Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005)

(a) Rule 60(b) applies in § 2254 habeas proceedings only “to the ex tent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable federal statutes and rules. § 2254 Rule 11. Because § 2244(b) applies only where a court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s “habeas corpus application,” the question here is whether a Rule 60(b) motion is such an application. The text of § 2244(b) shows that, for these purposes, a habeas application is a filing containing one or more “claims.” Other federal habeas statutes and this Court’s decisions also make clear that a “claim” is an asserted fed eral basis for relief from a state-court conviction. If a Rule 60(b) mo tion contains one or more “claims,” the motion is, if not in substance a “habeas corpus application,” at least similar enough that failing to sub ject it to AEDPA’s restrictions on successive habeas petitions would be “inconsistent with” the statute. A Rule 60(b) motion can be said to bring a “claim” if it seeks to add a new ground for relief from the state conviction or attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim [p. 525] on the merits, though not if it merely attacks a defect in the federal habeas proceedings’ integrity. Pp. 528–532.

Petitioner Aurelio Gonzalez pleaded guilty in Florida Cir cuit Court to one count of robbery with a firearm. He filed no appeal and began serving his 99-year sentence in 1982. Some 12 years later, petitioner began to seek relief from his conviction. He filed two motions for state postconviction re lief, which the Florida courts denied. Thereafter, in June 1997, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, [p. 527] alleging that his guilty plea had not been entered knowingly and voluntarily.

Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judg ment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly dis covered evidence.2 Rule 60(b)(6), the particular provision [p. 529] under which petitioner brought his motion, permits reopen ing when the movant shows “any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” other than the more specific circumstances set out in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5). See Lil jeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613 (1949) (opinion of Black, J.). The mere recitation of these provisions shows why we give little weight to respond ent’s appeal to the virtues of finality. That policy consider ation, standing alone, is unpersuasive in the interpretation of a provision whose whole purpose is to make an exception to finality. The issue here is whether the text of Rule 60(b) itself, or of some other provision of law, limits its application in a manner relevant to the case before us.

AEDPA did not expressly circumscribe the operation of Rule 60(b). (By contrast, AEDPA directly amended other provisions of the Federal Rules. See, e. g., AEDPA, § 103, 110 Stat. 1218 (amending Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22).) The new habeas restrictions introduced by AEDPA are made in directly relevant, however, by the fact that Rule 60(b), like the rest of the Rules of Civil Procedure, applies in habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U. S. C. § 22543 only “to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable federal statutory provisions and rules. 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 11; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2). The relevant provisions of the AEDPA-amended habeas statutes, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2244(b)(1)–(3), impose three requirements on second or successive habeas petitions: First, any claim that has already [p. 530] been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed. § 2244(b)(1). Second, any claim that has not already been adjudicated must be dismissed unless it relies on either a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability of actual innocence. § 2244(b)(2). Third, before the district court may accept a successive peti tion for filing, the court of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not previously raised that is sufficient to meet § 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actual-innocence provisions. § 2244(b)(3). We proceed to consider whether these provi sions limit the application of Rule 60(b) to the present case.

In some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will contain one or more “claims.” For example, it might straightforwardly [p. 531] assert that owing to “excusable neglect,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1), the movant’s habeas petition had omitted a claim of constitutional error, and seek leave to present that claim. Cf. Harris v. United States, 367 F. 3d 74, 80–81 (CA2 2004) (petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion sought relief from judg ment because habeas counsel had failed to raise a Sixth Amendment claim). Similarly, a motion might seek leave to present “newly discovered evidence,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(2), in support of a claim previously denied. E. g., Rod well v. Pepe, 324 F. 3d 66, 69 (CA1 2003). Or a motion might contend that a subsequent change in substantive law is a “reason justifying relief,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6), from the previous denial of a claim. E. g., Dunlap v. Litscher, 301 F. 3d 873, 876 (CA7 2002). Virtually every Court of Appeals to consider the question has held that such a pleading, al though labeled a Rule 60(b) motion, is in substance a suc cessive habeas petition and should be treated accordingly. E. g., Rodwell, supra, at 71–72; Dunlap, supra, at 876.

We think those holdings are correct. A habeas petition er’s filing that seeks vindication of such a claim is, if not in substance a “habeas corpus application,” at least similar enough that failing to subject it to the same requirements would be “inconsistent with” the statute. 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 11. Using Rule 60(b) to present new claims for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction—even claims couched in the language of a true Rule 60(b) motion—circum vents AEDPA’s requirement that a new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or newly discovered facts. § 2244(b)(2). The same is true of a Rule 60(b)(2) motion presenting new evidence in support of a claim already litigated: Even assuming that reliance on a new factual predicate causes that motion to escape § 2244(b)(1)’s prohibition of claims “presented in a prior ap plication,” § 2244(b)(2)(B) requires a more convincing factual showing than does Rule 60(b). Likewise, a Rule 60(b) mo tion based on a purported change in the substantive law gov erning the claim could be used to circumvent § 2244(b)(2)(A)’s [p. 532] dictate that the only new law on which a successive petition may rely is “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” In addition to the substantive conflict with AEDPA standards, in each of these three exam ples use of Rule 60(b) would impermissibly circumvent the requirement that a successive habeas petition be precertified by the court of appeals as falling within an exception to the successive-petition bar. § 2244(b)(3).

