The Merrimack, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 317 (1814)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
The Merrimack, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 317 (1814)
Full caption
The Merrimack.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1814
The Merrimack.
Prize of war.
Goods purchased by British merchants, before the war between the United States and Great Britain, in pursuance of orders from American citizens, shipped to the agent of the British merchants, in the United States, also an American citizen, “ on account and risk of an American citizen,” and no circumstances of fraud or unfairness appearing in the transaction—were vested in the American citizens at the time of the shipment, and are not liable to condemnation, although the vessel sailed from England, after the declaration of war was known there. Restitution.
But if goods be purchased as above, though the accompanying invoices, bills of lading, and letters be addressed by the British consignors to the American citizens for whom the purchase was made, and all concur to show the property to be in them, yet, if these documents are enclosed in a letter from the consignors to their agent in the United States, though an American citizen, directing him not to deliver the goods, in case of the existence of certain circumstances, nor until he should have received payment from the consignees in cash—the property in the said goods continued in the British consignors, at the time of capture. Condemnation,1 Goods by the same ship, purchased as above, and consigned to the agent of the consignors, being an American citizen, in whose name also the bill of lading was made out, but the bill of parcels and invoice in the name of the American merchants for whom the purchase was made; the shipment also being expressed to be on their account, though the goods are spoken of in the letter of the consignors as British property—vested in the American merchants at the time of shipment. The circumstance that the goods continue, during the whole voyage, at the risk of the shippers is immaterial. Restitution.12
This was an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland. The following are the material facts of the case :
The ship Merrimack, owned by citizens of the United States, sailed from Liverpool for Baltimore, a few days after the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain, was known in that country, having on board a cargo of goods, shipped by British subjects, and consigned to citizens of the United States. On the 25th of October 1812, she was captured, in the Chesapeake bay, between Annapolis and Baltimore, by the private armed vessel Rossie, Joshua Barney, commander.
The goods, being libelled as prize in the district *court of Maryland, were severally claimed by sundry citizens of the United States. L 18 These several claims, and the circumstances connected with them, respectively, were thus stated by Marshall, Ch. J., in delivering the opinion of the court :
1. William & Joseph Wilkins, merchants, of Baltimore, claimed the goods contained in eleven cases and one bale, marked W. J. W. These goods were made up for them, in pursuance of their orders, before the war was known in Great Britain, by a manufacturing company, one member of which, Thomas Leich, resided in Leicester, in Great Britain, and the other, Edward Harris, was 'an American citizen, residing in the United States. The bill of parcels was in the name of Messrs. William & Joseph Wilkins ; this paper also served for an invoice, and there was no other on board for these goods. The bill of lading was in the name of Edward Harris, who was the consignee. The goods were accompanied by a letter from Thomas Leich to Edward Harris, dated Leicester, the 29th of July 1812, in which he says, “ With this you will receive bill of lading of eleven cases of worsted and [p. 196] âis SUPREME COURT [Feb’y
The Merrimack.
cotton hosiery, for Messrs. W. & J. Wilkins, Baltimore, and with insurance to 892Z. 5s. It is a large sum, but, from what I can learn, they are very respectable. Indeed, Mr. Brown of the house of Chancellor & Co. came with him, and seemed almost offended, that did not send the cotton hose he ordered before, and said, he would guarantee the amount of the worsted goods, therefore, must have offended him, if did not comply. Have not sent but about half the cotton goods they ordered,” &c., “ informed them, that we thought it necessary to secure our property, to ship all to you, as you could prove that they were American property by making affidavit they are bond fide your property. As out orders in council are repealed, hope your *qi q] government will be amicably inclined as well, and *that trade will be
-* on regular footing again, but for fear there should be some other points in dispute, I shall send you, and our friends, through your hands, all the goods prepared for your market which you’ll perceive is very large.” “ Hope you will approve of my sending all, and as there may have been some alterations in some of your friends, shipping them to you gives the power of keeping back to you.” There was also on board, a letter dated Leicester, 22d July 1.812, signed Harris, Leich & Co., and addressed to Messrs. Wm. & Joseph Wilkins, merchants of Baltimore, in which they say, “The repeal of the orders in council having been agreed on by our government, we have availed ourselves of the opportunity of sending the greater part of your spring and fall orders,” &c. “ As we are not certain, that your government will protect British property, we have thought it right to ship all ours, under cover to Mr. Harris, who can claim as his own bond fide property, and he, being a citizen of the United States, thought proper to use every precaution, having received some unpleasant accounts about your government having agreed on war with this country, which we hope will not be the case.
2. McKean & Woodland, citizens of the United States, claim sundry parcels of goods, part of the same cargo, as their property. These goods were purchased by Baily, Eaton & Brown, merchants, of Sheffield, in pursuance of orders from the claimants. They were shipped to Robert Holladay, also an American citizen. The bill of lading was to Robert Holladay, “ on account and risk of an American citizen.” The invoice was also headed to Robert Holladay. A letter from Baily, Eaton & Brown, to Samuel McKean, dated 11th July 1812, says, “A few days ago, we received a letter from Mr. Rogerson, of New York, informing us that the partnership of Messrs. McKean & Woodland was dissolved, but he does not say, whether you or Mr. Woodland continue the business, or whether both of you decline it.
We have purchased about 3000Z. sterling of goods, by order of *the
J late firm, and on their account, most of which have been purchased and paid for by us, from fifteen to eighteen months ago, and have been on our hands, waiting for shipment. We have this day given orders to our shipper at Liverpool, to put them on board a good American vessel, sailing for ye ur port, with a British license ; but from the uncertainty we are m respecting the particulars of your dissolution of partnership, and, in fact, not knowing ■whether to consign them to you or Mr. Woodland, we have finally concluded to consign them to Mr. Holladay, with whom you will be pleased to make the necessary arrangements respecting them.” “We have addressed the invoice to Mr. Holladay to your care ; and directly on receiving it, if he should not be in Baltimore, you, will please advise him of its
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arrival.” The residue of the letter contains their reasons for hoping that Mr. McKean will not insist on the usual credit, but will remit immediately on receiving the goods. This request is founded on their having been so long in advance for the purchase of them. Messrs. Baily, Eaton & Brown addressed a letter to Mr. Holladay, dated the 10th of July 1812, in which they say, “ Inclosed you will receive invoices of sundry goods for Messrs. McKean & Woodland, which complete their orders.” They then assign the same reason for shipping the goods to Mr. Holladay, that is given in their letter to Mr. McKean ; and after directing him to arrange with Mr. McKean, add, “We cannot view this consignment at all in the light of an intercepted shipment, coming within the meaning of the articles of agreement between you and us.” This letter also contained a proposition for immediate remittance, founded on the time which had elapsed since the goods were purchased. This proposition, they say, is made to all their friends in the United States, and they hope none will refuse to accede to it. “ But,” they add, “in thus acting, we have left the matter to the free and unbiassed will of our friends, and they are certainly upon honor.”
3. Messrs. Kimmel & Albert, merchants, of Baltimore, claimed seven packages of goods on board the Merrimack,* which were purchased, ^391 in pursuance of their orders, by Baily, Eaton & Baily. The invoice, 1 bill of lading and letters, addressed (one by the consignors and the other by the shipper, who was their agent) to Messrs. Kimmel & Albert, concur in showing property in the claimants. But all these documents and letters are inclosed in a letter of the Sth of August 1812, written by Baily, Eaton & Baily to Samuel McKean. In this letter^ the writers refer to a former letter of the 3d of July, in which they informed Mr. McKean that they should, on the recommendation of their general agent, Mr. Holladay, inclose their invoices and bills of lading for the adjacent country to him, and requested .him to make inquiries into the circumstances of their correspondents, and be regulated, as to putting the letters, &c., into the post-office, so as to reach the persons to whom they might be addressed, by the result of those inquiries. Messrs. Baily, Eaton & Baily indulge the hope that the repeal of the British orders in council will restore peace between the two countries, in which event, McKean is still to be governed by their letter of the 3d of July. “ But,” they add, “ if, when you receive oui' invoices and bills of lading, a state of war should really continue, it will be proper not to deliver these goods, until you have received the amount of the invoices from the consignees, in cash.”
4. John H. Browning & Co. were also claimants of part of the cargo. This claim stood on precisely the same principles with that of Kimmel & Albert. The documents given in evidence, were, in effect, the same, and were inclosed in the same letter from Baily, Eaton & Baily to Samuel McKean.
It was contended by the captors, in the district court, that, from the papers and letters on board, it appeared, that the goods were not sold and delivered in England, so as to vest the property in the claimants, but were sent to the agents of the shippers in the United States, to be delivered or not, according to their discretion : consequently, that the property was not changed, and the goods, therefore, were liable to capture as British property.
The Merrimack.
