N.C. R.R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248 (1914)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
N.C. R.R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248 (1914)
Full caption
NORTH CAROLINA RAILROAD COMPANY v. ZACHARY, ADMINISTRATOR OF BURGESS.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 2, 1914
NORTH CAROLINA RAILROAD COMPANY v.
ZACHARY, ADMINISTRATOR OF BURGESS.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA.
No. 144. Argued December 17, 18, 1913.—Decided February 2, 1914.
In order to bring a case within the terms of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, the defendant must have been, at the time of the occurrence, engaged as a common carrier in interstate commerce and the injured employ^ must have been employed by such carrier in such commerce.
Where the defendant is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce and the employ6 for whose injuries the suit is brought was employed by the defendant in such commerce, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 governs to the exclusion of the state statutes.
Where the state court improperly refuses to apply the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in an action for injuries to an employ^ of a common carrier while both employer and employ^ were engaged in interstate commerce and the result might have been different, the judgment must be reversed.
The persons related to the deceased employ^ as specified in the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 are the beneficiaries of an action prescribed by the act and the damages are to be based upon the pecuniary loss sustained by such beneficiaries.
Whether the question of employment by the deceased employ^ in interstate commerce was properly raised in the state court as a bar to the action in accordance with the local code, is a question of state practice, and if the highest court of the State assumed or decided that the record presented that question and decided it against the party asserting it, this court has jurisdiction to review the judgment under § 237, Judicial Code.
A railroad company, leasing its entire line, which is wholly intrastate, to another railroad company doing an interstate business creates the latter its agent and becomes a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce; and if under the local law the lessor remains responsible for the lessee’s acts, the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 [p. 249] controls as to liability for injuries to employes of the lessee engaged in interstate commerce.
Where, upon the evidence, any essential matter bearing on the question of whether an employe of a railroad company was, at the time of the injury, engaged in interstate commerce is in doubt, it should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions.
Where the state court refused to submit questions to the jury on the ground that there was no evidence to sustain the Federal right asserted, this court will analyze the evidence to the extent necessary to give plaintiff in error the benefit of such Federal right if it was improperly denied. Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601. When a freight train for an intrastate point is being made up of cars including some from a train which started from another State, it is a reasonable inference that such cars were being carried forward as a part of a through movement of interstate commerce.
Hauling empty cars from one State to another is interstate commerce within the meaning of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908.
The Employers’ Liability Act is in pari materia with the Safety Appliance Act, and this court, following its rulings in regard to the latter, holds that the hauling of empty cars from one State to another is interstate commerce within the meaning of the act. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 146 U. S. 1.
Acts of an employ^ in preparing an engine for a trip to move freight in interstate commerce, although done prior to the actual coupling up of the interstate cars, are acts done while engaged in interstate commerce.
Although absent temporarily from his train for a short time for a purpose not inconsistent with his duty to his employer, a railroad employ6 may still be on duty and engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908.
156 Nor. Car. 496, reversed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 and its application to employes engaged in hauling interstate cars between intrastate points, and also to the owner of an intrastate railroad which it has leased to a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. John K. Graves for plaintiff in error:
As the Federal act applies, the judgment must be [p. 250] reversed as the record discloses neither allegation nor proof of the existence of any beneficiary or beneficiaries designated in the Federal act. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59; Gulf &c. Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173.
The testimony clearly shows that the cars were in the course of a through interstate journey and were therefore employed in interstate commerce regardless of whether they were loaded or empty. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1, 21; Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Maerkl, 198 Fed. Rep. 1; Pedersen v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146.
The preparation of the engine was an interstate service and the fireman while engaged in that service was employed in interstate commerce. Pedersen v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146.
The pleadings establish the status of the deceased as employed in his duties as fireman at the time of the accident, especially when it is observed that the action is brought and sought to be maintained under the so-called Fellow-servant Act of North Carolina (§ 2646, Nor. Car. Revisal, 1908), which provides for the recovery of damages by an employ^ of any railroad injured or killed in the course of his services or employment, etc.
Nothing in the evidence tends in any way to throw a different light upon the status of the deceased at the time of the accident. If deceased was on duty at the time of the accident such duty must be assigned to his employment as fireman on an engine which was being prepared for a [p. 251] movement in interstate commerce. Second Employers1 Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1.
The deceased’s status as a servant on duty having been established, this status had not been broken nor had it ceased. Missouri &c. R. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 112; Kitchenham v. /S. >S. Johannesburg, L. R. App. Cases, 1911, p. 417; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Tucker, 35 App. D. C. 123; Ewald v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 70 Wisconsin, 420; Boldt v. New York &c. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 432; United States v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 197 Fed. Rep. 624. See also to the same effect: United States v. Atchison &c. R. Co., 220 U. S. 37; United States v. Denver &c. R. Co., 197 Fed. Rep. 629; United States v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 189 Fed. Rep. 471; United States v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 189 Fed. Rep. 954.
The situation is not affected by the fact that the lessor and not the lessee who was operating the railroad is sued.
, In enacting the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, Congress undertook to cover the relation of master and servant with respect to injuries or death suffered by the servant in railroad service when the master and the servant were engaged in interstate commerce. Congress intended to go to the limit of its constitutional power as to every one in fact occupying the position or relation of master with respect to injuries to servants employed in interstate commerce on railroads engaging in interstate commerce. Colasurdo v. Central R. R. Co., 180 Fed. Rep. 832.
This case falls within the scope of the act.
Even assuming that the state court was correct in its suggestion that the plaintiff in error was not itself engaged in interstate commerce if § 1 only of the Federal act is considered, under § 7 the term “common carrier” includes the receiver or receivers or other persons or corporations charged with the duty of the management and operation of the business of a common carrier, and this includes as [p. 252] lessor the plaintiff in error. Logan v. North Carolina R. Co., 116 Nor. Car. 941.
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act applies to the cause of action presented in this case to the exclusion of the state law.
Mr. Thomas H. Calvert, with whom Mr. John A. Barringer and Mr. George S. Bradshaw were on the brief, for defendant in error:
The North Carolina Railroad Co. is not a common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States. Its tracks and property lie wholly within the State of North Carolina. It is in existence, has its officers and directors, receives its annual rents from its lessee, the Southern Railway Company, and distributes them among its stockholders; but it is not an interstate carrier within the meaning of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. While Logan v. Railroad Co., 116 Nor. Car. 941, has held that this lessor is responsible for all acts of negligence of its lessee, that is because a railroad corporation cannot escape its responsibility by leasing its road.
Plaintiff in error had the right and the opportunity to make its lessee, the Southern Railway Company, a party defendant.
On the pleadings, if there had been any evidence tending to show that the deceased was engaged in interstate service, it would have been the province of the jury to determine that fact.
Under § 527, Revisal of Nor. Car. of 1905, and following the well-recognized practice in this State, it has been held in many cases that where the evidence is conflicting, or different inferences may properly be drawn from the testimony, it is the duty of the trial judge to submit the questions of fact to the jury. Marks v. Cotton Mills, 138 Nor. Car. 401; Ramshottom v. Railroad Co., 138 Nor. Car. 38; Stewart v. Railroad Co., 137 Nor. Car. 687.
There was not sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question whether or not the deceased was engaged in interstate commerce.
As the plaintiff in error raised the question in the answer whether or not the deceased, at the time he was killed, was engaged in interstate commerce, it devolved upon it to show clearly that the deceased was so engaged.
At the time he was killed the deceased had left the engine and was going across the main Une and the tracks in the yard toward his boarding-house.
His service at the time of his death would not be changed to an interstate service by evidence that subsequently interstate freight was put on the train.
As to why the original act of 1906 was held to be invalid, see Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463.
It is not sufficient that the employe should at times have been engaged in interstate commerce, but the act of 1908 particularly declares that the injury or death must have been caused while he was employed by such carrier in such commerce.
The prayers for instruction, being predicated on a state of facts upon which there was not sufficient evidence to submit the question to the jury, were properly refused. Stewart v. Carpet Co., 138 Nor. Car. 60; Stewart v. Railroad Co., 136 Nor. Car. 385; Bryan v. Railroad Co., 134 Nor. Car. 538; Joines v. Johnson, 133 Nor. Car. 487; Trust Co. v. Benbow, 131 Nor. Car. 413; Burton v. Mfg. Co., 132 Nor. Car. 17; Carson v. Railroad Co., 128 Nor. Car. 95.
If the plaintiff desired to insist on its further defense that the deceased was engaged in interstate commerce, [p. 254] it was its duty to tender an issue on which that fact could properly be inquired into. Code of Civ. Proc., Revisal of 1905, §§ 545, 546. And see also Revisal of 1905, §§ 503, 548, as construed in Manufacturing Co. v. Cloer, 140 Nor. Car. 128; Pollock v. Warwick, 104 Nor. Car. 638; Mining Co. v. Smelting Co., 99 Nor. Car. 445; Oakley v. Van Noppen, 95 Nor. Car. 60; Simmons v. Mann, 92 Nor. Car. 12; Piedmont Wagon Co. v. Byrd, 119 Nor. Car. 460; Womble v. Grocery Co., 135 Nor. Car. 474; Walker v. Scott, 106 Nor. Car. 56; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Darr, 204 Fed. Rep. 751.
Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court.
This action was brought in the Superior Court of Guilford County, North Carolina, to recover damages for the negligent killing of Burgess, a locomotive fireman in the employ of the Southern Railway Company, lessee of the defendant, which occurred at Selma, North Carolina, on April 29, 1909. Under the local law, as laid down in Logan v. Railroad, 116 Nor. Car. 940, the lessor is responsible for all acts of negligence of its lessee occurring in the conduct of business upon the lessor’s road; and this upon the ground that a railroad corporation cannot evade its public duty and responsibility by leasing its road to another corporation, in the absence of a statute expressly exempting it. The responsibility is held to extend to employes of the lessee, injured through the negligence of the latter.
The complaint set forth in substance that plaintiff’s intestate, being in the employ of defendant’s lessee, and engaged at the Selma switchyards in the discharge of his duties as fireman upon Engine No. 862, about eight o’clock, p. m., on the date mentioned, after inspecting, oiling, firing, and preparing the engine for starting on a trip from Selma to Spencer, N. C., attempted to cross certain tracks that intervened between the engine and his [p. 255] boarding-house, which was located a short distance away; that another engine, No. 716, was standing upon a sidetrack in such position as to shut off intestate’s view of the main track; that No. 716 had its blower on, and was making a noise so loud that intestate could not hear a third engine—No. 1551, the shifting engine used in the yards—which at this time was running backward at a reckless and dangerous rate of speed, without headlight and without an adequate and competent crew; and that as intestate stepped from the track in the rear of Engine No. 716 and was about to step upon the main line in the attempt to cross it, he was struck and killed by the shifting engine. Defendant’s answer, besides denying the allegations of negligence, set up as a special defense that at the time plaintiff’s intestate was killed, he was engaged in interstate commerce as an employ^ upon a train of defendant’s lessee which was moving from Selma, North Carolina, to Spencer, in the same State, and carrying cars loaded with freight from the State of Virginia to the State of North Carolina and other States; that the liability of the defendant to him or to the plaintiff as his representative was fixed and regulated by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908; and that under that act the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
Upon the trial, at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, which tended generally to support the averments of the complaint, defendant moved for a non-suit, and among other grounds assigned the following:—that from the uncontradicted evidence it appeared that at the time of the occurrence in question defendant, through its lessee, was a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce, and plaintiff’s intestate was at that time a person employed by such carrier in such commerce; that the act of Congress already referred to exclusively regulated the liability of defendant to plaintiff’s intestate, and that upon all the evidence plaintiff had failed to make out a [p. 256] case of liability under that act. The court, in denying the motion, held that the action was brought under the statute of North Carolina, that the Federal act had no application, and that the cause was triable under the statutes of the State. To this ruling, defendant excepted. At the close of the case, defendant again undertook to invoke the protection of the Federal act by requested instructions to the jury, which were refused and exceptions allowed.
There was a verdict for plaintiff and judgment thereon, followed by an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State. That court overruled the contention of defendant that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908, applied, and held that the action was properly tried under the state law. The result was an affirmance, 156 Nor. Car. 496, and the case comes here under § 709 Rev. Stat. (Jud. Code, § 237).
In order to bring the case within the terms of the Federal act (35 Stat. 65, c. 149, printed in full in 223 U. S., p. 6), defendant must have been, at the time of the occurrence in question, engaged as a common carrier in interstate commerce, and plaintiff’s intestate must have been employed by said carrier in such commerce. If these facts appeared, the Federal act governed, to the exclusion of the statutes of the State. Second Employers1 Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York &c. Railroad Co.), 223 U. S. 1, 55; St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 158.
It is not disputed that if the provisions of the Federal act had been applied, the result of the action might have been different. To mention only one matter: there was neither averment in the pleadings nor evidence at the trial that deceased left a widow, child, parent, or dependent next of kin. Persons thus related to deceased are the respective beneficiaries of the action prescribed by the act of Congress, and the damages are to be based upon the [p. 257] pecuniary loss sustained by the beneficiary. Michigan Central R. R. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 68; Gulf, Colorado &c. Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173. The state law (Revisal 1908, § 2646) seems not to recognize this limitation upon the measure of recovery; certainly the damages in the present case were assessed without regard to it.
In support of the judgment, it is earnestly argued that the question whether deceased was employed in interstate commerce was not properly raised in the trial court in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the local Code of Civil Procedure. But this is a question of state practice; and since it appears that defendant expressly claimed immunity by reason of the act of Congress, and the highest court of the State either decided or assumed that the record sufficiently presented a question of Federal right and decided against the party asserting that right, the decisions of this court render it clear that it is our duty to pass upon the merits of the Federal question. Home for Incurables v. City of New York, 187 U. S. 155, 157; Land & Water Co. v. San Jose Ranch Co., 189 U. S. 177, 179; Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 299; Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R. R., 207 U. S. 142, 148; Miedreich v. Lauenstein, decided this day, ante, p. 236.
The court based its decision that the Federal act did not apply, in part upon the ground that the North Carolina Railroad is not an interstate railroad—its tracks and property lying wholly within the State—and that the corporation itself is not, although its lessee is, engaged in interstate commerce; the lessor’s activities being confined to receiving annual rents and distributing them among its stockholders. The responsibility of the lessor for all acts of negligence of the lessee occurring in the conduct of business on the lessor’s road, as established by the same court in Logan v. Railroad, 116 Nor. Car. 940, was recognized—indeed reasserted. “But,” it was said, “that is because a railroad corporation cannot escape its responvol. ccxxxn—17 [p. 258] sibility by leasing its road. It is still liable for its lessee’s acts of commission and omission, whether they occur in interstate or intrastate commerce, although the lessor is not actually engaged in either.” 156 Nor. Car. 500.
It is plain enough, however, that the effect of the rule thus laid down, especially in view of the grounds upon which it is based, is, that although a railroad lease as between the parties may have the force and effect of an ordinary lease, yet with respect to the railroad operations conducted under it, and everything that relates to the performance of the public duties assumed by the lessor under, its charter, such a lease—certainly so far as concerns the rights of third parties, including employes as well as patrons—constitutes the lessee the lessor’s substitute or agent, so that for whatever the lessee does or fails to do, whether in interstate or in intrastate commerce, the lessor is responsible. This being the legal situation under the local law, it seems to us that it must and does result, in the case before us, that the lessor is a “common carrier by railroad engaging in commerce between the States,” and that the deceased was u employed by such carrier in such commerce,” within the meaning of the Federal act; provided, of cours,e, he was employed by the lessee in such commerce at the time he was killed.
It was, however, further held by the Supreme Court of North Carolina that deceased, at the time he was killed, was not in fact employed by the Southern Railway, the lessee, in interstate commerce. There are several grounds upon which this decision was based, or upon which it is said to be supportable; and these will be separately noticed. Of course, if upon the evidence any essential matter of fact was in doubt, it should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions. The rulings of the trial court deprived plaintiff in error of the opportunity to go to the jury upon the question. But it is now insisted that there was no evidence tending to show that [p. 259] deceased was engaged in interstate commerce. This renders it incumbent upon us to analyze the evidence to the extent necessary to give to plaintiff in error the benefit of its asserted Federal right. Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601, 611, and cases cited.
The evidence tended to show that Train No. 72 of the Southern Railway had come in to Selma, N. C., from Pinners Point, Va., and other places, and that a shifting crew was “working” this train so as to take two cars from it and put them into a train that was to include these and other cars to be hauled from Selma to Spencer, N. C., by Engine No. 862, and that deceased was employed on this engine as fireman for the trip that was about to begin, and had already prepared his engine for ,the purpose. It is contended that the evidence failed to show that the two cars thus taken from Train No. 72 had come in from Virginia, rather than from the “other places,” which it is said might be intermediate North Carolina points. We find, however, evidence that the train which was to be hauled from Selma to Spencer by Engine No. 862, was being made up in part from cars that had come in from Pinners Point; and it was at least a reasonable inference that the two cars referred to were being put into the Spencer train in order to be carried forward as a part of a through movement of interstate commerce.
There seems to be no clear evidence as to the contents of these cars, and it is argued that, in the absence of evidence, it is as reasonable to infer that they were empty as that they were loaded; and that it was incumbent upon defendant to show that they contained interstate freight. We hardly deem it so probable that empty freight cars would be hauled from the Virginia point to Spencer. But were it so, the hauling of empty cars from one State to another is, in our opinion, interstate commerce within the meaning of the act. Such is the view that has obtained with respect to empty cars in actions based upon'the [p. 260] Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. 531, c. 196). Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1, 21; Voelker v. Railway Co., 116 Fed. Rep. 867, 873. And the like reason applies, as we think, to actions founded upon the Employers’ Liability Act, which, indeed, is in pari materia with the other.
