Case details
Bluebook Citation
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902)
Full caption
DREYER v. ILLINOIS.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 10, 1902
DREYER v. ILLINOIS.
error to the supreme court of THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
No. 37. Argued and submitted April 18,1902.—Decided, November 10,1902.
Dieyei was convicted in a state court of Illinois for having failed to turn ovei, as required by statute, to his successor in office, certain revenues, on s, funds, warrants and personal property, that came into his hands reasurer of a Board of Public Park Commissioners. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and the accused was sentenced to the penitentiary. ^>f Hlinois it was provided: “ When the jury retire to consider eir verdict, in any criminal case, a constable or other officer shall nla<H^O11\Of a®rme<^ to attend the jury to some private and convenient drink + ° *h s ability keep them together without meat or agreed 61 excePte(^) unless by leave of court, until they shall have when t]UP°Ui? u *r verdict> nor suffer others to speak to them, and that court ” 1 Sfh-1 ^ave aSreed upon their verdict he will return them into on thni-~ n jS Case ^tute was not complied with, but objection The accused°'Un<-i^aS ma<^e on a m°tion for new trial.
was comm CaSG WaS sentenced to the penitentiary, and the warden after thp 6 con$ne iu safe and secure custody, from and dons as a e lveyy thereof, “ until discharged by the State Board of Paru lonzed and directed by law, provided such term of impris-
Syllabus.
onment in said penitentiary shall not exceed the maximum term for the crime for which the said defendant was convicted and sentenced.” The sentence was based upon a statute of Illinois, approved April 21, 1899, and known as the Indeterminate Sentence Act. By that statute it was provided: “ Whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the State Board of Pardons from the warden’s,report or from other sources, that any prisoner has faithfully served the term of his parole, and the board shall be of the opinion that such prisoner can safely be trusted to be at liberty and that his final release will not be incompatible with the welfare of society, the State Board of Pardons shall have the power to cause to be entered of record in its office an order discharging such prisoner for, or on account of, his conviction, which said order, when approved by the Governor, shall operate as a complete discharge of such prisoner in the nature of a release or commutation of his sentence, to take effect immediately upon the delivery of a certified copy thereof to the prisoner, and the clerk of the court in which the prisoner was convicted shall, upon presentation of such certified copy, enter the judgment of such conviction satisfied and released pursuant to said order. It is hereby made the duty of the clerk of the Board of Pardons to send written notice of the fact to the warden of the penitentiary of the proper district whenever any prisoner on parole is finally released by said board. Laws of Ill. 1899, p. 142. Held:
(1) That the ruling that the objection as to non-compliance with the statute requiring the jury to be placed in charge of a swoin officer, was not made in time and was to be deemed as waive, presented no question of a Federal nature, but was an adjudi cation simply of a question of criminal and local law, and did not impair the constitutional guaranty that no State shall depuve any person of liberty without due process of law.
(2) The objection that the act of 1899 conferred upon executive or minis terial officers powers of a judicial nature, did not present any question under the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amen ment. Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one partinent may, in respect to some matters, exert powers w u strictly speaking, pertain to another department of goyeinmen, for the determination of the State. And its determination way or the other cannot be an element in the inquiiy w e the due process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amen has been respected by the State or its representatives when ing with matters involving life or liberty. anseof (3) If the jury in a criminal cause be discharged by the cour a their being unable to agree upon a verdict, the accuse, i . second time, cannot be said to have been put twice in J _ of life or limb, whether regard be had to the Fifth oi teenth Amendment.
By an indictment returned in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the 4th day of February, 1899, the plaintiff in error Dreyer was charged with the offence of having failed to turn over to his successor in office, as treasurer of the West Chicago Park Commissioners, revenues, bonds, funds, warrants and personal property that came to his hands as such treasurer, of the value of $316,013.40 — said Commissioners constituting a Board of Public Park Commissioners appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate of Illinois, and as such having the supervision of the public parks and boulevards in the town of West Chicago and authority under the law to collect and disburse moneys, bonds, etc., for their maintenance.
