Brown v. Gilman, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 255 (1819)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Brown v. Gilman, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 255 (1819)
Full caption
Brown et al. v. Gilman.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 24, 1819
Brown et al. v. Gilman.
Lien for purchase-money.
The scrip or certificate holders, in the association called the New England Mississippi Land Company, hold their shares under the company itself, as a part of the common capital stock, and are not considered as holding derivatively, and solely as individual sub-purchasers, under the separate original titles of the original purchasers from the Georgia Mississippi Company, so as to be affected by any circumstances of defect in these separate original titles; these titles being
in ^ac^> now vested in the trustees of the New England Mississippi *Company itself, as
-* part of its common stock, and not in the individual holders.
The equitable lien of the vendor of land, for unpaid purchase-money, is waived, by any of the parties showing that the lien is not intended to be retained, as by taking separate securities for the purchase-money.1 An express contract, that the lien shall be retained to a specified extent, is equivalent to a waiver of the lien to any greater extent.
Where the deed itself remains in escrow, until the first payment is made, and is then delivered as the deed of the party, and the vendor consents to rely upon the negotiable notes of the purchaser, indorsed by third persons, for the residue of the purchase-money, this is such a separate security as extinguishes the lien. Gilman v. Brown, 1 Mason 191, affirmed.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Massachusetts. This cause was by consent heard upon the bill, answer, and exhibits in the case. The material facts were these:
In the month of January 1796, sundry persons, and among them William Wetmore, purchased of the agents of certain persons in Georgia, called the Georgia Mississippi Company, then in Boston, a tract of land, then in the state of Georgia, and now in the Mississippi territory, estimated to contain 11,380,000 acres, at ten cents per acre ; which tract the Georgia Mississippi Company had purchased of the state of Georgia, and had received a grant thereof in due form of law. The conditions of the purchase were, that the pUrchase-money should be paid as follows, viz., two cents thereof on or before the first day of May 1796 ; one cent more, on or before the first day of October 1796 ; two and a half cents more, on or before the first day of May 1797 ; two and a half cents more, on or before the first day of May
1*798 ; and the remaining two *cents, on or before the first day of May
J 1799. The whole of the purchase-money was to be secured by negotiable notes of the several purchasers, with approved indorsers, to be made payable to Thomas Cumming, president of the Georgia Mississippi Company, or order, payable at the bank of the United States, at Philadelphia, or at the branch bank at Boston, and to be delivered to the agents, upon the execution of the deed of conveyance by them. It was further agreed, that the deed, when executed, should be placed in the hands of George R. Minot, Esq., ns an escrow, to be delivered over by him to the grantees, upon the first pay'
Brown v. Gilman.
ment of two cents, payable in May 1796, for which first payment, and for that only, the purchasers agreed to hold themselves jointly responsible.
Accordingly, a deed of conveyance was executed by the agents, dated the 13th day of February 1796, to certain grantees named by the purchasers, to wit, William Wetmore, Leonard Jarvis and Henry Newman, in trust for the purchasers; and the same was duly placed in the hands of Mr. Minot, as an escrow, and negotiable notes, with approved indorsers, were duly delivered to the agents, by all the purchasers, for their respective shares of the purchase-money. And afterwards, the first payment of two cents having been satisfactorily made to the agents, the said deed was, with their consent, delivered over to the grantees, as an absolute deed ; and a deed of confirmation thereof was, afterwards, in February 1797, duly executed and delivered to the grantees by the Georgia Mississippi Company.
After the purchase, and before the delivery of the deed, *the pur- r<! chasers formed themselves into an association by the name of the *- New England Mississippi Land Company, and executed sundry articles of agreement, and among other things, therein agreed, that the deed of the purchase should be made to Jarvis, Newman and Wetmore, as grantees as above stated ; (art. 2d) that they should execute deeds to the several original purchasers for their proportions in the lands, but should retain these deeds, until the purchasers should sign and execute the articles of association ; and should also execute a deed of trust, to certain trustees, as provided for in the articles, of such their respective shares in the purchase ; (art. 3d) that the several purchasers should execute a deed of trust to Jarvis, Newman and William Hull, of their respective shares in the purchase to hold to them and the survivor of them in trust, to be disposed of according to the articles ; (art. 4th) that the business of the association should be managed by a board of directors, who were to have full power and authority to sell and dispose of the whole, or any part of the property of the company, and to pay over to their respective proprietors their proportions of the money received from any and every sale, &c.; (art. 8, 16, 20) that upon receiving a deed from any purchaser, according to the tenor of the articles, the trustees were to give to each proprietor a certificate, in a prescribed form, stating his interest in the trust, and that he should hold it according to the articles of the association; which certificate was recorded in the company’s books, and was to be “ complete evidence to such person of his right in said purchase,” and was to be transferrible by indorsement; and upon a record of the transfer in the company’s books, the transferree was to be entitled to vote L as a member of the company. The share of Mr. Wetmore in the purchase was 900,000 acres. He paid the two cents per acre in cash ; and of the notes given by him for the purchase-money, $40,000 were paid by Mrs. Sarah Waldo, his indorser, and the residue, $45,000, still remained unpaid. Mr. Wetmore received his certificates from the trustees for his whole purchase ; and having sold or conveyed 500,000 acres, he afterwards conveyed the remaining 400,000 acres to Robert Williams, to whom certificates for that amount were duly issued by the trustees, three of which certificates, each for 20,000 acres, duly indorsed by said Williams, came into the plaintiff’s, Mrs. Gilman’s, hands, for a valuable consideration ; and the assignment hereof having been duly recorded in the company’s books, she was admitted, and had always acted as a member of the company.
Brown v. Gilman.
From causes well known to the public, the New England Mississippi Land Company never obtained possession of the tract of land so conveyed to them, (a) On the 31st of March 1814, congress passed an act, entitled, “ an act providing for the indemnification of certain claimants of public lands in the Mississippi territory.” By this act, and other subsequent acts amending the same,(£>) it was provided, that the claimants of the lands *9„ might file in *the office of the secretary of state, a release of all their
J claims to the United States, and an assignment and transfer to the United States of their claim to any money deposited or paid into the treasury of Georgia, such release and assignment to take effect, on the indemnification of the claimants, according to the provisions of the act. Commissioners were to be, and were, accordingly, appointed under the act, who were authorized to adjudge and determine upon the sufficiency of such releases and assignments, and also to “ adjudge and determine upon all controversies arising from such claims so released as aforesaid, which may be found to conflict with, and to be adverse to each other.” And the sum of $1,550,000, to be issued in public stock, was appropriated by the act, to indemnify the claimants, claiming in the name of, or under, the Georgia Mississippi Company. The New England Mississippi Land Company duly executed the release and assignment, required by the act of congress ; and presented the claims of the whole company before the commissioners. The commissioners awarded the company the sum of $1,083,812 in stock, certificates for which were duly issued, under the act of congress, and received by the treasurer of the company. A further claim was made for the whole amount of the original share of Mr. Wetmore, but the board of commissioners decided, that the Georgia Mississippi Company had a lien in equity on the land sold and conveyed to said Wetmore, for the purchase-money due and unpaid by said Wetmore, and that the indemnity under the act of congress should follow that lien, and be awarded to said *Georgia Mississippi
J Company to the amount thereof. And inasmuch as the said Sarah Waldo was the holder of certain certificates issued by said trustees, on account of said Wetmore’s original purchase, 'the commissioners further awarded, that the sum of $40,000 of the purchase-money (which had been paid or satisfied by her for said Wetmore, on her indorsement) should be applied first to make good the scrip or certificates so issued to her ; and that if there was any surplus, after making her scrip or certificates good, such surplus could not be applied to the scrip or certificates held under Robert Williams, who did not become the assignee of the said Wetmore,’ until after the said sum was paid. And the commissioners further decided, that, the certificates, issued by the trustees on account of any of the original purchasers, who failed to make payment of the purchase-money to the Georgia Mississippi Company, were bad, and that the parties claiming under them must lose their indemnity under the act of congress. By this award of the commissioners, the claim of the New England Mississippi Land Company, for the amount of the share of the plaintiff, was completely excluded. But the plaintiff claimed her share of the stock actually received, as a proprietor
(a) See the history of this case in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 89, and in the public documents of Congress, 1809.
(&) Act of 23d of January 1815, ch. 706; Act of 3d of March 1815, ch. 778.
Brown v. Gilman.
in the New England Mississippi Land Company, notwithstanding the award of the commissioners, and to establish this claim, the present suit was brought; and in her bill she averred, that she was a bond fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice of the non-payment of the purchase-money *by Mr. Wetmore, which averment was not denied by the answer. The court below decreed, that the complainant was entitled to the relief she claimed, and the cduse was brought by appeal to this court.