*Restitution was decreed in the district court, and the decree was affirmed in the circuit court. An appeal was taken to this court, where the captors prayed condemnation, on the same grounds as in the courts below.
Harper, for the appellants, after stating the facts of the case, argued, that the claims of the captors to the several parts of the cargo in question all rested on the same principle, viz : That no transfer of the property had taken place at the time of the capture. The shippers were British subjects.
1st. As to the property claimed by William & Joseph Wilkins. It appears from the evidence introduced into this part of the cause, that the goods were not to be delivered to the claimants, until they had come first to the hands of the shippers’ agent, who was to decide upon the solvency of W. & J. Wilkins, and to regulate himself accordingly, with regard to the delivery of the goods. He even had a power, under certain circumstances, to make them his own. W. & J. Wilkins were also to have an option, either to take the goods or not. But a more powerful argument than either is, that the shippers themselves, in their letters both to the consignee and the claimants, denominate these goods British property, and express their apprehensions that the American government will not protect it. Again, if these goods had been lost at sea; they could not have been charged to the Messrs. Wilkins, as goods sold and delivered ; the loss would clearly have been the loss of the shippers. The property in this part of the cargo cannot, therefore, be considered as having been vested in W. & J. Wilkins. It was clearly in the British shippers, both at the time of shipment, and at the time of capture. The claim of the Messrs. Wilkins ought, therefore, to be rejected.
2d. As to the claim of McKean & Woodland, Harper stated the facts, and prayed condemnation on the general principle that the property had not been transferred. *3231 3d an^ opposing the respective claims of Kimmel *&
Albert, and of John H. Browning & Co., the counsel for the captors argued on nearly the same grounds as in the case of W. & J. Wilkins ; and in addition thereto, he urged the condition of payment which was annexed to these two cases, and which was to be performed before the delivery of the goods to the claimants.
He also made a second point, in regard to all the claims, viz : That, admitting the goods to have been the property of American citizens, yet, since the declaration of war was known in Liverpool, at the time of the shipment, the claimants are to be considered as having been engaged in a hostile trade, which gives the property an enemy character, and subjects it to condemnation. The shippers, on this supposition, must be looked upon as the agents of the claimants, and the acts of agents, are, in law, the acts of their principals.
Pinkney, contra, for the claimants.—If the title of the claimants be good in equity, it is sufficient; but it is good at law, as well as in equity. In examining the several claims, I shall follow the order which has been pursued by the counsel for the captors.
First, as to the claim of W. & J. Wilkins. The invoice and bill of parcels show the purchase by the claimants. The bill of parcels is always good
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evidence, in an action on a policy, to show interest. The invoice corresponds with the bill of parcels and is not contradicted by the bill of lading. Leich’s letter to Harris speaks of the goods as being “for Messrs. W. & J. Wilkins.” These circumstances are strongly in our favor. It has been urged, however, on the other side, that the property of the goods could not have been in the claimants, at the time of capture, because, 1st. There was a condition of payment, without complying with which, the goods were not to be delivered; and 2d, because there was a power vested in Harris, to keep back the property, in case of the insolvency of the Wilkins’s. The first objection is founded on an error in fact. The objection, if applicable to the claimants of the other parts *of the cargo, is not so here. It appears, r*™. indeed, in some part of the evidence, that an inducement to prompt L payment was held out to the Wilkins’s, viz., an offer to allow seven per cent, discount for prompt payment; but there was no express condition of payment. The second objection, viz., that Harris was empowered to keep back, the goods, in case of the insolvency of the claimants, is easily answered. Insolvency of the parties was the sole ground on which Harris could retain the goods ; but this is only the same power which the shipper himself would! have had, by the general law in maritime cases, if he had consigned the goods directly to the Wilkins’s. It is the general law, in case of the insolvency of the consignee, that the shipper may stop the goods in transitu in itinere, although purchased in England, if the purchase was on credit. The intervention of Harris, in this case, merely gives a facility to the right which the shippers before possessed. The Josephine, 4 Rob. 21, 25.
It is also urged, that the shippers themselves, in their letters, have denominated the goods in question, British property, and expressed an apprehen!- sion that it would not be protected by the American government, and have therefore suggested to Harris, that he could swear they were his. This objection possesses little weight. A mere attempt to conceal belligerent property only deprives the party of the benefit of further proof, but is not a ground of confiscation. The Madonna delle Gracie (Gregory's case), 4 Robi-161, 195.
2d. As to the claim of McKean & Woodland. Two objections to this^ claim, arising from the letter of Baily, Eaton & Brown to McKean, have been urged by the captors. 1 st. The consignment to Holladay. 2d. The' expectation of the shippers that McKean & Woodland would pay cashi. The consignment to Holladay needs no farther explanation than is to be found in the letter which states the fact. The shippers, having heard that the partnership of McKean & Woodland was dissolved, were uncertain to which of them the consignment ought to be made, and *thei'efore, r*™« determined to consign the goods to Holladay. But the property L vested in McKean & Woodland, notwithstanding this intermediate consignment. In a court of prize, such intermediate consignment is not considered, as altering, in any degree, the nature of the case. 2d. Though the letter from the shippers requests an immediate cash payment, there is no express condition to that effect: there is merely an appeal to the justice and honor of the claimants. An additional proof that the property was in the claim*- ants, is, that it was insured for them and not for the shippers. It appears that all the bills of lading, except that for W. & J. Wilkins, express the shipments to have been made on account and risk of American citizens gen
The Merrimack.
erally. The reason for this general mode of expression was the uncertainty of the shippers respecting the dissolution of the partnership, z
3d and 4th. We now come to the claims of Kimmel & Albert, and Browning & Co., which depending on precisely the same principle, will be examined together. In these two cases only, is there an absolute condition of payment. But the goods had been regularly ordered by the claimants, long before they were shipped. They were finally shipped for them, and in pursuance of their orders. They were delivered to the master of a general ship. The invoice, bill of lading and letters, all concur in showing property in the claimants. The legal property vested in them, by the delivery of the goods to the master. The shipper, having delivered them to the master, was functus officio, and could not thereafter stop the goods, on any ground but the insolvency of the consignee, which is the only case of stoppage in transitu authorized by the common law or the law maritime. The Aurora, 4 Rob. 181, 219 (Conversation between Sir W. Scott and Dr. Lawrence); The Constantia, 6 Rob. 325-27.
Again, can a captor divest the eventual rights of citizens, or does he take the property subject to the conditions to which it would be subject in the hands of the consignor or his agent ? We contend for the latter doctrine. ■*3281 *^ ie rights of the citizen become absolute, upon his complying with
J those conditions. In the present case, if the goods had arrived at -their port of destination, without capture, the title to them would have ^become absolute in Kimmel & Albert, upon payment to the consignor of the ¿amount required: and, as the captor, according to our doctrine, does but :stand in the place of the consignor, we contend, that the property will ¡become equally absolute in the claimants, upon making the same payment .to him.
We do not admit the doctrine, that property cannot, upon the high seas, ¡pass, in transitu, so as to defeat the captors. Suppose, it had been agreed that the property should change, after it had passed a certain degree of longitude would not the agreement be carried into effect, upon that degree of longitude being past ? But it is not now necessary to contend for this doctrine, because the property in the present case, was vested in the claimants, upon the shipment, liable, however, to be divested upon a condition. There is manifest inconsistency in the English prize law. A belligerent lien will be condemned, but a neutral lien will not be protected: neutral property may become belligerent in transitu, but belligerent property cannot become neutral. This court will adopt the reason of the rule, but not the rule itself.
Harper, in reply.—In this case, there was no transfer of either an equitable or legal right. In the case of W. & J. Wilkins, the delivery of the goods was only to Harris ; or to the master of the ship, who, by undertaking to deliver them to Harris, became his agent, and not the agent of the Wilkins’s. So, with regard to the invoice, bill of lading and bill of parcels ; they were all delivered, not to the Wilkins’s, but to Harris or his agent, the master. No evidence of the title of W. & J. Wilkins was put in a course to reach them, but through the agency of Harris, who was not to deliver it at all, but in a certain event. The goods, although purchased by order of the claimants, were not delivered to them. The claimants could not have maintained an action for them, either at law or in equity.
The Merrimack.
*McKean & Woodland’s case is still stronger against them. The business of that concern was not continued by any person. They have become insolvent. Holladay has the absolute control over the goods. He was to make arrangements with the claimants, or with McKean alone, and was to require cash.
Saturday, March 12th, 1814. (Absent, Livingston, J.) Marshall, Ch. J., after stating the facts relating to the several claims in this case, delivered the following opinion of the court, as to the claims of McKean & Woodland, Kimmel & Albert, and John H. Browning & Co.
