The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903)

189 U.S. 185
23 S. Ct. 491
47 L. Ed. 770
1902 SCDB 114
1903 U.S. LEXIS 1342
US-DOC-27821163
locator
Case details
Bluebook Citation
The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903)
Full caption
THE ROANOKE.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 2, 1903
THE ROANOKE.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON.
No. 123. Submitted December 17,1902.—Decided March 2,1903.
The following propositions in regard to lien for supplies furnished to vessels may be considered as settled:
(1.) That by the maritime law, as administered in England and in this country, a lien is given for necessaries furnished a foreign vessel upon the credit of such vessel; and that in this particular the several States of the Union are treated as foreign to each other.
(2.) That no such lien is given for necessaries furnished in the home port of the vessel, or in the port in which the vessel is owned, registered, enrolled or licensed, and the remedy in such case, though enforceable in the admiralty, is in personam only.
(3.) That it is competent for the States to create liens for necessaries furnished to domestic vessels, and that such liens will be enforceb by the courts of admiralty under their general jurisdiction on the subject of necessaries.
Where, however, Congress has dealt with a subject within its exclusive power, or where such exclusive power is given to the Federal courts, as d cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it is not competent for
Statement of the Case. 189 Ü. S.
the States to invade the domain of such jurisdiction and enact laws which in any way trench upon the power of the Federal courts. The statutes of the State of Washington, sections 5953, 5954, 2 Ball-
inger’s Code, giving an absolute lien upon foreign vessels for work done or material furnished at the request of a contractor or sub-contractor, and making no provision for the protection of the owner in case the contractor has been paid the full amount of his bill before notice of the claim of the sub-contractor is received, in so far as it attempts to control the administration of the maritime law by creating and superadding conditions for the benefit of a particular class of creditors, and thereby depriving the owners of vessels of defences to which they would otherwise have been entitled, is an unlawful interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of all admiralty and maritime cases which is vested by the Constitution in the Federal courts, and to that extent such statute is unconstitutional and void.
This was a libel in rem for materials, and also for work and labor, alleged to have been furnished by the libellants King and Winge in the repair of the steamship Roanoke, to certain contractors with the owners, who had full charge of the alteration and repair of the steamship. An intervening libel was also filed by one Fraser for labor and material furnished under the same conditions.
The cases resulted in decrees for the libellants, from which the North American Transportation and Trading Company, owner of the steamship, appealed directly to this court, and the following facts were found :
“ The North American Transportation and Trading Company appeared as claimant and owner and the vessel was released upon its stipulation.
“ It admitted all the allegations of the libel except that the work was done on the credit of the ship, which it denied except that it admitted that libellants had acted under the belief that they had a lien by virtue of law7. It then alleged its incorporation and existence under the laws of the State of Illinois, the residence there at all times of its president and general manager, its maintaining only agencies at Seattle and at other places in Alaska and Canada, and its enjoying a high credit. T e Roanoke it alleged to be an ocean-going vessel registered a Chicago, Illinois, under the navigation lawrs of the United States, with the name of Chicago painted on her stern. She was a [p. 187] 189 Ü. S. Argument for Appellant.
leged to have been purchased by claimant in 1898 on the Atlantic coast, and, upon the Pacific coast since that time, employed between Seattle and the mouth of the Yukon in the summer, and between San Francisco and southern ports in the winter. It was further alleged that the claimant had never given any order for the material and labor described in the libel, and that these were furnished on the order of the contractor, who, before the filing of the libel and without any knowledge by claimant of these unpaid claims, had been paid by this claimant for these materials and labor in full. It was alleged in conclusion that the lien claimed by libellants was claimed under sections 5953 and 5954 of Ballinger’s Code and Statutes of Washington, that such a lien was in this instance void, being in violation of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several States, was an illegal burden upon interstate commerce, and in violation also of the fourteenth article of the Constitution of the United States, as depriving claimant of its property without due process of law and without its equal protection, and was in violation of the second section of the third article of the Constitution conferring on the courts of the United States admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
To the intervening libel of Fraser the same answer was made.
To each of these answers respectively the libellants and inervening libellant excepted as insufficient, and the whole of cons^^u^e any answer or defence to the libel.
e exceptions were sustained, the claimant elected to 8 n on its answer and a decree was entered against it and its 8 ipu ators for the whole sum claimed in the libels.”
Frederick Bausman, with whom Jfn Daniel Kelleher was on the brief, for appellant. and ,e R°ayoke was a non-resident ship. Registered in a port, th °n^n” a citizen, of Illinois, she was property only of e btate of Illinois. Hays v. Pacific J/. N. Co., 17 How. 596;
v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471. However much she might [p. 188] loiter in other waters, she was not liable even to taxation outside of Illinois, for she had no other situs. The Jennie Middleton, 94 Fed. Rep. 683 ; The Havana, 92 Fed. Rep. 1007; Pullman Co. n. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 32.