It is argued that because, so far as appears, deceased had not previously participated in any movement of interstate freight, and the through cars had not as yet been attached to his engine, his employment in interstate commerce was still in future. It seems to us, however, that his acts in inspecting, oiling, firing, and preparing his engine for the trip to Selma were acts performed as a part of interstate commerce, and the circumstance that the interstate freight cars had not as yet been coupled up is legally insignificant. See Pederson v. Del., Lack. & Western R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 151; St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 161.
Again, it is said that because deceased had left his engine and was going to his boarding-house, he was engaged upon a personal errand, and not upon the carrier’s business. Assuming (what is not clear) that the evidence fairly tended to indicate the boarding-house as his destination, it nevertheless also appears that deceased was shortly to depart upon his run, having just prepared his engine for the purpose, and that he had not gone beyond the limits of the railroad yard when he was struck* There is nothing to indicate that this brief visit to the boarding-house was at all out of the ordinary, or was inconsistent with his duty to his employer. It seems to us clear that the man was still "on duty,” and employed in commerce, notwithstanding his temporary absence from the locomotive engine. See Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 112, 119.
We conclude that with respect to the facts necessary to bring the case within the Federal act, there was [p. 261] evidence that at least was sufficient to go to the jury. It is doubtful whether there was substantial contradiction respecting any of these facts; but this we need not consider.
From what has been said, it follows that the state courts erred in holding that the Federal act had no application. As the case stands, we are not called upon to determine the validity of the several contentions that were raised by defendant at the trial on the strength of that act, nor to pass upon the mode in which they were raised. Upon these matters, therefore, we express no opinion.
Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
BILLINGS v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
UNITED STATES v. BILLINGS.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
Nos. 66 and 625. Argued January 6,7,1914.—Decided February 24,1914.
The jurisdiction of this court on direct writ of error is not confined to the constitutional questions, but embraces every issue in the case. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425.
The Circuit Court of Appeals has no power to ask instructions upon an issue which it has no right to decide, nor has this court authority to instruct on such a subject.
This court cannot refuse to decide questions which are properly before it for judgment.
Where one party has taken a writ of error direct from this court to the Circuit Court based on the constitutional question decided against [p. 262] it, and the other party has obtained a writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals as to other questions decided against it, which court has certified that question to this court, and the record is in such condition as to enable this court to decide the whole case, this court may treat the writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals as a cross-writ and so determine all the issues involved.
Under § 37 of the Tariff Act of August, 1909, imposing a tax on the use of foreign-built yachts owned or chartered for more than six months by citizens of the United States, to be collected annually on September 1, the tax became due on the first day of September next occurring after the act became effective; further held that the six months’ clause relates only to the chartering of the yachts, and the word “annually” indicates continuity and that the tax is not a sporadic one to cease after a single payment.
Where words are used in a statute in their every-day sense and not in a technical one, they should be so construed.
The use of a foreign-built yacht which renders the owner subject to the tax imposed by § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909 is active and actual use and not the potential use arising from the mere fact of ownership. See Pierce v. United States, p. 290, post.
The fact that a tax statute operates retroactively does not necessarily cause it to be unconstitutional. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107.
The rule that statutes should be construed if possible so as not to operate retroactively does not authorize a judicial reenactment of the statute to save it from acting retroactively if Congress intended it so to do.
Section 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, imposing a tax on foreign-built yachts, is not unconstitutional because it operates retroactively as to the tax levied for the year 1909, and the use of yachts within the meaning of the statute during the year 1909, renders the owner or charterer Hable for the tax for that year.
The requirement of uniformity imposed by the Constitution on Congress in levying excise taxes is not intrinsic but geographic.
The Constitution is not self-destructive—it does not take away by one provision powers conferred by another, and the express authority to tax is not limited or restricted by subsequent provisions or amendments, especially the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27.
The difference between things domestic and things foreign is recognized by the Constitution itself, and a classification for taxation of foreign- [p. 263] built yachts is not so repugnant to justice as to amount to denial of due process of law because domestic-built yachts are not subject to the same tax; nor is § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, unconstitutional for lack of uniformity.
The state rule as to interest on taxes differs from the United States rule—the former excludes interest unless the statute so provides; the latter allows interest unless forbidden by statute. This court will not now apply the state rule, as to do so would repudiate settled principles and disregard the sanction expressly or impliedly given by Congress to the rule adopted by the Federal courts. The Government is entitled to interest on taxes on use of foreign-built
yachts under § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, from the date when the taxes become due, and may maintain an action against the owner or charterer therefor. 190 Fed. Rep. 359, modified and affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, imposing a tax on the use of foreign-built yachts, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. William D. Guthrie for the owners of foreign-built yachts, in this and other cases argued simultaneously herewith:
The classification in § 37 violates the Fifth Amendment.
A tax law must be imposed impartially upon all in the same class similarly situated, and must apply equally and uniformly to all persons in like circumstances or under like conditions.
The yacht owners purchased their yachts when no import duty or excise tax was imposed or ever had been imposed by Congress upon foreign-built yachts, The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 110, and presumably have duly paid the tonnage tax laid upon all vessels classed as foreign. The practical effect of this legislation is to penalize them and compel them to pay an import duty of thirty-five per centum ad valorem as the alternative to submitting to this new tax. The act is precisely the same as if it had provided in so many words that all citizens who had theretofore acquired foreign-built yachts should pay a retrospective [p. 264] hnport “duty of thirty-five per centum ad valorem” in order to escape an annual tax of seven dollars per ton. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 268; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 244. See Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., pp. 4, 260.
As to the selection of property according to origin as a subject for a special form of taxation, see Phillips v. Raynes, 136 App. Div. 417, aff’d 198 N. Y. 539, holding void under the Fourteenth Amendment, § 190 of the New York Labor Law prohibiting sale of convict-made goods without the payment of an annual license fee of 8500. See also Farrington v. Mensching, 187 N. Y. 8, 17; People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1, 9; Knowlton v. Rock County, 9 Wisconsin, 410, 422.
While in the case of import duties the foreign origin of the article imported is necessarily the basis and test of the duty, the yacht tax now before the court purports to be an excise tax upon the use of an article and not upon its importation. The law, therefore, must be treated solely as an excise tax upon use, and cannot be sustained upon a theory which might uphold an import duty.
There is no substantial difference between the requirement of due process of law contained in the Fifth Amendment and that iij the Fourteenth Amendment, Carroll v.
Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401, 410; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 101.
The act of Congress requires use of a foreign-built yacht during the taxable period.
Tax statutes, especially when attempting to impose special, novel and extraordinary taxes, should be strictly construed, and, if any ambiguity be found to exist, it must be resolved in favor of the citizen. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 583; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, 374; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Herold, 198 Fed. Rep. 199, 201, aff’d 201 Fed. Rep. 918; Parkview Bldg. Assn. v. Herold, 203 Fed. Rep. 876, 880; Mutual Trust Co. v. Miller, 177 N. Y. 51, 57.
The language plainly indicates that it was the intention to levy a tax not upon foreign-built yachts as property but solely upon their use. The Anjer Head, 46 Fed. Rep. 664.
The distinction between an excise tax on the use of a thing and a direct tax upon the thing itself is, of course, fundamental and substantial. But it would vanish into nothingness if “use” be now construed to mean not actual use at all but mere capacity for use.
The word “use” was advisedly employed in order to avoid creating what might be held to be a direct tax on the property, and as such necessary to be apportioned. Pollock v. Farmers’ L. & T. Co., 157 U. S. 429; 158 U. S. 601; McCoach v. Minehill Railway Co., 228 U. S. 295, 306. The court will not, therefore, now adopt a construction of the statute which would create grave doubts as to its constitutionality, when another construction, which avoids all constitutional difficulties, is not only equally consistent with the terms of the act, but more consonant with its plain intent. United States v. Del. & Hud. Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408; The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166,175; United States v. Nipissing Mines Co., 206 Fed. Rep. 431; Abrast Realty Co. v. Maxwell, 206 Fed. Rep. 333,
The tax is not leviable in respect of foreign-built yachts not within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Property in order to be the subject of taxation must be within the jurisdiction of the power assuming to tax. Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 400. If the yachts in question had no permanent situs anywhere, the fact that their owners were domiciled abroad would fix their situs there. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 69; Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194.
The power to tax depends upon jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the tax.
Taxation must have relation to some subject-matter actually within the jurisdiction of the taxing power, otherwise it violates the constitutional guaranty against the taking of property without due process of law. Neither a State nor the Federal Government can tax the property of citizens situated in foreign countries, or the use of such property in foreign countries. Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262, 267; State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319; Pullman Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 22; Louisville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 398; Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 307; Delaware &c. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 353; Chi., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585, 592; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395,399; Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 200, 203; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 38; Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 73; Gromerv. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 372, 376,377; Detroit &c. Ry. Co. v. Fuller, 205 Fed. Rep. 86,90.