1. As to the claim of McKean & Woodland. The question of property, in this case, depends on certain letters written by Baily, Eaton & Brown, which were found on board the captured vessel. A letter of the 11th of July 1812, addressed to Samuel McKean, shows in the clearest manner, that the property in dispute was purchased and shipped for McKean & Woodland, in pursuance of their orders; and accounts for assigning it to Mr. Holladay;
There is nothing in the cause which can throw the slightest suspicion on the fairness of this transaction. It, unquestionably, is, what, on the face of these letters, it purports to be, a purchase for McKean & NVoodland, made in pursuance of their orders, and shipped for them to Robert Holladay, because, in the moment of shipment, information was received that their partnership was dissolved, and the shipper had no instructions in what manner to direct to them. In this situation, he considered himself as acting most certainly for their advantage, by addressing the goods to an agent residing in the same town with McKean & Woodland, who should receive them to their use. In such a case, the court is of opinion, that the property was vested in McKean & Woodland, and is, consequently, not liable to condemnation as enemy property. The sentence is affirmed.
*2. As to the claim of Kimmel & Albert. From their letter, it is r*Q 2Q apparent, that, in the event of war, Baily, Eaton & Baily reserved to L themselves that power which ownership gives over goods, and instructed their agent, McKean, in what manner that power was to be exercised. There being no letter addressed to Kimmel & Albert, but under cover to McKean, it is apparent, that they were to know nothing of the shipment, unless, in the opinion of McKean, it should be prudent to make the communication ; and even then, the property was to became theirs, not under the original contract, but under a new contract to be made with McKean. The delivery on board the ship, was a delivery to McKean, not absolutely for Kimmel & Albert, but for them, provided they acceded to new and distinct propositions made by Baily, Eaton & Baily. In such a case, no change of property could take place until Kimmel & Albert should accede to these new propositions ; and the capture having taken place before the contract was complete, the goods must be considered as enemy property. The sentence is reversed, and the claim dismissed.
3. The claim of John H. Browning & Co. This claim stands on precisely the same principles with that of Kimmel & Albert. The documentary evidence is in effect the same, and was inclosed in the same letter from Baily, Eaton & Baily to Samuel McKean. The claim, therefore, must be dis missed. The sentence is reversed, and the claim dismissed.
The Merrimack.
Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the majority of the court, as to the claim of W. & J. Wilkins, as follows :—The points of distinction between this case and that of McKean & Woodland, unfavorable to these claimants, are the following: 1. That Harris, the direct consignee, had a control given over the goods» which authorized him, had *he thought proper, to
-* refuse to deliver them over to the Wilkins’s. 2. That Harris had also a power, under certain circumstances, to make them his own. 3. That, in the letters both to the Wilkins’s and Harris, the consignor alleges as his reason for making the shipment through Harris, his fears that this government would not protect British property ; thereby, as is contended, acknowledging this property to be British. On the other hand, it is a circumstance favorable to this claim, that the original bills of parcels were made directly to the claimants, and were sent along with the shipment, as a substitute for an invoice.
It is assumed as a postulate, that a direct consignment on account of the consignee, made in pursuance of his orders, is not subject to condemnation as prize of war ; and that it is immaterial, whether it be purchased for cash or credit ; or insured in the enemy’s country or elsewhere. It will, then, be enough to show, that every beneficial interest which such a shipment would vest in the consignee, was vested in the claimants in this case.
The first difficulty arises from the circumstance that the bill of lading was made out to Harris, and not to the Wilkins’s, whereby the master of the ship became bound to deliver them to Harris, or his assigns. Upon a fair view of the whole transaction, this distinction will be found rather to be formal than real; and that it produces no difference in the state of right between these parties. The interest vested in the consignee, by the delivery to the master, is not absolute to all purposes. So far as relates to the right of stoppage in transitu, it continues subject to the control of the consignor, and may be reduced by him into possession, before actual deliv*3301 ery ’ or t^ie authority °T magter to deliver them *according to
J the original bills of lading, may be countermanded, and another destination given them.
Upon comparing all the circumstances of this case, it will be found, that the transaction was so arranged as to produce no other change in the rights of the parties, than to put it in Harris’s power to exercise this right of stoppage in transitu, in case of the insolvency of the Wilkins’s, The bill of lading is made out to Harris, which gave him the right to demand the goods of the master. But the invoice, which has the additional strength of a bill of parcels, is made out to the claimants, which gave them the right to demand the goods of Harris. Both in the letter to Harris and to the Wilkins’s, the shipment is declared to be on account of the latter; and in the letter to the former, the shipper goes into a detail of his reasons for giving the claimants so large a credit. Thus, these papers, taken together, place the interest of these claimants on the same footing as if a bill of lading had been made out to Harris, for the use of the Wilkins’s; and in that case, there could have been little doubt that the claim must be sustained.
' If the invoice, although made out to the claimants, had been inclosed to the direct consignee, it would have furnished a strong argument in favor of the captor. But here, the evidence of right is placed in the claimants’ own hands ; thereby acknowledging their right in the goods shipped, and furnish
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ing them with the means of asserting it. Thus, the shipper could never have denied the rights of the claimants in this case ; for he had furnished the most direct and conclusive evidence against himself.
But it is asserted, that Harris had it in his power to make these goods his own, in defiance of the will of the claimants. If this were the fact, it would only show that, in *either view of the alternative, it was a shipment on American account, and that the shipper had parted with *■ all his interest. But the fact is not so : and in answering this argument, we answer the remaining one also. The shipper knew what he was about. War was already probably declared, and he was aware of the crash of mercantile credit which generally follows on such an event. He also knew, that in case of asserting his right of stoppage in transitu, the property reverted and became British ; in which case, as he expresses himself, the property might be subjected to seizure, as enemy’s property. With these considerations on his mind, he makes out the bill of lading to Harris, and informs him that his object is to enable him to keep the goods back, in case of an alteration in the circumstances of the claimants : and in this case only, is the hint given him that he may claim them as his own.
It is contended, that he acknowledges, in his letter to the claimants, that the property is British. But this is an error in fact. It was necessary to assign some reason, or some excuse* for not having the bills of lading made out to the claimants themselves. And for this reason, he urges an apprehension that our government would not protect British property. But this reason could only be applicable in the event of a stoppage in transitu; as a direct shipment to the claimants would have left no room for such an apprehension. In the letter also to Harris, it is said, is contained an acknowledgment that the property is British. This, also, is founded in mistake ; for the letter to Harris only communicates the reason which had been assigned in the other letter for having the bill of lading made out as it was. But suppose, the passage in the letter to the claimants, on this subject, had been full and explicit to the declaration of an opinion that the property continued British, although shipped on American account ; yet this would have been but an expression of an erroneous opinion, and certainly ought not, so far as the interests of the claimants are concerned, to have an influence on the decision of this court.
But it is asserted, that the goods continued, on the whole voyage, at the risk of *the shippers. This may be true, and yet it does not prove r*oo9 enough. Had the shipment been direct to the claimants, and insurance omitted, contrary to order or custom, the shippers would have been equally liable, and yet the property would not have been subject to capture. It is enough for the purposes of the claimants, that the property in the goods had been transferred to them, independently of the control of the shipper or his agent, except so far as the right to stop in transitu interfered. And such was the situation of the rights of the parties in this case. The goods ordered by the claimants were shipped to an agent, for their use, subject only to a right which unqestionably, under any circumstances, existed in the shippers. In their letter to the claimants, they inclose a bill of parcels, by way of invoice, containing a positive acknowledgement of the sale to them ; and the letter itself, as well as that to Harris, speaks of the goods expressly as their goods. The immediate consignee could, therefore, only
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be considered as the bailee of the claimants. Nor does it appear, that a tender of the money would have been necessary to entitle them to receive the goods of Harris, as, in the letter to Harris, it is acknowledged to be a sale on credit, and particular discounts offered as an inducement for an early payment. Indeed, there are words in the letter to the direct consignee, which amount to a positive declaration that the shipments were not on his account, nor on that of the shippers, but for the use and benefit of others. “ I shall send you, and our friends, through your hands, all the goods prepared for your market.” By connecting these words with the bills of lading, the result is, that, although the direct consignee was entitled to demand the goods of the master, yet it was not to his own use, but to the use of the several persons on whose account they were shipped.
Decree affirmed.