The indictment was based on section 215 of the Criminal Code of Illinois, which is as follows:
“If any state, county, town, municipal or other officer or person, who now is or hereafter may be authorized by law to collect, receive, safely keep or disburse any money, revenue, bonds, mortgages, coupons, bank bills, notes, warrants or dues, or other funds or securities belonging to the State, or any county, township, incorporated city, town or village, or any state institution, or any canal, turnpike, railroad, school or college fund, or the fund of any public improvement that now is or may hereafter be aut orized by law to be made, or any other fund now in being or f at may hereafter be established by law for public purposes Or. elonging to any insurance or other company or person, required or authorized by law to be placed in the keeping of any sue officer or person, shall fail or refuse to pay or deliver over e same when required by law, or demand is made by his sucsh^0]1]^11 °^C? or ^rus^ or the officer or person to whom the same th°U J3,6 °r ^e^vere(t over, or his agent or attorney, aun onze in writing, he shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary ess than one nor more than ten years: Provided, Such de-ma^e when, from the absence or fault of the That ei>’sa,me cann°t oonveniently be made: And provided, this n<r Person shah be committed to the penitentiary under hund86^1^11 Un^ess ^Ie money not paid over shall amount to one occasT,°^ars’ °r if if aPPear that such failure or refusal is one y unavoidable loss or accident. Every person con- [p. 74] U OCTOBER TERAI, 1902.
Counsel for Parties.
victed under the provisions of this section shall forever thereafter be ineligible and disqualified from holding any office of honor or profit in this State.” Hurd’s Revised Statutes, 1901, p. 630, § 215.
A trial was commenced on the 29th day of August, 1899, and a jury was empaneled and evidence heard. The jury not having agreed upon a verdict were discharged.
A second trial was begun on the 19th day of February, 1900. The defendant filed a plea of once in jeopardy, which in substance averred that it was not true, as recited in the order of court at the previous trial, that the jury were unable to agree upon a verdict; also, that the discharge of the jury was without the defendant’s assent, was against his objections made at the time, and was without any moral or physical necessity justifying such a course on the part of the trial court.
On motion of the State, the plea of former jeopardy was stricken from the files, the defendant at the time excepting to the action of the court.
There was a second trial which resulted in the defendant being found “ guilty of failure to pay over money to his successor in office, in manner and form as charged in the indictment,” the jury stating in the verdict that the amount not paid over was $316,000, and imposing the punishment of confinement in the penitentiary.
The defendant upon written grounds filed moved for a new trial, and also moved in arrest of judgment. Both motions were overruled, and it was ordered and adjudged that the defendant be sentenced to the penitentiary “ for the crime o failure to pay over money to his successor in office, whereof he stands convicted.”
The judgment of the trial court having been affirmed by t e Supreme Court of Illinois, the case is here upon writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of that court.
Mr. Alfred S. Austrian for plaintiff in error. Mr. T. Moran and Mr. Levy Mayer were with him on the brief.
Mr. IL J. Hamlin, attorney general of the State of Illinois, [p. 75] J/?. Charles 8. Deneen and Mr. A. C. Barnes for defendants in error.
Mr. Justice Harlan, after stating the facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, affirming the judgment in the present case of the Criminal Court of Cook County, in that State, denied to the plaintiff in error certain rights secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, particularly by the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding a State to deprive any person of liberty without due process of law.
The defendant insists that three questions, involving rights secured by the Constitution of the United States, are presented by the assignments of error.
1. The first of those questions, as stated by his counsel, relates to the alleged “ omission to swear the baliffs in the manner prescribed by the common law and the statutes of the State of Illinois before the jury retired to consider of their verdict.” This point will be first examined.
The Criminal Code of Illinois provides: “ When the jury retire to consider of their verdict in any criminal case, a constable or other officer shall be sworn or affirmed to attend the jury to some private and convenient place, and to the best of s ability keep them together without meat or drink (water excepted), unless by leave of the court, until they shall have agreed upon their verdict, nor suffer others to speak to them, and that w en they shall have agreed upon their verdict he will return em into court: Provided, In cases of misdemeanor only, if e prosecutor for the people and the person on trial by him-or counsel, shall agree, which agreement shall be entered pon t e minutes of the court, to dispense with the attendance a^an o cer upon the jury, or that the jury, when they have ee, lh)on their verdict, may write and seal the same, and lawf 1 1Ver^n^ the same to the clerk, may separate, it shall be and U °r ^1G cour^ cai>r>y into effect any such agreement, receive any such verdict so delivered to the clerk as the [p. 76] lawful verdict of such jury.” Hurd’s Rev. Stat. Ill. 1901, p. 660, § 435.
