United States v. Giles, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 212 (1815)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
United States v. Giles, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 212 (1815)
Full caption
United States v. Giles and others.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1815
United States v. Giles and others, (a)
Sureties in official bonds.—Set-off against the government.
If a marshal, before the date of his official bond, receive, upon an execution, money due to the United States, with orders from the comptroller to pay it into the Bank of the United States, which he neglects to do, the sureties in his official bond, executed afterwards, are not liable therefor, upon the bond, although the money remain in the .marshal’s hands, after the execution of the bond.1 Quaere ? Whether the sureties in a marshal’s bond, conditioned for the faithful execution of his duty, “during his continuance in the said office,”eare liable for money received by him, after his removal from office, upon an execution which remained in his hands at the time of such removal ?
The comptroller of the treasury has a right to direct the marshal to whom he shall pay money received upon execution, and a payment according to such direction is good; and it seems, he may avail himself of it, upon the trial, without having submitted it as a claim to the accounting officers of the treasury.
No debtor of the United States can, at the trial, set off a claim for a debt due to him by the United States, unless such claim shall have been submitted to the accounting officers of the treasury, and by them rejected, except in the cases provided for by the statute.2
This was a case certified from the Circuit Court for the district of New *2131 York, in which the opinions of the *judges of that court were opposed,
J upon ten questions of law arising out of a special verdict.
It was an action of debt, brought by the United States against Giles, late marshal of the district of New York, and his sureties, upon his official bond, dated the 9th of January 1801, the condition of which was as follows : “ Whereas, the above-bound Aquila Giles hath been appointed the marshal in and for the New York district, in pursuance of the act, entitled “ an act to establish the judicial courts of the United States Now, therefore, the condition of the preceding obligation is such, that if the said Aquila Giles shall, by himself, and by his deputies, faithfully execute all lawful precepts directed to the marshal of the said district, under the authority of the United States, and true returns make, and in all things, well and truly, and without malice or partiality, perform the duties of the office of marshal in and for the said district of New York, during his continuance in the said office, and take only his lawful fees, then the preceding obligation to be void, or else to remain in full force and virtue.”
The defendants pleaded performance. The replication set forth six breaches of the condition of the bond.
1. That the United States having, in May 1799, recovered judgment in the district court against one John Lamb, for the sum of $127,952.99, debt, and $20 damages, a writ of fieri facias, was thereupon issued and delivered to the defendant, Giles, then being marshal, upon which he returned, in August 1799, that he had taken goods and chattels to the value of $50, which remained unsold for want of buyers ; whereupon, a writ of venditioni exponas and fieri facias was issued and delivered to the said defendant,
(a) February 28d, 1815. Absent, Todd, Justice.
1
United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 187; United Gilmore, 7 Wall. 491; Watkins v. United States, States ®. Linn, 2 McLean 500, 506. 9 Id. 759; Halliburton v. United States, 13 Id.
2
Walton v. United States, 9 Wheat. 651; 63 ; United States w. Austin, 2 Cliff. 325 ; United United States«/. Robeson, 9 Pet. 319; United States v. Smith, 1 Bond 68; United States v. States v. Hawkins, 10 Id. 125; United States v. Davis, 1 Deady 294.
United States v. Giles.
Giles, on the 9th of January 1800, by virtue whereof he sold the said goods and chattels for $50, which sum he received ; and also, by virtue of the said writ, sold lands of Lamb, to the amount of $60,000, which sum he received, and continued to hold, until the 1st of February 1801, when he converted the same to his own use, contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of his said bond.
*2. That by virtue of the said writ, the defendant, Giles, on the r* 2i4 17th of September 1800, sold other lands of Lamb, for $60,000, which *- he received, on the 20th day of January 1801, and on that day converted the same to his owrn use, contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of the bond.
3. That on the 17th of December 1800, the comptroller of the treasury of the United States directed the defendant, Giles, to pay into the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States, at New York, to the credit of the account of the treasurer of the United States, all such sums of money as should be made from the property of Lamb, by virtue of the aforesaid writ. That the defendant, Giles, afterwards, on the 23d of December 1800, by virtue of that writ, sold other lands of Lamb, to the amount of $60,000, which he received, on the 15th of January 1801, but has not paid the same, nor any part thereof, into the said office of discount and deposit, in the manner directed, contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of his said bond.
4. That on the 1st of February 1801, the defendant, Giles, being marshal as aforesaid, had in his hands, as marshal, fourteen bonds, the property of the United States (particularly described), and on that day, converted the same to his own use, contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of his bond aforesaid.
5. That the defendant, Giles, having, in September 1800, made the sum of $309.87, by virtue of a fieri facias, in behalf of the United States, against one Richard Capes, and having received the same, converted it to his own use, on the 1st of February 1801, contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of his bond.
6. That the defendant, Giles, having so received all the several sums of money before mentioned, retained the same in his hands, until the 27th of March 1801, wThen he was duly removed and dismissed from his office of marshal, and ceased to be marshal of the New York district, and has retained the said several sums of money in his hands ever since. That on the 2d of June 1804, he was duly notified, according to law, by the comptroller of* the treasury of the United States, to render to the auditor p^.. _ of the treasury of the United States, on or before the 10th of October then next, all his accounts and vouchers for the expenditure of all moneys received by him, as marshal of the New York district, but he has never rendered the same ; contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of his bond aforesaid.
The defendants rejoined, 1. To the first breach, that the defendant, Giles, received the sum of $50, and sold the lands of Lamb for $30,000, and no more. That by the orders of the comptroller of the treasury of the United States, he received, on the 10th of December 1800, from the purchasers, $11,000, and no more, in cash, in part of the said sum of $30,000, and took from them, by the like orders of the said comptroller, their respective bonds
United States v. Giles.
and mortgages, thirty in number, for 819,000 being the residue of the said sum of $30,000. That on that day, the United States were justly indebted to the said Giles in the sum of $20,000 for money paid by him, at their request, for their use, and for fees justly due by them to him as marshal, and for services performed by him for them, at their request; when he retained in his hands the said sums of $50 and $11,000, as it was lawful for him to do, in part payment and satisfaction of the sum of $20,000 so due to him from the United States, and then and there delivered to the United States, the said several bonds and mortgages in full payment and satisfaction of the said residue of the said sum of $30,000 ; without that, that he converted to his own use the said sums of $50 and $60,000 in the replication, in assigning the first breach mentioned, or any part thereof in manner and form, &c., any otherwise than by retaining the said sums of $50 and $11,000 as aforesaid.