Stoby, J., delivered the following separate opinion, as to the claim of W. & J. Wilkins—I cannot concur in the opinion of the court, just delivered, as to the claim of the Messrs. Wilkins. It is true, that the goods were purchased pursuant to the orders of Messrs. Wilkins ; but I do not think * , that the *property, by the mere purchase, became vested in them ;
J and the usage and course of trade is generally otherwise. The purchase was made with the money of the shipper : and until a delivery, actual or constructive, to the Messrs. Wilkins, the propriety thereof, remained completely in the shipper. The goods were also shipped as the property of the shipper, consigned to the agent of the shipper, and not to the agent of the Messrs. Wilkins, to be delivered only in case of the consignee’s being satisfied of their perfect solvency. It is true, that the bill of lading purports that the goods are shipped on account and risk of the consignee ; but the confidential letters explain the transaction, and show that the shipment was so made, as a cover against belligerent risks ; and that the property was not intended to be changed from the British shipper, in its transit. The delivery, then, of the goods on board of a general ship, was no delivery to the Messrs. Wilkins : it was not even a delivery which vested the property of the goods in the consignee. The legal property and possession thereof still remained in the shippers ; and if the goods had actually come to the hands of Mr. Harris, his possession would have been but a continuation of the possession of the shipper. In contemplation of law, the goods were as much under the control and possession of the shipper, as if he had been on board the vessel, during the voyage, or had shipped them in his own name. If they had been lost, during the voyage, the loss would have been his. He had not a mere right of stoppage in transitu in case of insolvency, for that can be exercised only where the property by the shipment is vested in the consignee for his own use ; but he had a perfect right of countermand in all cases whatever. He might sell the property, give it a new direction, control its delivery, and, indeed, exercise all the rights of full dominion and propriety. It seems to me, that if the Messrs. Wilkins had neither a jus ad rem, nor a jus in re, and the latter only is recognised in prize courts, they could not, by subsequent acts, overreach the legal rights of the captors. At the time of the shipment and capture, it was, in my view, enemy property, liable to condemnation, having no neutral or American onus attached to it. It was subject to the legal claims of the creditors of the shipper ; and noth-
The Frances.
ing existed in the Messrs. Wilkins but a mere spes occupandi, or, as the common law phrases it, a mere possibility, which attached *neither to [-* the substance nor the form of the thing.
Upon what ground, then, if I am right as to the ovznership of the goods, I can the claim be maintained ? The right of capture acts upon the proprietary interest of the thing captured, at the time of capture. It is not affected by the secret liens, or private engagments of the parties. It repudiates even the strong claim of a bottomry-bond, because it is not ajus in re. Can, then, a mere possibility be of more consideration in a court of prize ? The absence of all authority to this effect, and the strong and emphatic language of all the cases as to secret liens, speak as powerfully as the most direct and pointed decisions against it.
There is a case cited by the court in The Aurora, 4 Rob. 218, where property was shipped, by a merchant in Holland, to A., a person in America, by order of B., and per account of B., but with directions to A. not to deliver it, unless satisfaction should be given for the payment; and it was held as good prize, on the ground, that the property still remained in the enemy shipper. This case I think strongly in point; and the manner in which Lawrence attempted to distinguish it from the case then on trial, shows a full concurrence in its correctness. The reasoning of the court in The Aurora itself, and in The Marianna, 6 Rob. 22, are also illustrative of the general doctrine.
On the whole, I consider that, by the doctrine of the common and the prize law, these goods were, at the time of capture, enemy property ; and that the claim of the Messrs. Wilkins, ought to be rejected ; and in this opinion, I have the concurrence of two of my brethren, (a)
Monday, March 14th. Harper suggested diminution of the record in the case of W. & J. Wilkins, and prayed the court to grant a writ of certiorari to the court below; but the court refused, the case having been argued and decided.
*
The Fbances, Boyee, master: Thompson et al., claimants. [*335 Prize.—Domicil. A naturalized citizen, who, in time of peace, returns to his native country, for the purpose of trade, but with the intention of returning again to his adopted country, continuing in the former a year after the knowledge of the existence of war between the two countries, for the purpose of winding up a complicated business, and engaging in no new commercial transactions whatever with the enemy, and actually returning to his adopted country in a little more than a year after his first knowledge of the war, is to be considered .as having gained a domicil in his native country; and his goods, captured after the war, liable to condemnation.*1 Goods appearing by the ship’s papers to be a consignment from alien enemies to American merchants, condemned in toto as prize, although further proof was offered that American merchants were jointly interested, and that they had a lien upon the goods, in consequence of advances made by them. Further proof on these points refused. This was an appeal from the sentence of the United States’ Circuit Court for the district of Rhode Island. The facts were as follows : (a) Judges Washington and Todd.
The Frances.
War was declared by the United States against Great Britain, on the 18th of June 1812. The ship Frances, having on board a cargo of goods of British manufacture, consigned to various persons in the United States, sailed from Greenock, in Scotland, on the 19th of July, in the same year, for New York. On the 28th day of August following, she was captured by the Yankee privateer, and carried into the district of Rhode Island, where the cargo was libelled as enemy property.
Robert and James Thompson and William Steele, naturalized citizens of the United States, claimed a considerable part of this cargo as their own property ; and also claimed 130 packages, another part of the same cargo, as being owned by them jointly with British subjects, or as having a lien upon the property, in consequences of advances made upon the consignment. These goods were all consigned by James Thompson, a naturalized citizen of the United States, residing in Scotland, to William Steele, a citizen of the United States, carrying on the business of the concern in New York.
All the goods claimed, except the 130 packages, were incontestibly the property of the claimants ; and on the trial, restoration of two-thirds was decreed to Robert Thompson and William Steele, residents in the United States ; in which decree, the captors acquiesced. The remaining third, which belonged to James Thompson, who resided in Scotland, was condemned : and from this sentence, he appealed to this court. *3361 *The 130 packages were also condemned as enemy property ; and
J from this sentence, the claimants appealed to this court; but having received more full information than they originally possessed respecting the ownership of these goods, they abandoned their claim as to this property, except as to 66 boxes, of which they still claimed to hold a moiety ; the other moiety being acknowledged to be the property of Messrs. Dalgleish & Frame, British subjects.
A claim to all the above mentioned goods was also interposed by the United States, for a violation of the non-intercourse laws : which claim was rejected in the circuit court, and an appeal taken to the supreme court.
James Thompson, as appeared from the evidence, was a native of Scotland, and came to the United States in the year 1793, where he resided, carrying on trade and commerce, until the year 1801. In 1797, he was naturalized. In the year 1801, he went to France, on the commercial business of his house, and some time afterwards, passed over to England, where he was employed in making purchases for and shipments to his house. In the year 1803, he settled in Glasgow, where he continued doing that part of the business of the partnership which was to be transacted in Great Britain, until the declaration of war. After the knowledge of that event, he transacted no commercial business whatever, and was exclusively employed in arranging his affairs, in such manner as would enable him to return to the United States. This being accomplished, he, in August 1813, engaged a passage on board the cartel ship, the Robert Burns, about to sail from Liverpool to New York, but was stopped by the orders of government. He then passed over to Ireland, and privately embarked for the United States, where he arrived in November last. Several affidavits were taken to show that he always considered the United States as his permanent place of residence, and that he uniformly expressed his determination to return. His letters manifested the same intention. It also appeared, that his business was com-
The Frances.
plicated, and required his attention, after he ceased to engage in new adventures ; but it did not appear, that he had performed any act which could be considered as *commencing to return, until August 1813, when he r*qo>, engaged a passage on board the Robert Burns. *-
As to the 66 boxes of merchandize, the moiety of which was still claimed by Robert and James Thompson and William Steele, they prayed, on bringing up the cause to this court, to be allowed to make further proof of their property in the said goods ; and offered, as further proof, the affidavit of James Thompson, that they were the joint property of the house of Dalgleish & Frame and of Messrs. Thompsons and Steele, under a contract made by two letters which were exhibited, and which he said were original. In addition to this, James Thompson swore that he gave his bill for the moiety of these goods, which bill he had paid, and that he was prevented from notifying this contract to his partners, in his letter to them, by the hurry produced by the shipment. The claimants offered also, the affidavit of William Steele, stating that, some time after the papers of the ship Frances were opened, he received the invoice and letters annexed to his affidavit, in an envelope with some other papers. That the letters were in the handwriting of John Frame and James Thompson. That, before he received them, he was convinced, from the marks, that the goods in the invoice were, in some respects, the joint property of his house and of Dalgleish & Frame ; which fact he stated to the agents of the captors, as well as the judge of the circuit court, at the trial, in June 1813 ; and that James Thompson was in the habit of taking goods on joint account, from houses in Scotland, and sending them to the house in America, without specifying whether they were on joint account or on commission.
The letters referred to, were, one from Dalgleish & Frame, dated Glasgow, 27th June 1812, and addressed to Mr. James Thompson, Glasgow, in which they say, the goods were printed in consequence of his orders ; and express a hope that he will take the whole contained in the invoice ; or, if not, that he will allow them to go to his house on joint account. The other was a letter addressed to Messrs. Dalgleish & Frame, signed James Thompson, and dated Glasgow, 1st July 1812, in which he acknowledges the receipt of their letter of the 27th of June 1812, and says, that as there are a *great many more goods in the invoice than he had ordered, and as r*ooo he did not wish to take so large a quantity, he would send them on L joint account.
