Cbocs W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008)

CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit

No. 06–1431. Argued February 20, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008

Claiming that petitioner CBOCS West, Inc., dismissed him because he is black and because he complained to managers that a black co-employee was also dismissed for race-based reasons, respondent Humphries filed suit charging that CBOCS’ actions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U. S. C. § 1981, the latter of which gives “[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The District Court dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to timely pay filing fees and granted CBOCS summary judgment on the § 1981 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the direct discrimination claim, but remanded for a trial on Humphries’ § 1981 retaliation claim, rejecting CBOCS’ argument that § 1981 did not encompass such a claim.

Held: Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. Pp. 446–457.

(b) CBOCS’ several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from this well-embedded interpretation of § 1981. First, while CBOCS is correct that § 1981’s plain text does not expressly refer to retaliation, that alone is not sufficient to carry the day, given this Court’s long recognition that § 1982 provides protection against re taliation; Jackson’s recent holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 includes an antiretaliation remedy, despite Title IX’s failure to use the word “retaliation,” 544 U. S., at 173–174, 176; and Sullivan’s refusal to embrace a similar argument, see 396 U. S., at 241. Second, contrary to CBOCS’ assertion, Congress’ failure to include an explicit antiretaliation provision in its 1991 amendment of § 1981 does not demonstrate an intention not to cover retaliation, but is more plausi bly explained by the fact that, given Sullivan and the new statutory language nullifying Patterson, there was no need to include explicit re taliation language. Third, the argument that applying § 1981 to employment-related retaliation actions would create an overlap with Title VII, allegedly allowing a retaliation plaintiff to circumvent Title VII’s detailed administrative and procedural mechanisms and thereby undermine their effectiveness, proves too much. Precisely the same kind of Title VII/§ 1981 “overlap” and potential circumvention exists in respect to employment-related direct discrimination, yet Congress explicitly and intentionally created that overlap, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 48–49. Fourth, contrary to its arguments, CBOCS cannot find support in Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53, 63, and Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U. S. 470. While Burlington distinguished discrimination based on status (e. g., as women or black persons) from discrimination based on conduct (e. g., whistle-blowing that leads to retaliation), it did not suggest that Con gress must separate the two in all events. Moreover, while Domino’s Pizza and other more recent cases may place greater emphasis on statu tory language than did Sullivan, any arguable change in interpretive approach would not justify reexamination of well-established prior law under stare decisis principles. Pp. 452–457.

474 F. 3d 387, affirmed.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 457.

Michael W. Hawkins argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael J. Newman and Mi chael Zylstra.

Cynthia H. Hyndman argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Aleeza M. Strubel and Eric Schnapper.

Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Becker, Deputy Solicitor General Garre, Curtis E. Gannon, and Dennis J. Dimsey.

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.

A longstanding civil rights law, first enacted just after the Civil War, provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981(a). The basic question before us is whether the provision encom passes a complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another person’s contract related “right.” We conclude that it does.

I

The case before us arises out of a claim by respondent, Hedrick G. Humphries, a former assistant manager of a Cracker Barrel restaurant, that CBOCS West, Inc. (Cracker Barrel’s owner), dismissed him (1) because of racial bias (Humphries is a black man) and (2) because he had com plained to managers that a fellow assistant manager had dis missed another black employee, Venus Green, for race-based reasons. Humphries timely filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5, and received a “right to sue” letter. He then filed a complaint in Federal District Court charging that CBOCS’ actions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and the older “equal contract rights” provision here at issue, § 1981. The District Court dismissed Hum phries’ Title VII claims for failure to pay necessary filing fees on a timely basis. It then granted CBOCS’ motion for summary judgment on Humphries’ two § 1981 claims. Hum phries appealed.

II

The question before us is whether § 1981 encompasses re taliation claims. We conclude that it does. And because our conclusion rests in significant part upon principles of stare decisis, we begin by examining the pertinent interpre tive history.

A

The Court first considered a comparable question in 1969, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229. The case arose under Rev. Stat. § 1978, 42 U. S. C. § 1982, a statu tory provision that Congress enacted just after the Civil War, along with § 1981, to protect the rights of black citizens. The provision was similar to § 1981 except that it focused, not upon rights to make and to enforce contracts, but rights related to the ownership of property. The statute provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con vey real and personal property.” § 1982.