2. To the second breach, they say, that on the 17th of December 1800, the defendant Giles, by virtue of the said writ, sold other lands of the said Lamb for the sum of $29,383.30 and no more, and that by order of The comptroller, he received from the purchasers only the sum of $10,000, and ♦oifil took their bonds and mortgages, thirty in number, for the payment J *of the balance, being $19,383.30. That the United States were on that day justly indebted to him in the sum of $20,000 for moneys expended, &c., and for fees and services, &c., wherefore, he retained in his hands $8950, part of the $10,000 in part payment and satisfaction of the said sum of $20,000 ; and paid to the United States the sum of $1050 the residue of the said sum of $10,000, and delivered to the United States the thirty bonds and mortgages aforesaid, in full payment and satisfaction of the aforesaid sum of $29,383.30 ; without that, that the said Giles converted to his own use, &c., otherwise than by retaining the said sum of $8950 as aforesaid, &c.
3. To the third breach, they say, that the said Giles did not receive $39,000, parcel of the said $60,000, but that he received in all the sum of $21,000 only, from the buyers of the lands of the said John Lamb : and that the United States were on the said 15th of January 1801, justly indebted to the said Giles, in the sum of $22,000, wherefore, he did not pay the said sum of $21,000 or any part thereof into the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States, &c., but then and there retained the same in his own hands, as it was lawful for him to do, &c.
4. To the fourth breach, they say, that the said Giles, on the 1st of February 1801, delivered the said bonds to the attorney for the United States ; without that, that he converted them to his own use, &c.
5. To the fifth breach, they say, that on the 8th of January 1801, the United States were justly indebted to Giles, in the sum of $22,000, where* fore, he retained the said sum of $309.87, in part payment and satisfaction of the said sum of $22,000 ; without that, that he otherwise converted the same to his own use, &c.
6. To the sixth breach, they aver, that Giles did render his accounts to the auditor on the 10th of October 1804, as he was required to do. *2171 T° these rejoinders, there were general sur-rejoinders *and issues,
J except as to the rejoinder to the third breach ; upon which the plaintiffs took issue as to $39,000, and demurred as to the retainer of the $21,000,
United States v. Giles.
upon which demurrer, the court gave judgment for the United States. The jury found a special verdict, which stated, in substance, as follows :
1. As to the first breach, they find, that the defendant, Giles, was authorized by the officers of the treasury department of the United States, in executing the aforesaid writ of fieri facias, to sell the lands of the said John Lamb, on the following terms, viz., one-fourth of the purchase-money to be paid in cash, one-fourth, with interest, in two years, one-fourth, with interest, in three years, and the residue, with interest, in four years from the day of sale, to be secured by bonds and mortgages ; and was directed by the comptroller of the treasury, on the 17th of December 1800, to pay over all moneys he might receive therefor, into the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States, in the city of New York, to the credit and account of the treasurer of the United States. That the sales were commenced on the 26th of November, and continued, from time to time, to the* 23d of December 1800. That Giles received from the purchasers, before the* 9th day of January 1801 (the date of the bond), $3713.98, and no more,, which sum, together with the sum of $50, which he had before received for the sales of the goods and chattels of the said John Lamb, he never had,* nor any part thereof, before the said district court, to render to the United States, and never paid the same, nor any part thereof, into the said office of discount and deposit, and that he has never been required by any rule or order of the said district court to bring the said moneys into the court, nor to pay them over in any manner whatever. That between August 180G; and May 1801, he arrested one Elias Hicks, by virtue of a writ of ca. sa. in-favor of the United States, for $80,000, and by an indorsement thereon was directed to levy, by virtue thereof, $33,156.38, besides marshal’s fees and pound1 - age. That he kept the said Hicks in custody, in execution, until he was discharged by order of the secretary of the treasury of the United States, pursuant to the act of congress,* entitled “ an act providing for the rijs relief of persons imprisoned for debts due to the United States.” >• " That the poundage fees for the service of that writ, if any such fees were due to the defendant, Giles, thereon-, have not been paid to him, and that they amounted to the sum of $419.57.
That the United States also became indebted to the defendant, Giles, in the further sum of $8133.96, for his own fees and services in taking the second census or enumeration of the inhabitants of the United States in the said district ; and for moneys paid by him, as marshal as aforesaid, to his assistants in taking the said census, pursuant to the act of congress in such case provided, which several sums, so due from the United States to the said Giles, amount to the sum of $8553.53, and that he has retained the said sums of $50, and $3713.98, from the times when they were received by him, and still retains them, claiming to hold and retain the same towards the payment and satisfaction of an equal sum due to him from the United States as aforesaid. But whether upon the whole matter aforesaid, the said Giles did in law convert the said several sums of $50 and $3713.98 to his own use, contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of his said bond, the jurors aforesaid are ignorant, &c., and if the said Giles did so convert, &c., they assess the damages at $3763.98, and if, &c.
2. As to the second breach, they find, that the said Giles, having received such instructions as aforesaid from the comptroller of the treasury, and
United States v. Giles.
having sold the lands as aforesaid, afterwards, and after the 9th of January 1801 (the date of the bond), and at different times before the commencement of this suit, received of certain other purchasers of the said lands, several other sums of money, viz., before the 27th of March 1801 (when he was removed from office), the sum of $1683.52 ; and after that day, the sum of $17,191.58, which two sums amount to $18,875.10, which was all the money he received from the said purchasers, after the 9th of January 1801 ; and that the poundage and charges due to and paid by the said Giles upon the execution and the said sales, and *legally chargeable against the
J proceeds of the said sales, amounted to the sum of $1332.85, which being deducted from the said sum of $18,875.10, left the net sum of $17,542.25, in the hands of the said Giles, of the money so received by him, after the 9th day of January 1801. That on the 13th of April 1803, he paid part of the same, viz., $6238.35, to Edward Livingston, who was then the United States’ attorney for the New York district, which payment was so made with the assent and approbation of the comptroller of the treasury of the United States, and agreeable to the usage and practice in that district; that the said Giles never had the said sum of $6238.35, nor any part thereof, before the district court, to render to the United States, and has never paid the same to the United States, in any other manner than by the said payment to the said Edward Livingston (if such payment was a payment to the United States), and never paid the same, nor any part thereof, into the office of discount and deposit, &c.
