Fanny’s Cargo v. Cargo of the Ship Fanny, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 181 (1815)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Fanny’s Cargo v. Cargo of the Ship Fanny, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 181 (1815)
Full caption
The Fanny’s Cargo, (a) United States v. Cargo of the Ship Fanny, Jennings, Master.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1815
*The Fanny’s Cargo, (a) [*181 United States v. Cargo of the Ship Fanny, Jennings, Master.
Non-intercourse law.
Under the non-intercourse act of 1809, a vessel from Great Britain had a right to lay off the coast of the United States, to receive instructions from her owners in New York; and if necessary, to drop anchor, and in case of a storm, to make a harbor; and if prevented, by a mutiny, of her crew from puttiug out to sea again, might wait in the waters of the United States for orders.
Appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court for the district of Connecticut, restoring the property to the claimants.
The American ship Fanny was laden at Greenock, in Scotland, with a cargo of British goods, the property of citizens of the United States, and sailed from thence, on the 4th day of July 1812, after the repeal of the orders in council, and before the war between Great Britain and the United States was known in Greenock. The orders to the master were, to proceed to New York; but unless he was perfectly sure of being allowed an entrance for ship and cargo at New York, he was not to go into the waters of the United States, but to send up a pilot-boat with his letters, so that the consignees might fix upon a port of discharge. The master had no knowledge of the war, until his arrival on the coast, when he received it off Montauk point, from a pilot-boat, who also informed him that several British frigates were off Sandy Hook, capturing American vessels. Whereupon, he dispatched the pilot-boat, with letters for his owners, by the way of New London. Soon afterwards, it became calm, and the ship, drifting too near the shore, he dropped anchor. In the course of the night, it came on to blow a gale, and finding it impossible to lay there, he attempted to get under weigh and stand off, but before he could get up the anchor and make sail, he drifted so far in, that he could not fetch Montauk point, and the pilot informing him that there was good anchorage ground in Fort-pond bay, and that it would not be safe to keep out, he proceeded with the ship to that bay, intending to stand out as soon as the storm abated. Having there cast anchor, and rode out the gale, his crew refused to get under weigh, to go out of the waters of the United States, alleging that they understood he had a British license, and was going to put his ship *under the pro- *-
(a) February 24th, 1815. Absent, Todd, Justice.
The Fanny’s Cargo.
tection of British ships of war, and they were afraid of being impressed. He then determined to come out into the sound, and there wait for orders, without going into any port. He did so, but was boarded about half way from Port-pond bay to the Race, Fisher’s Island bearing north, and seized by a revenue-cutter, who carried him into New London, where the cargo was libelled for having been shipped in Great Britain, with the knowledge of the master, with intent to be imported into the United States, contrary to the provisions of the non-intercourse act of 28th June 1809 (2 U. S. Stat. 550). In the district court, the cargo was condemned, but was restored by the circuit court. From this sentence, the United States appealed.
The cause was argued by. «Tones, for the United States, and Daggett^ for the claimants, in the absence of the reporter.
March 1st, 1815. (Absent, Todd, J.) Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the court, as follows :—This case bears every feature of fairness. The voyage was undertaken upon the repeal of the orders in council. The vessel was laden in the short space of four days, and sailed without a knowledge of the war. Her destination was alternative—-to New York, if she could enter; if not, to a British port. Upon arriving off Montauk, she receives notice of the war, and of the danger of capture in prosecuting her voyage to New York. A pilot-boat is then dispatched to New London, by the master, with notice to his owners of his situation, and a request for instructions.
To call off for instructions, was fair and justifiable ; and to obtain them it was necessary that he should await the return of the pilot-boat. Thus circumstanced, a calm obliges him to drop anchor to prevent his drifting on shore, and a storm forces him into a bay for shelter. Whilst there, his crew mutiny, and prevent his leaving the bay, in order to lay off, and await * n the return of his messenger; and whilst plying in the waters between 1 J *Montauk and New London, he is seized by the revenue-cutter, and forced into the latter port. We are of opinion, that there was nothing, either in action or intention, which subjected this vessel to municipal forfeiture. A condemnation is claimed on no other ground ; and- the decree of the circuit court must, therefore, be affirmed.
