Sherlock v. -, 93 U.S. 99
Case details
Citation
93 U.S. 99
Full caption
Sherlock et al. v. Alling -, Administrator.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Majority
Field (Justice)
Sherlock et al. v. Alling -, Administrator.
mar^°nfre8S some regulation touching the liabilities of parties for givin16 *n death of the persons injured, the statute of Indiana his d^ ac^on personal representatives of the deceased, where tort b * 18 CaU8^ by the wrongful act or omission of another, applies, the aPpliedn^tC°mm'-tte^ the territorial limits of the State; and, as thus Congres 1 COnst’tutes no encroachment upon the commercial power of 2 The
infrinffem°f ^?n^ress as to a regulation of commerce, or the liability for its by Congress^ h exC\us*ve State authority; but, until some action is taken of re™u]Sx^ 6 eglslation a State, not directed against commerce or any of citizens * ^f8’ re^at*n^ generally to the rights, duties, and liabilities it may ind’ °i ^Ugatory force within its territorial jurisdiction, although commerce an^ remo^eiy affect the operations of foreign or inter-State 81 The act nf ivr** ^ersons engaged in such commerce.
, lo&2, to provide for the Vetter security of the lives of
passengers on bo^d of ves^^^ropelled in whole or part by steam, and for other purposes,no^sjmnpt the owners and master of a steam-vessel, and the from-djapnity for injuries caused by the negligence of its pilot or^pigmeer, burjnakes them liable for all damages sustained by a passengm^nis b^g^ge, from any neglect to comply with the provisions of the IsmA^o mattws^iere the fault may lie; and, in addition to this remedy, any wrson m^hr^d by t^Ai^egligence of the pilot or engineer may have his action ch^ctly ag^^st those officers. 4. The jeiqtjion betw^rf the owner or master and pilot, as that of master and
is noDrhanged by the fact that the selection of the pilot is lim-Aited to those who have been found by examination to possess the requisite '^knowledge and skill, and have been licensed by the government inspectors.
Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.
Argued by Mr. T. D. Lincoln for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. C. A. Korbly for the defendants in error.
Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court.
In December, 1858, the defendants were the owners of a line of steamers employed in navigating the river Ohio between the port and city of Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, and the port and city of Louisville, in the State of Kentucky, for the purpose of carrying passengers, freight, and the United States mail. On the 4th of that month, at night, two boats of the line, designated, respectively, as the “ United States ” and the “ America, collided at a point on the river opposite the mainland of the State of Indiana. By the collision, the hull of one of them was broken in, and a fire started, which burned the boat to the water’s edge, destroying it, and causing the death of one of its passengers, by the name of Sappington, a citizen of Indiana. The administrator of the deceased brought the present action for his death in one of the courts of common pleas of Indiana, under a statute of that State, which provides, “ that when the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission.” . *
The complaint in the action alleged that the collision occurre within the territorial jurisdiction of Indiana, above the ® low-water mark of the river, and charged it genera y careless and negligent navigation of the steamboat “ ni e
States,” by the defendants’ servants, and officers of the vessel, but especially to the carelessness of the pilot, in running the same at too great a speed down the stream; in giving the first signal to the approaching boat as to the choice of sides of the river contrary to the established custom of pilots navigating the Ohio, and the rules prescribed by the act of Congress; and in not slackening the speed of the boat and giving a signal of alarm and danger until it was too late to avoid the collision.
To defeat this action, the defendants relied upon substantially the following grounds of defence: 1st, that the injuries complained of occurred on the river Ohio, beyond low-water mark on the Indiana side, and within the limits of the State of Kentucky; and that, by a law of that State, an action for the death of a party from the carelessness of another could only be brought within one year from such death, which period had elapsed when the present action was brought; and, 2d, that at the time of the alleged injuries the colliding boats were engaged in carrying on inter-State commerce under the laws of the United States, and the defendants, as their owners, were not liable for injuries occurring in their navigation through the carelessness of their officers, except as prescribed by those laws; and that t ese did not cover the liability asserted by the plaintiff under the statute of Indiana.