February 13th. Jones, for the appellants, argued, that the decision of the commissioners was correct in principle. The "property acquired by the New England Company, under their purchase from the Georgia Company, was not a legal, but a mere equitable interest, unassignable at law. Even if the Georgia Company had a legal estate, their deed to the New England Company does not pass such estate, according to the local law of Georgia ; it never having been acknowledged, proved and recorded. It amounted only to a covenant to stand seised to uses, an agreement to sell, which a court of equity would enforce. The rescinding act of Georgia has a double effect; one to annul the contract; the other to render all deeds conveying the property incapable of being recorded. It is only as to the first effect that the court has pronounced, or could pronounce, the act to be unconstitutional and void. The states have an unquestionable right to regulate the mode of conveying real property and the rule of evidence as to land titles. Even supposing the trustees to have acquired a legal estate, the cestuis que trust have acquired an equitable interest only. The claim of the vendor for unpaid purchase-money is the prior equity, which must be preferred. If the subsequent purchaser acquires a mere equitable interest, *he is ejititied to no notice of the vendor’s lien. The assignee of a chose in ac- *- Hon, which is not assignable at law, has a mere equitable interest, and takes' subject to the same equity as the assignor. Finch 9, 34 ; Davies v. Austin, 1 Ves. jr. 247 ; Coles v. Jones, 2 Vern. 692 ; Ibid. 765 ; 1 Ves. sen. 123 ; 1 Bro. C. C. 302 ; Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329. But even if notice be necessary, the lien of the vendor is sustainable, because there was notice either actual or constructive, and notice to the trustees of the New England Company, was notice to the individuals whom they represented. Sugd. on Vend. 492, 498 ; Mertins v. Jolliffe, Ambl. 311. But all discussion on this point is, cut short by the well-established principle, that the purchaser who sets up the want of notice must positively deny the notice in her plea, and swear to it. Sugd. on Vend. 510-13. Here, the pleadings, so far from denying notice, impliedly admit it ; and the rule of presumption against the party omitting to deny notice, is to be applied d fortiori in a case like the present, where the person insisting on the want of notice is the party plaintiff. Nor has there been in this case any waiver of the equitable lien for the purchase-money. All the facts of the case repel the presumption of a waiver of the lien. The notes, with approved indorsers, taken from the individual purchasers, cannot furnish such a presumption. The case of Fawell v. Ueelis, Ambl. 734 ; 3 Bro. C. C. 422, n., which will be relied on to support this position, has been repeatedly overruled. Sudg. on Vend. 252, et infra. *The taking of personal security is not considered as a waiver of the lien. Hughes v. *- Kearney, 1 Sch. & Lef. 132 ; Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329 ; Grant v. Mills, 2 Ves. & B. 306 ; Elliot v. Edwards, 3 Bos. & Pul. 181. It is not
Brown v. Gilman.
necessary to prove affirmatively the intent to retain a lien. It is a natural equity ; and he who would repel it must show that the vendor agreed to rely on the personal security, and to abandon the lien. Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. 288 ; Garson v. Green, Ibid. 308 ; Mackreth v. Symmons, and the cases there cited, 15 Ves. 329. As to the lex loci of Massachusetts, which does not recognise the equitable lien on land for unpaid purchase-money, it has nothing to do with the question ; for the record does not show that the deed was executed in that state ; and even if it did, the lex loci rei sitae of Georgfh must govern the case, according to a well-known rule. But even supposing the award of the commissioners to be erroneous, it is still conclusive upon the parties. The commissioners had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, under the act of congress by which the board was established, to determine upon all controversies arising from adverse claims to these lands. There is no analogy between this claim, and the lien of a judgment. It is a real interest in the land ; an equitable mortgage ; a charge upon it, which descends, and is assigned with it. Gator v. Bolingbrook, 1 Bro. C. C. 302 ; Ibid. 424 ; Pollexfen v. Moore, 3 Atk. 272. The decision of the commissioners, then, has the force of res judicata.
* -■ * Amory, contri, insisted, that Mrs. Gilman was not the assignee
J of Mr. Wetmore, and did not hold his title. She could not be an assignee, without a privity, either in fact or in law, which did not exist in this case. The intention of the associates, from the beginning, was to render the certificates of the trustees the only evidence of the title ; for which purpose, the legal title was vested in the trustees, and a new title, in all the property, was derived from them. The certificate possessed by Mrs. Gilman does not contain the name of Wetmore, nor was the certificate originally issued in his name ; it could not have expressed a trust upon the portion, or title, acquired by him, and conveyed to the trustees; but such a certificate must have expressed a general interest, or title, pervading the whole land. Inasmuch as the trustees derived their title, not from Wetmore only, but from different sources, it must be presumed and intended, that their certificates were to operate generally on all the right and title which they possessed, without reference to the mode of acquirement. If Mrs. Gilman, or any holder of certificates, was obliged to search into the title, this estate would be attended with all the consequences and incidents of other titles. But that difficulty was expressly intended to be avoided by the 12th art. of association, which declares, that such certificate shall be complete evidence; thereby announcing to any purchaser, that the common rules of real property were dispensed with. Shall the trustees and associates now be permitted, contrary to their express stipulation, to depart from this rule of
Pr0Perty, which they *themselves created, and thus entrap a bond fide purchaser, without notice ? This association was not incorporated ; but the parties intended, so far as they could by law, to give it those facilities, and in some decree, to convert this real estate into personal estate. The title at law was to vest in the trustees, until bond fide sales of the land were actually made. It is the proceeds of such sales only, or money acquired therefrom, that is assured to the holders of the certificates. The trustees and original purchasers undertook to examine each other’s title, and precluded all further inquiries in relation to it. Wetmore gave a quit-claim
Brown v. Gilman.
deed only ; the quality of his title, the associates or trustees could judge of, of which they had as much knowledge as he had ; and such deed of quit-claim, whether it conveyed a good or a bad title, constituted a good consideration for the compact with the associates and trustees.
If the doctrine of lien for the purchase-money, without mortgage, obtains in Georgia; the contract being made in Massachusetts, where the intention of both parties must be considered as constituting the contract, the laws of Massachusetts ought to construe such a contract, in preference to those of Georgia. We contend, that this doctrine of lien is only a creature of equity, and refers only to such estates or rights of real property as are especially recognised by that tribunal, and which do not derive their support from the ordinary rules of law. The title, in order to be what is commonly denominated equitable, must be, such a one as is not recognised by law ; such as the assignment of a chose in action, * which cannot r* 9fi/7 be assigned by law ; or the title must be equitable, from the inefficient mode adopted for its transfer, such as the conveyance of real estate by an instrument without seal, or by an executory contract. The conveyance of land, in this case, did not pass an equitable title merely; the cases of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 89, and Green v. liter, 8 Ibid. 229, show, that, notwithstanding the Indian title be not extinguished, the freehold and seisin may be transferred ; and in this case, the most solemn deeds and instruments, duly acknowledged, were adopted for the conveyance of the title ; and it is sustained by every legal form.
Even in courts of equity, this lien is only raised by implication; and where other circumstances resist this implication, showing that the parties did not mean to rely on the estate sold for security, the lien is waived. This transaction is filled with circumstances repugnant to such implication. The design of the parties to sell the land, instead of cultivating the same, whereby to pay the notes, expressly excludes the idea of such a lien, as no man would have purchased, who knew that such a note was given for the first purchase, without seeing that his money was appropriated to extinguish the notes ; and the strongest circumstance, to repel such a lien for the consideration, consists in this, that the sum of five dollars only is expressed as the pecuniary consideration. Any purchaser, therefore, making inquiry concerning the purchase-money’s being p^aid or not, is at once checked in the pursuit; and no *case of lien for the purchase-money, can be shown, where the sum is not expressed in the deed of sale. It is also a doctrine in equity, that the vendee has a lien on the land, in case the title be defective, and proper conveyance not made to him ; thus making the right reciprocal. But in this deed, express provision is made, that the consideration-money shall not be refunded by the vendor, for any cause whatsoever ; thus essentially distinguishing the present case from those in which such lien is maintained.
It is said, that the commissioners, having a right to decide upon adverse titles, here conclusively decided on our claims; but the adverse titles or claims, on which they were to decide, were adverse claims to the stock from e treasury of the United States, and between such persons as released
t eir claims to the United States. Mrs. Gilman did not release any claim o the United States, or demand any money from the treasury ; of course, er rights or claims could not be adjudged by the commissioners ; her
Brown v. Gilman.
claim is not on the government, but on her associates and trustees. The commissioners were bound to decide, to whom the money or stock from the treasury should be paid ; not the use the receiver should afterwards make of that money, or the obligations he might be under in relation to it. Decrees affect only those who are parties to the suit; and an opinion incidentally given by the commissioners, ought not to control the plaintiff’s right.
The Attorney- General, on the same side, contended, that no such lien, as insiste<^ upon, existed, *even as to Mr. Wetmore’s title ; much
-1 less was Mrs. Gilman’s affected by it. The question whether the legal title passed from the Georgia Company to the New England Company, cannot be raised in the appellate court; because, so far from being raised in the court below, the pleadings admit the fact that the legal title did pass, and the catise was argued upon that ground in the court below. But supposing it were otherwise; as a bond fide purchaser, without notice, Mrs. Gilman cannot be affected with the equitable lien for purchase-money unpaid by the original vendee, because a distinct personal security was taken, and all the other circumstances of the case combine to show, that the original vendors did not mean to rely on the lien.
