Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347
Full caption
Gaines v. Thompson.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Gaines v. Thompson.
The act of the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of the Land Office, in cancelling an entry for land, is not a ministerial duty, but is a matter resting in the judgment and discretion of these officers as representing the Executive Department. Accordingly, this court will not interfere by injunction more than by mandamus to control it.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.
The Secretary of the Interior having directed the Commissioner of the Land Office to cancel an entry under which Gaines and others claimed an equitable right to certain lands in Arkansas, these last brought their suit in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, praying that the secretary and commissioner should be enjoined from making such cancellation. The defendants entered their appearance, and Wilson, the commissioner, filed a plea. The substance of this plea was that the matters set up in the bill were within the exclusive control of the executive department of the government, the secretary and commissioner representing the President, and that the court had no jurisdiction or authority to interfere with the exercise of this power by injunction. In point of fact the validity of the entry in question depended upon the construction of certain acts of Congress, upon the meaning of which different secretaries of the interior had been so far divided that it was thought best to take the opinion of the Attorney-General upon their interpretation.
The court below, sustaining the plea, dismissed the bill; and the question on this appeal was the correctness of such action.
J. L. Brent, for the appellant, went largely into the merits of the respective claimants, to show that the proposed cancellation was wrong, and ought to be enjoined. He p. 348relied upon Lytle v. Arkansas,* Cunningham v. AshleyJ Barnard’s Heirs v. Ashley’s Heirs,£ Minnesota v. Bachelder,§ and several other cases, in order to show that this court did constantly go into such merits and decide according to them, irrespective of decisions by the executive officers connected with the issue of patents.
Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney- General, contra, argued, that there were no functions within the range of the executive authority less ministerial in their character than those which devolved upon the officers of the land department in the administration of matters relating to the disposal of the public domain; that these officers had not merely the right, but were obliged to the duty of judgment and decision in them, and were directly responsible in determining the questions which arose before them only to the authority, within their own department of the public service, upon whom a supervisory jurisdiction had been conferred by statute.
The case was therefore within the principle which forbade judicial interference with the exercise of executive discretion; a principle lately so ably explained in this court in the case of Mississippi v. Johnson,\\ that it was almost unnecessary to refer to previous adjudications.^
All the cases, he contended, cited by the appellants, in which the courts had undertaken to review ultimately the action of the land office, were cases between private parties, litigated after the legal title had passed, by patent or otherwise, out of the government. That right was undisputed.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The extent of the jurisdiction which may lawfully be asserted by the Federal courts over the officers of the executive departments of the government, has been mooted in*§
* 9 Howard, 329; 22 Id. 202. f 14 Id. 382. I 18 Id. 43. § 1 Wallace, 115. || 4 Wallace, 499. f Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters, 609; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 lb. 515; Kendall v. Stokes, 3 Howard, 98; Brashear v. Mason, 6 lb. 101; Beeside ■». Walker, 11 lb. 289.
Dec. 1868.] Gaines v. Thompson. * 849
this court from the case of Marbury n. Madison* down to the present time; and while the principles which should govern the action of the courts in that regard have been settled long since, the frequent application of late to this court, and to other Federal courts, for the exercise of powers not belonging to them, shows that the question is one not generally understood.
In the case already referred to, of Marbury v. Madison, the Chief Justice commented at some length upon the power of the courts over the action of the executive officers of the government, in the course of which he arrived at the conclusion that it is a question which must always depend upon the nature of the act. He then argues, that by the Constitution the President is invested with certain political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and for which he is accountable only to his country and his conscience, and that he has officers to aid him in the exercise of these powers, who are directly accountable to him. The acts of such an officer, he says, can never, as an officer, be examinable in a court of justice. He holds, however, that where an officer is required by law to perform an act, not of this political or executive character, which affects the private rights of individuals, he is to that extent amenable to the courts. The duty which it was held in that case could be enforced in the proper court by mandamus, was the delivery of a commission already signed by the President. The point, as there presented, was new and embarrassing, and it is no reflection on the distinguished jurist who delivered the opinion to say, that the rule which governs the court in its action, in this class of cases, has since been laid down with more precision, without conflicting with the principles there stated.
In the case of McIntire v. Wbod,f an application was made to the Circuit Court for the District of Ohio for a mandamus to the register of the land office, to compel him to issue certificates of purchase to plaintiff for lands to which he
* 1 Cranch, 137. t 7 Id. 504.