That as to another part of the said sum of $17,542.25, to wit, as to the sum of $4479.68, the said Giles never had the same, nor any part thereof, before the district court, to render to the United States, nor paid the same into the said office of deposit, &c., but has ever since held and retained the same, claiming to hold and retain the same towards payment and ¡satisfaction of an equal sum so due to him by the United States as aforesaid.
That as to the residue of the said sum of $17,542.25, to wit, as to the sum of $6824.25, the said Giles never had the same, nor any part thereof, before the district court, to render to the United States, nor paid the same .to the United States, nor into the office of discount and deposit, &c., but . still retains the same ; but whether, in law, he converted the said three sums, viz., the $6238.35, $4479.68 and $6824.25, or either of them, to his own use, .contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of his said bond, they are ¡ignorant, &c. If, in law, he so converted the whole to his own use, then *2201 they so and assess *damages at $20,613.12. If he did not so
J convert the first of the said three sums, but did so convert the other two, then they so find and assess damages at $14,374.77. If he did not so convert the first and second of the said three sums, but did so convert the third, then they so find, and assess damages at $9895.09. If he did not so convert the said third sum, but converted the two first sums, then they so find, and assess damages at $10,718.03. If he did not so convert the said second sum, but converted the first and third sums, then they so find and assess damages at $16,133.44. If he did not so convert the two last of the said three sums, but converted the first, they so find and assess damages at $6238.35. If he did not so convert the first and third of the said three sums, but converted the second, then they so find, and assess damages at $4479.68.
United States v. Giles.
And if he did not so convert either of the said three sums to his own use, then they so find, &c.
3. As to the third breach, the jurors find that the defendant, Giles, did not receive the sum of $39,000, and as to the judgment upon the demurrer respecting the retainer of the sum of $21,000, they assess damages at $21,000.06.
4. As to the fourth breach, they find that the defendant, Giles, kept possession of the said fourteen bonds, from the 1st of February 1801, until the 3d of January 1803, when he delivered them, with the assent and approbation of the comptroller of the treasury of the United States, to Edward Livingston, then being the United States’ attorney for the district of New York. That on the 12th day of the same January, the comptroller of the treasury of the United States directed the said Giles to deliver the said fourteen bonds to his successor in office, John Swartwout, marshal of the said district, which the said Giles did not do. But whether upon the whole matter aforesaid, he did, in law, convert the same bonds to his own use, contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of his said bond, they are ignorant, &c., and if, &c., then they assess damages at $5255.73.
*5. As to the fifth breach, they find, that the defendant, Giles, r* 2o-i having levied and received the said sum of $309.87, never had the *• same before the district court, to render to the United States, nor paid the same to the United States, but retains the same, claiming to hold it in payment and satisfaction of so much due to him by the United States as aforesaid ; but whether in law he converted the same to his own use, contrary to the tenor and effect of the condition of his said bond they are ignorant; and if, &c., then they assess damages at $309.87.
6. As to the sixth breach, they find that the defendant, Giles, did not render to the auditor of the treasury of the United States all his accounts and vouchers, &c., in manner and form as the defendants in their rejoinder have averred, and assess damages at six cents.
This cause came up to this court in the year 1812, with a certificate from the court below, that after argument upon the special verdict thereunto annexed, “ it appeared that the opinions of the judges were opposed upon all the points submitted by and in the said special verdict, and thereupon, at the request of the attorney of the United States for the said district, the judges of the said court have directed this disagreement of opinion to be certified,” &c.
The cause was argued in this court, at February term 1812, by Dallas and Pinkney, for the United States, and by Harper, for the defendants.
But this court, upon inspecting the record, was of opinion, that the points on which the opinions of the judges of the circuit court were opposed, were too imperfectly stated to enable this court to form an opinion thereon. Whereupon, the cause was remanded to the circuit court, and came back with a certificate that the opinions of the judges of that court were opposed upon the ten following questions arising on the said special verdict, viz : 1. Whether judgment ought to be given for the plaintiffs *or for the r* 999 defendants, as to the sum of $3763.98, being the damages assessed *• upon the first breach ? 2. Whether, &c., as to the sum of $20,613.12, being the first sum assessed as conditional damages upon the second breach ?
United States v. Giles.
3. Whether, &c., as to the sum of $14,374.77, being the second sum assessed as conditional damages on the second breach ? 4. Whether, &c., as to the sum of $9,895.09, being the third sum assessed as conditional damages on the second breach? 5. Whether, &c., as to the sum of $10,718.03, being the fourth sum assessed as conditional damages on the second breach?
6. Whether, &c., as to the sum of $16,133.44, being the fifth sum assessed as conditional damages on the second breach ? 7. Whether, &c., as to the sum of $6238.35, being the sixth sum assessed as conditional damages on the second breach ? 8. Whether, &c., as to the sum of $4479.68, being the seventh sum assessed as conditional damages on the second breach ? 9. Whether, &c., as to the sum of $5255.73, being the damages assessed upon the fourth breach ? and 10. Whether, &c., as to the sum of $309.87, being the damages assessed upon the fifth breach ?
The cause was now again argued by Jones, for the United States, and Harper, for the defendants.
On the part of the defendants, it was contended, 1. That the obligors in this bond are not answerable *for the money received by Giles, before the date of the bond. 2. That he had a right to retain the amount due to him by the United States. 3. That his receiving the bonds was not an official act, for which his sureties are liable upon this bond ; but if it was, that he was discharged by delivering them over to E. Livingston, the attorney of the United States, with the assent of the comptroller of the treasury. 4. That the sureties upon this bond are not liable for the money received by the defendant, Giles, after he was removed from office. 5. That the payment of the $6238.35, to E. Livingston, the attorney of the United States for the district of New York, with the assent and approbation of the comptroller, was a good payment to the United States, and ought to be applied to the discharge of the first money which Giles received.
1. This bond is prospective. It covers no past transgressions. He received $3763.98, before the date of the bond, and the United States being indebted to him, at the same time, in a larger amount, he immediately applied and retained it in part satisfaction of their debt to him. If he had no right so to do, it was a conversion of it to his own use ; and that conversion took place before the date of the bond. The defendants, therefore, are not liable therefor upon this bond. If Giles is answerable for it to the United States, it is not in this action.