It is worthy of observation, that this doctrine of lien for unpaid purchase-money,, which has grown to its present extravagant height, seems to have originated in the inaccuracies and mistakes of some of the earlier chancery reporters. The first case is that of Chapman n. Tanner, 1 Vern. 267, which is erroneously reported. According to the reporter, it was the case of a bankrupt, who purchased land, and the purchase-money not being paid, the assignees would have had the vendor come in as a creditor under the commission, for the. remainder of his purchase-money : “ Per Cur.—In this case, there is a natural equity that the land should stand charged with so much of the purchase-money as was not paid ; and that without any special *2701 agreement f°r that purpose.” But Lord *Apsley says, “ Chapman
n. Tanner (1 Vern. 267), according to the report, is in point ; but it appears, by the register’s book, that the vendor retained the title deeds till he was paid ; the court said, that a natural equity arose, from his having the title deeds in his custody.” Farnell v. Heelis, Ambl. 724. In the case of Pollewfen v. Moore, 3 Atk. 372( (which is also said, in the last-mentioned case, by Lord Apsley, to be badly reported), the title deeds were also kept back by agreement; and it was impossible for a court of equity to doubt, in either of these cases, that the lien was retained. But it is from them that the doctrine, as now understood, has originated ; and even according to the modern cases, it is nothing more than a lien raised by equity on the presumed intention of the parties. Sugd. on Vend. 358.
This presumption, however, may be repelled by evidence of a contrary intention. Among other circumstances to repel this presumption, is the delivering an absolute deed to the purchaser. Although this circumstance may not be considered strong enough to repel the presumption, as between vendor and vendee, it is so, as to a bond fide purchaser, under the latter, without notice ; otherwise, such a deed would be a fraud on the public. In such a case, this circumstance, connected with that of taking a distinct security, must certainly be deemed sufficient to repel the presumed intention to rely on the lien. The rule is accurately laid down by President
Brown v. Gilman.
Pendleton. ♦“ The doctrine that the vendor of land not taking a security, nor making a conveyance, retains a lien upon the property, is so well settled, as to be received as a maxim. Even if he hath made a conveyance, yet he may pursue the land, in the possession of the vendee, or of a purchaser with notice. But if he hath taken a security, or the vendee hath sold to a third person, without notice, the lien is lost.” Cole v. Scott, 2 Wash. 141. It has been much contested in England, whether passing the legal title to the vendee, and taking his bond or note alone, will not defeat the lien. But there has been no case, where, after passing an absolute deed, and taking the security of a third person, the lien has been held still to exist. In Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Sch. & Lef. 132, the note was that of the vendee merely ; and Lord Redesdale is understood to admit, that taking a distinct security would discharge the lien. Grant v. Mills, 2 Ves. & B. 306, is also relied on to show that the taking of the security of a third person would not discharge the lien ; but the bills of exchange, in that case, were not considered as the security of a third person, but as a mode of payment merely : Sir W. Grant, distinctly admitting that the security of a third person would repel the lien. In Hlliot v. Edwards. 3 Bos. & Pul. 181, which was a case at law, the point was not decided ; and it depended upon its own peculiar circumstances ; the surety himself might seem to have stipulated for the lien, by *requiring a covenant against the assignment of the P272 premises, without the joint consent of himself and the vendor. *-
If further circumstances are necessary, in the present case, to remove the presumtion, that the vendor intended to rely upon the lien, they will be found to exist. Holding back the deed, or what is equivalent, depositing it as an escrow, until after the first payment, has always been considered as indicating the intention to rely upon the lien : and if so, the delivery of'the deed, after the first payment was made, equally manifests an intention to relinquish the lien.
The counsel then proceeded to argue, that, from other circumstances and facts in the case, it never could have been the intention of the parties, that the lien should exist. But even supposing the lien did exist, as against Mr. Wetmore, the original purchaser, would it follow the shares, through every variety of modification, into the hands of a remote purchaser, without notice ? But it is said, that Mrs. Gilman .has not denied notice. Nor could she deny notice in the manner’ pointed out by the authorities—that is, upon oath, being the party plaintiff. But the same authorities lay down the rule, that if notice is neither alleged by the bill, nor proved, and the defendant by his answer denies notice, the court will not grant an inquiry to affect him with notice. Sugd. on Vend. 512. This rule has more analogy to the present case ; for the answer does not charge the plaintiff with notice ; and it is denied in the bill. We insist, that where the legal estate has passed from the vendor, a bond fide purchaser, *without notice, even though he has no deed, will overreach the implied lien for unpaid purchase- L money. Mr. Sugden, after reviewing all the cases, expresses the opinion, that even an equitable mortgage, created by the vendee depositing deeds with a third party, bond fide, and without notice, will give him a preferable equity, and will overreach the vendor’s equitable lien for any part of the purchase-money. Sugd. on Vend. 366. Now, a mortgage is a mere
Brown v. Gilman. (
security for a debt, and the same conclusion is much stronger in the case of an absolute purchaser.
But supposing the lien to exist: according to Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. 288, it only exists to the amount of the consideration expressed on the face bf the deed ; which, in this case, is only five dollars. And even if it exists to any extent, according to the law of the English court of chancery, that is not the law of this case ; the contract being made in Massachusetts, relative to lands in Georgia. It is admitted, that the law of Massachusetts, recognises no such lien ; but it is said, that it is not the lex loci contractus, which is to govern, but the lex loci rei sitae; and that the law of Georgia adopts the English principle. We do not deny that the lex loci rei sitae is to govern as to the transfer of real property ; but we insist, that the intention of the contracting parties is to be gathered from the law of the place where the contract is made. Admitting, however, that the law of Georgia is to give the rule, it remains to be shown, on the other side, that this pecu* liar doctrine of the English courts of equity is *adopted in that state.
-I We insist, we are not concluded by the decision of the commissioners, under the acts of congress, because their power extended only to legal or equitable claims to the lands ; such equitable elaims as enabled the holder to call for the legal title, and such as conflict with each other ; which not being the case here, the commissioners had no jurisdiction to determine this question.
Webster, for the apellants, in reply, insisted, that the title was no better in the plaintiff’s hands, than it was in the hands of Mr. Wetmore. The purchaser of an equity must abide by the case of the person from whom he buys. He must take the estate, subject to all incumbrances. Want of notice, or payment of a valuable consideration, will not enable him to raise himself higher than his vendor. Lord Thurlow says, he takes that to be a universal rule. Davis v. Austen, 1 Ves. jr. 247. See also Murray v. Lilburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441 ; Redfearn v. Ferrier, 1 Dowl. 50. It is unnecessary to say, whether the commissioners were well-founded in the decision they have pronounced. No fraud or negligence is, at any rate, imputable to the defendants. They have used'due diligence, and sought to increase the fund, by obtaining from the commissioners the stock which would have belonged to the original purchase of Wetmore, if his title had been deemed valid. In this they have failed, but without any fault of their own. The commissioners have decreed, that that portion of Wetmore’s purchase, which was
_ conveyed to Williams, *through whom the plaintiff derives her title, is not entitled to any indemnification. They proceed on the ground that the original Georgia vendors had a lien for the purchase-money, and that they, if anybody, the purchase-money not being paid, are entitled to the indemnity provided by the act of congress. That the vendor has m equity a lien for the purchase-money against the vendee, and all purchasers under him with notice, if it be a legal estate ; and against all persons purchasing, with or without notice, if it be an equitable estate; could not be denied as a general doctrine. The English cases on this point, are all considered by Lord Eldon in Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329. There may be a relinquishment of this lien ; and the evidence of such relinquishment may result from the nature of the transaction, and the circumstances attending it. How far such evidence existed here, it was the duty of the commissioners to con-
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sider. If they have erred in judgment, the consequences of that error ought not to be thrown on the defendants. The stock, which the commissioners were to issue, may be considered as the product of the estate vested in the trustees.
The bill does not complain, that the defendants have injured the plaintiff, by surrendering the estate to the United States. In this, they are admitted to have done precisely what they ought to have done. The complaint is, that a just distribution has not been made of the proceeds. But the plaintiff’s estate has produced no proceeds. The *commissioners were rii empowered by the act to adjudge between adverse claims. They L have decided against tlfe claim of the plaintiff ; and it would be manifestly unjust and unreasonable, that, having a bad claim herself, she should partake with others in the benefit of their claims, which are good, unless she clearly proves an agreement to form this sort of partnership. And, indeed, if it were proved, that Wetmore and others agreed to form this partnership, each at the same time covenanting for the title of what he himself brought to the common stock, he could not claim, in equity, a proportionate share of the proceeds of the whole, having broken his own covenant, and the general proceeds being thereby diminished in an amount equal to what he undertook to convey to the trustees. If the plaintiff could recover in this case against the defendants, one of whom is the surviving trustee, that trustee must have his action against Wetmore on the covenants of his deed of trust. But it is not the course in equity, to treat covenants as distinct and independent, but to require of plaintiffs to allege and prove performance, or readiness to perform, on their part. 2 Fonbl. 383. If the land, or its proceeds, have been taken from the trustee by some one, whose title has been adjudged better than that of the cestui que trust, is it possible, that the cestui que trust can have any claim on the trustee ?