850 Gaines v. Thompson. [Sup. Ct.
supposed himself entitled by law. This court was of opinion that no power had been vested by Congress in the circuit courts to issue the writ in such cases. The reasoning of the court is not extended, but the case bears a strong analogy to the one under consideration.
But in Kendall v. United States* the majority of the court held that the courts of the District of Columbia had a larger power than the circuit courts, and could issue writs of mandamus to Federal officers in proper cases. As this is the first case in which the writ was actually ordered, it is worth while to examine the ground on which it was placed. “ The act required to be done by the Postmaster-General,” says the court, “ is simply to credit the relators with the full amount of the award of the solicitor. This is a precise, definite act, purely ministerial, and about which the Postmaster-General had no discretion whatever. This was not an official act in any other sense than being a transaction in the department where the books and accounts were kept, and was an official act in the same sense that an entry in the minutes of a court, pursuant to an order of the court, is an official act. There is no room for the exercise of any discretion, official or otherwise.”
In this language there is no ambiguity, and in it we find a clear enunciation of the rule which separates the class of cases ih which the court will interfere from those in which it will not. In the subsequent case of Decatur v. Paulding,] where the writ was refused, the Chief Justice, who had dissented in the former case, accepts both the doctrine of the right to issue the writ by the court of the district, and of the cases in which it may be issued, as settled by the case of Kendall v. United States. “ The first question, therefore, to be considered,” he says, “ is whether the duty imposed upon the Secretary of the Navy by the resolution'in favor of Mrs. Decatur was a mere ministerial act?” The case of Mrs. Decatur arose under an act of Congress, and also a joint resolution of that body of the same date, both providing
t 14 Id. 497.
compensation for the services of her deceased husband; but the measure of this compensation (which was to be paid to her by the Secretary of the Navy) was in the act different from what it was in the resolution. The secretary held that but one of these was intended by Congress, and gave her the election. She brought suit to compel him to give her both. It is clear she had no other legal remedy. The United States could not be sued. The secretary could not be sued in any other form of action than mandamus. But on the ground that the action of the secretary involved the exercise of judgment and discretion, the order of the Circuit Court refusing the writ was sustained.
This case is cited and relied on in the case of The Commissioner of Patents v. Whiteley * and some of the observations of Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion in the former, are so pertinent to the case before us, and state so well the relations of the judicial branch of the government to the officers engaged in the executive branch, that they may well be reproduced here.
Speaking of the functions of these officers, he says: “ In general, such duties, whether imposed by act of Congress or by resolution, are not mere ministerial duties. The head ot an executive department of the government, in the administration of the various and important concerns of his office, is, continually required to exercise judgment and discretion. He must exercise his judgment in expounding the laws and resolutions of Congress under which he is required to act.” “If,” he says, “a suit should come before- this court, which involved the construction of any of those laws, the court certainly would not be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of the department. And if they supposed his decision to be wrong, they would, of course, so pronounce their judgment. But this judgment, upon the construction of the law, must be given in a case in which they have jurisdiction, and in which it is their .duty to interpret the acts of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights
* 4 Wallace, 522.
of the parties before them. The court could not entertain an appeal from the decision of one of the secretaries, nor revise his judgment in any case where the law authorized him to exercise judgment or discretion. Nor can it by mandamus act directly upon the officer, and guide and control his judgment or discretion in the matters committed to his care, in the ordinary exercise of his official duties. . . The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments would be productive of nothing but mischief, and we are quite satisfied that such a power was never intended to be given to them.” To the same effect are also the cases, United States v. Seaman;* Same v. Guthrie,! Same v. Commissioner of Land Office.^,
It may, however, be suggested, that the relief sought in all those cases was through the writ of mandamus, and that the decisions are based upon the special principles applicable to the use of that writ. This is only true so far as these principles assert the general doctrine, that an officer to whom public duties are confided by law, is not subject to the control of the courts in the exercise of the judgment and discretion which the law reposes in him as a part of his official functions. Certain powers and duties are confided to those officers, and to them alone, and however the courts may, in ascertaining the rights of parties in suits properly before them, pass upon the legality of their acts, after the matter has once passed beyond their control, there exists no power in the courts, by any of its processes, to act upon the officer so as to interfere with the exercise of that judgment while the matter is properly before him for action. The reason for this is, that the law reposes this discretion in him for that occasion, and not in the courts. The doctrine, therefore, is as applicable to the writ of injunction as it is to the Writ of mandamus.