This court has jurisdiction. The amount involved is sufficient. The Paquette Hdbana, 175 U. S. 677. That the constitutional question was raised by the defence and not by libellants is no objection. Direct appeal may be taken no matter which party raised such question in the lower court. Lod v. Trustees, 179 U. S. 472; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540.
The Washington statute offends the commerce clause of the Constitution. Interstate commerce is one province which, relinquished by the States, has been everywhere explored, occupied and subjected by its new possessor. Nowhere is anything left uncertain. The regulations of government are wrought out in the finest detail. Nothing has been too small. The placing of buoys, the licensing of masters, engineers and pilots, and even the wages of seamen, have become the subject of statutes. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 ; The Genessee Chief, 12 How. 443. The maritime laws of the national government cannot even be enforced by the States. No more can the uncodified jurisprudence of the seas, for courts of admiralty belong to the Federal government alone.
Rail/road Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456, 470, is quoted with approval even by that majority in this court who conceded to the States certain rights as to commerce by land. Pullman Co. n. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 32. Cars that were owned in one State might be taxed if moving in another, but the ships of another State never.
The very sale, hypothecation and transfer of ships is regulated by the navigation laws of the Union, and those laws have their origin in the interstate commerce provisions of the Federal Constitution. Why should one State be allowed, then, to fasten liens upon vessels of other States ? Does this not directly invade the interstate commerce right of the general government ?
189 U. S. Argument for Appellees.
Any other view seems full of danger. State liens might become unreasonable.
Hard as it is to conceive that the Federal government will ever permit the encroachment of state liens where both commerce and admiralty are concerned, it is altogether too hard to imagine that they will permit such liens to be unreasonable in themselves. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.
This law shows it is one of the most unreasonable ever enacted of its kind.
The Washington statute invades the jurisdiction in admiralty. Although a State may enact lien laws as to ships owned within it has long been settled, but no decision can be construed as authorizing also liens on ships owned without the State. Indeed, it is questionable whether such liens were intended to be supported, even within the State, beyond the home port. The General Smith, 4 Wheaton, 438 ; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Peters, 342; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The J E. Rumbell, 148 IT. S. 1; The (Jhusan, 2 Story, 455.
This case was cited with approval twelve years later, in Steamboat New York v. Rae, 18 How. 223, in which a local rale of navigation of New York was held good as to domestic, and bad as to foreign, ships; in Hall v. De Cuir, 95 IT. S. 485, in 1877; in The Globe by Justice Nelson, 2 Blatch. 427; and Selah, 4 Sawyer, 40 ; The Lyndhurst, 48 Fed. Rep. 839; The Electron, 74 Fed. Rep. 689.
In conclusion (1) that as applied to vessels of other States, a oca lien invades the interstate commerce powers of the Federa government; (2) that even if any such law can be valid, is one cannot because it is not a reasonable one ; (3) that, as regards the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal government, sue aws, whether reasonable in terms or not, are void as to vesse s of other States, because wholly unnecessary, and in eir nature incompatible with the complete system of admiralty and its policy.
Preston, with whom Hr. Benton Einbree and arence S, Preston were on the brief, for appellees.
Argument for Appellees.
189 U. S.
This court does not have jurisdiction. Baltimore R. Co. v. Hopkins, 130 IT. S. 210; State of Arkansas v. Schlierhdl2,Yl2 U. S. 598, 601; City of Lampasas v. Bell, 180 IT. S. 276, 281.
I. The statute of Washington does not violate the commerce clause of the Constitution. It is well settled that the laws of the State in which personal property is situated govern respecting the transfer of title to and liens thereon, even where the owner is a non-resident of the State. Walworth v. Harris, 129 U. S. 355 ; Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454; Pullman Company v. Pennsylvania, 141 IT. S. 32; The Iris, 100 Fed. Rep. 104, 106 ; Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; 7 Wall. 139.
In determining the relative power of the States and of Congress concerning foreign and interstate commerce, the place of residence of the owner of the instruments of such commerce is wholly immaterial. A vessel is none the less engaged in interstate commerce because her owner resides in one of the States between which such commerce is carried on. Therefore, in considering whether the statute of the State of Washington conferring liens on vessels violates the commerce clause of the Constitution, the place of residence of the owner may be laid aside.
The uniform current of decisions of this court is to the effect that in those respects in which Congress has not exercised its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, state legislation is valid so long as it affects such commerce only indirectly oflfremotely. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 IT. S. 1, and citations; Lake Shore R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, and citations; Missouri R. Co. v. Haber, 169 IT. S. 613; Louisville R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 IT. S. 677; Wilkerson v. Rohrer, 140 IT. S. 545.
This reserved power in the States is not limited to the right to legislate concerning the public health, morals or safety, but extends also to and includes the power to legislate respecting matters of mere convenience and the prosperity of the people. Lake Shore R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 IT. S. 285.