The plaintiff relies on the articles of association, which say that the certificate shall be complete evidence of the title. So it may be ; but they do not *say what title the holder of the certificate shall be taken to have. riI. The articles mean no more than that the certificate should be evidence *- of the transfer. Whatever the vendor could sell, he might assign, by indorsing the certificate. But in this, there is no agreement to assure the title. The certificate itself refers to the articles of association, and the deeds of trust, to show the nature and condition of the property. These articles and deeds prove clearly, that the original purchasers stand on their several distinct purchases, and decline all mutual responsibility. She must, therefore, be taken to have known what she purchased, as the reference in the certificate to the deed and articles, was sufficient to put her on inquiry. Where one has sufficient information to lead him to the knowledge of the fact, he shall be deemed conusant of it. Sugd. on Vend. 498, and cases there cited. Even if her estate had been a legal, and not an equitable interest, this constructive notice would have prevented her from standing in any better condition than those under whom she held.
February 24th, 1819. Marshall, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court.—The question to be decided is, whether, under all the circumstances of this case, the New England Mississippi Land Company, or Mary Gilman, shall lose the sum awarded by the commissioners to the Georgia Mississippi
Brown v. Gilman.
Company, in satisfaction for the lien that company was supposed to retain , on the lands they sold, for the *non-payment of the notes of WilJ liam Wetmore, given for the purchase-money on his interest in the purchase ?
In examining this question, the nature of the contract, the motives of the New England Mississippi Company, and their acts, are all to be considered. The contract was made in January 1796, for 11,380,000 acres of land, lying within the country occupied by the Indians, whose title was not extinguished. The purchase-money, amounting to Si,380,000, was to be divided into five instalments, the first of which, amounting to $113,800, was to be paid on the 1st of May 1796, and the last on fhe 1st of May 1799. It is obvious, that this purchase could not have been made with a view to hold all the lands. The object of the purchasers must have been to make a profit by reselling a great part of them. Accordingly, we find them making immediate arrangements to effect this object. In February 1796, before the legal title was obtained, the purchasers formed an association, by which it was, among other things, agreed, that the land should conveyed to three of their partners, Leonard Jarvis, Henry Newman and William Wetmore, for the use and benefit of the company. It was also agreed, that seven directors should be appointed, with power to manage their affairs, and after the company should be completely organized, as prescribed in the articles of association, to sell their lands for the common benefit of the proprietors. In addition to this mode of selling the lands themselves, which might be slow in its operation, it was agreed, that each proprietor might transfer his interest, in whole or in part; and to facilitate *this transfer, the whole purchase
-• was divided into 2276 shares, and it was determined, that an assignable certificate should be granted to each proprietor, or to such person as he should appoint, stating the amount of his interest in the company. No certificate was to issue for less than one share.
It is of great importance, to inquire, how far the company pledged itself, to the assignee of this certificate ; and how far it was incumbent on him to look beyond the certificate itself, in order to ascertain the interest which it gave him in the property of the company ? In pursuing this inquiry, we must look, with some minuteness, into the state, of the property, and the articles of association, as well as into the language of the paper which was to evidence the title of the holder. Although the association was formed, before the lands were conveyed, no certificate was to issue, until the legal title in the company should be as complete as it could be made. It was obviously necessary for the purchasers, before they proceeded to sell, to examine well their title, and to use every precaution which prudence could suggest, for its security. This appears to have been done. On the 13th of February 1796, a deed was executed by. the Georgia Company, purporting to convey the lands to William Wetmore, Leonard Jarvis and Henry Newman ; and afterwards, in February 1797, a deed of confirmation was executed and delivered. By these deeds the Georgia Company certainly
“tended to *pass, and the New England Company expected to receive,
J the legal title.
The articles of association direct these trustees to convey the purchased lands to the proprietors, as tenants in common, who are immediately to reconvey them to Leonard Jarvis, Henry Newman and William Hull, in trust, to
Brown v. Gilman.
be disposed of according to the articles. The certificate granted to each proprietor, for the purpose of enabling him to dispose of his interest, certifies, that he is entitled to the trust and benefit of a certain specified proportion of the property contained in the trust deed, “ to hold said proportion or share, to him, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, according to the terms, conditions, covenants and exceptions contained in the said deed of trust, and in certain articles of agreement entered into by the persons composing the New England Mississippi Land Company.” This certificate purports on its face to be transferable by indorsement. If it amounted to no more than a declaration, that the holder had a right to sell a specified part of the common property, it would be difficult to maintain, that the company could afterwards charge this part exclusively with a pre-existing incumbrance. But the certificate proceeds further, and declares, that the share or shares, thus transferred, shall be held according to the terms, &c., of the deed of trust, and of the articles of agreement. So far, therefore, as that deed, or those articles, incumber the property, it certainly remains incumbered in the hands of the assignee. To what *extent does either of those instruments affect the case ? [ ¿ol
The deed from the proprietors to Jarvis, Newman and Hull, recites the grant of the state of Georgia, the conveyance of the grantees to Wetmore, Jarvis and Newman, in trust for the New England Company, the conveyance of those trustees to the members of the company, to hold as tenants in common, according to their respective interests, and adds, that it is found necessary and expedient, that the premises should be conveyed “ in trust to Leonard Jarvis, Henry Newman and William Hull, Esquires, to have and to hold the same, subject to all the trusts, provisions, restrictions, covenants and agreements, contained in certain articles of agreement, constituting the New England Mississippi Land Companytherefore, and in consideration of ten dollars, the parties of the first part, severally “ remise, release and for ever quit-claim to the said Jarvis, Newman and Hull, all the interest, &c., which they have, or ever had, or of right ought to have, in the premises, subject, however, to and foi' the purposes mentioned in the agreement constituting the New England Mississippi Land Company. ' The parties of the first part, each for himself,” and no further, covenant, that the premises are free and clear of all incumbrances, by him made or suffered to be made, and warrant the same against himself and all claiming under him.
A separate conveyance was made by Wetmore, Jarvis and Newman, to John Peck, who conveyed *to Jarvis, Newman and Hull. But these r* 989 conveyances are not supposed to vary the case. In this deed of trust, *■ each proprietor covenants for his own title, not for that of his copartners. Phis has been supposed to give notice to the assignee of each certificate issued by the company, that the property conveyed did not constitute a common stock in the hands of the trustees, out of which each holder was to draw in proportion to his interest, as expressed in the face of his title paper ; but that the interest of each copartner was limited to the product of his own share, as under the original purchase, and that the holder of every certificate was bound to trace his title through the particular original purchaser under whom he claims, and in whose place he stands.
We do not think the fact will sustain the argument. This deed conveys the estate of each partner to the company, and the covenants it contains
Brown v. Gilman.
ascertain the extent of each partner’s liability for the title it passes. The lands thus conveyed are held by the company, in like manner as if they had been conveyed by persons who were not members of it. The legal title is in the company ; the power to sell is in the company; and if it was intended that the right of each individual to dispose of his interest, should depend on the validity of the title he had made, and that the purchaser of such interest took it subject to any incumbrance with which the estate conveyed might have been burdened, previous to its conveyance, it would have been unneces*9ooi saryto make any *pro vision respecting the sale of such interest. The -* right of sale is connected with the right of property, and without any regulation whatever, each member would have possessed it, to the extent of his property. The object for granting the certificate seems to have been, to enable each shareholder to sell, unobstructed by those entangling embarrassments which may attend a mere equitable title. This object, in which every member was equally concerned, could not be effected, without giving to each some evidence of his title, which should make it unnecessary for the purchaser to look further, in order to ascertain his interest in the general fund, whatever that fund might be.
The history of the title, as well as the words of the certificate, would confirm this opinion. From its origin, every step of its progress was marked out and controlled by the company. The legal title was, by their order, conveyed to three persons, selected by themselves, and the deed contains no allusion to the interest of other purchasers. By this order also, the title which was then made to the several purchasers, was immediately reconveyed to trustees in whom the company confided, to uses and purposes expressed in certain articles of agreement which the company had formed. They guarded the title against incumbrances from individuals, and this watchfulness was for the double purpose of enabling their agents to sell the lands themselves, for the common benefit, and enabling each member to sell to the best advantage his particular interest in that fund. It was scarcely possible for any individual to have incumbered the title, after it was received by the *2841 ^rst aSents*°f the company, and against defects in the title conveyed
-* by the Georgia company, the certificate does not profess to engage.
The article of agreement, to which also the certificate refers, explain fully the views of the company. The great object of the association is to sell their lands to advantage ; this is too plainly expressed to be mistaken. The words “terms, conditions, covenants and exceptions,” contained in the certificate, refer chiefly to provisions respecting the sale of lands, and to others which recognise the absolute control over the property, which each member had ceded to the whole body. It is unnecessary to recite the particular articles which tend to this general result ; it is the spirit which pervades the whole association. Only those articles which relate to the certificate need be adverted to. The 11th article divides the whole purchase into 2276 shares. The 12th directs that a transferrible certificate shall be given to each proprietor, prescribes its form, directs it to be recorded, and declares that it shall be complete evidence to such person, of his right in the purchase. No assignee is admitted as a member, to vote in the affairs of the company, until his assignment shall be recorded. The 13th declares, that no certificate shall issue for less than one share, and that the holder of any certificate for a larger quantity, may, at any time, surrender it to the trustees, and
Brown v. Gilman.
take out others for such quantities as he may choose. The 16th obliges the directors to pay over to the Respective proprietors, their proportions of the moneys received from any and every sale, as soon after *- the receipt thereof as may be.