The claims of the several parcels of merchandise seized in the Fanny, rest on the same circumstances, and must likewise be restored.
Decree affirmed.
The Frances, Boyer, Master: Dunham & Randolph’s claim, (a)
Prize.—Enemy’s property.
If a British merchant purchase, with his own funds, two cargoes of goods, in consequence of, but not in exact conformity with, the orders of an American house, and ship them to America, giving the American house an option, within twenty-four hours after receipt of his letter, to take or reject both cargoes; and if they give notice, within the time, that they will take one cargo, but will consider as to the other; this puts it in the power of the British merchant, either to cast the whole upon the American house, or to resume the property, and make them accountable for that which came to their hands. The right of property in the cargo, not accepted, does not, in transitu, vest in the American house, but remains in the British subject, and is liable to condemnation, he being an enemy.*1 The Frances, 1 Gallis. 445, affirmed.
In this case, further proof was ordered, at the last term. (See 8 Cr. 354.)
Pinkney, for the claimants.—The property vested in Dunham & Randolph by the shipment. It was made in consequence of, although not strictly in conformity with, their orders ; and delivery to the master of the vessel was tantamount to a delivery to themselves. The invoices and bills, of lading all stated the goods to be shipped on their account and risk.
But if the property did not pass by the shipment, there is no reason why it should not pass' in transitu, so that it be, before capture. It is true,; that it cannot vest in transitu, so as to defeat a vested belligerent right. But if the transfer take place, according to the original terms of the contract,, before a belligerent right has accrued, it is not within the principle nor the spirit of the rule. If the further proof shows that the property had abso>~ lutely vested in Dunham & Randolph, before the capture, it must be restored.
The further proof shows that the invoice, stating the shipment to be made for their account and risk, was *sent to them ; and that Dun- . ham & Randolph wrote a letter, before the capture of the Frances, accepting the goods by the Fanny, and saying that they would consider as to those by the Frances.
The question then is, whether the whole of both cargoes did not thereby vest, eo instanti, in Dunham & Randolph? The documentary evidence is clear and positive ; it behooves the captors to show how it is qualified. The condition upon which the property was to vest in the claimants, was performed, before the capture. They agree to take the goods by the Fanny, and. were instantly bound to take both shipments. They could not- afterwards refuse that by the Frances. Their letter, agreeing to take the goods by the Fanny, was dated the 22d of August. The Frances was not captured until the 28th.
Emmett, on the same side.—The surplus of goods, beyond the other, was chiefly, if not entirely, in the Fanny, and accepted by Dunham & Randolph, so that there can be no question, on the ground that the goods by the Frances were not ordered. Dunham & Randolph’s letter of 19th of September explains the cause of their partial acceptance.
(a) February 18th, 1815. Absent, Todd, Justice.
1
The Frances, 2 Gallis. 391. * , *Emmett, in reply.—There are two questions in this cause : 1. The -* first is a question of fact, did Dunham & Randolph accept the goods ?
The Frances.
Dexter, contrá.—This court has decided, that this was a condition precedent, and that the transfer could not take place until the condition was performed.
The first question is, whether, if the goods were accepted by Dunham & Randolph, either in fact or in law, the property could pass in transitu. The general principle is, that it could not. The question always is, in whom was the right of property at the time of shipment ? The simplicity and celerity with which the trial of captures must be conducted, require that the quesi tion should be limited to the time of shipment. For the *same reason, J prize courts have rejected equitable liens. If it were not so, further proof would be required in every case. The Twende Venner, 6 Rob. 329, n. This rule is reasonable. Possession is evidence of ownership. . Change of title in transitu is only an exception to the general rule. The exception should be confined to the cases in which it has been held necessary, as where possession could not be delivered, &c. The papers on board are always sufficient for the captors. In a prize court, the documentary evidence is all important. This point is settled in the case of the claim of Magee & Jones, in The Venus, at this term.