Counsel for appellant admits this right on the part of the State to legislate as applied to commerce on land, but denies the right respecting commerce by water; there is no groun for such a distinction. Railroad Company n. Maryland, 2 [p. 191] 189 U. S. Argument for Appellees.
Wall. 456, cited by appellant, distinguished, and see Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99.
The court draws a distinction between the effect of taxation upon the instruments of interstate commerce, and the regulation of such commerce by other means. Missouri R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 632; Louisville R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 701; Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 IT. S. 590, 598-599.
Compulsory pilotage laws of a State, while admitted to be regulations of commerce, are held valid so long as Congress refrains from legislating on the subject. Cooley v. Board of hardens, 12 Howard, 299, 320; Huus v. Steamship Co., 182 U. S. 392 ; China, 7 Wall. 53 ; Ex parte ALcNeil, 13 Wall. 236; Pacific Afa.il S. Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wallace, 450. See also as to materialmen statutes, The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; McRae v. Dredging Co., 86 Fed. Rep. 344, 350; The Robert Dollar, 115 Fed. Rep. 218.
The statute is not unreasonable, in that by its terms the lien conferred continues for a period of three years. In this instance the liens against the Roanoke were asserted by the commencement of these proceedings within five months after the causes of action accrued. The record fails to show that this lapse of time was unreasonable. No claim of laches on the part of the appellees is made. During this period the vessel was in foreign waters, beyond the jurisdiction of the court. No change in the ownership of the vessel took place. No claim is made that the appellant was without knowledge that the appellees furnished the materials and performed the services set orth in the libel. Nor are any facts set forth in the answers to show that the contractors, at whose instance the appellees rnished the materials and rendered the services, were obligated to pay appellees therefor.
I. The statute does not invade the jurisdiction in admiralty, ile a state statute cannot convert a contract non-maritime in c aracter by the general principles of the maritime law, into amaritime one, for that would be to extend the jurisdiction in a lniralty5 it is now well settled that a lien conferred by a state " ute as incident to a maritime contract, is, for all practical
Opinion of the Court. 189 U. S.
purposes, a maritime lien, and that such a lien is cognizable in the admiralty. The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 20; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606; The Robert Dollar, 115 Fed. Rep. 218.
The imposition by a local statute of a lien upon foreign vessels, so long as such lien is consistent with the principles of the general maritime law, is no more an invasion of the admiralty jurisdiction than the creation by such statute of a lien upon domestic vessels. The Chusan, 2 Story, 455; The Lyndhurst, 48 Fed. Rep. 839; Steamboat New York v. Rae, 18 How. 223; Hall n. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 585, cited by appellant distinguished; and see Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, in which it was held that by the maritime law the city was liable, and that the local law, which, as construed by the state court, exempted the city from liability, was not applicable because it deprived parties of rights conferred by the admiralty law. In other words, because it was inconsistent with the principles of the admiralty law.
We contend, therefore, (1) that this court is without jurisdiction to review these proceedings; (2) that the statute of Washington is not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the Constitution ; and (3) that such statute does not invade the jurisdiction in admiralty.
Mr. Justice Brown, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is appealed directly from the District Court to this court under that clause of section 5 of the Court of Appeals Act, which permits such appeal “ in any case in which the constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States.” No additional sig niiicance is given to the appeal by certain questions cert’ e by the District Court, as the power to certify is only given in cases appealed upon questions of jurisdiction. But as the case is properly before us upon direct appeal from the District Cour, we proceed to dispose of the question of the constitution y of the law of Washington, under which these proceedings were taken.
By that law, 2 Ballinger’s Code, secs. 5953 and 5954—
“ 5953. All steamers, vessels, and boats, their tackle, apparel, and furniture, are liable,—
********
“ 3. For work done or material furnished in this State, for their construction, repair, or equipment, at the request of their respective owners, masters, agents, consignees, contractors, sub-contractors, or other person or persons having charge in whole or in part of their construction, alteration, repair, or equipment; and every contractor, sub-contractor, builder, or person having charge, either in whole or in part, of the construction, alteration, repair, or equipment of any vessel shall be held to be the agent of the owner, for the purposes of this chapter;
********
“ Demands for these several causes constitute liens upon all steamers, vessels, and boats, and their tackle, apparel, and furniture, and have priority in their order herein enumerated, and have preference over all other demands; but such liens only continue in force for the period of three years from the time the cause of action accrued.
“5954. Such liens may be enforced, in all cases of maritime contracts or service, by a suit in admiralty, in rem, and the law regulating proceedings in admiralty shall govern in all such suits; and in all cases of contracts or service not maritime, by a civil action in any District Court of this Territory.”
