have brought about a different result, and would have saved plaintiff’s property, or would have placed defendant in a position to successfully defend itself.
“Unquestionably the river was rising rapidly on the morning of the 26th at 7 o’clock; in 35 minutes it covered the switch tracks. It does not seem that anything was done to prevent the destruction of the cars. Leisurely enough, the employés, went about their respective occupations, and now, when they give an account of themselves, it does seem as if they wish to lay all the trouble on the rising waters, although they remained indifferent when they should have exerted themselves (p. 645).
* * * * * * * * ‘Admitting for a moment.all that is claimed under the Carmack Amendment, under any of the laws of this coun-
try, indifferent railroad people, who receive freight to be transported some distance, and who, just before the waters of a storm have flowed down, stop the cars on the way, and run them to the lowest part of their yards, and place them next to cars loaded with quicklime, easily ignited by water, and leave them at that place while other cars are taken out, and who make no attempt to haul them out, although the waters are rising slowly enough for such work after warning given, are not protected from the charge of negligence under the law” (p. 649)/
Syllabus. 234 U. S.
True, the testimony upon which the court rested its conclusion that negligence was proved did not come from the plaintiff’s witnesses but from those for the carriers, and was largely elicited by cross-examination, but that is quite immaterial. The plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of all the testimony in the case, from whatever source it came, and was not required, even though having the burden of proof, to go through the ceremony of proving any fact otherwise established.
As it clearly appears that the judgment rested upon a ground which was not only adequate to sustain it but in entire harmony with the carrier’s asserted Federal right, it cannot be said that there was a denial of that right in the sense contemplated by § 237 of the Judicial Code. Whether the right was well founded we therefore need not consider.
Wrii of error dismissed.
WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY v. HAYES.
ERROR TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT.
No. 843. Motion to dismiss submitted April 27,1914.—Decided May 25, 1914.
Plaintiff, an injured employé of an interstate common carrier by rail, sued for personal injury, alleging that he was employed in interstate commerce, and stating a good cause of action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, if so employed, and, if not, under the state law; the defendant asked for an instruction that the proof did not show that the injury occurred in interstate commerce, which the court gave, and then, over defendant’s objection, treated the allegation to that effect as eliminated from the declaration and submitted the case to the jury as one under the state law, and plaint p. 87234 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error.
had a verdict. Held, that defendant having asked for the instruction that the case could not be maintained under the Federal act, was bound thereby, and, therefore, was denied no right under the Federal law by the action of the state court, and the writ of error must be dismissed. Where the state court treats a mistaken allegation that the injury
occurred in interstate commerce as eliminated, it merely gives effect to a rule of local practice and does not deprive defendant of any Federal right. Quœre, as to what the effect would be if the shift from a claim under the
Federal act to one under the state law cut the defendant off from presenting a defense open under the latter or deprived him of a right of removal. Writ of error to review 180 Ill. App. 511, dismissed.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review a judgment of the state court in an action by a railroad employé for personal injuries which did not occur in interstate commerce, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Jâmes C. McShane for defendant in error in support of the motion.
Mr. J. L. Minnis, Mr. John M. Zane and Mr. Charles F. Morse for plaintiff in error, in opposition to the motion :
A Federal question is here involved; the Federal right was claimed and denied in the state court.
This court has jurisdiction of this writ of error.
In support of these contentions, see Acardo v. N. Y. &c. T. Co., 116 App. Div. N. Y. 793; Adams v. Capital State Bank, 74 Mississippi, 307; Atkinson v. Bullard, 80 S. E. Hep. 220; Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142; C.&G. T.R. Co. v. Spurney, 197 Illinois, 471 ; Clark v. Southern Pacific Co., 175 Fed. Rep. 122; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, 97 Ill. App. 188; Cound v. Atchison &c. Ry. Co., 173 Fed. Rep. 527 ; El Paso &c. R. R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87; Erie R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 191 Fed. Rep. 332; Green Bay &c. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U. S. 58; p. 88Hall v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 149 Fed. Rep. 564; Howerton v. Southern Ry. Co., 101 N. E. Rep. 121; III. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 218 U. S. 551; Jones v. C. & 0. R. Co., 149 Kentucky, 566; Ky. Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140; Kleps v. Bristol Mfg. Co., 189 N. Y. 516; Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181U. S. 589; McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458; Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1; Nor. Car. R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248; Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12; Payne v. N. Y. &c. R. Co., 201 N. Y. 436; Payne v. N. Y., 8. & TF. R. R. Co., 201 N. Y. 436; Powell v. Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 440; St. Louis &c. R. Goi v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265; Troxell v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., 227 U. S. 434; Vandalia R. Co. v. South Rend, 207 U. S. 359.
