Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)
Full caption
CosSTiTtndSAL Law.j Gibbons, Appellant, v. Ogden, Respondent.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1824
^CosSTiTtndSAL Law.j
Gibbons, Appellant, v. Ogden, Respondent.
The utts nf the Legislature of tbn State of NepSTork, granting to Robert R. Livingston aunt Robert FultorrlM exclusive navigation of all the waters -.utKid rhe jurisdiction of that State, with boats moved by fire or steun, for a term of years, arc repugnant to that clause of the constitution of the United &Atts, which authorizes Congress to regulaW^<npm<;rce, serf^rhs the said acts prohibit ves sels licensed, aetxjKhn^ to the law's of the United Stales, for car-tying on the crusting trade, from navigating the said walers by means of fire or steam.
APPEAL from the Court for the Trial of Im peachments and Correction of Errors of the State of New-York. Aaron Ogden filed his bill in the Court of Chancery of that State, against Thomas Gibbons, setting forth the several acts of the Legis lature thereof, enacted for the purpose of securing to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton, the
Vol. IX. T
1824. exclusive navigation of all the waters within the '^T','^' jurisdiction of that State, with boats moved by v* fire or steam, lor a term of years winch has not
Ogden. ^^ expired; and authorizing the Chancellor to award an injunction, restraining any person what ever from navigating those walers with boats of that description. The bill stated an assignment from Livingston and Fulton to one John IL Living ston, and from him to the complainant, Ogden, of the right to navigate the waters between Eliza bethtown, and other places in New-Jersey, and the city of New-York; and that Gibbons, the de fendant below, wns in possession of two steam boats, called the Stoudinger and the Bellona, which were actually employed in running between New-York and Elizabethtown, in violation of the exclusive privilege conferred on the complainant, and praying an injunction to restrain the said Gib bons from using the said boats, or any other pro pelled by fire or steam, in navigating the waters within the territory of New-York. The injunc tion having been awarded, the answer of Gibbons was filed, in which he stated, that the boats em ployed by him were duly enrolled and licensed, to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, Under the act of Congress, passed the 18th of Feb ruary, 1793, c. 8. entitled, “ An act for enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regu lating the same.” And the defendant insisted on his right, in virtue of such licenses, to navigate the waters between Elizabethtown and the city of New-York, the said acts of the Legislature of the p. 3State of New-York to the contrary notwithstand- 1824. nig. Al tiie hearing, the Chancellor perpetuated ^^' the injunction, being of the opinion, that, the said v. acts were not repugnant to the constitution and °Bden' laws of the United States, and were valid. This decree was affirmed in the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, which is the highest Court of law and equity in the State, before which the cause could be carried, and it was thereupon brought to this Court by appeal.
Mr. Webster, for the appellant, admitted, that Peb. ah, 5W. there was a very respectable weight of authority “’^ *(^ in favour of the decision, which was sought to be reversed. The laws in question, he knew, had been deliberately re-enacted by the Legislature of New-York; and they had also received the sanction, at different times, of all her judicial tri bunals, than which there were few, if any, in the country, more justly entitled to respect and defer ence. The disposition of the Court would be, undoubtedly, to support, if it could, laws so passed and so sanctioned. He admitted, there fore, that it was justly expected of him that he should make out a clear case; and unless he did so, he did not hope for a reversal. It should be remembered, however, that the whole of this branch of power, as exercised by this Court, was a power of revision. The question must be de cided by the State Courts, and decided in a parti cular manner, before it could be brought here at all. Such decisions alone gave the Court juris diction ; and therefore, while they are to be re-
1824. spected as the judgments of learned Judges, they ■JfTY^^ are yet in the condition of all decisions from Ori boons #
v. which the law allows an appeal.
It would not. be a waste of time to advert to the existing state of the facts connected with the sub ject of this litigation. The use of steam boats, on the coasts, and in the bays and rivers of the country, had become very general. The inter course of its different parts essentially depended upon tins mode of conveyance and transportation. Rivers and bays, in many cases, form the divi sions between States; and thence it was obvious, that if the States should make regulations for the navigation of these waters, and such regulations should be repugnant and hostile, embarrassment would necessarily happen to the general inter course of the community. Such events had ac tually occurred, and had created the existing state of things.
By the law of New-York, no one can navigate the bay of New-York, the North River, the Sound, the lakes, or any of the waters of that State, by steam vessels, without a licence from the grantees of New- York, under penalty of forfeiture of the vessel.
By the law of the neighbouring State of Con necticut, no one can enter her waters with a steam vessel haring such license.
By the law’ of New-Jersey, if any citizen of that State shall be restrained, under the New-York law', from using steam boats between the ancient shores of New-Jersey and New-York, he shall be entitled to an action for damages, in
New-Jersey, with treble costs against the party 1824. who thus restrains or impedes him under the law
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of New- York! This act of New-Jersey is calledv.
Ogden.
an act of retortion against the illegal and oppres sive legislation of New-York; and seems to be defended on those grounds of public law which justify reprisals between independent States.
It would hardly be contended, that all these acts were consistent with the laws and constitution of the United States. If there were no power in the general government, to control this extreme bel ligerent legislation of the States, the powers of the government were essentially deficient, in a most important and interesting particular. The present controversy respected the earliest of these State laws, those of New-York. On those, this Court was now to pronounce; and if they should be declared to be valid and operative, he hoped somebody would point out where the State right stopped, and on what grounds the acts of other States were to be held inojierative and void.
It would be necessary to advert more particu larly to the laws of New-York, as they were stated in the record. The first was passed March 19th, 1787. By this act, a sole and exclusive right was granted to John Fitch, of making and using every kind of boat or vessel impelled by steam, in all creeks, rivers, bays, and waters, within the ter ritory and jurisdiction of New-York, for fourteen years.
On the 27th of March, 1798, an act was passed, on the suggestion that Fitch was dead, or had withdrawn from the State, without having made
1824. any attempt to use his privilege, repealing the grant to him, and conferring similar privileges on
v. Robert Ji. Livingston, for the term of twenty Ogden. yeargj on a suggestion, made by him, that he was possessor of a mode of applying the steam engine to propel a boat, on new and advantageous prin ciples. On the 5th of April, 1803, another act was passed, by which it was declared, that the rights and privileges granted to Ji. JI. Livingston, by the last act, should be extended to him and Robert Fulton, for twenty years, from the pass ing °f this act' Then there is the act of April 11, 1808, purporting to extend the monopoly, in point of time, five years for every additional boat, the whole duration, however, not. to exceed thirty years; and forbidding any and all persons to navi gate the waters of the State, with any steam boat or vessel, without the license of Livingston ami Ful ton, under penalty of forfeiture of the boat or vessel. And, lastly, comes the act of April 9, 1811, for enforcing the provisions of the last men tioned act, and declaring, that the forfeiture of the boat or vessel, found navigating against the provisions of the previous acts, shall be deemed to accrue on the day on which such boat or vessel should navigate the waters of the State ; and that Livingston and Fulton might immediately have an action for such boat or vessel, in like manner as if they themselves had been dispossessed thereof by force; and that on bringing any such suit, the defendant therein should be prohibited, by injunc tion, from removing the boat or vessel out of the State, or using it within the State. There were p. 7one or two other acts mentioned in the pleadings, 1824. which principally respected the time allowed for
Gibbons
complying with the condition of the grant, and V. were not material to the discussion of the case.Ogden.
By these acts, then, an exclusive right is given to Livingston and Fulton, to use steam naviga tion on all the waters of New-York, for thirty years from 1808.
It is not necessary to recite the several convey ances and agreements, stated in the record, by which Ogden, the plaintiff below, derives title under Livingston and Fulton, to the exclusive use of part of these waters.
The appellant being owner of a steam-boat, and being found navigating the waters between New-Jersey and the city of New-York, over which waters Ogden, the plaintiff below, claimed an exclusive right, under Livingston and Fulton, this bill was filed against him by Ogden, in Octo ber, 1818, and an injunction granted, restraining him from such use of his boat, This injunction was made perpetual, on the final hearing of the cause, in the Court of Chancery; and the decree of the Chancellor has been duly affirmed in the Court of Errors. The right, therefore, which the plaintiff below asserts to have and maintain his injunction, depends obviously on the general validity of the New-York laws, and, especially, on their force and operation as against the right set up by the defendant. This right he states, in his answer, to be, that he is a citizen of New-Jersey, and owner of the steam-boat in question; that the boat was a. vessel of more than twenty
1824. tons burden, duly enrolled and licensed for car *, . '^- ryingon the coasting trade, and intended to be
v. employed by him, in that trade, between Eliza-Ogden. bethtowi), jn New-Jersey, and the city of New-York; and was actually employed in navigating between those places, at the time of, and until notice of the injunction from the Court of Chan cery was served on him.
On these pleadings the substantial question is raised: Are these laws such as the Legislature of New-York had a right to pass ? If so, do they, secondly, in their operation, interfere with any right enjoyed under the constitution and laws of the United States, and are they, therefore, void, as far as such interference extends ?
It may be well to state again their general pur port and effect, and the purport and effect of the other State laws, which have been enacted by way of retaliation.
A steam vessel, of any description, going to New-York, is forfeited to the representatives of Livingston and Fulton, unless she have their li cense.
Going from New-York, or elsewhere, to Con necticut, she is prohibited from entering the wa ters of that State, if she hare such, license.
If the representatives of Livingston and Ful ton, in New- York, carry into effect, by judicial process, the provision of the New-York laws, against any citizen of New-Jersey, they expose themselves to a statute action, in New-Jersey, for all damages, and treble costs.
The New-York laws extend to all steam vessels; p. 9to steam frigates, steam ferry-boats, and all in 1824. termediate classes.
Gibbous
They extend to public as web as private ships ; v.
Ogden.
and to vessels employed in foreign commerce, as well aa to those employed iu the coasting trade.
The remedy is as summary as the grant itself is ample; for immediate confiscation, without seizure, trial, or judgment, is the penalty of in fringement.
In regard to these acts, he should contend, in the first place, that they exceeded the power of rhe Legislature; and, secondly, that if they could be considered valid, for any purpose, they were void, still, as against any right enjoyed under the laws of the United States, with which they came in collision; and that, in this case, they were found interfering with such rights.
He should contend, that the power of Congress to regulate commerce, was complete and entire, and, to a certain extent, necessarily exclusive; that the acts in question were regulations of com merce, in a most important particular; and af fecting it in those respects, in which it was under the exclusive authority of Congress. He stated this first proposition guardedly. He did not mean to say that all regulations which might, in their operation, affect commerce, were exclusively in the power of Congress; but that such power as had been exercised in this case, did not remain with the States. Nothing was more complex than commerce; and in such an age as this, no words embraced a wider field than commercial regula tion. Almost all the business and intercourse of
Vol. IX.
1824- life may be connected, incidentally, more or less, with commercial regulations. But it was only Gibbens
v, necessary to apply to this part of the constitution Ogderh
the well settled rules of construction. Some powers are holden to be exclusive in Congress, from the use of exclusive words in the grant; others, from the prohibitions on the States to exercise similar powers; and others, again, from the nature of the powers themselves. It has been by this inode of reasoning that the Court has ad judicated on many important questions; and the same mode is proper here. And, as some pow ers have been holden exclusive, and others not so, under the same form of expression, from the na ture of the different powers respectively; so, where the power, on any one subject, is given in general words, like the power to regulate commerce, the true method of construction would be, to consider of what parts the grant is composed, and which of those, from the nature of the thing, ought to be considered exclusive. The right set up in this case, under the laws of New-York, is a mono poly. Now, be thought it very reasonable to say, that the constitution never intended to leave with the States the power of granting monopolies, either of trade or of navigation; and, therefore, that as to this, the commercial power was exclu sive in Congress.
It was in vain to look for a precise and exact definition of the powers of Congress, on several subjects. The constitution did not undertake the task of making such exact definitions. In conferihg powers, it proceeded in the way of p. 11enumeratioa, slating the powers conferred, one after ano 1824. ther, in few words; and, where the power was
Gibbons
general, or complex in its nature, the extent of v.
Ogden.
the grant must necessarily be judged of, and limi ted, by its object, and by the nature of the power.
Few things were better known, than the imme diate causes which led to the adoption of the pre sent constitution; and bethought nothing clearer, titan that the prevailing motive was to regulate commerce; to rescue it from the embarrassing and destructive consequences, resulting from the le gislation of so many different States, and to place it under the protection of a uniform law. The great objects were commerce and revenue; and they were objects indissolubly connected. By the confederation, divers restrictions had been imposed on the States; but these had not been found sufficient. No State, it was true, could send or receive an embassy; nor make any treaty; nor enter into any compact with another State, or with a foreign power; nor lay duties, interfering with treaties which had been entered into by Con gress. But all these were found to be far short of what the actual condition of the country required. The States could still, each for itself, regulate commerce, and the consequence was, a perpetual jarring and hostility of commercial regulation.
In the history of the times, it was accordingly found, that the great topic, urged on alt occasions, as showing the necessity of a new and different government, was the state of trade and commerce. To benefit and improve these, was a great object in itself; and it became greater when it was re-
1821. garded as the only means of enabling the country ^^5^0^ t° pay ^e public debt, and to do justice to those
v. who had most effectually laboured for its indepen-
^d*11, deuce* The leading state papers of the time are full of this topic. The New-Jersey resolutions’ complain, that the regulation of trade was in the power of the several States, within their separate jurisdiction, in such a degree as to involve many difficulties and embarrassments; and they express an earnest opinion, that the sole and exclusive pair er of regulating trade with foreign States, ought to be in Congress. Mr. Witherspoon’s motion in Congress, in 1781, is of the same gene ral character; and the report of a committee of that body, in 1785, is still more emphatic. It de clares that Congress ought to possess the sole and exclusive power of regulating trade, as well with foreign nations, as between the States/ The re solutions of Virginia, in January, 1786, which were the immediate cause of the convention, put forth this same great object, indeed, it is the only object stated in those resolutions. There is not another idea in the whole document. The entire purpose for which the delegates assembled at Annapolis, was to devise means for the uniform regulation of trade. They found no means, but in a general government; and they recommended a convention to accomplish that purpose. Over whatever other interests of the country this govern ment may diffuse its benefits, and its blessings, it
d 1 Laics U. S. p. 28. 6 Id. 50.
will always be true, as matter of historical fact, 1824. that it had its immediate origin in the necessities
Gibbon*
of commerce ; and, for its immediate object, thev.
Ogden.
relief of those necessities, by removing their causes, and by establishing a uniform ami steady system, it would he easy to show, by reference to the discussions in the several State conventions, the prevalence of the same general topics; and if any one would look to the proceedings of several of the States, especially to those of Massachu setts and New-York, he would see, very plainly, by the recorded lists of votes, that wherever this commercial necessity was most strongly felt, there the proposed now constitution had most friends. In the New-York convention, the argument arising from this consideration was strongly pressed, by the distinguished person whose name is connected with the present question.
We do not find, in the history of the formation and adoption of the constitution, that any man speaks of a general concurrent power, in the re gulation of foreign and domestic trade, as still residing in the States. The very object intended, more than any other, was to take away such power. If it had not so provided, the constitu tion would not have been worth accepting.
He contended, therefore, that the people in tended, in establishing the constitution, to trans fer, from the several States to a general govern ment, those high and important powers over com merce, which, in their exercise, were to maintain an uniform and general system. From the very nature of the case, these powers must be erchf-
1824. sire; that is, the higher branches of commercial regulation must be exclusively committed to a Gibbons
single hand. What is it that is to be regulated ? Ogden.
Not the commerce of the several States, respec tively, but the commerce of the United States. Henceforth, the commerce of the States was to be an unit; and the system by which it was to exist and be governed, must necessarily be complete, entire, and uniform. Its character was to be described in the flag which waved over it, E plujubus unim. Now, how could individual States assert a right of concurrent legislation, in a case of this sort, without manifest encroachment and confusion ? It should be repeated, that the words used in the constitution, “to regulate commerce,” are so very general and extensive, that they might be construed to cover a vast field of legislation, part of which has always been occupied by State laws; and, therefore, the words must have a rea sonable construction, and the power should be considered as exclusively vested in Congress, so far, and so far only, as the nature of the power requires. And he insisted, that the nature of the case, and of the power, did imperiously require,- that such important authority as that of granting monopolies of trade and navigation, should not be considered asstill retained by the States.
It is apparent, from the prohibitions on the power of the States, that the general concurrent power was not supposed to be left with them. And the exception, out of these prohibitions, of the inspection laws, proves this still more clearly. Which most concerns the commerce of this p. 15country, that New-York anti Virginia should have an 1824. uncontrolled power to establish their inspection for flour and tobacco, or that they should have an v. uncontrolled power of granting either a monopoly °6den‘ of trade in their own ports, or a monopoly of na vigation over all the waters leading to those ports ? Yet, the argument on the other side must be, that, although the constitution has sedulously guarded and limited the first of these powers, it has left the last wholly unlimited and uncontrolled.
But, although much had been said, in the dis cussion on former occasions, about this supposed concurrent power in the States, he found great dif ficulty in understanding what was meant by it. It was generally qualified, by saying, that it was a power, by which the States could pass laws on the subjects of commercial regulation, which would be valid, until Congress should pass other laws controlling them, or inconsistent with them, and that then the State laws must yield. What sort of concurrent powers were these, which could not exist together? Indeed, the very reading of the clause in the constitution must put to Hight this notion of a general concurrent power. The constitution was formed for all the States; and Congress was to have power to regulate commerce. Now, what is the import of this, but that Congress is to give the rule—to establish the system—to exercise the control over the subject? And, can more than one power, in cases of this sort, give the rule, establish the system, or exercise the control ? As it is not contended that the power of Congress is to be exercised by a supervision
1824. of State legislation; and, as it is clear, that Con-
?ress *s to ^ve ^^ genera^ rule, he contended,
v. that this power of giving the general rule was s °“’ transferred, by the constitution, from the States to Congress, to be exercised as that body might see fit. And, consequently, that all those high exercises of power, which might be considered as giving the rule, or establishing the system, in re gard to great, commercial interests, were necessa rily left with Congress alone. Of this character he considered monopolies of trade or navigation; embargoes; the system of navigation laws; the countervailing laws, as against foreign states; and other important enactments respecting our connexion with such states. It appeared to him a most reasonable construction, to say, that in these respects, the power of Congress is exclu sive, from the nature of the power. If it be not so, where is the limit, or who shall fix a boundary for the exercise of the power of the States ? Can a State grant a monopoly of trade ? Can New-York shut her ports to all but her own citizens? Can she refuse admission to ships of particular nations? The argument on the other side is, and must be, that she might do all these things, until Congress should revoke her enactments. And this is called concurrent legislation. What confusion such notions lead to, is obvious enough. A power in the States to do any thing, and every thing, in regard to commerce, till Congress shall undo it, would suppose a state of things, at least as bad as that which existed before the present constitution. It is the tme wisdom of these p. 17governmcnteto keep their action as distinct as possi- 1324. ble. The general government should not seek v^^"' to operate where the States can operate with v. more advantage io the community; nor should O^en the States encroach on ground, which the public good, as well as the constitution, refers to the exclusive control of Congress.
If the present state of things—these laws of New-York, the law’s of Connecticut, and the laws of New-Jersey, had been all presented, in the convention of New-York, to the eminent person whose name is on this record, and who acted, on that occasion, so important a part; if he had been told, that, after all he had said in favour of the new government, and of its salutary effects on commercial regulations, the time should yet come, when the North River would be shut up by a monopoly from New-York; the Sound interdicted by a penal law of Connecticut; reprisals au thorized by New-Jersey, against citizens of New-York; and when one could not cross a ferry, without transhipment; does any one suppose he would have admitted all this, as compatible with the government which he was recommending ?
This doctrine of a general concurrent power in the States, is insidious and dangerous. If it bo admitted, no one can say where it will stop. The States may legislate, it is said, wherever Congress has not made a plenary exercise of its power. But who is to judge whether Congress has made this plenary exercise of power? Congress has acted on this power; it has done all that it deemed wise; and arc the States now to do whatever
Vol. IX. ■»
1824. Congress lias left undone ? Congress makes such rules as, in its judgment, the ease requires; and Gibbous
v, those rules, whatever they are, constitute the Ogden.
system.
All useful regulation docs not consist in re* attaint; and that which Congress sees fit to leave free, is a part of its regulation, as much as the rest.
He thought the practice under the constitution sufficiently evinced, that this portion of the com mercial power was exclusive in Congress. When, before this instance, have the States granted mo nopolies? When, until now, have they interfered with the navigation of the country? The pilot laws, the health laws, or quarantine laws, and various regulations of that class, which have been recognised by Congress, arc no arguments to prove, even if they are to be called commercial regulations, (which they are not,) that other re gulations, more directly and strictly commercial, arc not solely within the power of Congress. There was a singular fallacy, as he humbly ven tured to think, in the argument of very learned and most respectable persons, on this subject. That argument alleges, that the States have a concurrent power with Congress, of regulating commerce; and its proof of this position is, that the States have, without any question of their right, passed acts respecting turnpike roads, toll bridges, and ferries. These are declared to be acts of commercial regulation, affecting not only the interior commerce of the State itself, but also commerce between different States. Therefore, p. 19as all these are commercial regulations, and are1824. yet acknowledged to be rightfully established by
Gibbons
the States, it follows, as is supposed, that the v.
Ogden
States must have a concurrent power to regulate commerce.
Now, what was the inevitable consequence of this mode of reasoning? Does it not admit the power of Congress, at once, upon all these minor ob jects of legislation? If all these be regulations of commerce, within the meaning of the consti tution, then, certainly, Congress having a con current power to regulate commerce, may esta blish ferries, turnpikes, bridges, &c. and provide for all this detail of interior legislation. To sus tain the interference of the State, in a high con cern of maritime commerce, the argument adopts a principle which acknowledges the right of Con gress, over a vast scope of internal legislation, which no one has heretofore supposed to be within its powders. But this is not all; for it is admitted, that when Congress and the States have power to legislate over the same subject, the power of Congress, when exercised, controls or extin guishes the State power; and, therefore, the con sequence would seem to follow, from the argu ment, that all State legislation, over such subjects as have been mentioned, is, at all times, liable to the superior power of Congress; a consequence, which no one would admit for a moment. The truth was, he thought, that all these things wrere, in their general character, rather regulations of police than of commerce, in the constitutional understanding of that term. A road, indeed,
1324. might be a matter of great commercial concern.
In many cases it is so; and when it is so, he Gibbons
v. thought there was no doubt of the power of Con Ogden*
gress to make it. But, generally speaking, roads, and bridges, and ferries, though, of course, they affect commerce and intercourse, do not obtain that importance and elevation, as to be deemed commercial regulations. A reasonable construc tion must be given to the constitution; and such construction is as necessary to the just power of the States, as to the authority of Congress. Qua rantine laws, for example, may be considered as affecting commerce; yet they are, in their nature, health taws. In England, we speak of the power of regulating commerce, as in Parliament, or the King, as arbiter of commerce; yet the city of London enacts health laws. Would any one infer from that circumstance, that the city of London had concurrent power with Parliament or the Crown to regulate commerce ? or, that it might grant, a monopoly of the navigation of the Thames? While a health law is reasonable, it is a health law; but if, under colour of it, enactments should be made for other purposes, such enactments might be void.
In the discussion in the New-York Courts, no small reliance was placed on the law of that State prohibiting the importation of slaves, as an ex ample of a commercial regulation, enacted by State authority. That law may or may not be constitutional and valid. It has been referred to generally, but its particular provisions have not p. 21been stated. When they are more clearly seen, 1824. its character mav be better determined.
Gibbous
It might further be argued, that the power of v.
Ogden.
Congress over these high branches of commerce was exclusive, from the consideration that Con gress possessed an exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. That it did possess such exclusive jurisdiction, would hardly be contested. No State pretended to exercise any jurisdiction of that kind. The States had abolished their Courts of Admiralty, when the constitution went into operation. Over these waters, therefore, or, at least, some of them, which are the subject of this monopoly, New-York has no jurisdiction whatever. They are a part of the high sea, and not within the body of any county. The authorities of that State could not punish for a murder, committed on board one of these boats, in some places within the range of this exclusive grant. This restraining of the States from all jurisdiction, out of the bodies of their own counties, shows plainly enough, that navigation on the high seas, was understood to be a matter to be regulated only by Congress. It is not unreasonable to say, that what are called the waters of New-York, are, to purposes of naviga tion and commercial regulation, the waters of the United States. There is no cession, indeed, of the waters themselves, but their we, for those pur poses, seemed to be entrusted to the exclusive power of Congress. Several States have enacted Laws, which would appear to imply their convic tion of the power of Congress, over navigable waters, to a greater extent.
1824, If there be a concurrent power of regulating S^v-^ commerce on the high seas, there must be a con-Gibbons , ■ , . . .
v. current admiralty jurisdiction, and a concurrent
°8de“- control of the waters. It is a common principle, that arms of the sea, including navigable rivers, belong to the sovereign, so far as navigation is concerned. Their use is navigation. The United States possess the general power over navigation, and, of course, ought to control, in general, the use of navigable waters. If it be admitted, that for purposes of trade and navigation, the North River, and its bay, are the river and bay of New-York, and the Chesapeake the bay of Virginia, very great inconveniences and much confusion might be the result-
It might now be well to take a nearer view of these laws, to see more exactly what their provi sions were, what consequences have followed from them, and what would and might follow from other similar laws.
The first grant to John Fitch, gave him the sole and exclusive right of making, employing, and navigating, all boats impelled by fire or steam, (t in all creeks, rivers, hays, and waters, within the territory a nd jurisdiction of the Sta te.” Any other person, navigating such boat, was to forfeit it, and to pay a penalty of a hundred pounds. The subsequent acts repeal this, and grant simi lar privileges to Livingston and Fulton: and the act of 1811 provides the extraordinary and summary remedy, which has been already stated. The river, the bay, and the marine league along the shore, are all within the scope of this grant.
Any vessel, therefore, of this description, coming 1824. into any of those waters, without a license, whe
Gibbons v.
ther from another State, or from abroad, whether
Ogden.
it be a public or private vessel, is instantly for feited to the grantees of the monopoly.
Now’, it must be remembered, that this grant is made as an exercise of sovereign political power. It is not an inspection law, nor a health law, nor passed by any derivative authority; it is profes sedly an act of sovereign power. Of course, there is no limit to the power, to be derived from the purpose for which it is exercised. If exercised for one purpose, it may he also for another. NoX one can inquire into the motives which influence i sovereign authority. It is enough, that such power manifests its will. The motive alleged in this case is, to remunerate the grantees for a benefit conferred by them on the public. But there is no necessary connexion between that benefit and this mode of rewarding it; and if the Slate could grant this monopoly for that purpose, it could also grant it for any other purpose. It could make the grant for money; and so make the monopoly of navigation over those waters a direct source of revenue. When this monopoly shall expire, in 1838, the State may continue it, for any pecuniary consideration which the holders may see fit to oiler, and the State to receive.
Tf the State may grant this monopoly, it may also grant another, for other descriptions of ves sels; for instance, for ail stoops.
If it can grant these exclusive privileges to a few, it may grant them to many; that is, it may
1824. grant them to all its own citizens, to the exclu sion of every body else. Gibbons
v. But the waters of New-York are no more the Ogden.
subject of exclusive grants by that State, than the waters of other States are subjects of such grants by those other States. Virginia may well exercise, over the entrance of the Chesapeake, all the power that New-York can exercise over the bay of New-York, and the waters on the shore. The Chesa peake, therefore, upon the principle of these laws, maybe the subject of State monopoly; and so may the bay of Massachusetts. But this is not all. It requires no greater power, to grant a mo nopoly of trade, than a monopoly of navigation. Of course, New-York, if these acts can be main tained, may give an exclusive right of entry of vessels into her ports. And the other States may do the same. These are not extreme cases. Wc have only to suppose that other States should do what New-York has already done, and that the power should be carried to its full extent.
To all this, there is no answer to be given ex cept this, that the concurrent power of the States, concurrent though it be, is yet. subordinate to the legislation of Congress; and that, therefore, Con gress may, when it pleases, annul the State legis lation; but, until it does so annul it, the State le gislation is valid and effectual. What is there to recommend a construction which leads.to a result like this ? Here would be a perpetual hostility ; one Legislature enacting laws, till another Legis lature should repeal them; one sovereign power giving the rule, tilt another sovereign power should p. 25abrogate it; and ail this under the idea of can 1824. current legislation!
Gibbons
But further; under this concurrent power, the v.
Ogden.
State does that which C^igress cannot do; that is, it gives preferences to the citizens of some States over those of others. I do not mean here the advantages conferred by the grant on the grantees; but the disadvantages to which it sub jects all the other citizens of New-York. To im pose an extraordinary tax on steam navigation visiting the ports of New-York, and leaving it free every where else, is giving a preference to the citizens of other States over those of New-York. This Congress could not do; and yet the State does it: so that this power, at first subordinate, then concurrent, now becomes paramount.
The people of New-York have a right to be protected against this monopoly. It is one of the objects for which they agreed to this constitution, that they should stand on an equality in commer cial regulations; and if the government should not insure them that, the promises made to them, in its behalf, would not be performed.
He contended, therefore, in conclusion on this point, that the power of Congress over these high branches of commercial regulation, was shown to be exclusive, by considering what was wished and intended to be done, when the convention, fol' forming the constitution, was called; by what was understood, in the State conventions, to have been accomplished by the instrument; by the prohibi tions on the States, and the express exception re lative to inspection laws; by the nature of the
Vol. IX. 4
1824. power itself; by the terms used, as connected ^ibtCu^ w’^‘ th® nature °f th® power; by the subsequent
v. understanding and practice, both of Congress and
^den* the States; by the grdfit of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government; by the manifest danger of the opposite doctrine, and the ruinous consequences to which it directly leads.
It required little now to be said, to prove that this exclusive grant is a law regulating commerce;
although, in some of the discussions elsewhere,
. it had been called a law of police. If it be not a
regulation of commerce, then it follows, against
the constant admission on the other side, that
Congress, even by an express act, could not annul
or control it. For if it be not a regulation of
commerce, Congress has no concern with it. But
the granting of monopolies of this kind is always
referred to the power over commerce. It was as
arbiter of commerce that the King formerly
granted such monopolies.'* This is a law regu
lating commerce, inasmuch as it imposes new
conditions and terms on the coasting trade, on
foreign trade generally, and on foreign trade as
regulated by treaties; and inasmuch as it inter
feres with the free navigation of navigable wa
ters.
If, then, the power of commercial regulation, possessed by Congress, be, in regard to the great branches of it, exclusive; and if this grant of New-York be a commercial regulation, affecting com merce, in respect to these great branches, then
a 1 BA Com. 273. 4 Bl. Com. 160.
the grant is void, whether any case of actual col 1824. lision had happened or not.
Gibhom
But, he contended, in the second place, that
Ogden
whether the grant were to be regarded as wholly void or not, it must, at least, be inoperative, when the rights claimed under it came in collision with other rights, enjoyed and secured under the laws of the United States; and such collision, he main tained, clearly existed in this case. It would not be denied that the law of Congress was para mount. The constitution has expressly provided for that. So that the only question in this part of the case is, whether the two rights be inconsistent with each other. The appellant had a right to go from New-Jersey to New-York, in a vessel, owned by himself, of the proper legal description, and enrolled and licensed according to law. This right belonged to him as a citizen of the United States. It was derived under the laws of the United States, and no act of the Legislature of New-York can deprive liim of it, any more than such act could deprive him of the right of holding lands in that State, or of suing in its Courts. It appeals from the record, that the boat in question was regularly enrolled, at Perth Amboy, and pro perly licensed for carrying on the coasting trade. Under this enrolment, and with this license, she was proceeding to New-York, when she was stop ped by the injunction of the Chancellor, on the application of the New-York grantees. There can be no doubt that here is a collision, in fact; that which the appellant claimed as a right, the respondent resisted; and there remains nothing
1824. now but to determine, whether the appellant had, '^**^^ as he contends, a right to navigate these waters; Gibbons f " , ■ , -
v. because, if he had such right., it must prevail.
Ogden. jy0W} ^g right was expressly conferred by the laws of the United States. The first section of the act of February, 1793, c. 8. regulating the coasting trade and fisheries, declares, that all ships and vessels, enrolled and licensed as that act pro vides, “ and no others, shall be deemed ships or vessels of the United States, entitled to the pri vileges of ships or vessels employed in the coast ing trade or fisheries.” The fourth section of the same declares, “ that in order to the licensing of any ship or vessel, for carrying on the coasting trade or fisheries,” bond shall be given, &c. ac cording to the provisions of the act. And the same section declares, that the owner having com plied with the requisites of the law, “ it shall be the duty of the Collector to grant a license for car rying on the coasting trade;” and the act proceeds to give the form and words of the license, which is, therefore, of course, to be received as a part of the act; and the words of the license, after the necessary recitals, are, “ license is hereby granted for the said vessel to be employed in car rying on the coasting trade.”
Words could not make this authority more ex press.
The Court below seemed to him, with great deference, to have mistaken the object and nature of the license. It seemed to have been of opinion that the license had no other intent or effect than to ascertain the ownership and character of the p. 29vessel. But this was the peculiar office and object 1824. of the enrolment. That document ascertains
Gibbous
that the regular proof of ownership and character v.
Ogden.
has been given; and the license is given, to con fer the right., to which the party has shown him self entitled. It is the authority which the muster carries with him, to prove his right to navigate freely the waters of the United Slates, and to carry on the coasting trade.
In some of the discussions which had been had on this question, it had been said, that Con gress had only provided for ascertaining the owner ship and property of vessels, but had not pre scribed to what use they might be applied. But this he thought an obvious error; the whole object of the act regulating the coasting trade, was to declare what vessels shall enjoy the benefit of being used in the coasting trade. To secure this use to certain vessels, and to deny it to others, was precisely the purpose for which the act was passed. The error, or what he humbly supposed to be the error, in the judgment of the Court be low, consisted in that Court’s having thought, that although Congress might act, it had not yet acted, in such a way as to confer a right on the appel lant: whereas, if a right was not given by this law, it never could be given; no law could be more express. It had been admitted, that sup posing there was a provision in the act of Con gress, that ail vessels duly licensed should be at liberty to navigate, for the purpose of trade and commerce, over all the navigable harbours, bays, rivers and lakes, within the several States, any
1824. law of the States, creating particular privileges as K^-v-^
to any particular class of vessels, to the contrary Gibbons
v. notwithstanding, the only question that could arise,
Ogden.
in such a case, would be, whether the law was constitutional; and that if that was to be granted or decided, it would certainly, in all Courts and places, overrule and set aside the State grant.
Now, he did not see that such supposed case could be distinguished from the present. We show a provision in an act of Congress, that all vessels, duly licensed, may carry on the coasting trade; nobody doubts the constitutional validity of that law; and we show that this vessel was duly licensed according to its provisions. This is all that is essential in the case supposed. The presence or absence of a non obstante clause, cannot affect the extent or operation of the act of Congress. Congress has no power of revoking State laws, as a distinct power. It legislates over subjects; and over those subjects which are within its power, its legislation is supreme, and necessa rily overrules all inconsistent or repugnant State legislation. If Congress were to pass an act ex pressly revoking or annulling, in whole or in part, this New-York grant, such an act would be wholly useless and inoperative. If the New-York grant be opposed to, or inconsistent with, any constitu tional power which Congress has exercised, then, so far as the incompatibility exists, the grant is nugatory and void, necessarily, and by reason of the supremacy of the law of Congress. But if the grant be not inconsistent with any exercise of the powers of Congress, then, certainly, p. 31Congrass lias no authority to revoke or annul it. Such 1824. an act of Congress, therefore, would be either ^jfY^ unconstitutional or supererogatory. The laws of v. Congress need no non obstante clause. The °S en constitution makes them supreme, when State laws come into opposition to them; so that in these cases there is no question except this, whe ther there be, or be not, a repugnancy or hostility between the law of Congress and the law of the State. Nor is it at all material, in this view, whe ther the law of the State be a law regulating com merce, or a law of police, or by whatever other name or character it may be designated. If its provisions be inconsistent with an act of Congress, they are void, so far as that inconsistency extends. The whole argument, therefore, is substantially and effectually given up, when it is admitted, that Congress might, by express terms, abrogate the State grant, or declare that it should not stand in the way of its own legislation ; because, such ex press terms would add nothing to the effect and operation of an act of Congress.