In the one case the officer is required to abandon his right to exercise his personal judgment, and to substitute that of
* 17 Howard, 225. t Id. 284. J 5 Wallace, 563.
Dec. 1868.] Gaines v .. Thompson. 358
the court, by performing the act as it commands. In the other he is forbidden to do the act which his judgment and discretion tell him should be done. There can be no difference in the principle which forbids interference with the duties of these officers, whether it be by writ of mandamus or injunction.
Accordingly, in the case of The State of Mississippi v. Johnson* which was an application to this court for the writ of injunction, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the court says that it is unable to perceive that the fact that the relief asked is by injunction takes the case out of the general principles which forbid judicial interference with the exercise of executive discretion.
In the same case the Chief Justice gives us this clear definition of a ministerial duty in the relation in which we have been considering it: “A ministerial duty, the performance of which may in proper cases be required of the head of a department by judicial process, is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under circumstances admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.”
The action of the officers of the land department, with which we are asked to interfere in this case, is clearly not of this character. The validity of plaintiffs’ entry, which is involved in their decision, is a question which requires the careful consideration and construction of more than one act of Congress. It has been for a long time before the department, and has received the attention of successive secretaries of the interior, and has been found so difficult as to justify those officers in requiring the opinion of the Attorney-General. It is far from being a ministerial act under any definition given by this court.
The numerous cases referred to by counsel, in which this court—after the title had passed from the United States, and the matter had ceased to be under the control of the executive department—has sustained the courts of justice in
* 4 Wallace, 475.
VOL. VII.
decreeing the equitable title to belong to the person against whom the department had decided, are not in conflict with these views, but furnish an additional reason for refusing to interfere with such cases while they remain under such control.
Decree affirmed.
The Diana.
To justify a vessel of a neutral in attempting to enter a blockaded port, she must be in such distress as to render her entry a matter of absolute and uncontrollable necessity.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
The schooner Diana was captured, on the 26th of November, 1862, by vessels of war of the United States, off Pass Cavallo, on the coast of Texas, then in rebellion against the United States, and, fpr some time previously, under blockade along the whole line of its coast, and taken to Key West for adjudication.
A libel in prize was filed against both vessel and cargo, in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in December, 1862, to which the master of the vessel interposed a claim in behalf of John Cabada, of Campeachy, Mexico, the alleged owner of the schooner, and in behalf of Miguel Canno, a Spanish subject residing at Campeachy, the alleged owner of the cargo. Subsequently a claim was filed by Idela Cabada, alleging that he was owner of the vessel, and that he had let her to one Miguel Canno on freight for a voyage from Campeachy to Matamoras, Mexico, in good faith.
The ship’s papers showed that the vessel was on a voyage from Campeachy to Matamoras, and was consigned to one San Roman, at the port last named. She set sail on t e 11th November, 1862. •
When captured the vessel was near the port of Matagorda, off the coast of Texas. She was fourteen days from Campeachy, and was two hundred miles out of her direct course, having deviated therefrom on the third day out from Campeachy.
The master, in his deposition taken in preparatory), testified that11 the first port the vessel would have entered had she not been captured would have been the nearest convenient port of entrance, and the second would have been Matamoras,” and “ that for twenty-four hours previous to the capture the ship was steering toward the coast of Texas, in hopes to make a harbor, or beach, or something.”
One of the seamen found on board testified that but for our capture “the vessel would have entered first the port of Cavallo,” and that “they were running along the coast for an entrance, and that at the time of the capture the captured vessel was only some three miles from the lighthouse on Pass Cavallo Point.”
In excuse for the position in which the vessel was found it was alleged that when three days out from Campeachy damage had resulted to the rigging of the vessel, causing her to deviate from her course, and that the master approached the coast “ from no other motive than that of seeking shelter to repair the damage of his vessel.”