Mr . Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action against a railroad company to recover for a personal injury sustained by the plaintiff through the negligence of the company while he was employed as a switchman in its railroad yard in Cook County, Illinois. The action was brought in the Superior Court of that county, and a trial to the court and a jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for that district (180 Ill. App. 511), which was the highest court of the State in which a decision of the case could be had, and this writ of error was then sued out by the company. By a motion to dismiss the writ our jurisdiction to review the judgment is challenged. Shortly stated, the facts bearing upon the disposition of the motion are these:
The plaintiff’s declaration alleged that the injury occurred while the defendant was engaged, and while the plaintiff was employed by it, in interstate commerce. The p. 89other allegations were such that, with that one, they stated a good cause of action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149, and, without it, they stated a good cause of action under the common law prevailing in the State. There was a plea of not guilty; and upon the trial, the proof failing to show that the injury occurred in interstate commerce, the court, at the defendant’s request, instructed the jury that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act had no application to the case. Then, over the defendant’s objection, the court treated the allegation respecting interstate commerce as eliminated, and submitted the case to the jury as one controlled by the common law prevailing in the State. The plaintiff recovered under that law. In the Appellate Court the defendant contended that, even though the allegation that the injury occurred in interstate commerce proved unwarranted, the declaration could not be treated, consistently with the Federal act, as affording any basis for a recovery under the law of the State, common or statutory. But the court held otherwise and sustained the recovery under the state law. Whether that ruling operated as a denial of a right or immunity to which the defendant was entitled under the Federal act is the question, and the only question, Sought to be presented by the assignments of error.
Had the injury occurred in interstate commerce, as was alleged, the Federal act undoubtedly would have been controlling and a recovery could not have been had under the common or statute law of the State; in other words, the Federal act would have been exclusive in its operation, not merely cumulative. Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 223 U. S. 1, 53-55; St. Louis &c. Railway Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 158; North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248,256; Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492. On t e other hand, if the injury occurred outside of interstate p. 90commerce, the Federal act was without application and the law of the State was controlling. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473. That the injury did occur outside of interstate commerce was declared in the court’s instruction to the jury, and the defendant, having requested the instruction, is bound by it. It therefore must be taken as settled that the right of recovery arose under the state law.
The plaintiff asserted only one right to recover for the injury, and in the nature of things he could have but one. Whether it arose under the Federal act or under the state law, it was equally cognizable in the state court; and had it been presented in an alternative way in separate counts, one containing and another omitting the allegation that the injury occurred in interstate commerce, the propriety of proceeding to a judgment under the latter count, after it appeared that the first could not be sustained, doubtless would have been freely conceded. Certainly, nothing in the Federal act would have been in the way.
Instead of presenting his case in an alternative way, the plaintiff so stated it as to indicate that he was claiming only under the Federal act. And when the proofs demonstrated that the injury arose outside of interstate commerce and therefore that no recovery could be had under the Federal act, the court was confronted with the question whether the declaration could be amended, or regarded as amended, to conform to the proofs. Holding that this could be done, the court treated the mistaken allegation that the injury occurred in interstate commerce as eliminated. Therein the court merely gave effect to a rule of local practice, the application of which was not in anywise in contravention of the Federal act. See Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., supra, pp. 56-57.
It follows that the contention that the defendant was denied a right or immunity to which it was entitled under p. 91234 U. S. Syllabus.
the Federal act is not only untenable but so devoid of color as to furnish no basis for this writ of error. See Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U. S. 154.
As it is not claimed that by reason of the shifting from one law to the other the defendant was cut off from presenting any defense which was open only under the latter, or that the course taken by the plaintiff deprived the defendant of a right of removal otherwise existing, we intimate no opinion in either connection.
Writ of error dismissed.