He contended, therefore, upon the whole of this point, that a case of actual collision had been made out, in this case, between the State grant and the act of Congress; and as the act of Con gress was entirely unexceptionable, and clearly in pursuance of its constitutional powers, the State grant must yield.
There were other provisions of the constitution of the United States, which had more or less bearing on this question : “ No State shall, with out the consent of Congress, lay any duty of ton-
extending the former act for twenty years from its date, 1824. ami giving two years for making the experiment, ^y^* That passed the Council of Revision without any v. objection, none of the judges having dreamt that °»dS“’ it was unconstitutional. The time for making the experiment having run out, without a boat having been made, and Mr. Fulton having associated him self to Mr. Livingston in the investigation, on the 5th of April, 1803, the Legislature made the grant anew to Messrs. Livingston and Fulton. And that law was again approved of by the Council of Revision, consisting almost entirely of new mem bers, and differing' from the first. The time grantcd by this law for constructing a boat, again ran out ; and on the 6th of April, 1807, it was again extended for two years, and that act also approved of by the Council of Revision. In the course of that year, the experiment was successfully made; and on the 11th of April, 1808, the Legislature, by an act, which also passed the Council of Revision, made a coniract with Messrs. Livingston and Ful ton, by which they hoped to gain, and did gain, unequalled accommodations for persons travelling in the State.
The success of those gentlemen awoke the cu pidity of others, and doubts of the constitution ality of those laws were, for the first time, raised. But, after these questions were first broached, and while opposition boats were actually building, on the 9th of April, 1811, the Legislature passed another act, which also received the sanction of the Council of Revision. These were not judicial decisions; but they were six consecutive and de-
Voi. IX. it
1824. uage.” Under colour of grants like this, that ^Gibbo^T Pr°bibition might be wholly evaded. This grant
v. authorizes Messrs. Livingston and Fulton to li-
°^1"- cense navigation in the waters of New-York.
They, of course, license it on their own terms. They may require a pecuniary consideration, as certained by the tonnage of the vessel, or in any other manner. Probably, in fact, they govern themselves, in this respect, by the size or tonnage of the vessels, to which they grant licenses. Now, what is this but substantially a tonnage duty, under the law of the State? Or does it make any dif ference, whether the receipts go directly to her own treasury, or to the hands of those to whom she has made the grant ?
There was, lastly, that provision of the consti tution which gives Congress power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by secu ring to authors and inventors, for a limited time, an exclusive right to their own writings and dis coveries. Congress had exercised this power, and made all the provisions which it deemed use ful or necessary. The States might, indeed, like munificent individuals, exercise their own bounty towards authors and inventors, at their own dis cretion. But to confer reward by exclusive grants, even if it were but a part of the use of the writing or invention, was not supposed to be a power properly to be exercised by the States. Much less could they, under the notion of conferring re wards in such cases, grant monopolies, the enjoy ment of which should be essentially incompatible with the exercise of rights holden under the laws
182). iibcrative acts of Judges, equally bound, by their '^*7, ^ duty and oath of office, to examine, decide, and OiEnaons B B k k 6 i
v. act upon this objection, if it had sufficient force;
Oiden. t|iey g0 nearjy resembled judicial decisions, that they might well be cited as authorities. They also showed, that the laws now objected to had not grown out of any temporary effervescence, or excitement, or party intrigues. The grant began in 1798, and had been universally ratified down to 1811.
But the constitutionality of those laws had been the subject of a judicial decision of the most respectable character. The act of 1811 had a proviso, that nothing therein contained should ex tend to the three opposition boats actually built and launched. With regard to two of them, Li vingston and Fulton filed a bill for an injunction to prevent their navigating. The then Chancel lor thought the question too important to grant an injunction, in the first instance, and refused it; from that decision an appeal was made to the Court of Errors of that State; there the consti tutionality of those laws was very ably disputed, but supported by the unanimous decree of that Court, and the very elaborate opinions of the Judges, which, for sound constitutional reason ing, can scarcely be surpassed/
New-York is not the only State which has passed such laws. Massachusetts, February ", 1815, granted to J. L. Sullivan, a similar grant for steam tow-boats, on Connecticut river, for
a Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. Rep. 50’,
of the United States. He should insist, however, 1824. the less on these points, as they were open to counsel, who would come after him, on the same v. side, and as he had said so much upon what ap- Osden’ pcared to him the more important and interesting part of the argument.
Mr. Oakley, for the respondent, stated, that there were some general principles applicable to this subject, which might be assumed, or which had been settled by the decisions of this Court, and which had acquired the force of maxims of political law. Among these was the principle, that the States do not derive their independence and sovereignty from the grant or concession of the British crown, but from their own act in the declaration of independence. By this act, they became “ free and independent States,” and as such, “ have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which indepen dent States may of right do.” The State of New-York, having thus become sovereign and inde pendent, formed a constitution, by which the “ su preme legislative power” was vested in its Legis lature: and there are no restrictions on that power, which in any manner relate to the present contro versy. On the other hand, the constitution of the United States is one of limited and expressly de legated powers, which can only be exercised as granted, or in the cases enumerated.* This prin-
a M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. Rep. 405. Per Marshall, C. J. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 4S. Per Story» J.
Vol. IX. f.
twenty-eight years, after the expiration of his pa- 1824. tent, which, on February 11, 1819, was enlar- ^^v^x
r ' i • Gibbons
ged for two years. New-Hampshire, in June, v. 1816, gave him a similar privilege on the Merri- <Mrn mack. Pennsylvania, on the 26th of March, 1813, gave a similar right to James Barnes, from Wilksbarre to Tioga Point, the borders of our State. Georgia, on the 14th November, 1814, gave a similar right to 8. Howard, for all the waters of the State, with steam tow-boats; and by another act, 19th December, 1817, granted to a company, (probably deriving under Howard,) a similar right for steam boats for twenty years. Tennessee has lately given a similar right on the Tennessee river.
What are the provisions of the constitution al leged against the validity of those laws? They are to be found in the powers given to Congress, art. 1. s. 8. to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; and, also, to promote the pro gress of science and of the useful arts, by secu ring, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
If the constitution had not contained either of the provisions referred to, the right of the States to grant exclusive privileges would be unquestion able. At any rate, no point could be presented to this Court, by which it could have jurisdiction to consider the validity of their grants. In free countries, which reject the pretensions of prero gative, it is (unless constitutionally forbidden) a
1824. ciple, which distinguishes the national from the "mbb^^ Stat® governments, is derived from the nature of
v. the constitution itself, as being a delegation of Ogden- pOWer> aiwj not a restriction of power previously possessed; and from the express stipulation in the 10th amendment, that “the powers not dele gated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The national constitution must, therefore, be construed strictly, as regards the powers expressly granted, and the objects to which those powers are to be applied. As it is a grant of power in derogation of State sovereignty, every portion of power, not granted, must remain in the State Legislature."
These principles are all founded on the doc trine, that a strict rule of construction must be applied, in ascertaining the extent and object of those powers which are expressly delegated. The powers delegated are of two classes: such as are expressly granted, and such as are implied, as “ necessary and proper” to carry into execution the powers expressly enumerated. As to these implied powers, the constitution must be construed liberally, as respects their nature and extent: because the constitution implies that rule, by not undertaking to enumerate these powers, and be cause the grant of these powers is general and unlimited. But this rule has one exception: When the means of executing any expressly grant
a The Federalist, No. 82. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep.
48. Per Story, J. .
ed power are particularly enumerated, then no 1824. other mode of executing that power can be im
Gibbons
plied or used by Congress, since the constitution v.
Ogden.
itself determines what powers are “necessary and proper” in that given case.
These delegated powers, whether express or implied, are, (1.) those which are exclusively xeat-ed in the United States; and, (2.) those which are concurrent in the United States and the respective States.
It is perfectly settled, that an affirmative grant of power to the United States does not, of itself, devest the States of a like power/ The authori ties cited settle this question, and it is no longer open for discussion in this Court.
The powers vested exclusively in Congress are, (1.) Those which are granted in express terms. (2.) Those which are granted to the United States, and expressly prohibited to the States. (3.) Those which are exclusive in their nature.
Ail powers, exclusive in their nature, may be included under two heads: (I.) Those which have their origin in the constitution, and where the ob ject of them did not exist previous to the Union. These may be called strictly national powers. (2.) Those powers which, by other provisions in the constitution, have an effect and operation, when exercised by a State, without or beyond the territorial limits of the State.
re Sturges v. Crowninshteld, 4 Wheat. Rep. 193. Per Mar shall, C. J. Houston v, Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 15. 17. Per Washington, J. Hi, 45. Per Johnson, J. Id. 48. Per Story, J.
1824. As examples of the first class, may be men'w» / tioned, the “ power to borrow money on the cre-
v. dit of the United States.” Here the object of the
Oem”' power, (to borrow money for the use of the Uni ted States,) and the means of executing it, (by pledging their credit,) have their origin in the Union, and did not previously exist. So as to the power “ to establish tribunals inferior to the Su preme Court,” the same remark will apply.
Of the second class, the power “ to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,” is an instance. This power was originally in the States, and was extensively exercised by them, and would now be concurrent, except for another provision in the constitution, that. “ citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.”* It is not held to be exclusive, from the use of the term “ uniform rule.” This Court has held, that the use of an analogous term, “ uniform laws,” in respect to the associated subject of bankruptcy, does not imply an exclusive power in Congress over that subject.4 The true reason why the power of establishing an uniform rule of naturalization is exclusive, must be, that a person becoming a citizen in one State, would thereby become a citizen of another, per haps even contrary to its laws, and the power thus exercised would operate beyond the limits of the State.
As to concurrent powers: it is highly important
a Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. Rep. 268, 269. 6 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 193.
lo hold all powers concurrent, where it can be 1824. done without violating the plain letter of the con
Gibbons
stitution. All these powers are essential to State
Ogden.
sovereignty, and are constantly exercised for the good of the State. These powers can be best exercised by the State, in relation to all its in ternal concerns, connected with the objects of the power. All powers, therefore, not expressly ex clusive, or clearly exclusive in their nature, ought to be deemed concurrent. All implied powers are, of course, concurrent, it has never yet been contended, that powers implied as necessary and proper to carry into effect an exclusive power, are themselves exclusive. Such a doctrine would de prive the States almost entirely of sovereignty, as these implied powers must inevitably be very nume rous, and must embrace a wide field of legislation. So also, all enum«raW powers arc to be considered concurrent, unless they clearly fall under the head of exclusive: either as being granted, in terms, exclusively to the United States, or as expressly prohibited to the States, or as being exclusive in their nature, as before explained.
A power exclusive in its nature, is said to be repugnant and contradictory to a like power in the States. This repugnancy exists only in cases where a State cannot legislate, in any manner, or under any circumstances, under a given power, without conflicting with some existing act of Con gress, or with some provision of the constitution. Thus, it is laid down by the commentators on the constitution, that “the power granted to the Union is exclusive, when the existence of a similar power p. 38182-1. in the States would be absolutely and totally con
' tradictory and repugnant."" “ Or where an au Gibbons
v. thority is granted to the Union, with which a simi Ogden.
lar authority in the State would be utterly in compatible."1’ And again: “ It is not a mere pos sibility of inconvenience in the exercise of pow ers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy, that can, by implication, alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.”1 These strong expressions show that the repugnancy of power to power must be such, as to produce actual inter ference and conflict, under all circumstances, and in all cases, in which the power is exercised by the two governments: or, in other words, must be such that the States can pass no law on the sub ject matter of the power, without contravening the express provisions of the constitution; or with out actually interfering with the operation of some statute of Congress. These terms are used by the author of the papers from which they are quoted, to distinguish those cases of absolute re pugnancy from others, “ where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of oc casional interference in the policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitu tional authority.”'' The same principle has been adopted by this Court on several occasions/
a The Federalia, No. 32.
e M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 IFheat. Rep. 425. Per Marshall, C, J. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 49- Per Story, J.
ll appears, then, that the repugnancy which 1824. makes a power exclusive, must be clear, direct, positive, and entire* It cannot be a matter of v. speculation or theory, but must be practical: not o^" a repugnancy that may arise in some exercise of the power by both governments; but one that must arise, in any exercise of such power, which is attempted by the States. To ascertain, then, whether any given power be concurrent, we must inquire, (1.) Whether it was possessed by the States, previous to the constitution, as appertain ing to their sovereignty ? (2.) Whether it is grant ed, in exclusive terms, to the Union ? (3.) Whether it is granted to the Union, and prohibited in ex press terms to the States? (4.) Whether it is exclu sive in its nature, either as operating, when exer cised by the States, without their territorial limits, and upon other parts of the Union; or as having its origin and creation in the Union itself; or as being so entirely repugnant, that no exercise of it can take place by the States, without actual con flict with the constitution of the Union, in its prac tical operation and effects.
All concurrent powers may be divided into two classes: (1.) Those where, from their nature, when Congress has acted on the subject matter, the States cannot legislate al all in any degree. (2.) Those where the States may legislate, though Congress has previously legislated on the same subject matter.
The first class includes those instances where any act of Congress covers the whole ground of legislation, and exhausts the subjects on which it
1824. nets. Such is the power to fix the standard of '^?/>w' weights and measures. Here, when the standard
v. of any particular weight or measure is fixed by
Ogden. Congress t^ whole power is executed as to that particular; and so far the power of the States is at an end. But, until Congress does this, it cannot be doubted that a State may act on the subject; and if the laws of Congress apply only to some weights and measures, all others are subject to State regulation. Thus, New-York has long had a law to regulate weights and measures, which establishes the English standard for that State, “ until Congress shall establish the standard for the United States.”* So, also, the power to regu late the value of foreign coin. An act fixing the value of any species of coin, necessarily disposes of the whole power as to that species. They are both instances in which, when Congress has acted at all, there immediately arises that entire and absolute repugnancy, and that utter incom patibility, which exclude the States from all power over the subject.
The second class of concurrent powers contains those in which, from their nature, various regula tions may be made, without any actual collision in practice. These are, those where the power may be exercised on different subjects ; or on the same subject, in different modes; or where the object of the power admits of various independent regu lations, which may operate together. In all these cases, the State may legislate, though Congress
a 1 R. Z. c. 30. s. 86.
has legislated under the same power. This re 1824. sults from the very nature of concurrent power.
Gibbons
Each party possessing the power, may of coursev.
Ogdehj
use it. Each being sovereign as to the power, may use it in any form, and in relation to any subject; and to guard against a conflict in practice, the law of Congress is made supreme.
The provision, that the law of Congress shall be the supreme law in such cases, is the ground of a conclusive inference, not only that there are concurrent powers, but that those powers may be exercised by both governments at the same time; One law cannot be said to be superior to another, and to control it, unless it acts in a manner in consistent with and repugnant to that, other. The question of supremacy, therefore, can never arise, unless in cases of actual conflict or interference. If the mere exercise of a power by Congress takes away all right from the State to act under that power, then any State law, under such a power, would be void; not as conflicting with the supreme law of Congress, but as being repugnant to the provisions of the constitution itself, and as being passed by the State, in the first instance, without authority. If this doctrine were true, then the provision that the laws of Congress should be supreme, was entirely idle. It would have been sufficient to have said merely, that the constitution should be supreme.* These positions
a Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 195, 196. Per Marshall, C. J. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 34. 45. Per Johnson, J. Id. 49, 50. 55. Per Story, J. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johnt. Rep. 575, 576. Per Thompson, J.
Vnt. IX. H
1824. are all supported by the judgments of this Court, and of other Courts whose authority deserves to Ribbons
V. be respected. Ogden.
From this mass of authority, and the reasons on which it is founded, it results, (1.) That a State may legislate in all cases of concurrent power, though Congress has acted under the same power and upon the same subject matter. (2.) That the question of supremacy cannot arise, except in the case of actual and practical collision. (3.) That such collision must be direct and positive, and the State law must operate to limit, restrict, or de feat, the effect of a statute of Congress. (4.) That in such case, the State law yields in those parti culars, in which such actual collision arises, hut remains valid in all other respects.
The States have, accordingly, acted upon this construction to a great extent. Thus, the power to lay and collect taxes, is admitted on all hands to be concurrent. It is constantly exercised by the States, in every form, and both real and per sonal estate have frequently been taxed by the national and local governments, at the same time. So, under the power to lay and collect excises, the same article has frequently been taxed by both governments. And the power to lay imposts, or duties on exports, and imports, and tonnage, is also concurrent, except that no State can lay any duty on imports and exports, or duty of tonnage, unless such as are absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. So, also, the power to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, is a power p. 43which may be exercised by the Stales. A State 1824. may make it an offence to counterfeit the coin of any foreign country within its territory. Thus, *’. New-York has provided for the punishment of o*dun-counterfeiting “ any of the species of gold or sil ver coins, now current, or hereafter to be current in this State.”* And Congress lias provided for the punishment of counterfeiting “any gold or sil ver coin of the United States,” or of any “ foreign gold or silver coins, which, by law, now are, or hereafter shall be made current, or be in actual use and circulation as money, within the United States.”1 New-York has punished the counter feiting of “ any promissory note, for the payment of money,” including notes made by any body corporate;° and under this the counterfeiting of the notes of the bank of the United States is punished. Congress has punished the same of fence in the law incorporating the bank of the United States/ In all these acts of Congress, relating to coins and bank notes, it is provided, “ that nothing in them contained shall be so con strued as to deprive tlie Courts of the individual States of jurisdiction, under the laws of the seve ral States, over any offence made punishable by these acts.” This shows that Congress considered the power to punish these offences as concurrent, and that it could be exercised by the States on the
a 1 K. L. p. 406. s. 5. 6. b 4 L.U. S. 67. c L R.L. 404. d4L.ttS.91. 61*47.
1824. ground of their own inherent authority, as it is held that Congress cannot delegate any part of Gibbons
v. the criminal jurisdiction of the United States to Ogden.
the State tribunals." Again : the power to pro vide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, is a concurrent power, according to the same principles.1 But the States have been in the constant habit of superadding to the regula tions of Congress, additional provisions, suited to their own views and local circumstances.' These instances, which might be greatly multiplied, show the practical construction put, both by Congress and the State Legislatures, upon these concurrent powers.
The learned counsel here recapitulated the prin ciples laid down, and proceeded to apply them to the discussion of the cause, which he divided into two branches. (1.) The supposed repugnancy of the laws of New-York to the power of Con gress on the subject of patents and copy-rights. (2.) Their supposed conflict with the power of Congress to regulate commerce.
As to the first, the words of the constitution are, “ Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by se curing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”
a Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. <59. Per Story, J. 6 Id. 51. c I R.L. of N. Y. 216. Laics of Georgia, 468. 6 Laws of
Pennsylvania, 320.
This power is concurrent, according to all the 1824. principles before laid down. It is clearly a power
Gibbons
appertaining to sovereignty, and, as such, vestedv,
Ogden.
in the Legislature of New-York, before the for mation of the United States’ constitution. A power to Remote science and the useful arts, is highly important to every civilized society. It embraces all the means of education, and all kinds of me chanical labour and improvements. It is con stantly exercised by all governments, as a sove reign authority, by laws for the promotion of edu cation in all its branches, by bounties for the en couragement of discoveries and new methods of business, and by the grant of exclusive rightsand privileges for the same end. It has frequently been exercised by the State of New-York, and by other States, before the adoption of the consti tution. It is not granted exclusively to Congress. No exclusive terms are used. The grant is af firmative and general, like all the other powers. There is no express prohibition upon the States against the exercise of it. Nor is it exclusive in its nature, it does not owe its existence or creation to the Union. When exercised by a State, it does not operate in any manner beyond the ter ritorial jurisdiction of that. State. From its nature, it admits of a great variety of regulations, both by local and general laws, which may exist har moniously together. Being thus a concurrent power, it fellows, according to the principles al ready established, that the State may exercise it at ail times, and in every mode, until an actual and practical conflict arises between a right exer-
1824. cised under a statute of Congress, and the same right claimed to be exercised under the State.
v. The power, as granted in the constitution, is a limited power. It is a clear principle, that when the means of executing any given power arc specified in the grant, Congress cannot taken by implication, any other means, as being necessary and proper to carry that power into execution. This power, then, is limited: (1.) As to the per sons and the objects in regard to which it may be exercised: these are, “ authors and inventors, writings and discoveries.” This enumeration ex cludes all right in Congress to legislate on the subject of any improvement, which is not an “ invention,” either domestic or foreign. It ex cludes also all right to legislate for the benefit of any person who is not himself the “ inventor.” (2.) As to the means of executing the power, and the time during which those means may be exer cised. They are by “ securing the exclusive right for limited times.''
The power, considered in itself, is supreme, unlimited, and plenary. No part of any sovereign power can be annihilated. Whatever portion, then, of this power, was not granted to Congress, remains in the States. Consequently, the States have exclusive authority to promote science and the arts, by all other modes than those specified in the constitution, without limitation as to time, person, or object; and the Legislature is the sole judge of the expediency of any law on the sub ject.
But this power, though limited in Congress, p. 47is still (as has been seen) concurrent in the States. 1824.
\^/x/ It follows, then, from all the principles before Gibbons
v.
laid down relative to the exercise of concurrent
Ogden,
powers, that a State may exercise it by the same means, and towards the same persons and objects with Congress. A State may, therefore, grant patents and copy-rights, which would secure to the inventors and authors, the benefit of their dis coveries and writings, within the limits of the State. In such cases, the citizens of other States might use the invention, or publish the book at pleasure. But if a patent or copy-right should be obtained under the law of Congress, the right under the State grant would cease as against that of the United States. Suppose the author or in ventor does not apply for a patent or copy-right from the United States, or is willing to secure the exclusive right within any one State only, and leave the invention common in every other part of the Union ; may not that one State secure the right within its own territory? This question may be answered by seeing how far Congress has exer cised the power. An examination of the dif ferent patent laws will show, that Congress has, in various particulars, omitted to exercise the en tire power given to them by the constitution. Thus, by several of these laws, the right of obtaining a patent is confined to citizens, and, consequently, the power of granting patents to aliens, is left to the States. The whole power is inoperative, un til Congress acts under it by legislating : and the law itself is inoperative until some person obtains a patent. In every case, therefore, the power is
1824. unexecuted until a patent is actually granted. ^^ The State may consequently act in all cases.
v. But Congress has confined its statutes to cases o°du,‘ of invention, as the constitution directs. Where then is the power to reward or encourage the in troduction of useful machines or inventions freyn abroad? or, the establishment of any art, when invented at home, and the discoverer does not apply for a patent? or, where the invention is given to the public, and great expense must be incurred to put it into use? All these things appertain to sovereignty. Congress has no power over them. The power, being sovereign, must exist some where, and is, therefore, exclusively in the States. If the nature of the power which is given to Con gress be examined, it will be found that it con fers no authority to create or grant any right or property. It is clearly founded on the presump tion, that the right or property may exist, inde pendent of the power. Thus, one of the com mentators on the constitution says, “ The copy right of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. The right to useful inventions seems, with equal rea son, to belong to the inventor.”" The adjudica tion here referred to, is that of Millar r. 'Taylor,1' where it was held, that the author of any book has the sole right of first printing and publishing it, but that the right was controlled by the provi sions of the stat. 8 Ann, relative to copy-rights.
a The Federalist, No. 43. b 4 Burr. 2408.
But, the common law of England was the law of 1824. New-York, at the adoption of the national consti
Gibbons
tution. There was no statute of New-York simi v.
Ogden.
lar to that of Ann, and, of course, the right ex isted there, without the security for its enjoyment, provided by that statute. The right, also, was local, and confined to the territorial jurisdiction of the State. The policy and object of the consti tution was, to secure the right co-extensively with the Union. Its exercise in any one State, might be affected in its operation by the pirating of books and inventions in the adjoining States, and that evil could only he corrected by the national Le gislature. The right, therefore, in any one State, was imperfect only as to the security and the means of enjoyment.
It appears, then, that the power is founded on the basis of a pre-existing right of property, from the nature and origin of the right, as before stated, and from the terms in which the power itself is granted. The word “ secure,” implies the exist ence of something to be secured. It docs not pur port to create or give any new right, but only to secure and provide remedies to enforce a pre existing right throughout the Union. This power differs essentially from the sovereign power to create and grant an exclusive right. It has been adjudged, under the English stat. 21 Jac. I. c. 3. that a grant may be made for any invention which is new in England, though known abroad.’ That statute, therefore, authorizes the creation of a right
a 3 meat. Rep. App. p. 15-Vol.JX 7
1824. of property in a thing imported, in which no right S*^“<^/ of property, under the laws of England, before
y. existed. But the patent laws of the United States
^don' merely extend to inventions actually made in the
United States, and not to any imported invention. The whole extent of the sovereign power, exer cised by the British Parliament, on this subject, was vested in the Legislature of New-York. A part only was given to Congress, and all the resi due remains in the State exclusively.
What then is the effect of a patent ? It creates no new’ right. It secures the patentee, for a limit ed time, the exclusive right to his invention; so that he has the same exclusive right in it, that he has in any other kind of property. His right, however, is secured more extensively than any State law could secure it. But, within the limits of the State, a patent under the local law’ would be just as effectual. What is the situation of the light, after the expiration of a patent ? The right under the common law of the State, may be considered as perpetual. It was so ruled by the Judges in Millar c. Taylor; but it was deter mined in the House of Lords, that the perpetuity of the right was controlled and limited by the statute of Ann. There is no such statute in New-York, and, therefore, the right remains as at Common law’. The act of Congress cannot de stroy tire perpetuity of a right held under the law of New-York, and which the act of Congress has only secured for a certain lime, to a greater ex tent, and by means of more effectual remedies. The right, then, •remains, at the expiration of the p. 51patent, in the same condition as at its commence- 1824. ment, so far as regards the laws of New-York,
Y, * Gibbons
and within the territorial limits of that State, but v. cannot be asserted in other States. Even if this °£den were not so, and it should be considered that the right becomes common, at the expiration of the patent, then it is like all other common rights, subject to the control of the municipal laws of the State. It is of the essence of sovereignty to con trol and regulate all common rights. The Legis lature, possessing “ supreme legislative power,” may destroy a common right, either by abolishing it, and prohibiting the use of it altogether, or by converting it into an exclusive right. Thus, a right of way may be common, either by land or water, and it may be shut up by law, and the use of it prohibited. So, a right of fishery, in navi gable waters, is common, and it may be prohibited altogether, or converted into a several fishery. In the same manner, as to patent rights and lite rary productions: if, after a patent or copy-right has expired, the right to use or publish becomes common, it may be controlled by law, and turned into a private right. So that a State law may continue or extend a patent-right at pleasure.
Thus, it follows, that whether the right of the patentee remains in him, after the expiration of his patent, at common law, or whether its use be comes common to all, it is subject to the State law, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as all other rights, and may, consequently, be con trolled, limited, extended, or prohibited, at the pleasure of the Legislature.
1824. But the State may control or prohibit the use of Giiibim^ ^^ patented thing, during the existence of the v. patent. If an inventor do not apply for a patent OsaeB- for the invention, no other man can. The right of the inventor, in such a case, remains as at com mon law. Every right or kind of property, crea ted by the law s of the State, is subject to be con trolled and regulated by the supreme legislative power of the State. Il cannot then be doubted, that before a patent is obtained, the State may prohibit the use of the thing invented ; either on the ground that it is mischievous in itself, or from motives of general policy, that it is inexpedient to permit it. As, if it interferes with any general interest, as a labour saving machine, which might deprive great numbers of their ordinary means of subsistence: or, if it should effect any great change in the course of business, which the Legislature might deem injurious, as it relates to the commu nity, Of these questions of general policy, and of the expediency of any such prohibition, the Legis lature must, of course, be the sole judge. Thus, in the act of New-York, to incorporate the North River Steam-boat Company, the corporation is pro hibited from using any of its boats for the purpose of carrying freight. This was done to protect the great shipping interest employed in the navigation of the Hudson River. Would this exercise of power be affected by the obtaining of a patent? The object and effect of a patent is, (as we have seen,) to secure a pre-existing right, imperfect as to its means of enjoyment and its extent. The patentee obtains nothing by his grant, except an p. 53exclusive right, as it relates to the Union, instead 1824. of a right limited to the State, together with more ''^j^' complete and certain remedies to protect and en- v. force that right. If, therefore, he could not use °5den' the thing invented, against the State law, before it is patented, neither can he thus use it after it is patented, for his grant conveys no greater right than before existed. It is the undoubted attribute of all sovereignty, to regulate and control the use of all property. A thing patented, when made and put in use, is nothing more than property; and, like all other property, is subject to the con trol of the sovereign power, as to the right to use it. There can be no doubt that it may sometimes become important or necessary to the welfare of society, to regulate or prohibit the use of a thing patented. Congress cannot do this, or, at least, it has not done it. After the patent is granted, the power of Congress over the subject matter is exhausted. Patented things may be dangerous or noxious, either universally so in every- part of the country, or locally ; or, they may be useful at one time, and mischievous and noxious at another. Patented manufactures may be injurious to the public health, though highly useful as manufac tures; or they may be nuisances to private indivi duals and neighbourhoods, though extremely use ful to the public. Can Congress provide by its laws for the abatement of a public nuisance? or give a right of action to an individual for a pri vate nuisance? If not, these powers must reside in the States. The right to use all property, must be subject to modification by municipal law. Sic
1824. utere tuo ut alienum non ladas, is a fundamen tal maxim. It belongs exclusively to the local Gibbons
State Legislatures, to determine how a man may Ogden,
use his own, without injuring his neighbour. Can a patent give rights, by which a patentee may in fringe the vested rights of others? Can a patented boat be used on a ferry, the exclusive use of which has been granted by a State law ?
This argument may be illustrated by the power to secure to authors the exclusive right to their works. This power is founded on the same rea sons with the other, and gives the author the same rights as the inventor. Can the author, by virtue of his copy-right, publish against the prohibition of State law ? A book may be libellous, or blas phemous, or obscene. Cannot the author be in dicted and punished for it ? May not a citizen maintain an action for the libel? If so, it cannot be lawful by virtue of the copy-right. If the State can punish the act of publishing, it may entirely prohibit the publication. It may regulate and restrain the press, so far as it is not prohi bited by its own constitution.
The laws of Congress arc framed on the sup position that the power to prohibit remains in the States. By the existing statute, they have not provided that any inquiry shall be made as to the utility of the supposed invention, when the patent is applied for. There is no authority to refuse a patent, on the ground of the inutility of the inven tion, and in practice, no inquiry is ever made, and patents issue, of course, on making the oaths and paying the fees, even for things the most p. 55trifling, absurd, and injurious. There is no pro 1824. vision for the repeal of a patent, on the ground of
Gibbons
its noxious or useless character. The law does v.
Ogden.
not purport, in its terms, to give a right to use the thing patented, against the provisions of any State law. The act provides, (s. I.) that if any person shall present a petition, “ signifying a de sire of obtaining an exclusive property” &.c. then a patent shall issue, granting to the petitioner “ the full and exclusive right and liberty of ma king, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used,” the thing patented. The “ exclu sive property” spoken of, is only the same pro perty that exists in any thing else, and, of itself, gives no right to use the thing against the State law, any more than in the case of any other pro perty. The words “ using, and vending to others to be used,” are inserted to make the description of that “exclusive property” complete. The words “ making, constructing, and vending,” would not have constituted entire property in the thing, as one might make and vend, and ail the world might use. The patentee’s right of property might thus be greatly invaded, and he would be left without remedy, except against the “ maker.” The word “ using,” in the act, must receive this limited con struction, or the law of Congress goes beyond the power in the constitution. That was only to “ se cure” a right, and meant nothing more than that a patentee should enjoy it alone, if any body was permitted to enjoy it. But it was never intended that the patentee should set the State laws at de fiance. The acts relative to copy-rights, strongly
1824. support this position. These acts contain no proVC<X/ vision to ascertain the character of the books or
Gibbons iit i t v. engravings to be published, and whether they be sdan‘ guc|) ^ may be safely permitted, consistently with the good order of society and public morals. They grant the same right to the author, as the patent grants to the inventor. In both cases, they depend on the same constitutional right, and only convey a right to prevent others from using or pub lishing without his consent, but not to enable him to use or publish without restraint.
If a State can thus control a right to use a thing patented, directly, it may do it indirectly. If by a positive law, then, through the agency of the Courts, by injunction or otherwise. Or, the right to prohibit the use of it may be delegated to indi viduals, either acting as public agents, or in their own behalf, to protect some other right vested in them; and may forbid the use of the thing patented, or the publication of the book, the copy-right of which has been secured, without their license. So that if an exclusive grant be made by a State law to an individual, with a provision that the thing grant ed shall not be used in the State, without license of the grantee, and there be a patent under the act of Congress for the same thing, the consequence would be, that the State grantee could not use it, because it would be a violation of the patent, and the patentee could not, without the license of the State grantee, because the State law prohibited him. Thus, the State law would be inoperative, so far as it granted the exclusive right; but valid, so far as it prohibited the use of the thing patented.
These principles may be applied to the law now in 1824. question, which gives an exclusive right, and for
Gibbons
bids any person to use the thing which is the sub v.
Ogden-
ject of the right, without the license of the persons in whom it is vested. It contains a granting clause, and a prohibiting clause. The injunction is found ed on the prohibition, and may be enforced, though the grantees might not use their right. Let it be supposed that, from reasons of public policy, the laws of New-York had prohibited the use of steam boats entirely, and had directed the Court of Chan cery to restrain them by injunction, would not the prohibition have been a valid one ? and if so, may not the State determine that it is against the public interest, that steam boats should be built or naviga ted, unless under the direction, or with the license, of an individual, who may be thought particularly skilful in that business? It might, therefore, be contended, that this injunction is to be sustained, whatever might become of the respondent’s exclu sive right.
A State may prohibit the use of a thing patent ed, by virtue of its power over the public domain. A patented thing cannot be used on the private property of an individual, without his consent. The power of the State over the public property, is, at least, equal to that of an individual over his own; and particularly so, as to the navigable ri vers in the State, which are, emphatically, the pro perty of the people of the State, and subject to their authority, acting through the local Legisla ture.
The question has hitherto been discussed, as if Vol. IX. 9
1824. the exclusive right claimed by the respondents, was the right to an invention, for which a patent Gibbons
v. may have been, or may yet be obtained. Hut in Ogden.
truth, his right is not to the use of any invention, or of any thing for which a patent can be granted. Livingston and Fulton do not, on the face of the acts granting or securing the right, claim to be the inventors of any thing. In the act of 1798, c. 55. s. 2L it is recited, that R. R. L. “ is the possessor of a mode of applying the steam engine to the pro pelling of vessels, on new and advantageous prin ciples.” It is not alleged or pretended, that he was the discoverer of that mode, or of the princi ples of its application; or that the mode, or the principles, were secret or unknown to the rest of the world. His right, therefore, is to the use of an improvement, introduced (perhaps) from a fo reign country, and, consequently, not the subject of a patent, and in respect to which Congress has no power to legislate at all. On the other hand, it does not appear, that the appellant has a patent for anything connected with the subject of steam boats, or for any thing belonging to the steam en gine, which can be used in navigation by steam. He can, therefore, claim no right, in this case, un der the patent laws; and there is no questions to any actual conflict between the State right and a patent right. He is, consequently, compelled to rely upon the broad ground, that t he State has no power to legislate at all, for the encourage me nt of any art or science, orfor any improvement connect ed therewith, because Congress has legislated un der a cower which L par.■ / in its. extent, both a- p. 59The result of all that has been said, tends to 1824. establish, that the power in the constitution is strict
Gibbons
ly a concurrent power. That it is also a limited v.