2. The defendant, Giles, had a right to retain in his hands the amount which was due to him from the United States. This is not claimed as a set-off, but as an equitable deduction, to be taken into view by the court in deciding what sum is to be recovered under the penalty of this bond. By § 26 of the judiciary act (1 U. S. Stat. 87), it is provided, “that in all causes brought before either of the courts of the United States, to recover *99.-\ the forfeiture* annexed to any articles of agreement, covenant, bond
-* or other specialty, where the forfeiture, breach or non-performance shall appear, by the default or confession of the defendant, or upon demurrer, the court, before whom the action is, shall render judgment therein for the plaintiff, to recover so much as is due according to equity.” If, then, in this case, there had been judgment by default, or upon demurrer, or even upon confession, the court must have decided upon the principles of equity. The
United States v. Giles.
case, if not within the words of the statute, is within its spirit. He who seeks equity must do equity. But the defendant, Giles, was not a common debtor of the United States. He was an agent of the government, or a receiver of money, and bound to account for what he received. To account, is to retain what he had a right to demand, and to pay over the balance only. If this principle does not apply to the poundage in the case of Hicks, yet it does to his expenses and compensation in taking the census. By the act of congress of the 28th of February 1800 (2 U. S. Stat. 11), it was made his duty to commence the business of taking the census, on the first Monday in August 1800, and to close it in nine months, and he was authorized to employ assistants, and if he did not make his return within the period limited, he was liable to a penalty of $800. The act provides for the compensation of the marshal and his assistants, but no appropriation of money was made by congress for his payment, until after the service had been performed, nor until March 1801. (2 U. S. Stat. 120). The marshal had only three ways to obtain the money necessary for this business, viz., either to advance his own money, which he was not bound to do, or to get an advance from the treasury, which it had no right to make, or to apply the money of the United States in his hands for that purpose. Congress, having ordered him to do the work, gave him the right to use all the necessary means. The jury has found the fact absolutely that the United States was indebted to him at the time, which fact cannot now be denied. His obligation was not absolutely to pay over all the money which he received, but to account for it. If he shows that he expended it for the use of the United States, in a work which he was required to perform, he accounts for it. It was not strictly retaining the money, but applying it in a manner in which he was authorized to apply it.
*He was also entitled by law t<j the poundage upon the ca. sa. r4. against Hicks. By the act of the 28th of February 1799 (1 U. S. L Stat. 624), the marshal is allowed “ for all other services” not therein enumerated, “ such fees and compensation as are allowed in the supreme court of the state, wherein such services are rendered.” (a)
3. It was not the official duty of the marshal to take the bonds from the purchasers of the property. He was only bound to execute all lawful precepts, according to the law of the land. He could officially sell for money only ; not on credit. If, by the order of the comptroller, he sold on credit, he did not do it as marshal, but as the agent of the treasury department. The condition of his bond is, that he shall faithfully do his duty ; his sureties are not liable for any act not done in the course of his duty. But if he did act as marshal, in receiving the bonds, yet his delivery of them to the attorney of the United States, with the assent of the comptroller, is a complete discharge ; and if it were not, • and if the delivery of them to the attorney of the United States be a conversion of them to his own use, it was after his removal from office, and the defendants are not liable for it on their bond.
4. The sureties upon this bond are not liable for money received by the
(a) Livingston, J.—It has been settled in the courts of New York, that upon a ca. sa., the sheriff is entitled to poundage upon the whole sum due. But upon a ft. fa., he is only to receive poundage upon the sum received.
United States v. Giles.
defendant, Giles, after his removal from office. The condition of the bond
is, that he shall faithfully execute the duties of marshal, “ during his continu-
ance in the said office.” Admitting, that, for the purpose of finishing the
business in his hands at the time of his removal, his authority may continue
quoad hoc, yet the liability of his sureties is expressly limited, by their con-
tract, to the time of his continuance in office. It is like the case of Arling-
ton v. Merricke, 2 Saund. 411, which was an action by the postmaster-
general against the sureties of one of his deputies, upon a bond, the condi-
*00/.-] tion of which was, “ that whereas, the plaintiff had appointed *one
J Thomas Jenkins his deputy, &c., to execute the said office from the
24th of June next coming, for the term of six months next following:
now, if the said Thomas Jenkins shall, for and during all the time that he
shall continue deputy-postmaster, &C., execute all the duties,” &c. The
breach assigned was in not paying over moneys received by Jenkins, after'
the expiration of the term of six months, and upon demurrer, it was held,
that the defendant was only bound for moneys received within the six
months. So, in the case of Barker, executor of Pyott, n. Parker, 1 T. R.
287, the condition of the bond was, that one J. H. should pay to E. Pyott,
his executors or administrators, all such moneys as he should receive,
belonging to the said E. Pyott, his executors or administrators ; but it was
held, that the defendant was not liable for moneys received by J. H.,
belonging to the executors of Pyott in their own right. So also, in the case
of the Liverpool Waterworks Co. n. Atkinson, 6 East 507, the condition of
the bond, reciting that the defendant had agreed with the plaintiffs, to
collect their revenues, “ from time to time, for twelve months,” and afterwards
stipulating, that “ at all times thereafter, during the continuance of such his
employment, and for so long as he should continue to be employed,” he
would justly account, &c., was held to confine the obligation to the period of twelve months mentioned in the recital. A similar decision was given by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Commonwealth v. Boynton, 4 Dall. 282, upon-a sheriff’s bond.
5. The payment to the attorney of the United States, which is found to have been in conformity with the usage in New York, and with the assent and approbation of the comptroller of the treasury, is a good payment to the United States. The United States are represented by their attorney, as to everything relative to actions, in the same manner as a common person is represented by his attorney ; an attorney-at-law has a right, within the year and day after judgment, to receive payment of the debt, and to enter satisfaction of the judgment upon the record. Yates v. Freckleton, 2 Doug. 623; *oo 71* * Com. Dig. tit. Attorney, B, 10. The comptroller is the agent of
-I the United States* for the purpose of assenting, and his assent binds the United States.
The defendant, Giles, received $3763.98, before the date of the bond, and $1683.52, after that date, and before his removal from office, making together the sum of $5447.50. The payment of the sum of $6238.35 to Mr. Livingston, not having been specifically appropriated to the payment of any particular part of the amount due from Giles, we contend, ought to be applied to the payment of that part of the money which he first received, which will discharge all that the defendants can be liable for upon their bond.