Like the Court of Appeals, respondent relies heavily on our decision in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538 (1998). In that case we reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to recall its mandate and reconsider the denial of Thompson’s first federal habeas petition; the recall was, we held, an abuse of discretion because of its inconsistency with the policies embodied in AEDPA. Id., at 554–559. Analogizing an ap pellate court’s recall of its mandate to a district court’s grant of relief from judgment, the Eleventh Circuit thought that Calderon’s disposition applied to Rule 60(b). 366 F. 3d, at 1272–1277. We think otherwise. To begin with, as the opinion said, compliance with the actual text of AEDPA’s [p. 534] successive-petition provision was not at issue in Calderon—because the Court of Appeals considered only the claims and evidence presented in Thompson’s first federal habeas peti tion. 523 U. S., at 554. Calderon did state, however, that “a prisoner’s motion to recall the mandate on the basis of the merits of the underlying decision can be regarded as a sec ond or successive application.” Id., at 553 (emphasis added). But that is entirely consonant with the proposition that a Rule 60(b) motion that seeks to revisit the federal court’s denial on the merits of a claim for relief should be treated as a successive habeas petition. The problem for respondent is that this case does not present a revisitation of the merits. The motion here, like some other Rule 60(b) motions in § 2254 cases, confines itself not only to the first federal habeas peti tion, but to a nonmerits aspect of the first federal habeas proceeding. Nothing in Calderon suggests that entertain ing such a filing is “inconsistent with” AEDPA.

Moreover, several characteristics of a Rule 60(b) motion limit the friction between the Rule and the successive petition prohibitions of AEDPA, ensuring that our harmoni zation of the two will not expose federal courts to an ava [p. 535] lanche of frivolous postjudgment motions. First, Rule 60(b) contains its own limitations, such as the requirement that the motion “be made within a reasonable time” and the more specific 1-year deadline for asserting three of the most open ended grounds of relief (excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud). Second, our cases have required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to show “extraor dinary circumstances” justifying the reopening of a final judgment. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950); accord, id., at 202; Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864; id., at 873 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (“This very strict inter pretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judg ments is to be preserved”). Such circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas context. Third, Rule 60(b) proceedings are subject to only limited and deferential appellate review. Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 263, n. 7 (1978). Many Courts of Appeals have con strued 28 U. S. C. § 2253 to impose an additional limitation on appellate review by requiring a habeas petitioner to obtain a COA as a prerequisite to appealing the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion.7

Because petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion challenges only the District Court’s previous ruling on the AEDPA statute of limitations, it is not the equivalent of a successive habeas [p. 536] petition. The Eleventh Circuit therefore erred in holding that petitioner did not qualify even to seek Rule 60(b) relief.

Petitioner’s only ground for reopening the judgment deny ing his first federal habeas petition is that our decision in Artuz showed the error of the District Court’s statute-of limitations ruling. We assume for present purposes that the District Court’s ruling was incorrect.8 As we noted above, however, relief under Rule 60(b)(6)—the only subsection petitioner invokes—requires a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Petitioner contends that Artuz’s change in the interpretation of the AEDPA statute of limitations meets this description. We do not agree. The District Court’s interpretation was by all appearances correct under the Eleventh Circuit’s then-prevailing interpretation of 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2). It is hardly extraordinary that subse quently, after petitioner’s case was no longer pending, this Court arrived at a different interpretation. Although our constructions of federal statutes customarily apply to all cases then pending on direct review, see, e. g., Harper v. Vir ginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 97 (1993), not every interpretation of the federal statutes setting forth the re quirements for habeas provides cause for reopening cases long since final.9 If Artuz justified reopening long-ago dis [p. 537] missals based on a lower court’s unduly parsimonious inter pretation of § 2244(d)(2), then Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408 (2005), would justify reopening long-ago grants of habeas relief based on a lower court’s unduly generous interpreta tion of the same tolling provision.