As to the further proof produced in this cause, it is of very little importance. Dunham & Randolph did not comply with the condition upon which the property was to vest in them. They agreed to take a part only, and therefore, were not entitled to any. It is immaterial, whether this bound them to take the whole or not. It did not bind Thompson. He had a right to refuse to let them have any part, as they had not accepted the whole, or he might insist upon their taking the whole. It was at his option, to call upon them to account, as his factors, for the whole. If Thompson had such a ¿right, the captors have such a right, for by the capture they succeeded, jure 'belli, to all the rights of Thompson.
The time was past when they accepted the goods by the Fanny ; they ■were in the custody of the law, under the seizure of the revenue officers. Dunham & Randolph could only accept them conditionally ; i. e., if they : should be restored ; but if they should be condemned, they could not receive them.
It is not credible, that they should have received them absolutely, at the time they were under seizure. They did not bond fide accept them. It is not to be believed, that they would take upon themselves the risk of their * condemnation. It was probably done as a cover, for the benefit of Thompson. The goods not being according to order, they were not bound to accept them. Thompson made a new proposal to them. They did not accept it, but offered new terms on their part, to which Thompson did not assent; so that there was no agreement. The property never passed.
2
The second is a question of law, can such an acceptance change the title in transitu ? 1. Dunham & Randolph, relying on the justice of the United States, and that they would protect goods, the property of citizens of the United States, shipped on the faith of the declarations of their agents respecting the effect of the repeal of the orders in council, did bond fide accept them. This
The Frances.
appears from their letter of the 19th of September. They had no motive to make the goods appear American rather than British ; for in each case, they would be equally liable to condemnation. They relied entirely upon the justice of the government.
The acceptance of the goods by the Fanny was absolute. The language used in regard to those by the Frances was intended to deceive the enemy, in case of British capture.
Thompson had no right to annex the condition to the acceptance. The goods were ordered by Dunham & Randolph. Thompson had agreed to execute the order, and was bound so to do. In shipping the goods, he was executing an order, not making a bargain. Dunham & Randolph had a right to take to their own account the goods ordered, and receive the residue as a consignment, to sell for the account of Thompson. If the question were now open, I should say, that these goods never belonged to the shipper. They were purchased by the agent of Dunham & Randolph, by their order, and for their account.
2. In point of law, what was the effect of the acceptance ? The acceptance was good for both cargoes, or it was good for neither. Thompson either had, or had not, a right to annex the condition. If he had not, then the goods were the property of Dunham & Randolph ab initio. If he had a right to annex the condition, they *had no right to reject it. They r4. were bound to take all or none ; if they took part, they were bound L to take the residue. Their reservation of a right to consider as to the goods by the Frances, was void.
The only remaining question is, whether belligerent property can change in transitu. Belligerent rights, in derogation of the common law, are to be construed strictly. They are not to be extended further than the state of war requires. The Vrow Anna Catharina, 5 Rob. 161. The rules of war are not to be changed for the convenience of captors. It is true, that the captors are to judge by the ship’s papers ; but here the ship’s papers all showed the truth of the case ; and nothing but a single letter cast any doubt upon it.
The rule extends no further than that a neutral title shall not originate during the voyage. If the title originated anterior to the war ; if the shipment was made before the war, and not in contemplation of .war; and if the condition, upon which the title was to change, was annexed before the war; such a contract could not be in violation of the belligerent rights. Thompson had not an option to hold Dunham & Randolph to the acceptance, or not, as he pleased. If they did an act which bound them, he was bound also. The acceptance must be considered absolute, and the condition not in derogation of belligerent rights.