The invoice, or rather bill of parcels, was dated Glasgow, 27th of June 1812, and was headed “Messrs. R. & J. Thompson and W. Steele bought of Dalgleish & Frame.” The affidavit of John Frame, taken in Glasgow, was also exhibited, in which he swears that the goods are the joint property of Messrs. R. & J. Thompson and Wm. Steele and of Dalgleish & Frame. Such was the further proof offered.
In the Frances, were two letters from James Thompson to Wm. Steele. The first was dated Glasgow, July 13th, 1812, in which he says “I annex a list of goods consigned by the Frances. These consignments are the safest and surest trade for us, and it was from this conviction, that I allowed of so many consignments.” In the annexed list of consignments, referred to in the foregoing letter, were the goods shipped by Messrs. Dalgleish & Frame. In this letter, he writes on the business of the house, speaks of the consign-
The Frances.
merits generally, recommend that the goods should be promptly sold at the market price, and accounts of sales returned ; but makes no allusion to any interest in the goods of Dalgleish & Frame.
Irving, for appellants, after stating the facts of the case, and the claim of Robert & James Thompson and William Steele, contended, that British property shipped on board an American vessel, before a knowledge of the war, was not liable to capture, either under the laws of the United States or the president’s instructions to the commanders of privateers. That the commissions issued by the president to the private armed vessels of the United States, only authorized them to seize, 1st. British vessels and the property found on board : 2d. All property liable to capture by the laws of war ; and that the property, in the present case, did not come under either of these *ooqi descriptions. *Acts of Congress of June 18th, and June 26th, 1812
J (2 U. S. Stat. 755, 759). See also, the instructions of the President to the private armed vessels of the United States.
Enemies’ property in possession of the nation declaring war, at the time of the declaration, is not liable to seizure as prize of war : it can only be sequestered by municipal regulation. The court having jurisdiction in cases of this kind, sits as a municipal, not as a prize court. The Rebeckah, 1 Rob. 238 ; The Boedes Bust, 5 Ibid. 207 ; 2 Azuni 224.
The property, in the present case, is to be considered as committed to the public faith. The circumstances under which it was shipped, and afterwards sailed, were very peculiar. The non-intercourse act and the several acts supplementary thereto, the revocation of the French decrees, thQ president’s proclamation of 2d November 1810, the letter of the American secretary of state (Mr. Monroe) to Mr. Foster, the British minister, under date of July 26th, 1811, the revocation of the British orders in council, and the assurances of Mr. Russell, the American charge d'affaires in Great Britain, presented a state of things on which the British merchants, and the American merchants in Great Britain, confidently relied for the security of their property shipped, under these circumstances, to the United States.
This doctrine, that the property of an enemy, found in the country at the breaking out of a war, is under the safeguard of the public faith, is a principle of the common law. In England, property in this situation would not be condemned. Enemy goods which came down the Baltic, and were landed in England, before a knowledge of the war, have been there held to be safe. Magna charta itself recognises the principle. By the rule of reciprocity, therefore, protection ought to be extended by the American government to the property now in dispute.
It is said, that we have not a standing in court, that James Thompson is an alien enemy, and that an alien enemy cannot support a claim of this kind. *3401 we *sa?’ ^at, admitting James Thompson to be an alien enemy,
■* his agent in this country may have a standing in court, if the property in question be divested of its hostile character, "which we contend is the case here. Nostra Madonna delle Gracie, 4 Rob. 161; 6 Ibid. 1 ; Ibid. 21; The Marianne, Ibid. 24 ; The Packet de Bilboa, 2 Ibid. 135.
But if these goods be hostile property, and the claimants, on that account, have no right to them, still, we contend, the captors cannot support their claim : The property of the goods, if not in the claimants, is in the United
The Frances.
States, and liable to seizure under the non-intercourse act of March 1st, 1809 ; which act is neither repealed by nor merged in the act declaring war, nor any other act. (2 U. S. Stat. 528, §§ 5, 8, 18.) The 3d section of the prize act (Ibid. 759), requires that all the laws of the United States then in force, be observed by the owners, officers and crews of privateers. The non-intercourse act was one of the laws of the United States then in force. The second act of instructions to the privateers of the United States (issued 6th August 1812), interdicts the capture of American vessels having on board British goods : they are to be seized by the collectors of the respective ports. The United States have always asserted their prior right to such property. (See the circular letter from the controller of the treasury, of October 16th,. 1812.) They have chosen to municipalize it—to reserve it to themselves. Congress has resisted every attempt to the repeal the non-intercourse. The act of July 13th, 1813 (3 U. S. Stat. 4), shows that the United States have not relinquished their claim to property situated like that now in dispute. Their relinquishment only goes to such property as should be condemned as. prize of war.
As to the first instructions of the president, they only authorize the private armed vessels of the United States to capture enemy property on board neutral or hostile vessels, and not that found on board American vessels returning to the United States, flying before the storm of war, and seeking the protection of their country. See the circular letter of Mr. Secretary Gallatin, of 26th August 1812. The second set of instructions, before referred to, prohibit the capture of American vessels returning to the United States with British property shipped *after the repeal of r*o 4T the orders in council, and before the declaration of war was known *• in England. These instructions were operative as soon as issued, and were the law for all the privateers of the United States. They made a cessation of hostilities as to the property above described ; which if thereafter captured by a privateer, would be restored to the owners. The captors w’ould only be relieved from the payment of damages and costs. 2 Azuni, 229r 230, 355, 263 ; The Speedwell, 2 Dall. 40 ; The Mentor, 1 Rob. 154.
We would now, on behalf of the claimants, move the court to allow us further proof as to the ownership of the property. We wish to show that the goods are not, in truth, consigned property, but that one moiety belongs to the claimants. We wish to explain the papers which the captors have considered as proving the property in question to be hostile. That we have a right to make this explanation, we refer the court to the following cases. 6 Rob. 3 ; BelVs Case, Ibid. 1’32 ; Madonna delle Gracie, 4 Ibid. 161 ; The Josephine, Ibid 21 ; The Sarah, 3 Ibid. 268. That further proof may be allowed in an appellate court, see 1 Rob. (Am. ed.) p. 7, Sir W. Scott and Sir J. Nicholl’s statement of the general principles of proceedings in the admiralty.
Dexter, contra, said, that the motion, on behalf of the claimants, for further proof, was entirely unexpected ; that there was nothing for them to found such a prayer upon ; that the claim to the 130 packages was ambiguous, the ground upon which it was made being alternative, viz., either that the goods were shipped on joint account, or that the claimants have an equitable lien on them, on account of advances made on the consignment.
The Frances.
That these 130 packages were wholly British property, is clear from the papers exhibited : they were consigned by British merchants to the claimants, with orders to sell, and remit the proceeds.
The decision as to the residue of the property in dispute, viz., the third claimed by James Thompson, depends upon his national character. That this is hostile is evident *from the decision in the case of The Venus
J (ante, p. 253), to which decision, and the argument on behalf of the in captors that case, we beg leave to refer the court.
To return, then, to the 130 packages. It being clear that they were British property, the only question is, whether such property is liable to condemnation, as prize of war. The case, as stated and argued upon by the captors, is not justified by the facts ; the real state of the case is materially different. The Frances was captured, not in port, but on the high seas. She did not enter the port, upon the faith of the nation, but was brought in as prize. The counsel for the claimants, admitting the goods now in dispute, to be British property, has said, that American property similarly situated would not be condemned in England ; and that, therefore, by the rule of reciprocity, protection ought to be extended by the American government to these goods. But even the rule of reciprocity, if it were one which -this court could enforce, would not avail the claimants in the present case ; for the British government do not themselves respect the rule : they have captured and condemned our vessels sailing towards England, though ignorant of the war.
The declaration of war is expressed in terms as general as possible. The instructions of the president to the privateers of the United States give them a general authority to capture all property liable to capture by the Haws of war. The public faith was not pledged so as to protect this vessel. If it was pledged to repeal the non-intercourse law, there was no pledge that war should not be declared ; and we claim condemnation under the declaration of war.
As to the president’s instructions of 26th August, it appears, that they were issued only two days previous to the capture of the Frances. The captors, consequently, had no notice of their existence. They sailed with instructions authorizing this capture : and we contend, *that the new
J instructions were no instructions to these captors, until they had received notice of their being in force.
It has been said, on the part of the appellants, that if their claim is rejected, the United States, and not the captors, will be entitled to the property. We reply, that the United States have now abandoned their claims ; so that the property, if condemned, must be condemned to the captors.
Harper, for appellants.—The reasons on which we ground our prayer for further proof, are the following : 1st. Certain bales of carpeting appear, by the invoice and bill of lading, to be the property of Steele. In the letter of 13th July 1812, from James Thompson to Steele, they are stated to be a consignment. The further proof which we would offer, in regard to this apparent inconsistency, goes to show that upon these goods, although stated to be consigned to Steele, James Thompson & Co. had made advances to the owners, to the amount of 1000?. sterling, which created a lien upon the goods. This lien, we contend, was the property of James Thompson & Co.