Paul E. Sullivan, a white man, had rented his house to T. R. Freeman, Jr., a black man. He had also assigned Free man a membership share in a corporation, which permitted the owner to use a private park that the corporation con trolled. Because of Freeman’s race, the corporation, Little Hunting Park, Inc., refused to approve the share assignment. And, when Sullivan protested, the association expelled Sulli van and took away his membership shares.

As indicated in Runyon, the Court has construed §§ 1981 and 1982 alike because it has recognized the sister statutes’ common language, origin, and purposes. Like § 1981, § 1982 traces its origin to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. See General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 383–384 (1982) (noting shared historical roots of the two provisions); Tillman, supra, at 439–440 (same). Like § 1981, § 1982 represents an immedi ately post-Civil War legislative effort to guarantee the then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy. See General Building Contractors Assn., supra, at 388 (noting strong purposive connection between the two provisions). Like § 1981, § 1982 uses broad language that says “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” Compare § 1981’s language set forth above, supra, at 445. See Jones, supra, at 441, n. 78 (noting the close parallel language of the two provisions). Indeed, § 1982 differs from § 1981 only in that it refers, not to the “right . . . to make and enforce contracts,” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(a), but to the “right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,” § 1982.

In light of these precedents, it is not surprising that fol lowing Sullivan, federal appeals courts concluded, on the basis of Sullivan or its reasoning, that § 1981 encompassed retaliation claims. See, e. g., Choudhury v. Polytechnic Inst. of N. Y., 735 F. 2d 38, 42–43 (CA2 1984); Goff v. Conti nental Oil Co., 678 F. 2d 593, 598–599 (CA5 1982), overruled, Carter v. South Central Bell, 912 F. 2d 832 (1990); Win ston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1266, 1270 (CA6 1977).

B

In 1989, 20 years after Sullivan, this Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, significantly limited the scope of § 1981. The Court focused upon § 1981’s words “to make and enforce contracts” and interpreted the phrase narrowly. It wrote that the statutory phrase did not apply to “conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the con tract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions.” Id., at 177 (emphasis added). The Court added that the word “enforce” does not apply to post-contract-formation conduct unless the discrimination at issue “infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Thus § 1981 did not en compass the claim of a black employee who charged that her employer had violated her employment contract by harassing her and failing to promote her, all because of her race. Ibid.

In 1991, however, Congress weighed in on the matter. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, with the design to supersede Patterson. Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 383 (2004). Insofar as is relevant here, the new law changed 42 U. S. C. § 1981 by reenacting the former provision, designating it as § 1981(a), and adding a new subsection, (b), which, says:

“ ‘Make and enforce contracts’ defined

“For purposes of this section, the term ‘make and en force contracts’ includes the making, performance, modi fication, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”

After enactment of the new law, the Federal Courts of Appeals again reached a broad consensus that § 1981, as amended, encompasses retaliation claims. See, e. g., Haw kins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163 F. 3d 684, 693 (CA2 1998); Aleman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F. 3d 206, 213–214 (CA4 2007); Foley v. University of Houston System, 355 F. 3d 333, 338–339 (CA5 2003); Johnson v. University of Cin cinnati, 215 F. 3d 561, 575–576 (CA6 2000); 474 F. 3d, at 403 (case below); Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F. 3d 792, 800–801, and n. 11 (CA9 2003); Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehabilitation Hospital, 140 F. 3d 1405, 1411–1413 (CA11 1998).

The upshot is this: (1) In 1969, Sullivan, as interpreted by Jackson, recognized that § 1982 encompasses a retaliation action; (2) this Court has long interpreted §§ 1981 and 1982 alike; (3) in 1989, Patterson, without mention of retaliation, narrowed § 1981 by excluding from its scope conduct, namely, post-contract-formation conduct, where retaliation would most likely be found; but in 1991, Congress enacted legisla tion that superseded Patterson and explicitly defined the scope of § 1981 to include post-contract-formation conduct; and (4) since 1991, the lower courts have uniformly inter preted § 1981 as encompassing retaliation actions.

C

III

In our view, CBOCS’ several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from what we have just described as the well-embedded interpretation of § 1981. First, CBOCS points to the plain text of § 1981—a text that says that “[a]ll persons. . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citi zens.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(a) (emphasis added). CBOCS adds that, insofar as Humphries complains of retaliation, he is complaining of a retaliatory action that the employer would have taken against him whether he was black or white, and there is no way to construe this text to cover that kind of deprivation. Thus the text’s language, CBOCS concludes, simply “does not provide for a cause of action based on retali ation.” Brief for Petitioner 8.