Ogde
power in Congress to promote science and the arts, by particular means, and in regard to particular objects, and for limited times. That all the resi due of the power, to promote science and the arts, by all other means, and towards all persons and objects, and for unlimited times, remains exclu sively in the States. That the States may legis late, in pursuance of this concurrent power, in all cases, and can grant exclusive rights to any thing which may be the subject of a patent, which will be valid within their own territory until a patent is actually issued under the authority of the Union. That when a patent issues, the State has full pow er to prohibit or control the use of it within its territory, though it cannot grant, the right to use the patented thing to others. That it may exer cise the power of prohibition, partially or totally, by direct legislative acts, or through the medium of its Courts, and may delegate the right to prohibit to any of its citizens. That in the present case, the right of prohibition has been delegated to Liv ingston and Fulton ; and the mode of exercising that right, is by injunction out of Chancery. That this right of prohibition may be valid, even though the grant of the exclusive right to use, &c., might be invalid. That the State law's are, therefore, valid, even on the supposition that the right grant ed by them, was to an invention which might be patented ; and that they would be valid, as to their prohibitions, even were a patent issued for the same
1824. object. But that, in truth, the right in question, has no connection with any thing that can be the
Gibbons # -
v. subject of a patent; and if it has, that no patent g en- has, in fact, issued to the appellant, nor does he, in any mode, claim a right under a patent. '1'hat the question, therefore, on this branch of the cause, is reduced to the inquiry, whether the State may legislate under a power, confessedly concurrent, when Congress has not acted at all, or when no person sets up a right under any act of Congress.
But the laws of New-York, now in question, are supposed to be in conflict with the constitu tional power of Congress, “ to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”
This is a concurrent power, according to all the principles before laid down. It was fully pos sessed by the States, after the declaration of inde pendence, and constantly exercised. It is one of the attributes of sovereignty, specially designated in that instrument, “ to establish commerce.” It is not granted, in exclusive terms, to Congress. It is not prohibited, generally, to the States. The only express restraints upon the power of the States, in this respect, are against laying any im post or duty on imports or exports, (except for the execution of their ow n inspection laws,) or of ton nage; against making any agreement or compact with a foreign power; and against entering into any treaty. All these prohibitions, being partial, are founded on the supposition, that the whole power resided in the States. They are, accord ingly, all in restraint of State power. It is a clear
OF THE UNITED STATES. til
principle of interpretation, that where a general 1824. power is given, but not in exclusive terms, and '<^y^/ . « . • 1 Gibbons the stales are restrained, in express terms, irom ». exercising that power in particular cases, that in °Btle"' all other cases, the power remains in the States as a concurrent power. Thus, the commentators on the constitution, speaking of the taxing power, say, “ this restriction implies an admission that, if it were not inserted, the States would possess the power it excludes. And it implies a further admission, that, as to all other taxes, the autho rity of the States remains undiminished.”" And, again: “ In all cases in which the restriction does not apply, the States would have a concurrent power with the Union.” This doctrine applies precisely to the power to regulate commerce. Laying imposts or duties of tonnage, is a part of the power to regulate commerce; and the making of a compact or agreement with other States or nations, is the only method by which a State could make any commercial regulation, which, as it regards its own citizens, would operate beyond its territorial limits. These restrictions imply, that the general power to regulate commerce, is concurrently in the States, and that it may be exercised by the States in all cases to which these prohibitions do not extend. But, the same implication is still stronger from the nature and terms of those prohibitory clauses. The State may lay duties on imports and exports, to execute its inspection laws. That class of laws
a The Federalist, No. 32,
1824. are, or may be, essentia) regulations of commerce, ^Gibbon^ and they derive their authority altogether from
v. State power. The existence of a power to pass
^^h- them, is, therefore, expressly recognised by the constitution. So, also, a State may lay any duty upon imports or exports, or of tonnage, with the consent of Congress. This provision implies, that the power to lay all duties remains essentially in the States; that the exercise of the power is suspended, until Congress consent; and that, when the consent is given, the State law acts of itself, and by State authority alone. The States no where derive any powers from the constitution. All its provisions are in restraint of their authority, and the consent of Congress, in this instance only removes the restraint. A State may not. enter into any treaty; but, with the consent of Congress, may enter into an agreement or com pact with another State, or with a foreign power. A treaty is made with a view to the public welfare, either in perpetuity, or for a considerable length of time, and binds the whole Union. A compact or agreement is generally temporary in its na ture and operation, and is executed by a single act, and binds only the State that makes it. In this sense the constitution must be understood, when it speaks of treaties as distinguished from com pacts. It follows, that general and permanent commercial regulations with foreign powers, must be made by treaty, but that particular and tempo rary regulations of commerce may be made by an agreement of a State with another, or with a foreign power, by the consent of Congress. But, p. 63in this case, the compact would derive all its effi cacy from the original inherent power of the State, not from the act of consent by Congress, which would merely remove an existing restraint.
There is nothing in the nature of this power, which renders it exclusive in Congress. The power itself does not grow out of the Union, like the power “to borrow money on the credit of the United States.” It does not operate, when exer cised by a State beyond its territorial limits, like the power of naturalization. There is no neces sary repugnancy between the acts of the two go vernments under this power, since it clearly ad mits of a great variety of regulations, which may operate together, without direct interference. The restraints specially imposed on the power of the State, relating to commerce, would have been un necessary, if it were not considered as a concur rent power.
The practice of the States shows that the power has always been considered as concurrent. Thus, the State of New-York has passed numerous jaws, which are regulations of commerce with foreign nations, with other States, and with the Indian tribes.'1 As io that part of the power which re lates to trade with the Indian tribes, the people here referred- to may be within the limits of a State. Tims, the commentators on the constitu tion consider it in that light, and contrast the power with that relating to the same subject in. the
a T^sp l.7i w?i’’o/. ■>n(j e..^.s^.>'i<, ^unr-r^M and stated
1824. old confederation, which was qualified so as “not ^^ to infringe the legislative rights of any State
v. within its own limits.”” Thus, Congress has legis-Oedcu' Jated on that, basis. By the act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, it is provided, s. 19, “ that nothing contained in the act shall be so construed as to prevent any trade with Indians, on lands surrounded by settlements of citizens, and being within the ordinary jurisdiction of any of the individual States.” But the State of New-York has also legislated on the same subject, and by the “ act relative to the different tribes and na tions of Indians within this State,” prohibits the purchase of land from any Indian, without the authority of the Legislature; prohibits the sale of various articles to any Indian or tribe; makes nu merous other regulations, as to trade and inter course with them, by the citizens who surround them, so as to cover the whole ground over which Congress has declared its act should not extend. An examinatien of the laws of other States, will show that many of them have legislated, under every part of this power, to the same extent, and, in some cases, to a greater extent than New-York; and will show' the havoc which must be made in the State laws, if this power is not to be consi dered concurrent. .
This power is not only concurrent, but is limited in Congress. It does not extend to the regulation of the internal commerce of any State. This re sults from the terms used in the grant of power,
“ among the several States.” It results also from 1824. the effects of a contrary doctrine, on the whole ^iTY^ mass of State power. Internal commerce must v. be that which is wholly carried on within the ^B^*”- limits of a State: as where the commencement, progress, and termination of the voyage, are wholly confined to the territory of the State. Thia branch of power includes a vast range of State legislation, such as turnpike roads, toll bridges, exclusive rights to run stage wagons, auction li censes, licenses to retailers, and to hawkers and pedlers, ferries over navigable rivers and lakes, and all exclusive rights to carry goods and passen gers, by land or water. All such laws must ne cessarily affect, to a great extent, the foreign trade, and that between the States, as well as the trade among the citizens of the same State. But, although these laws do thus affect, trade and com merce with other States, Congress cannot inter fere, as its power does not reach the regulation of internal trade, which resides exclusively in the States.
It has thus been seen, that this power is con current; and as such, may be exercised by the States, subject, like all other concurrent powers, to the power of Congress, when actually exerci sed ; and that it is limited, not extending to the internal trade of a State. We contend, that the exclusive right claimed by the respondent is va lid, considered either as a regulation of intercourse and trade among the several States, or as a regulation of the internal navigation of the State.
Considering it, then, as a regulatoin of trade Vol. IX. o p. 66GO CASES IN 'HIE SUPREME COURT
1824. among the States, it becomes necessary to inquire into the foundation of the right of intercourse
Gibbons
v.
among the States, either for the purposes of com
Ogden*
merce, or residence and travelling. From the de claration of independence, in 1776, until the es tablishment of the confederation, in 1781, the States were entirely and absolutely sovereign, and foreign to each other, as regarded their respective rights and powers as separate societies of men. During that period, the right of intercourse among them rested solely on the jus communt of nations. By the law of nations, the right of commerce has its foundation in the obligation resting upon all men, mutually to assist each other, and to con tribute to the happiness of their fellow' creatures. Right on one side, springs from obligation on the other. The right to purchase, springs from the obligation to sell. “ One nation has, therefore, a natural right to purchase of another the things which it wants, and which the other does not need.’ The law' of nations being only the application of the lawr of nature, as regulating the rights and ob ligations of individuals, to nations and sovereign States, this is the foundation of the right of buy ing. But the right of selling does not impose any obligation on another nation to buy, as that other may not want, and must be the sole judge of its own necessities.* It follows, then, that any State has a natural right to purchase of any other the articles which it needs, and to open a commer cial intercourse for that purpose; but that every
a Mattel, Druit des Geiis, Ho. 1. c. 8. 1.2. c. 2.
State, being under no obligation to purchase of 1824. another, may, at its pleasure, prohibit the introduc- s^^^/ tion of any foreign merchandise. These rights of v. purchasing arc not perfect rights, and of course °Sdcncannot be enforced by one nation against another; and, being thus imperfect, it depends upon the will ofcach nation, whether it willcarry on any commerce with another, or upon what terms and under what regulations. These imperfect rights, like all other imperfect rights between nations, can become per fect only by treaty ; the effect of which, is to se cure to a nation rights of commerce or intercourse, which it before enjoyed at the will of another. The right of travelling, or of entering into and re siding in one nation by the citizens or subjects of another, depends on the same principles of inter national law’. But the sovereign may forbid the entrance into his territory, either to foreigners in general, or in particular cases, and under particu lar circumstances, or as to particular individuals, and for particular purposes.0 And as he may pro hibit the entrance altogether, he may annex what conditions he pleases to the permission to enter. In the absence of any treaty stipulation, and of any prohibitory regulations, the natural right would exist, and might be exercised and enjoyed.
This being the relation subsisting between so vereign States, it follows, that before the confede ration, each State enjoyed the right of intercourse with all the others, at the will of those others, both as respects the transit and residence of persons.
a Vattel, 1. 2. c. 8. s. 180.
1824. and the introduction and sale of property. The confederation was a treaty between sovereign
Gibbons
v. States, and “the better to secure and perpetuate
Ogden.
mutual friendship and intercourse among the peo ple of the different States,” stipulated, that the free inhabitants of each State should have “ free ingress and egress to and from any other State,’’ and should enjoy in each State “ all the privileges of trade and commerce; subject to the same du ties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabi tants thereof respectively: provided, that such re strictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an inhabi tant.” This article, then, secured the right of passing from one State to another, but gave no new right of commerce as to the introduction of any goods, and not even the right of removing from the State any property purchased in it. The rights of commerce, therefore, as between the States, remained as before, subject to all the mu nicipal laws of the State, except that those laws must be general and impartial in their application. Under the confederation, then, the States retained the whole power of regulating foreign commerce, and that between the States, except as stipulated in the treaty of confederation itself. Under it, all the trade and intercourse between any State and any foreign nation, was carried on by the law of nature and nations alone. Ail trade between any State and another State, as to the right of im portation, &c., was carried on in the same man ner. No State could make any treaty of p. 69commerce with a foreign power, or with another 1824.
x^v^/
State.
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The inconveniences resulting from these pow v.
Ogden.
ers of the States, gave rise to the new' constitu tion. These inconveniences consisted principally in the impositions and taxes levied on property imported and exported by one State through ano ther. There was no inconvenience as to the right of passing from State to State, as that was secured by the articles of confederation. The constitu tion applied the remedy to these evils in two ways: (1.) By express prohibitions on the States, in those particulars in which the evils had been must f sensibly felt, preventing them from levying any impost or duty of tonnage, without the consent of Congress. (2.) By vesting Congress with a general power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States. The constitution docs not profess to give, in terms, the right of ingress and regress for commercial or any other purposes, or the right of transporting articles for trade from one State to another. It only protects the personal rights of the citizens of one State, when within the jurisdiction of another, by se curing to them " all the privileges and immunities of a citizen” of that other, which they hold sub ject to the laws of the State as its own citizens; and it protects their property against any duty to be imposed on its introduction. The right, then, of intercourse with a State, by the sub jects of a foreign power, or by the citizens of another State, still rests on the original right, as derived from the law of nations. Suppose there
1824. was no treaty with a foreign power, and no act of
' Congress regulating intercourse with that power, Gibbons
v. but barely a state of peace; that power would Ogden.
enjoy the right of trade and intercourse with New-York, by the law of nations alone. But that right might be restrained, or regulated, or abo lished by the law of New-York alone. Such was the situation of New-York before the adoption of the constitution, both as to foreign nations and the other States. The constitution has not abridged the power of the State in this respect. It has only subjected it to the superior power of Con gress when actually exercised.
An examination of the acts of Congress on this subject will show’, that, as the constitution has not given the right of intercourse and trade, so neither has Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, by any law, given that right. Here the learned counsel entered into an elaborate exami tion of the statutes, for the purpose of establishing this position.
It would seem to follow, from this view of the constitution and the acts of Congress, that the right of transit from State to State, by land or wa ter, for commercial or other purposes, is founded on the jus commune of nations; that the constitu tion does not affect that right, except in specified cases ; and as to all others, leaves the right as be fore, with a general power in Congress to regulate and control it, so far as it may be connected with commerce ; that the State has the concurrent pow'- er also, to regulate and control it, so far as it may be connected w’ith commerce ; that the State has p. 71the concurrent power also, to regulate and control 1824. it, in all cases where its regulations do not actually ^^ conflict with those of Congress ; that Congress has v. _ made no regulations, which alter or aflect the O’de" right at all, by giving any other right than was be fore enjoyed; that all the regulations of the State, therefore, which operate within its own limits, are binding upon all who come within its jurisdiction; and that if Congress deems such regulations to be injurious, it may control them by express provi sions, operating directly upon the case.
The case has, heretofore, been considered as if the steam boat law's were regulations of commerce among the States, in the ordinary acceptation of those terms. But is the law in question any thing more than a regulation of the internal navigation of the waters of the State ? In terms, it applies only to the waters within the State. It does not deny the right of entry into its waters to any ves sel navigated by steam : it only forbids such ves sel, when within its waters and jurisdiction, to be moved by steam; but that vessel may still navi gate by all other means; and it leaves the people of other States, or of New-York, in the full pos session of the right of navigation, by all the means known or used at the time of the passage of the law. It is, therefore, strictly a regulation of inter nal trade and navigation, which belongs to the State. This may, indeed, indirectly aflect the right of commercial intercourse between theStates. But so do all other law's regulating internal trade, or the right of transit from one part to another of the same State; such as quarantine laws, inspec-
1824. tion laws, duties on auctions, licenses to sell goods, <7, "^ &c. All these laws are acknowledged to be va-
v. lid. They are passed, not with a view or design °s'k’1, to regulate commerce, but to promote some great object of public interest, with in the acknowledged scope of State legislation: such as the public health, agriculture, revenue, or the encouragement of some public improvement. Being passed for these legitimate objects, they are valid as internal regulations, though they may incidentally restrict or regulate foreign trade, or that between the States. So of the laws now in question; they were passed to introduce and promote a great pub lic improvement, clearly within the power of the State to encourage. They operate entirely with in the limits of the State. They put no restraint on the right of entry into the State ; but they ex clude from the right of navigation on its waters in a particular mode, because they deem that mode injurious to the public interest, unless used by particular persons. How can they be distinguish ed in principle, from all the other laws which have been referred to? If steam boats had been per nicious in themselves, or had been deemed so as affecting injuriously other great public interests, could Congress have prohibited them on the wa ters of New-York, by any exercise of the power to regulate commerce ? Could not the State have done it, by virtue of its general power, on its navi gable waters ? Suppose that steam boats were found to be unsafe, and destructive to property or lives, unless built or navigated by persons par ticularly skilful, could not the State prohibit the p. 73use of them, unless thus built and navigated? If, 1824. under any circumstances, the State may restrict the use of them to particular persons, it may do so v. in its own discretion, for reasons of which it alone 0=1 n is the judge.
All this shows that the restraint imposed by these law s, on the navigation of the waters of the State, is merely an internal regulation of the right of transit, or passage from one part of the State to another ; that it is a regulation which, if even in dispensable to the public safety, Congress could not make ; and that the power to make it must, therefore, be in the State.
The right of a State to regulate its internal trade, applies as well to its navigable waters, as to its other territory. Its rivers arc its territory and domain, as much as the land, and equally subject to its laws in all respects. The power of Congress to regulate commerce applies as well to the land as to the water. Commerce between the States, and with foreign powers, is very ex tensively carried on by land. Congress has ac cordingly adapted its revenue laws to the land, by imposing duties on goods imported in carriages, &c. When goods are brought into the State in a carriage or wagon, cannot the State prohibit the transportation of those goods from one part of the State to another, except in a particular man ner, or by a particular road, or in vehicles of a particular description? Where is the difference between an exclusive right to navigate vessels by steam on the water, and an exclusive right to move carriages by steam on the land ? Cannot a
Vol. IX. 10 p. 74State grant an exclusive privilege to carry goods as well as passengers, in carriages or vessels, by water or by land? May it not convert all its roads leading into other States, into turnpikes, levy tolls upon them, and alter and abolish them at plea sure? /UI these arc regulations of the internal trade of the State, but they may, and, indeed, must affect, to a great degree, the trade between the States. By virtue of the right of a State over its navigable waters, it establishes ferries, which are exclusive rights to use parts of navigable wa ters for particular purposes and in a particular manner; and bridges, which interrupt, and some times destroy the navigation of rivers: It grants the land under the water at pleasure, builds public piers, erects damsand other obstructions, and di verts the course of the waters for any purpose whatsoever. By its power over its land territory, a State establishes roads and canals, regulates the carrying of goods, and the amount of tolls upon them, grants exclusive privileges to stage wagons and others, for the carriage of goods and passen gers, and perforins all other acts of sovereignty in regard to these public highways.
It appears, then, that a State may exercise the same control in these respects, over both land and water, within its own jurisdiction; that the right, as to both, rests on the same foundation, that ol a sovereign over his domain; and that it has uni formly been exercised over both in the same man ner. What, then, is the right under which the respondent claims? It is only an internal regula tion of the use of the waters of the State. This p. 75is clearly the case, when it applies to the case of 1824. the conveyance of passengers or goods, on the x«^v^/
~ Gibbons
waters of the State, where the whole journey or v. transit is within the State, as from New-York to O^ei-Albany. Is it in truth any thing more than an exclusive right of ferry over the waters of Hud son’s river? It is, in substance and effect, an ex clusive right to carry passengers in boats navi gated in a particular mode, on the navigable wa ters of the State. These waters arc a public highway, like any other public road on land, and, as such, arc completely subject to the control of the State laws. There are various acts of Con gress which recognise the power of the States to control their navigable waters. Thus, in the act enabling the people of Louisiana to form a con stitution, there is a provision, that the State con vention shall. “ pass an ordinance providin '? that the river Mississippi, and the navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, or into the gulf of Mexico, shall be common highways, and for ever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said State, as to other citizens of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor, imposed by the said State.”’ And in the act for the ad mission of that State, the above provisions, as to the navigation of the Mississippi, are made one of the fundamental conditions of the admission? Similar conditions were also imposed upon the ad mission of the States of Mississippi, Missouri,
a Ingersoll^ Dig. 586. h Id. 583.
1824. and Alabama;“ which strongly imply, that the new '■**'"' '^/ States would have had a right to control the navi-
v. gation of their waters, if those provisions had not s‘,en' been inserted; that there is nothing in the consti tution which could prevent them from doing so, when they should once have been admitted as equal members of the Union; and that Congress could pass no law, under the constitution, to pre vent them from doing it.
But the power of Congress is “ to regulate commcrcc'' The correct definition of commerce is, the transportation and sale of commodities. It is so considered in all the regulations made by the laws of Congress. They speak generally of ves sels and their cargoes, and whatever rights arc given by the laws of Congress, apply to commerce strictly and properly speaking. Any person claiming to navigate the waters of the State of New-York against the State laws, under any right derived from the laws of Congress relative to commerce, must show himself qualified according to these laws, and actually exercising that right under their provisions. Now, if the license here set up gives any right, it is to carry on the coast ing trade, which consists in transporting goods from one State to another, it is not pretended that the appellant was engaged in this trade, when stopped by the injunction. It appears by the pleadings, that his boat was employed in the transportation of persons or passengers for hire, and it is notorious that this is a distinct business*
a Ingersoll’# Dig' 506. 612. 617.
It is often entirely disconnected from any com 1824. mercial object, though sometimes indirectly con
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nected with trade. So it has been considered by
Ogden.
some of the States. New-York once laid a tax upon passengers travelling in the steam boats; and Delaware taxed passengers travelling through that State in carriages. But these States could have laid no tax on property thus transported. If, then, the appellant’s boat was engaged, ban a fide, in the coasting trade, the question might arise as to its rights and privileges under the enrolment and license. But, when no trade is carried on, or intended to be curried on, under the license, it is clear that the license is a fraud upon the Stale law, if that law is in other respects valid. An examination of the provisions of the statutes re lating to the coasting trade will show, that they all relate exclusively to the coasting trade as be fore defined, and do not contemplate the carrying of passengers as distinguished from commerce. Every vessel engaged in it, must not only have a license, but must comply with various regulations, at every departure she takes from one district to another; and, unless it is shown that such regula tions have been complied with, the vessel can claim no right (in any case) to navigate under the laws of the United States. Tt docs not appear that the appellant’s boat has ever done this, or pretended to do it, or, in fact, to be engaged in trade at all.
It has thus been attempted to be shown, that our exclusive right is valid, even if the law grant ing it is to be considered as a regulation or restric-
1824. tion of the right of commercial intercourse be■**“ "^ tween the States, on the ground, (1.) That the Gibbons ’ . / .
v. power to regulate commerce is strictly a concur-Ogden. r(Jnt pOwer (2 ) That the State may act in any manner, in the exercise of that power, so long as its law's do not interfere with any right exercised under the constitution or law's of the United States. (3k) That the appellant, in this case, has shown no right under that constitution or these laws, and, therefore, cannot contest the validity of the exclu sive grant. (4.) That even if the enrolment and license relied on, give a right, it is not the right of
• intercourse for any other purpose than for the coasting trade ; and the appellant does not show that he was carrying on, or intended to carry on, that trade. But that the State law, in fact, is only a regulation of the internal trade and right of navi gation, within the territorial limits of the State: that the power to regulate this, is exclusively in the State ; that the State has exercised it, in the same manner, both by land and water; and that the law' is valid, although incidentally it may affect the right of intercourse between the States.
To which it may be added, that the State law may be valid in part, or as enforced under particu lar circumstances, though it may be void under other circumstances. Thus, the law may be held void, so far as it restrains the right of navigation between State and State, either for commercial purposes, strictly speaking, or for all purposes, including the transportation of passengers. And it may, at the same time, be valid, so far as it re strains the right of internal navigation, strictly p. 79speaking, cither in the whole extent of the right, 1824. or as a mere exclusive right to carry passengers
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in steam boats. Thus, the State law may be suf V.
Ogden.
fered to operate, in whole or in part, so far as it may, without actual conflict with the constitution or laws of the United States.
Mr. Emmett, on the same side, stated, that the question sought to be presented, was the complete invalidity of these laws of New-York, as be ing repugnant to the constitution of the United States. If the invalidity be not total and abso lute, (and that might well be the case with statutes, which are often void in part, and good for the re sidue,) the appellant must further show, that he himself stands in that situation, which entitles him to allege their partial invalidity ; that his ease is such, as that the part of the law which is void, is calculated, if enforced, to affect or injure his rights.
In addition to the general prima facie presump tion in favour of the constitutionality of every act of a State Legislature, this series of laws derives a peculiar claim to that presumption, from the history of the circumstances attendant on their enactment. On the 19th of March, 1787, a short time before the meeting of the federal convention, the Legislature of the State of New-York made its grant to John Fitch, for 14 years. From motives, of the correctness of which this Court can lake no cognizance, the Legislature, on the 27th of March, 1798, thought lit to repeal that law, on the suggestion that Fitch was either dead, or had with-
81) CASES TN THE SUPREME COURT
1824. drawn himself, and that Robert R. Livingston was possessed of a mode of applying the steam
Gibbons
v. engine to propel boats, &c. At this time, all the
Ogden.
laws of Congress regulating commerce and pa tents, had been for above five years in operation, and their provisions familiarly known. The Coun cil of Revision, consisting of Mr. Jay, as Governor, Chief Justice Lansing, Judge Lewis, and Judge Benson, notwithstanding the personal regard they might well be supposed to have entertained for Chancellor Livingston, (who was also a member, but did not sit,) thought it their duty to object to this bill, on the ground that the facts from which Fitch’s forfeiture was to arise, had not been found by some due course of law. The act, however, passed the Legislature by a constitutional majori ty. But he would here ask, who made this objec tion, and what were the inferences it afforded, as to the constitutionality of the law? Mr. Jay’s is a name of peculiar authority ; Chief Justice Lansing had been a member of the federal convention; and both the Judges were perfectly conversant with the political proceedings of the day. They were adverse to this act on principle, and must be presumed to have presented al) the objections against it which they thought well founded. They not only did not think that the adoption of the constitution, and the enacting by Congress of her revenue and patent laws, had made Fitch’s privi leges cease, but neither the constitution nor those laws appeared to furnish any objection against a similar grant to Robert R. Livingston. On the 29th of March, 1799, an act was passed,
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1824. part of the right of legislation; and whether wisely ^7?^' exercised or not, is a question between the go
v. vernment and the people, with which this Court O^00, have nothing to do." Those are the only provi sions on the subject; for it is clear, that the 2d sec. of the 4th art. (which, however, has some times been mentioned,) would not have prevented the exercise of this right: That is only intended to secure to all citizens of the United States, when coming into any State, the same immunities and privileges that are enjoyed by the citizens of that State, and subject to the same laws and regula tions; and, unquestionably, those laws do not place the citizens of other States on a different footing than the citizens of the Stale of New-York.
Those provisions, before specified, cannot ap ply to interfere with the State laws, unless where a case is presented, the facts of which bring it within one or other of those provisions? Now, the case presented contains nothing to make either of the provisions of the constitution applica ble to it. Certainly iw patent is here presented touching the same subject matter, and with which the State grants arc pretended to interfere. On this point the appellant has no right to ask for the decision of this Court, or to claim the benefit of its jurisdiction.
Neither does the case present any ground on
a 6 Jolin*. Rep. 559, 560. Per Yates, J. 563. Per Thomp
son, J. 573, 574. Per Kent, Ch. J.
6 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 1. Per Johnson, J. p. 33. p. 85which the application of the clause respecting 1821. commerce can be made; the vessels not having ’^7. ^ been engaged in trade or commerce, but in carry- v, ing passengers for hire. But if either of those ^s^uprovisions can be applicable, what is the general rule for their construction, as to the extent and Conclusive ness of the powers they confer? In the delegation of authority to Congress itself by the constitution, the phraseology does not imply exclusive power It is remarkable, that even the definite article the is omitted, and it is only pro vided that Congress shall hare power, &c. And this omission was not accidental, but studiously made. By referring to the journals of the Fede ral Convention/ it will be found, that the sixth ar ticle of Mr. Charles Pinkney’s draft has the words “ shall have the power,” &c. In the draft re ported by the committee of five, (art. 7th,) the definite article is still preserved.6 In the draft as reported by Mr. Brearly, the word “ the” is left out, clearly by design." Notwithstanding that, Mr. Patrick Henry and Mr. George Mason, and, indeed, the opposers of the constitution generally, thought, that by that instrument, as originally presented to the people, all the powers given to Congress would be considered as given to them exclusively of the States/ Mr. Henry said, “ the right interpretation of the delegation of those
a p. 75. b p. 222. c p. 323, 324. d Virginia Debates, 300.
1824. powers was, that, when power was given, it was V^*- -^-
exclusively given.” And Mr. George Mason' asks, Gibbons
v. “ will powers remain to the States, which are not
Ogden.
expressly guarded and reserved r” This construc tion, which was the general foundation of the opposition to the constitution, was strenuously disavowed and reasoned against in the Federalist,1 and actually produced the IOth article of the amendment. The same doctrine was, neverthe less, maintained by one of the counsel in the case of Sturges v. CrowntnshieldJ He says, “every power given to the constitution, unless limited, is entire, exclusive and supreme.” But the Court held differently; that the grant of a power to Con gress does not imply a prohibition on a State to exercise the same right/ And the doctrine is very fully enlarged upon by Mr. Justice Story, in Hous ton v. Moore.1 It is also very clearly laid down in the case already cited, by Thompson, J. and by Kent, Ch. J/ But the rule is more strongly, and perhaps not less justly, laid down by Judge Tucker, in his edition of Blackstone's Commen taries* after alluding to the clauses restraining the powers given, he says, “ the sum of all which appears to be, that the powers delegated to the federal government are, in all cases, to receive the
a Virginia Debate*, 313. b Nos. 32. 82. c 4 Wheat. Rep. 124.
e 5 Wheat. Rep. 48. 54. f Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. Rep. 565. 571. g Tucker’s Bl. Comm. Part 1. App. D. p. 154.
most strict construction that the instrument will 1824. bear, where the rights of a State, or of the peo-
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pie, either collectively or individually, may be
Ogden.
drawn in question.” This rule of construction must be correct; for the constitution gives no thing to the States or to the people. Their rights existed before it was formed, and are derived from the nature of sovereignty and the principles of freedom. The constitution gives only to the gene ral government, and so far as it operates on State or popular rights, it takes away a portion, which it gives to the general government. Tn respect to extent and range, this delegation of powers ought, perhaps, to be liberally construed; but the States or the people must not be thereby excluded from the exercise of any part of the sovereign or popu lar rights held by them before the adoption of the constitution, except, where that instrument has given it exclusively to the general government. The 10th amendment of the constitution was adopted to secure that construction, and it is con formable to the rules of reason and law, in con struing every similar instrument. The truth of this rule has, however, been sometimes contro verted, by referring to the power of naturaliza tion as exclusive, and reasoning from that to the others. Naturalization is decided by this Court to be an exclusive power; but it must be so con sidered, not from the grant of it in the 7th article, but from the force and necessary effect of the 2d sec. of the 4th article. It is, therefore, an excep tion, and does not shake the general rule.
It is of very little importance, whether the power
1824. to regulate commerce be exclusive or concur rent. since this State grant does not, in fact, in Gibbons
v. terfere with any congressional regulation of com Ogden.
merce. But. as the exclusive nature of that power hits been always insisted on, and used as an argu ment against this grant, it may be right, to consider the solidity of the assertion.
The expression, concurrent powers, is object ed to, as if it implied equality in the rights vested in Congress and the States. It is only a verbal criticism, that it would be more correct if the term used was co-ordinate. The term, concurrent, is adopted by the Federalist, and has constantly Ireen used to express those powers. It is always understood, when so applied, that the exercise by the States must be subordinate, and never can be in collision with that by Congress. It has been said, commerce is an unit: the meaning of that ex pression does not very clearly appear, nor its force and application to the argument. If it be an unit, the constitution has broken it into fractions, and given to the States the exclusive control of one of the fractions. But further, the regulations relating to that unit, arc many and various: some acting on one part, and some on another, and operating on it in different ways. It is with these regulations, that, this discussion has to do; and the question still remains, whether some of those regulations may not, subordinately, emanate from the States.
As Congress has no power to regulate the in ternal commerce of any State, none of its regu lations can affect so much of the exclusive grant, as p. 89restrains vessels which are only used within the 1824. States; nor can it. give to any man a permission
Gibbons
to carry on any steam boat navigation, which, in v.
Ogden.
its beginning, and ending, and course, is entirely con fined within- the waters of the State : for instance, between New-York and Albany ; on Cayuga lake; on lake Ontario, and the St. Lawrence, from Ni agara to Ogdensburg. The only questions can be, as to navigation between foreign countries, or ano ther State and New-York; and even there, the power of Congress could only be extended to fair cases of trading, within the purview of the consti tution, and not to the mere transportation of pas sengers; nor to any colourable pretence of trading, as a cover for carrying passengers, and defeating the grant. This distinction is, in itself, of great consequence, and peculiarly applicable to the case before the Court, in which the complainant states, and the defendant admits, the vessels to have been employed in the transportation of passengers. The power given to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and between the several States, relates to commerce, in the proper accep tation of the term ; “the exchange of one thing for another; the interchange of commodities ; trade or traffic.” This is the direct subject of the power; and by force of the auxiliary power, “to make all laws which shall be necessary for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,” Congress has passed laws for erecting ports of entry and delive ry, lor the collection of duties, regulation of sea men and ships employed in foreign commerce, or that between the States. Ports, duties, seamen
Vol. IX. 12
1324. and ships, afford the means of regulating com'fTY"'*"' merce, and therefore, so far as they are used in Gibbons 7 w -
v. such commerce, they come within the powers of
°5deM’ Congress. It has an incidental power, indeed, to regulate navigation, but only so far as that navi gation is, or may be, subservient to the commerce it has a direct power to regulate. It has no right to interfere with the navigation of the navigable waters of any State, or even where they arc com mon to two States, except so far as that navigation is used for, or applicable to, the purposes of the commerce it has the power to regulate ; and it is a proposition unequivocally false, when asserted generally, that Congress has power to interfere with or regulate the navigation of the navigable waters of any State or States. The proposition can only be made true, by adding the qualification, “ in so far as that navigation is used in foreign commerce, or commerce between the States.” It is contended, that the navigable waters belong pe culiarly to the Federal government, and not to the States within which they are. This position, com bined with some others, made by the appellant’s counsel, leads to alarming results. We have ca nals of which we are proud, and from their tolls the State anticipates large profits: one is laying out from Sharon, in Connecticut, to the Hudson ; and another contemplated through New-Jersey, from the Delaware to the Hudson, Those alrea dy in operation, run from navigable waters to na vigable waters ; from lake Eric or Champlain to the Hudson : those projected, are to be from one State to another. Their utility and profits must p. 91result from transporting the produce of Canada, 1824. or other States, to New-York, principally for ex- '“J^^/ portation and foreign trade; and bearing back, in v. return, the products of foreign commerce to those °S eUplaces. They are, then, instruments of foreign commerce, and of that among the States; and mere channels of communication between naviga ble waters, or different States. Now, where a power is given to Congress, all the means which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the execution of that power, are also given." It is contended, that it belongs exclusively to Congress to regulate the navigation and vessels that arc the medium of foreign trade, and that between the States; this commerce is an unit, and cannot be divided ; the navigable waters belong to the general govern ment, and not to the States ; no State has a right to collect revenue from foreign trade, or that be tween the States. If these positions be consider ed together, what becomes of the State control over our canals, the craft on them, or the tolls from them ? the pier at Black Rock, or the basin at Albany ? If the power of Congress over com merce be exclusive, it must also have exclusive con trol over the means of carrying it on. No State, then, should be mad enough to make another ca nal, susceptible of being used for intercourse be tween the States, or foreign commerce.