March 2d, 1815. (Absent, Todd, J.) Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the court; as follows :—This claim is interposed to obtain restitution of three bales and nineteen boxes of goods captured in the Frances. As early as the 23d of July 1811, these claimants, anticipating a repeal of the orders in council, gave an order to Alexander Thompson, of Glasgow, to ship him a variety of articles. In July 1812, upon the repeal of the orders in council, Thompson ships the articles ordered ; and originally intending r^gg to ship to *the claimants, a consignment on his own account, inter- *-
The Frances.
mingles with the goods ordered, a variety of others, not contained in the ordei- of the claimants. These goods are shipped by two vessels, the Fanny and the Frances ; and by a letter dated the 11th of July 1812, Thompson advises the claimants of these shipments ; and after descanting on the merits of the articles, and declaring his reason for blending other goods with those shipped to their order, and his subsequent determination to make them an offer of the additional goods, he continues in these words : “ I leave it with yourselves, to take the whole of the two shipments, or none at all, just as you please. If you do not wish them, I will thank you to hand the invoices and letters over to Messrs. Falconer, Jackson & Co. I think twenty-four hours will allow you ample opportunity for you to make up your minds on this point ; and if you do not hand them over within that time, I will, of course, consider that you take the whole.” “ You will see, I think, the reasonableness of your taking the whole or none of the shipment.”
The Fanny reached the waters of the United States in safety; and being seized by a revenue-cutter, was carried into New London, where she has been finally restored. The Frances was captured on the 28th of August, by the privateer Yankee, and carried into Rhode Island. On the 22d of August, after the arrival of the Fanny, the claimants write to Falconer, Jackson & Co., and accept of the shipment by the Fanny ; but with regard to that by the Frances, they write in the following words : “ His letter also speaks of another shipment of thirty-one packages per Frances, which, on arrival, we shall then hand in our determination.” On the first of September following, they again write to Falconer, Jackson & Co., intimating their acceptance of the shipment by the Frances. On this state of facts, it is contended, that the claimants are entitled to restitution ; that they either had an original interest in the goods shipped, or had acquired one, before the capture.
In the ordinary course of mercantile transactions, a delivery to a ship* master is a delivery to the consignee. *But it is evident, that this
-* delivery may be absolute or qualified, and that the effect of it must vary accordingly. A voluntary agent has the option either to enter upon his agency, in strict conformity with the instructions of his principal, or with such reservations or conditions as he may think proper to prescribe ; and the only consequence is, that, in the latter case, he leaves his principal at liberty to adopt or repudiate his acts. The shipper who purchases goods on his own credit, or with his own funds, is not acting in the ordinary capacity of a factor. If he were, the goods, even before shipment, would be the property of the individual on whose order the purchase is made. Such shipments are in the nature of a mercantile credit, and the shipper always retains the uncontrolled exercise of discretion in extending.it. There was, therefore, nothing inconsistent with the relative rights of the parties, in Thompson’s imposing upon the consignees the condition of taking all or none of the two shipments ; and the consequence was, that the delivery'was not absolute, but qualified ; and until the condition performed, the goods remained the property of the shippei’; and had they suffered shipwreck, the loss would have been his.
But it is contended, that the condition was performed, and that this case forms an exception from the rule, that, as to the exercise of belligerent
The Frances. '
rights, there shall be no transfer in transitu. The acceptance of the cargo by the Fanny was on the 22d, the capture of the Frances on the 28th of August. It is contended, that the acceptance of the Fanny’s cargo was conclusive as to both shipments ; and that, although partial in terms, it must, in law, have effect as to the whole, since such was the condition imposed by the shipper ; and that it was, in fact, the intention of the claimants that such should be the effect of the acceptance ; but the reservation was intended only as a ruse de guerre to guard against the effects of hostile capture.
There is certainly nothing illegal, in resorting to devices to elude hostile capture ; and where it can be clearly shown, that property is really neutral or friendly, its being covered under hostile habiliments, for the purpose *of evasion, will not necessarily subject it to condemnation. But the evidence must be less equivocal than that relied on in this case. The L property was already captured and libelled, as liable to American capture, when the claimants’ letter of the 19th September was written. To receive such evidence, under such circumstances, to so critical a point, would be to surrender every belligerent right to fraud and imposition. The letter of the 22d of August must, therefore, be taken on its plain import, and such effect given to it as its words imply. This letter contains an express exclusion of the goods under consideration ; but it is contended, that as Thompson’s letter left them no latitude, but obliged them either to choose or refuse the whole, their acceptance of part cast on them the property in the whole.