In this connection the following propositions may be considered as settled:
1. That by the maritime law, as administered in England and in this country, a lien is given for necessaries furnished a foreign vessel upon the credit of such vessel; The General iih, 4 Wheat. 438; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129; Gen. Admiralty Rule 12, and that in this particular the several States o this Union are treated as foreign to each other. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; The Kalorama, 10 Wall. 204, 212,
2. That no such lien is given for necessaries furnished in the ome port of the vessel, or in the port in which the vessel is owned, registered, enrolled or licensed, and the remedy in such Vol. clxxxix —13
Opinion of the Court.
189 U.S.
case, though enforceable in the admiralty, is in personam only. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The Edith, 94 U. S. 518. This is a distinct departure from the Continental system, which makes no account of the domicil of the vessel, and is a relic of the prohibitions of Westminster Hall against the Court of Admiralty, to the principle of which this court has steadily adhered.
3. That it is competent for the States to create liens for necessaries furnished to domestic vessels, and that such liens will be enforced by the courts of admiralty under their general jurisdiction over the subject of necessaries. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438 ; The Planter, (Peyronx v. Howardfl Pet. 324; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 ; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The J. E. Bumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 12. The right to extend these liens to foreign vessels in any case is open to grave doubt. The Chusan, 2 Story, 455; The Lyndhurst, 48 Fed. Rep. 839.
The question involved in this case, however, is whether the States may create such liens as against foreign vessels, (vessels owned in other States or countries,) and under such circumstances as would not authorize a lien under the general maritime law. The question is one of very considerable importance, as it involves the power of each State, which a vessel may visit in the course of a long voyage, to impose liens under wholly different circumstances and upon wholly different conditions. In the case under consideration the vessel was owned by an Illinois corporation, enjoying a high credit, and maintaining agencies at Seattle and at other places in Alaska an Canada. The Roanoke was an ocean-going vessel, registere at Chicago under the navigation laws of the United States, with the name “ Chicago ” painted on her stern, although s e was engaged in trade upon the Pacific coast between Seat e and the mouth of the Yukon in summer, and between an Francisco and southern ports in winter. Neither the owne nor master nor other officers of the vessel had given an or er for the material and labor set forth in the libel, which were furnished upon the order of a contractor, who, before the in8 [p. 195] of the libel and without any knowledge by the owner of these unpaid claims, had beenpaid in fullfor these claims.
Although this court has never directly decided whether materials and labor furnished by workmen or sub-contractors constitute a lien upon a vessel — in other words, whether the contractor can be regarded as an agent of the vessel in the purchase of such labor and materials—there is a general consensus of opinion in the state courts and in the inferior Federal courts that labor and materials furnished to a contractor do not constitute a lien upon the vessel, unless at least notice be given to the owner of such claim before the contractor has received the sum stipulated by his contract. Smith v. The Steamer Eastern Railroad, 1 Curtis, 253; Southwick v. The Clyde, 6 Blackf. 148; Hubbell v. Denison, 20 Wend. 181; Burst v. Jackson, 10 Barb. 219; The Brig Whitaker, 1 Sprague, 229 ; The Whitaker, 1 Sprague, 282 ; Harper v. The New Brig, Gilpin, 536; Ames v. Swett, 33 Maine, 479 ; Squire v. One Hundred Tons of Iron, 2 Ben. 21; The Marquette, Brown’s Adm. 364.
The injustice of permitting such claims to be set up is plainly apparent. The master is the agent of the vessel and its owner in more than the ordinary sense. During the voyage he is in factfact the alter ego of his principal.principal. He is entrusted with an uncontrolled authority to provide for the crew, and for the preservation and repair of the ship. He engages the cargoes, receives the freight, hires and pays his crew, and is entrusted perhaps for years with the command and disposition of the vessel. With full authority to bind the vessel, his position is such that it is almost impossible for him to acquaint himself with the laws of each individual State he may visit, and he has 4 SUhP0Se that the general maritime law applies to him an is ship, wherever she may go, unhampered by laws which are mainly intended for local application, or for domestic ves-86 • Local laws, such as the one under consideration, ordi-
Pro^ec^ by requiring notice of the claim to be e in some public office, limiting the time to a few weeks or a 00 S w^ich the laborer or sub-contractor may proceed thfi1QS\ er’ re<^iring notice to be given of the claim, before e contractor himself has been paid, and limiting his recovery
Opinion of the Court.
189 U. S.
to the amount remaining upaid at the time such notice is received. The statute of Washington, however, provides for an absolute lien upon the ship for work done or material furnished at the request of the contractor or sub-contractor, and makes no provision for the protection of the owner in case the contractor has been paid the full amount of his bill before notice of the claim of the sub-contractor is received. The finding in this case is that the contractor, who had agreed in consonance with the usual course of business, to make the repairs upon this vessel, had been paid in full by the claimant. The injustice of holding the ship under the circumstances is plainly manifest.
