Barney v. Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co., 117 U.S. 228
Case details
Citation
117 U.S. 228
Full caption
BARNEY & Others v. WINONA & ST. PETER RAILROAD COMPANY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
BARNEY & Others v. WINONA & ST. PETER RAILROAD COMPANY.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOB
THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.
Submitted January 7, 1886.—Decided March 1,1886.
Inadvertent expressions in an opinion of the court, which are not material to the decision of the case, are not decisions of the court within the general rule that what is decided in a cause on appeal is not open to reconsideration in the same case on a second appeal on similar facts.
In the construction of land grant acts in aid of railroads, “granted lands’’are those falling within the limits specially designated, the title to which attaches as of the date of the act of Congress, when the lands are located by an approved and accepted survey of the line of the road filed in the Land Department ; but “indemnity lands” are lands selected in lieu of parcels lost by previous disposition or reservation for other purposes, the title to which accrues only from the time of their selection.
The provision in § 3 of the act of March 3, 1865, that any lands granted to Minnesota by the act of March 3, 1857, which might be located within the limits of the extension made by said act of 1865 to the original grant made by said act of 1857, should be deducted from the full quantity of lands granted by the act of 1865, applies to “ granted lands ” of the prior grant falling within the six-mile limit, and not to possible indemnity lands which might be subsequently acquired.
This case was before the court at October Term, 1884,113 U. S. 618. The questions which arose in the execution of the mandate, and which were brought up by the second appeal, are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Gordon E. Cole for appellants.
Mr. Thomas Wilson for appellee.
Mr . Just ice Fiel d delivered the opinion of the court.
This case was before us at the October Term, 1884. By an act of Congress passed March 3, 1857, a grant of land was made to Minnesota, then a Territory, to aid in the construction of certain railroads, including one from Winona, a town p. 229on the Mississippi River, to a point on the Big Sioux River, in the present Territory of Dakota. 11 Stat. 195. The grant was of every alternate section designated by odd numbers, for six sections in width on each side of the road, subject to certain exceptions, not important to be here mentioned, with a right to select indemnity lands within fifteen miles from the line of the road. In May following the legislature of the Territory authorized a company, previously incorporated, to construct and operate this road; and, to aid in its construction, granted to the company the interest and estate, present and prospective, of the Territory and future State, in the lands ceded by the act of Congress, together with the rights, privileges and immunities conferred by it.
In 1858 * the Territory became a State and was admitted into the Union; and under proceedings for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the company, it became, before March, 1862, reinvested with the estate in the lands and the rights and privileges it had granted. In March, 1862, its legislature passed an act transferring the lands, property, franchises and privileges, with which it had thus become reinvested, to the Winona and St. Peter Railroad Company, which soon afterwards commenced the construction of the road. By the act of Congress of March 3,1865, the quantity of land granted by the act of 1857 was increased to ten sections per mile, with an enlargement of the limits within which indemnity lands might be selected from fifteen to twenty miles. 13 Stat. 526. The third section provided that any lands which had been granted to Minnesota for the purpose of aiding in the construction of any railroad which might be located within the limits of the extension, should be deducted from the “full quantity ” granted by the act. The full quantity was the four additional sections, and we held that the reservation was merely a legislative declaration of that which the law would have pronounced independently of it, inasmuch as a prior grant of the p. 230same property must necessarily be deducted from a subsequent one in which it is included.
In October, 1867, the company agreed with the plaintiffs, upon sufficient consideration, to convey to them as many acres of land, previously granted by. Congress to Minnesota, as it should receive from the State by reason of the construction of its road already made, estimated to be 105 miles, but in fact only 102 miles and a fraction of mile. This suit was brought to enforce the specific performance of this contract, and the only question between the parties was as to the quantity of land to be conveyed under it.
By the act of 1857, lands were also granted to Minnesota to aid in the construction of the road of the Minnesota (Minneapolis) and Cedar Valley Railroad Company, afterwards the Minnesota Central Railroad Company (Laws of Minnesota, Extra Session of 1857, 20, and Special Laws of 1863,137), and that road intersected the road of the defendant between Rochester and Waseca; and lands of that company at the intersection were located within the limits of the extension of four sections made by the act of 1865.