But there is no grant in the constitution giving the navigable waters peculiarly to the Federal go-
1824. vernment, and not to the States within which they ''"^'T',■ "'*“' may be ; nor is it traced to any want, but to some Gibbons . . , , . . ,
v. mystical consequence of the Union itself. The
Ogden, potion [s entirely denied, and met by another, of which the strictest examination is solicited. It is this : the Federal government can do no act on the navigable waters within the limits oj the Uni ted States, which, or a corresponding act to which, it cannot do on the land, within the same limits. If it can, let the act be named. Then the navigable waters belong no more to the Fede ral government, and are no otherwise aflected by the Union, than the land itself. Both are equally subject to the jurisdiction of the general govern ment, for the exercise of all powers delegated to it by the constitution, and both equally subject to State jurisdiction, for the exercise of all powers connected with State sovereignty. It is said, that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction belong exclu sively to the Federal government; but this Court has decided, that the grant to the United States in the constitution, of all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, does not extend to a cession of the waters in which those cases may arise, or of general jurisdiction over the same ; and that the general jurisdiction over the place, subject to this grant, adheres to the territory as a portion not yet given away ; and that the residuary powers of legislation still remain in the State. Besides, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction depends either on the place where the act is done, or the nature of
the act itself. The place gives no jurisdiction, 1824. where the navigable waters in which the tide ebbs and Hows are within the body of a county or a *• State, or of two States." Accordingly, the Jaws ^1<n giving jurisdiction of crimes to the District and Circuit Courts, confine it to ** places out of the ju risdiction of any particular State.” If the Admi ralty Court has cognisance of any matter done on navigable waters within a State, it is derived, not from the locus, but from the causa litis, which gives jurisdiction, though it should arise on land : for instance, seamen’s wages, founded on ship ping articles made on land, have always, and charter parties and policies of insurance, have lately, been held to be of admiralty jurisdiction?
But, it is further said, to prove the exclusive control of the general government over those na vigable waters, that they are regarded and treated as the high seas, since this admiralty and mari time jurisdiction includes “ all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters which arc navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts, as well as upon the high seas.” The seizures allu ded to, are for breaches of commercial law’s, co ining under the constitutional powers of Congress, and the authority of the United States over the place, on that account, is equal, whether the of-
« 4 tot 137,13 8, 139, 140. 12 Co. 129. Moor, 122. 591, 892.
6 De Lorio v. Boit, 2 Gallit. Rep. 308.
1824. fence be committed on land or water; and the very next sentence gives to the same District Gibbons
v. Court “ exclusive original cognisance of all sei Ogden.
zures on land, or other waters, than as aforesaid made.” In fact, analogous provisions for regula ting foreign commerce by land, are made by the act of the 2d of March, 1821, “further to regu late the entry of merchandise imported into the United States from any adjacent territory.” It directs every conductor of any carriage or sleigh, and every other person coming from any adjacent foreign territory into the United States, with mer chandise subject to duty, immediately on arrival within the United States, to deliver a manifest, &c. at the office of the nearest Collector, or De puty Collector, to be verified on oath; for non compliance, the carriage or sleigh shall be for feited. The duties to be paid or secured by bonds; and all penalties and forfeitures to be sued for and recovered in the manner prescribed by the general collection law. Clearly, then, Congress has no more power over the navigable waters, than over the land; nor over the ships, than it has over the carriages and sleighs engaged in the same kind of commerce. It might register, enrol and license the latter, if it thought fit, as well as ships. Noris there any greater control acquired by the ge neral government, in virtue of the existence of the Union, over navigable waters or shipping, than over land and land carriages. The power it pos sesses as to ships or vessels, is only in so far as they are instruments of foreign commerce, or of that between the different States ; but in so far p. 95as the employment of a ship or vessel in naviga 1824 ting the waters of any State or States, has no con
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nexion with the commerce which Congress has v.
Ogdew-
power to regulate; neither that employment, nor its regulation or prohibition, falls within the pur view of the federal constitution. It could not, 1 think, be seriously contended, that Congress can regulate the carrying of passengers from any part of the Union, who are travelling to Balston, Sa ratoga, or any other place, for health or pleasure; and even if the object of their passing were to trade, that would not legalize the interference of Congress as to the mode of their conveyance from place to place. That naturally falls within the sphere of State legislation ; and we must keep in memory the rule of construction laid down by Judge Tucker, and already cited, “that the powers delegated to the federal government are, in all cases, to receive the most strict construction that the instrument will bear, where the rights of a State or of the people, either collectively or indi vidually, may be drawn in question.” Those who contend, that navigating by steam boats between different States, falls within the powers of Con gress, must admit that it would have the power to prohibit the carrying of goods, wares or merchan dise in a steam boat from any foreign place, or difl'erent State, to another. Now, would Con gress have the power to prohibit the carrying of passengers in steam boats from Norfolk or Eliza bethtown Point to New-York ? Certainly such a pow’er could not be contended for; and why not ?
1824- only because the powers of Congress have nothing '“unit"ns* t° 8fl^ t0 ^'' carrytog of passengers.
v. It may be urged against this train of reasoning,
Ogden. thftt Congress has actually legislated on the sub ject of passengers. By the act of the 2d of March, 1819, regulating passenger ships and vessels, the fact is admitted; but, though the humane motives which suggested the law, and its provisions, arc laudable, its constitutionality may well be doubled. If Congress has the power to regulate the convey ance of mere passengers, coming by water from foreign countries, it has an equal power to regu late those coming by land, or passing from one State to another. If that law he constitutional, or if a steam boat, only employed in carrying passengers between New-Jersey and New-York, can come within the jurisdiction of Congress, it must necessarily follow, that Congress has a right (and, indeed, according to the doctrine of our adversaries, is exclusively authorized,) to regulate the number of passengers to be received into every ordinary stage coach, though it does not cany the mail, and the size, shape, description, and kind of diligence, and the kind and number of horses, to be employed in conveying passengers between New-Brunswick and Maine, Vermont and New-York, and through the State of New-Jersey, between New-York and Philadelphia! If this legislation falls under the power to regulate commerce, and that power is exclusive, it must be contended, that none of the States in which these diligences may travel, have a right to pass any law respecting them ! Neither this Court, nor the people of the p. 97United States, are, probably, prepared for the 1824. assertion of that claim. The States have always '^TY^' legislated on a different principle, whether the v. conveyance of passenger? was to be by land or ^d”1 water. Every State has, probably, made nume rous provisions on this subject; but, want of time and opportunity has confined research to the sta tutes of New-York and Georgia/
a In those States, 1st, as to ferries anti bridges: In the laws nf New-York, (3d vol. Webster's ed. p. 321.) an act passed 19th March, 1803, grants to John Hansom the exclusive right, for ten years, to keep a ferry across Lake Champlain, from his landing, at Cumberland Head, to Grand Isle, in Vermont, with a prohi bition and penalty against any other person’s keeping a ferry, or transporting any persons, goods or chattels, for hire or pay, across the lake, between the point of Cumberland Head and the north point, called Gravelly Point, on said Cumberland Head. An act passed May 16th, 1810, (6th vol. Websters $ Skinner’s ed. p. 16.) makes the same grant for ten years more, with the same prohibition and penalties, to Russel Ransom. An act passed May 26th, 1812, (/d. 391.) grants, in the same way, to Peter Dealt, and his assigns, to keep a ferry across Lake Champlain, from Ticonderoga to the town of Shoreham, in Vermont, for six teen years, with a like prohibition and penalties for carrying, Ac. from any place on the west shore, within half a mile north or south of Deall’s dwelling house. An act, passed March 28, 1805, (4th vol. same ed, 66.) gives to David Mayo the same right, from his landing, in the said town of Chainplain, to Windmill Point, in
Vermont, for ten years, with a like prohibition and penalty. An
act, passed February 20, 1807, (5th vol. same ed. p. 11.) gives
to Peter Steenberg the same right to keep, Ac. a ferry between
the south west point of Carlton Island and the outlet of Lake On
tario, (the high road to Canada,) with the same prohibition and
penalty.
In Georgia, by an act of the I4th December, 1809, an exclu
sive right is given to Joseph Hill, Ac. for one hundred years, to
erect three toll bridges across the Savannah and its branches, (di-
Vol. IX. 13 p. 98<J8 CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT
1824. It is, however, contended, that the power of '"ihbiijn^ regulating commerce is concurrent. Thia posi-
v. tion, indeed, is by no means universally acceded
Ogden,
viding Smith Carolina and Georgia,) a little above the city of Sa vannah, on the road between it and Charleston; and it prohibits any person’s erecting a toll bridge across the said river Savannah, up or down it, within five miles of the city- An act of December 6, ISIS, authorised John Hill to establish a ferry from Savanna!) to Proctor’s Point, till he has built his bridges. An act of 15th of December, 1809, gives to William Garrittand Le Roy Hammond a right to make a toll bridge, and exact toll, across the Savannah river, from a place on the Georgia side, opposite Campbletown: and to Walter Leigh and Edward Rowell a similar bridge, &c. over the Savannah river, at Augusta- An act of December 5, ISOO, gives tn commissioners the right to establish a ferry over the river Savannah, at Augusta; the lolls to be for the benefit of the academy of Richmond county; which, perhaps, the appel lant’s counsel may think at variance with his positron, that no State has a right to derive revenue by toils on the trade or inter course between two States. The same law prohibits any other ferry or bridge between Williams’ ferry, opposite Fort Moore’s bluff, and Hay’s ferry, opposite Campbletown. An act of 6lbof December, ISIS, gives a ferry across the Savannah, to Ezekiel Dutae; and another is given io Zachariah Bowman and Daniel Tucker. An act, passed 9th of November, 1814, on the express ground of facilitating intercourse with South Carolina, gives to John AVKinne and Henry Shultz, for twenty years, an exclusive right to a toll bridge over the 'avannah, from Augusta, or within four miles thereof; and prohibits the establishing of any other toll bridge over the Savannah, from Augusta, or within four miles above or below the city.
2 - -4s to stores. In the laws of New-KorA, an act, passed March 30,1798, (4th vol. Lnring- £ Andrews’ ed. p. 399.) grant', to Alexander J. Turner and Adonijah Skinner, an exclusive right for five years, of running stages between Lansingburgh and the town of Hampton, in the county of Washington, (i. e. to Vermont or the road through it to Canada.) An act, passed February 26, 1803, (3d vol. Webster's ed. p. 322.) grants to T. Donally and p. 99to. Judge Tucker, in his edition of Blackstone,'1 1824.
■^^-■Z^/ ranks among the powers exclusively granted to Gifaboru?
the federal government, the power to regulatev*
Ogdan.1
others, the exclusive right, for seven years, of the same kind, from the city of Albany to the north boundary line of the State of New-Jersey. An act, passed April 6, 1807, (5th vol. Websters $ Skinner’s ed. p. 186.) grants to John Metcalf the exclusive right, for seven years, of running stage wagons between (he village of Canandaigua anti the village of Buffalo, (L e. the road by lake Erle tn Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan.)
In Georgia, an act of November 25, 1802, gives to Nathaniel Twining, &c. for ten years, the sole and exclusive right of run ning a tine of stage carriages between the city of Savannah and town of St. Marys, (on the borders of Florida.) Sec. 3, gives to him an exclusive right of conveying passengers and their baggage, by water, between Darien and St. Macys, (a coasting trade be tween two ports of entry, if carrying passengers be a branch of trade,) til! a post road is established. An act of December 7th, 1812, gives to William Dunham the right of running stage car riages as above. Add to these, the decision of Perrins v. Sikes, in 1802, ( Day’s Conneel. Reg. in Err, p. 19.) that a grant by the General Assembly, of an exclusive privilege to carry passen gers by the stage, on the post road leading to Boston, as far as rite Massachusetts line, was valid, which may be added as another legal decision on the constitutionality of those laws. Indeed, as lo the regulation of passengers arriving in ships from foreign parts, some of 1 he Stales have exercised, al least, a concurrent power. Of that kind is the act of the Slate of New-York, (2 N. R. L. 440.) and New-Jersey has passed a similar law on 10th of February, 1819. (Justice’s ed. N. J. Laws, 655.) So also in .Massachusetts, (2 Maw, Laws, 629.) by an act of February, 1794, masters of vessels coming from abroad, are required to report passengers, &c. And in Delaware, (2 Lairs of Del. ed. 1797, by S. # J. Adams, C. 134. p. 1354.) an acl to prevent infectious diseases, passed 24th of January, 1797, (sec. 5.) enacts, (hat no master, &C. of any ship bound to any port of that State, shall bring or import any greater
a Vol. 1. Part 1. App. D. p. 180.
1824. commerce, &c. the commerce between the indiV**TY^^ viduals of the same State being reserved to the Gibbons ? z
v. State governments. And he repeats the doc-
°sdcn' trine.* on the very untenable ground, that the re gulation of commerce is not susceptible of a con current exercise: a doctrine which a review of State laws will show' to be contrary to fact and experience. The opposite doctrine is strongly supported by Kent, Ch. J. in Livingston v. Van Ingen/ as the only safe and practicable rule of conduct, and the true constitutional rule, arising from the federal system. And it is the only safe
number of passengers and servants than shall be well provided and supplied with good and wholesome meat, drink, and other necessaries, particularly vinegar, as well to wash and cleanse the vessel, as for the use of the persons on board, during the voyage; and it directs the size of each birth, &c.; and that if any master shall offend, &c. he shall forfeit 600 dollars for every such offence Sec. 7, enacts, that every master, &c. shall pay to the physician who boards his ship, six cents for every person he shall import or land in that State, which he is thereby authorized to recover from such passengers and servants respectively; and the physician shall pay over the moneys so received, to the treasurer of the trustees of the poor in his county. Here is another instance inconsistent with the position of the appellant’s counsel, if carrying passengers be trading,) that a State has no right to raise a tax or revenue by fo reign trade. Uy another act of that State, passed February 5, 1802, the master or owner is required to give bond, that the per son so imported and landed, shall not become chargeable. If the regulation of passengers belong to commerce, and that exclusively, (as it must, if the power to regulate commerce be exclusive,) by what authority can a State Court issue a ne exeat against a trotter or merchant about to leave the State ?
'b 9 John*. Rep. 577, 578- p. 101and practicable rule; it is one which the extent of 1824. our territory would indicate, even if the govern- '
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inent were despotic, in China, the Mandarins of v,
Ogden.
provinces must be intrusted with some subordi nate authority, to make commercial regulations adapted to local circumstances. W ith us, the peculiar nature and principles of our free and federative government, make the existence of such subordinate legislation more prudent and politic. There must be, even in respect to foreign com merce, local interests and details, which cannot well be presented to the view of Congress, and can be, at least, better provided for by the State Legislatures, emanating from the very people to whom they relate. This must, have been percei ved by the framers of the constitution, and they must have felt the difficulty of designating the limits of what ought to be permitted to State authority. They did not, therefore, attempt the limitation, except in some plain cases, which they marked by restrictions and prohibitions; but they guarded against any practical abuse of the permis sion, by securing to Congress the paramount and controlling power over the whole matter. This view’of the subject is exceedingly strengthened, when we contemplate the probable future increase and extent of this confederacy. The thirteen original States were a band of brothers, who suf fered, fought, bled, and triumphed together; they might, perhaps, have safely confided each his se parate interest to the general w’ill; but if ever the day should come, when representatives from be yond the Rocky Mountains shall sit in this capi-
1824. fol; if ever a numerous and inland delegation GiihonT sha'l wield the exclusive power of making regulav, lions for our foreign commerce, without communi-Ogden- ty of interest or knowledge of our local circum stances, the Union will not stand ; it cannot stand ; it cannot be the ordinance of God or nature, that it should stand. It has been said by very high authority, that the power of Congress to regulate eonynerce, “ sweeps away the whole subject mat ter.” If bo, it makes a wreck of State legislation, leaving only a few standing ruins, that mark the extent of the desolation. The position, however, is not correct. A power of regulating commerce is impliedly acknowledged to be in the States, by the 10th section of the 1st article; for that section makes specific limitations on its exercise by them, which would be unnecessary, if the power were not possessed by them ; and tacitly admits (what is true as to all the State powers) that it is possessed in all other matters not expressly restrained. Con gress can lay no tax or duty on any articles ex ported from any State. If the word experts wore not in the 10th section, what would be the conse quence? that the States, and they only, could lay duties on exports; and as it is, what is the con struction? that, although Congress can, under no circumstances, impose a duty on exports, any State can, with the consent of Congress, to any amount; and without asking the consent of Con gress, to an amount and extent necessary for exe cuting its inspection laws ; possessing, in that re spect, a power of regulating external commerce, which is directly withheld from Congress. And
from whence is derived the power to make inspec 1824. tion laws, but from the existing and more exten
Gibbons
sive rigiit of making laws to regulate commerce ? v.
Ogden.
It seems, also, that the 9th section of the same article, paragraph 1, in like manner, admits the power to be in the States. The importation of slaves is, and has always been, considered as a branch of commerce ; and it is in that point of view only, that Congress has authority to legislate on the subject. When, then, that paragraph speaks of any of the States thinking proper to allow that importation, it surely admits in them a right to permit or prohibit; and thus to legislate on what is undoubtedly a branch of commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States.
Indeed, it seems susceptible of demonstration, that Congress did not intend to ask, nor the States to give to that body, the exclusive power of regu lating foreign commerce, or that between the States. In Colvin’s edition of the Laws of the United States/ we find the proceedings, which led to the formation of the General Conven tion. The appellants counsel has selected, as one of these, the representation from New-Jersey, to be found in pages 22, 23. art. 2d. But that can scarcely be said to have led to the convention. It was made in 1778, during the revolutionary war, and to meet objectionable parts of the old articles of confederation. At any rate, it appears from page 25, that the proposed alterations were reject ed in Congress. In 1781/ Mr. Witherspoon
a 1st vol. 6 Ib.p. 28,
1824. proposed in Congress a modified change of the power of regulating commerce, which was also
v. negatived. None of the other States made any OgGen' proposition similar to that from New-Jersey, in
1778. The following, more nearly approaching the time of the convention, better shows the ex tent of what Congress asked, and the States appeared willing to concede." “ In Congress, Wednesday, July 13th, 1785. The committee, consisting of Mr. Monroe, Mr. Spaight, Mr. Houston, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. King, to whom was referred the motion of Mr. Monroe, submit the following report : ‘That the 1st paragraph of the 9th of the articles of confederation, be alter ed, so as to read thus, viz. The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and ex clusive right and power of determining on peace or war, except in cases mentioned in the 6th article ; of sending and receiving ambassadors; entering into treaties and alliances ; of regulating the trade of the States, as well with foreign nations as with each other; and of laying such imposts and du ties upon imports and exports, as may be necessary for the purpose. Provided, that the citizens of the States shall, in no instance, be subjected to Pay higher imposts or duties than those imposed on the subjects of foreign powers. Provided also, that the legislative power of the several States, shall not be restrained front prohibiting the im portation or exportation of ant/ species of goods or commodities whatsoever.'” This is what the
a 1 L. U. S. p. 49, 50.
Congress itself asked for and required. The 1824. ’ State of Virginia was among the first to meet its
Gibbons
views ; and Mr. Madison, in the Legislature of v.
Ogden.
that State, proposed a resolution, which will be found in the same book," as follows :
“ Virginia, to wit: In the House of Delegates, Wednesday, November 30th, 1785.”
[Mr. Madison’s resolution for empowering Con-
• gress to regulate trade.]
“ Mr. Alexander White reported, according to order, a resolution agreed to by the committee of the whole house, on Monday last, respecting com merce,” &.c.
“ Whereas the relative situation of the United States has been found, on trial, to require uni formity in their commercial regulations, as the only effectual policy for obtaining, in the ports of foreign nations, a stipulation of privileges recipro cal to those enjoyed by the subjects of such na tions in the ports of the United States; for pre venting animosities, which cannot fail to arise among the several States, from the interference of partial and separate regulations; and whereas such uniformity can be best concerted and carried into effect by the federal councils, which, having been instituted for the purpose of managing the interests of the States, in cases which cannot so well be provided for by measures individually pur sued, ought to be invested with authority in this case, as being within the reason and policy of their institution:
a p. 5S. Vol IX 14
1824. “Resolved, That it is the opinion of this com^11^' mittee, that the delegates representing this Com-
v. monwealth in Congress, be instructed to propose
Oi'PR in Congress a recommendation to the States in the Union, to authorize that assembly to regulate their trade on the following principles, and under the following qualifications: 1st. Giving power to Congress to prohibit foreign vessels from entering any port, or to impose duties on them and their cargoes; such duties to be uniform, and carried into the treasury of the State. 2d. That no State be at liberty to impose duties on any goods, wares, or merchandise imported, by land or by water, from any other State; but may altogether prohi bit the importation from any State, of any par ticular species or description of goods, wares or merchandise, of which the importation is, at the same time, prohibited from all other places ■whatsoever” In each of those proceedings, it was clearly contemplated, that the individual States should at least retain the power of absolutely pro hibiting the importation of any article they thought fit, within their own respective limits. How far was this intention subsequently departed from : Where is the power of prohibiting the exportation or importation of any article taken from the States by the constitution? They are indeed qualifiedly restrained from laying imposts or duties on exports or imports, but not from entirely prohibiting their exportation or importation ; and they are also re strained from laying any duty on tonnage ; and it is, perhaps, the fair construction of the instru ment, that even their prohibitory legislation, is p. 107under the control of Congress, as having tlie pa- 1824. ramount authority to regulate commerce; but valid until Congress shall have made regulations incon- v. sistent with their laws. A review of some of the °sdtn' laws of different States, will show that they have always exercised the power of making very mate rial regulations respecting commerce. This re view* must be abridged ; but it is of extreme im portance, and if it were possible to spread out in detail the immense mass of State laws, regulating and affecting foreign commerce, and that among the States, it would be conclusively seen, that they have always considered themselves as possessing, and have, accordingly, exercised a concurrent power over both those branches of trade; and that the power of Congress cannot be decided to be exclusive, without declaring to be unconstitu tional, an appalling body of State legislation.
To begin with the law s respecting slaves. The appellant’s counsel has questioned their constitu tionality, and called them of doubtful authority. That expression showed he felt their application and important bearing, if their constitutionality be admitted; and it has never before been called in question. The constitution most clearly admits the right of the States to legislate on this subject, not merely till 1808, but always, unless Congress should prohibit the trade; and yet, as has been already suggested, slaves are treated in that very paragraph itself, as an article of commerce ot trade. Congress, renouncing for a time the para mount right to prohibit their importation, claims the right to lay a tax or duty on it. So also, they
1824. arc treated as an article of commerce in the laws of Congress; for it is only under the power to Gibbons
v. regulate foreign commerce, that, before 1808, Ogden.
they could forbid and make penal, the trade by our citizens to foreign nations, and since 1808, prohibit it entirely. In this point of view it was also considered, and the right of the States to prohibit, it asserted, in the debates of the Virginia convention. On this article, Mr. George Mason observed," “ should the government be amended, still this detestable kind of commerce cannot be discontinued till after the expiration of twenty years.” To which Mr. Madison, in reply, says,* “ We arc not in a worse situation than before. That traffic is prohibited by our laws, and we may continue the prohibition. The Union, in general, is not in a worse situation. Under the articles of the confederation, it might be con tinued for ever.” And again/ “as to the restriction in the clause under consideration, it was a restraint on the exercise of a power expressly delegated to Congress, namely, that of regulating commerce with foreign nations.” Mr. George Nicholas also, alluding to both objections, says/ “ Virgi nia might continue the prohibition of such impor tation during the intermediate period.” And to obviate the objection, that the restriction of Con gress was a proof that they would have power not
a p. 321. 6 p. 322. C p. 323. d p. 324.
given to them, lie remarked, “ that they would 1824. only have had a general superintendency of trade, '^.^ if the restriction had not been inserted. But the v.
i i i Ogdrn. southern states insisted on this exception to that general superintendency for twenty years. It could not, therefore, have been a power by impli cation, as the restriction was an exception to a delegated power.” And, finally, Governor Ran dolph says/ “ the power respecting the importa tion of negroes, is an exception from the power given to Congress to regulate commerce.” The same doctrine is also maintained in the Federalist.'' Let us then see the laws that have been made by some of the different States respecting this branch of trade/
a p. 330.
b No. 42.
c New-York, as well as many other States, prohibited the im portation and exportation of slaves before the adoption of the constitution. The first law was passed in February, 1788; (2 firee.deof, 85.) it prohibits the selling of an imported slave, and the buying of a slave with intent to export him: and subsequent laws have confirmed and increased the prohibition of exporting and importing slaves. It may be proper here to observe, as appli cable to this, as well as to many other laws of the States respect ing commerce, dial if, after the adoption of the constitution, the individual States had not a right to make them, they, and all other previously made similar laws, would, by force of that disqualifi cation, have become inoperative.
In 1792, the State of Virginia passed a law prohibiting the im portation or selling of imported slaves. (1 Pleasants if Pace’* ed. p. 186. sec. 13.) In Delaware, (Lawsof Del. ed.of 1797, by S. if J. Adams, p. 942.) an act passed February 3, 1789, enacts, that if any owner, master, &c. shall fit out, equip, man, or other wise prepare any ship or vessel, within any port or place in that
1824. Indeed, Congress itself has recognised and act \^^r^/
ed on the power of the States to prohibit this Gibbons
v. trade. The constitution restrained Congress (as
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State, or shall cause any vessel to sail from any port or place in that State, for the purpose of carrying on a trade or traffic in slaves, to, or from, or between Europe, Asia, Africa, or America, or any places or countries whatsoever, or of transporting slaves to or from one port or place to another, in any part of the world, such ship, &c. her tackle, &c. shall be forfeited to the State, and shall be liable to be seized and prosecuted by any officer of the custom#, by information, &c. And, moreover, every person so fitting out, &c. shall severally forfeit and pay the sum of 500 pounds, one half to the use of the State, the other half to the informer. It further enacts, that if any person shall export, or sell, with intention to export or carry out for sale, any negro or
• mulatto slave, from that State to Maryland, Virginia, either of the Carolinas, Georgia, or the West Indies, without license or permit of five Justices, &c. he shall pay, for every slave so exported, 100 pounds, and for every attempt so to do, 20 pounds, one half to the use of the State, and one half to the informer. Here is a State law minutely controlling a branch of foreign trade, and of that between the States, and operating explicitly by the officers of the customs. It was passed, indeed, a few weeks before the present constitution went into operation, but long after it had been accepted by Delaware; at all events, it is referred to, and confirmed, by an act, passed June 24,1793, (c. 2 2. p. 1094.) requiring bail as to those offences.
In Pennsylvania, (Bioren's ed. vol. 2. p. 443.) an act was passed, March, 1788, also prohibiting the trade; but, before ex amining it, let it be remembered, that the first law Congress passed on that subject, was in 1794, and that Pennsylvania had accepted the constitution in December, 1787, which, at the time of passing this act, she had recently studied and discussed. Her legislation, then, was not founded on, and did not rely on, any law of Congress tn pari materid. She not only prohibited the expor tation and importation of slaves, but, by sec. 5. of that act, pro hibits the building, Jitting out, tyc. of any vessel for the slave trade, or to sail from the port for that trade, under the penally of forfeiture of the vessel, &c. and 1000 pounds by qui tarn.
has been already seen) from prohibiting the im- 1824. portation of negroes, &c.t before 1808. But in ^ft^^ 1803, it passed “ an act to prevent the importation ^v.
At that time, Congress absolutely permitted llic slave trade; but, would not that law have been valid to prohibit it from that port?
New-Jersey passed a law co the same purport, in March, 1798, fPattfr™’* ed. p. 307. Justice’s ed. p. 371, 372, 573.) when Congress had onlyr prohibited, and could only prohibit, the trade as a foreign, trade. Sec. 12, 13. prohibit the importation of slaves tor sale. Sec. 17, 18, 19- prohibit the slave trade, and the fitting out of vessels, for the purpose of transporting slaves from one place to another, clearly including from one State to another, which Congress then could not do.
Connecticut, in October, 1783, after she and nine States had ratified the constitution, {Hudson y Goodwin's rd. p. 626.) forbade any citizen or inhabitant of that State, either as master, factor, supercargo, owner, or hirer of any vessel, directly or indirectly, to transport, or buy, or sell, or receive on board his vessel, with intent to cause to be transported or imported, any of the inhabit tants of Africa, as slaves, with ipii trim penalties; and made all insurances on them void. And, in 1792, (p. 628.) let it be still remembered, when Congress had no such power, she enacted, that no citizen or inhabitant of that State should transport out of the State, for the purjwe of selling into any other State, country or kingdom, or buy or sell, with intent to transport out of that State, or should sell, if transported, &c. In Massachusetts, (1 Laws of Mass. 407, 408.) an act, passed March 26, 1788, re citing the evils of the African trade, enacts, that no citizen of that Commonwealth, or other person residing within the same, shall, for himself or any other person, as master, factor, super cargo, owner or hirer, in whole or in part, of any vessel, directly or indirectly, import or transport, or buy, or sell, or receive on board his or their vessels, with intent to cause to be imported or transported, any of the inhabitants of any state or kingdom, in that part of the world called Africa, as slaves, &c. under a penalty for every vessel fitted out with such intent, and actually employed, &c. Doubtless, the laws of other States might be produced to the same purpose, if the means of examination had been convenient;
1824. of certain persons into certain States, where, by the laws thereof, their importation is prohibited.'1 Gibbons
V. Proceeding upon the right of the several States to Ogden.
prohibit, and acting under its general power to re gulate commerce, it imposes additional penalties on the importing or landing of any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, &c., in any State which, by law, has prohibited, or shall prohibit, their admis sion or importation. And it makes it the duty of the officers of the customs, to notice and be go verned by the provisions of the laws of the several States prohibiting their importation or admission; and enjoins it on them vigilantly to carry into ef fect the said law’s of such States, any law of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding. How could Congress do this, if the power of pro hibiting the trade were not unquestionably pos sessed by the States, in their sovereign capacity ?
The quarantine laws further illustrate our posi tion. The appellant’s counsel says, these are to be considered merely as law’s of police; they are laws of police, but they are also laws of com merce; for such is the nature of that commerce, which we arc told must be regulated exclusively by Congress, that it enters into, and mixes itself with, almost all the concerns of life. But surely that furnishes an argument, showing the necessity
those already cited, however, are sufficient to show, that the indi vidual States regulated the slave trade, at a trarfe,both with foreign nations, and between the States, by virtue of their own sovereign authority, after the adoption of the constitution ; but before Con gress did, and before they Could do it.
a 3 U. S. L. p. 529.
that the States should have a concurrent power 1824. over it. Judge Tucker considers them as laws of
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commerce, when he says," “ another consequence
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of the right of regulating foreign commerce, seems to be, the power of compelling vessels infected with any contagious disease, or arriving from pla ces usually infected with them, to perform their quarantine. The laws of the respective States upon this subject, were, by some persons, suppo sed to have been virtually repealed by the consti tution of the United States:” (and why must not that be the case, if the power of Congress regula ting commerce be exclusive?) “ but Congress have manifested a different interpretation of that instru ment, and have passed several acts forgiving aid and effect to the execution of the law's of the several States respecting quarantine.” It will be recol lected, that the first recognition by Congress of the quarantine laws, was in 1796; and that only directs the officers of the government to obey them; but does not pretend, or attempt, to legalize them. And, indeed, it could not do so, if the States had no concurrent power, and the regulation of com merce was exclusively delegated to Congress; for the power which is exclusively delegated to Congress, can only be exercised by Congress it self, and cannot be sub-delegated by it. It is, therefore, no reply to the force of the argument drawn front those law's, to say, that they have been ratified by Congress. Another answer to that ob servation is, that the supposed ratification by Con-
“ Tuck. 'Black, part 1st. Appen. D. p. 251. Vol. TX. 15
1824. gress did not take place until 1796; and that ma ny of those laws were in active operation several Gibbons
v. years before. For instance, as few out of many : Ogden.
Next! Hampshire passed her quarantine laws first, February 3d, 1789,' and again on the 25th of Sep tember, 1792.* Connecticut passed hers in May, 1795." The laws of Maryland'1 show the tempo rary continuation of those laws in that State, front 1784 to 1785, from 1785 to 1792, from 1792 to 1799, and so down to 1810 ; and the 2d vol/con tains a law passed in November, 1793, giving to the Governor the strongest powers on the subject. The State of Virginia passed, 26th of December, 1792/“an act reducing into one the several acts to oblige vessels coming from foreign parts, to perform quarantine ;” which act was amended on the 5th of December, 1793;* and further amended on the 19th of December, 1795? Georgia passed her quarantine law December 17th, 1793.' Un doubtedly those laws derive their efficacy from the sovereign authority of the States ; and they ex pressly restrain, and indeed prohibit, the entry of vessels into part of the waters and ports of the States. They are all so similar, that one or two
ft Melcher's cd. p. 302, 6 p, 304. e p. fill. d 1 vol. p. 270. e p, 200. f I vol, p. 244. §p. 313. h p, 349. i Marbury ^ Crawford's Dig. p, 393.
may suffice as examples. The quarantine law of 1824. Georgia, s. 1. prohibits the landing of persons or
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goods coming in any vessel from an infected place,V.
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without permission from the proper authority; and enacts, that the said vessels or boats, and the per sons and goods coming and imported in, or going on board during the time of quarantine ; and all ships, vessels, boats, and persons, receiving any person or goods under quarantine, shall be sub ject to such orders, rules and directions, touching quarantine, as shall be made by the authority di recting the same. The law’ of Delaware, passed the 24th of January, 1797,’ s. 1. provides, that “no master of a ship bound to any part of that State, having on board any greater number of passengers than forty, or any person with an infectious dis ease, or coming from a sickly port, shall bring his ship, or suffer it to be brought, nearer than one mile to any port or place of landing; nor land such persons, or their goods, till he shall have obtain ed a permit.” The law’ of Massachusetts, passed June 22d, 1797, s. 6/ enacts, that “vessels passing the castle, in Boston harbour, may be questioned and detained ; s. 12. that vessels nt any other port than Boston, may be prevented from coming up, and brought to anchor where the select men shall direct; s. 4. empowers the select men of any town, bordering on either of the neighbouring States, to appoint persons to attend at ferries and other proper places, by or over which passengers
a 2 Del. Lawn, ed. 1797, cap. 134. p. 1354. 5 2 JU#M. Laux, p. 788.
1824. may pass from such infected places, which persons
^ave P°wer t0 examine, stop and restrain such pas-
v. sengers from travelling, until licensed by a Justice °£dl“' of the peace, or the select men ; and a fine of 100 pounds is enacted on the passenger presuming to travel onward ; s- 5. gives power to seize and de tain suspected goods coming from any other State,” &c. By an act of June 20th, 1799, s. 10/ “ any master, &c. who shall enter the harbour of Boston after notice of a quarantine, for all vessels coming from the same place, &c., or who shall land, or suffer to be landed, any passenger or goods, with out permission of the board of health, is subject to - fine and imprisonment/* These are all obviously direct regulations of trade, and so is the whole of every quarantine system.