It is not more apparent, that the general object of the association was to promote the sale of their lands, than it is that the particular object of this certificate, and of the articles which relate to it, was to enable every proprietor to avail himself of his individual interest, and to bring it into circulation. On no other principle, can we account for subdividing the stock of the company into such small shares; for issuing the certificate itself; for making it assignable ; for declaring that it shall be complete evidence of title to that quantity of interest which is expressed on its face; for enabling every holder, by surrendering his certificate, to divide it as his convenience might suggest; and for declaring that each holder shall receive his proportion of the money arising from the lands which might be sold. All these provisions tend directly to the same object, and are calculated for the single purpose of affording to each member of the company every possible facility in selling his share of the stock. In this operation all were equally interested ; every member of the company was alike concerned in removing every obstruction to the free circulation of his own certificate, which could only be done, by making it complete evidence of title ; an advantage which, to be acquired hy him, must be extended to all. In the particular benefit accruing to each member of the company from this arrangement, a full consideration was received for his joining in it. It is a mutual assurance, in which all the *members pledge themselves for each, that he is really entitled to r4s sell what he offers for sale. •-
The articles of agreement, then, strengthen, instead of weakening, the language of the certificate. They prove that the company must have intended to give it all the credit they could bestow on it, and to give to the assignee all the assurance they could give him, that he would stand on the same ground with other members, and was liable to no casualty to which they were not all exposed.
It was scarcely possible, for any member, unless it Be one of the original agents, to have eluded the precautions of the company, and have parted with, or incumbered any portion of his estate. But suppose the fact to have happened, and a certificate to have issued, from any accident whatever, to him, for a larger interest than that to which he was really entitled, would an assignee, without notice, have been affected by this error on the part of the company? We think it clear, that he would not. The company has itself undertaken to judge of his title ; and for its own purposes, for the advantage of all its members, to certify what that title is. The object and effect of that certificate is to stop inquiry. The company has pledged its faith, that the title under this certificate shall not be questioned. This is not all; the articles require that an assignee shall have his assignment recorded ; here is a second confirmation of title.
We find a number of persons associated together for the purpose of purchasing an immense body of land, which they expect to resell upon a profit, they watch the progress of the title, direct its course, leave no ri|e power to individuals over their individual shares, but keep the whole L nnder the control of the company, until they are perfectly satisfied with the
Brown v. Gilman.
state in which they have placed it. The legal title is, by their order, vested in three trustees, who are to be controlled by seven directors. Then, in order to enable each proprietor to dispose of any portion of his interest which he may incline to sell, assignable certificates are issued, declaring that the holder is entitled to a specified share of the land. This certificate refers to certain laws of the company, and these laws declare, that such certificate shall be complete evidence of title, that the assignee shall become a member of the company, authorized to vote, on having his assignment recorded in books kept for that purpose. These certificates are offered to the public; confiding to the promise they contain, an individual becomes a purchaser, has his assignment recorded, and is received, without objection, as a member. If any latent defect exists in the title of one of the original purchasers, which was unknown to the company, when the certificate issued, we think the company cannot set up this latent defect against an assignee. The company possessed the means of obtaining full information of all circumstances which could affect the title, so far as information was attainable. They undertook to judge of it, and to assert unconditionally, that the holder of the certificate was entitled to the quantity of interest it specified. However true it may be, that the individual in whose default this defect origin* , ated, *might be held accountable for it, we cannot agree that the
J assignee stands in his place. The company which would set it up against him, has inquired into the title ; has, for its own purposes, assured him that it is perfect, and, upon the faith of this assurance, he has purchased. Had he taken an equitable interest in trust, relying upon the faith of the vendor, his equity, it is conceded, would not be better than that of the vendor; but he had relied upon the company. He has mounted up to the source of the equitable title, and is there assured of its goodness. The company can never be permitted to say, that being themselves mistaken, they have imposed innocently upon him; and that, therefore, they will throw the loss from themselves on him.
If, then, Mr. Wetmore had really, by any act of his, diminished the estate he carried into the common stock,, and if the deduction of his share from the sum awarded to the company had been proper, he would have been personally answerable to the company for such diminution ; but we do not think this liability passes with the certificate to his assignee without notice. We do not think the company could be permitted to assert against the assignee, the right they might assert against Mr. Wetmore.
But this is not a defect in the title itself, created, voluntarily created, by Mr. Wetmore. It is a still weaker case on the part of the company. A sum
of money, equal to the claim of the plaintiff, has been awarded to the Geor-
gia, instead of the New England company, by the commissioners, under the
idea, that so much of the original purchase-money *remained unpaid,
J and that a lien on the lands they sold was still retained by the Georgia company. As this failure was on the part of Mr. Wetmore, the New England company claim the right of subjecting to this loss the shares of Mis. Gilman, which were derived from certificates issued on the stock of Mr. Wetmore. On the part of Mrs. Gilman it is contended, 1. That this lien did not exist; and if it did, 2. That it affects her only as a member of the company.
The commissioners determined in favor of the lien, because they consi
Brown v. Gilman.
ered the New England company as holding only an equitable estate. The deeds from the Georgia to the New England company certainly purport to pass, and were intended to pass, the legal title. The only objection we have heard to their having the operation intended by the parties, is, that they were not recorded, and that the legislature of Georgia passed an act which forbid their being recorded. But by the laws of Georgia, a deed, though not recorded within the time prescribed by law, remains valid between the parties; and were it even otherwise, it might well be doubted, whether this deed would not retain all the validity it possessed, when executed, since its being recorded is rendered impossible by act of law. Could it even be admitted, that the deeds passed only an equitable estate, it might well be doubted, whether the Georgia compapy, as plaintiffs in equity, could, under all the circumstances of this case, stand on better ground, than if their deed had operated as they intended it should operate.1
*But the court considers the title at law as passing by the deeds r* 9qq to the New England company, and remaining with them, although *- those deeds were not recorded. If this opinion be correct, even admitting the law of England respecting the lien of vendors for the purchase-money, after the execution of a deed, to be the law of Georgia, a point which we do not mean to decide, we think it perfectly clear, that no lien was retained, and none intended to be retained, in this case. It must have been well known to the Georgia company, that the purchase was made for the purpose of reselling the lands ; and of consequence, that it was of great importance to the purchasers, to have a clear unincumbered title; and the event that the property might pass into other hands, before the whole purchase-money was paid, was not improbable. In the original agreement, an express stipulation is made, that the property shall remain liable for the first payment, but that separate securities shall be taken for the residue of the purchase-money. The deed itself remains an escrow, until the first payment shall be made, and is then to be delivered, as the deed of the parties ; after which, the vendors consent to rely on the several notes of the respective purchasers. This is equivalent to a mortgage of the premises, to secure the first payment, and a consent to rely on the separate notes of the purchasers for the residue of the purchase-money. The express contract, that the lien shall be retained to a *specified extent, is equivalent to a waiver of that lien to any r* 9qi greater extent. The notes, too, for which the vendors stipulated, are *• to be indorsed by persons approved by themselves. This is a collateral security, on which they relied, and which discharges any implied lien on the land itself for the purchase-money. We think this, on principles of English law, a clear case of exemption from lien.
Could this be doubted, it would not alter the obligation of the New England company to Mrs. Gilman. If they were in the situation of purchasers with notice, it must be with a very ill grace that they set up against her particular interest, after having induced her to perchase, by the assurance that she came into company on equal terms. If they were purchasers without notice, the lien is gone.
We are unanimously of opinion, that the sum deducted from the claim
As the effect of the decision of the board of commissioners, see Brown v. Jackson, 7 Wheat. 218.
Brown v. Gilman.
of the New England company, by the commissioners, is chargeable on the fund, generally, not on the share of Mrs. Gilman particularly.
Some doubt was entertained, on the question, whether Mrs. Gilman should Recover from the parties to this suit, her proportion of the money received by them, or her proportion, after deducting therefrom, the sum she would be entitled to receive from those members, who obtained an order from the commissioners, by which they received directly, and not through the agents of the company, the sums to which they were entitled, The majority of the *2021 court directs me to say, that in this respect also, the *decree is right,
J and that the company, or their agents, have the right to proceed against those members for what they have received beyond their just proportion of the whole sum awarded to the company.
Decree affirmed, with costs, (a)
(a) This subject of lien for unpaid purchase-money, is so fully discussed in the opinion of the court below in this case, that the following extract from that opinion, in Mr. Mason’s reports, may be useful to the reader.
“ The doctrine, that alien exists on the land for the purchase-money, which lies at the foundation of the decision of the commissioners, as well as of the present defence, de-
serves a very deliberate consideration. It can hardly be doubted, that this doctrine was
borrowed from the text of the civil lawand though it may now be considered as settled,
as between the vendor and the vendee, and all claiming under the latter, with notice of the
non-payment of the purchase-money, yet its establishment may be referred* to a com-
paratively recent period. Lord Eldon has given us an historical review of all the
cases, in Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 29, from which he deduces the following in-
ferences. 1st. That, generally speaking, there is such a lien. 2d. That in those
general cases, in which there would be a lien, as between vendor and vendee, the ven-
dor will have the lien against a third person, who had notice, that the money was not
♦oqq I paid. These two points, he adds, seem to be clearly settled; and the *same
J conclusion has been adopted by a very learned chancellor of our own country.