Referring to this section the Supreme Court, in the present case, said that it was reversible error in a trial for a felony to allow the jury to retire for the purpose of considering their verdict without being placed in charge of a sworn officer as required by the statute—citing McIntyre v. People, 38 Illinois, 514, 518; Lewis v. People, 44 Illinois, 452, 454; Sanders v. People, 124 Illinois, 218, and Farley v. People, 138 Illinois, 97. InLewis People, just cited, the court observed that the provisions of the above section “ show the great care and solicitude of the General Assembly to secure to every person a fair and impartial trial; and it is eminently proper, as in many cases the accused is imprisoned, and it is not in his power to protect his rights from being prejudiced by undue influences. It should ever be the care of courts of justice to guard human life and liberty against being sacrificed by public prejudice or excitement. The jury should be entirely free from all outside influences from the time they are empaneled until they return, their verdict and it is accepted and they discharged ; and the legislature have determined that the provisions of this statute are necessary to accomplish the object. It*is a provision easily complied with, and one member of the court, at least, has never in practice seen it dispensed with, except in cases of misdemeanor. The provisions of the statute are clear, explicit and peremptory. We know of no power short of its repeal, to dispense with this requirement.
But the court further said : “ The point of controversy in t e present case is not, however, whether it is reversible error to fail to comply with the statute, but whether the question is properly raised upon this record. No objection or exception was taken by the defendant, at the time of the retirement o the jury, that the officers in charge of it were not sworn, n the question was raised by him for the first time on his moW for new trial, one of the grounds of that motion being when the jury retired to consider of their verdict in sai case no constable or other officer was sworn or affirmed to a en^ the jury, in manner and form as provided by the statute ® State of Illinois.’ . . . Affidavits made by the bailifls the- [p. 77] selves, and by an assistant of the prosecuting attorney, who participated in the trial, tend to prove that the oath administered was in the statutory form; but these affidavits also show that the only oath administered to them was on the 21st day of February, immediately after the empaneling and swearing of the jury. It is shown by the bill of exceptions that the trial was not concluded and the jury finally sent out until February 28th, so that even by the proof made on behalf of the people the only oath taken by the bailiffs was some six days prior to their retirement with the jury, and prior to the introduction of evidence and the subsequent steps of the trial. This cannot be held to be a compliance with the requirement of the statute that ‘ when the jury shall retire to consider of their verdict,’ etc., ‘ a constable or other officer shall be sworn,’ etc. To swear the bailiffs immediately upon the jury being sworn, and prior to the introduction of the evidence, the arguments of counsel and instructions of the court—six or seven days prior to the retirement of the jury to consider of their verdict—would be little less than farcical.”
It was, however, held, that under the principles established by former decisions in Illinois, the requirement of the statute could be waived by the accused, and that his failure to object at the time that the officer having charge of the jury was not sworn when the jury retired was equivalent to a waiver of compliance with its provisions. And it was adjudged “ that the question whether or not, upon the retirement of the jury to consider of its verdict, it was placed in charge of a constae’ or other officer, sworn to attend it, as prescribed by stat**e’ is not properly raised by the record [of this case] and erefore [is] not available as error in this court.”
t thus appears that while the state court expressly recogtM accused under the statute it adjudged r a d f n°t ProPerly raised on the record the question ^aise or the first time on motion for a new trial as to non-0rnP lance with its provisions. But manifestly this decision fe n° questi°n a Federal nature. A ruling to the efanc ?accused shall be deemed to have waived compli-
Wit the statute if the record does not show that he [p. 78] objected at the time to the action of the court, was an adjudication simply of a question of criminal practice and local law, was not in derogation of the substantial right recognized by the statute, and did not impair the constitutional guaranty that no State shall deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. We cannot perceive that such a decision by the highest court of the State brings the case upon this point within the Fourteenth Amendment, even if it should be assumed that the due process of law prescribed by that Amendment required that a jury in a felony case should be placed in charge of an officer especially sworn at the time to attend and keep them together until they returned their verdict or were discharged.
We adjudge that in holding that the record did not sufficiently present for consideration the question now raised, the state court, even if it erred in its decision, did not infringe any right secured to the defendant by the Constitution of the United States.
2. Another question which counsel for the defendant contends is raised by the assignments of error relates to the final judgment of the Criminal Court of Cook County. It was adjudged by the trial court that the defendant be taken to the penitentiary of the State, at Joliet, and delivered to its warden or keeper, who was required and commanded to “ confine him in said penitentiary, in safe and secure custody, from and after the delivery thereof, until discharged by the State Board of Pardons, as authorized and directed by law, provided such term of impris onment in said penitentiary shall not exceed the maximum term for the crime for which the said defendant was convicted a sentenced.” , .