There is no law of the United States which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to extend any special right or privilege to foreign-built yachts owned by American citizens, and the action of the Treasury Department cannot make these yachts American vessels or classify them otherwise than Congress has done. White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. 646, 655, 656.
Conceding that Congress has power to tax the use of foreign-built yachts owned and used outside of the United States by American citizens permanently residing abroad, it has not expressed the intention so to do. Such a novel tax burden should be expressed in plain terms, free from doubt or ambiguity. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 583; Lynch v. Union Trust Co., 164 Fed. Rep. 161, 163.
Section 37 fails to reveal any such legislative intent. 190 Fed. Rep. 368, 369.
Section 37 should not be construed as retrospective so as to tax the use of foreign-built yachts during the year 1909.
One who has owned property, or exercised or enjoyed a right or privilege, or carried on a vocation, at a time and under circumstances when such ownership or acts were not taxable, ought not to be subjected to a special, novel and extraordinary tax by a subsequent statute operating retrospectively upon his past ownership or acts. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Gaus, 200 N. Y. 328, 330.
A tax should not be levied upon past ownership so as to cover a period when the property was not subject to taxation. People v. Trust Co. of America, 205 N. Y. 74, 77. A statute imposing a tax upon use should not be construed retrospectively unless the language imperatively requires it. U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Struthers, 209 U. S. 306, 314; United States v. Heth, 3 Cr. 399, 413; Assur. Soc’y v. Miller, 179 N. Y. 227; 180 N. Y. 525, 526; Metz v. Hagerty, 51 Oh. St. 521. See also United States v. Burr, 159 U. S. 78, 82; United States v. Am. Sugar Co., 202 U. S. 563, 577; Holliday v. Atlanta, 96 Georgia, 377; Young v. Henderson, 76 N. Car. 420; 2 Lewis’ Sutherland Stat. Const. (2d ed.), p. 640.
If it be held that it must be presumed that Congress intended that the obligation to pay the tax should begin to accrue from the date when the act took effect, this annual tax on use should be apportioned according to the period of actual use during the year ending September 1, 1909, [p. 268] while the tax law was in force and operation. Mutual Trust Co. v. Miller, 177 N. Y. 51, 54, 56. See Lincoln Trust Co. v. Glynn, 132 App. Div. 546, 547, aff’d 198 N. Y. 501, and distinguished in N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Gaus, 200 N. Y. 328, 331.
The Government is not entitled to recover interest. The burden of a tax should not be increased by the addition of interest unless such a purpose of the legislature has been clearly expressed. Hartford v. Hills, 75 Connecticut, 599, 600. What the State omitted to demand, the court cannot require. People v. Gold & Stock Tel. Co., 98 N. Y. 67, 80.
The act itself shows that Congress did not intend to exact interest as a penalty for delay in payment of the tax.
Courts may not find an intention to impose interest as a penalty for delay in payment of taxes and cannot award interest on taxes unless there be some express statutory provision to that effect. Crabtree v. Madden, 54 Fed. Rep. 426, 431; People v. Gold & Stock Tel. Co., 98 N. Y. 67, 79; Rochester v. Bloss, 185 N. Y. 42, 52'; Camden v. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398, 399; Belvidere v. Warren R. R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 193, 199; Road Commissioners v. Freeholders, 44 N. J. L. 570, 571, aff’d 45 N. J. L. 173; Brennert v. Farrier, 47 N. J. L. 75; Shaw v. Peckett, 26 Vermont, 482, 486; Hughes v. Kelley, 69 Vermont, 443, 445; Perry v. Washburn, 20 California, 318, 350; People v. C. P. R. R. Co., 105 California, 576, 595; aff’d 162 U. S. 91; Sargent & Co. v. Tuttle, 67 Connecticut, 162, 167; Hartford v. Hills, 12 Connecticut, 599; Cromwell v. Savage, 85 Connecticut, 376, 377; Stitt v. Stringham, 55 Oregon, 89, 94; State v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 175 Indiana, 59, 85; State v. Southwestern R. R. Co., 70 Georgia, 11, 32, 33; Georgia R. R. Co. v. Wright, 124 Georgia, 596, 618; 125 Georgia, 589, 610, reversed on other grounds in 207 U. S. 127; McWilliams v. Jacobs, 128 Georgia, 375, 378; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 89 Kentucky, 531, 538; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Adams, 29 So. Rep. 996, 997(Miss.); New Whatcom v. [p. 269] Roeder, 22 Washington, 570, 575; State v. New England Furniture Co., 107 Minnesota, 52, 53; Perry County v. Railroad Co., 65 Alabama, 391,401; Edmonson v. Galveston, 53 Texas, 157, 161; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. State, 55 Texas, 314, 319, reversed on other grounds in 105 U. S. 460; Cave v. Houston, 65 Texas, 619, 622; Brooks v. State, 58 S. W. Rep. 1032,1035 (Tex.); Rockland v. Ulmer, 87 Maine, 357, 361; Danforth v. Williams, 9 Massachusetts, 324; Greer v. Richards, 3 Arizona, 227, 235; 1 Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., pp. 19, 20; 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of L., 2d ed., p. 777; 37 Cyc. 1165.
This is not a suit for the recovery of taxes in an action in the nature of debt as Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486; United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U. S. 250. The form of procedure cannot change their character. See also Boston v. Turner, 201 Massachusetts, 190, 193; Gautier v. Ditmar, 204 N. Y. 20, 27.
In nearly all of the tax cases cited by the Government in the court below, the question of interest was not before the court.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Adkins, with whom Mr. Karl W. Kirchwey was on the brief, for the United States, in this and other cases argued simultaneously herewith:
The tax was due September 1, 1909. The act was approved August 5, 1909, and took effect from its passage. The act, as so construed, is not retroactive. Endlich, Statutes, § 280; Johnston v. United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 157, 171; Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172; People v. Spring Valley Co., 92 N. Y. 383, 390; Frellsen v. Mahan, 21 La. Ann. 79, 103; McClellan v. Railroad, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 336. See also State v. Certain Lands, 40 Arkansas, 344; Litson v. Smith, 68 Mo. App. 397, 402; Fennell v. Pauley, 112 Iowa, 94; Hudson v. Miller, 10 Kans. App. 532; Hardesty v. Fleming, 57 Texas, 395; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622.
The contention that another rule of construction applies to an indirect tax like the present cannot prevail. The tax is upon the present use of the property, whether that use has endured for a year or for a day. The tax is called an annual one, which means that the tax is to be collected once a year.
Even if such construction does give the statute a retroactive effect, Congress intended the tax to be paid September 1, 1909.
Courts will construe a statute retrospectively when that is clearly the legislative intent. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445; Lamb v. Powder River Co., 132 Fed. Rep. 434.
The language of the act shows a clear intention to make it immediately effective. Pauley Mfg. Co. v. Crawford County, 84 Fed. Rep. 942.
Punctuation is to be given little weight in determining the legislative intent. Hammock v. Loan cfc Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77, 84; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 480.
A construction which leads to absurd and unjust consequences is to be avoided if possible. Pickett v. United States, 216 U. S. 456, 461.
The tax cannot be apportioned. McClellan v. Railroad, 11 Lea, 336.
The tax is upon consumption or upon the privilege of using, and is not avoided by failure to employ the yacht on cruises.
The language of the act indicates that the tax is to be levied upon the use of foreign-built yachts.
The transaction of active business is the thing taxed; [p. 271] the income derived therefrom is included in the measure of the tax. Were it otherwise the tax would probably run counter to the decision of this court in Pollock v. Farmers’ L. & T. Co., 157 U. S. 429.
A privilege tax is not direct simply because measured by capacity for use. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 166; United States v. Singer, 15 Wall. Ill; Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171.
While economically the incidence of the present tax is upon the yacht itself, its legal incidence is upon the privilege of using, and whether this be called a tax upon consumption, potential use, or capacity for use, it is indirect in the constitutional sense. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 81, 83; Missouri &c. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 112.
The reasonable construction of the act shows that the tax is primarily a revenue measure and secondarily designed to encourage the building of yachts in America, and there would be no object in exempting yachts out of commission.
The privilege of use, as shown by ownership or a charter of more than six months, is the only test of liability imposed by the act.
The tax applies to every foreign-built yacht belonging to a citizen of the United States, though such citizen be domiciled and resident abroad and the yacht has acquired a permanent situs abroad.
The statute is to be construed sensibly and to accomplish the legislative intent. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 17.
The congressional proceedings, however, clearly indicate that Congress understood that the tax would apply to the specific yachts now involved. Cong. Rec., Part V, 61st Cong., 1st sess., p. 4875. See Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 591.
Every citizen of the United States comes within the [p. 272] description. United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U. S. 263.