The regulation of pilots in sea ports, flows from the power of regulating external commerce. This power, like that of making quarantine regulations, has hitherto been exclusively exercised by the se veral States ; Congress having only made one law on the subject, and that seems explicitly to recog nise the concurrent power of the States, and to place over it the true constitutional control. By the 4th sec. of the act of August 7th, 1789, c. 9/it is enacted, that “all pilots in the bays, inlets, ri vers, harbours and ports of the United States, shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the States, respectively, wherein such pilots may be; or with such laws as the States
a p. 872. b 2 U. S. L. p. 3'1.
may respectively hereafter enact for the purpose, 1824. until further legislative provision shall be made
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by Congress.” Now, it is a principle which can
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not be too often brought into view or enforced, that Congress cannot delegate to State Legis latures, the exercise of powers which are given to it exclusively; and the very act of referring to those law’s, is a recognition that the power to le gislate on the subject is concurrent.
In like manner, the law’s regulating light houses, buoys, &c. are all exercises of the implied pow'ers derived from that of regulating commerce. They have hitherto been generally left to Congress; but it does not follow from thence, that they are exclu sive. Can it be doubted, that any State has a right to establish a light house or buoys at its own expense, in one of its harbours ? That a State has such a power cannot be questioned, if it be shown that individuals have. Some time in 1798, a number of the inhabitants of New-Bedford, Mas sachusetts, raised a fund by subscription, for build ing and maintaining a light house at Clark’s Point, at the entrance of the harbour of New-Bed ford. They maintained it, and kept it regularly lighted for about a year ; and the act of Congress admits their right to do so. On the 29th of April, 1890, Congress enacted, that the light house lately erected at Clark’s Point, &c., shall and may be supported at the expense of the United States, &c. Provided, that the property and jurisdiction of the said light house, and sufficient territon’ for
« 3 V. S. L. p. 366. c. 193. s. 3.
1824. the accommodation thereof, shall be fully ceded and legally vested in the United States. Gibbons
The laws of Congress on this subject, recognise Ogden.
the right of the States to maintain light, houses, if they please. The first act, passed August 7th, 1789,“ directs, that their expenses, after the 15th of August, 1789, shall be defrayed out of the treasu ry of the United States: Provided, nevertheless, that none of the said expenses shall continue to be so defrayed by the United States, after the ex piration of one year, unless such lighthouses shall, in the mean time, be ceded, &c. Few States did make the requisite cession ; and by the act of July, 1790/ the time was extended to the 1st of July, 1791, and so, from time to time, for five or six-years, till all the States came in ; during which the light houses in several of the States were kept up by their authority, without the control of Con gress.
The inspection laws arc very important regula tions of trade. Tucker says, “ there seems to be one class of laws, which respects foreign com merce, over which the States still retain an abso lute authority; those 1 mean which relate to the inspection of their own produce, for the execution of which, they may even lay an impost or duty, as far as may be absolutely necessary for that purpose. Of this necessity, it seems presumable, they arc to be regarded as the sole judges.” The extent
1821.
and importance of* this system of regulations does not strike the mind at the first view ; nor do
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v.
the powerful inferences it affords, to show the con
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current right in the States to regulate commerce. Judge Tucker has very imperfectly stated their extent. They do, indeed, regulate, in almost every State, the foreign trade, so far as it is con nected with our produce to be exported; but they do not confine themselves to produce to be ex ported, they relate to imports also. They act by restraining, and sometimes prohibiting, the expor tation and importation of certain articles. Before examining those laws, it may be asked, from whence is the right of restraining derived, but from the more extended right of prohibiting? The difference between regulation or restraining and interdiction, is only a difference of degree in the exercise of the same right, and not a differ ence of right. The article in the constitution, art. 1. sec. 10. impliedly allows that right to be in the several States, and the right to enforce their laws by any other means than imposts and duties, and, therefore, by prohibitions of exports or im ports. The right does not depend on the idea, that the thing prohibited or restrained from being exported or imported, is dangerous or noxious; even if that could, ex necessitate, create a right, and give it to the State, instead of the congres sional jurisdiction ; on the contrary, the rules and enactments seem arbitrary.’
a For instance, as to I lie number of hoops on. and size of bar rels or casks, (2 X Ji X. of N. F. p. 331. s. 3. p. 325. s. 3. p.
1824. As to trade with the Indian tribes, without stopV'oibbons’/ ping ^° enter int0 details, it is sufficient to say, it
v. must stand on the same footing as foreign com-
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390.5,3,4. 1 Laws of Maryland, Maxey’s ed. 218. 1 Fir. Laws, Pace &■ Pleasant’s cd. p. 352. s. 3. p. 350. s. 3. Laws of Conn. Hudson ^ Goodwin’s ed. p. 394. s. 1,2. 5, 6. 8, 9.) as to quantity as well as quality or kind, of their contents. What pieces of beef or park, (2 N. R. L. of N. Y. p. 326. s. 4. p. 32b. s. 5. 9. p. 32y. s. 11.) or quantity and sise of nails should be in one cask, (Lures of Hl. H. Melcher’s ed, 386. Laws of Conn. p. 394. s. 2. p, 256. s. 2.) or the length, breadth, and thickness of staves and heading, lumber, boards, shingles, &c. (2 N. R. L. of N. Y. p, 336. s. 1. 1 Laws of Fir. 237. Laws of Conn. p. 397. s. 21.) These regulations have no object but to improve our foreign trade, and raise the character and reputation of the arti cles in a foreign market; and if the States have no right to pass laws prohibiting exportation, what can prevent a person having an inferior article, from exporting it, in its uninspected state, and taking hie chance for the price it might bring in a foreign market?
These laws are much too numerous and complicated to he de tailed ; but a very slight examination of some of them will show the very extensive powers for regulating commerce, possessed by the Legislatures from which they emanate. Some operate by the forfeiture of the uninspected article, as in the New-York act for inspecting pot and pearl ashes. (2 N. R. L. p. 335. s. 8.) It gives the liberty of entering onboard of any ship, &c. to search for any pot or pearl ashes, shipped or shipping for exportation; and, it any unbranded be discovered, it is forfeited,and the captain sub ject to a pecuniary fine. A similar/sr/e^ure is given in the same State, (p. 3 39. s. 8.) and a penalty on the master, (p. 339, 340. s. 10.) In Kentucky, a similar forfeiture is given, for attempting to export unbranded flour. {Ky. Laws, Toidmau’s ed. 440.) In New-Hampshire, a like forfeiture is given of unpacked beef or pork shipped for exportation. {Laws of N. IL p. 387,388.) And in Connecticut, n forfeiture is given of unbranded nails. {Laws of Conn. p. 527- s. 5.) Virginia has enacted a forfeiture of unbranded fish, and a penalty on the master. (1 Laws of Fa. p. 353-s. 6.) She has not only done the same in respect to lumber, but p. 121merce and that among the States, as they are all 1824. given in the same sentence. If the power of re
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gulating the two latter be exclusive, so must it be v.
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»he has gone much fan her, anti acted on the collector and officers of the customs, (1 Laws of fa, p. 238. s. 4.) The collector, of other proper officer of the customs, is thereby charged and di rected not to suffer any vessel to clear from his office, unless the master, &c. shall produce inspection notes or certificates, &c. and make oath that he has no lumber on board, but what is en tered on his manifest. To this exercise of power, equal to that of Congress itself, I probably shall be told, that Congress has, in the collection laws, directed the collectors to pay regard to the inspection laws of the respective States. That is at least an ad mission that they arc rightfully made; but the answer is entirely insufficient; for the first act of the United Stales, directing this, was passed the 2d of March, 1799, and the act of Virginia, that I have last referred to, was passed the 26th of December, 1792. In like manner, the laws of the same State give a forfeiture of uninspected tobacco, about to be exported, and similar duties are imposed on the master and collector. (1 Lairs of fa. p. 363. s. 27. p. 3®. s. 45. p. 271- s. 49.) This law was also passed in November, 1792. Connecticut, too, gives a forfeiture of unsure veyed tobacco ; (1 Laws of Conn, p. 895. s. IS-) and, as to pro visions, it also enacts a penally against the master, and imposes a duty on the collector, (p. 397. S. 20. p. 303. s. 11. p. 407- s. 3.)
Several of those inspection acts regulate as to the importation nt articles, equally with their exportation. The New-York act, relative to the inspection of sole leather, expressly says, “ Whc» ther such leather be manufactured within the same, or imported 6r brought into it from any place whatsoever.” (2 N, R. L. p.
340. & 2.) In Maryland, the act for the inspection of salted provi sions, exported and imported from and to Baltimore, relates to beef, pork and fish “ imported into the said town, from any part of this State, or any one of the United States, or from any fo reign part whatever,” (2 Laws of Maryland, p. 3. a. 5.) Sec. 6 relates to the size, quality, and make of all imported beef and pork barrels. This act, it is true, was passed in 1786, before the adoption of the constitution. If tire power of Congress, how;
vU. i^. it
1824. with the former. And yet every State, whose '^^^ situation places it in communication or contiguity
v. with Indian tribes, has thought fit, and, indeed,
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ever, was exclusive, it should then have ceased to operate. But the argument does not stop there. In 1796, it was extended to Havre de Grace, (p. 335. s. 9.) and in 1797 to Chester, (p. 369. s. 9.) The act of the same Slate, for the gauge of barrels for pork, beef, pitch, tar and turpentine, and tare of barrels for flour and bread, continued by several statutes down to 1810, and probably to the present time, prohibits the importation, by land or water, of those articles, except in barrels of certain dimensions and contents. In Virginia, the act for the inspection of fish, passed in December, 1795, sec. 6. provides for tire inspection of imported fish, as well as of that packed for exportation; and it also enacts a forfeiture of the article, and a penalty on the master. (1 Laws of Va. p. 352. s. 3.) In Pennsylvania, the act providing for the inspection of gunpowder, relates to the inspection of imported as well as manu factured; and gives a forfeiture of the article for selling imported gunpowder without inspection. (3 Laws of Perm. p. 240.) And an antecedent law of March, 1787, directs the captain of every vessel. importing gunpowder into the port of Philadelphia, under a penalty and forfeiture of the article, if it be his own property, to deliver it at a magazine, and directs the health officer to give strangers notice of the act, and also enjoins the custom-house and naval officers, and their deputies, to do the same.” (2 Laws of Fenn. p. 402. s. 3.) In New-Hampshire, {Laws of N. H. ed. of 1815. p. 460.) by the act relating to gunpowder, sec. 2. it is enacted, that every master of any merchant vessel bringing gunpowder into Portsmouth, shall, within forty-eight hours, deposit it in a magazine, and, on neglect, shall pay a fine of 30 pounds to the poor of Portsmouth. Sec. 13. directs a keeper of the magazine to be chosen, who shall be enti tled to a fee on all he shall receive and deliver out; another in stance of what the appellant’s counsel has declared to be unconsti tutional, the raising of revenue by a State law from foreign com merce. In .Massachusetts, (2 Mass. Laws, p. 37.) the act of June 19, 1801, sec. 1. directs imported gunpowder, landed at the port of Boston, to be deposited in a magazine. And by sec.3. no gunpowder shall be kept on board any ship or other vessel. p. 123found it necessary, by acts of their own Legisla 1824.
V^V^^
tures, to regulate their trade with the Indians,
Gibbons the laws of Congress not only not exhausting, but v. Ogden.
not even adequately reaching the subject.
It now seems incontrovertibly established, that the States have a concurrent right to legislate on matters of foreign trade, or of that between the States; and a concurrent right to prohibit the ex portation or importation of articles of merchan dise. If they can do that, even as to the articles themselves, to winch the power of Congress ex pressly relates, and if the right to regulate ship ping be only impliedly given to Congress, by the general power to regulate commerce, and only so far as they are instruments of that commerce, why cannot a State, that lias a concurrent right, within its own sphere, (and that not by implication, but directly, and as the result of its sovereign power, unabridged and unaltered by the constitu tion,) over all ships or vessels within, or coming within, its jurisdiction, prohibit the entry of any particular kind of vessels within its waters, subject
lying to or grounded at any wharf in Boston, under pain of con fiscation and pecuniary penalty.
More extensive examinations would produce a much greater variety of regulations of foreign commerce, and that between the States, made by State Legislatures; but only one more instance need be added, not indeed coming tinder any of the preceding heads. In Virginia, the act laying taxes for the support of government, passed io January, 1799, prohibits unlicensed merchant# from selling, by wholesale or retail, goods of foreign growth or manufacture, on land, or on board of any vessel. (1 Lata? of Va. p. 386. s. 2.) Tlte same law has been renewed, from time to time, and it probably exists at this day.
1824. always to be controlled by the contradictory and ■^^^ paramount regulations of Congress, made within
'■ the sphere of its powers.
This leads to the consideration of an argument that has been frequently urged on tins subject. It is said, that if a State has a right to prohibit the navigation of its waters to steam boats, it has an equal right to prohibit the same navigation to row boats or sailing vessels; and the extravagance of this position, it is supposed, sufficiently refutes the assertion of a more limited right. First, there is an error in the statement of our claim. We do not prohibit the navigation of our waters to steam boats; we only prohibit them, while in our waters, from using steam as the means of their propulsion. Every steam boat which ventures on the ocean, carries and uses sails; and they can, without diffi culty, be adapted to every steam boat. Such a vessel, therefore, may, without objection, load in a different State, or foreign port, and come, by means of steam, to the verge of our waters; there is no difficulty opposed to its coming up, with its full cargo, to our custom house, entering, dis charging, reloading, and departing, provided that, for the short space of time while it may be in our waters, it employs the only things that any other vessel can employ for entering and departing, and with which it is or may be amply provided—sails and oars. That is the extent of what is very in considerately called our extravagant claim. Let us now examine the argument itself, and to test its soundness, let us apply it to other cases. A State has no right to prohibit the use of narrow wheeled
OF THE UNITED STATES. 12a
wagons for the transportation of merchandise on 1824. any of its roads; for if it can do that, it can pro- ''^7/7^ hibit the use of any kind of wagons, and, indeed, v. all transportation of merchandise on any of its O? ’’ roads, and thus affect the commerce between dif ferent States. A State has no right to regulate the assize of bread; for if it can do that, it can prohibit all baking of bread, and thus starve the community. Is there any one act of legislation against which the same reasoning, drawn from an excessive and tyrannical exercise of legislative authority, may not be urged? And if the argu ment be unsound, when applied to all those in stances, what makes it sound in its application to the present question? The answer to it is found in the rights of a free people, which make every act of tyranny void. But, either the right entirely to prohibit the use of row boats, sailing vessels, and steam boats, belongs to some of the constituted authorities that govern those States, or it docs not. If it does not belong to any of them, then, clearly, this boasted argument falls to the ground. If it does belong to some of them, to whom does it belong? Ilas Congress the power to make such a prohibition of all modes of commercial inter course, by virtue of its limited authority to regu late, commerce with foreign powers, and between the different States? In answering no, the em bargo laws are fully remembered, and their consti tutionality admitted; but it is not derived from the power to regulate commerce. The embargo was a measure of State policy, nearly approaching to war: it may sometimes be of such a character as
1824. to derive a legitimate origin from the war making K^f?y"^' power: but the embargo of 1807 rests for its conGibbons ♦ ♦ . , *
v. stitutionality on the power in Congress of pro-
°sd'’"- viding for the common defence and general wel fare of the United States. If, then, the power of entirely prohibiting trade, as a commercial mea sure, exists in some of the governing powers of those States, and does not exist in Congress, where does it exist? Assuredly in the State Legis latures. If its exercise should ever become void, it will not be because it is contrary to the consti tution of the United States, but because it is op pressive to the people it affects to bind; not be cause it is unconstitutional, but because it is tyrannical.
Congress itself seems to acknowledge that the constitution does not deprive the States of this prohibitory power; for, if it did, as it binds all the citizens of the United States, it would neces sarily bind the territorial governments, and all States admitted into the Union subsequent to its adoption. Yet, in the ordinance of the 13th of July, 1787, for the government of the territory of the United States north west of the river Ohio,' by art. 4th, for the government of the said terri tory, and the States which may be formed therein, it is provided, among other matters, that “ the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways, and for ever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said p. 127territory, as to the citizens of the United States, and 1824. those of any other States that may be admitted into
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the Confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty v.
Ogden.
thereon.” Il is made a fundamental provision of the different acts erecting portions of this ter ritory into Stales, that their constitutions shall not be repugnant to this ordinance. In the act also for erecting the State of Louisiana, sec. 3. it is enacted, that the convention for making the constitution, shall provide by an ordinance, irre vocable without the consent of the United States, among other things, " that the river Mississippi, and the navigable waters leading into the same, or into the gulf of Mexico, shall be common highways, and for ever free, as well to the in habitants of the said State, as to the other citi zens of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost or toll therefor, imposed by the said State.” The same was also done with regard to the States of Mississippi and Missouri. Now, this provision, so studiously introduced into all those new compacts, which Congress had a right to make with new Stales, as the condition of their admittance into the Union, would be very singu lar, and very useless, if, by an effect of the Union itself, all navigable waters belonged exclusively to the general government; or if the federal con stitution, which each State adopted, contained in itself an equivalent restraint on the States. The appellant's counsel has alluded to and denied a position, stated to have been used by counsel in arguing the case of Livingston a. Fun Ingen, before the Court of Errors, that the Legislature might, if it thought fit, stop up the mouth of the
1824. Hudson. It is of very little importance to defend what fell, on that occasion, from counsel, and has Gibbons
v. not been adopted by the Court; still, the learned Ogden.
counsel maybe asked, by what authority the State of Rhode Island has erected a bridge over the Seakonnet branch of Taunton river, essentially impairing, if not destroying, its navigation from the sea, and far below where the tide ebbs and flows? By what authority his native State of New-Hampshire has erected a bridge from Ports mouth over the Piscataqua river? By what au thority his adopted State of Massachusetts has built two bridges over Charles river, on its tide waters, one near Boston, and the other higher up? and, by what authority the State of Penn sylvania has built a dam over the Schuylkill, near Philadelphia, and three miles below where the tide used previously to ebb and flow ?
There, however, is, in fact, no regulation of commerce, made by Congress, with which this exclusive right does or can interfere. What is that degree or kind of interference, which is suflicientto invalidate a State law?
The Federalist,0 discussing the cases where powers are exclusively delegated to the United States, makes one of the classes, (and, perhaps, un necessarily, if not incorrectly,) where the consti tution granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be, abso lutely and totally, contradictory and repugnant,’ and then goes on: “I use these terms to distin guish this last case from another, which might ap-
a The Federalist, No. 32.
pear to resemble it; but which would, in fact, be 1824. essentially different: I mean, where the exercise
Cihluns
of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive
Ogden.
of occasional interferences in the policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy, in point of con stitutional authority.” And again: “it is not, however, a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy, that can, by implication, alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.”
That the third class of cases, as arranged by the Federalist, is unnecessary in its application to any of the powers, and that it is derived from an erro neous notion, as to the possibility of repugnancy and its consequences, seems to follow, from the principles laid dow n by Thompson, J. in Firingston v. Van Ingcn“ “ There are subjects upon which the United States and the individual States must, of necessity, have concurrent jurisdiction; and all fears and apprehensions of collision in the exercise of these powers, which have been urged in argument, are unfounded. The constitution has guarded against such an event, by providing that the laws of the United States shall he the supreme laic of the land, any th ing in the constitution of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. In case of collision, therefore, the State laws must yield to the superior authority of the United States” Tiie same doctrine is very ably maintained by Kent, Ch. J,4, who gives, as a safe rule of construc
ts 9 Johns. Hep. p. 56g. b 9 Johns. Rep. p. 575, 576. Vol. IX. 17
1824. tion and of action, "that if any given power was originally rested in this State, if it has not been
v. exclusively ceded to Congress, or if the exercise of °sden- it has not been prohibited to the States, we may then go on in the exercise of the power, until it
comes practically in collision with the actual exer
cise of some congressional power. When that
happens to be the case, the State authority will
so far be controlled ; but it will still be good in all
. those respects, in which it does not absolutely con
travene the provision of the paramount law.”
The same doctrine is very briefly, but very clear ly laid down, by Mr. Ch. J. Marshall, in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield:” “ It is not the mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which is incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the States." In Houston v. Moore/ Mr. J. Story, however, adopts the arrangement of the Federalist, and goes on : “ In all other cases, not falling within the classes already mentioned, it seems unquestionable, that the States retain con current authority with Congress, not only upon the letter and spirit of the 11th amendment of the constitution, but upon the soundest principles of general reasoning. There is this reserve, how ever, that in cases of concurrent authority, where the laws of the States and of the Union arc in di rect and manifest collision on the same subject, those of the Union, being the supreme law of the land, are of paramount authority; and the State
« 4 Ifheat. Rep. 196. b 5 Wheat. Rep. 49.
laws, so far, and so far only as such incompatibili 1324. ty exists, must necessarily yield.”
Although those authorities show, that nothing
but a direct and absolute collision can produce
such an interference as will render the State grants
invalid, yet a license is relied on by our adversa
ries, as creating this interference. There is a
leading and fundamental error growing out of the
nature and form of that instrument, and one which
has induced the supposition, that a license gives a
right to trade, or a right to enter, or a right to
navigate the waters of the United States, to any
vessel possessing it. It, indeed, uses the words,
“ license is hereby granted for the said vessel to be
employed in carrying on the coasting trade for one
year, from the date hereof, and no longer;" but
those words must necessarily be understood in
reference to the extent of the authority granting
the permission. Equivalent words arc to be found
in every license to distil or to sell, or to do any
act, the right to do which existed prior to and in
dependent of the authority by which it may be re
gulated; and they only mean, license is granted to
do the act, notwithstanding the regulations made
on that subject by the licensing authority, and
which, without this instrument, would restrain the
act. So far as those rights to trade, to enter, or
to navigate, exist unmodified, they rest on the
common law, independent of any gift from or
right conferred by Congress; which, in truth, has
no power whereby it might be enabled to make
such gift, its authority being only to regulate com-
merce. These righta are, all three, portions of the
\^>^^/
Gibbons
v.
Ogden.
1824. jus commune, and so far as the competent Legisla tures have thought fit to let them remain, the right Gibbons
v. to them, and their efficacy, depend on that jus Ogdon.
commune and the common law. The right to trade is regulated by the State Legislatures and laws of Congress; the right, to enter is modified principally by the laws of Congress; and the right to navigate the waters, almostexclusively by the State Legislatures. The license has nothing to do with any of those rights; it only gives some privileges as to payment of tonnage duties, and less frequent en tries at the custom houses; and it exempts the licen sed vessel from being included within a restriction of the jus commune as to trading, by which Con gress prohibits certain vessels from carrying foreign articles and distilled spirits from State to State: even there, not giving to the licensed vessel the right of doing so, but only exempting them from the prohibition. A review of the acts of Congress on the subject, will show the truth of these positions.
By the now repealed act of July 20th, 1789,’ im posing duties on tonnage, different rates were fix ed : 1st. six cents per ton on vessels built in the Uni ted States, &c., and belonging to a citizen or citizens of the United States; 2d. thirty cents on vessels built in the United States, and belong ing to foreigners; 3d. forty cents on all other ships and vessels. But it was provided, that no United States built vessel, owned by a citi zen, or citizens, while employed in the coast ing trade, or on the fisheries, should pay ton nage more than once a year; and that every p. 133ship employed in transporting the produce and 1824. manufactures of die United States, unless United \J^ States built, and owned bv a citizen or citizens,
“
should, on every entry, pay 50 cents per ton. The
* lb. p. 35. 42.
*-
Osdpn-
only advantages, then, to American built and own ed ships, were, a less tonnage duty; and, if on the coasting trade, paying it only once a year ; but let it be well remembered, that they had no exclusive, or peculiar right to trade any where. By the collection law of July 31, 1789/ which establish ed ports of entry and delivery, it was enacted, that no ship or vessel from a foreign port, not wholly belonging to a citizen or citizens, should be permitted to unload at any port or place, ex cept those there specified.
Neither this, nor any other act, gives the right
of entering into the designated ports. It proceeds on the supposition and the truth, that by some other code, distinct from t he laws of Congress, the entry into all places had been antecedently lawful, and thru restrains it as to all other places but those named.
The registering, recording, and enrolling of
vessels, were enacted by the act on that subject, passed September 1st, I 789? They were for the purpose of describing the vessel, her built, ton nage, and ownership ; and neither they, nor their certificates, give, nor purport to give, anyr^Ai to trade. The enrolment, and certificate of enrol ment, is to entitle unregistered vessels of twenty
a % U. s. L. p, y.
1824. tons and upwards, American built and property, and destined from district to district, or to the Gibbons
V. fisheries, to the privileges of a ship belonging to Ogden.
the United States, employed in the coasting trade or fisheries. These .1 have already mentioned, to be a less tonnage duty, and paying it only once a year; but no exclusive or peculiar right to trade any where.” Registered or enrolled vessels, on application to the collector where they belonged, were entitled to receive a licence to trade between the different districts in the United States, or car ry on the bank or whale fishery for one year.1 The meaning of that license, notwithstanding the generality of its language, was only to certify that the proper tonnage duty for that year had been paid; and that the vessel was licensed, for that year, to trade without paying any tonnage duty. That such is its object, appears from the 22d sec.1 enacting, that the master, &c. “shall annually pro cure a license from the collector of the district to which such vessel belongs, who is hereby authori zed to give the same, purporting that such vessel is exempt from clearing and entering for the term of one year from the date thereof” Every vessel had a right to carry on the trade (between district and district) without a license, on paying the prescribed tonnage duties, suited to the case. That further appears, by a provision in the same section, (s. 23.) that if any vessel of twenty tons or p. 135upwards, not having certificate of registry, oxen- 1824. rolment, and a license, should be found trading between different districts, or be employed in the v. bank or whale fisheries, it should be subject to the o»dL" same tonnage and fees as foreign ships or vessels.
The act, already cited, for tonnage and duties, was repealed by the act of July 20th, 1790;" but the substituted clauses do not affect this argument. A ship having a license to trade between differ ent districts, or to carry on the fisheries, while employed therein, is only to pay the six cents per ton once a year, (i. c. on getting the license,) and “ upon every ship, &c. not of the United States, which shall be entered in one district from ano ther, having on board goods, &c. taken in one district, to be delivered in another, there shall be paid at the rate of fifty cents per ton;”'’ a duty which clearly recognises their right to carry on that trade on those terms.
The former act for registering and clearing ves sels, w as repealed by that passed the 18th of Feb ruary, 1793. This enacted, that none but enrolled and licensed ships, &,c. (or, if under twenty tons, simply licensed,) should be deemed ships or ves sels of the United States, entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries. These privileges, it will be again remembered, are only the paying of a less ton nage duty, and paying it but once a year; and they do not comprehend any exclusive or peculiar
a 2 U.S. L. p. 119,120. b lb. p. 332.
1824. right to trade any where. It enacts, that before getting the license, the tonnage for the year must Gibbons
V. be paid; and the effect and object of the license Ogden.
was to certify that the proper tonnage duty for that year had been paid, and that the vessel was, therefore, lice used for that year to trade without paying tonnage. But every other vessel had still a right to trade. By sec. 6.’ vessels of twenty tons and upwards, except, registered, found trading be tween district and district, or different places in the same district or fishery, not enrolled and licensed, &c. if laden with domestic produce or manufacture, shall pay the same duties as foreign ships; or, if laden with foreign produce or manu facture, or distilled spirits, shall be forfeited. This show's that ybreign ships had a right to carry on the coasting trade without a license, (a thing which they could not possibly obtain,) on paying the extra tonnage duties, and making entry at every port. This further and most fully appears by the 24th section of the same act/ prescribing the duties of masters of foreign ships, bound from one district to another, whether with a cargo or in ballast; and by sec. 34/ establishing the rates of fees under that act, in which are found, “ For granting a permit for a vessel not belonging to a citizen or citizens of the United States, to proceed from district to district, and receiving the mani fest, 200 cents. For receiving a manifest, and p. 137granting a permit to unload, for such last men 1824. tioned vessel, on her arriving in one district from
Gibbons v.
another district, 200 cents.” Indeed, until the
Ogden*
year IS 17, there was no kind of prohibition on foreign vessels carrying on the coasting trade. On the 1st of March, 1817, “ an act concerning the navigation of the United States” was passed; and by sec. 4. it was enacted, “ that no goods, wares, or merchandise, shall be imported, under penalty of forfeiture thereof, from one port of the United States to another port of the United States, in a vessel belonging, wholly or in part, to a subject of any foreign power.” This, however, does not affect American ships not having a license, and they have still a right to trade coastwise, subject only to the increased tonnage duty, and the neces sity of making entry at every port. How, then, can it be said, that the license gives the right to carry on the coasting trade, which exists as part of the jus commune, and existed, and was exer cised, before the constitution, or any law on the subject, was formed; and when, until March, 1817, every foreign vessel had a right to carry it on; and when, to this hour, every American vessel has a right to carry it on, without a license or re gister, and only becomes subject to an increase of tonnage duty, and the necessity of making entry at the custom-house on every voyage ? It is only a license to carry on the coasting trade, without making entry or paying tonnage duties, conformably to the laws of Congress in other cases. It gives no right to enter, nor to trade, nor to navigate the waters of the United States ;
Vol. IX. 1 &
1824. it only enables the licensed vessel to do those things, in certain cases, on cheaper and easier Gibbons
v. terms than other vessels could, who, nevertheless, Ogden.
had equal rights to carry on the same trade, though with less advantages; and now, in the event of having foreign produce or manufacture, or distilled spirits, on board, a license protects from a for feiture, which was not enacted for some years after licenses were devised and used in their pre sent shape. It is not, then, a license to trade, to enter, or to navigate, but to be exempt from paying tonnage duty for a year. If, then, die position is correct, (and it undoubtedly is,) that a license gives no right to trade, to enter a port, or to navigate its waters, no argument can be drawn from the act of March 12, 1812, “ respecting the enrolling and licensing of steam boats.”' The only object of that law is, to enable aliens to be part owners of such vessels, and to modify, as to them, the oath that the boat belongs to a citizen or citizens of the United States.
But, even if the right of entry, or to trade or navigate, were given by the acts of Congress, and not by the common law, as originally existing or subsequently modified, this exclusive right does not prevent the entry of any vessels into our wa ters, nor their navigating or trading there; nor does it materially impede them. The only part of this exclusive grant that can come under the cog nizance of this Court, in this case, is that on which the injunction is grounded. That, and the p. 139prohibition of the injunction, can only be fairly 1824. considered as extending to prevent the navigation of the waters by the force or agency of steam or v. fire; not to prevent vessels from navigating those °-1'1’" waters, because they have a steam engine on board, and wheels at the side, if the engine and the wheels be not used on our waters for propel ling the vessel, contrary to our State laws. Before the vessel comes into those waters, and after it leaves them, it is out of the State jurisdiction, and not liable to any State penalty for using the agency of steam. What, then, is the amount of the prohibition of entry? That the same vessel, with the same cargo and crew, may come up and pass through our waters, if, while in our waters, she will come up and navigate under sail, ns all commercial vessels have hitherto done. In the argument of this case before the Court of Errors," one of the appellant’s counsel couched his rea soning in the form of a remonstrance by an English ship master against those State laws. The reply can, perhaps, be best given by turning the discussion into a dialogue. An English steam vessel is boarded by a pilot, outside of Sandy-Hook. “ Captain,” says the pilot, “ you will have to stop those wheels at your sides, when you get within our waters.” “ Why so?” asks the captain. “ Because the State of New-York have granted to Livingston and Fulton an exclusive right of navigating in its waters by steam.” “ Sir,” re sumes the captain, “ I care nothing for the laws
fl 17 Johns'. Rep. p. 488.
1824. of New-York. I know of no laws or regula tions of a particular State, in regard to trade Gibbons
and commerce. I claim the privilege of enter Ogden.
ing the harbour of New-York, under the laws of the United States, and the treaty of amity and commerce subsisting between them and my sovereign. I insist upon my right of entering your waters as I please; and if your State autho rities, or any one acting under them, should pre vent mo, the King, my master, will know how to enforce the rights of his subjects.” “ Patience, good captain, patience,” replies the pilot; “ let your head and your boiler cool; no one means to prevent your entering into our waters. Only stop your machinery, and hoist those sails you have carried twenty times between this and Liverpool, arid, 1’11 answer for it, we shall be alongside the wharf as soon as yon vessel, that you sec bound inwards, with all her canvass spread.” This is the extent of the prohibition—the Deo digitus Tindiee nodus! When the case occurs of a vessel navigating across the Atlantic, without sails, the question may be discussed, whether it be a viola tion of the laws of Congress, that she should be required to fit herself to the harbour, by providing herself with a sail. The same may be said as to coasting vessels from more distant States. As to those from contiguous States, and whose trade can just as well be carried on by sails as by steam engines, it is ridiculous to say, that such a regula tion prohibits or interferes with their commerce. Is it any part of the power intended to be dele gated to Congress, to regulate as to those matters? p. 141The utmost that can be said is, that the passage 1824. may be a little longer, and may be somewhat re
Gibbons
tarded. The doctrine of the federalist'1 applies v.
Ogden.
here, that it is not a mere possibility of inconve nience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy, that can, by implica tion, alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty. Regulations for a toll-bridge may delay the mail carrier, and so far interfere with the execution of the power delegated to Congress, of regulating the post office and post roads; but, could he gallop over a bridge, that a State law-directed should always be crossed on a walk?
But the clause in the constitution, authorizing Congress to make law's respecting patents, is sup posed to present another argument against the constitutionality of those State law's. This point, having been but very slightly mentioned, and in some measure abandoned, by the appellant’s open ing counsel, w'ould not be dwelt on now, if the Attorney General had not intimated an intention of insisting and relying on it. If the appellant had a patent of any kind, on which he could rest, it might fairly be urged by us, that a patent cannot give to any unpatented thing, even though con nected with one that is patented, the right to vio late the State law. But how docs or can that question come up in this case? There is here no allegation of a patent, nor a claim of any thing entitled to be protected by the patent law’, and the use or enjoyment of which has been interfered
a The Federalist, No. 32.
1824. with by the exclusive grant. As the appellant 'gm™^ claims no patent, if this power in Congress can v- furnish to him any objection against the State oSdcn- iawg> R must be on the ground, that inasmuch as
Congress is authorized to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries, every State law’, calculated or purporting to promote the progress of science and useful arts, is utterly void, merely because that is its purport and object, even though it should not relate to any invention or discovery; though the privileges it may confer should not be given on the score of invention or discovery, but of public policy and convenience; and further, although there is no discovery or in vention of any other person in existence, the right to which Congress could secure, and which has any relation to the State grant. That, in short, the appellant, or any other person, has a right to treat the State law as a nullity, and, in violation of it, to use unpatented articles, and incapable of being the subject of a patent or protection; and, that no Court or process of law has authority to restrain him from the use of what never can come within the power of Congress; because, peradven ture, something may hereafter be discovered, having some relation to the subject of the State grant, and some person may, hereafter, be enti tled to claim the benefit of the constitutional pro tection, as an inventor. The extraordinary bold ness of this position must surprise and astonish. Tf the passing of the patent law is per se p. 143competent to prevent a State granting this exclusive 1824. right, for a thing (so far as the pleadings show)
Gibbons
not the subject of a patent, it is equally so to pre v.
Ogden.-
vent a State granting every other exclusive right, and particularly if connected with science and the useful arts. If the law alone will not produce that effect, until a patent is granted, at variance with the exclusive right, the patent should appear, to let us see if it be really at variance, and have that effect.