The judgment was in conformity with a statute of Illinois approved April 21, 1899, entitled “ An act to revise the law in relation to the sentence and commitment of prisoners convicte of crime, and providing for a system of parole,” etc. The s a ute is sometimes referred to as the Indeterminate Sentence c of Illinois, and as its validity under the Constitution of the m ted States is assailed its provisions must be examined.
That statute provides that every male person over tv en y years of age, and every female person over eighteen years o [p. 79] age, convicted of a felony or other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, except treason, murder, rape and kidnapping, shall be sentenced to the penitentiary, the court imposing the sentence to fix its limit or duration, the term of such imprisonment not to be less than one year, nor exceeding the maximum term provided by law for the crime of which the prisoner was convicted, making allowance for good time, as provided by law. § 1.
It was made the duty of each board of penitentiary commissioners to adopt such rules concerning prisoners committed to their custody as would prevent them from returning to criminal courses, best secure their self-support, and accomplish their reformation. To that end it provided that whenever any prisoner was received into the penitentiary the warden should cause to be entered in a register the date of his admission, the name, nativity, nationality, with such other facts as could be ascertained, of parentage, education, occupation and early social influences as seemed to indicate the constitutional and acquired defects and tendencies of the prisoner, and, based upon these, an estimate of his then present condition, and the best probable plan of treatment. And the physician of the penitentiary was required to carefully examine each prisoner when received and enter in a register the name, nationality or race, the weight, stature and family history of each prisoner, also a statement of the ^adition of the heart, lungs and other leading organs, the rate 0 t e pulse and respiration, and the measurement of the chest an abdomen, and any existing disease or deformity, or other isa iity, acquired or inherited. Upon the warden’s register was to be entered from time to time minutes of observed im^0^ei^en^ or deterioration of character, and notes as to the e o and treatment employed; also all alterations affecting j e siding or situation of the prisoner, and any subsequent b c 8 or personal history brought officially to his knowledge aring upon the question of the parole or final release of the theTer ’ an<^ WaS duty °f the warden, or, in his absence, ino- war<^en> each penitentiary to attend each meet-he w 6 ^°ar(^ Pardons held at the penitentiary of which warden, for the purpose of examining prisoners as to [p. 80] their fitness for parole. He shall advise with that Board concerning each case, and furnish it with his opinion, in writing, as to the fitness of each prisoner for parole whose case the board considered. And it was made the duty of every public officer to whom inquiry was addressed by the clerk of the Board of Pardons, concerning any prisoner, to give the board all information possessed or accessible to him, which might throw light upon the question of the fitness of the prisoner to receive the benefits of parole. § 2.
It was made the duty of the judge before whom any prisoner was convicted, and also the State’s Attorney, of the county in which he was convicted, to furnish the board of penitentiary commissioners an official statement of the facts and circumstances constituting the crime whereof the prisoner was convicted, together with all other information accessible to them in regard to the career of the prisoner prior to the time of the committal of the crime of which he was convicted, relative to his habits, associates, disposition and reputation, and any other facts and circumstances tending to throw any light upon the question as to whether such prisoner was capable of again becoming a law-abiding citizen. § 3.