The log-book, which had perhaps a somewhat elaborate and artificial aspect, stated that there had been a good deal of heavy weather; that the vessel worked much; that when three days out from Campeachy she “ broke the clamp of the peak of the foresail,” which it was necessary to wait till daylight to repair, but which then, at six o’clock in the morning, was repaired, the wind then being favorable, as it was generally, for going to Matamoras; that on the 15th she broke the bobstay of the bowsprit; and that “ a lashing of rope was made to secure the said bowsprit, having no better nieans, and that sail was then ma.de with -double reefs. It indicated, generally speaking, variable weather, sometimes eavy, sometimes fine; that the vessel, however, required t e pumps to be not unfrequently at work; that on the p. 35625th she became uncertain about her longitude, and that on that day, under light variable winds, she “ luffed all that was possible, for the purpose of finding soundings and determining our longitude, and by that means to enable us to make a straight course for our port of destination, or some port near by, where we might repair the damages sustained by the vessel and her rigging.” Twenty-four hours afterwards she was captured, being, as already stated, now off the Texan port of Matagorda.
The following letter of instructions, from the owner of the vessel and the owner of the cargo to the master, was found among his papers.
[Translation.]
Campeachy, November 10th, 1862.
Dn. Pedro Jaurequiberry, present.
Dear Sir and Friend: We think it advisable to hand you this letter of instructions, in order that you may remember with greater facility and precision the objects of the voyage to be undertaken to-day by our pilot-boat “ Diana, of whic vessel you are master.
You have ample authority to dispose of the goods which are on board of the vessel, and to invest the proceeds in the artic e which we have mentioned to you verbally, not forgetting tha our wishes as well as your personal interest consist in ma mg the most of the article referred to.
Although the vessel goes consigned to Dn. Jose San E°man’ you will do what you consider best for our interest. You shou not disburse any money while you are able to make pure ases from the proceeds of the invoice, and of such ship’s stores as yo can conveniently dispense with after reserving a sufficient quan tity for the return voyage. ,
As we are embittered by the war which France has e against the republic, upon the return voyage you will touc Sisal or Celestun,‘where yqu will receive our instructions.
You will keep an accurate account of all moneys disburse you, in order that we may determine whether to continue or n these expeditions. We omit any further instructions whic p. 357might give, having full confidence in your intelligence and activity.
We conclude by wishing you a safe voyage, and by acknowledging ourselves
Your friends, &c.,
Canno & Cabada.
The cargo of the Diana consisted in part of rice, starch, coarse flannel, paper, nails, rum, brandy, shoes, and segars; articles which were nearly or quite as abundant at Matamoras as at Campeachy, but which were greatly needed in Texas, at the time, as already said, under blockade by the United States.
There was on board, apparently as a passenger, an Englishman, whose name appeared in the ship’s papers as George Stites, but whose real name was George Chase, and who was a pilot, and a resident of Lavacca, Texas.
Acting Master Atkinson, of the United States Navy, in his deposition, taken by leave of court, testified that when he boarded the Diana, her master said that his purpose was to run the blockade; that he had before attempted to do so at St. Louis Pass and did not succeed, and that the same statement was made to him by the pilot of the Diana, who was part owner of the cargo.
Acting Master Samson, also of the United States Navy, in his deposition testified that Chase, the ostensible passenger on board, and who was part owner of the cargo, stated that he was engaged to act as her pilot in entering Matagorda Bay, or any other convenient port of Texas, and that the vessel was intended to violate the blockade; and that Chase made a written acknowledgment to this effect, in presence of several witnesses.
On the hearing, it was brought to the notice of the court that a person of the same name with the captain of the Diana, and residing at the same place, commanded the schooner Sea itch, which was captured oft* the coast of Texas for an aleged intention to violate the blockade, and was restored to or owner upon the ground that while on a voyage from p. 358Matamoras to New Orleans, she was driven out of course by heavy weather and had been damaged;* the same excuse which is offered in this case.
The District Court decreed restitution, and from the decree the United States appealed.
Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States, relied upon the very suspicious facts disclosed by the case upon the position of the vessel, so far out of her proper course, and upon the circumstance, very remarkable if the case was one of innocence, that the captain of the vessel had been recently found on another vessel, in exactly the same unfortunate circumstances as he now invoked the interest of the court for, in the case of the Diana. He was not a novus hospes in this tribunal.
No opposing counsel.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.