If the last steam boat laws, enacted since the North River boats were in operation, had, instead of using a general phraseology, forbid any person to use, on the waters of the State, steam boats constructed or made in the same manner as those then used by Livingston and Fulton, or in any manner before known or used, or in any manner invented by a non-resident alien, would there be any thing for the patent laws or power of Con gress to operate on in collision thereto? If not, then those State laws are so far good; and any one, to impeach their operation, must claim and show’ that he has a boat constructed in a different manner, and which is patented as an invention, or, at least, is a subject for the law's of Congress to operate upon, and which he is restrained from using.
Has it ever been disputed that, each State has a right to grant exclusive privileges, where not for bidden to the Legislature by its constitution? The wisdom and the motives of the grant, arc points for which it is responsible to the people of the State only; they can never be drawn into
1824. discussion in this Court, nor come under the con* trol of Congress. It is a fight inherent in the Gibbens
v. sovereignty of every country, not delegated to Ogden.
Congress, but allowed to, and constantly exer cised by, the State governments. It is a legisla tive instrument of great power, and may, therefore, be used to evil purposes; but it may be, and often has been, as in the present instance, productive of splendid benefits. It must reside somewhere; it does not reside in Congress; where, then, does it reside?
Whether the power delegated to Congress be exclusive or concurrent, the power of promoting science and useful arts, by the introduction of imported improvements, and encouraging the em ployment of things not susceptible of being pa tented, is exclusively in the State Legislatures. It is of great importance, and exercised by every wise government; by England, France, &c. It domesticates the sciences and useful arts, the talents and genius of the civilized world. The States, in the exercise of this their exclusive po wer, which has been employed in making those laws, are not to be interfered with from any apprehen sion of collision in the exercise of a concurrent power, only relating to another branch of the same subject, which the State has not used, and which Congress may never have an opportunity of using.
I say, a concurrent power; for such is that delegated to Congress. One of the counsel now opposed to us, in his argument in the case <d
Sturges v. Crowninshield,‘ places in his third 1824. class, that is, among the concurrent powers, that
Gibbons v.
to promote the progress of science and useful arts;
Ogden.
and says, very truly, “from the exercise of any of these powers, the States arc neither expressly, nor by any fair rule of construction, excluded.” Judge Tucker, in his Appendix D. p. 182. 265. among the cases in which the States have unques tionably concurrent, though, perhaps, subordinate powers, with the federal government, ranks the power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing to the authors and inventors the exclusive right, within the State, to their respective writings and discoveries. In the case of Livingston r. Van Ingcn^ Thomp son, J. takes for granted, that it is so, and it is expressly asserted by Kent, C. J.; and in the same case, an instance is given of its exercise, by an act of the Legislature of New-York, in favour of Mr. Rumsey, passed on the 23d of February, 1789, after the adoption of the federal constitution, and shortly before the first meeting of Congress. It was entitled, “ for securing to James Rumsey the sole right and advantage of making and employing, for a limited time, the several mechanical im provements by him lately invented.”' I do not speak from research, but I understand that he obtained a similar patent from several other States. This law is a cotemporaneous exposition of the
« 4 meat. Rep. 168. b 9 Johns. Rep. 567, 568. c 2 Greenleaf's ed. of the Lairs, p. 2“J. Vol. IX. 19
1824. constitution, and shows that the State considered ^b^ Rself as still retaining a concurrent right of legisv- Jation on the subject of inventions in science and
°sdcn’ the useful arts, notwithstanding the new consti tution, and the recent transfer of similar powers to Congress.
What is the power delegated to Congress, and on what principle is it founded? A confined and partial mode of promoting the progress of science and useful arts, viz. by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. The Federalist, No. 43/ says, “ the utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy right of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common law. The right to useful inventions seems, with equal rea son, to belong to the inventors.” This commen tary, and the words of the constitution, show that the power is only founded on the principle of lite rary property extended to inventions. It pro ceeds upon assuming a pre-existent common law right, which, however, requires to be properly secured by adequate remedies. Its principle is entirely dififerent from that on which patents rest in England. They are exclusive rights, not merely secured, but created and granted; they are monopolies for things invented or imported, and do not suppose or act on any pre-existent right; but grant a right, the origin and efficacy of which is derived from its being a gift from the
a p. 269- p. 147crown, permitted and legalized by act of Pariia- 1824. ment. Il is contended, because the English Judges have construed their statute of monopolies v. so as to include imported improvements, under ^M®11-the term inventions, that our constitution should receive the same construction; but there is no foundation for the position. The English Judges strained the words of their statute, contrary to all fair construction, because they felt the importance of a power to encourage imported improvements, and saw no other way by which it could be done; and, besides, their interpretation went to strengthen and increase the royal prerogative. But, with us, imported improvements can be per fectly encouraged by the States; and the power delegated to Congress, is founded on the common law pre-existent right of inventors to their own discoveries, which can have no application to the mere possessors of imported improvements. The constitution itself docs not use the word patent, and it is to be regretted that the act of Congress does; for, the use of the word implying a resem blance to the English patent, has led to a false view of the powers of Congress.
But, in truth, according to the English accep tation of the term, Congress has no power to grant them. It has no authority to make exclusive grants of any kind; that power remains solely in the States, as a part of their original sovereignty, which has never come within the purview of the federal constitution. A patent, in England, and every country but this, implies, the creation and gift of a right, by force of the sovereign power,
1824. conferring upon an individual a monopoly, in ^rriKM^ wh'ch ^e had no pre-existent right. This can be
v. done by the States, and only by the States. The
^S^"* power delegated to Congress, does not authorize it to create any right, or to give any right; it only enables that body to secure a pre-existent common law right, and for that purpose it may create and give a remedy. Where there is no pre-existent right to be secured, the power of Congress cannot operate. To these positions, the attention of the Court is directed, as they may be found important in the sequel.
Although the article in the constitution is ex pressed with accuracy, yet it also has employed a word, sometimes taken in different senses, and which has likewise contributed to a false view of the power of Congress: the expression is, “ an exclusive right.” The word “ exclusive” may well mean, as it does here, individual, sole, or sepa rate, in which sense, every man’s private property, to which no other man has any claim, is his ex clusive property. In that sense, Judge Chase says, in the case of Calder ct ux. v. Bull et ux." “ If any one has a right to property, such right is a perfect and exclusive right." But, that word, exclusive, is more frequently applied to express, that others have been excluded or shut out from the participation of what they were previously entitled, or would, but for that exclusion, be en titled to enjoy and use. In this sense, the phrase, exclusive rights or privileges, is ordinarily under-
fl 3 Dattas’ Rep. 394.
stood. But, it never was intended to give Con- 1824. gress any power to grant exclusive privileges; and
Gibbons
in the article of the constitution, that meaning ofv.
Ogden.
the word would be inconsistent with the idea of securing a pre-existing right. All error would have been avoided, if the adjective had been entirely omitted, or the word individual substituted.
At the time of making the State grant in ques tion, no man had, and, indeed, no man yet has, any pre-existing right to an invention, connected with the subject matter of the grant. Suppose any man, however, now to make an invention, and seek to use it without procuring for himself a patent, or availing himself of the power dele gated to Congress, surely the law* of the State would be competent to prevent his using it within its waters and jurisdiction. The statute law would, in that instance, operate on the common law*, and prevent the common law right, pro tanio, from ever arising, in the same way as in a fishery. The right of fishing, in a public navigable river, is a common right; but, suppose that before the birth of any given individual, a part of that navi gable river had, by statute, been turned into a several fishery, surely his common right would not entitle him to fish in that part of the na vigable river which a statute had, before the commencement of his common right, turned into a separate fishery. His right to fish there never had a commencement or origin—So with this supposed inventor. A statute, prior to the commencement of his common law* right, so acted on that common law itself, that a right
1824. in him to use his invention, in the waters of the ^f^ State, never had a commencement or origin. Gibbons 7 .
v. Now, suppose the inventor to procure a patent; °8den- would that enable him to use his patented inven tion within the jurisdiction and waters of a State, contrary to its statutes? If it did, what would be its operation ? The delegated power is only to secure a pre-existent right; it can only do that, so far as there is a pre-existent right; where there is not, there is nothing to be secured. So far, then, as relates to any use or exercise of the invention within the State, there would be no right to be secured, and nothing for the power of Congress to operate upon. But further, if the inventor, before obtaining his patent, could not legally use his invention, but, after obtaining his patent, could use it in despite of the State laws, the patent would then create and give a right that did not exist before, and thus transcend the power delegated to Congress, which does not enable that body to create or give any right, but only to create and give a remedy, for the purpose of se curing an existing right, which derives its origin and force from some other law or laws than those made by Congress.
So far, then, as relates to those State laws, it is impossible that their validity can be affected by the patenting of any invention or discovery made subsequent to their enactment. But it may still be advisable to pursue the same course of reason ing, and inquire how far even the existence of a patent, previous to the passing of such acts, would p. 151enable the patentee to use his invention in despite 1821 of them*
Gibbons
The object of a patent, granted in pursuance
Ogden.
of the delegated power, is to perfect an imperfect right, by exactly ascertaining, if I may say so, its means, and boundaries, and identity, and by afford ing an adequate remedy for its violation. The precise nature of the remedy is within the discre tion of Congress; but the nature of the evil it pur ports to remedy, is entirely illustrative of the extent of the power delegated to Congress. The * patent law itself shows that its object is, to turn the imperfect right into property, for it directs, that the applicant’s petition shall signify a desire of obtaining an exclusive property in his improve ment. And the clause giving the remedy, shows the injury against which Congress intended to guard, and against which alone it had any power, under the constitution, to provide a guard: where any person “ shall make, devise, use, or sell” the thing, whereof the exclusive right is secured to the patentee by such patent, &c.“ But, no remedy is provided against prerenting the patentee from making, devising, using or selling the thing so patented. That, if any grievance at all, is one not within the purview of the act, nor within the powers of Congress, and against which, therefore, no remedy is there provided.
The object of this power, and of the law made under it, is to give to the pre-existent but imper fect right, the security and attributes of actual
a Act of Feb. 21, 1793, s. 1.
1824. property. When the law of Congress has done that, it is functus officio; and it leaves that right,
v. which it has placed in the class of actual pro°8den- perty, to be used and enjoyed like every other kind of actual property, conformably to the laws of the place where it is to be enjoyed. That which is thus the object of the power and law of Congress, is the patent-right, which it has, as it were, con verted into a chattel. But the difference between the patent-right and the thing patented, is great and palpable, equal to the difference between a copy-right and a book. If a State attempted to authorize a violation of these rights, to enable another to make use of or vend the thing patented, or to print the book, or to throw open and in com mon, the patent-right or the copy-right, then its law would be unconstitutional. But the rights, and only the rights, are the object of the power and laws of Congress; the things themselves are personal property or chattels of the ordinary kind, to be enjoyed, like all other property, subject to laws over which Congress has no control.
If so, why has not a State a right to prohibit the use of the thing patented within its jurisdic tion? It can do so, as to all other kinds of pro perty. It is no argument to say, that if one State can do it, every State can do it. If every State wished to do it, how could they, or why should they, be prevented? But, is not that the case with every kind of property? And if they should extend that power over any species of unpatented property, could Congress interfere? The indivi dual States having that power over every kind of p. 153originally perfect property, can it be supposed, 1824. that because Congress was empowered to turn
Gibbons
imperfect into perfect property, this newly secured v.
Ogdeir.
species should occupy a superior class, and pos sess privileges and exemptions that were never attached to any other kind of property? The power of regulating and prohibiting the use of every kind of property must be somewhere; it is a necessary part of legislative sovereignty, and must be intrusted to some constituted authority. As to all other kinds of property, it is undoubtedly in the State Legislatures. Things patented may be dangerous or noxious; they may be generally useful, and locally injurious; such, for instance, might be torpedoes in a peaceful and commercial port; fire balloons and squibs in a populous city; though, in some places and on some occasions, they may well be useful and advantageous, or, at least, harmless. Among the curiosities in the patent office, there probably are some patented velocipedes. The Corporation of New-York, in 1819, by an ordinance, prohibited the use of any velocipede in the streets of that city. Had it not a right to do so; and could the owner of any of those patent velocipedes use them in the streets, in despite of that ordinance? The Legislature of New-York has, for many years, prohibited the drawing of any lotteries there, except what it has granted to certain public institutions, such as Union College, and the College of Physicians. By virtue of the prohibition to others, and the grant to those institutions, they have obtained an exclusive right of drawing lotteries, similar to
Vol. IX. 20
1824. that, the constitutionality of which is now in con-. '^iuiji>ns^ trovcrsy‘ Joseph Van ini has patented a new
v. mode of drawing lotteries, which is, unquestiona-
Ogdcn, b|y, a grcilt improvement, simplifying the opera tion, and, by completing it in Jess than five minutes, preventing all insurances, and many of the evils attendant on the old mode. But, could he, be cause his invention is an improvement and patent ed, insist on a right to use it, and draw lotteries in the State of New-York, contrary to its laws, and indeed, now, to the express provisions of its constitution? No. The power to prohibit the use of patented things, either generally or locally, must reside somewhere. Can Congress prohibit the use of locally injurious, but patented, things, in the waters, or the cities, or the populous towns of New-York? If not, because it has no power of regulation or prohibition, where does that power reside ? If it reside, as it must, exclusively in tin; State Legislatures, or subordinate authori ties, who but their constituents can inquire into the motives or propriety of their exercise of that power, or the extent to which it should be carried? If the Slates have not that regulating and control ling power, as Congress assuredly has it not, what is the consequence ? A patent can be got for anything, and with no previous competent autho rity to decide upon its utility or fitness. If it once issues from the patent office, as full of evils as Pandora’s box, if they be as new as those that issued from thence, it is above the restraint and control of the State Legislatures—of the Legisla ture nf the United States—of every human p. 155authoyity! I put the case of their being noxious or 1824. dangerous; but there maybe a multitude of other '^^^/ reasons for regulating, restraining, or even pro- v. hibiting their use; of these Congress can take no cognizance, if the State governments can take no cognizance of them, no institution can; if they can take cognizance, their power is exclu sive, and their exercise of it cannot be reviewed. Could Congress (incapable as it is, of itself, pro hibiting the use of patented things,) pass a law, in words, that a patentee shall have a right to use his patented machine in any State, notwithstand ing any prohibitory Jaws of that State? Would that be within the power of Congress ? How, then, can implication give to the patentee the same right? If a patent can give a right to use the thing patented, in contravention of this exclusive right, it would have the same effect in contraven tion of any other exclusive right granted by a State. Ferries, stage-coaches, &c. all the grants respecting them, would be broken down by some patented vehicle, for, they are all, in pari mate ria, exclusive grants, from motives of public policy; and, having no connexion with the princi ple of literary property, which is the origin and the object of patent-rights, they cannot be affected by any power given to Congress. A State has the same jurisdiction and authority over its rivers and lakes, that it has over its canals. Now, if the Legislature of New-York judged it advisable so to do, could it not prohibit any boat, using some patented machinery, from navigating its western canal? Jf it could, why could it not make the
1324. same prohibition as to its rivers and lakes; and if '^^Ty^^ the act here should be an excess or abuse of le-Gibbons
v. gislation, would not its responsibility be exchi'
Ogden. siveiy (o the people of the State ?
The State of New-York, from motives not examinable here, made a cantract, which is the foundation of our right; it could only do so by a law. The State had a right, to contract, and, so far, it stands on the same footing as if one indi vidual contracted, for a valuable consideration, with another, to receive his supplies of any article from him only. In the case of individuals, could a man, having a patented improvement of the same article, insist on annulling that contract, as interfering with his exclusive right and patent? If not, why should not a State, capable of con tracting, have the same right to make that bar gain, and, consequently, exclude the use of the patented article in its jurisdiction and domain, as an individual has in his own house and farm.' The waters of the State are the domain and pro perty of the Slate, subject only to the commercial regulations of Congress. Why should not the contract of a State, in regard to its domain and property, be as sacred as that of an individual ? Such a contract was in this, and may in many cases, be very useful and advantageous. Who is to judge of that but the State Legislatures? Could Congress have made this contract, or ac quired this benefit for the State? Certainly not. If the State cannot, what power or authority can? And is it come to this, that a contract, such as every individual in the land may wisely and p. 157lawfully make, for his own benefit, and to be enforced 1824. in his own premises, no State, and no authority
for any State, can make for its benefit, and to be
enforced in its jurisdiction?
There are circumstances connected with those
laws, sufficient to make any tribunal require the
strongest arguments before it adjudged them in
valid. The State of New-York, by a patient and
forbearing patronage of ten years, to Livingston
and Fulton, by the tempting inducement of its
preferred reward, and by the subsequent libe
rality of its contract, has called into existence the
noblest and most useful improvement of the pre
sent day. Genius had contended with its inherent
difficulties, for generations before; and if some
had nearly reached, or some even touched, the
goal, they sunk exhausted, and the result of their
efforts perished in reality, and almost in name.
Such would, probably, have been the end of Ful
ton’s labours; and, neither the wealth and talents
of his associate, nor the resources of his own
great mind, would have saved him from the fate
of others, if he had not been sustained, for years,
by the wise and considerate encouragement of the
State of New-York. She has brought into noon
day splendour, an invaluable improvement to tlie
intercourse and consequent happiness of man,
which, without her aid, would, perhaps, have
scarcely dawned upon our grandchildren. She
has not only rendered this service to her own citi
zens, but the benefits of her policy have spread
themselves over the whole Union. Where can
you turn your eyes, and where can you travel,
v.
Ogden.
1824. without having your eyes delighted, and some part of the fatigues of your journey relieved, by the Gibbons
v. presence of a steam boat? The Ohio and Missis Ogden.
sippi, she has converted into rapid channels for communicating wealth, comforts and enjoyments, from their mouths to their head waters. And the happy and reflecting inhabitants of the States they wash, may well ask themselves, whether, next to the constitutions under which they live, there be a single blessing they enjoy from the art and la bour of man, greater than what they have derived from the patronage of the State of New-York to Robert Fulton ? But the mighty benefits that have resulted from those laws, are not circumscribed, even by the vast extent of our Union. New-York may raise her head, she may proudly raise her head, and cast her eyes over the whole civilized world; she there may see its countless waters bearing on their surface countless offsprings of her munificence and wisdom. She may fondly calcu late on their speedy extension in every direction, and through every region, from Archangel to Cal cutta; and justly arrogating to herself the labours of the man she cherished, and, conscious of the value of her own good works, she may turn the mournful exclamation of/Eneas into an expression of triumph, and exultingly ask,
(jure regia in tern's, nostri non plena tabaris ?
And it is, after ail those advantages have been acquired and realized to the world—alter nume rous individuals have embarked their fortunes, on p. 159the faith of those grants, and a ten years acquies- 1824. cence in the decision bv which they were sane- ^fTy^^ tioned—after the property they have created has *. been diffused among a multitude of possessors— Ogden, after it has become the sole support of the widow and the orphan—after it has received and ex hausted the accumulated savings of the laborious and industrious heads of families, that a decision is required, which cannot, indeed, undo the last ing benefits already procured to the world, but would, assuredly, undo many of those who have confided their wealth and means to the stability and observance of those laws!
The Attorney-General, for the appellant, in reply, insisted, that the laws of New-York were unconstitutional and void:
1. Because they are in conflict with powers ex clusively vested in Congress, which powers Con gress has fully exercised, by laws now subsisting and in full force.
2. Because, if the powers be concurrent, the legislation of the State is in conflict with that of Congress, and is, therefore, void.
He stated, that the powers with whicii the laws of New-York conflict, are the power “ to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and in ventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and inventions,” and the power “ to re gulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.” If these powers were exclu sive in Congress, and it had exercised them by
1824. subsisting laws; and if the laws of New- York m-^STy^^ terfere with the laws of Congress, by obstructing,
v. impeding, retarding, burdening, or in any other o^cn• manner controlling their operation, the laws of
New-York arc void, and the judgment of the State Court, founded on the assumption of their validity, must be reversed.
In discussing this question, the general princi ples assumed, as postulates, on the other side, might be, for the most part, admitted. Thus, it might be admitted, that by force of the de claration of independence, each State became sovereign; that they were, then, independent of each other, and foreign to each other; that by virtue of their separate sovereignty, they had, each, full power to levy war, to make peace, to establish and regulate commerce, to encourage the arts, and generally to perform all other acts of sovereignty. It was also conceded, that the government of the United States is one of dele gated powers; and the counsel for the respondent added, that it is one of enumerated powers. Yet they admitted that there were implied powers, and had given a different rule for the construction of the two classes of powers, which was, that “ the express powers are to be construed strictly, the implied powers liberally." But the implied powers, he presumed, were only those which arc necessary and proper to carry the powers, ex pressly given, into effect—the means to an end. This clause had not been generally regarded as, in fact, giving any new powers. Congress would have had them without the express declaration- p. 161The clause was inserted only ex abundanti cau- 1821. tela. With this explanation, it might be con
Gibbons
ceded, that the constitution of the United States v.
Ogden.
is one of delegated and enumerated powers; and that all powers, not delegated by the constitution to the national government, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec tively, or to the people. The peculiar rule of construction demanded for those powers, might also be conceded: that the express powers are to be strictly construed, the implied liberally. By which was understood to be meant, that Congress can do no more than they arc expressly authorized to do; though the means of doing it are left to their discretion, under no other limit than that they shall be necessary and proper to the end.
On the other hand, the counsel for the respon dent themselves admitted, that Congress, never theless, has some exclusive powers; and, in con formity with the decisions of the Court, they admit that those exclusive powers exist under three heads. (1.) When the power is given to Con gress in express terms of exclusion. (2.) When a power is given to Congress, and a like power is expressly prohibited to the States. (3.) Where a power given to Congress, is of such a nature, that the exercise of the same power by the States would be repugnant.
With regard to the degree of repugnancy, it was insisted, that the repugnancy must be mani
fest, necessary, unavoidable, total, and direct.
Certainly if the powers be repugnant at all, they
must be so with all these qualifications. If Con-
Vol. IX.
1824. gress, in the lawful exercise of its power, says that a thing shall be done, and the State says it Gibbons
v. shall not; or, which is the same thing, if Congress Ogden.
says that a tiling shall be done, on certain terms, and the State says it shall not be done, except on certain other terms, the repugnancy has all the epithets which can be lavished upon it, and the State law must be void for this repugnancy.
A new test for the application of this third head of exclusive power, had been proposed. It was said, that “ no power can be exclusive from its own nature, except where it formed no part of State authority previous to the constitution, but was first created by the constitution itself.” But why were these national powers thus created by the constitution? Because they look to the whole United States as their theatre of action. And are not all the powers given to Congress of the same character ? Under the power to regulate com merce, the commerce to be regulated is that of the, United States with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. No State had any previous power of regulating these. The same thing might be affirmed of all the other powers enumerated in the constitution. They were all created by the constitution, because they are to be wielded by the whole Union over the whole Union, which no State could previously do. If any one power, created by the constitution, may be exclusive for that reason, then all may be exclusive, because all are originally created. If» on the other hand, we are to consider the powers enumerated in the constitution, not with reference p. 163to the greater arm that wields them, and the more 1824.
\X-ZX.' extended territory over which they operate, hat Gibbons
v.
merely in reference to the nature of the particular
Ogden.
power in itself considered ; then, according to this new test, all the powers given to Congress are concurrent’ because there is no one power given to it, which, considered in this light, might not have been previously exercised by the States within their respective sovereignties. But this argument proved too much: for, it has been con ceded, that some of the powers are exclusive from their nature; whereas, if the argument were true, none of them could be exclusive. On this argu ment, the entire class or head of exclusive powers, arising from the nature of the power, must be abolished. But this Court had repeatedly deter mined, that there is such a class of exclusive powers. The power of establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, is one of the instances. Its exclusive character is rested on the constitu tional requisition, that the rule established under n should be uniform.’
It had been objected, that this would have been a concurrent power, but for the auxiliary provision in the constitution, that a citizen of one State shall be entitled to all the privileges of a citizen in every other State. The answer was, that it is not so determined by the Court in the case cited, and that the commentators on the constitution place it exclusively on the nature of tire power as described in the grant.1
a Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. Rep. 269, b The. Federalist, No. 42.
1824. So also, the power of establishing uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, is clearly an ex Gibbons
clusive power from its nature. The Court has, Ogden.
indeed, determined, that until Congress thought fit to exercise the power, the States might pass local bankrupt laws, provided they did not impair the obligation of contracts; but, that as soon as Congress legislate on the subject, the power of the States is at an end/
But it bad been said, that th is doctrine takes away
State power, by implication, which is contrary to the principles of interpretation laid down by the commentators on the constitution. It was not the opinion of the authors of the Federalist, that a State power could not be alienated by implication. Their doctrine was, that it might be alienated by implication, provided the implication be inevita ble; and that it is inevitable wherever a direct and palpable repugnancy exists. The distinction be tween repugnancy and occasional interference, is manifest. The occasional interference, alluded to in the Federalist, and admitted by this Court, in its adjudications, is not a repugnancy between the powers themselves: it is a mere incidental interference in the operation of powers harmo nious in themselves. The case put, was of a tax laid by Congress, and a tax laid by the State, upon the same subject, e. g. on a tract of land. The taxes operate upon, and are to be satisfied out of the same subject. It might be inconve nient to the proprietor to pay both taxes. In a"
extreme case, the subject might be inadequate to 1824. the satisfaction of both. Then the tax laid by '^^'^ the paramount authority must be first satisfied. v. Still, this incidental interference in their operation, °eden' is not an inherent repugnance in the nature of the powers themselves.
It was also said, that to constitute the power an exclusive one in Congress, the repugnance must be such, that the State can pass no law on the subject, which will not be repugnant to the power given to Congress.
This required qualification before it could be admitted. Some subjects are, in their nature, extremely multifarious and complex. The same subject may consist of a great variety of branches, each extending itself into remote, minute, and infi nite ramifications. Ono branch alone, of such a sub ject, might be given exclusively to Congress, (and the power is exclusive only so far as it is granted,) yet, on other branches of the same subject, the States might act, without interfering with the power exclusively granted to Congress. Com merce is such a subject. It is so complex, multi farious and indefinite, that it would be extremely difficult, if not impracticable, to make a digest of all the operations which belong to it. One or more branches of this subject might be given ex clusively to Congress; the others may be left open to the States. They may, therefore, legislate on commerce, though they cannot touch that branch which is given exclusively to Congress.
So Congress has the power to promote the pro gress of science and the useful arts; but only in
1824. one mode, viz. by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their Gibbons
v. respective writings and discoveries. This might Ogden.
be an exclusive power, and was contended to be so. Yet, there are a thousand other modes in which the progress of science and the useful arts may be promoted, as, by establishing and endow ing literary and philosophical societies, and many others which might be mentioned, lienee, not withstanding this particular exclusive grant to Congress, of one mode of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, the States may rightfully make many enactments on the general subject, without any repugnance with the peculiar grant to Congress.
But, to come now to the question, whether these State laws be repugnant to this grant of power, we must first inquire, why it was conferred on Congress? Why was it thought a matter of suffi cient importance to confer this power upon the national government? The answer to this ques tion would be found in the history of the country, in the nature of our institutions, and the great national objects which the constitution had in view. The country was in its infancy; its population was small; its territory immense: it had recently thrown off its bondage by the war of the revolu tion, and was left exhausted and poor—poor in every thing but virtue and the love of country. It was still dependent on the arts of Europe, for all the comforts, and almost all the necessaries oi life. We had hardly any manufactures, science, or literature of our own. Our statesmen saw the p. 167great destiny which was before the nation, but 1824. they saw also the necessity of exciting the ener gies of the people, of invoking the genius of in- *• vention, and of creating and diffusing the lights °sdf"' of science. These were objects, in which the whole nation was concerned, and were, therefore, naturally and properly confided to the national government. The States, indeed, might have exercised their inherent power of legislating on this subject; but their sphere of action was com paratively small; their regulations would naturally have been various and conflicting. Discourage ment and discontent would have arisen in some States, from the superior privileges conferred on the works of genius in others; contests would have ensued among them on the point of the ori ginality of inventions; and laws of retortion and reprisal would have followed. Ail these difficul ties would be avoided by giving the power to Con gress, and giving it exclusively of the States. If it were wisely exerted by Congress, there could be no necessity for a concurrent exercise of the power by the States.
The terms of the grant are, “ Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” This exclusive right is to be co-extensive with the ter ritory of the Union. The laws to be made for securing it, must be uniform, and must extend throughout the country. The exclusive nature of every power is to be tested by the character of tin; p. 168108 cases in the supreme court
1824. acts which Congress is to pass. This is the ease ^'^ with the naturalization laws. The exclusiveness
v. of the power to establish them, resulted from 6 en’ their character of uniformity. So here, the ex clusiveness results from the character of the right which they are to confer. It is to be exclusive. It is not, indeed, said, that Congress shall have the exclusive power, but it is said that they shall have power to do a certain act, which, when done, shall be exclusive in its operation. The power to do such an act, must be an exclusive power. It can, in the nature of things, be performed only by a single hand. Is not the power of one sove reign to confer exclusive rights, on a given subject, within a certain territory, inconsistent with a power in another independent sovereign, to confer exclu sive rights on the same subject, in the same terri tory? Do not the powers clash ? The right to be conferred by Congress, is to exclude all other rights on the subject in the United States; New-York being one of those States. The right to be conferred by New-York, is to exclude all other rights on the subject within the State of New-York. That one right may exclude another, is perfectly intelligible; but that two rights should reciprocally exclude each other, and yet both con tinue to subsist in perfect harmony, is inconceiva ble. Can a concurrent power exist, if, from the very nature of its action, it must take away, or render nugatory, the power given to Congress: Supposing the power to be concurrent, Congress may secure the right for one period of time, and the respective States for another. Congress may p. 169secure it for the whole Union, and each State may 1824. secure it to a different claimant, for its own terri
Gibbons v.
tory. Congress possesses the power of granting
Ogden.
an exclusive right to authors and inventors, within the United States. New-York claims the power to grant such exclusive right within that State. Au author or inventor in that State, may take a grant for a period of time far longer than that allowed by the act of Congress. He may take a similar grant from every other State in the Union; and thus this pretended concurrent power super sedes, abrogates, and annuls the power of Con gress. What would become of the power of Con gress after the whole sphere of its action was taken away by this concurrent power of the States? Who would apply to the power of Congress for a patent or a copy-right, while the States held up higher privileges ? This concurrent legislation would degenerate into advertisements for custom. These powers would be in the market, and the highest bidder would take all. Are not powers repugnant, when one may take from the other the whole territory on which alone it can act? Is not the repugnance such as to annihilate the power of Congress, as completely as if the whole Union was itself annihilated?
Something had been said of Congress repealing the laws of the State, wherever they should con flict with those of the Union. But where is this power of repeal? There is no such head of power in the constitution. Congress can act only by positive legislation on any subject, and this it has done in the present instance. But this action
Vol. IX. 90
1824.
would be in vain, if another authority can act on '•^"v'^z
the same subject. If this concurrent power would Gibbons
v. defeat the power of Congress, by withdrawing
Ogden.
from it the whole territory on which it is to act, it would also defeat it by giving a monopoly of all the elements with which invention is to work. This has been done by these laws, as to fire and steam. Why should it not be done equally with all the other elements, such as gravitation, mag netism, galvanism, electricity, and others? What is to consecrate these’ agents of nature, and se cure them from State monopoly, more than fire or steam? If not, then is the power of Congress subject to be defeated by this concurrent power, first by a monopoly of all the territory on which it can act, and then by a monopoly of all the ele ments and natural agents on which invention can be exerted. Still it would be said, that there is no direct repugnance between these powers, and that the power of Congress may still act. But on what can it act? The territory is gone, and all the powers of invention are appropriated. There is no difference whatever between a direct enact ment, that the law of Congress shall have no ope ration in New-York, and enactments which ren der that operation impossible. If, then, this pro cess of reasoning be correct, the inevitable con clusion from it is, that a pow er in the States to grant exclusive patents, is utterly inconsistent with the power given to the national government to grant such exclusive patents: and hence, that the power given to Congress is one which is exclusive from its nature.
But suppose, for the sake of the argument, 1824. that the States have this concurrent power, yet it
Gibbons
cannot be denied, that if the legislation of the v. State be repugnant to the laws of Congress, thatOgden. of the State is void, so far as the repugnance exists. In the present case the repugnance is manifest. The law of Congress declares, that all inventors of useful improvements throughout the United States, shall be entitled to the exclusive right in their discoveries for fourteen years only. The law of New-York declares, that this inventor shall be entitled to the exclusive use of his disco very for thirty years, and us much longer as the State shall permit. The law of Congress, by limiting the exclusive right to fourteen years, in effect declares, that after the expiration of that time, the discovery shall be the common right of the whole people of the United States. The law of New-York declares that it shall not, after four teen years, be the exclusive right of the people of the United States, but that it shall be the exclusive right of this inventor for thirty years, and for so much longer as she, in her sovereign will and pleasure, may permit. If this be not repugnance, direct and palpable, we must have a new vocabu lary fur the definition of the word.
But it was said, that the appellant had no pa tent under the United States, and, therefore, could not raise the question. To this it was answered, that it was not necessary that he should have a patent. The question as to the validity of the law of New-York, is raised, whenever a right is asserted under that law, and is resisted by the
1824. pally against whom it is asserted; and that validity is to be tested, not by comparing the law of New-Gibbons
v.
York with a patent, but by comparing it with the Ogden-
constitution and laws of the United States.
It was also said, that there could be no repug nance, because it was admitted, that wherever a patent from the United States appears, the patent obtained under the State law must yield to it; that the patent under the State is valid only until the patent from the paramount power appears; and that the rights derived from the different sovereigns must be found practically to clash, before the law of New-York was to give way for repugnancy. This is an insidious argument, and fraught with all the dangers which have been enumerated. For if the New-York patentee be the inventor, the law of New-York is absolute, and however unconstitutional it may be, there is no power of resistance. Besides, the argument is incorrect. To illustrate this, suppose a grant from Virginia, within the military reservation in Ohio, after she had ceded the whole territory to the United States; would the party in possession, even if a mere in truder, be bound to show a grant from the United States, before he could resist the unlawful grant of Virginia? But there the plaintiff would be claiming under a State which had previously ceded away the power to make such grants, which is precisely the case here, so that there need be no repugnance arising from patents. If a repug nance exist between the laws of New-York and the constitution and laws of the United States, any citizen of the United States has a right to act p. 173as if the law of New-York were a nullity; and 1824. the question of its nullity and validity arises, wherever an attempt is made to enforce it. v.
But it was argued that the power of Congress °?de,T’ is limited to inventors, and that the power to en courage by patents the introduction of foreign discoveries, stands clear of this constitutional grant. If it were necessary, this doctrine might be questioned. The statute of the 21st James 1. c. 3. uses the same word with the constitution, “ inventors;” and the decisions upon the construc tion of this statute might be referred to, in order to show that it has been considered as embracing discoveries imported from abroad/ But, even acceding to this doctrine, it might be asked whe ther the question now before the Court had any thing to do with an art, machine, or improvement, imported from abroad? The privilege here granted by the State, is to an American citizen, who claims to be the inventor. The privilege is the reward of invention, not of importation, and this it is which brings it in conflict with the act of Con gress. It is true, the law does not call him the inventor; it calls him merely the “ possessor.” But, can the constitution and laws of the United States be evaded in this manner? If he was not the inventor, why this unjust tax which has been levied upon our admiration and gratitude? When the validity of a law is challenged fora fraudulent evasion of the rights of others, you are not bound by its own averments, but may resort to proof
a 17 Kin. 211.