The Frances. g
Again, certain other goods appear, in like manner, by the bill of lading and invoice, to be the property of Steele ; but, by the letter, to be the property of Dalgleish & Frame and James Thompson. The further proof we offer here, is, that we were joint-owners with Dalgleish & Frame. It is a general rule of prize law, that further proof shall be allowed on an appeal, where the preparatory evidence was doubtful or ambiguous. The present case, we conceive, comes within this rule.
Dexter, contra, on this point of further proof, cited the two following cases, The Marianna, 6 Rob. 24 (Am. ed.), to show that an equitable lien is no ground of restitution in prize causes ; and The Tobago, 5 Ibid. 196, where it is decided, that a bottomry-bond, given in time of peace, gives *no such title to the obligee as will enable him to support at claim for *• restitution, after a declaration of war. He contended, that a captoj’ takefc cum onere, only when the onus is visible and direct.
Pinkney, on the same side.—Further proof, under the circumstances of this case ought not to be allowed. The goods were shipped, when war was expected. The intention of the shipper was to give a neutral character to the property. James Thompson knew the facts relative to the transaction, as well when he made the shipment, as now. He had reason to expect and did expect war: hence, the color given to the transaction. If the court allows further proof in a case like this, they will hereafter be inundated with fraud and perjury. It is a general rule of the prize courts, that further proof which goes to contradict the ship’s papers, shall not be admitted. If there had been really an American interest in this case, it was James Thompson’s duty, as well as interest, to let it appear upon the ship’s papers. The original claim of the appellants was stated in the alternative—either they had a lien on the goods for money advanced by them through James Thompson, or the goods were consigned to them on joint account.
The heading of the invoices was false, by their own admission. A letter appears among the papers in this cause, from Robert Sterling, jun., who had property on board, shipped in the name of William Steele : this letter was evidently written in contemplation of war. James Thompson’s letter of 13th July, contains a list of goods consigned, in contradistinction to the goods belonging to the firm. The goods in question are among the consignments. By James Thompson’s letter of 14th July, it appears, that he knew of the war. From a second letter of Robert Sterling, jun., dated 15th July, it is evident, that he also knew of the war. In contradiction to such documents, further proof ought not to be admitted.
Harper, in reply.—In the cases of the bottomry-bond and lien, cited by the counsel on the opposite side, the possession of the *property was in the captors. The lien was a lien without possession, it was only *- an incumbrance. But here, the thing was in the possession of him who had the lien: the property was vested, so far as the lien extended for the advances. Steele was Thompson’s agent, and might have retained the goods, until the advances were repaid.
Although war was feared, peace was confidently expected. There was no motive for giving a neutral character to the property : no fraud was
| The Frances.
intended. There was no intention to defeat the non-intercourse law. Besides, an intent, even if it existed, to defeat a municipal law, is no ground for refusing further proof.
The letters referred to by the counsel for the captors, went with the invoices ; and the accidental ambiguity which seems to exist in the papers was owing to the hurry occasioned by the endeavor to get the goods first to market, and to obtain the bounty on exportation.
Dexter.—In the cases cited, the property was not more in the belligerent captor, than it was in the present case : These goods never were in possession of the consignee ; they were captured in the hands of the shipper: they were not shipped as the property of James Thompson & Co., but as the property of the Scotch merchants.
Irving cited The Demon, 1 Rob. 86, on the point of further proof.
Monday, March 7th. Irving.—As to the national character of James Thompson. It appears, from the testimony in this case, that James Thompson is a native of Scotland, that he came to the United States in 1793, was naturalized in 1797, and in 1801, returned to Scotland, where he continued to reside as a merchant, until some time subsequent to the declaration of war.
Naturalization, under the laws of the United States, confers upon the subject of it all the rights and privileges of anative Citizen, excepting that of
*q4.ni becoming president of the United States. He has, therefore, the *same
J right to leave this country and go abroad, which a native citizen pos-
sesses. The law of England is the same in this respect. When is the hos-
tile character to be fixed upon him ? Not until a war breaks out between
the two countries, and he continues, notwithstanding, to reside and carry on
a hostile trade with the enemy country. Murray v. The Charming Detsy,
2 Cr. 120. A citizen, whether native or naturalized, surprised in a foreign
country, by a war, has a right to a reasonable time to withdraw his effects.
Madonna delle Gracie, 4 Rob. 161,195. In Mr. Johnson’s case {The Indian
Chief, 1 Rob. 17, 12), his engagements to his creditors were considered by
the court as a sufficient justification of his residence in Great Britain, and
his property was restored. On the point of reasonable time to withdraw,
see The Ocean, 5 Rob. 90; The Hoop, Ibid. 165, 196; The Dree Gebroeders,
4 Ibid. 191, 232 ; Vattel, lib. 3, ch. 4, § 63.
Expectation of peace justifies delay in an enemy country, or explains the quoanimo of the resident. The Diana, 5 Rob. 60. In Dell v. Gilson, 1 Bos. & Pul. 355, it is decided, that the goods of a British subject, purchased in an enemy’s country, after the commencement of hostilities, may, under certain circumstances, be sent to England. This decision, though now overruled in that country, in the case of Potts v. Dell, 8 T. R. 548, has not been overruled here. The liberty to withdraw property in case of ■war, is expressly recognised by various treaties, which fix the time for withdrawing. See, among others, the Treaty of 1794, between his Britannic majesty and the United States, art. 26. But these treaties do not create the principle. If, then, we allow time to an enemy to withdraw his effects, shall we not allow at least the same indulgence to our own citizens ?
,.^1 A cruizer cannot capture for violation of a municipal law. The
-* seizure for a violation of the non-intercourse *act is directed to be
The Frances.
by the collectors ; the action for the recovery of the penalties and forfeitures arising under the act is to be debt, and the proceedings generally are to be in conformity with the act of 2d March 1799, to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage. But where a statute gives a particular form of action, that form must be pursued. Act of Congress of March 1st, 1809, § 8, 18 (2 U. S. Stat. 530, 532) ; act of March 2d, 1799, § 67, 68, 69, 88, 91 (1 Ibid. 677) ; 4 Bac. Abr. 654, tit. Statute K.
Saturday, March 12th, 1814. (Absent, Livingston, J.) Marshall, Ch. J., after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows :—The rights of James Thompson depend entirely on his national commercial character ; which is decided by the opinion given in the case of The Venus (ante, p. 253). The sentence of condemnation pronounced in the circuit court, as to James Thompson’s claim, is affirmed.
The original evidence is very strong to prove that the shipment made-by Dalgleish & Frame was entirely a consignment. The whole letter of the 13th of July confirms this idea. It is scarcely credible, that the property of Dalgleish & Frame would have been placed on the list of consignments, without a note upon it, had it been shipped on joint account. The hurry of business will not excuse or account for this omission. The proposition of Dalgleish & Frame is stated to have been made on the 27th of June, and to have been accepted on the 1st of July. The letters of Thompson to Steele are written on the 13th and 17th of July, when this shipment is treated as being altogether a consignment. The hurry could not have been such as to account for a mis-statement of the fact. There is, too, something mysterious in the manner in which the papers, offered as additional proof, reached Mr. Steele. That they should not have been accompanied by a letter, nor bear any marks of coming from abroad, is singular. *Further proof * is not admitted, and the sentence is affirmed. *-
Wednesday, March 16th. (Absent, Marshall, Ch. J.) Washington, J., as to the opinion of the court on the question of lien, referred to the opinion delivered in the case of The Frances (Irvin’s claim, post, p. 418), which he said was precisely within the principle of the present case.
Sentence affirmed.
The Frances, Boyer, Master: Graham’s claim.
Prize.—Further proof.
Where the affidavits produced on the order for further proof are positive, but their credibility impaired by the non-production of letters mentioned in the affidavits, a second order for further proof will be allowed, in the appellate court.
This case, like the preceding, was an appeal from the Curcuit Court of Rhode Island : and the claim of John Graham, the appellant, was to certain other goods by the same ship, the Frances, captured and carried into Rhode Island, as stated in the case referred to, by the Yankee privateer.
Harper, for claimant : Pinkney and Dexter, for the captors.
The material facts of the case, and the substance of the argument on
The Frances.
both sides, are stated in the following opinion of the court, (a) delivered March 12th, 1814, by—
Marshall, Ch. J.—John Graham, a merchant of New York, claimed sundry parcels of goods shipped on board the Frances, as his sole property. The goods were shipped by William Graham & Brothers, merchants, of Glasgow, on account and risk of John Graham, merchant, of New York.