nder the first head, no question is presented for considerarion of which we can take cognizance. It is admitted that the erntorial limits of Indiana extend to low-water mark on the nort side of the river, and the jury found that the collision th° a^°Ve ^at mark. It is, therefore, of no moment to o e endants that the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the a e possessed concurrent jurisdiction with Kentucky on the a°t ^e Commonwealth of Virginia of 1789, ind ^°r erec^on ^he district of Kentucky into an that^en en^ and ^hat the legislation of Indiana could, for occuTrinSOIl, e(^Ua^ enforced with respect to any matters rin<» ^.°n river, as with respect to similar matters occurng within her territorial limits on the land. bead of^thS^OnS ^°r °Ur cons^erarion arise under the second statute f T,^ence’ Under this head it is contended that the a iana creates a new liability, and could not, p. 102therefore, be applied to cases where the injuries complained of were caused by marine torts, without interfering with the exclusive regulation of commerce vested in Congress. The position of the defendants, as we understand it, is, that as by both the common and maritime law the right of action for personal torts dies with the person injured, the statute which allows actions for such torts, when resulting in the death of the person injured, to be brought by the personal representatives of the deceased, enlarges the liability of parties for such torts, and that such enlarged liability, if applied to cases of marine torts, would constitute a new burden upon commerce.
In supposed support of this position numerous decisions of this court are cited by counsel, to the effect that the States cannot by legislation place burdens upon commerce with foreign nations or among the several States. The decisions go to that extent, and their soundness is not questioned. But, upon an examination of the cases in which they were rendered, it will be found that the legislation adjudged invalid imposed a tax upon some instrument or subject of commerce, or exacted a license fee from parties engaged in commercial pursuits, or created an impediment to the free navigation of some public waters, or prescribed conditions in accordance with which commerce in particular articles or between particular places was required to be conducted. In all the cases the legislation condemned operated directly upon commerce, either by way of tax upon its business, license upon its pursuit in particular channels, or conditions for carrying it on. Thus, in The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 445, the laws of New York and Massachusetts exacted a tax from the captains of vessels bringing passengers from foreign ports for every passenger landed. In the Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 id. 518, the statute of Virginia authorized the erection of a bridge, which was held to obstruct the free navi gation of the river Ohio. In the case of Sinnot v. Davenpo, 22 id. 227, the statute of Alabama required the owner oi a steamer navigating the waters of the State to file, before t e left the port of Mobile, in the office of the probate judge oi 1 o-bile County, a statement in writing, setting forth the name o vessel, and of the owner or owners, and his or their p ace o re dence and interest in the vessel, and prescribed pena ties p. 103lecting the requirement. It thus imposed conditions for carrying on the coasting trade in the waters of the State in addition to those prescribed by Congress. And in all the other cases where legislation of a State has been held to be null for interfering with the commercial power of Congress, as in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 425, State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204, and Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, the legislation created, in the way of tax, license, or condition, a direct burden upon commerce, or in some way directly interfered with its freedom. In the present case no such operation can be ascribed to the statute of Indiana. That statute imposes no tax, prescribes no duty, and in no respect interferes with any regulations for the navigation and use of vessels. It only declares a general principle respecting the liability of all persons within the jurisdiction of the State for torts resulting in the death of parties injured. And in the application of the principle it makes no difference where the injury complained of occurred in the State, whether on land or on water. General legislation of this kind, prescribing the liabilities or duties of citizens of a tate, without distinction as to pursuit or calling, is not open to any valid objection because it may affect persons engaged in oreign or inter-State commerce. Objection might with equal propriety be urged against legislation prescribing the form in w ich contracts shall be authenticated, or property descend or the 011 the death of its owner, because applicable to e contracts or estates of persons engaged in such commerce, conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce, it s never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all JT ^he health, life, and safety of their citizens, the cS t 6 ^e^s^a^on might indirectly affect the commerce of com °Un^r^‘ legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect re 1 an? Persons engaged in it without constituting a
It is within the meaning of the Constitution. stitut* c°mmercial power conferred by the Con^ith reU 18 °ne W^h°ut limitation. It authorizes legislation Bierce suhjects of foreign and inter-State comh is carf ^erSOns enSaged in it, and the instruments by which conimen/b °n* legislation has largely dealt, so far as y water is concerned, with the instruments of that p. 104commerce. It has embraced the whole subject of navigation, prescribed what shall constitute American vessels, and by whom they shall be navigated; how they shall be registered or enrolled and licensed; to what tonnage, hospital, and other dues they shall be subjected; what rules they shall obey in passing each other; and what provision their owners shall make for the health, safety, and comfort of their crews. Since steam has been applied to the propulsion of vessels, legislation has embraced an infinite variety of further details, to guard against accident and consequent loss of life.