Not only is the statute in question obnoxious to the general maritime law in declaring every contractor and sub-contractor an agent of the owner, but it establishes a new order of priority in payment of liens, abolishes the ancient and equitable rule regarding “ stale claims,” and permits the assertion of a lien at any time within three years, regardless of the fact that the vessel may have been sold to a 'bona fide purchaser, not only without notice of the claim, but without the possibility of informing himself by a resort to the public records. It also gives, or at least creates the presumption of, a lien, though the mar terials be furnished upon the order of the owner in person.
No opinion upon this subject can afford to ignore the admirable discussion of Mr. Justice Story in the case of Tm Chu.san, 2 Story, 455, in which he refused to apply to a Massachusetts vessel a law of the State of New York, requiring a lien for supplies to be enforced before the vessel left the State.
“ This statute is, as I conceive, perfectly constitutional, as applied to cases of repairs of domestic ships, that is, of ships belonging to the ports of that State. . . . But in cases o foreign ships, and supplies furnished to them, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is governed by the Consti tution and laws of the United States, and is, in no sense gov erned, controlled, or limited by the local legislation. • • ; For myself, I can only say, that during the whole of my ju 1 cial life, I have never, up to the present hour, heard a sin& e doubt breathed upon the subject.” To the same effect is Lyndhurst^ 48 Fed. Rep. 839; The Kate, 56 Fed. Rep. 61.
While no case involving this precise question seems to have arisen in this court, we have several times had occasion to hold that where Congress has dealt with a subject within its exclusive power, or where such exclusive power is given to the Federal courts, as in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it is not competent for States to invade that domain of legislation, and enact laws which in any way trench upon the power of the Federal government. Cases arising in other branches of the law furnish apt analogies. The principle is stated in a nutshell by Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 193. “ But it has never been supposed that this concurrent power of legislation extended to every possible case in which its exercise by the States has not been expressly prohibited. The confusion resulting from such a practice would be endless. . . . Whenever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of the power, require that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the state legis-
latures as if they had been expressly forbidden to act on it.” This was said of a bankrupt law of New York which assumed to discharge the debtor from all liability for debts previously contracted, notwithstanding the Constitution had vested the power in Congress of establishing uniform laws on the subject o ankruptcy. It was held that the States had a right to pass bankrupt laws until the power had been acted upon by ongress, though the law of New York discharging the debtor rom iability was held to be void as impairing the obligation
o prior contracts within the meaning of the Constitution.
n all v. DeCui/r, 95 U. S. 485, 498, it was said that, inasuc as interstate commerce is regulated very largely by Conessional legislation, it followed that such legislation must
npPe 6 s^e legislation upon the same subject, and, by leoiRW^ 1T^Pllca^0I1J prohibit it, except in cases where the nartia i°n ° ^on&ress manifests an intention to leave some instarT .maV'er regulated by the several States, as, for fa., 1“ How 900^°' pil°tage: CooUy v- Board War-of Lon- ‘ Upon this principle it was held that a law isiana excluding colored passengers from the cabin set [p. 198] 1Ô8 OCTOBER TERM, 1902.
Opinion of the Court. 189 U.S.
apart for the use of whites during the passage of steamboats down the Mississippi, was a regulation of interstate commerce, and therefore unconstitutional. To the same effect is Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227. In the subsequent cases of Louisville &c. Railway v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, state laws requiring separate railway carriages for the white and colored races were sustained upon the ground that they applied only between places in the same State.
In the very recent case of Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, it was held that a state law punishing presidents of banks receiving deposits of money at a time when the bank was insolvent, and when such insolvency was known to them, was unconstitutional as applied to national banks whose operations were governed exclusively by acts of Congress. Said Mr. Justice Shiras (p. 231): “ But we are unable to perceive that Congress intended to leave the field open for the States to attempt to promote the welfare and stability of national banks by direct legislation. If they had such power it would have to be exercised and limited by their own discretion, and confusion would necessarily result from control possessed and exercised by two independent authorities.” See also Farmer^ dbc. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 425.
The following cases are also to the same general effect: D& gant n. Michael, 2 Indiana, 396; State v. Pike, 15 N. H- 83, Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 644; Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311; Ex parte Hill, 38 Alabama, 429, 450; v Fonda, 62 Michigan, 401. Although it is equally true that where Congress, having the power, has exercised it but incidentally, and obviously with no intention of covering the su ject, the States may supplement its legislation by regulations o their own not inconsistent with it. Reid v. Colorado, 187 137.
Bearing in mind that exclusive jurisdiction of all a(^^ra and maritime cases is vested by the Constitution in the e era courts, which are thereby made judges of the scope o so jurisdiction, subject, of course, to Congressional legislation, statute of the State of Washington, in so far as it attemp s
UNITED STATES v. NIX. 190
Syllabus.
189 Ü. S.
control the administration of the maritime law by creating and superadding conditions for the benefit of a particular class of creditors, and thereby depriving the owners of vessels of defences to which they would otherwise have been entitled, is an unlawful interference with that jurisdiction, and to that extent is unconstitutional and void.