United States v. Giles.
On behalf of the United, States, it was said, 1. As to the money received by Giles, before the date of the bond, it remained in his hands at the time the bond was executed. It was as much his duty to pay it over afterwards, as it was before ; and by not paying it over, he was guilty of default for which his sureties are liable. Besides, the writ was not returnable until after the date of the bond, and there was no breach of his duty, until after the writ was returnable, when he ought to have had the money in court to render to the United States.
2. As to the marshal’s right to retain money due to him by the United States, it was said, that the claim never had.been submitted to the accounting officers of the treasury, agreeable to the provisions of the act of congress of the 3d of March 1797,- § 4 (1 U. S. Stat. 515), by which it is enacted, “ that in suits between the United States and individuals, no claim for a credit shall be admitted upon trial, but such as shall appear to have been presented to the accounting officers of the treasury, for their examination, and by them disallowed in whole or in part,” &c. If a marshal might retain money to answer his own claims, there would be no necessity of an appropriation by law ; and it would subject the whole revenues of the government to the caprice of juries. The jury had no right to find a debt due from the United States. It was a mattei* coram non judice, unless it had been first submitted to the accounting officers of the treasury. A* defend- ri! ant cannot set off a debt, if he could not maintain a suit for it. Com- -* rnonwealtli v. Jfattack, 4 Dall. 303. This defendant could not maintain a suit against the United States. To give him the benefit of the set-off, would be a violation of the prerogative of the United States.
The Court stopped the counsel for the United States, upon this point, saying they were satisfied.
3. As to the delivery of the fourteen bonds to the attorney of the United States, it was said, that they were made payable to the marshal for the time being, and ought to have been delivered to his successor. That in taking the bonds, he acted officially. He could only sell, as marshal, whether he sold for cash or on credit. A plaintiff may waive a rule intended for his benefit, and authorize a marshal to sell on credit. He had no authority to sell, as agent, nor had he any orders to deliver the bonds to the attorney. The assent of the comptrollei* is not sufficiently found, for the jurors find a fact inconsistent with such assent, viz., that the comptrollei' ordered him to deliver them to his successor. The violation of his duty in not delivering them to his successor, was prior to his delivery of them to the attorney.
4. As to the question, whether the sureties in this bond are liable for the money received by Giles, after the revocation of his commission, it was said, that by the 28th section of the judiciary act (1 U. S. Stat. 87), “every marshal, when removed from office, shall have power, notwithstanding, to execute all such precepts as may be in his hands at the time of such removal,” and in case of the death of any marshal, his deputies shall continue in office, unless otherwise specially removed, and shall execute the same, in the name of the deceased, until another marshal shall be appointed and sworn: and the defaults or misfeasances in office of such deputies .in the meantime, as well as before, shall be adjudged a breach of the condition of the bond given, as before directed, by the marshal who appointed them.
United States v. Giles.
Here, a liability is imposed upon the sureties, which is not expressed in the condition of the bond. *The words in the condition, “ during his continuance in the said office,” mean, so long as he shall have authority to act by virtue of the said office. So far as regarded the execution and return of the writ of fieri facias against John Lamb, his authority to act by virtue of his office continued, after the revocation of his commission. The writ was not completely executed, until it was returned fully satisfied. Quoad hoc he still continued in office, within the meaning and intention of the bond. In all the cases cited by the opposite counsel, the time was limited by months, and not by such a general expression as this. The act of congress contemplates a course of duty, and intended that the bond should cover all his responsibility, and no doubt, the parties intended to give such a bond as the act required. Congress could not have intended, that upon the removal of a marshal, perhaps, for wasting the public money, or for insolvency, he should still go on to collect other moneys, after his sureties upon his official bond should be discharged, by his removal from office.
5. As to the payment of the sum of $6238.35, to the attorney of the United States, it was said, that the district-attorney, as such, has no authority to receive the public money collected by the marshal. In common cases, the authority of an attorney-at-law arises from presumption, and is limited to a year and day after judgment, in which time, if execution be not taken out, the judgment is presumed to be satisfied. But as to the attorney for a government, no such presumption of authority arises. The United States is considered as a moral person only, and can only act by proper organs legally appointed ; and their acts can bind the United States only so far as they act within the powers given them by law. In no other government, does the law-officer receive the public money, without the order of the treasury. The treasury department is to manage the whole fiscal concerns of the nation. There is no exception in favor of the attorney of the United States. His duty is only to support the claims of the United States. There is no necessity that such a power should be lodged in his hands. He gives no security. Why should the money be taken out of the hands of a responsible officer and given to one not responsible ? *2301 *But this payment is claimed as a credit, and it is a sufficient
J answer, to say, that it has never been submitted to the accounting officers of the treasury. The jury had no right to find such a credit, or even to act upon it.
But if it is to be considered as a payment to the United States, still it does not appear, that at the time of payment, it was applied to the discharge of any particular part of the money which Giles had received. The United States have, therefore, a right now to apply it to such part as they please, and this court will make such application of it as will be most beneficial to the United States. That is to say, if the court shall be of opinion, that the sureties are not liable for the money received by Giles, after his removal from office, they will apply this payment to that part of the debt, and leave the sureties liable for the part received while he was in office.
March 7th, 1815. (Absent, Todd, J.) Livingston, J., delivered the opinion of the court, as follows :—This is a joint action of debt on a bond
United States v. Giles.
dated the 9th of January 1801, in the penalty of $20,000. The condition of the bond is as follows : Whereas, the above-bound Aquila Giles hath been appointed the marshal in and for the New York district, in pursuance of an act, entitled “ an act to establish the judicial courts of the United States : ” now, the condition of the preceding obligation is such, that if the said Aquila Giles shall, by himself and his deputies, faithfully execute all lawful precepts directed to the marshal of the said district, under the authority of the United States, and true returns make, and in all things, well and truly, and without malice or partiality, perform the duties of the office of marshal in and for the said district of New York, during his continuance in the said office, and take only his lawful fees, then the obligation to be void, &c. General performance is pleaded by the defendants, to which a replication is filed assigning six breaches, to all of which there was a rejoinder, surrejoinder and issue.