The power to prescribe these and similar regulations necessarily involves the right to declare the liability which shall follow their infraction. Whatever, therefore, Congress determines, either as to a regulation or the liability for its infringement, is exclusive of State authority. But with reference to a great variety of matters touching the rights and liabilities of persons engaged in commerce, either as owners or navigators of vessels, the laws of Congress are silent, and the laws of the State govern. The rules for the acquisition of property by persons engaged in navigation, and for its transfer and descent, are, with some exceptions, those prescribed by the State to which the vessels belong; and it may be said, generally, that the legislation of a State, not directed against commerce or any of its regulations, but relating to the rights, duties, and liabilities of citizens, and only indirectly and remotely affecting t e operations of commerce, is of obligatory force upon citizens within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on land or watei, or engaged in commerce, foreign or inter-State, or in any o e pursuit. In our judgment, the statute of Indiana fa s un e this class. Until Congress, therefore, makes some regu a ion touching the liability of parties for marine torts /esu1^ the death of the persons injured, we are of opinion a statute of Indiana applies, giving a right of action in sue to the personal representatives of the deceased and that as thus applied, it constitutes no encroachmen commercial power of Congress. United States
3 Wheat. 337. snorted in
In the ease of The Steamboat Company v. Chase,, I the 16th of Wallace, this court sustained an action o
tort resulting in the death of the party injured, in the name of the administrator of the deceased, under a statute of Rhode Island, similar in its general features to the one of Indiana. There the deceased was killed whilst crossing Narraganset Bay in a sail-boat by collision with a steamer of the company; and though objections were taken, and elaborately argued, against the jurisdiction of the court, it was not even suggested that the right of action conferred by the statute, when applied to cases arising out of marine torts, in any way infringed upon the commercial power of Congress.
In addition to the objection urged to the statute of Indiana, the defendants also contended, that, as owners of the colliding vessels, they were exempt from liability to the deceased, as a passenger on one of them, and, of course, to his representatives, as the collision was caused, without any fault of theirs, by the negligence of the pilots; and they relied upon the thirtieth section of the act of Congress of March 30,1852, to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or part by steam. That act was in force when the injuries complained of in this case were committed, an its principal features have been retained in subsequent legislation. The section provided, “ that whenever damage is sustained by any passenger or his baggage, from explosion, fire, co lision, or other cause, the master and the owner of such vessc ,or either of them, and the vessel, shall be liable to each and every person so injured to the full amount of damage, if it hap-through any neglect to comply with the provisions of law prescribed, or through known defects or imperfections of taini^6^111^11^ aPParatus or the hull; and any person sus-
,0SS °r through the carelessness, negligence, or refu .miSCOn^uc^ an engineer or pilot, or their neglect or uavi ft° °bey the provisions of law herein prescribed as to recoy9^ SUC^ steamers’ may sue such engineer or pilot, and snoh araages for any such injury caused as aforesaid by any
10 Stat. 72.
exempt" that by this section Congress intended the iu the fa ° confirmation of this view was found Wer© rest i t owners were obliged to take a pilot, and c e in their choice to those licensed by the p. 106government inspectors. It was supposed that the relation between owner and pilot, as that of master and employé, was thus changed, and that, with the change, the responsibility of the former for the negligence of the latter ceased. The court, however, proceeded through the trial upon a different theory of the position of the defendants. It held, that, as owners, they were responsible for the conduct of all the officers and employés of the vessels, and that it was immaterial whether the vessels were or not at the time of the collision under the exclusive charge of the pilots. The instructions to the jury, at least, went to that extent. They, in substance, declared that, if the collision occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Indiana, and was caused, without fault of the deceased, by the carelessness or misconduct of the defendants, or any of their agents, servants, or employés, in navigating and managing the steamers, or either of them, the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
In support of the exemption, the counsel of the defendants called to our attention an opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in a similar case arising upon the same collision, where such exemption was upheld. The opinion is maiked by the usual ability which characterizes the judgments of that court; but, after much hesitation and doubt, we have been compelled to dissent from its conclusions. The statute appears to us to declare, that the owners and master of a steam vesse, and the vessel itself, shall be liable for all damages sustame y a passenger or his baggage, from any neglect to comp y wi the provisions of the law, no matter where the fau t may 5 and that, in addition to this remedy, any person injured by e negligence of the pilot or engineer may have his action direc y against those officers. , ,.