Garson®. Green, 1 Johns.,Ch. 308. The rule, however, is manifestly founded on a
supposed conformity with the intentions of the parties, upon which the law raises an
implied contract; and therefore, it is not inflexible, but ceases to act, where the cir-
cumstances of the case do not justify such a conclusion. What circumstances shall
have such an effect, seems, indeed, to be matter of a good deal of delicacy and difficulty;
and the difficulty is by no means lessened, by the subtle doubts and distinctions of recent
authorties. It seems, indeed, to be established, that primd facie the purchase-money is a
lien on the land; and it lies on the purchaser to show, that the vendor agreed to waive
it (Hughes ®. Kearney, 1 Sch. & Lef. 132; Mackreth ®. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329; Gar-
son ®. Green, 1 Johns. Ch. 308); and a receipt for the purchase-money, indorsed upon
the conveyance, is not sufficient to repel this presumption of law. But how far the
taking a distinct security for the purchase-money shall be held to be a waiver of the
implied lien, has been a vexed question.
“ There is a pretty strong, if not decisive, current of authority, to lead us to the conclusion, that merely taking the bond, or note, or covenant, of the vendee himself, for
down the rule in the Institutes thus, “ Vendit«
1 “ Quod vendidi non aliter accipientis quam si aut pretium nobis solutum sit, aut satis eo vero res et traditœ, non aliter emptori acquirun nomine factum, vel etiamfidem habuerimus emp- tur, quam si is venditori pretium solvent, v alio modio ei satisfecebit, veluti expromissors ant
tori sineulla sa tisfactione." Dig. lib. 18, tit. 1,
pignore dato," &c., adds, “ sed si is qui vendi it
1. 19. Domat, lib. 1, tit. 2, § 3, 1. 1. But this lien was lost, by the civil law, not only by tak- fidem emptoris sequutus fuerit, dicendum es statim rem emptoris fieri." Inst. 1. 2, t. 1,
ing a separate security from the purchaser, as a surety or pledge, &c., but also by giving a term Herum Divis. § 41. Pothier, De Venie, o.
322, 323, Pothier’s Pandects, tom. 3, p. 107-
of credit to him. For Justinian, after laying
Brown v. Gilman.
the purchase-money, will not repel the lien; for it may be taken to countervail the receipt of the payment usually indorsed on the conveyance. (Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Sch. & Lef. 132; Nairn®. Prowse, 6 Ves. 752; Mackreth ®. Symmons, 15 Ibid. 329; Blackburn ®. Gregson, 1 Bro. 0. C. 420; Garson ®. Green, 1 Johns. Ch. 308; Gibbons ®. Baddall, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 682; Coppin «. Coppin, 2 P. Wms. 291; Oases cited in Sugden on Vendors, ch. 12, p. 352, &c.) But where a distinct and independent security is taken, either of property, or of the responsibility of third persons, it certainly admits of a very different consideration. There, the rule may properly apply, that expressum facit cessare taciturn; and where the party has carved out his own security, the law will not create another in aid. This was manifestly the opinion of Sir William Grant in a recent case; where he asks, “If the security be totally distinct and independent, will it not then become a case of substitution for the *lien, instead r* 9Q. of a credit given because of the lien?” And he then puts the case of a mort- *■ gage on another estate for the purchase-money, which he holds a discharge of the lien, and asserts, that the same rule must hold with regard to any other pledge for the purchase-money. Nairn ®. Prowse, 6 Ves. 752. And the same doctrine was asserted in a very early case, where a mortgage was taken for a part only of the purchase-money, and a note for the residue. Bond ®. Kent, 2 Vern. 281. Lord Eldon, with his characteristic inclination to doubt, has hesitated upon the extent of this doctrine. He seems to consider, that whether the taking of a distinct security will have the effect of waiving the implied lien, depends altogether upon the circumstances of each case, and that no rule can be laid down universally; and that, therefore, it is impossible for any purchaser to know, without the judgment of a court, in what cases a lien would, and in what cases it would not, exist. His language is, “If, on the other hand, a rule has prevailed (as it seems to me), that it is to depend, not upon the circumstance of taking a security, but upon the nature of the security, a,s amounting to evidence (as it is sometimes called), or to declaration plain, or manifest intention (the expression used on other occasions) of a purpose to rely not any longer upon the estate, but upon the personal credit of the individual; it is obvious, that, a purchaser taking a security, unless by evidence, manifest intention, or declaration plain, he shows his purpose, cannot know the situation in which he stands, without the judgment of a court, how far that security does contain the evidence, manifest intention, or declaration plain, upon that point.” Mackreth ®. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329, 342; Austin ®. Halsey, 6 Ibid. 475.
“If, indeed, this be the state of the law upon this subject, it is reduced to a most distressing uncertainty. But on a careful examination of all the authorities, I do not find a single case, in which it has been held, if the vendor takes a personal collateral security, binding' others as well as the vendee, as, for instance, a bond or note, with a surety or an indorser, or a collateral security by way of pledge or mortgage, that under such circumstances, a lien exists on the land itself. The only case, *that looks that way is Elliot ®. Edwards, 3 Bos. & Pul. 181; where, as Lord Eldon says, the point was not decided; and it was certainly a case depending upon its own peculiar circumstances, where the surety himself might seem to have stipulated for the lien, by requiring a'covenant against an assignment of the premises, without the joint consent of himself and the vendor. Lord Redesdale, too, has thrown out an intimation (Hughes ®. Kearney, 1 Sch. & Lef. 132), that it must appear, that the vendor relied on it as security; and he puts the case, “Suppose, bills given as part of the purchase-money, and suppose them drawn on an insolvent house, shall the acceptance of such bills discharge the vendor’s lien? They are taken, not as a security, but as a Mode of payment.” In my humble judgment, this is begging the whole question, •u, upon the contract of purchase, the money is to be paid in cash, and bills of exange are afterwards taken in payment, which turn out unproductive, there the receipt o the bills may be considered as a mere mode of payment. But if the original con-act is, that the. purchase-money shall be paid at a future day, and acceptances 0 third persons are to be taken for it, payable at such future day, or a bond, with surety, payable at such future day, I do not perceive how it is possible to assert, that e acceptances or bond are not relied on as security. It is sufficient, however, that the
Brown v. Gilman.
case was not then before his Lordship; and that he admits, that taking a distinct security would be a waiver of the lien. On the other hand, there are several cases in which it is laid down, that if other security be taken, the implied lien on the land is gone. To this effect certainly the case of Farwell ®. Heelis, Ambl. 724, s. c. 2 Dick. 485, is an authority, however, it may, on its own circumstances, have been shaken; and the doctrine is explicitly asserted and acted upon in Nairn v. Prowse, 6 Ves. 752: see also, Bond v. Kent, 2 Vern. 381. In our own country, a very venerable judge of equity has reognised the same doctrine. He says, “the doctrine that the vendor of land, not taking a security, nor making a conveyance, retains a lien upon the property, is so well settled, as to be received as a maxim; even if he hath made a conveyance, *29fil he may pursue the land in the possession of the vendee, or of a *purchaser
J with notice; but if he hath taken a security, or the vendee hath sold to a third person without notice, the lien is lost. Cole v. Scott, 2 Wash. 141. Looking to the principle, upon which the original doctrine of lien is established, I have no hesitation to declare, that taking the security of a third person for the purchase-money, ought to be held a complete waiver of any lien upon the land; and that, in a case standing upon such a fact, it would be very difficult to bring my mind to a different conclusion. At all events, it is prima facie evidence of a waiver, and the onus is on the vendor to prove by the most cogent and irresistible circumstances, that it ought not to have that effect.