*On the issue joined on the first breach, the special verdict finds, pp., that on the 20th of January 1800, the said writ of vend. exp. and fi. L fa. was delivered to Giles, who, before he proceeded to execute it, was authorized by the officers of the treasury to sell the land of Lamb, under said writ, for one-fourth part of the purchase-money in cash, one-fourth part payable in two years from the time of sale, one-fourth part in three years, and the other fourth part in four years, with interest from the time of sale, to be secured by bonds and mortgages, payable to Giles, as marshal, or to the marshal of the district for the time being, to and for the use of the United States» That on the 17th of December 1800, John Steele, being comptroller of the treasury, did instruct and order Giles to pay into the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States, in New York, to the credit of the treasurer of the United States, all the moneys which might be levied from the property of Lamb, by virtue of the said writ of vend. exp. and fi. fa. That under these instructions, Giles proceeded to sell the lands of John Lamb ; the sales of which commenced on the 26th of Novembei’ 1800, and were continued until, the 23d of December, in the same year. That during the sales, and afterwards, and before the execution of the bond by the defendants, Giles received from some of the purchasers several sums, amounting to $3713.98, and no more, which sums were paid as the fourth of the purchase-money of the lands bought by them. That Giles has never brought into court, or paid into the bank, either of the said sums of $50, which was received on the 20th of January 1800, on a sale, by Giles, of the chattels of Lamb, or of $3713.98, and that he never was required so to do by any order of the district court. That while Giles was marshal as aforesaid, a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum was issued out of said court, and delivered to him, against Elias Hicks, on a judgment recovered by the United States, on which was indorsed a direction to Giles to levy the sum of $33,156.38, besides marshal’s fees and poundage ; that Hicks was arrested by Giles, and in custody on said writ, until discharged therefrom by the secretary of the treasury ; that the poundage fees of Giles thereon, if any were due, have not been paid to him by any one, and that they amount, if due at all, to $419.57. *That the United States became indebted r* 2oQ to Giles, while marshal as aforesaid, in the sum of $8133.96, for his *• fees and services, in taking the second census in his district, and for moneys
United States v. Giles.
paid to his assistants, in taking the said census, pursuant to the act in such case made and provided, which sums amount to $8553.53, in part payment of which, Giles retains the two sums of $50, and of $3713.98. But whether in law he converted them to his own use, contrary to the form and effect of the condition of the said bond, the jurors pray the advice of the court. If the court shall think that it was such a conversion, the jurors assess damages on this breach at $3763.98. But if the court shall be of opinion, that such retaining was no conversion, then the jury say that he did not convert the same to his use.
2. The second breach assigned is, that Giles having, on the 17th of December 1800, sold other lands of Lamb, under the writ aforesaid, for the further sum of $60,000, received the said sum on the 20th of January 1801 (which was after the execution of the bond), and converted and disposed of the same to his own use. On the issue joined on this breach, the jury find that Giles, having made the sales as aforesaid, and under the instructions and orders aforesaid, received from the purchasers, after the 9th of January 1801, and before the 27th of March 1801 (when he went out of office), the sum of $1683.52 ; and after that day, the sum of $17,191.58, amounting in the whole to $18,875.10, which sums were paid by the purchasers, as the cash payment which was to be made by them for the land so purchased (which sales took place between the 26th of November, and the 23d of December 1800). That the poundage and charges due to and paid by Giles, and legally chargeable against the proceeds of these sales, amounted to $1332.85, which leaves in the hands of Giles the net sum of $17,542.25, of the moneys received by him after the 9th of January 1801. That on the 13th of April 1803, he paid to Edward Livingston, who was district-attorney, the sum of $6238.35, which was receipted for on the said writ of execution. *2331 That it was then, and yet is, the usage and practice * within the said -1 district, for the marshal to pay to the district-attdrney all moneys levied by executions issued by the said attorney, in suits in which the United States are plaintiffs. That this payment was made by and with the approbation of the comptroller of the treasury, and that Giles has never in any other way paid the said last-mentioned sum to the United States, or brought it into court in any other way, than by paying it as aforesaid, to the district-attorney. That as to another part of the said sum of $17,542.25, to wit, the .sum of $4479.68, Giles retains the same towards satisfaction of an equal sum due to him as aforesaid from the United States. That the residue of the said sum, to wit, the sum of $6824.22, Giles retains to this day. But they pray the advice of the court, whethei’ Giles converted to his own use, contrary to the condition of the said bond, the said several sums of $6238.35, $4479.68 and $6824.22.
1. If he converted all of the said sums contrary, &c., then they assess damages at $20,613.12. 2. If he did not convert the said sum of $6238.35, paid to Livingston, but converted the other two sums, then they assess damages at $14,374.77. 3. If he did not convert the two first sums, to wit, the sum of $6238.35 and $4479.68, but did convert the sum of $6824.22, to his own use, then they assess damages at $9895.09. 4. If Giles did not convert to his own use the sum of 6824.22, but did convert the other two sums, then they assess damages at $10,718.03. 5. If Giles did not convert to his own use the said sum of $4479.68, but did so convert the other two sums,
United States v. Giles.
they assess damages at $16,133.44. 6. If Giles did not convert to his own use the two sums *of $4479.68 and $6824.22, but did so convert the r* 234 other sum of $6238.35, then the damages are assessed at $6238.35. 7. *• If Giles did not so convert the two sums of $6238.35 and $6824.22, but did so convert the other sums of $4479.68, they then find damages to the amount of $4479.68. 8. If, in the opinion of the court, Giles converted neither of those sums, to his own use, contrary to the effect of the said condition, then the jury find that he did not so convert either of them.
On the issue joined on the fourth breach, the following facts appear on the special verdict. That on the 1st of February 1801, Giles had in his hands, as marshal, fourteen bonds, described in assigning the fourth breach belonging to the plaintiffs. That Giles continued marshal until the 27th of March 1801, when he was duly removed and dismissed from office, and John Swartwout, on the same day, appointed marshal of the said district in his place, who continued marshal until the commencement of this suit. That the said bonds continued in the hands of Giles, until the 3d of January 1803,. when they were delivered by him to Edward Livingston, who was then, district-attorney, by and with the assent and approbation of the comptroller-of the treasury. That on the 12th of January 1803, Gabriel Duval, being, comptroller of the treasury, as such, did instruct, order and direct Giles,, as late marshal, to deliver immediately the said fourteen bonds to the said John. Swartwout, his successor in office, which he did not do. If the court shall, think this was a conversion of these bonds, the jury assess damages at $5255.73. If the court think otherwise, the jury find it to be no conversion,.