Other sections of the statute are as follows :
“4. The said Board of Pardons shall have power to establis rules and regulations under which prisoners in the penitentiary may be allowed to go upon parole outside of the penitentiary building and enclosure: Provided, That no prisoner sha e released from either penitentiary on parole until the State Boar of Pardons or the warden of said penitentiary shall have ma e arrangements, or shall have satisfactory evidence that ai ranoe ments have been made, for his honorable and useful emp oy ment while upon parole in some suitable occupation, an for a proper and suitable home, free from criminal in uenc and without expense to the State: And, provided furl ei, all prisoners temporarily so released upon parole s a’a. . times, until the receipt of their final discharge, be consi er> the legal custody of the warden of the penitentiary rom vv they were paroled, and shall, during the said time, be cons1 as remaining under conviction for the crime of whic t ey [p. 81] convicted and sentenced and subject at any time to be taken back within the enclosure of said penitentiary; and full power to enforce such rules and regulations and to retake and reimprison any inmate so upon parole is hereby conferred upon the warden of said penitentiary, whose order or writ, certified by the clerk of said penitentiary, with the seal of the institution attached, and directed to all sheriffs', coroners, constables, police officers, or to any particular person named in said order or writ, shall be sufficient warrant for the officer or other person named therein to authorize said officer or person to arrest and deliver to the warden of said penitentiary the body of the conditionally released or paroled prisoner named in said writ, and it is hereby made the duty of all sheriffs, coroners, constables, police officers or other persons named therein to execute said order or writ the same as other criminal process. In case any prisoner so conditionally released or paroled shall flee beyond the limit of the State, he may be returned pursuant to the provisions of the law of this State relating to fugitives from justice. It shall be the duty of the warden, immediately upon the return of any conditionally released or paroled prisoner, to make report of t e same to the State Board of Pardons, giving the reasons for t e return of said paroled prisoner: Provided, further, That the tate Board of Pardons may, in its discretion, permit any prisoner to temporarily and conditionally depart from such penieatlar? on parole and go to some county in the State named an t ere remain within the limits of the county, and not to epart from the same without written authority from said oar for such length of time as the board may determine, and th°n e, ^Ur^er c°ndition that such prisoner shall, during the . .e 0 ls Parole, be and continuously remain a law abiding shpZ6ff r industrious and temperate habits, and report to the
,. n t e county on the first day of each month giving a be .iCU.ar account of his conduct during the month and it shall tain wh *+ SUCh s^eri® to investigate such report and ascerdurino- th ^een the habits and conduct of such prisoner renort 6 covered by such report, and to transmit such tentiarv ^f011 • an^s burnished him by the warden of the peni-
’ o sai warden within five days after the receipt of vol. clxxxvii —6 [p. 82] such prisoner’s report, adding to such report the sheriff’s statement as to the truth of the report so made to him by the prisoner. It shall also be the duty of such sheriff to keep secret the fact that such prisoner is a paroled prisoner, and in no case divulge such fact to any person or persons so long as said prisoner obeys the terms and conditions of his parole.
“ 5. Upon the granting of a parole to any prisoner the warden shall provide him with suitable clothing, ten dollars in money, which may be paid him in installments at the discretion of the warden, and shall procure transportation for him to his place of employment or to the county seat of the county to which he is paroled.
“ 6. It shall be the duty of the warden to keep in communication, as far as possible, with all prisoners who are on parole from the penitentiary of which he is the warden, also with their employers, and when, in his opinion, any prisoner who has served not less than six months of his parole acceptably has given such evidence as is deemed reliable and trustworthy that he will remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his final release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the warden shall make a certificate to that effect to the State Board of Pardons ; and whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the State Board of Pardons, from the warden’s report or from other sources, that any prisoner has faithfully served the term of his parole, and the board shall be o the opinion that such prisoner can safely be trusted to be at li erty and that his final release will not be incompatible witht e welfare of society, the State Board of. Pa/rdons shall have t 6 power to cause to he entered of record in its office an order is charging suchprisoner for, or on account of, his conviction, w n said order, when approved by the Governor, shall operate as complete discharge of suchprisoner in the nature of a re ase o commutation of his sentence, to take effect immediately upon delivery of a certified copy thereof to the prisoner, an tec & of the court in which the prisoner was convicted shall, upon pr sentation of such certified copy, enter the judgment of sue viction satisfied and released pursua/nt to said or. hereby made the duty of the clerk of the Board of ar ons [p. 83] send written notice of the fact to the warden of the penitentiary of the proper district whenever any prisoner on parole is finally released by said board.” Laws of Ill. 1899, p. 142.
In this connection we are referred to article 3 of the constitution of Illinois, dividing the powers of government into three distinct departments—legislative, executive, judicial—and providing that “ no person, or collection of persons, being one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted; ” to section 1 of article 6 of the same constitution, providing that “ the judicial powers, except as in this article is otherwise provided, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, Circuit Courts, county courts, justices of the peace, police magistrates and such courts as may be created by law in and for cities and incorporated towns ; ” and to section 13 of article 5, providing that the pardoning power shall be in the Governor of the State.