In other income statutes there were reasons for naming non-resident citizens. See act of August 5, 1861, 12 Stat. 309; act of June 30, 1864,13 Stat. 281; Tariff Act of October 3, 1913.
The United States merely asks that the language used be given its plain meaning, and that no words of exception be read into the statute under the guise of construction.
The annual tax is an excise, and is uniform throughout the United States. Geographical uniformity is the only limitation imposed by the Constitution. This limitation being observed, the tax does not amount to deprivation of property without due process of law, even if in its operation it be found intrinsically unequal. And the present tax would be valid, even were the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applicable.
The present tax meets this requirement of geographical uniformity. It operates upon every citizen of the United States owning a foreign-built yacht, wherever such citizen may be found.
The classification of the statute is reasonable within the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138; Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1.
One assailing the classification must carry the burden [p. 273] of showing that it does not rest on any reasonable basis, but. is essentially arbitrary. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 30.
A tax law may be adopted to further a specific policy or to accomplish a certain purpose. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59.
The classification involved includes all citizens who own or charter foreign-built yachts. Two reasons exist for putting them in a class apart from owners of domestic-built vessels—one a question of revenue, and the other a matter of policy. Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U. S. 364.
As a matter of policy, Congress desired to develop the shipbuilding industry of the United States.
A classification by which the producer-seller and the purchaser-seller are distinguished is proper. Am. Sugar Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89; St. John v. New York, 201 U. S. 633; Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572.
The principle of imposing a duty because of the foreign origin of goods is the foundation of our tariff system. See § 5 of the Tariff Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 205; §§ 3385, 3386, Rev. Stat.
The United States may tax the use of yachts owned by its citizens, even though such citizens are domiciled abroad and their yachts have a foreign situs. Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194; Ayer & Lord v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409; Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky. 222 U. S. 63, do not apply.
These decisions have arisen from attempts by a State to tax absent property. The United States, as a nation, is not bound by the same rule, as it is not confined by its territorial limitations in the protection of its citizens and their property. Its protection extends throughout the world. The United States may tax its citizens residing abroad. Acts of June 30, 1864, § 116, 13 Stat. 281;
vol. ccxxxn—18 [p. 274] March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 477; August 27, 1894, 28 Stat. 553; July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 257. See United States v. Erie Ry. Co., 106 U. S. 330.
Ships are in a class by themselves. A yacht belonging to a citizen of the United States, even though not a vessel of the United States in the sense that it is entitled to registry or enrollment, yet flies the American flag, and is the object of peculiar protection by the United States.
These yachts fly the American flag. The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 119.
They are territory of the United States to which our laws extend. Clark & Marshall on Crimes, 2d ed., p. 737; 2 Moore, Int. Law, pp. 256, 266, and see § 272, Penal Code, 35 Stat. 1142.
Treaties have been made with foreign nations permitting the punishment by this country of certain offenses committed on such vessels in foreign ports. Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U. S. 1, 12.
The protection thus given by the United States to these yachts is as great as if they were entitled to registry or enrollment; and it is conceivable that such a case may arise with respect to one of them as to involve the United States in war with a foreign country.
Additional privileges within the waters of the United States are extended to these yachts. Sections 4225, 4226, Rev. Stat., and see also § 4190, Rev. Stat.
The owner of the yacht is exempt from the payment of the light money. The Miranda, 47 Fed. Rep. 815, aff’d 51 Fed. Rep. 523; and see The Conqueror, 166 U. S. p. 119; The Alta, 136 Fed. Rep. 513.
The right to tax may be supported by analogy to the right of a nation to punish its citizens for crimes committed abroad. Clark & Marshall, Crimes, p. 743; Beale, Crim. Pl. & Pr., p. 2; 2 Moore, Int. Law, 255.
The paragraph of § 37, permitting the owner of any yacht to pay a duty of 35 per cent, ad valorem in lieu of the [p. 275] annual tax, is not unconstitutional, and if so may be separated'from other legal provisions and effect be given to the latter.
Section 37 is not unconstitutional because it originated in an amendment first proposed in the Senate. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. p. 143.
A foreign-built yacht is liable to the tax, notwithstanding the treaty of July 3, 1815, with Great Britain.
The court below finds as a fact that under the law of Great Britain a ship is not a British vessel unless owned by a subject or corporation of that country. Where the bill of sale has been recorded with the collector of customs of a United States port, the yacht has lost her character as a British vessel and is not within the treaty.
A treaty is repealed by an inconsistent subsequent act of Congress.
A suit in personam lies to recover the duty. United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U. S. 250, 258.
The United States is entitled to interest on the several taxes from the time they became due. Rochester v. Bloss, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694.
Although a State does not see fit to exert its extraordinary power of imposing heavy penalties, it is none the less entitled to the ordinary interest upon the tax from the time it falls due until it is paid. Young v. Godbe, 15 Wall. .562, 565; People v. New York, 5 Cowen, 334.
Duties on imported merchandise constitute personal debts to the United States from the importers and an action of debt will lie to collect them with interest. United States v. Lyman, 1 Mason, 482; Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486; Cheang-Kee v. United States, 3 Wall. 320; United States v. Dodge, 1 Deady, 124; United States v. Cobb, 11 Fed. Rep. 76; United States v. Mexican Int. Ry. Co., 154 Fed. Rep. 519.
It is immaterial that the tax is technically a debt. The amount is definite, and time of payment fixed and [p. 276] ceftain. Railroad Co. v. United States, 101 U. S. 550; Litchfield v. Webster County, 101 U. S. 773; United States v. Erie Ry. Co., 106 U. S. 327.
Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
It is necessary to determine whether these two cases from different courts are not virtually one and to be considered in that aspect.
The United States sued for the amount of a tax with interest. The alleged liability under the statute was challenged and if it existed the statute was alleged to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and right to interest was denied. The court held the statute to be constitutional and judgment was awarded for the sum claimed, but the prayer for interest was rejected. Error was prosecuted directly from this court by the defendant and from the Circuit Court of Appeals by the United States, the first because of the constitutional questions and the second because of the disallowance of interest. The Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question concerning the right to recover interest, and the two cases before us consist of the direct writ of error on the one hand and the certificate on the other. Both writs of error when taken were authorized. Ohio R. R. Comm. v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101; Macfadden v. United States, 213 U. S. 288. Our jurisdiction, however, on the direct writ of error is not confined to the constitutional questions, but embraces every issue in the case. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has no power to ask instructions upon an issue which it has no right to decide and we have no authority to instruct on such a subject or to refuse to decide issues which are properly before us for judgment.
Under these conditions, we think the better practice is, [p. 277] as regards the controversy as to interest which was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals by writ of error and in which cases the certificates now before us were drawn, to treat the writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals as in substance pending here on a cross-writ by the United States, and as without further orders the record is in such a condition as to enable us to decide the whole case, we proceed to do so.
Section 37 of the Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112, provided in part as follows:
“There shall be levied and collected annually on the first day of September by the collector of customs of the district nearest the residence of the managing owner, upon the use of every foreign-built yacht, pleasure-boat or vessel, not used or intended to be used for trade, now or hereafter owned or chartered for more than six months by any citizen or citizens of the United States, a sum equivalent to a tonnage tax of seven dollars per gross ton.”
The second paragraph of the provision which we need not quote, gives the right to the owner of any “foreign-built yacht, pleasure-boat or vessel above described” to-pay a duty of 35 per cent, ad valorem and thus secure an exemption from the tax provided by the first paragraph.
The act went into effect on August 6, 1909, and the collector of the port of New York thereafter made a demand upon C. K. G. Billings, the plaintiff in error, for the payment of $7,644.00, that is, of the sum produced by calculating seven dollars per ton on 1,091.71 tons, the tonnage of the foreign-built yacht Vanadis, owned and controlled by him.
Failing to pay, in January, 1911, the United States sued in the court below to recover the tax. The defendant was alleged to be a citizen of the United States and the suit was averred to have been brought in the district nearest his residence. The ownership and use by him of the pleasure-yacht Vanadis, an English foreign-built vessel, [p. 278] the levy based upon her tonnage according to the statute of the amount of $7,644, the demand for payment, the failure to pay on the first day of September, 1909, under the statute, were all alleged, and recovery of the tax as well as of interest was prayed. The answer admitted citizenship and the ownership of the yacht and that she was a foreign-built pleasure craft, but set up three distinct defenses, the first, that the vessel was not enrolled, registered, or documented as a vessel of the United States and enjoyed no privileges because she was of that character. It was expressly admitted that “ during the year preceding the first day of September, 1909” the said yacht “has been used by the defendant outside of the waters and territorial limits or jurisdiction of the United States from time to time and at various times . . . and was not used for six months during such year within the waters and territorial limits or jurisdiction of the United States or elsewhere.”
The second, defense expressly averred that the tax imposed by the statute was intended by Congress to be “an annual tax, that it should be prospective and operate only upon the future use of any such foreign-built yacht, pleasure-boat or vessel, and that said annual tax did not accrue and could not be duly levied and collected prior to the first day of September in the year 1910.”