On the subject of the fifth breach, it is found, that Giles, on the 1st of September 1800, received as marshal, $309,87, on an execution issued against one Richard Capes, at the suit of the plaintiffs, which he retains towards satisfaction of an equal sum due from them to him. If this be deemed a conversion by the court, *the jury assess damages at r$2„, $309.87. But if the court shall not think so, then the jury, on this *- breach, find for the defendants.
It is certified, that the circuit court, were divided in opinion, on the following points arising on this record. 1. Whether judgment should be
given for the plaintiffs, or for the defendants as to the sum of $3763.98,
being the damages assessed upon the first breach assigned ?. 2. The like
question as to the sum of $20,613.12, being the first sum assessed as con-
ditional damages, on the second breach ? 3. The same question as to the
sum of $14,374.77, being the second sum conditionally assessed on the
second breach? 4. The like as to the sum of $9895.99, being the third sum
assessed conditionally on the second breach? 5, The like as to the sum of
$10,718.03, being the fourth sum assessed on the second breach ?. 6. The like
question as to the sum of $16,133.44, being the fifth sum. assessed on the
second breach? 7. The like question as to the sum of. $6238.35, being
the sixth sum assessed on the second breach? 8. The like question as to
the sum of $4479.68, being the seventh sum assessed on the second breach ?
9. The like question as to the sum of $5255.73,«being the damages assessed
on the fourth breach ? 10. The like question as to the sum.ofi$309.87,
*being the damages assessed on the fifth breach ? *-
The first point on which the direction of this court is asked, will require a decision of the following questions. 1. Had Giles a right to retain out of
United States v. Giles.
the public moneys in his hands, any sums which might be due to him for his services, or for advances made by him as marshal ? 2. Are the defendants liable, under the condition of their bond, for the two sums of $50, and of $3713.98, received by Giles, the first sum on the 20th of January 1800, and the other on some day prior to the 9th of January 1801, which is the date of their bond ?
The act of congress providing for the settlement of accounts between the United States and the receivers of public moneys, is so explicit, as to preclude every difficulty in deciding on the first question. The third section of the law provides, that where a suit shall be instituted against any person indebted to the United States, the court shall grant judgment at the return-term, on motion, unless the defendant shall, in open court, make oath or affirmation, that he is equitably entitled to credits, which had been, previous to the commencement of the suit, submitted to the consideration of the accounting officers of the treasury, and rejected, specifying each particular claim so rejected in the affidavit. The next section declares, that in suits between the United States and individuals, no claim for a credit shall be admitted upon trial, but such as shall appear to have been submitted to the accounting officers of the treasury for their examination, and by them disallowed, unless it shall appear that the defendant, at the time of trial, is in •possession of vouchers not before in his power to procure, and that he was -prevented from exhibiting a claim for such credit, by absence from the United States, or by some unavoidable accident.
It is clear, then, that if this had been an action against Giles for moneys *oq >71 received by him as marshal, he could not *have availed himself of
-• any credit against the public, however well founded the claim might ibe, unless he had previously submitted his title to such a credit to the .accounting officers of the treasury, and they had rejected the same, or unless he had been prevented from so doing, by one of the accidents mentioned in the law.
On this subject, the special verdict, on the issue joined on the sixth breach, finds that Giles did not render to the auditor of the treasury all his accounts and vouchers for the expenditure of moneys received by him as marshal as aforesaid. If, then, in a suit against Giles himself, a claim for these credits, under existing circumstances, could not be sustained, neither can it,.in an action on this bond, without permitting the defendants to do indirectly, what the marshal could not have done directly, and in this way, avail themselves of what tne law seems to regard as a default, or, at least, a negligence on the part of their principal.
We are next to consider, whether the defendants are liable for the sum of $50, and the sum of $3713.98, received by Giles. The first sum was received on the 20th of January 1800, on the ft. fa. wAvend. exp. issued against the estate of John Lamb ; and the other was received on the same writ, after the 27th of November 1800, but before the date of the bond upon which the action is brought.
It is contended by the defendants, that the retaining of moneys which were received by Giles anterior to the date of the bond, cannot be considered a conversion by him, within the terms of its condition ; while the plaintiffs, on the contrary, maintain, that as these sums were in his hands, at the time of its execution, and have not been paid over to this day, his official
United States v. Giles.
delinquency is made out within the meaning of this instrument, and the responsibility of the defendants thereby established.
On this point, two of the judges think that the conversion of these sums by Giles was complete, by his not paying them into the bank, agreeable to the directions of the comptroller of the treasury, under which he acted\ and that this having taken place prior to the execution of the *bond, the defendants are not liable therefor, within the terms of its condi- •- tion, which are entirely prospective. Two other members of the court are of opinion, that no demand appearing on the record to have been made on the marshal for these sums, either by rule of court or otherwise, no conversion of them is made out; and that, therefore, the defendants are not liable. The other two judges think, that although these two sums were received before the date of the bond, yet as they remained in the hands of the marshal, afterwards, and have not been paid over to this day, the defendants are accountable for them. Judgment must, therefore, be rendered for the defendants as to the sum of $3763.98, being the damages assessed upon the first breach assigned.
The next question on which the court below was divided, related to the sum of $20,613.12, being the first sum assessed as conditional damages upon the second breach. By recurring to the special verdict, it appears, that Giles, having had a fieri facias put into his hands, on the 20 th of January 1800, against the real estate of John Lamb, was directed by the officers of the treasury, to make sales of it for one-fourth of the purchase-money in cash, and for the other three-fourths on certain credits and securities specified in said instructions. These sales commenced on the 26th of November 1800, and continued until the 23d of December following. After the 9th of January 1801, and before he went out of office, which was the 27th of March following, Giles received of the purchasers of Lamb’s estate, $1683.52, and after that day, the sum of $17,191.58, amounting in the. whole to $18,875.10. Deducting the poundage and charges which the special verdict finds to be legally chargeable against this sum, there was left in Giles’ hands the net sum of $17,542.25, of the moneys received by him after the 9th of January 1801. On the 13th of April 1803, he paid to E. Livingston, who was district-attorney, with the assent and approbation of the *comp- r*noa troller of the treasury, the sum of $6238.35.
Before we examine into the deductions claimed by the defendants against the sums received by Giles for cash payments, it will be necessary to settle for what portion of these sums they are chargeable, under the condition of their bond. Of these sums, a majority of the court think, they are liable for the sum of $1683.52, which was received between its execution and the marshal’s dismissal from office.