We agree with CBOCS that the statute’s language does not expressly refer to the claim of an individual (black or white) who suffers retaliation because he has tried to help a different individual, suffering direct racial discrimination, secure his § 1981 rights. But that fact alone is not sufficient to carry the day. After all, this Court has long held that the statutory text of § 1981’s sister statute, § 1982, provides protection from retaliation for reasons related to the en forcement of the express statutory right. See supra, at 447.

Regardless, the linguistic argument that CBOCS makes was apparent at the time the Court decided Sullivan. See 396 U. S., at 241 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the construc tion of § 1982 in Jones, 392 U. S. 409, was “in no way required by [the statute’s] language”—one of the bases of Justice Har lan’s dissent in Jones—and further contending that the Court in Sullivan had gone “yet beyond” Jones). And we believe it is too late in the day in effect to overturn the holding in that case (nor does CBOCS ask us to do so) on the basis of a linguistic argument that was apparent, and which the Court did not embrace at that time.

We believe, however, that the circumstances to which CBOCS points find a far more plausible explanation in the fact that, given Sullivan and the new statutory language nullifying Patterson, there was no need for Congress to in clude explicit language about retaliation. After all, the 1991 amendments themselves make clear that Congress intended to supersede the result in Patterson and embrace prePatterson law. And pre-Patterson law included Sullivan. See Part II, supra. Nothing in the statute’s text or in the surrounding circumstances suggests any congressional effort to supersede Sullivan or the interpretation that courts have subsequently given that case. To the contrary, the amend ments’ history indicates that Congress intended to restore that interpretation. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 102–40, at 92 (noting that § 1981(b) in the “context of employment discrimi nation . . . would include . . . claims of . . . retaliation”).

This argument, however, proves too much. Precisely the same kind of Title VII/§ 1981 “overlap” and potential circum vention exists in respect to employment-related direct dis crimination. Yet Congress explicitly created the overlap in respect to direct employment discrimination. Nor is it obvi ous how we can interpret § 1981 to avoid employment related overlap without eviscerating § 1981 in respect to non-employment contracts where no such overlap exists.

Regardless, we have previously acknowledged a “neces sary overlap” between Title VII and § 1981. Patterson, 491 U. S., at 181. We have added that the “remedies available under Title VII and under § 1981, although related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 461 (1975). We have pointed out that Title VII provides important administrative remedies and other benefits that § 1981 lacks. See id., at 457–458 (de tailing the benefits of Title VII to those aggrieved by race based employment discrimination). And we have concluded that “Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than sup plant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 48–49 (1974). In a word, we have previously held that the “overlap” reflects congressional design. See ibid. We have no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case.

CBOCS highlights the second case, Domino’s Pizza, along with Patterson, and cites Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), and Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522 (1987) (per curiam), to show that this Court now follows an approach to statutory interpretation that emphasizes text. And that newer approach, CBOCS claims, should lead us to revisit the holding in Sullivan, an older case, where the Court placed less weight upon the textual language itself. But even were we to posit for argument’s sake that changes in interpretive approach take place from time to time, we could not agree that the existence of such a change would justify reexamina tion of well-established prior law. Principles of stare deci sis, after all, demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same. Were that not so, those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon which the rule of law de pends. See, e. g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U. S., at 139.

IV

We conclude that considerations of stare decisis strongly support our adherence to Sullivan and the long line of re lated cases where we interpret §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly. CBOCS’ arguments do not convince us to the contrary. We consequently hold that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, dissenting.

I

It is unexceptional in our case law that “ ‘[s]tatutory con struction must begin with the language employed by Con gress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’ ” Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Manage ment Dist., 541 U. S. 246, 252 (2004) (quoting Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 194 (1985)). Today, that rule is honored in the breach: The Court’s analy sis of the statutory text does not appear until Part III of its opinion, and then only as a potential reason to depart from the interpretation the Court has already concluded, on other grounds, must “carry the day.” Ante, at 452. Unlike the Court, I think it best to begin, as we usually do, with the text of the statute. Section 1981(a) provides:

“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Ter ritory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, li censes, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”