The third defense, after fully averring that there were within the United States many pleasure yachts not foreign-built which were in use and whose use was identical with that of a foreign-built yacht like the one which the defendant used, charged that the law imposing the burden sought to be enforced was void because repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The case was submitted to the court on bill and answer and as we at the outset said, there was a judgment holding that the sum claimed was due by the defendant as an excise or duty upon the use of his yacht and that the act imposing [p. 279] the tax'was not repugnant to the Constitution, but that the Government was not entitled to recover interest.
To avoid if it may be the necessity of determining the constitutional question, we shall first decide what, if any, burden the statute imposes, and then if necessary consider its asserted repugnancy to the Constitution. In view of the requirement that direct taxes be apportioned and assuming as we do assume, that the act before us was adopted by Congress in the light of the ruling in Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601, it is certain that the tax levied by the provision was intended to be an excise tax upon “the use of every foreign-built yacht, pleasure-boat or vessel . . . now or hereafter owned or chartered for more than six months by any citizen or citizens of the United States.” This is not seriously, if at all, disputed in argument, the controversy turning first upon the period when the tax provided for is to take effect and the nature and character of the use which is taxed. These subjects are so interwoven that we consider and dispose of them together.
Was the tax due on the first day of September, 1909, or was it only due on the same day in September, 1910? In view of the positive direction that the tax shall be levied and collected on the first day of September, we can see no escape from the conclusion that the court below was right in holding that it became due on the first day of September after the passage of the act. The word “annually” upon which so much reliance to the contrary is placed, is manifestly used not for the purpose of postponing the time of payment, but rather as provision for continuity; that is, the word but shows the purpose of fixing the annual duty of levying and collecting the tax on the designated day. This becomes quite apparent when it is observed that if the word “annually” be removed, there would be room for the implication that the tax was to be but sporadic and would therefore cease to [p. 280] be collectible after one payment. And it is equally clear that the six months clause is concerned not with the period when the tax imposed shall be levied and collected, but addresses itself to the subject-matter upon which the tax is placed; in other words, it qualifies the word ucharter” and therefore only indicates when the use of a chartered vessel shall become subject to the duty imposed. The tax being leviable and collectible, on the first of September in each year after the passage of the act, upon what was it assessed? is the question. It seems difficult to answer it in clearer terms than does the text of the act when it provides that it shall be upon the use of the yachts with which the provision is concerned. But it is said to respond in the language of the act leaves the question virtually unanswered, since the extent of the use and its essential period are left wholly undetermined. But this is a misconception based upon a disregard of the fact that the word “use” in the text is unqualified, from which it results that the recurrence of the tax is annual and depends upon two elements, ownership er charter rights, as specified in the act, and use for any time during the year. It is to be observed that the provision deals with ownership and distinguishes between ownership and use, since it bases the tax not upon the former but upon the latter. From this it follows that it is not ownership but the election during the taxing period of the owner to take advantage of one of the elements which are involved in ownership, the right to use which is the subject upon which the statute places the excise duty. In this view the fact of use, not its extent or its frequency, becomes the test, as distinguished from mere ownership, for that in the statutory sense could exist without use having taken place. The words of the statute under this construction were used in an every-day sense and not in a technical one: in other words but convey the distinction without reference to nice analysis of the nature of things which is [p. 281] commonly conceived to exist between ownership and use. Let it be conceded that the ownership of property includes the right to use, plainly we think, as use and ownership are distinguished one from the other in the provision, the word “use” as there employed means more than the mere privilege of using which the owner enjoys, and relates to its primary signification, as defined by Webster; “The act of employing anything or of applying it to one’s service; the state of being so employed or applied.” If the use which arises from the fact of ownership without more was what the statute proposed, then it is inconceivable why the difference between use and ownership was marked in the provision and made the basis of the tax which it imposed. While this construction in this case leads to the same conclusion as does that which the court below affixed to the statute, that is, that it taxed the privilege of use, or, in other words the potentiality of using involved in ownership, inherently there is this fundamental difference between the interpretation we give and that which the lower court adopted, since the privilege of use is purely passive (or subjective), a right which necessarily pertains to ownership and must exist where there is ownership, as one may not obtain ownership without acquiring the privileges of use which ownership gives. The other, on the contrary, that is, use in the statutory sense, although it arises from ownership, is active (objective), that is, it is the outward and distinct exercise of a right which ownership confers but which would not necessarily be exerted by the 'mere fact of ownership. The contention that inequality must be the result from making the tax depend upon mere use without reference to the extent of its duration, addresses itself not to the question of power, and is therefore beyond the scope of judicial cognizance. But it is to be observed that it may well have been that the character of the property with which the statute deals and the mere element of [p. 282] caprice as to its use and the uncertainties of the subject led to the fact of making the use alone the criterion as the wiser and j uster method of operating equally upon alL Again let it be conceded that the causing the tax for the annual period to become due in September, 1909,’ is to give it in some respects a retroactive effect, such concession does not cause the act to be beyond the power of Congress under the Constitution to adopt. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Company, 220 U. S. 107 and authorities there cited. While the rule is that statutes should be so construed as to prevent them from operating retroactively, that; principle is one of construction and not of reconstruction and therefore does not authorize a judicial reenactment by interpretation of a statute to save it from producing a retroactive effect.
As under the meaning which we thus give the statute the admitted use of the vessel was within its provision and therefore the amount due for excise was rightfully imposed and under our interpretation was due when demanded, we must consider whether the asserted repugnancy of the statute to the Constitution is well founded.
It has been conclusively determined that the requirement of uniformity which the Constitution imposes upon Congress in the levy of excise taxes is not an intrinsic uniformity, but merely a geographical one. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Company, 220 U. S. 107; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41. It is also settled beyond dispute that the Constitution is not self-destructive. In other words, that the powers which it confers on the one hand it does not immediately take away on the other; that is to say, that the authority to tax which is given in express terms is not limited or restricted by the subsequent provisions of the Constitution or the amendments thereto, especially by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. McCray v. United States} 195 U. S. 27 and authorities there cited.
Nor is there anything in Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Company, 199 U. S. 401, or Twining v. New Jersey, 2111 U. S. 78, which in the remotest degree nullifies or restricts the principle thus stated. Indeed it is apparent, if the suggestion as to the meaning of those cases were assented to, it would result in rendering the Constitution unconstitutional. This certainly was the view entertained by the pleader when the answer in the case was prepared, since the sole attack on the constitutionality of the statute was based upon the assertion that it was repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. And such also is the line of the argument at bar where the fundamental rights secured by the Fifth Amendment are constantly referred to as the basis upon which the unconstitutionality of the statute is urged. Is there foundation for this claim under the Fifth Amendment? is then the issue, and that of course requires a statement of the grievances which it is asserted result from upholding the tax. They all come to this, that to impose a burden in the shape of a tax upon the use of a foreign-built yacht when a like tax is not imposed on the use of a domestic yacht under similar circumstances is so beyond the power of classification, so abhorrent to the sense of justice, and so repugnant to the conceptions of free government as to be void even in the absence of express constitutional limitation. We do not stop to point out the obvious unsoundness of the contentions, nor indeed to direct attention to the self-evident demonstration of their want of merit even from the point of view of the power to Classify, since the difference between things domestic and things foreign and their use are apparent on the face of things and are expressly manifested by the text of the Constitution. We say we do not stop to do these things because in any event we are of opinion the conclusion cannot be escaped that the propositions, each and all of them, whatever may be their form of expression, are in substance and effect but an [p. 284] assertion that the tax which the statute imposes is void because of a want of intrinsic uniformity, and therefore all the contentions are adversely disposed of by the previous decisions of this court on that subject. That which is settled beyond dispute may not be disregarded and be brought into the realm of that which is controvertible and questionable by the mere garb in which propositions are clothed.