1824. aliunde to establish the facts. The word possestT,'^' sot is a now and unusual word to apply to such a Gibbons . *
v. case, and marks a studious effort to conceal the Ogden, truth. pfe waSj of necessity, either the inventor or the importer. If he was the importer, there is no conceivable reason why he should be called by any other than that name. The Legislature of New-York, in its act in behalf of Fitch, passed before the adoption of the constitution, had no difficulty in applying the natural and appropriate name to him. But when the final law was passed in favour of Livingston and Fulton, in 1798, the constitution of the United States, which cedes this power to Congress, had been adopted, and the laws by which that power is executed had been passed. This constitution and these laws used the term inventors. But the privilege was too short. The State of New-York offered better terms. The only difficulty was, to give them effect without encroaching upon that power which had been constitutionally exercised by Congress. It would not do to call them inventors, and the device was adopted of calling him merely the pos sessor, which was a manifest evasion of the law of Congress.
But it was contended, that the patent laws oi the United States give no right; they only secure a pre-existing right at common law. What then do these statutes accomplish? If they do nothing more than give the inventor a chattel interest in his invention, and a remedy for its violation, he had these at common law. And if they only give him a mere right to use his invention in the States, p. 175with their permission, he had that before. The 1824. case of Millar v. Taylor proves the right to have ^y^
J _ Gibbons
been perfect at common law. The tune of en- v. joyment was far greater. Thompson’s Seasons OKd*”- had been published forty years when that action was brought. If the patent and copy-right laws were merely intended to secure an exclusive right throughout the United States, and are, in fact, a limitation on the common law right, (as was con tended by the respondent’s counsel,) when this right has been thus secured throughout the United States, and a limitation constitutionally put upon it by Congress, can a State interfere with this regulation? The limitation is not for the advan tage of the inventor, but of society at large, which is to take the benefit of the invention after the period of limitation lias expired. The patentee pays a duty on his patent, which is an effective source of revenue to the. United States. It is vir tually a contract between each patentee and the people of the United States, by which the time of exclusive and secure enjoyment is limited, and then the benefit of the discovery results to the public. A State cannot, by its local laws, defeat this resulting interest of the whole Union.
But it was said that a State might prohibit the use of a patented machine, if it be noxious to the health of its citizens, or of an immoral or impious book, the copy-right of which had been secured. The answer to all such arguments was, that it would be time enough to consider such questions when they arise. The constitutional power of Congress is to patent useful discoveries. The
1824. patent authorizes the patentee to use his invention, and it is the use which is secured. When a dis Gibbons
v. covery is deemed useful by the national govern Ogden.
ment, and a patent shall issue authorizing the patentee to use it throughout the United States, and the patentee shall be obstructed by a State in the exercise of this right, on the ground that the discovery is useless and dangerous, it will be time enough to consider the power of the States to defeat the exercise of the right on this ground. But this is not the question before the Court. It might be admitted, that the State had authority to prohibit the use of a patented machine on that ground, or of a book, the copy-right of which had been secured, on the ground of its impiety or immorality. But the laws which are now in judg ment were not passed upon any such ground. The question raised by them is, can the States obstruct the operation of an act of Congress, by taking the power from the National Legislature into their own hands? Can they prohibit the pub lication of an immoral book, licensed by Con gress, on the pretext of its immorality, and then give an exclusive right to publish the same book themselves? Can they prohibit the use of an in vention on the ground of its noxiousness, and then authorize the exclusive use of the same in vention by their own law ?
But there is no pretext of noxiousness here. The authority to enact these laws is taken up under a totally distinct head of State power. It is the sovereign power to grant exclusive privileges and create monopolies, the constitution and laws p. 177of the United States to the contrary notwithstand- 1824. ing. This is the real power under which these laws are defended; and it may perplex, although v. it cannot enlighten the discussion, to confound it °»dtnwith another and a distinct head of State power. If then the power of securing to authors and in ventors the use of their writings and discoveries, be exclusively vested in Congress, the acts of New-York are void, because they are founded on the exercise of the same power by the State. And if the power be concurrent, these acts are still void, because they interfere with the legisla tion of Congress on the same subject.
These law's were also void, because they inter fere with the power given to Congress, to regu late commerce with foreign nations and among' the several States. This nullity of the State laws would be supported, first, upon the ground of the power being exclusive in Congress; and, secondly, that if concurrent, these laws directly interfered with those of Congress on the same subject.
That this power was exclusive, would be mani fest from the fact, that the commerce to be regu lated, was that of the United States; that the government by which it was to be regulated, was also that of the United States; and that the sub ject itself was one undivided subject. It was an entire, regular, and uniform system, which was to be carried into effect, and would not admit of the participation and interference of another hand. Does not regulation, ex ri termini, imply harmony and uniformity of action ? If this must be ad mitted to be the natural and proper force of the Vol.KJ. ' 23
1824. term, let uh suppose that the additional term, uni form, had been introduced into the constitution, Gibbons J ’ . , ,
v. so us to provide that Congress should have power °6dem (0 make uniform regulations of commerce through out the United States. Then, according to the adjudications on the power of establishing a uni form rule of naturalization, and uniform laws of bankruptcy, throughout the United States, this power would unquestionably have been exclusive in Congress. But regulation of that commerce which pervades the Union, necessarily implies 'uniformity/, and the same result, therefore, fol lows as if the word had been inserted.
With regard to the quarantine laws, and other regulations of police, respecting the public health in the several States, they do not partake of the character of regulations of the commerce of the United States. It had been said, that these local regulations were recognised by Congress, which had made them a part of its own system of com merce. But this recognition would have been su perfluous, if they could have stood without it on the basis of State sovereignty; and so far as their adoption by Congress could be considered as af fecting the question, the manner and purpose of the recognition operated the other way. It would be found that, by the commercial regulations which Congress had made, a general system was adopt ed, which, if executed in every instance, would have carried ships and vessels into all the ports of the several States, their local quarantine laws to the contrary notwithstanding. An express regulation
- is, therefore, introduced, requiring the collectors p. 179of the customs to conform the execution of their 1824. official duties, under the navigation and revenue
Gibbons
laws, with the quarantine laws of the respective v.
Ogdon*
States. Without such a provision, the local health laws must have given way to the supremacy of the navigation and revenue laws of the Union.
A serious objection to the exclusive nature of this power of regulating commerce, was supposed to arise from the express prohibitions on the States, contained in the 10th sec. of the 1st art. of the con stitution. It has been considered, that these prohi bitions imply that, as to every thing not prohibited, the power of the State was meant to be reserved ; and the authority of the authors of the Federalist, was cited in support of this interpretation. But another commentator, of hardly less imposing au thority, and writing, not as a polemic, for the pur pose of vindicating the constitution against popu lar objections, but for the mere purpose of didactic instruction as a professor, with this section before him, and with a strong leaning towards State pre tensions, considers the power to regulate com merce as an exclusive power.” But the difference between them is rather in appearance, than in re ality. It does not appear that the author of that, number of the Federalist, did himself consider these police regulations as, properly speaking, re gulations of the commerce of the Union. But the objectors to the constitution had presented them as such, and his argument in substance is, that if
1824. they are, the constitution does not affect them.
The other commentator did not consider them as
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v. regulations of the commerce of the United States;
Ogden.
for if he did, he could not admit them, as he did, to be left in the States, and yet hold the opinion that the power to regulate commerce was exclu sively vested in Congress. But might not a rea son for these prohibitions be found, in the recent experience of the country, very different from that which had heretofore been assigned for them. The acts prohibited, were precisely those which the States had been passing, and which mainly led to the adoption of the constitution. The section might have been inserted ex abundanti cautela. Or the convention might have regarded the pre vious clause, which grants the power to regulate commerce, as exclusive throughout the whole sub ject ; and this section might have been inserted to qualify its exclusive character, so far as to permit the States to do the things mentioned, under the superintendance and with the consent of Congress. If either or both of these motives combined for inserting the clause, the inference which had been drawn from it against the exclusive power of Con gress to regulate commerce, would appear to be wholly unwarranted.
But if these police regulations of the States are to be considered as a part of the immense mass of commercial powers, is not the subject susceptible of division, and may not some portions of it be ex clusively vested in Congress ? It was viewing the subject in this light, that induced his learned p. 181associ ate" to assume the position which had been mis 1824. conceived on the other aide. This proposition was,
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not that all the commercial powers are exclusive, v.
Ogden.
but that those powers being separated, there are some which are exclusive in their nature; and among them, is that power which concerns navi gation, and which prescribes the vehicles in which commerce shall be carried on. It was, however, immaterial, no far as this case was concerned, whe ther the power of Congress to regulate commerce be exclusive or concurrent. Supposing it to be concurrent, it could not be denied, that where Con gress has legislated concerning a subject, on which it is authorized to act, all State legislation which interferes with it, is absolutely void. It was not denied, that Congress has power to regulate the coasting trade. It was not denied that Congress had regulated it. If the vessel now in question, was sailing under the authority of these regula tions, and has been arrested by a law of New-York forbidding her sailing, the State law must, of ne cessity, be void. The coasting trade did, indeed, exist before the constitution was adopted; it might safely be admitted, that it existed by the jus com mune of nations; that it existed by an imperfect right; and that the States might prohibit or per mit it at their pleasure, imposing upon it any regu lations they thought fit, within the limits of their respective territorial jurisdictions. But those re gulations were as various as the Slates; continu ally conflicting, and the source of perpetual dis-
^ Afr. Webster-
1821. cord and confusion. In this condition, the consti tution found the coasting trade. It was not a thing Gibbons
T. which required to be created, for it already exist Ogden,
ed, But it was a thing which demanded regula tion, and the power of regulating it. was given to Congress. They acted upon it as an existing sub ject, and regulated it in a uniform manner through out the Union. After this regulation, it was no longer an imperfect right, subject to the future control of the States. It became a perfect right, protected by the laws of Congress, with which the States had no authority to interfere. It was for the very purpose of putting an end to this interfe rence, that the power was given to Congress ; ami if they still have a right to act upon the subject, the power was given in vain. To say that Congress shall regulate it, and yet to say that the States shall alter these regulations at pleasure, or disre gard them altogether, would be to say, in the same breath, that Congress shall regulate it, and shall not regulate it; to give the power with one hand, and to take it back with the other. By the acts for regulating the coasting trade, Congress had de fined what should he required to authorize a ves sel to trade from port to port ; and in this defini tion, not one word is said as to whether it is moved by sails or by fire ; whether it carries passengers or merchandise. The license gives the authority to sail, without any of those qualifications. That the regulation of commerce and navigation, in cludes the authority of regulating passenger ves sels as well as others, would appear from the most approved definitions of the term commerce^ It ab p. 183ways implies intercommunication and intercourse. 1824. This is the sense in which the constitution uses it;
Gibbons
and the great national object was, to regulate thev.
Ogden.
terms on which intercourse between foreigners and this country, and between the difterent States of the Union, should be carried on. If freight be the test of commerce, this vessel was earning freight; for what is freight, but the compensation paid for the use of a ship ? The compensation for the carrying of passengers may be insured as freight. The whole subject is regulated by the general commercial law ; and Congress has super added special regulations applicable to vessels employed in transporting passengers from Europe. In none of the acts regulating the navigation of the country, whether employed in the foreign or coast ing trade, had any allusion been made to the kind of vehicles employed, further than the general de scription of ships or vessels, nor to the means or agents by which they were propelled.
In conclusion, the Attorney-General observed, that his learned friend (Mr. Emmett) had elo quently personified the State of New-York, casting her eyes over the ocean, witnessing every where this triumph of her genius, and exclaiming, in the language of vEneas,
“ Quae regio in terris, nostri non plena laboris?5’
Sir, it was not in the moment of triumph, nor with feelings of triumph, that jEneas uttered that exclamation. It was when, w’ith his faithful Acha tes by his side, he was surveying the works of art
1824. with which the palace of Carthage was adorned, and his attention had been caught by a represen Gibbons
tation of the battles of Troy. There he saw the Ogden.
sons of Atreus and Priam, and the fierce Achilles. The whole extent of hia misfortunes—the loss and desolation of his friends—the fall of his beloved country, rush upon his recollection.
*' Constitit, et tackrymanx; Quisjam locus, inquit, Achate, Qu& regie in terns nostri non plena laboris ?”
Sir, the passage may, hereafter, have a closer application to the cause than my eloquent and classical friend intended. For, if the state of things which has already commenced is to go on; if the spirit of hostility, which already exists in three of our States, is to catch by contagion, and spread among the rest, as, from the progress of the human passions, and the unavoidable conflict of interests, it will too surely do, what are we to expect ? Civil wars have often arisen from far inferior causes, and have desolated some of the fairest provinces of the earth. History is full of the afflicting narratives of such wars, from causes far inferior; and it will continue to be tier mourn ful office to record them, till time shall be no more. It is a momentous decision which this Court is called on to make. Here are three States almost on the eve of war. It is the high province of this Court to interpose its benign and mediatorial in fluence. The framers of our admirable constitu tion would have deserved the wreath of unmet' p. 185tahty which they have acquired, had they done 1821. nothing else than to establish this guardian tribu nal, to harmonize the jarring elements in our sys- v. tern. But, sir, if you do not interpose your friendly O-^'" hand, and extirpate the seeds of anarchy which New-York has sown, you will have civil war. The war of legislation, which has already com menced, will, according to its usual course, be come a war of blows. Your country will be shaken with civil strife. Your republican institutions will perish in the conflict. Your constitution will fall. The lust hope of nations will be gone. And, what will be the effect upon the rest of the world? Look abroad at the Scenes which are now passing on our globe, and judge of that effect. The friends of free government throughout the earth, who have been heretofore animated by our exam ple, and have held it up before them as their po lar star, to guide them through the stormy seas of revolution, will witness our fall with dismay and despair. The arm that is every where lifted in the cause of liberty, will drop, unnerved, by the warrior’s side. Despotism will have its day of triumph, and w ill accomplish the purpose at which it too certainly aims. It will cover the earth with the mantle of mourning. Then, sir, when New-York shall look upon this scene of ruin, if she have the generous feelings which I believe her to have, it will not be with her head aloft, in the pride of conscious triumph—“ her rapt, soul sitting in her eyes;” no, sir, no: dejected, with shame and confusion—drooping under the weight of her
Vol. 1X. 2-1
1824. sorrow, with a voice suffocated witii despair, well)^*v^/
may she then exclaim,
Gibbous
».
Ogden.
“ Quisjam locus,
Quae regio in terris nosiri non plena Jaboris!”
March 2. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opi nion of the Court, and, after stating the case, pro ceeded as follows:
The appellant contends that this decree is erro neous, because the laws which purport to give the exclusive privilege it sustains, are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States.
They are said to be repugnant—
1st. To that clause in the constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce.
2d. To that which authorizes Congress to pro mote the progress of science and useful arts.
The Stale of New-York maintains the consti tutionality of these laws; and their Legislature, their Council of Revision, and their Judges, have repeatedly concurred in this opinion. It is sup ported by great names—by names which have all the titles to consideration that virtue, intelligence, and office, can bestow. No tribunal can approach the decision of this question, without feeling a just and real respect for that opinion which is sustained by such authority; but it is the province of this Court, while it respects, not to bow to it implicitly; and the Judges must exercise, in the examination of the subject, that understanding which Providence has bestowed upon them, with that independence which the people of the United
States expect from this department of the govern 1824. ment.
Gibbons
As preliminary to the very ahle discussions ofs.
Ogden.
the constitution, which we have heard from the
Principles of
bar, and as having some influence on its construe- ,
interpretation.
lion, reference has been made to the political si tuation of these States, anterior to its formation. It has been said, that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is true. But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government, when they converted their Congress of Ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a Legislature, empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the States appear, underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected.
This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said, that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed ? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution. Congress is authorized “ to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper” lor the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used, is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in
1824. the constitution, which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able
v. to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, 6ckn‘ therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it.
What do gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged con struction, which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict con struction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded. As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally em ploy the words which most directly and aptly ex press the ideas they intend to convey, the enlight ened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any gi ven power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects p. 189for which it was given, especially when those ob- 1824. jecU are expressed in the instrument itself, should ^j^ns have great influence in the construction. We know v-of no reason for excluding this rule from the pre- 0°du’' sent case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents se lected for that purpose ; which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connex ion with the purposes for which they were confer red.
The words are, “ Congress shall have power fT** power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and commerce ex among the several States, and with the Indian regulation of tribes.” «<w^..
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to as certain the extent of the power, it becomes necessa ry to settle the tbeaning of the word. The counsel / for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Com merce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more : it is intercourse. It describes the com-
1824. mercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
Gibbons
v. prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. Ogden.
The mind can scarcely conceive a system for re gulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be con fined to prescribing rules for the conduct of indi viduals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter.
If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescri bing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by Ameri can seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regula tion. All America understands, and has uniform ly understood, the word “ commerce,” to compre hend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce, inclu ding navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their govern ment, and must have been contemplated in form ing it. The convention must have used the word in that sense, because all have understood it in that sense ; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late.
If the opinion that “ commerce,” as the word is used in the constitution, comprehends p. 191navigatian also, requires any additional confirmation, 1824. that additional confirmation is, we think, furnish
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ed by the words of the instrument itself.
Ogden.
It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that the exceptions from a power mark its ex tent ; for it would be absurd, as well as useless, \ to except from a granted power, that which was \ not granted—that which the words of the grant / could not comprehend, if, then, there are in the constitution plain exceptions from the power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the exercise of that power in a particular way, it is a proof that those who made these exceptions, and proscribed these inhibitions, understood the power to which they applied as being granted.
The 9th section of the 1st article declares, that i “ no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State [ over those of another.” This clause cannot be understood as applicable to those laws only which arc passed for the purposes of revenue, because it is expressly applied to commercial regulations ; and the most obvious preference which can be gi ven to one port over another, in regulating com merce, relates to navigation. But the subsequent part of the sentence is still more explicit. It is, > “ nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be f obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties, in another.’’ These words have a direct reference to naviga tion.
The universally acknowledged power of the government to impose embargoes, must also be considered as showing, that all America is united
1824. in that construction which comprehends navigavtT7v^/ don in the word commerce. Gentlemen have
v. said, in argument, that this is a branch of the war-making power, and that, an embargo is an in strument of war, not a regulation of trade.
That it may be, and often is, used ns an instru ment of war, cannot be denied. An embargo may be imposed for the purpose of facilitating the equipment or manning of a fleet, or for the purpose of concealing the progress of an expedi tion preparing to sail from a particular port. In these, and in similar cases, it is a military instru ment, and partakes of the nature of war. But all embargoes are not of this description. They arc sometimes resorted to without a view to war, and with a single view to commerce. In such case, an embargo is no more a war measure, than a merchantman is a ship of w ar, because both are vessels which navigate the ocean with sails and seamen.
When Congress imposed that embargo which, fora time, engaged the attention of every man in the United States, the avowed object of the law was, the protection of commerce, and the avoiding of war. By its friends and its enemies it was treated us a commercial, not as a war measure. The persevering earnestness and zeal with which it was opposed, in a part of our country which supposed its interests to be vitally affected by the act, cannot be forgotten. A want of acuteness in discovering objections to a measure to which they felt the most deep rooted hostility, will not be imputed to those who were arrayed in p. 193opposition to this. Yet they never suspected that navi 1824. gation was no branch of trade, and was, there
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fore, not comprehended in the power to regulatev,
Ogden,
commerce. They did, indeed, contest the con stitutionality of the act, but, on a principle which admits the construction for which the appellant contends. They denied that the particular law in question was made in pursuance of the consti tution, not because the power could not act directly on vessels, but because a perpetual embargo was the annihilation, and not the regulation of com merce. In terms, they admitted the applicability of the words used in the constitution to vessels; and that, in a case which produced a degree and an extent of excitement, calculated to draw forth every principle on which legitimate resistance could be sustained. No example could more strongly illustrate the universal understanding of die American people on this subject.
The word used in the constitution, then, com prehends, and has been always understood to com prehend, navigation within its meaning; and a power to regulate navigation, is as expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word “ commerce.”
To what commerce does this power extend ? ^'“^"J' trit • • 1 every njw A he constitution informs us, to commerce “with"” foreign nations, and among the several States,couo* ’’T and with the Indian tribes.” ^ Sl»««s ®»d
i , fore>En
has, we believe, been universally admitted, tin™, and a
i . . monttheseve-
inat tnese words comprehend every species of mi state*, it commercial intercourse between the United States at the external and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be s?^'"'’ “*a VOB.IX.
1824. carried on between this country and any other, to which this power does not extend. It has been
Gibbons
v* truly said, that commerce, as the word is used in
Ogdeih
the constitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term.
If this be the admitted meaning of the word, in its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, unless there be some plain intelli gible cause which alters it.
The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce “ among the several Slates.” The word “ among” means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.
But it does it is nol inten(jcj to say t]iat these words com-Itai extend to « commerce prehend that commerce, which is completely in-which is com- * , , , r - picteiy inter- ternal, which is carried on between matt and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend* to or affect other Slates. Such a power would be inconve nient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word “ among” is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is-not an apt phrase for that pur pose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the power was to be ex tended, would not have been made, had the inten-
UE THE UN [TED STATES. HKi
non been to extend the power to every descrip 1824. tion. The enumeration presupposes something
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not enumerated; and that something, if we rev.
Ogden.
gard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State. The genius and character of the whole government seem to he, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which arc com pletely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not neces sary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the governmental The completely internal commerce of a Stale, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.
Bat, in regulating commerce with foreign na tions, the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless power, if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations, is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country hi every direction, pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exer cising this right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised when ever the subject exists. If it exists within the States, it a foreign voyage may commence or ter minate ata port within a State, then the power of Congress maybe exercised within a State.
Th is pr inci pl e i s, i f possi b Ie, st i 11 mo re c I ear, w Iren
1824. applied to commerce “among the several States.” -^,^> They either join each other, in which case they arc
v. separated by a mathematical line, or they are re-
°’den- mote from each other, in which case other States lie between them. What is commerce “among" them; and how is it to be conducted? Can a tra ding expedition between two adjoining States, commence and terminate outside of each ? And if the trading intercourse be between two States remote from each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass through a third ? Commerce among the States must, of necessity, be commerce with the States. In the regulation of trade with the Indian tribes, the action of the law, especially when the consti tution was made, was chiefly within a State. The power of Congress, then, whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States. The sense of the nation on this subject, is unequivocally manifested by the provisions made in the laws for transporting goods, by land, between Baltimore and Providence, be tween New-York and Philadelphia, and between Philadelphia and Baltimore.
We are now arrived at the inquiry—What is this power ?
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe J^L^nnd^aa *he rule by which commerce is to be governed. b”imThTsa™ This power, like all others vested in Congress, is prescribed in complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost rioniweif. extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the
OF THE LMTED STATES. 1H7
questions which arise in this case, or which have 1824. been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been
Gibbons
understood, the sovereignty of Congress, (hough v.
Ogden.
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign na tions, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same re strictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wis dom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their con stituents possess at elections, arc, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of de claring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.
The power of Congress, then, comprehends na vigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with “commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.” It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New-York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies.
But it has been urged with great earnestness, that, although the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, be co-extensive with the subject it self, and have no other limits than are prescribed in the constitution, yet the States may severally
1824. exercise the same power, within their respective jurisdictions. Tn support of this argument, it is
v. said, that they possessed it us an inseparable attri" "* bate of sovereignty, before the formation of the constitution, and still retain it, except, so far as they have surrendered it by that instrument; that this principle results from the nature of the govern ment, and is secured by the tenth amendment; that an affirmative grant of power is not exclusive, unless in its own nature it be such that the conti nued exercise of it by the former possessor is in consistent with the grant, and that this is not of that description.
The appellant, conceding these postulates, ex cept the last, contends, that full power to regu late a particular subject, implies the whole power, and leaves no residuum; that a grant of the whole is incompatible with the existence of a right in another to any part of it.
Both parties have appealed to the constitution, to legislative acts, and judicial decisions; and have drawn arguments from all these sources, to support and illustrate the propositions they re spectively maintain.
J^iauT"™- The grant of the power to lay and collect taxes me।ct, so fur js jj^c the newer to regulate commerce, made in as it extends, 7 is excii stwiy general terms, and has never been understood to vested in Con-. . i grew, and uo interfere with the exercise of the same power by part of it can. ™ . Lh QKerciHetl the States; and hence has been drawn an argu ment which has been applied to the question un der consideration. But the two grants are not, it is conceived, similar in their terms or their na ture. Although many of the powers formerly p. 199exercised by (he States, are transferred to the 182-1. government of the Union, yet the Stale govern- ^i^' merits remain, and constitute a most important v. part of our system. The power of taxation is in- 0Sde“- dispensable to their existence, and is a power which, in its own nature, is capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different authorities at the same time. We are accustomed to see it placed, for different purposes, in different hands. Taxation is the simple operation of taking small portions from a perpetually accumulating mass, susceptible of almost infinite division; and a power in one to take what is necessary fur certain pur poses, is not, in its nature, incompatible with a power in another to take what is necessary for other purposes. Congress is authorized to lay and collect taxes, &c. to pay the debts, and pro vide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. This does not interfere with the power of the Slates to tax for the support of their own governments; nor is the exercise of that power by the Slates, an exercise of any por tion of the power that is granted to the United States. In imposing taxes for State purposes, they are not doing what Congress is empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive pro vince of rhe States. When, then, each govern ment exercises the power of taxation, neither is exercising the power of the other. But, when a State proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exer cising the very power that is granted to Congress,
1824. and is doing the very thing which Congress ia au^*7^^ thorized to do. There is no analogy, then, be-
v. tween the power of taxation and the power of
0Sden- regulating commerce.
In discussing the question, whether this power is still in the States, in the case under considera tion, we may dismiss from it the inquiry, whether it is surrendered by the mere grant to Congress, or is retained until Congress shall exercise the power. We may dismiss that inquiry, because it Jias been exercised, and the regulations which Congress deemed it proper to make, are now in full operation. The sole question is, can a State regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States, while Congress is regulating it?
The counsel for the respondent answer this question m the affirmative, arid rely very much on the restrictions in the 10th section, as supporting their opinion. They say, very truly, that limitations of a power, furnish a strong argument in favour of the existence of that power, and that the sec tion which prohibits the States from laying duties on imports or exports, proves that this power might have been exercised, had it not been ex pressly forbidden; and, consequently, that any other commercial regulation, not expressly forbid den, to which the original power of the State was competent, may still be made.
That this restriction shows the opinion of the Convention, that a State might impose duties on exports and imports, if not. expressly forbidden, will be conceded; hut that it follows as a con p. 201scquence, from this concession, that a State may 1824. regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States, cannot be admitted. „ ’•
i i Ogden*
We must first determine whether the act of lay ing “ duties or imposts on imports or exports,” is considered in the constitution as a branch of the taxing power, or of the power to regulate com merce. We think it very clear, that it is consi dered as a branch of the taxing power. It is so treated in the first clause of the 8lh section: “ Con gress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises;” and, before com merce is mentioned, the rule by which the exer cise of this power must be governed, is declared. It is, that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform. In a separate clause of the enume ration, the power to regulate commerce is given, as being entirely distinct from the right to levy taxes and imposts, and as being a new power, not before conferred. The constitution, then, consi ders these powers as substantive, and distinct from each other; and so places them in the enu meration it contains. The power of imposing duties on imports is classed with the power to levy taxes, and that seems to be its natural place. But the power to levy taxes could never be considered as abridging the right of the States on that sub ject; and they might, consequently, have exer cised it by levying duties on imports or exports, had the constitution contained no prohibition on this subject. This prohibition, then, is an excep tion from the acknowledged power of the States
Vol. IX. 26
1824. to levy taxes, not from the questionable power to 'rT?z^/ regulate commerce. Gibbons
v. “ A duty of tonnage” is as much a tax, as a
^'^H’ duty on imports or exports; and the reason which induced the prohibition of those taxes, extends to this also. This tax may be imposed by a State, with the consent of Congress; and it may be ad mitted, that Congress cannot give a right to a State, in virtue of its own potvers. But a duty of tonnage being part of the power of imposing taxes, its prohibition may certainly be made to depend on Congress, without affording any implication respecting a power to regulate commerce. It is true, that duties may often be, and in fact often arc, imposed on tonnage, with a view to the re gulation of commerce; but they may be also im posed with a view7 to revenue; arid it was, there fore, a prudent precaution, to prohibit the States from exercising this power. The idea that the same measure might, according to circumstan ces, be arranged with different classes of pow er, was no novelty to the framers of our con stitution. Those illustrious statesmen and pa triots had been, many of them, deeply engaged in the discussions which preceded the war of our re volution, and all of them were well read in those discussions. The right to regulate commerce, even by the imposition of duties, was not contro verted ; but the right to impose a duty for the purpose of revenue, produced a war as important, perhaps, in its consequences to the human race, us any the world has ever witnessed.
These restrictions, then, are on the taxingpower. p. 203not on that to regulate commerce ; and presuppose 1824. the existence of that which they restrain, not of v^^s’ that which they do not purport to restrain. v.
But, the inspection laws are said to be regula- O?^"* lions of commerce, and are certainly recognised in 6 ec^ela^.“* the constitution, as being passed in the exercise of >■«“’«> |anF. ° 1 and laws lor a power remaining with the States. regulating the
’ , * ■ i internal coni That inspection laws may have a remote aild merce of a considerable influence on commerce, will not be those which denied ; but that a power to regulate commerce is ^k^Mis^"- the source from which the right to pass them is '^'wiSik "« derived, cannot be admitted. The object of in- ^"l™"'^ spection laws, is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labour of a country ; to fit them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic use. They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose. They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general govern ment: all which can be most advantageously exer- / cised by the States themselves. Inspection laws. quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal com merce of a State, and those which respect turn pike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass.
No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress ; and, consequently, they re main subject to State legislation. If the legisla tive power of the Union can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where the
1824. power is expressly given'for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is ex Gibbons
pressly given. It is obvious, that the government Ogden.
of the Union, in the exercise of its express powers, that, for example, of regulating commerce with fo reign nations and among the States, may use means that may also be employed by a State, in the exer cise of its acknowledged powers; that, for exam ple, of regulating commerce within the State. If Congress license vessels to sail from one port to another, in the same State, the act is supposed to be, necessarily, incidental to the power expressly granted to Congress, and implies no claim of a di rect power to regulate the purely internal com merce of a State, or to act directly on its system of police. So, if a State, in passing laws on subjects acknowledged to be within its control, and with a view to those subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same character with one which Congress may adopt, it does not derive its authority from the par ticular power which has been granted, but from some other, which remains with the State, and may be executed by the same means. All experience shows, that the same measures, or measures scarce ly distinguishable from each other, may flow from distinct powers; but this does not prove that the powers themselves are identical. Although the means used in their execution may sometimes ap proach each other so nearly as to be confounded, there are other situations in which they are suffi ciently distinct to establish their individuality.
In our complex system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one general government, whose p. 205action extends over the whole, but which possess 1824. es only certain enumerated powers ; and of nume
Gibbons
rous State governments, which retain and exercise all powers not delegated to the Union, contests re specting power must arise. Were it even other wise, the measures taken by the respective go vernments to execute their acknowledged powers, would often be of the same description, and might, sometimes, interfere. This, however, does not prove that the one is exercising, or has a right to exercise, the powers of the other.
The acts of Congress, passed in 1796 and 1799/ empowering and directing the officers of the gene ral government to conform to, and assist in the ex ecution of the quarantine mid health laws of a State, proceed, it is said, upon the idea that these laws are constitutional. It is undoubtedly true, that they do proceed upon that idea; and the con stitutionality of such laws has never, so far as we arc informed, been denied. But they do not im ply an acknowledgment that a State may rightfully regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the States; for they do not imply that such laws are an exercise of that power, or enacted with a view to it. On the contrary, they arc treated as quarantine and health laws, are so denominated in the acts of Congress, and are considered as flow ing from the acknowledged power of a State, to provide for the health of its citizens. But, as it was apparent that some of the provisions made for this purpose, and in virtue of this power, might
fl 2 U. 8. K p. Jty 3 It S. L. p. 156.
1824. interfere with, and be affected by the laws of the
United States, made for the regulation of com Gibbons
v. merce, Congress, in that spirit of harmony and Ogden,
conciliation, which ought always to characterize the conduct of governments standing in the rela tion which that of the Union and those of the States bear to each other, has directed its officers to aid in the execution of these laws; and has, in some measure, adapted its own legislation to this object, by making provisions in aid of those of the States. But, in making these provisions, the opi nion is unequivocally manifested, that Congress may control the State laws, so far as it may be ne cessary to control them, for the regulation of com merce.
The act passed in 1803/ prohibiting the impor tation of slaves into any State which shall itself prohibit their importation, implies, it is said, an admission that the States possessed the power to exclude or admit them; from which it is inferred, that they possess the same power with respect to other articles.
If this inference were correct; if this power was exercised, not under any particular clause in the constitution, but in virtue of a general right over the subject of commerce, to exist as long as the constitution itself, it might now be exercised. Any State might nowr import African slaves intoits own territory. But it is obvious, that the power of the States over this subject, previous to the year 1808, constitutes an exception to the power of
Congress to regulate commerce, and the exception 1024. is expressed in such words, as to manifest clearly ^^ the intention to continue the pre-existing right of v. the States to admit or exclude, for a limited period. °^den-The words are, “ the migration or importation of such persons as any of the Slates, now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808.” The whole object of the exception is, to preserve the power to those States which might be disposed to exorcise it; and its language seems to the Court to convey this idea un equivocal ly. The possession of tins particular pow er, then, during the time li mited in the constitution, cannot be admitted to prove the possession of any other similar power.
It has been said, that the act of August 7, 1789, acknowledges a concurrent power in the States to regulate the conduct of pilots, and hence is infer red an admission of their concurrent right with Congress to regulate commerce with foreign na tions, and amongst the States. Rut this infer ence is not, we think, justified by the fact.
Although Congress cannot enable a State to le gislate, Congress may adopt the provisions of a State on any subject. When the government of the Union was brought into existence, it found a system for the regulation of its pilots in full force in every State. The act which has been mention ed, adopts this system, and gives it the same vali dity as it its provisions had been specially made by Congress. But the act, it may be said, is pros pective also, and the adoption of laws to be made
[figure]
1824. i» future, presupposes the right in the maker to le\^^ gislate on the subject.
Gibbons
v, I he act unquestionably manifests an intention
Oedeit to ]eave this subject entirely to the States, until
Congress should think proper to interpose; hut the very enactment of such a law indicates an opi nion that it was necessary; that the existing sys tem would not be applicable to the new state of things, unless expressly applied to it by Congress. But this section is confined to pilots within the “ bays, inlets, rivers, harbours, and ports of the United States,” which are, of course, in whole or in part, also within the limits of some particular state. The acknowledged power of a State to re gulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens, may enable it to legislate on this subject, to a considerable extent; and the adop tion of its system by Congress, and the application of it to the whole subject of commerce, does not seem to the Court to imply a right in the States so to apply it of their own authority. But the adop tion of the State system being temporary, being only “until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress," shows, conclusively, an opi nion that Congress could control the whole subject, and might adopt the system of the States, or pro vide one of its own.
A State, it is said, or even a private citizen, may construct light houses. But gentlemen must be aware, that if this proves a power in a State to regulate commerce, it proves that the saute power is in the citizen. States, or individuals who own lands, may, if not forbidden by law.
OF THE UNITED STATES. >i)9
erect on those lands what buildings they please; 1824. but this power is entirely distinct from that of re
Gibbons-
gulating commerce, and may, we presume, bev.
Ogdrb
restrained, if exercised so as to produce a public mischief.
These acts were cited at the bar for the pur pose of showing an opinion in Congress, that the States possess, concurrently with the Legislature of the Union, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States. Upon reviewing them, we think they do not establish the proposition they were intended to prove. They show the opinion, that the States retain powers enabling them to pass the laws to which allusion has been made, not that those laws pro ceed from the particular power which has been delegated to Congress.