‘ ‘ Such was the result of my judgment upon an examination of the authorities, when a very recent case before the Master of the Rolls first came to my knowledge. I have perused it with great attention, and it has not, in any degree, shaken my opinion. The case there was, of acceptances of the vendee, and of his partner in trade, taken for the payment of the purchase-money. It was admitted, that there was no case of a security given by a third person, in which the lien had been held to exist. But the Master of the Rolls, without deciding what would be the effect of a security, properly so denominated, of a third person, held, in conformity to the opinion of Lord Redesdale, that bills of exchange were merely a mode of payment, and not a security. This conclusion he drew from the nature of such bills, considering them as mere orders on the acceptor to pay the money of the drawer to the payee; and that the acceptor was to be considered, not as a surety for the debt of another, but as paying the debt out of the debtor’s funds in his hands. Grant ®. Mills, 2 Ves. & B. 306. With this conclusion of the Master of the Rolls, I confess myself not satisfied, and desire to reserve myself for the case, when it shall arise in judgment. It is founded on very artificial reasoning, and not always supported, in point of fact, by the practice of the commercial world. The distinction, however, on which it proceeds, admits, by a very strong implication, that the security of a third person would repel the lien. If, indeed, the point were new, there *2Q71 wou^ be much reason to contend, that a distinct security *of the party himself would extinguish the lien on the land, as it certainly does the lien upon personal chattels. (Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. 276). In applying the doctrine to the facts of the present case, I confess, that I have no difficulty in pronouncing against the existence of a lien for the unpaid part of the purchase-money. The property was a large mass of unsettled and uncultivated lands, to which the Indian title was not as yet extinguished. It was, in the necessary contemplation of all parties, bought on speculation, to be sold but to sub-purchasers, and ultimately to settlers. The great objects of the speculation would be materially impaired and embarrassed, by any latent incumbrance, the nature and extent of which it might not always be easy to ascertain, and which might by a sub-division of the property, be apportioned upon an almost infinite number of purchasers. It is not supposable, that so obvious a consideration should not have been within the view of the parties; and viewing it, it is very difficult to suppose, they could mean to- create such an incumbrance. A distinct and independent security was taken, by negotiable notes, payable at a future day. There is no pretence, that the notes were a mere mode of payment, for the indorsers were, by the theory of the law, and in fact, conditional sureties for the payment; and in this respect, the case is distinguishable from that of receiving bills of exchange, where, by the theory of the law, the acceptor is not a surety, but merely pays the money of the drawer in pursuance of
The Estrella.
his order. (Hughes ®. Kearney, 1 Sch. & Lef. 132; Grant ®. Mills, 2 Ves. & B. 306.) The securities themselves were, from their negotiable nature, capable of being turned immediately into cash, and in their transfer from hand to hand, they could never have been supposed to draw after them, in favor of the holder, a lien on the land for their payment. But I pass over these, and some other peculiar circumstances of this case, and put it upon the broad and general doctrine, that here was the security of a third person, taken as such, and that extinguished any implied lien for the purchase-money.” (1 Mason 212.)1
*The Estrella : Hernandez, Claimant? [*298
Revolutionary government.—Neutrality.
The seal to the commission of a new government, not acknowledged by the government of the United States, cannot be permitted to prove itself; but the fact that the vessel cruising under such commission, is employed by such government, may be established by other evidence, without proving the seal.
Where the privateer, cruising under such a commission, was lost, subsequent to the capture in question, the previous existence of the commission on board, was allowed to be proved by parol evidence.
Where restitution of captured property is claimed, upon the ground, that the force of the cruiser making the capture has been augmented within the United States, by enlisting men, the burden of proving such enlistment is thrown upon the claimant; and that fact being proved by him, it is incumbent upon the captors to show, by proof, that the persons so enlisted were subjects or citizens of the prince or state under whose flag the crusier sails, transiently within the United States, in order to bring the case within the proviso of the 2d section of the act of June 5th, 1794, and of the act of the 20th April 1818.® The right of adjudicating on all captures and questions of prize, exclusively belongs to the courts of the captors’ country: but it is an exception to the general rule, that where the captured vessel is brought, or voluntarily comes, infra præsidia of a neutral power, that power has a right to inquire whether its own neutrality has been violated by the crusier which made the capture ; and if such violation has been committed, is in duty bound, to restore to the original owner, property captured by cruisers illegally equipped in its ports.4 No part of. the act of the 5th of June 1794, is repealed by the act of the 3d of March 1817 ; the act of 1794 remained in force, until the act of the 20th of April 1818, by which all the provisions respecting our neutral relations were embraced, and all former laws on the same subject were repealed. In the absence of any act of congress on the subject, the courts of the United States would have authority, under the general law of *nations, to decree restitution of property captured r in violation of their neutrality, under a commission issued within the United States, or under an armament, or augmentation of the armament, or crew, of the capturing vessel, within the same.
Appeal from the District Court of Louisiana. This vessel and her cargo were libelled in the district court for the Louisiana district, by the alleged former Spanish owner.
The libel stated, that he was owner of the schooner and cargo, which sailed from Havana, for the coast of Africa, on the 23d of April 1817 ; that on the next day, she was lawlessly and piratically captured on the high seas, and held as prize, by an armed schooner, called the Constitution, of Venezuela, and forcibly brought within the jurisdiction of the United States, when she was re-captured by the United States ketch, the Surprise, and conducted to New Orleans. That the captors had no lawful commission from any sover-
The Esta ella.
eign state to commit hostilities at sea ; but that the said schooner and cargo, until their re-capture, were forcibly withheld from the libellant, in open violation and contempt of the law of nations. That if they had such commission, the same was issued, or delivered, within the waters and jurisdiction of the United States, with intent that the said vessel, the Constitution, should be employed in the service of Venezuela, to commit hostilities at sea against the subjects of the king of Spain, with whom the United States •then were, and now are, at peace, in violation of their laws, and of the laws of nations. The libel further stated, that the Constitution had, previously to her cruising, been fitted out and *armed, or increased or augmented
J in force, within the jurisdiction and waters of the United States ; and also, that she had been manned by sundry citizens or residents of the United States, with the intent that she should be employed to commit hostilities, as aforesaid, in violation of the laws aforesaid. For these causes, the libellant prayed a restitution to him of the Estrella and cargo.
A claim was interposed by J. F. Lamoureux, prize-master of the Estrella, which stated that the Constitution was duly commissioned by the Republic of Venezuela, and authorized to capture all vessels belonging to its enemies, under which authority, she had captured the Estrella, which, with her cargo, belonged to the enemies of the said republic. That before he could receive his prize commission, the Constitution upset, in a gale, and her commission and papers, with the greater part of the crew, were lost. The claimant further represented, that as he was carrying the Estrella into port, to have her condemned before a court of competent jurisdiction, she was captured by the United States ketch Surprise, and conducted to New Orleans: and therefore, claimed, that the Estrella and cargo might be adjudged to be restored to him.
It appeared, from the transcript of the proceedings in this case, that the Estrella was also libelled on the part of the United States, although it was not stated for what cause such libel was filed, but the same was dismissed ; from which decree there was no appeal.
*It appeared in evidence, that the Constitution had a commission
301J £rom government of Venezuela, at the time the capture was made, which was issued and delivered at Carthagena; but that the same was lost by the sinking of the privateer, immediately after the capture. There was some contradictory testimony as to her having increased her armament in the United States, and it was proved, that she had augmented the number of her crew, in the port of New Orleans.
On the libel filed by the Spanish owner, decree was made, that the claim of Lamoureux, the prize-master, be dismissed, with costs, and that the Estrella and cargo be delivered up and restored to the libellant; from which sentence, the cause was brought, by appeal, to this court.
February 18th. C. J. Ingersoll, for the appellant and captor, argued, that the law of nations gave to the court of the captor’s country the exclusive cognisance of questions of prizes made under its authority; and that t e only exceptions to this general rule were to be found in the acts of congress for preserving our neutral relations. In the present case, there was no sucient evidence, that the armament of the capturing vessel had been increase within the United States, so as to give our courts jurisdiction to restore the
The Estrella.
captured property, upon this ground ; and that the 2d section of the act of the 5th of June 1794, c. 226, which prohibited the enlistment of men within our territory, was impliedly repealed by the act of March 3d, 1817, c. 58, which contained *no such prohibition, and which was the law in force at the time this case occurred. But even if it were otherwise, the L 02 only proof of an increase of the crew was the hearsay of interested witnesses; and supposing their testimony to establish the fact, still the onus probandi was upon the claimant, to show that the persons so enlisted were not citizens of Venezuela, transiently within the United States, and so coming within the proviso of the 2d section of the act of 1794, c. 226. The existence of a commission, regularly issued by the government of Venezuela, within its own territory, which was on board the privateer, previous to the capture, was sufficiently proved; and the court has already determined, that the same testimony which would be sufficient to prove that a cruising vessel is in the service of an acknowledged state, is sufficient to prove that it is in the service of a newly-created government, like that of Venezuela. United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 635.
Sergeant, contra, argued, upon the facts, that the right of the original Spanish owner to restitution, was established by satisfactory proof, both of the increase of the armament and crew of the privateer within the United States. He insisted, that the act of 1794, c. 226, was not repealed by that of 1817, c. 58; and that, even if it were, the right to restitution depended upon the general law of nations and treaties. 1 Wheat. 244 n. ; Sir L. Jenkins’ Works, vol. 2, p. 727; Ibid. 780. The claimant having proved the fact of *an increase of the crew in New Orleans, the onus probandi of showing that the persons enlisted were citizens of Venezuela, tran- L siently within the United States, was thrown upon the captors. The commission, under which the capture was professedly made, being that of a new government, not yet acknowledged by the United States, its commission ought to have been produced, and the seal proved ; and if actually lost with the privateer, an exemplified copy ought to have been obtained, duly authenticated by the proper officers of that government. All the circumstances of the ease combined to show, that this was not a capture in the regular exercise of the rights of war; but a piratical seisure, in breach of our neutrality, aggravated by an intention to violate the revenue laws, which was evinced, by the fact of the vessel having been found hovering on the coast of Louisiana, instead of being conducted to the ports of Venezuela for adjudication.