Was the Government entitled to interest? is then the remaining question which we must decide in view of the purpose which we at the outset expressed of treating the United States as here present and urging its right to interest on a cross-writ of error. The cyclopedias and textbooks state the doctrine to be that in the absence of a statute expressly so directing, taxes bear no interest. The principle is thus announced in 37 Cyc., p. 1165: “Delinquent taxes do not bear interest unless it is expressly so provided by statute. But it is competent for the legislature to prescribe the payment of interest as a penalty for delay in the payment of taxes and to regulate its rate. This, however, can be effected only by an act plainly manifesting the legislative intention as to the right to recover interest, its amount, and the date from which it shall begin, the latter being ordinarily the time when the assessment is complete and the taxes become payable.” Cooley on Taxation, p. 17; Sedgwick on Damages (9th ed.), §332; Sutherland (3d ed.), §337; Black on Tax Titles (2d ed.), § 236, and see note in 6 L. R. A. (N. S.), p. 694. And the statement of the text is borne out by the decided cases in nearly all of the state courts of last resort. On the other hand, the Government relies upon four cases in this court where interest was allowed as a matter of course on taxes due the United States. Cheang-Kee v. United States, 3 Wall. 320; Railroad Co. v. United States, 101 U. S. 543; Litchfield v. County of Webster, 101 U. S. 773; United States v. Erie Railway Company, 106
U. S. 327. We say as a matter of course because in the cases referred to, the subject was not discussed and the liability for interest was practically admitted. The Government also relies on a careful and clear opinion by Maxey, Judge, in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Texas, holding that interest was due to the United States on customs duties. United States v. Mexican &c. R. Co., 154 Fed. Rep. 519. Whether the practice applied in the previous decisions of this court should be now followed or the theory established by the state cases adopted and made the rule as to taxes due the United States, is therefore the question. Its solution must depend not upon the mere authority of the state cases, but upon the conclusiveness of the principles upon which such cases rest and their concurrence with the principles by which interest is allowed in the courts of the United States, considerations which require us to determine the nature of the duty which arises from the liability for a tax imposed by the United States, not only inherently but as well from the practice which has obtained in the past in the enforcement of the law of the United States and the implication of legislative sanction, if any, to such practice which may have arisen. It would serve no purpose to refer to the abhorrence which obtained in early times concerning the payment of interest and the evolution by which the legitimate character of interest was gradually understood and it came to be recognized that its payment was, as a general principle, but the compensation due for the use of money or that its allowance was merely for damages caused by delay in discharging a duty and therefore in default on a contract to pay money even without express legislation so directing, interest would be allowed. The subject was explained in National Bank v. Mechanics National Bank, 94 U. S. 437 and was reviewed in Reid v. Rensselaer Glass Factory, 3 Cow. 393, 5 Cow. 587. To avoid prolixity we do not review the [p. 286] state cases as to non-liability for interest on default for taxes but content ourselves with stating that we think it is apparent that the conclusion which they sustain, leaving aside minor differences rests upon two fundamental propositions: First the necessity for an express statute providing for interest except in cases of contract, and second, that even where there is a statute providing for interest on all debts, such statute is not applicable to taxes because they are not debts and therefore must be enforced alone by virtue of express legislative penalties, except where a provision exists giving eo nomine interest on taxes. But both of these propositions are in conflict with the settled doctrine established by the decision of this court. Thus, as to the necessity for a statute it was long ago here decided in view of the true conception of interest, that a statute was not necessary to compel its payment where in accordance with the principles of equity and justice in the enforcement of an obligation, interest should be allowed. Young v. Godbe, 15 Wall. 562, 565:
“It is said there is no law in the Territory of Utah prescribing a rate of interest in transactions like the one in controversy in this suit, and that, therefore, no interest can be recovered. But this result does not follow. If there is no statute on the subject, interest will be allowed by way of damages for unreasonably withholding payment of an overdue account. The rate must be reasonable, and conform to the custom which obtains in the community in dealings of this character.”
And the decisions of this court have often since exemplified the principle by considering the question of the responsibility for interest from the point of view of reason and justice even though no express statute existed for compelling this payment. So also as to the nature and character of the obligation to pay taxes. As long ago as Meredith v. United States, 13 Peters, 486, it was decided, the court speaking by Mr. Justice Story (p. 493):
“It appears to us clear upon principle, as well as upon the obvious import of the provisions of the various acts of Congress on this subject, that the duties due upon all goods imported constitute a personal debt due to the United States from the importer. . . .”
Again in United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U. S. 250, the nature and character of an obligation to pay a stamp duty was considered, and the right to collect it by action of debt was passed upon and it was held that the obligation to pay was a debt and that it could be enforced by suit in the absence of an exclusive remedy created by the statute by which the obligation was imposed. In the course of the opinion, various decisions of this court recognizing the right of the United States to enforce internal revenue duties by suit were referred to and the statute to the same end was cited and its application to the case in hand was pointed out upon grounds which in reason may well be said to cause the statute to be applicable to the case here before us. In addition, in repeated adjudications in this court it has been settled that in a suit to recover taxes which have been illegally assessed interest would be allowed against the official although the real responsibility was on the Government. The concluded doctrine on this subject was thus stated in a recent case after referring to the exemption of the United States from liability for interest {National Volunteer Home v. Parrish, 229 U. S. 494, 496):
“On the contrary, in suits against collectors to recover moneys illegally exacted as taxes and paid under protest the settled rule is, that interest is recoverable without any statute to that effect, and this although the judgment is not to be paid by the collector but directly from the Treasury. Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. 75; Redfield v. Bartels, 139 U. S. 694.”
The conflict between the systems is pronounced and fundamental. In the one, the state rule, except as to [p. 288] contract, no interest without statute; in the United States rule, interest in all cases where equitably due unless forbidden by statute. In one no suit for taxes as a debt without express statutory authority, in the other the right to sue for taxes as for a debt in every case where not prohibited by statute.
From this review it results that the doctrine as to non-liability to pay interest for taxes which have become due which prevails in the state courts is absolutely in conflict with the doctrine applied to the same subject in this court and cannot now be made the rule without repudiating settled principles which have been here applied for many years in various aspects and without in effect disregarding the sanction either expressly or impliedly given by Congress to such rules. From this it follows that although in the cases in this court to which we at the outset made reference which enforced the liability for interest and which are here controlling if they be not now overruled, there was no controversy as to the liability for interest, this was presumably because the matter was deemed not disputable as the direct result of the then settled doctrine that interest could be recovered by the United States on a default in payment of import duties. Under this condition we can see no ground for departing from the rule which the cases enforced, and we are therefore constrained to the conclusion that the court below was wrong in rejecting the prayer of the Government for interest and its action in that respect must be reversed while in others it must be affirmed.
Modified and affirmed.
UNITED STATES v. BILLINGS.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
BILLINGS v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
Nos. 626 and 67. Argued January 6, 7,1914.—Decided February 24,1914. Decided on authority of Billings v. United States, ante, p. 261. 190 Fed. Rep. 359, modified and affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Adkins, with whom Mr. Karl W. Kirchwey was on the brief, for the United States.1
Mr. William D. Guthrie for the yacht owner in this and other cases argued simultaneously herewith.12
Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
These two cases are controlled by the two cases between the same parties just decided. In the case which is here on error, the suit was brought by the United States to recover the amount of the tax which became due upon the yacht Vanadis, on the first day of September, 1910, under the act of August 5,1909, which was under consideration in the previous cases. The complaint, leaving aside some additional averments which it is unnecessary to refer to, was the same as the one in the cases already passed upon, and this is true also of the answer. The case [p. 290] by stipulation was submitted to the court without a jury and the steps essential to save all the questions in the case were properly taken. The use of the vessel during the taxing period was shown. There was a judgment in favor of the United States for the amount of the tax, but against it for interest and error was prosecuted from the. Circuit Court of Appeals to review that subject and such case is here on certificate. Taking jurisdiction of both cases and treating them as one, as was done in the previous cases, and applying the conclusions in those cases expressed, to this, it results that the judgment below must be modified, so far as the interest is concerned, by allowing the claim of the United States in that respect, and in other respects it must be affirmed.
1
See argument, p. 269, ante.
2
See argument, p. 263, ante. VOL. CCXXXII—19
And it is so ordered.
PIERCE v. UNITED STATES.
’ ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
UNITED STATES v. PIERCE.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
Nos. 64 and 623. Argued. January 6, 7,1914.—Decided February 24,1914.
Billings v. United States, ante, p. 261, followed and distinguished, to the effect that the owner of a foreign-built yacht is not liable for the tax imposed by § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, if the yacht was not actually used at all during the preceding year. 190 Fed. Rep. 359, reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. William D. Guthrie, for the yacht owner in this and other cases argued simultaneously herewith.1
1
See argument, p. 263, ante.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Adkins, with whom Mr. Karl W. Kirchwey was on the brief, for the United States.1
Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
These two cases involve the liability of the plaintiff in error in No. 64 for a tax on the foreign-built yacht Yacona, which became due on the first of September, 1909. The complaint in every substantial particular was identical with that filed in the Billings Case this day decided, and this is true also of the defenses set up in the answer except that the answer in this case contained this distinct averment which was not in the Billings Case: “ That the said yacht Yacona was not in use by the defendant or by any other person at any time during the year next preceding the first day of September, 1909, but was out of commission and laid up unused at Brooklyn in the State of New York, throughout the whole of such year.” The case was submitted on bill and answer and the liability for the tax which was upheld by the court below was rested upon the construction as to potential use that is a tax on the privilege of using which we decided in the Billings Case to be unsound. In this case, as in that, the certificate is concerned with a writ of error prosecuted by the United States to the Circuit Court of Appeals because of the rejection of a prayer for interest. Treating both the cases in this instance as one, as we did in the previous cases, and applying to this the construction which we have given the statute in those cases, it follows that the judgment below was wrong and must be reversed, with direction to dismiss the complaint.