But we are of opinion, that such was not the effect of this act of the claimants. The consequence of such a doctrine would be, that where a property is to be acquired upon a condition performed, the condition may be rejected, and yet the property acquired. It certainly put it in the power of the shippers, either to cast the whole property upon the claimants, or resume the property, and make the consignee accountable for that which had come to his hands. Falconer, Jackson & Co., upon the arrival of the Frances, had she not been captured, would have had an undoubted right to demand the shipment made by her, on the ground of the claimants’ not having accepted it within the time limited ; and it would have been in vain for the claimants to have contested their right, whilst they held the letter of the 22d of August, and Thompson’s instructions on the subject of the acceptance. If, then, it rested with Thompson, or his agent, to retain the property in this shipment, or cast it upon the claimants, the consequence is, that the legal interest still remained in thè shippers.
This conclusion on the state of interest in the parties, renders it unnecessary to consider the argument urged to except this case from the rule relative to changes of property in transitu: and we hope it will be, at all times, recollected, that the reasoning in this case is not founded on the implied admission of the distinction taken by the claimants’ counsel on this subject.
Decree affirmed. [p. 118] *Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar, Adrian B. Bentzon, Claimant, Boyle and others, the Officers and Crew of the Privateer Comet, (a)
Enemy*1 s property.—Decisions offoreign courts.
The produce of an enemy’s colony is to be considered as hostile property, so long as it belongs to
the owner of the soil, whatever may be his national character in other respects, or whatever
may be his place of residence.
An island in the temporary occupation of the enemy, is to be considered as an enemy’s colony.1
In deciding a question of the law of nations, this court will respect the decisions of foreign
courts.
The Phcenix, 5 Rob. 25, recognised and followed.
Appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland, condemning thirty hogsheads of sugar, the property of the claimant, a Danish subject, it being the produce of his plantation in Santa Cruz, and shipped, after the capture of that island by the British, to a house in London, for account and risk of the claimant, who was a Danish officer, and the second in authority in the government of the island before its capture ; and who, shortly after the capture, withdrew, and has since resided in the United States and in Denmark. By the articles of capitulation, the inhabitants were permitted to retain their property, but could only ship the produce of the island to Great Britain. This sugar was captured in July 1812, after the declaration of war by the United Sates against Great Britain, and libelled as British property.
Harper, for the appellant, made two questions, 1. Is this case within the rule of the British prize courts, that the produce of a plantation in an enemy’s country shall be considered, while such produce remains the property of the owner of the soil, as the property of an enemy, whatever may be the general national character of the owner ? 2. If it be within that rule, is the rule to be considered in this country, as a rule of national law ?
1. Sir William Scott, in laying down the rule in the case of The .Phoenix, 5 Rob. 26, 20, refers to the case of The Juffroro Catharina, in 1783, and the reason of the rule seems to be, that the proprietor of the soil incorporates *1921 *himself whh the permanent interests of the country. The rule is J modern, and several exceptions have been made to it. In the case of The Phoenix, the claim was made by persons of Germany, for property taken on a voyage from Surinam to Holland, and described as the produce of their estates in Surinam, which was then a colony of Holland, with which Great Britain was at war, Germany being neutral. Sir William Scott admits, that if the estates had been purchased, while Surinam was in the possession of the British, the case would not have been within the general rule. So, in the case of The Diana, 5 Rob. 60 (Eng. ed.), those who settled in Demarara, while it was under British protection, were held not to be within the rule ; and the case of The Vrow Anna Catharina, 5 Rob. 161 (Eng. ed.)., is another modification of the rule. These cases were excepted, because the proprietors had not incorporated themselves with the permanent interests of 'the nation.