Are they also responsible for the sum of $17,191.50, which was received by Giles after another marshal came into office ? The bond on which this action is brought having been given for the faithful performance of the duties of Giles, as marshal, during his continuance in office, two of the judges are of opinion, that his sureties are not liable for the conversion of the last-mentioned sum, which took place after he was out of office, by not paying it as directed by the comptroller of the treasury. Two of the judges do not consider the finding of the jury as fixing upon Giles a conversion of this sum, at any time, inasnftich as it does not appear, that he was ever demanded
United States v. Giles.
to pay the same into court, or in any other way. The other two judges are of opinion, that the marshal, being authorized to do certain acts even after his removal from office, the condition of the bond embraces defaults committed after such dismissal, as well as before, and that the defendants are therefore liable for the said sum of $17,191.50, although received by Giles after he ceased to be marshal. It is, however, the opinion of a majority of the court, that the defendants are not so liable, under this bond.
Another question arises under this opposition of opinion in the circuit court; and that is, whether the payment to Edward Livingston, in April *2401 1803, was a payment to the United States? *It is supposed, that
J this payment, being made contrary to the comptroller’s order of the
17th of December 1800, which was to pay all moneys received under this execution, into the branch bank at New York, cannot be regarded as valid. It is true, such instructions are found by the jury, which certainly do not authorize such payment, yet it is also found, possibly, from some subsequent instructions of the comptroller, which do not appear, or at any rate from evidence, which must have satisfied the jury, that such payment was made with the assent and approbation of the comptroller of the treasury.. This ' finding, correct or not, must conclude the court ; and it has only to say, whether a payment be good, if made under such authority. The comptroller is authorized by law, “ to direct prosecutions to be commenced for all debts due to the United States.” During such prosecutions, he gives directions how they shall be conducted, and how the moneys recovered shall be paid. If, therefore, he directed, or assented to, the payment to Livingston, it is difficult to say, that Giles erred, or was guilty of any fault, either in pursuing his instruction, or in making a payment with his assent and approbation.
It yet remains to settle, under this branch of the division of the circuit court, how the payment to Livingston is to be applied. For although the sum paid to him is much greater than the sum of $1683.52, for which it is decided that the defendants are liable, the benefit which they may derive from such payment, will depend in some measure on the manner of its application.
It does not appear, that any direction was given by Giles, or that any election was made by either party, how it should be applied. Nothing more is known than that Giles, being then indebted to a much larger amount for moneys received at different times, under the execution against the property of Lamb, made this payment, without declaring what particular item in the account of the United States against him should thereby be discharged. ♦oj -ii If there be no designation how a sum paid on account*shall be cred-
J ited, and there be sureties for part of the debt, as was the case here, it seems reasonable to some of the judges, to let jthem have the benefit of it, by applying the credit in such a way as to exonerate them, so far as the sum paid shall be sufficient for that purpose. If regard be had to the order of time in which the moneys were received by Giles, it will be seen, that the sum of $3763.98, which is the first sum for which he is in arrear, was received by him prior to the 9th of January 1801 ; and the next sum for which he is accountable, to wit, the sum of $1683.52, came into his hands after that day, but previous to the 27th of March 1801, and after this,
United States v. Giles.
other moneys were received by him. These two sums together are not equal to the payment which was made to Livingston.
Following this order, the sum for which the defendants are liable, being among the first that were received, and being recoverable, with interest, on their bond, would, on this principle, be extinguished by the first payment, if it were sufficient, as was the case here, to discharge all the moneys which had been received prior to the receipt of the sum for which the defendants are answerable, and that also. But this is not the opinion of a majority of the judges. They think, and such is the decision of the court, that the United States have yet a right to apply these payments in a way most beneficial to themselves, and so as not to extinguish the sum of $1683.52, for which the defendants are accountable.
.The court then is of opinion, that judgment mnst be given for the defendants as to the sum of $20,613.12, being the first sum assessed as conditional damages upon the second breach. Judgment must in like manner be given for the defendants as to all the other sums assessed as conditional damages upon the second breach.
It is next to be decided, whether the conditional damages of $5255.73 assessed on the fourth breach be recoverable against the defendants. These damages are given in consequence of a supposed *conversion by Giles ^^242 of the fourteen bonds mentioned in the special verdict. But it being *- found, that these bonds were delivered to Edward Livingston, by and with the assent and approbation of the comptroller of the treasury, the court is unanimously of opinion, for reasons already assigned, that such delivery was no conversion of these bonds by Giles, and that, therefore, judgment must be rendered for the defendants, as to the said sum of $5255.73, being the damages assessed as aforesaid on the fourth breach.
The last question which is submitted to us regards the sum of $309.87, which it appears by the finding under the fifth breach assigned, was received by Giles, on the first of September 1800, on an execution at the suit of the United States against Richard Capes, which was retained by Giles towards satisfaction of an equal sum due to him. This sum being received prior to the execution of the bond, must be regarded within the reasons assigned for not considering the defendants liable for the two sums of $50 and of $3713.98, herein before mentioned, and judgment must, accordingly, in the opinion of a majority of the court, be given for the defendants, as to the said sum of $309.87, being the damages assessed upon the fifth breach.
It will be. seen, that the court is of opinion, that the defendants are liable under their bond, for the sum of $1683.52, which was received by the marshal, after its execution, and before he went out of office ; but by not one of the findings on the different breaches assigned, does it appear to have been contemplated, that this sum alone might be recoverable in this action, and accordingly no conditional damages are assessed to suit that state of the case.
The court, therefore, can only give its directions as to the questions submitted to them, which are, that it must be certified to the circuit court for the district of New York in the second circuit :
1. That judgment must be given for the defendants as to the sum of $3763.98, being the damages assessed* upon the first breach of the condition of the bond assigned in the replication of the plaintiffs. L
United States v. Barber.
2. That judgment must be given for the defendants as to the several sums of $20,613.12, of $14,374.77, of $9895.09, of $10,718.03, of $16,133.44, of $6238.35, and of $4479.68, being the several sums assessed, as conditional damages on the second breach.
3. That judgment must be given for the defendants, for the sum of $5255.73, being the damages assessed upon the fourth breach, and
4. That judgment must be given for the defendants for the sum of $309.87, being the damages assessed upon the fifth breach.