There are *two bills of lading, each filled up with the name of John
J Graham. There are also two invoices, each headed with the name of William Graham & Brothers as shippers, and stating the goods to be shipped on account and risk of John Graham. The first of these invoices is marked in the margin thus, W. G. I. P. and the other thus, [G.] There were also two lists of goods. The first headed, “ List of goods shipped by the 'Frances, for Messrs. John Graham & Co., New York.” This list is marked W. G. X I. P. The other is headed, “ List of goods shipped by the Frances, for Messrs. Peter Graham & Co., Philadelphia.” These goods are accompanied by two letters, dated the 15th and 16th of July, signed William Graham & Brothers, the first addressed to Messrs. John Graham & Co., and the last to Messrs. Peter Graham & Co. The letter to John Graham & Co. treats of their trade generally, and contains only the follow- . ing allusion to this shipment: “ You have herewith the ship Fanny’s accounts, to which refer; also invoice of sundry goods per Frances ; we hope they may go to a good market. We expect you will have about one hundred packages of English goods. There will be somewhat more to Philadelphia.” The letter to Peter Graham & Co. is also a general letter on the subject of their trade. It contains the following passage respecting the shipments by the Frances : “We have shipped by Frances a few goods well selected ; we could not get almost any cluster seeds.”
The circuit judge directed the cause to stand for further proof. It appears from the affidavit of John Graham, that in the month of January, in the year 1809, he entered into a limited partnership with his brothers, William Graham and Peter Graham, who, as well as himself, are naturalized citizens of the United States. The business was to be conducted at New York, by himself, under the name of John Graham & Co. ; at Philadelphia, by Peter Graham, under the name of Peter Graham & Co.; and at Glasgow, . by William Graham, under the name of William Graham & Brothers.
That, from the commencement of the partnership, he has been in the con*3501 s^an^ habit of carrying on extensive *business, with the knowledge of J his partners, on his private account, and also in connection with others. That the investment and disposal of the funds of the deponent, together with the management of the mercantile concerns of the firms composed as aforesaid, and the commission business, were the principal if not the sole business of William Graham & Brothers, at Glasgow. That, from the intimate knowledge they possessed of each others’ affairs, and in consequence of their connection as brothers, the distinction between his firm and his private character was not always preserved. It was the less attended to, because the affairs of the Company and his individual concerns were frequently the subjects of the same letter, and it became the more usual to address him by the style of the firm, because there are several other persons
(a) Livingston, J., was absent, when this opinion was delivered.
The Frances.
of the same name in New York. He adds, that in making shipments on the sole account of the deponent, William Graham has been in the habit of assorting the whole into invoices of small quantities, calculated to suit the generality of purchasers in the New York market, and also that the goods in any one of the said invoices might be sold entire, or transshipped to Philadelphia, or any other market, with the original invoice accompanying the same, as such original invoice would inspire more confidence in the buyers. This circumstance occasioned the lists of property shipped by the Frances, and one of them to be addressed to Peter Graham & Co. He swears, in the most positive and precise terms, that the property is entirely his own, and was purchased with his private funds in the hands of William Graham.
William Black deposes, that he has been long and intimately acquainted with John Graham, who is a man of fortune and character, and has been in the habit of transacting much of his own business in the said Graham’s counting-house. That, from his knowledge of the affairs of the said Graham, he verily believes, that the said Graham, both before and since the war, has been in the habit of doing business on his private account, and has received many shipments in which neither of his brothers were interested. He has been concerned with the deponent, as part-owner of vessels, in which the deponent believes that neither William nor Peter Graham held any share. *Isaac Belt and David Dunham, merchants of New York, swear to facts similar to those stated by William Black. L
Charles Graham, of a different family from the claimant, swears, that in the year 1811, there were, according to the directory, six persons of the name of John Graham, in New York, one of whom was the deponent’s father; and that mistakes were frequently made respecting each other’s letters which came through the post-office.
William Hill, principal clerk of William Graham & Brothers, deposes to the different concerns, and to the nature of the business transacted by William Graham & Brothers, as stated in the affidavit of John Graham. That they had under their care ships and vessels in which John Graham alone was interested. That since an early period in the year 1811, the concern of William Graham & Brothers have not shipped any goods whatever, for or on account of the said copartnership, to either of their said establishments, or in any other manner whatsoever. That vessels continued to arrive, particularly the Trident, the Fanny and the Cuba, to the charge of the said William Graham & Brothers, for the account and risk of John Graham, in which ships and cargoes the said copartnership, or the said William Graham, had no share or interest whatsoever. The deponent has seen sundry letters from the said John Graham to the said William Graham & Brothers, to invest the moneys arising from the freight and cargoes of those ships, in goods, in behalf of him, the said John Graham, so soon as the British orders in council should be revoked ; and until then, to place the amount to his private credit in the books of William Graham & Brothers, which was done by the deponent as clerk. That this money was invested in the goods shipped by the Frances and other vessels, which were shipped on the sole account of John Graham, and were so entered on the books, by the instructions of William Graham. He states the practice of dividing shipments into small invoices, as is stated in the affidavit of John Graham.
The Frances.
Peter Graham swears that he has not, and never had, any interest in the *3”21 goods dipped by the Frances. That *John Graham has been in the -* habit of transacting business on his own account, with the knowledge of his partners, and has frequently consigned his separate goods to Peter Graham & Co. William N. Steele, clerk of Peter Graham, deposes to the same facts ; and founds his belief that Peter Graham had no interest in the goods shipped by the Frances, on his knowledge of the business of the house. William Graham states in detail, with great explicitness, the circumstances narrated in the affidavits of John Graham and of William Hill, his principal clerk, and avers most solemnly that the goods shipped by the Frances, were the sole property of John Graham.
The court below directed restitution of two-thirds of the cargo, as being -the property of John and Peter Graham, and condemned one-third, as being the property of William Graham. From this sentence of condemnation, John Graham has appealed ; and from so much of the sentence as directs a restitution of one-third as the property of Peter Graham, the captors have appealed.
It is certainly a rule in prize courts, dictated by good sense, and calculated to promote the purposes of justice, that letters accompanying the cargo, written in good faith, in the prosecution of a fair and honest business, should have great influence in ascertaining the real proprietors of it. The letters on board the Frances are of this description. They are such as would be written, if the goods were really the property of the company ; but such as could scarcely have been written, if the goods were the sole property of John Graham. Had they been his sole property, it must have happened, that some expression would have been found in the letters indicating the fact. Men who write carelessly and without design; may not be very explicit; but it rarely happens, that they entirely conceal the truth. There will be some allusion to it.
If the goods were the sole property of John Graham, why address a letter to Peter Graham & Co. ? The .affidavits account rationally enough for making up separate invoices ; but addressing a letter to Peter Graham & *3531 ^o., ^Philadelphia, by a vessel destined for New York, has very
.J much the appearance of a shipment destined for the company at that place, and not for John Graham, of New York. The expressions of that letter favor the same idea. “We have shipped you, by Frances, a few goods, well selected.” These cannot well be the goods of John Graham. The language is surely not such as would be used in that state of things. “We could not get almost any cluster seeds.” These expressionshave a necessary reference to some letter of orders from Peter Graham, mentioning cluster seeds among the articles directed to be shipped.
The affidavits produced on the order for further proof, are too positive to be disregarded, without considerable reluctance and hesitation. There are, however, certain rules of evidence, the authority of which is admitted in all courts. One of these is, that if a written paper be referred to, which paper is in the power of the party, it ought to be produced. The affidavits of William Graham and of William Hill state expressly, that letters had been received from John Graham, directing the disposition of cargoes shipped from America, on his own account, and ordering the proceeds to be invested in British manufactures, also on his own account, so soon as the
The Frances.
British orders in council should be repealed. Why are not these letters produced ? It is impossible not to perceive their necessity. Mr. John Graham must have copied these letters into his letter-book. Why has he not furnished some evidence of this fact. His letters must have been answered by William Graham, more explicitly than in that which was found on board the Frances. Why is no one of those letters produced ? It is impossible to account for the fact, that no one of these letters is an exhibit in the cause. The court feels itself bound, judging on this evidence, according to the rules of law, to consider the goods as the property of the company.
But it is urged, on the part of the claimant, that if permitted to give further proof, he will produce the correspondence and such other proof as will be entirely satisfactory to the court. Several circumstances exist in this cause to induce the court to allow still further time for the production of such further evidence as may place the transaction beyond any doubt. The cause is ordered to stand for further proof.
*The Frances, Boyer, Master: Dunham & Randolph’s claim. [*354
Prize goods.—Further proof.
A case of further proof. Goods, shipped by a British to an American house (partly in conformity with orders, and partly without orders), who had an option to accept or reject the whole invoice, in a limited time, remain the property of the shippers, until the election be made to accept them.
This is another case of goods by the Frances, captured by the Yankee, and condemned in the Circuit Court of Rhode Island, brought up to this court on appeal. (Reported below, 1 Gallis. 445.)