(a) March 30th, 1815. Absent, Todd, Justice.
1
• p. Shanks v. Dupont, 8 Pet. 242.
Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle.
In the present case, Mr. Bentzon never incorporated himself with the interests of the British nation, either permanently or temporarily. The character was forced upon him against his will ; he always disclaimed it. He was, by birth, and always continued, a Danish subject. He did not voluntarily purchase a plantation in the country of the enemy. When he purchased his estate, Santa Cruz was neutral. The occupation of the island by the British was temporary ; it was neither permanent in fact nor in law. Peace has restored the island to Denmark. Mr. Bentzon could not, by means of his estate in Santa Cruz, incorporate himself permanently with the interests of Great Britain.
2. But if the case comes within the British rule, are we to adopt that rule, and extend it to a neutral nation which has never itself adopted it ? It is but the ordinary case of a neutral carrying on his lawful trade with our enemy ; and has nothing in it contrary to the law of nations. The rule contended for is a mere arbitrary one, calculated to extend the field of rapine, and to increase the maritime power of Great Britain. W e have no interest in aiding those views.
*What is the law of nations ? Not a rule adopted by one nation only, but the law of nature, of reason, and of justice, applied to the *- intercourse of nations, and admitted by all such as are civilized. What is there in the code of any other nation to support this rule ? It is to be found only in the maritime code of Great Britain ; which is not more binding upon us than that of any other maritime power. It can have no force with us, but in cases where thè rule of reciprocity or of retaliation will justify its use. But Denmark has never used nor acknowledged the rule ; and therefore, we cannot justly enforce it against her. ' But if this court should adopt the rule, we trust it will be with the strictest limitation.
Pinkney, contrà.—By the capture of Santa Cruz by the British, it immediately became the colony of an enemy. It is not necessary that the occupation should be perpetual ; for the time, it was indefinite, and during the occupation, it was as much the colony of an enemy as any of his other possessions.
If, then, Santa Cruz was an enemy’s colony, its produce, while it remained the property of the owner of the soil, was the property of an enemy. Sir W. Scott, in the case of The Phoenix, 5 Rob. 21 (Eng. ed.), says, that the rule has been so repeatedly decided, both in that and the superior court, that it is no longer open to discussion. No question can be made upon the point of law at this day. The opposite argument goes to show that if the property in the soil be acquired, before the capture of the island, the owner would not be considered an enemy, although the island should remain permanently a British colony. The case of The Phoenix contains no exception to the general rule ; it is, however, said, that the case of The Diana shows an exception ; but that was a mere question of domicil. The rule now under consideration was not discussed.
*It is said, that the party, in order to acquire the hostile character as to the produce of his estate, must incorporate himself with the *- interests of the enemy, while the soil is in possession of the enemy. But the rule is not so. There is no difference whether he acquire the estate before or after it come into the possession of the enemy ; if he continues to
Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle.
hold the estate, he becomes immediately incorporated with the nation, jure belli.
But it is asked, is Great Britain to legislate for other nations ? We say, no. But this court will pay great respect to the English decisions on this subject; especially, as the rule has been acquiesced in by all the nations of Europe. Not one of them has remonstrated—not even Denmark. It has therefore, the positive authority of England, and the negative authority of all the residue of Europe. The rule is not harder than that of domicil, to which it is analogous.
Harper, in reply.—It is said, that the rule is general, because all the nations of Europe have acquiesced in the English decisions. Several reasons may be given for this appearance of acquiescence. It is a recent rule. No authority can be produced for it, earlier than 1783, just at the close of the American war. Peace having immediately taken place, removed the cause of complaint. And as to the late war with France, no case of the kind appears to have arisen. The edicts of France, &c., had a different bearing. It is said, that the rule is analogous to that of domicil; but the rule of domicil rests upon a different principle—the principle of allegiance and the safety of the state. A man found in the enemy’s country, at the breaking out of the war, receives the protection of that country, and is bound to do nothing to its injury ; and if he do not remove in a reasonable time, is to be considered as having incorporated himself with the interests of that country. The rule of domicil is rather a rule of municipal than of national law ; and the principal ground of the rule is the necessity of preventing treasonable intercourse with the enemy. It becomes a part of national law only when it is applied to neutrals. It has no analogy to the rule now in question, *which was adopted merely to prevent the interference of neutral
J with belligerent rights.