The schooner Diana was captured, in November, 1862, off Cavallo, near the entrance jof Matagorda Bay, on the coast of Texas. According to her papers, she was on a voyage from Campeachy, in Mexico, to Matamoras, at the mouth of the Rio Grande; but at the time of “her capture she had been fourteen days at sea and had passed two hundred miles beyond her alleged port of destination. We have no doubt that she was then seeking to enter a blockaded port on the coast. The master states in his deposition that the vessel, if she had not been captured, would have first entered the nearest convenient port, and afterwards gone to Matamoras, and that for twenty-four hours previous to her capture he was steering the vessel toward the coast in hopes of making a harbor or a beach. One of the seamen testifies that the vessel was running along the coast for an entrance; that at the time of her capture she was only three miles from the lighthouse on Pass Cavallo Point, and but for the capture would have entered the port of Cavallo.
* 6 Wallace, 242.
Nor do we doubt that it was the object of the voyage to trade with the enemy, and for that purpose that the owners of the vessel and cargo intended to violate the blockade. The excuse offered by the master for the position in which the vessel was found—that she had been injured by stress of weather, and he was approaching the coast with no other motive than that of seeking shelter to repair the damage—is inconsistent with various facts developed by the evidence.
In the first place, the papers of the vessel purport that she was consigned to one San Roman, at Matamoras, but the instructions from the owners of both vessel and cargo show that thib consignment was colorable, and that the master was the real consignee. He was clothed with full authority to dispose of the goods on board, and to invest the proceeds in what is very mysteriously termed the article, which they had mentioned to him verbally. The article to which allusion is thus made, was cotton, which it was undoubtedly the object of the voyage to procure.
In the second place, the articles which composed the cargo were as abundant and cheap at Matamoras as at Campeachy, whilst they were in great demand and of high price in the country occupied by the enemy.
In the third place, the vessel had on board, ostensibly as a passenger, but under a fictitious name, an Englishman, who was a pilot, and a resident of Layacca, a town at the head of Matagorda Bay, for which the vessel was evidently directing her course when captured.
Besides these considerations, which are sufficient of themselves to justify the conclusion that a violation of the blockade was in the original intention of the owners of vessel and cargo before the vessel sailed from Campeachy, it was admitted by the master at the time of the capture that it was his purpose to run the blockade, and that he had before attempted, without success, to do so at St. Louis Pass. The Englishman on board, who joined the vessel at Campeachy, also stated that he was engaged to act as pilot of the vessel to enter Matagorda Bay, or any other convenient port of Texas.
The blockade of the coast of Texas had been established long before the vessel sailed from Campeachy, and its existence was generally known. It is proved that it was known to the owners and master of the captured vessel.
There is another circumstance which may be adverted to in this connection. The master of this vessel was also the master of the Sea Witch, which was captured off the coast of Texas for an attempt to violate the blockade, and was released upon the ground, that whilst on a voyage from Matamoras to New Orleans she was driven out of her course by stress of weather and injuries received—an excuse similar to the one offered in this case.* This circumstance the court will take notice of, and it will justify a rigid scrutiny into the character of the exculpating testimony produced by the master in the present case. Such is the language of the adjudged cases, f
The statement of the master as to the extent of injuries which the vessel had received is not supported by the log-book. The injuries which are shown by its entries were not of a very serious character—such as would endanger the safety of the vessel. Much less do the entries show the necessity of any deviation of the vessel from a direct course to Matamoras. The statement is, that she deviated from such course on the third day out from Campeachy, because the sea and wind were heavy, and the rigging of the vessel had been damaged. The log-book shows that the damage was repaired the following morning, and on the next day that the wind was fair for sailing? in a direct course to Matamoras, and so continued nearly all the time up to the capture.
It is undoubtedly true that a vessel may be in such distress as to justify her in attempting to enter a blockaded port. She may be out of provisions or water, or she may be in a leaking condition, and no other port be of easy access. The case, however, must be one of absolute and uncontrollable necessity; and this must be established beyond reasonable
* 6 Wallace, 242. f The Juffrouw Elbrecht, 1 Robinson, 127 ; The Experiment, 8 Wheaton, p. 361doubt. “Nothing less,” says Sir William Scott, “than an uncontrollable necessity, which admits of no compromise, and cannot be resisted,” will be held a justification of the offence. Any rule less stringent than this would open the door to all sorts of fraud. Attempted evasions of the blockade would be excused upon pretences of distress and danger, not warranted by the facts, but the falsity of which it w’ould be difficult to expose.
The decree of the court below must be reversed, and that court directed to enter a decree condemning the vessel and cargo as lawful prize; and it is
So ORDERED.