The change in the law worked by Artuz is all the less ex traordinary in petitioner’s case, because of his lack of dili gence in pursuing review of the statute-of-limitations issue. At the time Artuz was decided, petitioner had abandoned any attempt to seek review of the District Court’s decision on this statute-of-limitations issue. Although the District Court relied on Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that a state postconviction application is not “properly filed” if it is procedurally defaulted, and although that precedent was at odds with the rule in several other Circuits, petitioner nei ther raised that issue in his application for a COA, nor filed a petition for rehearing of the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of a COA, nor sought certiorari review of that denial.10 This lack of diligence confirms that Artuz is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief from the judgment in petition er’s case. Indeed, in one of the cases in which we explained Rule 60(b)(6)’s extraordinary-circumstances requirement, the movant had failed to appeal an adverse ruling by the District Court, whereas another party to the same judgment had [p. 538] appealed and won reversal. Ackermann, 340 U. S., at 195. Some years later, the petitioner sought Rule 60(b) relief, which the District Court denied. We affirmed the denial of Rule 60(b) relief, noting that the movant’s decision not to appeal had been free and voluntary, although the favorable ruling in the companion case made it appear mistaken in hindsight. See id., at 198.

The majority explains that a proper Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion “attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Ante, at 532. This is consistent with Judge Tjoflat’s descrip tion of the standard in his opinion below, see 366 F. 3d 1253, 1297 (CA11 2004) (specially concurring in part and dissenting in part), and I agree with it. I fear that other language in the majority’s opinion, especially its discussion of the signifi cance of the word “claim,” could be taken to imply a different [p. 539] standard, with which I would disagree. With that qualifi cation, I join the majority’s opinion.

As the Court recognizes, whether a Rule 60(b) motion may proceed in the habeas context depends on the nature of the relief the motion seeks. See ante, at 533.1 Given the sub stance of petitioner’s motion, I agree with the Court that this was a “true” Rule 60(b) motion and that the District Court and the Court of Appeals therefore erred in treating it as a successive habeas petition. And while I also agree with much of the Court’s reasoning in Parts I and II of its opinion, I believe the Court goes too far in commenting on [p. 540] issues that are not directly before us and that have not been fully briefed. See, e. g., ante, at 530–532 (discussing various Court of Appeals cases). My main disagreement, however, pertains to Part III of the Court’s opinion.

Orderly procedure aside, the Court’s truncated analysis is unsatisfactory. At least in some circumstances, a superven ing change in AEDPA procedural law can be the kind of “ex traordinary circumstanc[e],” Ackermann v. United States, [p. 541] 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950), that constitutes a “reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” within the mean ing of Rule 60(b)(6). In this case, the District Court dis missed petitioner’s habeas petition as time barred after con cluding that his second motion for state postconviction relief did not toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d). After that judgment became final, however, we decided Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), which made clear that the District Court’s ruling on tolling was errone ous and that the habeas petition should therefore not have been dismissed.2

While this type of supervening change in procedural law may not alone warrant the reopening of a habeas judgment, there may be special factors that allow a prisoner to satisfy [p. 542] the high standard of Rule 60(b)(6). For instance, when a prisoner has shown reasonable diligence in seeking relief based on a change in procedural law, and when that prisoner can show that there is probable merit to his underlying claims, it would be well in keeping with a district court’s discretion under Rule 60(b)(6) for that court to reopen the habeas judgment and give the prisoner the one fair shot at habeas review that Congress intended that he have. After all, we have consistently recognized that Rule 60(b)(6) “pro vides courts with authority ‘adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to ac complish justice.’ ” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisi tion Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 864 (1988) (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 614–615 (1949)). Here, peti tioner, who is serving a 99-year term in Florida prison, filed his Rule 60(b) motion approximately eight months after this Court’s decision in Artuz. A district court could reasonably conclude that this period reveals no lack of diligence on the part of an incarcerated pro se litigant.3 And while we have received scant briefing on the probable merit of his petition, his allegation—that his guilty plea was not knowing and vol untary because it was based on grossly inaccurate advice about the actual time he would serve in prison—at least states a colorable claim of a constitutional violation. See Finch v. Vaughn, 67 F. 3d 909 (CA11 1995); see also Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 504 (1984).4

The Court relies on petitioner’s supposed lack of diligence in pursuing review of the District Court’s initial statute-of [p. 543] limitations ruling. See ante, at 537. In fact, petitioner did appeal the District Court’s ruling, which the Court of Ap peals correctly interpreted as a request for a certificate of appealability (COA).5 As for petitioner’s failure to seek re hearing or certiorari, he alleged in his Rule 60(b) motion, App. 16, and again in his reply brief, that he filed a timely petition for rehearing on April 18, 2000, but that the clerk of the Court of Appeals returned the motion unfiled, “explain ing, erroneously, that his appeal was dismissed and closed on October 28, 1999.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis deleted). According to petitioner, “[t]his official misinforma tion carried the weight of a court decision and was enough to convince a pro se litigant (and some lawyers) that the 90-day window for filing a certiorari petition expired, as well.” Ibid. The State, however, represents that petitioner erro neously filed the petition for rehearing under the case num ber of an earlier, dismissed appeal. Brief for Respondent 4. [p. 544] I do not know how to resolve these allegations, but this only highlights the propriety of a remand. Even on the State’s version of events, petitioner’s attempt at filing for rehearing is proof of diligence on his part.