March 2d, 1819. Livingston, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court. The first allegation of the Spanish owner is, that the Constitution had no lawful commission from any sovereign state, to commit hostilities at sea; and he contends, that the commission, in the present case, if any there was, being that of a government not acknowledged by the United States, ought to have been produced, and its seal proved; or that if the vessel carrying it had been lost, yet an exemplification of it ought to have been obtained from the proper department of the state which issued it.
The court is satisfied with the proof which has been made, of the Constitution having had a commission, at the time of making the *■ capture, and that such commission was granted by the government of Vene-
The Estrella.
zuela ; and also, that the same was lost with the privateer herself, a very short time after the prize-crew took possession of the Estrella. The fact of the sinking of the Constitution is not disputed ; and that she had, at the time she went down, a commission on board, is also fully made out, which commission there is no reason to believe was any other than the one which the collector of New Orleans says was on board, when she arrived in that port from Carthagena. This was some time in the month of October, in the year 1816 : Mr. Chew then saw the commission, and describes it as a very regular one from the Venezuelan republic, signed, as others were, by Bolivar. Although the court, in another case, has said, that the seal of a government, unacknowledged, cannot be permitted to prove itself; it has, in the same case, said, that the fact of a vessel being so employed may be established, without proving the seal. United States n. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 635.
But if the Constitution had a commission on board, it is next alleged, that the same was issued or delivered within the waters of the United States, with intent that she should be employed in the service of Venezuela, to commit hostilities, at sea, against the subjects of the king of Spain, with whom the United States were at peace. This allegation is not supported *3051 by any evidence ; *on the contrary, the same witnesses who declare
-* that the Constitution was a commissioned vessel, and whose testimony has already been adverted to, establish, beyond controversy, that the same was obtained abroad, and not issued or delivered within the United States.
The libel next alleges, that the Constitution, previous to her last cruise, had been fitted out and armed, or that her force had been increased or augmented, within the jurisdiction and waters of the United States, and also, that she had there been manned by sundry citizens or residents of the United States, with the same intent. Whatever doubt there may be as to the augmentation of the armament of the Constitution within the United States, the court is satisfied, that a very considerable addition was made to her crew, at New Orleans, after her arrival at that port ; one of the customhouse officers declares, that at that time, she had only from twenty to twenty-five men ; another of these officers, who went on board, on her first arrival, states the number of her crew at about twenty ; and a witness by the name of Guzman, totally unconnected with this transaction, mentions by name two persons who entered on board, while she was lying there. Several of the original crew of the Estrella have also been examined to this point, who state, that after the capture, they had many conversations with the officers and seamen, who composed the prize-crew, by whom they were informed that the Constitution, when she left Carthagena, had but few *3061 bands °n board ; that at New *Orleans, she shipped almost the whole J of her crew, which, at the time oi the Estrella’s capture, amounted to sixty or seventy men. This species of testimony has been objected to, as being hearsay, and proceeding from a source entitled to no great credit: although there may be something in this objection, it is no reason for rejecting the evidence altogether. If the testimony be hearsay, it must be recollected, that the declarations proceeded from persons very much interested in giving a different representation of the transaction ; and as to the witnesses themselves, although they formed a part of the Estrella’s crew, and may have felt some little interest in the question, they were the only persons who could give any account of the armament or crew of the Constitution, at the time
The Estrella.
of her making the capture. It may be also remarked, that the testimony of these men is, in this respect, corroborated by that of other witnesses, who are liable to no objection, and that their declarations, if untrue, might, have been disproved by the claimant, by showing where and when the crew of the Constitution had been entered.
But if any of the crew of the Constitution were enlisted or entered within the jurisdiction of the United States, they may, it is said, have been citizens or subjects of the republic of Venezuela, who were transiently in the United States, at the time of her arrival, and had, therefore, a right, within one of the provisoes of the second section of the act of congress of the 7th of June 1794, c. 226, to enlist or enter themselves on board of her ; and it is insisted, that the libellant should have shown, that they were not persons of this description. The court is not of this opinion. On r*,, . the libellant, in the first instance, lay the onus of showing that the crew of the Constitution had been increased within the United States ; having done this, it became incumbent on the captors, if they wanted to establish their innocence, to show, as was in their power, if the fact was so, that they had done nothing contrary to law, by bringing their case within the proviso that has been mentioned.
The allegation, then, in the libel, being made out, that the Constitution, being a privateer commissioned by the republic of Venezuela, was manned within the United States, previous to the cruise on which she captured the Estrella, by sundry citizens or residents of the United States ; it remains to see, whether the libellant has not made out a case for restitution. It has been attempted, but without success, to distinguish this case, in principle, from several which have already been decided in this court. We have been told, as heretofore, that to the courts of the nation to which the captor belongs, and from which his commission issues, exclusively appertains the right of adjudicating on all captures and questions of prize. This is not denied; nor has the court ever felt any disposition to intrench on this rule ; but on the contrary, whenever an occasion has occurred, as in the case of The Invincible, 1 Wheat. 238, it has been governed by it. Not only is it a rule well established by the Customary *and conventional law of r*ofto nations, but it is founded in good sense, and is the only one which is *• salutary and safe in practice. It secures to a belligerent the independence to which every sovereign state is, entitled, and which would be somewhat abridged, were he to condescend so far as to permit those who bear his commission to appear before the tribunals of any other country, and submit to their interpretation or control, the orders and instructions under which they have acted. It insures also, not only to the belligerent himself, but to the world at large, a great decree of caution and responsibility, on the part of the agents whom he appoints ; who not only give security to him for their good behavior, but will sometimes be checked in a lawless career, by the consideration that their conduct is to be investigated by the courts of their own nation, and under the very eye of the sovereign, under whose sanction they are committing hostilities. In this way, also, is a foundation laid for a claim by other nations, of an indemnity against the belligerent, for the injuries which their subjects may sustain, by the operation of any unjust or improper rules, which he may think proper to prescribe for those who act under his authority.
The Estrella.
But general, and firmly established, as this rule is, it is not more so, than some of the exceptions which have grown out of it. A neutral nation, which knows its duty, will not interfere between belligerents, so as to obstruct them in the exercise of their undoubted right to judge, through the medium of their own courts, of the validity of every captu're made under their respective commissions, and to decide, on every question of prize law which *onQ-] may *arise in the progress of such discussion. But it is no departure
J from this obligation, if, in a case in which a captured vessel be brought, or voluntarily comes, infra præsidia, the neutral nation extends its examination so far as to ascertain whether a trespass has been committed on its own neutrality, by the vessel which has made the capture. So long as a nation does not interfere in the war, but professes an exact impartiality towards both parties, it is its duty, as well as right, and its safety, good faith and honor demand of it, to be vigilant in preventing its neutrality from being abused, for the purposes of hostility against either of them. This may be done, not only by guarding, in the first instance, so far as it can, against all warlike preparations and equipments in its own waters, but, also, by restoring to the original owner such property as has been wrested from him, by vessels which have been thus illegally fitted out. In the performance of this duty, all the belligerents must be supposed to have an equal interest, and a disregard or neglect of it, would inevitably expose a neutral nation to the charge of insincerity, and to the just dissatisfaction and complaints of the belligerent, the property of whose subjects should not, under any such circumstances, be restored.
The United States, instead of opening their ports to all the contending parties, when at peace themselves (as may be done, if not prevented by antecedent treaties), have always thought it the wisest and safest course, to interdict them all from fitting out or furnishing vessels of war, within their limits, and to ' punish those who may contribute to such equipments. *^iol *r^° enf°rce a general and strict observance of this neutrality, on the J part of our own citizens, and of others who reside among us, a law passed, as early as the year 1794, making it penal, among other things, for any one, within the jurisdiction of the United States, to enlist in the service of any foreign prince or state, as a soldier, marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque or privateer. This law, it is supposed, was not in force at the time when the crew of the Constitution was increased at New Orleans, having been repealed, as is alleged, by the act of the 3d oi March 1817, c. 58. But this act contains no repealing clause of this or any other section of the former law ; and having made no provision on the subject of enlistment, it must have been the intention of the legislature to leave in full force all those parts of the first law which had undergone no alteration, in the one which was then passing, and we, therefore, find no repeal of the act in question, until the 20th of April 1818, when all the provisions respecting our neutral relations were embraced by one act, and all former laws on the same subject were repealed.
But whether the act of 1794, c. 226, were in force or not, would make no difference ; for it did not, in terms, contain, nor did any of the others, which have, from time to time, been passed, contain, a provision for the restitution of property captured on the ocean, by vessels which might be thus illegally fitted out or manned in our ports. It is true, they recognise a right in the
Miller v. Nicholls.
courts of the United States to make restitution, when these laws have been disregarded, and impart *to the courts a power to punish those who p are concerned in such violations. But in the absence of every act of congress in relation to this matter, the court would feel no difficulty in pronouncing the conduct here complained of, an abuse of the neutrality of the United States; and although, in such case, the offender could not be punished, the former owner would, nevertheless, be entitled to restitution. Nor is our opinion confined to the single act of an illegal enlistment of men, which is the only fact proved in this case ; for we have no hesitation in saying, that for any of the other violations of our neutrality, alleged in the libel, if they had been proved, the Spanish owner would have been equally entitled to restitution.
Sentence affirmed, with costs.
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