The occasions upon which a pilot or engineer would be abi to. respond to any considerable amount would be excep ion The statute of England, which exempts the owners of v and the vessels from liability for faults of pi o there being compulsory, and pilots being icense ’ met with much commendation from the admira the general tendency of their adjudications as een the exemption with great strictness. This cours
P
’ true p. 107very fully stated in the exposition of the law made by Mr. Justice Swayne, in the case of The China, 7 Wall. 53, where this court declined to hold that compulsory pilotage relieved the vessel from liability. In the case of The Halley, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 15, decided as recently as 1867, Sir Robert Phillimore strongly questioned the policy of the statute, and said that it appeared to him difficult to reconcile the claims of natural justice with the law which exempted the owner who had a licensed pilot on board from liability for the injuries done by the bad navigation of his vessel to the property of an innocent owner; and observed, that no one acquainted with the working of the law could be ignorant that it was fruitful in injustice. The doctrine, that the owners are responsible for the acts of their agents and employés, ought not to be discarded; because the selection of a pilot by the owner is limited to those who, by the State, have been found hy examination to possess the requisite knowledge of the difficulties of local navigation, and the requisite skill to conduct a vessel through them. “As a general rule,” says Mr. Justice ner, “ masters of vessels are not expected to be, and cannot e’ acquainted with the rocks and shoals on every coast ” (and, ve may add, with the currents and shoals of every river), “ nor a e to conduct a vessel safely into every port. Nor can the absent owners, or their agent the master, be supposed capable gmg of the capacity of persons offering to serve as pilots, of k servan^ but are not in a situation to test or judge
18 qualifications, and have not, therefore, the information thatf8C^Ce' The pilot laws kindly interfere, and do
6 0Wneis which they could not do for themselves.” ti^ v. The Creole and The Sampson, 2 Wall. Jr. 515. And is re^11^ ^US^Ce °bseTves, that in such cases, where a pilot Master11'6 d ^a^en ^rom those licensed, the relation of the servit servant is not changed; that the pilot continues Wa2es faU ° °wners, acting in their employ, and receiving is selected6^068 rendered them, and that the fact that he his nnd’e °.1* them by persons more capable of judging of cannot alter the relation. this subject g6 Halley, Sir Robert Phillimore upon says. ‘ I do not quite understand why, because the p. 108State insists, on the one hand, upon all persons who exercise the office of pilot, within certain districts, being duly educated for the purpose, and having a certificate of their fitness, and insists, on the other hand, that the master shall, within these districts, take one of these persons on board to superintend the steering of his vessel, the usual relation of owner and servant is to be entirely at an end; and still less do I see why the sufferer is to be deprived of all practical redress for injuries inflicted upon him by the ship which such a pilot navigates.”
By the common law, the owners are responsible for the damages committed by their vessel, without any reference to the particular agent by whose negligence the injury was committed. By the maritime law, the vessel, as well as the owners, is liable to the party injured for damages caused by its torts. By that law, the vessel is deemed to be an offending thing, and may be prosecuted, without any reference to the adjustment of responsibility between the owners and employés, for the negligence which resulted in the injury. Any departure from this liability of the owners or of the vessel, except as the liability of the former may be released by a surrender of the vessel, has been found in practice to work great injustice. The statute ought to be very clear, before we should conclude that any such departure was intended by Congress. The section we have cited would not justify such a conclusion. Its language readily admits of the construction we have given, and that construction is in harmony with the purposes of the act. Judgment affirmed.