The decree of the District Court is therefore reversed, and the case remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the libels.
Me. Justice Harlan concurred in the result.
UNITED STATES v. NIX.
NIX v. UNITED STATES.
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
Nos. 142,195. Submitted December 18,1902.—Decided March 2,1903.
1- Under sec. 829, Rev. Stat., a United States marshal may elect to be reimbursed his actual travelling expenses incurred in serving writs, but there is no authority in law for allowing him mileage in excess of the distance from the place of arrest to the place of receiving the writs, even if the travel is in a new and unsettled Indian country and there are exceptional difficulties to overcome.
2. Where a United States court is opened for business by order of the judge, it is the duty of the marshal to attend and he is entitled to his per diem fee therefor whether the judge be present or not. • A general act is not to be construed as applying to cases covered by a prior special act on the same subject. The marshal for the District of Oklahoma is entitled to fees for transportation of prisoners arrested under warrants issued by United States commissioners as fixed by the statute providing a temporary government for the Territory of Oklahoma, notwithstanding the provisions of the act of Congress of August 19,1894, applicable to marshals generally throughout the country. The fact that a marshal’s accounts have been approved by a district judge is sufficient to cast upon the government the burden of showing any error of fact in his account. \4. Where the marshal charged for travel in transporting a prisoner who
Opinion of the Court.
189 U. S.
escaped from his custody, and there was no finding, either by the district judge in approving his accounts, or by the Court of Claims, of due diligence on the part of the officer to prevent the escape, the item was held to be properly disallowed, the presumption being that the prisoner escaped by negligence.
This is a petition for marshal’s fees for the District of Oklahoma, upon which the Court of Claims made the findings of fact set forth in the margin.1II.III.36 C. Cl. 593 ; 36 C. Cl. 598.
J//’. Assistant Attorney General Pradt and Mr. Assistant Attorney Brannigan for the United States.
Mr. Franlc B. Crosthwaite and Mr. Fra/nklin H. Mackey for Nix.
Mr. Justice Brown, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
Item 2 of the third finding, namely, “ travelling 1153 miles
11. The claimant, Evett D. Nix, was United States marshal for the District of Oklahoma from July 1, 1893, to February 24,1896, appointed, qualified and acting.
II. During said period the claimant, as such marshal, by his deputies, performed services and travel and incurred expenses in behalf of the United States, and his accounts therefor, verified by his oath and approved by the court in accordance with the law, were finally acted upon by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department, and part thereof was allowed and paid, but a part thereof, as more specifically set forth in Finding III, was disallowed, and no portion thereof has been paid to the claimant.
III. Item 2. To travel, 1153 miles in going to serve warrants of arrest, at six cents per mile, $69.18, being for travel in excess of the distance from the place of arrest to the place of receiving writs. The travel charged for was in a new and unsettled Indian country, without post offices, pos routes or section lines. The defendants were moving about from place to place to avoid arrest, and it was necessary to travel a circuitous rou The deputies had to find fordable places to cross the river to locate the e-fendants, there being no bridges. After arrest the defendants were ta en by the most direct routes to commissioners for examination.
Item 10. For attendance of the marshal at court, by deputy, for twen y days, at $5 per day, $100.00.
It does not appear whether business was transacted in the court on days, although the court was opened for business by order of the ju ge. does not appear that the judge was present at court on any of these y8.
in going to serve warrants of arrest, at six cents per mile, $69.18,” involves the question whether travel in excess of the distance from the place of service to the place of receiving the writs can be allowed, in view of the fee bill for marshals. Rev. Stat. sec. 829, provides “ for travel, in going only, to serve any process, warrant, attachment, or other writ, including writs of subpoena in civil or criminal cases, six cents a mile, to be computed from the place where the process is returned to the place of service.” This has always been interpreted to mean by the usual travelled route, Hitch v. United States, 66 Fed. Rep. 937, the length of which is not given in the finding. The excuse for not pursuing the route in this case is that it was a new and unsettled Indian country ; that defendants were moving about from place to place to avoid arrest, and it was necessary to travel a circuitous route; and that, in the absence of bridges, the deputies had to find fordable places to cross the river to locate the defendants.