Respondent nonetheless contends that “[t]he terms of sec tion 1981 are significantly different, and broader, than a simple prohibition against discrimination.” Brief for Re spondent 15. It is true that § 1981(a), which was enacted shortly after the Civil War, does not use the modern statu tory formulation prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of race.” But that is the clear import of its terms. Contrary to respondent’s contention, nothing in § 1981 evinces a “con cer[n] with protecting individuals ‘based on what they do,’ ” as opposed to “ ‘prevent[ing] injury to individuals based on who they are.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53, 63 (2006)). Nor does § 1981 “affirma tively guarante[e]” freestanding “rights to engage in particu lar conduct.” Brief for Respondent 16. Rather, § 1981 is an equal-rights provision. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780, 791 (1966) (“Congress intended to protect a limited cate gory of rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equal ity”). The statute assumes that “white citizens” enjoy cer tain rights and requires that those rights be extended equally to “[a]ll persons,” regardless of their race. That is to say, it prohibits discrimination based on race.1

Of course, this is not the first time I have made these points. Three Terms ago in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 (2005), the Court held that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., which prohibits recipients of federal education funding from discriminating “on the basis of sex,” § 1681(a), affords an im plied cause of action for retaliation against those who com plain of sex discrimination. In so doing, the Court disre garded the fundamental distinction between status-based discrimination and conduct-based retaliation, asserting that retaliation against those who complain of sex discrimination “is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it is an inten tional response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.” 544 U. S., at 174. But as I ex plained in my dissenting opinion in Jackson, “the sex-based topic of the complaint cannot overcome the fact that the re taliation is not based on anyone’s sex, much less the com plainer’s sex.” Id., at 188.

Notably, the Court does not repeat Jackson’s textual anal ysis in this case, perhaps because no amount of repetition could make it any more plausible today than it was three years ago. Instead, the Court acknowledges that “the stat ute’s language does not expressly refer to the claim of an individual (black or white) who suffers retaliation.” Ante, at 452. The Court concludes, however, that the statute’s failure expressly to provide a cause of action for retaliation “is not sufficient to carry the day,” ibid., despite our usual rule that “affirmative evidence of congressional intent must be provided for an implied remedy, . . . for without such in tent the essential predicate for implication of a private rem edy simply does not exist,” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 293, n. 8 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted; em phasis deleted); see also id., at 286–287 (emphasizing that, absent evidence of Congress’ intent to create a cause of ac tion, the “cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute”).

II

Unable to justify its holding as a matter of statutory inter pretation, the Court today retreats behind the figleaf of er satz stare decisis. The Court’s invocation of stare decisis appears to rest on three considerations: (1) Sullivan’s pur ported recognition of a cause of action for retaliation under § 1982; (2) Jackson’s (re)interpretation of Sullivan; and (3) the Courts of Appeals’ view that § 1981 provides a cause of action for retaliation. None of these considerations, sepa rately or together, justifies implying a cause of action that Congress did not include in the statute. And none can con ceal the irony in the Court’s novel use of stare decisis to decide a question of first impression.

Thus, both Sullivan and the United States argued that Sul livan had standing to seek relief for injuries he suffered as a result of the corporation’s violation of Freeman’s rights—not that Sullivan’s own rights under § 1982 were violated. And that is the best interpretation of what the Court subse quently held. Tracking the parties’ arguments, the Court first concluded that the corporation’s “refus[al] to approve the assignment of the membership share . . . was clearly an interference with Freeman’s right to ‘lease’ ” under § 1982. 396 U. S., at 237. Only then did it conclude—based on Bar rows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953), a third-party standing case in which another white litigant was permitted to “rely on the invasion of the rights of others,” id., at 255—that Sul livan “ha[d] standing to maintain this action.” Sullivan, 396 U. S., at 237. The word “retaliation” does not appear in the Court’s opinion. Nor is there any suggestion that Sulli van would have had “standing” absent the violation of Free man’s rights.

Of course, Sullivan is not a model of clarity, and Justice Harlan, writing in dissent, was correct to criticize the “undis criminating manner” in which the Court dealt with Sullivan’s claims. Id., at 251. Sullivan had sought relief both for the corporation’s refusal to approve the assignment and for his expulsion. Id., at 253. But in stating that Sullivan had standing to maintain “this action,” id., at 237 (majority opin ion), the Court did not specify what relief Sullivan was enti tled to pursue on remand. Lamenting the Court’s “failure to provide any guidance as to the legal standards that should govern Sullivan’s right to recovery on remand,” id., at 252 (dissenting opinion), Justice Harlan provided an instructive summary of the ambiguities in the Court’s opinion:

“As an alternative, Sullivan might be thought to be entitled to relief from those injuries that flowed from the Board’s violation of its ‘duty’ to Freeman under § 1982. Such a standard might suggest that Sullivan is entitled to damages that resulted from Little Hunting Park’s ini tial refusal to accept the assignment to Freeman but again not to reinstatement. Or does the Court think that § 1982 gives Sullivan a right to relief from injuries that result from his ‘legitimate’ protest aimed at con vincing the Board to accept Freeman?” Id., at 254–255.