It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, that, as the word “ to regulate” implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regu lated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which re main as they were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave un touched, as that on which it has operated.
There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.
Since, however, in exercising the power of re gulating their own purely interna! affairs, whether
Vol. IX. 27
1824. of trading or police, the States may sometimes enact laws, the validity of which depends on their
Gibbons
v, interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of
Ogden.
Congress passed in pursuance of the constitution, The hw*of the Court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the N.Y. granting 1 . . to k. r. u and laws of New-York, as expounded by the highest elusive right of tribunal of that State, have, in their application navigating tire , . . - waters of that to this case, come into collision with an actor fteam boai^ Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to ZroTthe ’""^ which that act entitles him. Should this collision regulating Ure exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws wbS!?1 bSngwere PMsed in virtue of a concurrent power made in pur-« jo regulate commerce with foreign nations and •nance of the “ “ constitution, amOng the several States,” or, in virtue of a power are supreme, ° # v und the state to regulate their domestic trade and police. In laws must ” < ■ < - t yield to that one case and the other, the acts ot New-York Iven^ ’hough must yield to the law of Congress; and the deci»uanwofp!Xsion sustaining the privilege they confer, against eis acknow
^ a right given by a law of the Union, must be ledged to main in
,hc erroneous. State*.
This opinion has been frequently expressed in this Court, and is founded, as well on the nature of the government as on the words of the consti tution. \ lu argument, however, it has been con tended, that if a law passed by a State, in the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty, comes into conflict with a law passed by Congress in pursuance of the constitution, they affect the sub ject, and each other, like equal opposing powers.
But the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for it, by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any act,
18^4.
inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by
y^v^^
the declaration, that the constitution is the su
Gibbons
preme law. The appropriate application of thatv.
Ogden.
part of the clause which confers the same supre macy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, ■ but, though enacted in the execution of acknow ledged State powers, interfere with, or are con trary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is su preme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.
In pursuing this inquiry at the bar, it has been said, that the constitution does not confer the right of intercourse between State and State. That right derives its source from those laws whose au thority is acknowledged by civilized man through out the W'orld. This is true. The constitution found it an existing right, and gave to Congress the power to regulate it. In the exercise of this power, Congress has passed “ an act for enrolling or licensing ships or vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same.” The counsel for the respondent contend, that this act does not give the right to sail from port to port, but confines itself to regulating a pre-existing right, so far only as to confer certain privileges on enrolled and licensed vessels in its exercise.
It will at once occur, that, when a Legislature
1824. attaches certain privileges and exemptions to the ■^zx; exercise of a right over which its control is abso-Gtbboiw ,
v. lute, the law must imply a power to exercise the
®Bdei1' right. The privileges are gone, if the right itself be annihilated. It would be contrary to all reason, and to the course of human affairs, to say that a State is unable to strip a vessel of the particular privileges attendant on the exercise of a right, and yet may annul the right itself; that the State of New-York cannot prevent an enrolled and li censed vessel, proceeding from Elizabethtown, iu New-Jersey, to New-York, from enjoying, in her course, and on her entrance into port, all the pri vileges conferred by the act of Congress; but can shut her up in her own port, and prohibit altoge ther her entering the waters and ports of another State. To the Court it seems very clear, that the whole act on the subject of the coasting trade, according to those principles which govern the construction of statutes, implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on the coasting trade.
a licence un- But we will proceed briefly to notice those sec tier the «ct* of. • . i । • conness for Hons which bear more directly on the subject, coasting trade, The first section declares, that vessels enrolled sion to entry by virtue of a previous law, and certain other vesonthattiade. se]s> enro)iej as described in that act, and having a license in force, as is by the act required, “and no others, shall be deemed ships or vessels of the United States, entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade.”
This section seems to the Court to contain a po sitive enactment, that the vessels it describes shall p. 213be entitled to the privileges of ships or vesselsem- 1824. ployed in the coasting trade. These privileges
Gibbons
cannot be separated from the trade, and cannot bev.
Ogden.
enjoyed, unless the trade may be prosecuted. The grant of the privilege is an idle, empty form, con veying nothing, unless it convey the right to which the privilege is attached, and iu the exercise of which its whole value consists. To construe these words otherwise than as entitling the ships or ves sels described, to carry on the coasting trade, would be, we think, to disregard the ajiparent in tent of the act.
The fourth section directs the proper officer to grant to a vessel qualified to receive it, “a license for carrying on the coasting trade;” and prescribes its form. After reciting the compliance of the ap plicant with the previous requisites of the law, the operative words of the instrument are, “license is hereby grauted for the said steam-boat, Bellona, to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade for one year from the date hereof, and no longer.”
These are not the words of the officer ; they are the words of the legislature; and convey as expli citly the authority the act intended to give, and operate as effectually, as if they had been inserted in any other part of the act, than in the license it self. / The word “license,” means permission, or aurthority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing ; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. It certainly transfers to
1824. him all the right which the grantor can transfer, to do what is within the terms of the license.
Gibboiis
v. Would the validity or effect of such an instru
Ogden-
ment be questioned by the respondent, if executed by persons claiming regularly under the laws of New-York ?
The license must be understood to be what it purports to he, a legislative authority to the steam boat Bellona, “to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, for one year from this date."
It has been denied that these words authorize a voyage from New-Jersey to New-York. It is true, that no ports are specified ; but it is equally true, that the words used arc perfectly intelligible, and do confer such authority as unquestionably, as if the ports had been mentioned. The coasting trade is a term well understood. The law' has defined it; and ail know its meaning perfectly. The act describes, with great minuteness, the various ope rations of a vessel engaged in it; and it cannot, we think, be doubted, that a voyage from New-Jersey to New-York, is one of those operations.
Tint license Notwithstanding the decided language of the is not irately intended tn license, it has also been maintained, that it gives center the na tional charao no right to trade; and that its sole purpose is to confer the American character.
The answer given to this argument, that the American character is conferred by the enrolment, and not by the license, is, we think, founded too clearly in the words of the law, to require the sup port of any additional observations. The enrol ment of vessels designed for the coasting trade, corresponds precisely with the registration of p. 215vesseis designed for the foreign trade, and requires 1824. every circumstance which cun constitute the Ame
Gibbons
rican character. The license can he granted only v.
Ogden.
to vessels already enrolled, if they be of the bur then of twenty tons and upwards; and requires no circumstance essential to the American character. The object of the license, then, cannot be to as certain the character of the vessel, but to do what it professes to do—-that is, to give permission to a vessel already proved by her enrolment to be American, to carry on the coasting trade.
The power
But, if the license be a permit to carry on the coast
of regulating commerce ea-
ing trade, the respondent denies that these boats
° r tends to naviwere engaged in that trade, or that the decree un- jatian carried der consideration has restrained them from pro- exclusively securing it. The boats of the appellant were, we tainting1" are told, employed in the transportation of pas-sen- b1^-1-'' - gers; and this is no part of that commerce which Congress may regulate.
If, as our whole course of legislation on this sub ject shows, the power of Congress has been uni versally understood in America, to comprehend navigation, it is a very persuasive, if not a conclu sive argument, to prove that the construction is correct; and, if it be correct, no clear distinction is perceived between the power to regulate vessels employed in transporting men for hire, and pro perty for hire. The subject is transferred to Con gress, and no exception to the grant can be ad mitted, which is not proved by the words or the nature of the thing. A coasting vessel employed in the transportation of passengers, is as much a portion of the American marine, as one employed
1824. in the transportation of a cargo ; and no reason is '^ '^- perceived why such vessel should be withdrawn
v. from the regulating power of that government,
Ogden, whjch has been thought best fitted for the purpose generally. The provisions of the law respecting native seamen, andrespectingownership,are as ap plicable to vessels carrying men, as to vessels car rying manufactures; and no reason is perceived why the power over the subject should not be pla ced in the same hands. The argument urged at the bar, rests on the foundation, that the power of Congress does not extend to navigation, as a branch of commerce, and can only be applied to that subject incidentally and occasionally. But if that foundation be removed, we must show some plain, intelligible distinction, supported by the con stitution, or by reason, for discriminating between the power of Congress over vessels employed in navigating the same seas. We can perceive no such distinction.
If we refer to the constitution, the inference to be drawn from it is rather against the distinction. The section which restrains Congress from pro hibiting the migration or importation of such per sons as any of the States may think proper to ad mit, until the year 1808, has always been consi dered as an exception from the power to regulate commerce, and certainly seems to class migration with importation. Migration applies as appro priately to voluntary, as importation does to invo luntary, arrivals ; and, so far as an exception from a power proves its existence, this section proves that the power to regulate commerce applies p. 217equally to the regulation of vessels employed in trans- 1824. porting men, who pass from place to place volun- K'^^ tarilv, and to those who pass involuntarily. ’•
If the power reside in Congress, as a portion of the general grant to regulate commerce, then acts applying that power to vessels generally, must be construed as comprehending all vessels. If none appear to be excluded by the language of the act, none can be excluded by construction. Vessels have always been employed to a greater or less extent in the transportation of passengers, and have never been supposed to be, on that ac count, withdrawn from the control or protection of Congress. Packets which ply along the coast, as well as those which make voyages between Europe and America, consider the transportation of passengers as an important part of their busi ness. Yet it has never been suspected that the general laws of navigation did not apply to them.
The duty act, sections 23 and 46, contains pro visions respecting passengers, and show’s, that vessels which transport them, have the same rights, and must perform the same duties, with other vessels. They are governed by the general laws of navigation.
In the progress of things, this seems to have grown into a particular employment, and to have attracted the particular attention of government. Congress was no longer satisfied with compre hending vessels engaged specially in this business, within those provisions which wore intended for vessels generally; and, on the 2d of March, 1819, passed “an act regulating passenger ships and
Vol. IX. 28 p. 2182115 cases in the Supreme court
1824. vessels.” This wise and humane law provides V^T^^*^ for the safety and comfort of passengers, and for
v. the communication of every thing concerning
^-'ten' them which may interest the government, to the
Department of State, but makes no provision con cerning the entry of the vessel, or her conduct in the waters of the United States. This, we think, shows conclusively the sense of Congress, (if, indeed, any evidence to that point could be re quired,) that the pre-existing regulations compre hended passenger ships among others; and, in prescribing the same duties, the Legislature must have considered them as possessing the same rights.
If, then, it were even true, that the Bellona and the Stoudinger were employed exclusively in the conveyance of passengers between New-York and New-Jersey, it would not follow that this occupa tion did not constitute a part of the coasting trade of tile United States, and was not protected by the license annexed to the answer. But we can not perceive how the occupation of these vessels can be drawn into question, in the case before the Court. The laws of New-York, which grant the exclusive privilege set up by the respondent, take no notice of the employment of vessels, and re late only to the principle by which they are pro pelled. Those laws do not inquire whether ves sels are engaged in transporting men or merchan dise, but whether they are moved by steam or wind. If by the former, the waters of New-York are closed against them, though their car goes be dutiable goods, which the laws of the
United States' permit them to enter and deliver in 1824. New-York. If bv the latter, those waters arc ^ff??^ free to them, though they should carry passengers v. only. In conformity with the law, is the bill of o&delu the plaintiff in the State Court. The bill does not complain that the Bellona and the Stoudinger carry passengers, but that they are moved by steam. This is the injury of which he complains, and is the sole injury against the continuance of which he asks relief. The bill does not even allege, specially, that those vessels were employed in the transportation of passengers, but says, ge nerally, that they were employed “ in the trans portation of passengers, or otherwise.” The answer avers, only, that they were employed in the coasting trade, and insists on the right to carry on any trade authorized by the license. No tes timony is taken, and the writ of injunction and decree restrain these licensed vessels, not from car rying passengers, but from being moved through the waters of New-York by steam, for any pur pose whatever.
The questions, then, whether the conveyance of passengers be a part of the coasting trade, and whether a vessel can be protected in that occupa tion by a coasting license, are not, and cannot be, raised in this case. The real and sole question The power seems to be, whether a steam machine, in actualof «8»,i»‘in« use, deprives a vessel of the privileges conferred w"d* ,0 ”E: , i a M|a propelled oy a license. by »te»m or
- ■ 1 • . . 6re, ®x well as in considering this question, the first idea which i’^ »>«• presents itself, is, that the laws of Congress for instrumental!- the regulation of commerce, do not look to the 2X'"'"* *“”
1824. principle by which vessels arc moved. That sub'^7>'^/ject is left entirely to individual discretion; and, Gibbons • / . ’
v. in that vast and complex system of legislative
°sden enactment concerning it, which embraces every thing that the Legislature thought it necessary to notice, there is not, we believe, one word respect ing the peculiar principle by which vessels are propelled through the water, except what may be found in a single act, granting a particular privi lege to steam boats. With this exception, every act, either prescribing duties, or granting privi leges, applies to every vessel, whether navigated by the instrumentality of wind or fire, of sails or machinery. The whole weight of proof, then, is thrown upon him who would introduce a distinc tion to which the words of the law give no coun tenance.
If a real difl’erence could be admitted to exist between vessels carrying passengers and others, it has already been observed, that there is no fact in this case which can bring up that question. And, if the occupation of steam boats be a mat ter of such general notoriety, that the Court may be presumed to know’ it, although not specially informed by the record, then we deny that the transportation of passengers is their exclusive oc cupation. It is a matter of general history, that, in our western waters, their principal employment is the transportation of merchandise; and all know, that in the waters of the Atlantic they are fre quently so employed.
But all inquiry into this subject seems to the Court to be put completely at rest, by the act p. 221already mentioned, entitled, “ An act for the enrol ling and licensing of steam boats.”
Gibbons v.
This act authorizes a steam boat employed, or
Ogden.
intended to be employed, only in a river or bay of the United States, owned wholly or in part by an alien, resident within the United States, to be enrolled and licensed as if the same belonged to a citizen of the United Slates.
This act demonstrates the opinion of Congress, that steam boats may be enrolled and licensed, in common with vessels using sails. They are, of course, entitled to the same privileges, and can no more be restrained from navigating waters, and entering ports which arc free to such vessels, than if they were wailed on their voyage by the winds, instead of being propelled by the agency of fire. The one clement may be as legitimately used as the other, for every commercial purpose authorized by the laws of the Union; and the act of a State inhibiting the use of either to any ves sel having a license under the act of Congress, comes, we think, in direct collision with that act.
As this decides the cause, it is unnecessary to enter in an examination of that part of the consti tution which empowers Congress to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.
The Court is aware that, in stating the train of reasoning by which we have been conducted to this result, much time has been consumed in the attempt to demonstrate propositions which may have been thought axioms. It is felt that the tediousness inseparable from the endeavour to prove that which is already clear, is imputable to
1824. a considerable part of this opinion. But it was unavoidable. The conclusion to which we have Gibbons
v.
come, depends on a chain of principles which it Ogden.
was necessary to preserve unbroken; and, al though some of them were thought nearly self evident, the magnitude of the question, the weight of character belonging to those from whose judg ment we dissent, and the argument at the bar, demanded that we should assume nothing.
Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as pos tulates, that the powers expressly granted to the government of the Union, are to be contracted by construction, into the narrowest possible com pass, and that the original powers of the States are retained, if any possible construction will re tain them, may, by a course of well digested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, founded on these premises, explain away the constitution of our country, aud leave it, a magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use. They may so entangle and perplex the understanding, as to obscure principles, which were before thought quite plain, and induce doubts where, if the mind were to pursue its own course, none would be per ceived. In such a case, it is peculiarly necessary to recur to safe and fundamental principles to sustain those principles, and, when sustained, to make them the tests of the arguments to be ex amined.
Mr. Justice Johnson. The judgment entered by the Court in this cause, has my entire approba tion ; but having adopted my conclusions on views
OF THE UNITED STATES. 22'3
of the subject materially different, from those of 1824. my brethren, I feel it incumbent on me to exhibit 'fry**7 those views. I have, also, another inducement: v. in questions of great importance and great delica- ^d*”- cy, I feel my duty to the public best discharged, by an effort to maintain my opinions in my own way.
In attempts to construe the constitution, I have never found much benefit resulting from the inqui ry, whether the whole, or any part of it, is to be construed strictly, or literally. The simple, clas sical, precise,yet comprehensive language, in which it is couched, loaves, at most, but very little lati tude for construction; and when its intent and meaning is discovered, nothing remains but to ex ecute the will of those who made it, in the best manner to effect the purposes intended. The great and paramount purpose, was to unite this mass of wealth and power, for the protection of the humblest individual ; his rights, civil and poli tical, his interests and prosperity, are the sole end; the rest arc nothing but the means But the prin cipal of those means, one so essential as to ap proach nearer the characteristics of an end, was the independence and harmony of the States, that they may the better subserve the purposes of che rishing and protecting the respective families of this great republic.
The strong sympathies, rather than the feeble government, which bound the States together du ring a common war, dissolved on the return of peace ; and the very principles which gave rise to the war of the revolution, began to threaten the
1824. confederacy with anarchy and ruin. The States '^^^’ h^ rcs'ate^ a tax imposed by the parent State,
v. and now reluctantly submitted to, or altogether re°sden* j ected, t he m oderate demand s of the confederation.
Every one recollects the painful and threatening discussions, which arose on the subject of the five per cent. duty. Some States rejected it altoge ther; others insisted on collecting it themselves; scarcely any acquiesced without reservations, which deprived it altogether of the character of a nation al measure ; and at length, some repealed the laws by which they had signified their acquiescence.
For a century the States had submitted, with murmurs, to the commercial restrictions imposed by the parent State ; and now, finding themselves in the unlimited possession of those powers over their own commerce, which they had so long been deprived of, and so earnestly coveted, that selfish principle which, well controlled, is so salu tary, and which, unrestricted, is so unjust and ty rannical, guided by inexperience and jealousy, be gan to show itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic measures, from which grew up a conflict of com mercial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal to their commercial interests abroad.
This was the immediate cause, that led to the forming of a convention.
As early as 1778, the subject had been pressed upon the attention of Congress, by a memorial from the State of New-Jersey ; and in 1781, we find a resolution presented to that body, by one of p. 225the most enlightened men of his day/ affirming, 1824. that “it is indispensably necessary, that the United
Gibbons
States, in Congress assembled, should bevest ed T.
Ogden.
with a right of superintending the commercial re gulations of every State, that none may take place that shall be partial or contrary to the common interests.” The resolution of Virginia/ appoint ing her commissioners, to meet commissioners from other States, expresses their purpose to be, “ to take into consideration the trade of the United States, to consider how far an uniform system in their commercial regulations, maybe necessary to their common interests and their permanent har mony.” And Mr. Madison’s resolution, which led to that measure, is introduced by a preamble en tirely explicit to this point: “ Whereas, the rela tive situation of the United States has been found, on trial, to require uniformity in their commercial regulations, as the only effectual policy for obtain ing, in the ports of foreign nations, a stipulation of privileges reciprocal to those enjoyed by the subjects of such nations in the ports of the United States, for preventing animosities, which cannot fail to arise among the several States, from the in terference of partial and separate regulations,” &c. “ therefore, resolved,” &c.
The history of the times will, therefore, sustain the opinion, that the grant of power over com merce, if intended to be commensurate with the evils existing, and the purpose of remedying those
a Dr. Withertipoon. b January 21, 1786. Vol. IX.
1824. evils, could be only commensurate with the power of the States over the subject. And this opinion Gibbons
v. is supported by a very remarkable evidence of the Ogden.
general understanding of the whole American peo ple, when the grant was made.
There was not a State in the Union, in which there did not, at that time, exist a variety of com mercial regulations; concerning which it is too much to suppose, that the whole ground covered by those regulations was immediately assumed by actual legislation, under the authority of the Union. But where was the existing statute on this subject, that a {state attempted to execute? or by what State was it ever thought necessary to repeal those statutes? By common consent, those laws drop ped lifeless from their statute books, for want of the sustaining power, that had been relinquished to Congress.
And the plain and direct import of the words of the grant, is consistent with this general under standing.
The words of the constitution are, “ Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with fo reign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”
It is not material, in my view of the subject, to inquire whether the article a or the should be pre fixed to the word “power.” Either, or neither, will produce the same result: if either, it is clear that the article the would be the proper one, since the next preceding grant of power is certainly ex clusive, to wit: “ to borrow money on the credit p. 227of the United States.” But mere verbal criticism 1824. 1 reject. Gibbuns
My opinion is founded on the application of the words of the grant to the subject of it.
The “ power to regulate commerce,” here meant to be granted, was that power to regulate com merce which previously existed in the States. But what was that power ? The States were, unques tionably, supreme ; and each possessed that power over commerce, which is acknowledged to reside in every sovereign State. The definition and li mits of" that power are to be sought among the features of international law; and, as it was not only admitted, hut. insisted on by both parties, in argument, that,(t ‘unaffected by a state of war, by treaties, or by municipal regulations, all com merce among independent States teas legitimate," there is no necessity to appeal to the oracles of the jus commune for the correctness of that doc trine. The law of nations, regarding man as a social animal, pronounces all commerce legitimate in a state of peace, until prohibited by positive law. The power of a sovereign state over com merce, therefore, amounts to nothing more than a power to limit and restrain it at pleasure. And since the power to prescribe the limits to its free dom, necessarily implies the power to determine what shall remain unrestrained, it follows,that the power must be exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and hence, the grant of this power car ries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the State to act upon.
And such has been the practical construction of
1824. the act. Were every law on the subject of com merce repealed to-morrow, all commerce would Gibbons
Ta be lawful; and, in practice, merchants never in Ogden.
quire what is permitted, but what is forbidden commerce. Of all the endless variety of branches of foreign commerce, now carried on to every quarter of the world, 1 know’ of no one that is permitted by act of Congress, any otherwise than by not being forbidden. No statute of the United States, that I know of, was ever passed to permit a commerce, unless in consequence of its having been prohibited by some previous statute.
I speak not here of the treaty making power, for that is not exercised under the grant now under consideration. I confine my observation to laics properly so called. And even where freedom of commercial intercourse is made a subject of stipu lation in a treaty, it is generally with a view to the removal of some previous restriction ; or the introduction of some new privilege, most fre quently, is identified with the return to a state of peace. But another view of the subject leads directly to the same conclusion. Power to regu-1 ate foreign commerce, is given in the same words, and in the same breath, as it were, with that over the commerce of the States and with the Indian tribes. But the power to regulate foreign com merce is necessarily exclusive. The States are unknown to foreign nations; their sovereignty exists only with relation to each other and the general government. Whatever regulations fo reign commerce should be subjected to in the ports of the Union, the general government would ^^ p. 229held responsible for them; and all other regula 1824. tions, but those which Congress had imposed,
Gibbons v.
would be regarded by foreign nations as trespasses
Ogden.
and violations of national faith and comity.
But the language which grants the power as to one description of commerce, grants it as to all; and, in fact, if ever the exercise of a right, or acquiescence in a construction, could be inferred from contemporaneous and continued assent, it is that of the exclusive effect of this grant.
A right over the subject has never been pre tended to in any instance, except as incidental to the exercise of some other unquestionable power.
The present is an instance of the assertion of that kind, as incidental to a municipal power; that of superintending the internal concerns of a State, and particularly of extending protection and patronage, in the shape of a monopoly, to genius and enterprise.
The grant to Livingston and Fulton, interferes with the freedom of intercourse among the States; and on this principle its constitutionality is con tested.
When speaking of the power of Congress over navigation, I do not regard it as a power inciden tal to that of regulating commerce ; 1 consider it as the thing itself; inseparable from it as vital motion is from vital existence.
Commerce, in its simplest signification, means an exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labour, transportation, intelligence, care, and various mediums of exchange, become commodities, and enter into commerce; the sub-
1824. ject, the vehicle, the agent, and their various ope rations, become the objects of commercial regu Gibbons
lation. Ship building, the carrying trade, and Ogden.
propagation of seamen, are such vital agents of commercial prosperity, that the nation which could not legislate over these subjects, would not pos sess power to regulate commerce.
That such was the understanding of the framers of the constitution, is conspicuous from provisions contained in that instrument.
The first clause of the 9th section, not only considers the right of controlling personal ingress or migration, as implied in the powers previously vested in Congress over commerce, but acknow ledges it as a legitimate subject of revenue. And, although the leading object of this section un doubtedly was the importation of slaves, yet the words are obviously calculated to comprise per sons of all descriptions, and to recognise in Con gress a power to prohibit, where the States per mit, although they cannot permit when the States prohibit. The treaty making power undoubtedly goes further. So the fifth clause of the same sec tion furnishes an exposition of the sense of the Convention as to the power of Congress over navigation : “ nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.”
But, it is almost labouring to prove a self-evi dent proposition, since the sense of mankind, the practice of the world, the contemporaneous as sumption, and continued exercise of the power, and universal acquiescence, have so clearly esta-
Of THE UNITED STATES. 2^1
biished the right of Congress over navigation, and 1824. the transportation of both men and their goods, as
Gibbons.
not only incidental to, but actually of the essencev.
Ogden.
of, the power to regulate commerce. As to the transportation of passengers, and passengers in a steam boat, I consider it ns having been solemnly recognised by the State of New-York, as a subject both of commercial regulation and of revenue. She has imposed a transit duty upon steam boat passengers arriving at Albany, and unless this be done in the exercise of her control over personal intercourse, as incident to internal commerce, I know not on what principle the individual has been subjected to this tax. The subsequent im position upon the steam boat itself, appears to be but a commutation, and operates as an indirect instead of a direct tax upon the same subject. The passenger pays it at last.
It is impossible, with the views which I enter tain of the principle on which the commercial pri vileges of the people of the United States, among themselves, rests, to concur in the view which this Court takes of the effect of the coasting li cense in this cause. I do not regard it as the foundation of the right set up in behalf of the appellant. If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitu tion, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints. And I cannot overcome the conviction, that if the licensing act was repealed to-morrow, the rights of the appellant to a rever sal ot the decision complained of, would be as
1824. strong as it is under this license. One half the X^-V'"'^.
doubts in life arise from the defects of language, Gibbons
V, and if this instrument had been called an exemp
Ogden.
tion instead of a license, it would have given a better idea of its character, licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spiritous liquors, &c. 'The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favour of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted ; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrolment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contradistinguished from foreign; and to pre serve the government from fraud by foreigners, in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the Ame rican commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected. Many duties and formalities are necessarily imposed upon the American foreign commerce, which would be burdensome in the ac tive coasting trade of the States, and can be dis pensed with. A higher rate of tonnage also is imposed, and this license entitles the vessels that take it, to those exemptions, but to nothing more. p. 233A common register, equally entitles vessels to 1824. crry on the coasting trade, although it does not GibL(HK exempt them from the forms of foreign commerce, v.
I ■ 0’^3611 or from compliance with the 16th and 17th sec tions of the enrolling act. And even a foreign vessel may be employed coastwise, upon comply ing with the requisitions of the 24th section. I consider the license, therefore, as nothing more than what, it purports to be, according to the 1st section of this act, conferring on the licensed ves sel certain privileges in that trade, not conferred on other vessels; but the abstract right of com mercial intercourse, stripped of those privileges, is common to all.
Yet there is one view, in which the license may be allowed considerable influence in sustaining the decision of this Court.
It has been contended, that the grants of power to the United States over any subject, do not, ne cessarily, paralyze the arm of the States, or de prive them of the capacity to act on the same sub ject. That this can be the effect only of prohibi tory provisions in their own constitutions, or in that of the general government. The vis vital of power is still existing in the States, if not extin guished by the constitution of the United States. That, although as to all those grants of power which may be called aboriginal, with relation to the government, brought into existence by the constitution, they, of course, are out of the reach of State power; yet, as to all concessions of powers which previously existed in the States, it was otherwise. The practice of our government cer-
Vw. IX 30
1824. vainly has been, on many subjects, to occupy so 'TTiX^ much °’dy of the fieW opened to them, as they
v. think the public interests require. Witness the
Ogden, jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, limited both as to cases and as to amount; and various other in stances that might be cited. But the license fur nishes a full answer to this objection ; for, although one grant of power over commerce, should not be deemed a total relinquishment of power over the subject, but amounting only to a power to assume, still the power of the States must be at an end, so far as the United States have, by their legislative act, taken the subject under their immediate su perintendence. So far as relates to the com merce coastwise, the act under which this license is granted, contains a full expression of Congress on this subject. Vessels, from five tons upwards, carrying on the coasting trade, are made the sub ject of regulation by that act. And this license proves, that this vessel has complied with that act, and been regularly ingrafted into one class of the commercial marine of the country.
It remains, to consider the objections to this opinion, as presented by the counsel for the appel lee. On those which had relation to the particu lar character of this boat, whether as a steam boat or a ferry boat, I have only to remark, that in both those characters, she is expressly recognised as au object of the provisions which relate to licenses.
The 12th section of the act of 1793, has these words: “That when the master of any ship or vessel, fern/ boats excepted, shall be changed, &c. And the act which exempts licensed steam p. 235boats from the provisions against alien interests, 1824 shows such boats to be both objects of the licen
Gibbons v.
sing act, and objects of that act, when employed
Ogden.
exclusively within our bays and rivers.
But the principal objections to these opinions arise, 1st. From the unavoidable action of some of the municipal powers of the States, upon commer cial subjects.
2d. From passages in the constitution, which are supposed to imply a concurrent power in the States in regulating commerce.
It is no objection to the existence of distinct, substantive powers, that, in their application, they bear upon the same subject. The same bale of goods, the same cask of provisions, or the same ship, that may be the subject of commercial regu lation, may also be the vehicle of disease. And the health laws that require them to be stopped and ventilated, are no more intended as regulations on commerce, than the laws which permit their importation, arc intended to innoculate the com munity with disease. Their different purposes mark the distinction between the powers brought into action ; and while frankly exercised, they can produce no serious collision. As to laws affecting ferries, turnpike roads, and other subjects of the same class, so far from meriting the epithet of com mercial regulations, they are, in fact, commercial facilities, for which, by the consent of mankind, a compensation is paid, upon the same principle that the whole commercial world submit to pay light money to the Danes. Inspection laws are of a more equivocal nature, and it is obvious, that
1824. the constitution has viewed that subject with much
' solicitude. But so far from sustaining an infer Gibbons
v. ence in favour of the power of the States over Ogden.
commerce, I cannot but think that the guarded pro visions of the 10th section, on this subject, furnish a strong argument against that inference. It was obvious, that inspection laws must combine muni cipal with commercial regulations ; and, while the power over the subject is yielded to the States, for obvious reasons, an absolute control is given over
■ State legislation on the subject, as far as that le gislation may be exercised, so as to affect the com merce of the country. The inferences, to be cor rectly drawn, from this whole article, appear to me to be altogether in favour of the exclusive grants to Congress of power over commerce, and the re verse of that which the appellee contends for.
'1’his section contains the positive restrictions imposed by the constitution upon State power. The first clause of it, specifies those powers which the States are precluded from exercising, even though the Congress were to permit them. The second, those which the States may exercise with the consent of Congress. And here the sedulous attention to the subject of State exclusion Iroin commercial power, is strongly marked. Not sa tisfied with the express grant to the United States of the power over commerce, this clause negatives the exercise of that power to the States, as to the only tw’o objects which could ever tempt them to assume the exercise of that power, to wit, the col lection of a revenue from imposts and duties on imports and exports; or from a tonnage duty. As p. 237to imposts on imports or exports, such a revenue 1824. might have been aimed at directly, by express le
Gibbons
gislation, or indirectly, in the form of inspection
Ogden.
laws ; and it became necessary to guard against both. Hence, first, the consent of Congress to such imposts or duties, is made necessary ; and as to inspection laws, it is limited to the minimum of expenses. Then, the money so raised shall be paid into the treasury of the United States, or may be sued for, since it is declared to be for their use. And lastly, all such laws may be modified, or re pealed, by an act of Congress. It is impossible for a right to be more guarded. As to a tonnage duty, that could be recovered in but one way ; and a sum so raised, being obviously necessary for the execution of health laws, and other unavoidable port expenses, it was intended that it should go into the State treasuries; and nothing more was required, therefore, than the consent of Congress. But this whole clause, as to these two subjects, appears to have been introduced « abundanti cautela, to remove every temptation to an attempt to interfere with the powers of Congress over com merce, and to show how far Congress might con sent to permit the States to exercise that power. Beyond those limits, even by the consent of Con gress, they could not exercise it And thus, we have the whole efleci of the clause. The infer ence which counsel would deduce from it, is neither necessary nor consistent with the general purpose of the clause.
But instances have been insisted on, with much confidence, in argument, in which, by municipal
1824. laws, particular regulations respecting their car goes have been imposed upon shipping in the ports
v. of the United States ; and one, in which forfeiture °sden wag made the penalty of disobedience.
Until such laws have been tested by exceptions to their constitutionality, the argument certainly wants much of the force attributed to it; but ad mitting their constitutionality, they present only the familiar case of punishment inflicted by both governments upon the same individual. He who robs the mail, may also steal the horse that carries it, and would, unquestionably, be subject to pu nishment, at the same time, under the laws of the State in which the crime is committed, and under those of the United States. And these punish ments may interfere, and one render it impossible to inflict the other, and yet the two governments would be acting under powers that have no claim to identity.
It would be in vain to deny the possibility of a clashing and collision between the measures ot the two governments. The line cannot be drawn with sufficient distinctness between the municipal powers of the one, and the commercial powers oi the other. In some points they meet and blend so as scarcely to admit of separation. Hitherto the only remedy has been applied which the case admits of; that of a frank and candid co-operation for the general good. Witness the laws of Con gress requiring its officers to respect the inspec tion laws of the States, and to aid in enforcing their health laws; that which surrenders to the States the superintendence of pilotage, and the p. 239many laws passed co permit a tonnage duty to be 1824, levied for the use of their ports. Other instances '<'^ could be cited, abundantly to prove that collision v. must be sought to be produced; and when it does °^dl11-arise, the question must be decided how far the powers of Congress are adequate to put it down. Wherever the powers of the respective govern ments are frankly exercised, with a distinct view to the ends of such powers, they may act upon the same object, or use the same means, and yet the powers be kept perfectly distinct. A resort to the same means, therefore, is no argument to prove the identity of their respective powers.
I have not touched upon the right of the States to grant patents for inventions or improvements, generally, because it does not necessarily arise in this cause. It is enough for all the purposes of this decision, if they cannot exercise it so as to restrain a free intercourse among the States.
Decree. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors of the State of New-York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion, that the several licenses to the steam boats the Stoudinger and the Bellona, to carry on the coasting trade, which are set up by the ap pellant, Thomas Gibbons, in his answer to the bill of the respondent, Aaron Ogden, filed in the Court of Chancery for the State of New-York, which were granted under an act of Congress, passed in pursuance of the constitution of the' p. 24018'24. United States, gave full authority to those vestTbi'^ ^^ t0 nav'gate th” waters of the United States,
'■- by steam or otherwise, for the purpose of carry°sden‘ ing on the coasting trade, any law of the State of Mew-York to the contrary notwithstanding; and that so much of the several laws of the State of New-York, as prohibits vessels, licen sed according to the laws of the United States, from navigating the waters of the State of New-York, by means of fire or steam, is repugnant to the said constitution, and void. This Court is, therefore, of opinion, that the decree of the Court of New-York for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors, affirming the decree of the Chancellor of that State, which perpetually enjoins the said Thomas Gibbons, the appellant, from navigating the waters of the State of New-York with the steam boats the Stoudinger and the Bellona, by steam or fire, is erroneous, and ought to be reverseri, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled: and this Court doth further direct, order, and decree, that the bill of the said Aaron Ogden be dismissed, and the same is hereby dis missed accordingly.
1824. Kirk v.
Smith.
[Local Law,J