The court below, however, held that, for the part of the defendant’s road constructed after the act of 1865, the plaintiffs were entitled, under their contract, to ten full sections per mile, without any deduction for the lands which were located at the intersection of the road with the road of the Minnesota Central Railroad Company, and within the grant for the construction of the latter. It was accordingly adjudged that the plaintiffs were entitled, in addition to what had been voluntarily conveyed to them, to a conveyance of 197,111 acres and a fraction of an acre, and a decree to that effect was entered. The case being brought to this court, that decree, at the October Term, 1884, was reversed, and the cause sent back to the court below in order that the proper deduction might be made by reason of the interference of the two grants, and the elder grant be deducted from the extension made by the act of 1865, so far as it was located within that extension. 113 U. S. 618-629.
In speaking of the two grants we said of the first one, that of 1857, that it was one by description, that is, of land in place p. 231and not one of quantity. It was of particular parcels of land designated by odd numbers for six sections on each side of the road; that is, of particular parcels of land lying within certain defined lateral limits to the road and described by numbers on the public surveys. The grant of the four additonal sections by the act of 1865 was also a grant of land in place. The intention of Congress was to enlarge the first grant from six to ten sections per mile ; the additional four to be taken in like manner as the original six, and subject to the same limitations, and to others that had been or might be prescribed, with a right to select indemnity lands within twenty miles instead of fifteen. The act did not purport to change the character of the first grant, but to increase its quantity. We said, however, that the grant of these additional sections might be regarded as one of quantity—an inadvertence for which the writer of that opinion, who is also the writer of this one, is alone responsible. The statement was not at all material to the decision, which was that a deduction should have been made by reason of the intersection of the two grants, so far as the prior grant was located within the extension.
We recognize the rule that what was decided in a case pending before us on appeal, is not open to reconsideration in the same case on a second appeal upon similar facts. The first decision is the law of the case, and must control its disposition; but the rule does not apply to expressions of opinion on matters the disposition of which was not required for the decision. When the case went back, the court below seems to have been embarrassed by the erroneous description of the character of the grant of the four additional sections, and to have felt obliged to deduct from the amount originally decreed the number of acres which, prior to March 3, 1865, had passed to Minnesota within the designated limits of the grant to aid the construction of the road of the Minnesota Central Railroad Company, and also the number of acres which had been taken beyond them within the indemnity limits of fifteen miles. . In this construction of the reservation made by the third section of the act of 1865, we think the court erred. The reservation from the four sections was of land previously granted, which p. 232Was located within them. The previous grant was of lands in place, for it was of alternate sections designated by odd numbers, for six sections in width on each side of the road, and that portion of it was reserved from the subsequent grant which fell within the four new sections, also land in place.
In the construction of land grant acts, in aid of railroads, there is a well-established distinction observed between “granted lands ” and “ indemnity lands.” The former are those falling within the limits specially designated, and the title to which attaches when the lands are located by an approved and accepted survey of the line of the road filed in the Land Department, as of the date of the act of Congress. The latter are those lands selected in lieu of parcels lost by previous disposition or reservation for other purposes, and the title to which accrues only from the time of their selection. It is these “granted lands” of the prior grant falling within the six-mile limit that, in our opinion, are reserved, and not the possible indemnity lands which might be subsequently acquired. These granted lands of the prior grant being in place could be readily deducted from the four sections, also in place, whenever the roads of the two companies intersected, and the lands fell within the four sections. The quantity thus granted is found by the special masters appointed by the court to be fifteen thousand acres and of an acre. This quantity only, in addition to the lands used for the track of the road of the Winona and St. Peter Railroad Company, and for depots and other purposes necessary and incident to its operation, should, therefore, be deducted from the number of acres, to a conveyance of which from the company the plaintiffs, by the decree of the court below at its December Term, 1880, were adjudged to be entitled.
The decree will, therefore, be reversed, and the cause be re-
manded with directions to enter a new decree comformaUe to this opinion.
COFFEY v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY. PETITION FOR REHEARING.
Petition received March 1,1886.—Decided March 15,1886.
The pleadings in a suit in rem brought by the United States, in a Circuit Court of the United States in Kentucky, for the forfeiture of property after its seizure for the violation of the internal revenue laws, are not required by section 914 of the Revised Statutes, to be governed by the statute of Kentucky in regard to pleadings in civil actions ; but are to be, as before the enactment of section 914, according to the course in Admiralty.
This was a petition for a rehearing of the cause reported 116 U. S. 427. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Samuel McKee for petitioner.
Mr . Justi ce Blatchf ord delivered the opinion of the court.