If we do not misapprehend the position of counsel, it is that the Indeterminate Sentence Act of 1899 is inconsistent with the above provisions of the state constitution, in that it confers judicial powers upon a collection of persons who do not belong to the judicial department, and, in effect, invests them with the pardoning power committed by the constitution to the Governor of the State.
e will not stop to consider whether the statute is in conflict ^it the provisions of the state constitution to which reference ere made. We may, however, in passing observe that a simi ar statute, previously enacted, was upheld by the Supreme ourt of Illinois. George v. The People, 167 Illinois, 447. It is on y necessary now to say that even if the statute in question it ,n°X^Or(s the objection now urged by plaintiff in error, the b n°t that this court would review a judgment of im C0Urt the State which expressly or by necessary vesti^o-10n sus?ined it as constitutional. A local statute inwitfi110 a COHectlon Persons not of the judicial department, the PO}ve? ^a^ are judicial and authorizing them to exercise the sT t°ning Power which alone belongs to the Governor of a e, pi esents no question under the Constitution of the [p. 84] United States. The right to the due process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment would not be infringed by a local statute of that character. Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of government, is for the determination of the State. And its determination one way or -the other cannot be an element in the inquiry whether the due process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment has been respected by the State or its representatives when dealing with matters involving life or liberty. “ When we speak,” said Story, “ of a separation of the three great departments of government, and maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree. The true mean-. ing is, that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments; and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of a free constitution.” Story’s Const. (5th ed.) 393. Again : “ Indeed, there is not a single constitution of any State in the Union, whic does not practically embrace some acknowledgment of t e maxim, and at the same time some admixture of powers, cons i tuting an exception to it.” Story’s Const. (5th ed.) 395.
The objection that the act of 1899 confers upon executive or ministerial officers powers of a judicial nature does not, in our judgment, present any question under the due-process clause o the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. The remaining contention of the defendant is that, un the circumstances disclosed by the record, the second tria o the case placed him twice in jeopardy, and therefore the ju o ment should be reversed.
Under date of September 1, 1899, the following or er w made of record in the case: “ This day come the said eop, [p. 85] by Charles S. Deneen, State’s Attorney, and the said defendant, as well in his own proper person as by his counsel, also comes; and also come the jurors of the jury aforesaid ; and the aforesaid jury hearing the arguments of counsel and instructions of the court, retire in charge of sworn officers to consider of their verdict.” And under date of September 2d, this order appears: “ This day come the said People, by Charles S. Deneen, State’s Attorney, and the defendant, as well in his own proper person as by his counsel, also comes. And also come the jurors of the jury aforesaid, being now returned into court, and, being unable to agree upon a verdict, a,re thereupon by order ofthis court dischargedfromfurther consideration of this cause.”
It seems to be undisputed that the case was submitted to the jury at four o’clock in the afternoon and that the jury having retired to consider of their verdict were kept together until nine o’clock and thirty minutes in the morning of the succeeding day, when they were finally discharged from any further consideration of the case.
The contention is that, notwithstanding the recital in the record that the jury were discharged by the court because they were unable to agree upon a verdict, such discharge was without moral or physical necessity and operated as an acquittal of the defendant.
Upon the face of the question under examination the inquiry 'fi’g t arise whether the due process of law required by the ourteenth Amendment protects one accused of crime from
Put twice in jeopardy of life or limb. In other words, is b t ? n°t twice in jeopardy of life or limb forbidden th 11° • °Ur^'een^1 Amendment; or, so far as the Constitution of e nited States is concerned, is it forbidden only by the Fifth nen ment which prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth ■vr n had been held as restricting only the powers of the
^iona Government and its agencies ? of it$ PaSS thi8’m.Portant question without any consideration the d 1^S me^s’ and content ourselves with referring to 579 ThT °f thiS C°Urt in United Statesv- Perez, 9 Wheat, the nri a WaS a capital case—in which without the consent of soner or of the attorney of the United States, the jury [p. 86] being unable to agree were discharged by the court from giving any verdict—this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, said: “We are of opinion, that the facts constitute no legal bar to a future trial. The prisoner has not been convicted or acquitted, and may again be put upon his defence. We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes ; and, in capital cases especially, courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge ; and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under their oaths of office. We are aware that there is some diversity of opinion and practice on this subject, in the American courts; but, after weighing the question with due deliberation, we are of opinion, that such a discharge constitutes no bar to further proceedings, and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner from being again pu upon trial.” If the due process of law required by the Four teenth Amendment embraces the guarantee that no person s a be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb—upon which question we need not now express an opinion—wThat was said in dm States v. Perez is applicable to this case upon the present wn of error and is adverse to the contention of the accused that was put twice in jeopardy.
The principles settled in United States v. Perez, we nU' '5. mark, were reaffirmed in Ex pa/rte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, a, Simmons n. United States, 142 U. S. 148; Logan v. States, 144 U. S. 263; Thompson v. United States, 155 U. b. 274.
Syllabus.
The conclusion is, that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois did not deny to the plaintiff in error any right secured by the Constitution of the United States, and is therefore
Affirmed.
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