Mayoe, Aldebmen & Commonalty of New Yoek v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 71 (1837)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Mayoe, Aldebmen & Commonalty of New Yoek v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 71 (1837)
Full caption
The Mayoe, Aldebmen and Commonalty of the City of New Yoek, Plaintiffs, v. Geoege Miln.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1837
*The Mayoe, Aldebmen and Commonalty of the City of New Yoek, Plaintiffs, v. Geoege Miln.
Constitutionality ofpassenger laws.—Police powers of the states.
In February 1824, the legislature of New York passed “an act concerning passengers in vessels arriving in the port of New York by one of the provisions of the law, the master of every vessel arriving in New York from any foreign port, or from a port of any of the states of the United States, other than New York, was required, under certain penalties prescribed in the law, within twenty-four hours after his arrival, to make a report in writing, containing the names, ages and last legal settlement of every person who should have been on board the vessel commanded by him, during the voyage; and if any of the passengers should have gone on board any other vessel, or should, during the voyage, have been landed at any place, with a view to proceed to New York, the same should be stated in the report. The corporation of the city of New York instituted an action of debt, under this law, against the master of the ship Emily, for the recovery of certain penalties imposed by this act; and the declaration allege 1, that the Emily, of which William Thompson was the master, arrived in New York, in August 1829, from a country out of the United States, and that one hundred passengers were brought in the ship, on the voyage, and that the master did not make the report required by the statute referred to; the defendant demurred to the declaration, and the judges of the circuit court being divided in opinion on the following point, it was certified to the supreme court: “ That the act of the legislature of New York, mentioned in the plaintiff’s declaration, assumes to regulate trade and commerce between the port of New York and foreign ports, and is unconstitutional and void.” The supreme court directed it to be certified to the circuit court of New York, that so much of the section of the act of the legislature of New York as applies to the breaches assigned in the declaration, does not assume to regulate commerce between the port of New York and foreign ports; and that so much of the said act is constitutional.
The act of the legislature of New York is not a regulation of commerce, but of police ; and being so, it was passed in the exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to the state ; the state of New York possessed the power to pass this law, before the adoption of the constitution of the United States ; the law was intended to prevent the state being burdened with an influx of foreigners, and to prevent their becoming paupers, and who would be chargeable as such; the end and means here used are within the competency of the states, since a portion of their powers were surrendered to the federal government.
The case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203, and Brown v. State of Maryland, 12 Ibid. 419, cited. The section of the act of the legislature of New York on which this action is brought, fails within the limits of the powers of state laws drawn by the court in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden ; and there is no aspect in which the powers exercised by it transcends there limits ; there is not the least likeness between the case of Brown v. State of Maryland, and the case before the court.
In the case of Brown v. State of Maryland, this court did, indeed, extend the power to regulate commerce, so as to protect the goods inported from a state tax, *after they were landed, r*i ng and were yet in bulk, because they were the subjects of commerce ; and because as the power to regulate commerce, under which the importation was made, implied a right to sell, whilst the bales or packages were in their original form. This does not apply to persons ; they are not the subjects of commerce.
There is a portion of the reasoning of the court, in the cases of Ogden v. Saunders, and Brown v- State of Maryland, which would justify measures on the part of the state, not only approaching the line which separates regulations or commerce from those of police, but even those which are almost indentical with the former class, if adopted in the exercise of their acknowledged powers. 9 Wheat. 204, 209.
From the language of the court, in these cases, it appears, that whilst a state is acting within the scope of its legitimate power, as to the end to be attained, it may use whatever means, being appropriate to the end, it may think fit; although they may be the same, or nearly the same, as scarcely to be distinguished from those adopted by congress, acting under a different power-; subject, only, the court say, to this limitation, that in the event of collision, the law of the state must yield to the law of congress. The court must be understood, of course, as meaning, that the law of congress is passed upon a subject within the sphere of its power; even then, if the section of the act of New York, under consideration in this case, would be considered as par.
New York v. Miln.
taking of the nature of a commercial regulation, the principle laid down in Gibbons v. Ogden would save it from condemnation, if no such collision existed. There is no collision between the provisions of the section of the law of New York, on which this suit has been brought, and the provisions of the laws of the United States of 1799 or 1819, relating to passengers.1 It is obvious, that the passengers laws of the United States only affect, through the power over navigation, the passengers, whilst on their voyage, and until they shall have landed; after that, and when they shall have ceased to have any connection with the ship, and when, therefore, they have ceased to be passengers, the acts of congress applying to them as such, and only professing to legislate in relation to them as such, have performed their office; and can, with no propriety of language, be said to come into conflict with the law of a state, whose operation only begins where that of the laws of congress end ; whose operation is not even on the same subject; because, although the person on whom it operates is the same, yet, having ceased to be a passenger, he no longer stands in the only relation in which the laws of congress either professed or intended to act upon him.
A state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; when that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the United States.
It is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation which it may deem to be conducive to these ends, where the power over the particular subject, or the manner of its exercise, are not surrendered, or restrained by the constitution of the United States.
All those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or which may more properly be called internal police, are not surrendered or restrained ; and consequently, in relation to these the authority of a state is complete, unqualified and exclusive.
It is, at all times, difficult to define any subject with precision and accuracy; if this be so, in gen*1041 erah *8 emphatically so, io relation to a subject so diversified and *various as that
J under the consideration of the court in this case; if the court were to attempt it, they would say, that every law came within the description of a regulation of police, which concerned the welfare of the whole people of a state, or any individual within it; whether it related to their rights or their duties; whether it respected them as men, or as citizens of the state in their public or private relations; whether it related to the rights of persons or of property, of the whole people of a state, or of any individual within it; and whose operation was within the territorial limits of the state, and upon the persons and things within its jurisdiction. An example of the application of these principles, is the right of a state to punish persons who commit offences against its criminal laws within its territory.
Persons are not the subjects of commerce; and not being imported goods, they do not fall within the reasoning founded upon the construction of a power given to congress to regulate commerce, and the prohibition of the states from imposing a duty on imported goods.2
1
But it is no answer to the objection, that a the law in question in that case was considered state law is void, as a regulation of commerce, as an internal police regulation, and as not into say, that it falls within the police powers of terfering with commerce. A duty was not laid the states ; for, to whatever class it may belong, upon the vessel, or the passengers, but a report it is prohibited to the states, if granted exclu- only was required from the master. Now, every sively to congress, by the constitution. Hen- state has an unquestionable right to require derson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259. a register of the names of the persons who
2
In the cases of Smith v. Turner, and Norris come within it, to reside, temporarily or permav. Boston, 7 How. 283, it was decided, by a bare nently. This was a precautionary measure to majority of the court, that the statutes of New ascertain the rights of the individuals, and the York and Massachusetts which imposed a tax obligations of the public, under any continupon alien passengers, arriving in the ports of gency that might occur. It opposed no obstructhose states, were unconstitutional and void. tion to commerce, imposed no tax or duty, but The New York statute, which was under con- acted upon the master, owner or consignee of the sideration, imposed a small tax upon every alien vessel, after the termination of the voyage, and passenger, brought into the state, for the use of when he was within the territory of the state, the Marine hospital on Staten Island. In that mingling with its citizens and subject to its case, Judge McLean, who concurred with the ma- law. 7 How. 404. Immediately after the decisjority of the ourt in New York v. Miln, said ion of the Passenger Cases, New York mod
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