March 4th, 1815. (Absent, Todd, J.) Marshall, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court, as follows :—The island of Santa Cruz, belonging to the kingdom of Denmark, was subdued, during the late war, by the arms of his Britannic majesty. Adrian Benjamin Bentzon, an officer of the Danish government, and a proprietor of land therein, withdrew from the island, on its surrender, and has since resided in Denmark. The property of the inhabitants being secured to them, he still retained his estate in the island, under the management of an agent, who shipped thirty hogsheads of sugar, the produce of that estate, on board a British ship, to a commercial house in London, on account and risk of the said A. B. Bentzon. On her passage, she was captured by the American privateer, the Comet, and brought into Baltimore, where the vessel and cargo were libelled as enemy property. A claim for these sugars was put in by Bentzon ; but they were condemned with the rest of the cargo; and the sentence was affirmed in the circuit court. The claimant then appealed to this court.
Some doubt has been suggested, whether Santa Cruz, while in the possession of Great Britain, could properly be considered as a British island. But for this doubt there can be no foundation. Although acquisitions made during war are not considered as permanent, until confirmed by treaty, yet, to every commercial and belligerent purpose, they are considered as a part of the domain of the conqueror, so long as he retains the possession and gov-
Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle.
ernment of them. The island of Santa Cruz, after its capitulation, remained a British island, until it was restored to Denmark.
Must the produce of a plantation in that island, shipped by the proprietor himself, who is a Dane, residing in Denmark, be considered as British, * and therefore, enemy property ? *In arguing this question, the coun- L sei for the claimants has made two points. 1. That this case does not come within the rule applicable to shipments from an enemy country, even as laid down in the British courts of admiralty. 2. That the rule has not been rightly laid down in those courts, and, consequently, will not be adopted in this.
1. Does the rule laid down in the British courts of admiralty embrace this case ? It appears to the court, that the case of The Phoenix is precisely in point. In' that case, a vessel was captured in a voyage from Surinam to Holland, and a part of the cargo was claimed by persons residing in Germany, then a neutral country, as the produce of their estates in Surinam. The counsel for the captors considered the law of the case as entirely settled ; the counsel for the claimants did not controvert this position. They admitted it; but endeavored to extricate their case from the general principle, by giving it the protection of the treaty of Amiens. In pronouncing his opinion, Sir William Scott lays down the general rule thus : “ Certainly, nothing can be more decided and fixed, as the principle of this court and of the supreme court, upon very solemn argument, than that the possession of the soil does impress upon the owner the character of the country, as far as the produce of that plantation is concerned, in its transportation to any other country, whatever the local residence of the owner may be. This has been so repeatedly decided, both in this and the superior court, that it is no longer open to discussion. No question can be made on the point of law, at this day.”
Afterwards, in the case of The Vrow Anna Catharina, Sir William Scott lays down the rule, and states its reason. “ It cannot be doubted,” he says, “that there are transactions so radically and fundamentally national as to impress the national character, independent of peace or war, and the local residence of the parties. The *produce of a person’s own plan- L tation, in the colony of the enemy, though shipped in time of peace, is liable to be considered as the property of the enemy, by reason that the proprietor has incorporated himself with the permanent interests of the nation, as a holder of the soil, and is to be taken as a part of that country, in that particular transaction, independent of his own personal residence and occupation.”