On the 18th of January last, a decision was made in this case, 116 U. S. 427, affirming the judgment below, rendered on an information in rem, filed for the forfeiture to the United States of certain personal property seized for a violation of the internal revenue laws. There was a trial by jury and a verdict for the United States. The claimant, in his answer, had set up m bar, that a criminal information had been filed against him, in the same court, alleging as offences the same matters averred in the information in the civil suit, and that he had pleaded guilty and been adjudged to pay a fine. There was no demurrer or reply to this answer. After verdict, the claimant moved in. arrest of judgment, alleging as cause the judgment in the criminal proceeding, but the motion was overruled. There was no bill of exceptions, and no exception to the overruling of the motion.
On the hearing in this court, the claimant contended that, as there was no traverse of the answer, it must be taken to be true. But this court held that no reply or replication to the apswer was necessary to raise an issue of fact on the matters averred 111 it; that the proceedings, so far as the pleadings were con- p. 234cerned, were kindred to those in a suit in Admiralty in rem: that the general rules of pleading in regard to Admiralty suits in rem apply to suits in rem for a forfeiture, brought by the United States, after a seizure on land, as laid down in the cases of The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391, Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 Wall. 759, 765, Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766, 769, and Morris' Cotton, 8 Wall. 507, 511; that Rule 22 of the Rules in Admiralty prescribes regulations for the form of informations and libels of information on seizures for the breach of the laws of the United States on land or water; that by Rule 51 in Admiralty, new matter in an answer is considered as denied by the libellant; that the issue of fact as to the former conviction must be held to have been found against the claimant, by the general verdict; and that no question in regard to the defence set up could be raised.
An application is now made by the claimant for a rehearing, on the ground that, as to the pleadings, the case must be governed by section 914 of the Revised Statutes, which is a reenactment of § 5 of the act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255,17 Stat. 197, and is in these words: “ The practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and Admiralty causes, in the Circuit and District Courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the Courts of record of the State within which such Circuit or District Courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding.” It is urged that this is a civil cause, but not an equity or an Admiralty cause, and that the provisions of sections 126 and 386 of the Civil Code of Practice of Kentucky, which took effect January 1, 1877, apply to it. Those sections áre as follows: “ § 126 [153]. Every material allegation of a pleading must, for the purposes of the action, be taken as true, unless specifically traversed.” “ § 386 [416]. Judgment shall be given for the party whom the pleadings entitle thereto, though there may have been a verdict against him.”
The practice as to the pleadings in suits in rem like the present having been well settled prior to the passage of the act of June 1st, 1872, the question is, whether it was changed by that p. 235act. In Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 Wall. 759, 764, where land was seized and proceeded against as forfeited to the United States under a confiscation act, it was held, that, while either party had a right to demand a trial by jury, the proceedings were to be “ in general conformity to the course in Admiralty.” A like ruling was made, in a like case, in Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766, 769; and in a case of the seizure of personal property on land, in Horrid Cotton, 8 Wall, 507, 511. Section 914 prescribes a conformity to the practice in the courts of the State only “ as near as may be,” and only “ in like causes.” It is a proper construction of this section to hold, that, while the provisions of the Code of Kentucky in regard to pleadings in civil suits in personam apply to like causes in the Federal courts in Kentucky, they do not apply to suits in rem by the United States for the forfeiture of property, after its seizure, for the violation of a revenue law, because there are no “ like causes ” known to the laws of Kentucky. Such suits in rem are peculiar in their practice, pleadings, and forms of procedure, and, so long as there is ample scope for the operation of section 914 of the Revised Statutes in regard to civil suits in personam, and no intention is manifest to change the established practice in such suits in rem, and any change in practice is limited to “ like causes,” we must continue to regard the former practice as applicable to the present suit.
The question of the scope of operation of § 914 has been considered by this court in Nudd v. Furrows, 91 U. S. 426; Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 584; and Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713. In Newcomb v. Wood, it was held that the section did not abrogate the established rule in the courts of the United States, that to grant or refuse a new trial was a matter of discretion, which could not be reviewed on a writ of error; and that a State law entitling a party to a second trial in an action to recover the value of personal property, did not entitle him to a second trial in such an action in a Federal court. No decision yas been made by this court in conflict with the views above indicated as applicable to this case; and
The application for a rehearing is denied.
*
In the opinion in 113 U. S. 621, the admission by. a misprint is stated to ave been in 1857. The constitution of the State was adopted in that year, but the admission was on May 11, 1858. 11 Stat. 285.