em 12. This item was charged in claimant’s accounts as transportation o prisoners, deputies and guards from the several places of arrest, for ing before the United States commissioners, whose offices were nearest p aces where the crimes for which the prisoners were arrested were tra number of miles charged in claimant’s accounts for this ve was fty-one thousand three hundred and fifty-five miles, at ten cents i e, amounting to five thousand one hundred and thirty-five dollars and ntty cents. Oklal aCC°UJntS were submitted to the United States District Court for 333 andTh provisions of the act of February 22, 1875, 18 Stat. Droved hr accounts> including this item, as above charged, were apthe acennn« a When the accounts so approved were submitted to disallowed ?ng °fficers’ a11 the charges for travel included in that item were act of Anm + 10T un<^er tbe provisions of the sundry civil appropriation Xlt Z8t 18L T’ 28 Stat- 372-416> -Wch made it the duty of the maror the nearest- a - antS ^efore nearest Circuit Court commissioner hearing commitm*3^ °fficer bavin" jurisdiction under existing laws, for a ing officers allow 4a^’n^ bad ^or trial. Subsequently the account-
After suit wa h claimant of this item twenty-seven dollars. in respect to tlT u°U^ couit’tbe claimant’s deposition was taken thousand four h.! he proved that, of his own knowledge, eleven Portation of said'**1 tllirty_tllree miles were traveled in the trans-the travel he cnni^180?1618’. deput*es and guards. As to the remainder of had been nerform testify of bis own knowledge, because that travel e y certain of his deputies who were not then in the
However equitable the charge may have been in this particular case, there is no authority of law for its allowance. There is, however, a special provision in the last clause of sec. 829, by which “ in all cases where mileage is allowed to the marshal he may elect to receive the same or his actual travelling expenses, to be proved on his oath, to the satisfaction of the court.” This seems to contemplate the very contingency which arose in this case, of a number of miles actually and necessarily travelled in excess of the direct route from the place where the process was returned to the place of service. It reimburses the marshal his expenses but denies him a profit upon them. This item must be disallowed.
(2.) Item 10. “ For attendance of the marshal at court by deputy, 20 days at $5 per day, $100.” The fact that it did not appear whether business was transacted in court on these days, or whether the judge was present in court, was immaterial, in
Territory, and who, he supposed, were in Alaska or the Philippine Islands. The depositions of those deputies were not taken. No other evidence was offered by the claimant to establish the number of miles actually traveled than the approval of the District Court for Oklahoma and his own deposition subsequently taken, as above stated. If the approval of his account by said District Court is competent evidence to establish the number of miles actually traveled, this court finds the ultimate fact that he travele 51,355 miles. If such approval of the District Court is incompetent to establish the number of miles actually traveled, this court finds that the number of miles so traveled was 11,433 in the transportation of prisoners, deputies and guards, as before set forth.
Item 16. For service of a capias and transportation (mileage) of a deputy, prisoner and guard. The capias was issued by the clerk of the Unite States District Court at Topeka, Kansas, on an indictment found by t e grand jury at Topeka. The capias was received by the claimant in & homa City and was executed by arresting the prisoner named in the capias, who was transported to the United States District Court at Wichita,
The claimant charged six cents a mile for going sixty-two miles, rom Oklahoma City to Perry, to serve the writ, $2 for the service of the wr^, and ten cents per mile each for the deputy, prisoner and guard foi 11 mi e $33.30, from Perry, Oklahoma, to Wichita, Kansas, and one meal for prisoner, 75 cents, making a total of $39.77. .
Item 24. For actual expenses for transporting a prisoner from Pr field, Ohio, to the penitentiary at Brooklyn, New York, under a warran^ commitment. The warrant of commitment was issued at the marshal transported the prisoner on that warrant to Spring e » '
UNITED STATES v. NIX. soa
i89 U. S. Opinion of the Court.
view of the fact that the court was opened for business by order of the judge. United States v. Finnell, 185 U. S. 236 ; JTcMullen v. United States, 146 U. S. 360. For aught that appears, the attendance may have been under the circumstances in which a similar charge was allowed in United States v. Pitman, 147 U. S. 669. Where the court is opened for business by order of the judge, it is the duty of the marshal to attend, and there is no reason why he should not receive his per diem therefor as if the judge were actually present. This claim is not contested by the government, and should be allowed.
(3.) Item 12, for the transportation of prisoners arrested under warrants issued by United States commissioners, involves two questions: first, whether travel should have been charged from the place of arrest to the nearest Circuit Court commissioner, or to the office of the commissioner nearest to the place where the crimes with which the prisoners were charged were committed; second, whether, assuming the position of the claimant in this particular to be correct, as matter of law, there was sufficient evidence of the number of miles travelled to entitle him to the charge of $5135.50.
By “ An act to provide a temporary government for the Territory of Oklahoma,” 26 Stat. 81, a certain portion of the Indian Territory was set off as a territorial government under the
where the prisoner was temporarily detained as a witness for the United States in a counterfeiting case. The prisoner having been discharged as a witness in that case at Springfield the marshal continued his transportation from Springfield to New York city on the original warrant of commitment. The prisoner, with a deputy and guard, arrived in New York city too late for the prisoner to be received at the Brooklyn penitentiary on the day of arrival in New York, and he escaped from the custody of the deputy on the night of the same day while they were going to supper in the hotel where they were stopping. The marshal made every effort to retake the prisoner and failed, $90.50.