This rule laid down with so much precision, does not, it is contended, embrace Mr. Bentzson’s claim, because he has not “ incorporated himself with the permanent interests of the nation.” He acquired the property, while Santa Cruz was a Danish colony, and he withdrew from the island when it became British. This distinction does not appear to the court to be a sound one. The identification of the national character of the owner with that of the soil, in the particular transaction, is not placed on the dispositions with which he acquires the soil, or on his general character. The acquisition of land in Santa Cruz binds him, so far as respects that land, to the fate of Santa Cruz, whatever its destiny may be. While that island belonged to Denmark, the produce of the soil, while unsold, was, according to.
Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle.
this rule, Danish property, whatever might be the general character of the particular proprietor. When the island became British, the soil and its produce, while that produce remained unsold, were British. The general commercial or political character of Mr. Bentzon could not, according to this rule, affect this particular transaction. Although incorporated, so far as respects his general character, with the permanent interests of Denmark, he was incorporated, so far as respected his plantation in Santa Cruz, with the permanent interests of Santa Cruz, which was, at that time, British ; and though, as a Dane, he was at war with Great Britain, and an enemy, yet, as a proprietor of land in Santa Cruz, he was no enemy : he could ship his produce to Great Britain in perfect safety.
The case is certainly within the rule as laid down in the British courts. The next inquiry is, how far will that rule be adopted in this country ?
Q *The law of nations is the great source from which we derive those
J rules, respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognised by all civilized and commercial states throughout Europe and America. This law is in part unwritten, and in part conventional. To ascertain that which is unwritten, we resort to the great principles of reason and justice : but as these principles will be differently understood by different nations, under different circumstances, we consider them as being, in some degree, fixed and rendered stable by a series of judicial decisions. The decisions of the courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon a law common to every country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect. The decisions of the courts of every country show how the law of nations, in the given case, is understood in that country, and will be considered in adopting the rule which is to prevail in this.
Without taking a comparative view of the justice or fairness of the rules established in the British courts, and of those established in the courts of other nations, there are circumstances not to be excluded from consideration, which give to those rules a claim to our attention that we cannot entirely disregard. The United States having, at one time, formed a component part of the British empire, their prize law was our prize law. When we separated, it continued to be our prize law, so far as it was adapted to our circumstances, and was not varied by the power which was capable of changing it.
It will not be advanced, in consequence of this former relation between the two countries, that any obvious misconstruction of public law, made by the British courts, will be considered as forming a rule for the American courts, or that any recent rule of the British courts is entitled to more respect than the recent rules of other countries. But a case professing to be decided on ancient principles will not be entirely disregarded, unless it be very unreasonable, or be founded on a construction rejected by other nations.
The rule laid down in The Phoenix is said to be a recent rule, because a case solemnly decided before the lords commissioners in 1783, is quoted in
*
_ the margin, *as its authority. But that case is not suggested to have J been determined contrary to former practice or former opinions. Nor do we perceive any reason for supposing it to be contrary to the rule of other nations in a similar case. The opinion that ownership of the soil does, in some decree, connect the owner with the property, so far as respects that
Evans v. Jordan.
soil, is an opinion which certainly prevails very extensively. It is not an unreasonable opinion. Personal property may follow the person anywhere ; and its character, if found on the ocean, may depend on the domicil of the owner. But land is fixed : wherever the owner may reside, that land is hostile or friendly, according' to the condition of the country in which it is placed. It is no extravagant perversion of principle, nor is it a violent offence to the course of human opinion, to say, that the proprietor, so far as respects his interest in this land, partakes of its character ; and that the produce, while the owner remains unchanged, is subject to the same disabilities. In condemning the sugars of Mr. Bentzon as enemy property, this court is of opinion, that there was no error, and the sentence is affirmed, with costs.
Sentence affirmed.
1
Evans v. Weiss, 2 W. 0. C. 342. by this court. And for the decisions on Evans’s
2
See 1 Brock. 248, for the opinion of the patent, see 3 Wheat. 4o4 ; 7 Id. 356, 453; Pet. chief justice, which was unanimously sustained 0. 0. 215, 322; 3 W. C. C. 408, 443.
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