It is noteworthy that of the three possible standards Jus tice Harlan outlined, the first two clearly depend on a show ing that Freeman’s § 1982 rights were violated. Only the third—“Or does the Court think that § 1982 gives Sullivan a right to relief from injuries that result from his ‘legitimate’ protest”—resembles a traditional retaliation claim and, in context, even it is probably best read to presuppose that Sul livan was protesting an actual violation of Freeman’s rights. Id., at 255. Which, if any, of these standards the Court had in mind is anybody’s guess. It did not say.

Steadfastly refusing to acknowledge any ambiguity, the Court asserts that it is “not surprising that following Sulli van, federal appeals courts concluded, on the basis of Sulli van or its reasoning, that § 1981 encompassed retaliation claims.” Ante, at 448. But given Sullivan’s use of the word “standing” and its reliance on a third-party standing case, what is unsurprising is that each of the cases the Court cites either characterized the issue as one of standing, Win ston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1266, 1270 (CA6 1977) (characterizing the issue as “whether or not the white plain tiff in this action has standing to sue his former employer under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 for discharging him in alleged retali ation for plaintiff ’s protesting the alleged discriminatory fir ing of a black co-worker”), or recognized that it was taking a step beyond Sullivan in inferring a cause of action for re taliation, Choudhury v. Polytechnic Inst. of N. Y., 735 F. 2d 38, 42 (CA2 1984) (stating that the Second Circuit “ha[d] never decided whether § 1981 creates a cause of action for retaliation,” even though it had previously held, based on Sullivan, “that a white person who claimed to have suffered reprisals as a result of his efforts to vindicate the rights of non-whites had standing to sue under § 1981”); Goff v. Conti nental Oil Co., 678 F. 2d 593, 598, n. 7 (CA5 1982) (recogniz ing that Sullivan and a previous Fifth Circuit decision rely ing on Sullivan were “essentially standing cases holding that white people can assert civil rights claims when they are harmed by someone’s discrimination against blacks,” which is distinct from holding that “a particular type of conduct—retaliation for the filing of a § 1981 law suit—is actionable in the first place”).

Second, the Court appears to give weight to the fact that, since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, “the lower courts have uniformly interpreted § 1981 as encompassing retaliation actions.” Ante, at 451. This rationale fares no better than the others. The Court has never suggested that rejection of a view uniformly held by the courts of appeals violates some principle of stare decisis. To the contrary, we have not hesitated to take a different view if convinced the lower courts were wrong. Indeed, it has become something of a dissenter’s tactic to point out that the Court has decided a question differently than every court of appeals to have considered it. See, e. g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 278, n. 11 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 643 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Sandoval, 532 U. S., at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 254 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 365 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court does not explain what makes this particular line of lower court authority any more sacrosanct than those we have rejected in the past.

Of course, lower court decisions may be persuasive, and when the Court rejects the unanimous position of the courts of appeals, it is fair to point out that fact. But the point has traction only to the extent it tends to show that the Court’s reasoning is flawed on the merits, as demonstrated by the number of judges who have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e. g., Buckhannon, supra, at 643–644 (Ginsburg, J., dis senting) (“When this Court rejects the considered judgment prevailing in the Circuits, respect for our colleagues de mands a cogent explanation”). Unlike decisions of this Court, decisions of the courts of appeals, even when unani mous, do not carry stare decisis weight, nor do they relieve us of our obligation independently to decide the merits of the question presented. That is why, when we have affirmed a view unanimously held by the courts of appeals, we have done so (at least until today) not because we gave preceden tial weight to the lower courts’ decisions, but because we agreed with their resolution of the question on the merits. See, e. g., Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 531 (2005) (“Vir tually every Court of Appeals to consider the question has held that such a pleading . . . is in substance a successive habeas petition . . . . We think those holdings are correct”); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350, 362 (1991) (“Thus, we agree with every Court of Appeals that has been called upon to apply a federal stat ute of limitations to a § 10(b) claim”).

III