Conclusion of Law.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact the court decides, as a conclusion of aw, that the claimant recover judgment of and from the United States in the sum of one hundred and eight dollars and ninety-five cents ($108.95) on items 2 and 16 of Finding III.
All other items disallowed.
name of Oklahoma. By section 9 the judicial power of the Territory was vested in certain courts, and the usual executive and judicial offices created. By section 10, “ persons charged with any offence or crime in the Territory of Oklahoma, and for whose arrest a warrant has been issued, may be arrested by the United States marshal or any of his deputies, wherever found in said Territory, but in all cases the accused shall be taken, for preliminary examination, before a United States commissioner, or a justice of the peace of the county, whose office is nearest to the place where the offence or crime is committed. All offences committed in said Territory, if committed within any organized county, shall be prosecuted and tried within said county.” By section 28, “ the Constitution and all the laws of the United States not locally inapplicable shall, except so far as modified by this act, have the same force and effect as elsewhere within the United States.”
This is the act upon which the claimant relies for his right to travel, while, upon the other hand, the government contends that this act was repealed by a general act of August 18,1894, 28 Stat. 372, making appropriations for sundry civil expenses for the year 1895, one of the clauses of which, under the head of “ Judicial,” provides that “ it shall be the duty of the marshal, his deputy, or other officer, who may arrest a person charged with any crime or offence, to take the defendant e-fore the nearest Circuit Court commissioner or the nearest ju i cial officer having jurisdiction under existing laws for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial, and the officer or magis trate issuing the warrant shall attach thereto a certified copy o the complaint, . . . and no mileage shall be allowe any officer violating the provisions hereof.”
The object of this statute was manifestly to amend Rev. a • sec. 829, which provided that the mileage of the marsha or transportation of prisoners should be computed from the p ace where the process was served to the place where it w as returne This statute provides that he shall be taken to the Circuit ou^ commissioner nearest the place of arrest, regardless o t e by whom the warrant was issued. Inasmuch as the ater is a general one, applicable to marshals generally throug [p. 205] the country, we do not think it was intended to repeal or interfere with the former act, providing specially for persons charged with any offence or crime in the Territory of Oklahoma, and that in all cases, whether the crime was committed against the Territory or the general government, the accused shall be taken before a commissioner, whose office is nearest to the place where the offence or crime was committed.
The rule of statutory construction is well settled that a general act is not to be construed as applying to cases covered by a prior special act upon the same subject. On this principle we held in Townsend v. Little, 109 U. S. 504, that special and general statutory provisions may subsist together, the former qualifying the latter. See also Churchill v. Crease, 5 Bing. 177; Magone v. King, 51 Fed. Rep. 525, and cases cited ; State v. Clarice, 25 N. J. Law, 54.
It would seem that this construction works no particular hardship upon the government, since in all cases where the criminal is unable to give bail he is required to be ultimately transported for trial to the county wherein the crime was committed.
The second question connected with this item is whether the marshal produced sufficient evidence of the number of miles travelled. His claim was for 51,350 miles at ten cents per mile. He was unable to prove, of his own knowledge, more than 11,433 miles. As to the remainder he could not testify of his own knowledge, because that travel had been performed by certain of his deputies who were not then in the Territory, and who, he supposed, were in Alaska or the Philippine Islands. The depositions of those deputies were not taken. He showed, however, t at his accounts had been allowed by the district judge. That was sufficient to cast upon the government the burden of showing any error of fact in his account. United States v. Jones, U- S. 483. In that case we held that the approval of the
commissioner’s account by a Circuit Court of the United States, under the act of February 22, 1875, 18 Stat. 333, was prima j(une evidence of the correctness of the items of that account, 5 m the absence of clear and unquestionable proof of misc on the part of the court, it should be conclusive. We
adhere to that view. It would be an insupportable burden upon the officers of courts if, every time a question was made before the accounting officers of the Treasury of the correctness of their account, they were required to produce affirmative evidence of every item. This was evidently not contemplated by the statute. Notwithstanding this, however, there is no doubt that the account may be impeached for error of law. McMullen n. United States, 146 U. S. 360. This item should have been allowed in full, less the amount paid.
(4.) Item 24, for actual expenses in transporting a prisoner from Springfield, Ohio, to the penitentiary at Brooklyn, New York, under a warrant of commitment, is the only other one contested. The prisoner with a deputy and guard arrived in New York too late for the prisoner to be received at the Brooklyn penitentiary on the same day, and that night he escaped from the custody of the deputy while they were going to supper in the hotel where they were staying.
As there is no finding, either by the district judge in approving his accounts or by the Court of Claims of due diligence on the part of the officer to prevent the escape, the item was properly disallowed. The presumption is that he escaped by negligence. State v. Hunter, 94 N. C. 829 ; State v. Lewis, 113 N. C. 622; Shattuck v. State, 51 Mississippi, 575.
The judgment of the Court of Claims will therefore be versed and the case remanded to that court for fwt proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
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