And it is so ordered.
1
See argument, p. 269, ante.
PIERCE v. UNITED STATES (NO. 2).
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
UNITED STATES v. PIERCE.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
Nos. 65, 624. Argued January 6, 7, 1914.—Decided February 24, 1914.
Decided on authority of Pierce y. United States, ante, p. 290. 190 Fed. Rep. 359, reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. William D. Guthrie for the yacht owner in this and other cases argued simultaneously herewith.1
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Adkins, with whom Mr. Karl W. Kirchwey was on the brief, for the United States.12
Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
These cases concern the right to recover a tax on the yacht Yacona, becoming due on the first of September, 1910. The complaint filed by the United States in No. 65 was in substance like that filed in the previous cases and the answer in effect set up the same defenses, especially the defense relating to the non-use of the yacht. The case, by stipulation, was submitted to the court without a jury, a finding of facts was made which distinctly established [p. 293] the non-use during the taxing year and the court gave a judgment for the tax, although it rejected the interest, upon the same construction of the act which it applied in the previous cases. The certificate in this as in the other cases is here in consequence of error prosecuted by the United States to the Circuit Court of Appeals, because of the rejection of the interest claimed. Treating this case as we treated the others and applying the construction in those cases given, it follows that the judgment in this case must be reversed.
1
See argument, p. 263, ante.
2
See argument, p. 269, ante.
And it is so ordered.
UNITED STATES v. GOELET.
CERTIFICATES FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
Nos. 631, 632. Argued January 6, 7, 1914.—Decided February 24, 1914.
Billings v. United States, ante, p. 261, followed to the effect that the tax on the use of foreign-built yachts imposed by § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909 is not an unconstitutional exercise of power by Congress, and it became due for the year 1909 on the first day of September, 1909.
While Congress may have the power to impose an excise duty on a citizen permanently domiciled abroad, such an imposition is so unusual that an intent to do so will not be presumed unless clearly expressed.
The expectation of those who sought the enactment of legislation may not be used for the purpose of affixing to such legislation, when enacted, a meaning which it does not express.
The tax imposed by § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909 does not apply to the use of a foreign-built yacht owned by a citizen of the United States who was permanently resident and domiciled in a foreign country for more than one year prior to September 1, 1909, and to the levy of such tax.
The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, imposing a tax [p. 294] on foreign-built yachts and the application of that section to a yacht owned by an American citizen permanently domiciled abroad and which had not been within the jurisdiction of the United States during a part of the period for which the tax was levied, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Adkins, with whom Mr. Karl W. Kirchwey was on the brief, for the United States.1
Mr. William D. Guthrie for the yacht owner in this and other cases argued simultaneously herewith.12
Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
The questions asked in both of these cases relate to § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909 which we have construed in several opinions just announced. They both concern the sum of excise duties levied on the foreign-built yacht Nahma, the one assessed for the year ending on the first of September, 1909 and the other on the first of September, 1910. The cases were decided by the trial court at the same time with other cases for a like period, the case relating to the tax for 1909 having been submitted on bill and answer as a result of the overruling of a demurrer filed by the Government to the answer of the defendant and the election to plead no further, and the case involving the levy for 1910 having been decided by the court along with other cases without the intervention of a jury as the result of a stipulation between the parties. The certificate fully states the situation as to both periods of taxation conforming to the conditions of fact which we have recapitulated in the opinions in the two Billings Cases, ante, [p. 295] pp. 261 and 289, and the questions asked concerning the construction of the statute, its operation and its constitutionality involve all the subject-matters which we have disposed of in the previous opinions. In both of these cases however, differing from those which we have previously decided, in the pleadings concerning the 1909 tax it was expressly averred and by the demurrer conceded that the owner of the yacht at least for a year prior to the levy of the tax, was domiciled in a foreign country and that the yacht whose use was taxed had a permanent situs in such country, and so far as the levy for 1910 is concerned that state of things as shown by the certificate was expressly covered by the findings of fact; and if the opinion of the trial court be considered, it will appear that it was one of these peculiarities of fact, that is, the permanent domicile abroad, which led that court, instead of deciding in favor of the tax, to hold that as to both periods it was unauthorized by the statute. To make the situation perfectly clear we quote from the certificate in the case concerning the 1909 tax (No. 631) the exact language of the answer on the subjects just stated, the equivalent of which is embraced in case involving the 1910 tax (No. 632), as follows:
1
See argument, p. 269, ante.
2
See argument, p. 263, ante.
“That the defendant was, on September 1, 1909, and for several years prior thereto had been permanently a resident of and domiciled at Paris, in the Republic of France; and that since 1901 her said yacht had not been within the jurisdiction of the United States, but had had a permanent situs within the jurisdiction of Great Britain.”
For the purpose of enabling it to determine the influence of the facts thus stated upon the decision of these two cases, the court, in its certificate in addition to many questions involving the issues of construction and constitutionality which we have disposed of in the other cases asks two questions whose order of statement we rearrange as follows;
“II. Does the tax purporting to be imposed by said act of Congress apply to the use of a foreign-built yacht owned by a citizen of the United States who was permanently resident and domiciled in a foreign country for more than one year prior to September 1, 1909, and to the levy of such tax?
“I. Does the tax purporting to be imposed by section 37 of the act of Congress, approved August 5, 1909, apply to the use of a foreign-built yacht owned by a citizen of the United States, when such yacht, for a period of more than one year prior to September 1, 1909, and to the levy of such tax, was used wholly outside of the limits and territorial jurisdiction of the United States? ”
It is manifest from what we have said that the response to these two questions will be substantially determinative of all the questions which the certificate propounds since if we answer either of them in the negative, the case will be disposed of and there will be no occasion to reply to the others, and if on the contrary we answer both of them in th€ affirmative there will be no need to do anything but state our reply to the other questions, since the reasons for such reply will be controlled by the opinions which we have previously announced. We come then to consider the questions in the order stated.
Not in the slightest degree questioning that there was power to impose the excise duty on the citizen owning a foreign-built yacht wholly irrespective of the fact that he was permanently domiciled in a foreign country and putting out of view all questions concerning the non-application of the statute to the case in hand purely because of the situs of the yacht itself, the single matter for decision is, do the terms of the statute provide for the payment by a citizen of the United States who has a permanent residence and domicile abroad of an excise duty because of the use by him as owner or charterer under the terms of the statute of a foreign-built yacht? It may not [p. 297] be doubted, as observed by the trial court in these cases (omitting the consideration of taxes imposed on property having a situs within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority), speaking in a general sense that the taxing power, when exerted, is not usually applied to those, even albeit they are citizens, who have a permanent domicile or residence outside of the country levying the tax. Indeed we think it must be conceded that the levy of such a tax is so beyond the normal and usual exercise of the taxing power, as to cause it to be, when exerted, of rare occurrence and in the fullest sense exceptional. This being true, we must approach the statute for the purpose of ascertaining whether its provisions sanction such rare and exceptional taxation. Considering the text, we search in vain for the express declaration of such authority. True, it is argued by the United States, that as the tax is levied on any citizen using a foreign-built yacht and as any includes all, therefore the statute expressly embraces a citizen permanently domiciled and residing abroad. But this argument in effect begs the question for decision which is whether the use of the general words, any citizen, without more should be considered as expressing more than the general rule of taxation, or in other words can be treated without the expression of more as embracing the exceptional exertion of the power to tax one permanently residing abroad. As illustrative and throwing light on the real question for decision, action taken by Congress in exerting its taxing power is at least worthy of note. For instance the provisions of the income tax law of June 30, 1864 (c. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 281), expressly extended that tax to those domiciled abroad and a like purpose is beyond doubt expressed in the income tax of 1913 (subdivision 1 of the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913). But without resting this case upon the implication against the conferring of the authority here claimed from the mere want of express statement in the statute of the giving of such exceptional [p. 298] power, and treating such implication as not in and of itself absolutely conclusive, we think when to the force of such inference, even though it be limited, there is added the weight arising from that which is expressly stated in the statute, the conclusion against want of power conferred to levy the tax here asserted is established. This arises from the command of the statute that the tax shall be levied “by the collector of customs of the district nearest the residence of the managing owner” etc., since the consequence of such command is to associate residence with citizenship and establishes such a relationship between them as to bring about the result which we have just stated. Nor do we think there is anything as suggested by the argument of the United States in the case of Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, which militates against the views just stated and this also is true of the suggestion made in argument concerning the circulation by those interested in the enactment, of the provision of a list of yachts which would become subject to the tax if the provision was enacted, which list included the yacht taxed in this case. The expectations of those who sought the enactment of legislation may not be used for the purpose of affixing to legislation when enacted a meaning which it does not express.
For the reasons just stated we conclude to answer the second question in the negative and not. to reply to the others, as it becomes unnecessary to do so.
And it will be so certified.
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