Messrs. Dunham & Randolph, merchants, of New York, claimed three bales and nineteen boxes of goods shipped by Alexander Thompson, of Glasgow, a British subject, and consigned to Dunham & Randolph. The biil of lading is in theii’ names, and the invoice purports to be on their account and risk. A letter from Thompson to Dunham & Randolph, dated Glasgow, 11th July 1812, after describing the goods, and the labor he had employed in the business, and stating that the goods were sent partly in the Fanny and partly in the Frances, says, “ I have exceeded in some articles, and have sent you others, not ordered.” “ I leave it with yourselves, to take the whole of the two shipments, or none at all, just as you please. If you do not wish them, I will thank you to hand the invoices and letters over to Messrs. Falconer & Co. I think twenty-four hours will allow you ample opportunity for you to make up your minds on this point; and if you do not hand them over within that time, I will of course, consider that you take the whole.”
On the 15th of July, Alexander Thompson again wrote to Dunham & Randolph a letter, in which he mentions the information that a bill declar-
• ing war had passed the hous§ of representatives. He then adds, “ considering the circumstances of the times, I thought it best to inform Messrs. Falconer, Jackson & Co. fully of the conditions on which I have shipped you the goods by the Fanny and Frances.” In a letter to Messrs. Falconer, Jackson & Co., of the same date, he explains, in full, the proposition he had
The Frances.
made to Dunham & Randolph, and directs how those gentlemen are to act for him, should Dunham & Randolph reject the consignment. *3551 *This property was condemned in the courts below, and from
-1 the sentence of condemnation, the claimants appealed to this court.
Pinkney, for the appellants.—This is a mere question of fact as to property. Were or were not the goods the property of the enemy ? We contend, that they were not. All the documentary evidence shows the property to belong to Dunham & Randolph. The condition mentioned in Thompson’s letter of 11th July, was a condition subsequent. The property vested in the claimants, liable to be divested, if rejected by them within twenty-four hours after receiving the letter. The greater part of the goods, if not the whole, was shipped by order of the claimants, long before the sailing of the vessel. The delivery to the master of the ship was an execution of the order. The shipper had no longer any control ovei’ the property, except, in case of the insolvency of the consignees, in which event, he might stop it in transitu. Every circumstance connected with the transaction appears to be perfectly fair ; and if the evidence now before the conrt is not sufficient to support the claim of the appellants, it is a case for further proof. The claimants had accepted the shipment by the Fanny, before the capture of the Frances, and thereby rendered certain what was before optional. They thereby bound themselves to take the shipment by the Frances.
Hunter, contra.—The goods in question were not shipped according -to order, as appears by Thompson’s letter of 11th July. They belonged to the shipper, until the consignees had elected to take them ; and they could not make their election, before the arrival of the Frances. At whose risk were the goods, while at sea ? Thompson had no power to impose the risk on the claimants. If the goods had arrived at Boston, they might have been attached as the property of the shipper. If attached *as the prop-
-* erty of the claimants, they might have said the goods were not their property ; or if they had been sued as garnishees of Thompson, they might have said, they owed him nothing. They were not bound to accept the goods.
If the property, at law, belonged to Thompson, d fortiori, in a case of prize. It is a rule of prize courts that, in time of war, no future election shall be allowed to change the right of property at sea, in transitu. The question is, in whom is the legal estate ? At whose risk were the goods passing at the time of capture? The Packet de Bilboa, 2 Rob. Ill, 133 ; The Danckebaar Africaan, 1 Ibid. 90, 107 ; The Jan Frederick, 5 Ibid. 115, 128 ; The Vrouw Margaretha, 1 Ibid. 283,- 336 ; The Josephine, 4 Ibid. 21, 25 ; The Aurora, Ibid. 180, 218 ; The Carl Walter, Ibid. 170, 207 ; The Carolina, 6 Ibid. 337 ; The Copenhagen, 1 Ibid. 243, 289. These cases all go to prove that, during war, property cannot change in transitu.
Dexter, on the same side.—In this case, there was no contract to change the property. To constitute a contract, the assent of both parties is necessary. The goods were not shipped according to the order of the claimants, and a condition was annexed. The property never vested in the claimants : It was only to vest in them, on condition that they failed to deliver over the goods to Messrs. Falconer & Co.
Pinkney, in reply.—The further proof which the claimants would offer,
The Frances.
will show that almost all the excess of goods beyond the order, was on board the Fanny. Here was a direct consignment to the claimants ; the goods were delivered to their agent, the master of the vessel ; the documents were all | sent to the consignees ; no change of property in transitu was necessary ; 1 the property was already vested in the claimants : and, upon its arrival, they might have asserted their right to it. So far as the goods comported with the order, the contract was *certainly executed : there can be no doubt about those goods; the claimants might have maintained trover or L replevin for them.
This was not the sort of shipment described by Sir W. Scott, in the cases cited. Thompson, the shipper, was a naturalized citizen of the United States : this appears in other cases before this court ; and that fact constitutes part of the further proof which we wish to introduce. There was no knowledge of the war, in this case. The transaction was not shaped by the expectation of war ; Thompson did not believe that war would take place, and he gives his reasons. The shipment was directed on the 11th of July ; between that and the 15th, the intelligence of the war was received.
Saturday March 12th, 1814. (Absent, Livingston, J.) Marshall, Ch. J., after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows :—It has been argued for the appellants, that, by the invoice and bill of lading, and the true construction of the letter of Alexander Thompson, the property was vested in Dunham & Randolph, liable to be divested by their rejecting the consignment, within twenty-four hours after receiving the letters ; that the condition annexed to the transfer, is subsequent, not precedent. The court cannot concur in this reasoning.
It has been very truly urged for the captors, that to vest this property in Dunham & Randolph, a contract is necessary ; and that to form a contract, the consent of two parties is indispensable. In this case, no such contract appears. Had Thompson, in execution of the orders of Dunham & Randolph, consigned to them, unconditionally, such goods as they had directed, the contract would have been complete ; and the goods would, on being shipped, have become the property of Dunham & Randolph. But Thompson has not done this. With the goods which were ordered, he has consigned other goods, expressly stipulating that Dunham & Randolph shall not take the goods they had ordered, unless they consent to take the whole quantity put on board both vessels. This, then, is a new proposition, on which Dunham & Randolph *are at liberty to exercise their discretion. They may accept or reject it; and until they do accept it, the *• property must remain in Thompson. The sentence of condemnation, therefore, in this case, was warranted by the evidence before the circuit court.
But the claimants pray an order for further proof ; and say, that, before the capture of the Frances, the Fanny had arrived, and Dunham & Randolph had consented to take both cargoes. This application is opposed, on the principle, that were the fact even true, as alleged by the claimants, belligerent property cannot change its character in transitu. Reserving any opinion on the law of the case, until the facts alleged shall be substantiated, if it shall be in the power of the claimants to substantiate them, the cause is ordered to stand for further proof.1
1
For a further decision on this claim, see 9 Cr. 183.
The Frances, Boyer, Master : Kennedy’s claim.
Prize.—Question offact.
This was likewise a case of goods by the Frances, condemned in the Circuit Court of Rhode Island. They were claimed by Duncan Kennedy, an American citizen, who appealed to this court. The case was submitted to the court, without argument.
Saturday, March 12th, 1814. (Absent Livingston, J.), Marshall, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court, as follows :—Duncan Kennedy, surviving partner of the house of George Stayley & Co., merchants, of New York, *3 591 claim8 eight boxes of merchandise, part of the cargo of the ship J Frances, as his property. *The invoice is headed—
“ Glasgow, 8th July, 1812.
“ Messrs. George Stayley & Co.
Receive from James Smith.”
A letter from James Smith to George Stayley & Co., in speaking, of the goods, terms them “ our goods,” and does not, in any manner, indicate that they are the goods of Stayley & Co. He concludes his letter with saying, “ As it is to be hoped the trade will now open, I shall expect your instructions, saying what goods are best suited for the market.” The bill of lading is filled up with the name of George Stayley & Co., “ on account and risk as per invoice.”
There are several letters from George Stayley, in Glasgow, to his father; but none of them indicate an opinion, that the property of the goods was in George Stayley & Co. The sentence, condemning these goods, must be affirmed.
Sentence affirmed.
The Frances, Boyer, Master: French’s claim.
Prize goods.—Change ofproperty.
An intention, clearly proved, of a consignor of goods, to vest the right of property in the consignee, is not sufficient to effect such a change of property, until the goods are received by the consignee, or some evidence is given of his agreement to take them on his own account; until that time, the goods are at the risk of the shippers ; and if they are enemies, the goods, if captured, are good prize.
No difference, though the consignee were the agent of a third person, who had directed him to order the goods, unless it appears that he actually did order them.
This, like the former cases of the Frances, was an appeal from the United States Circuit Court for thé Rhode Island district.
William French, the appellant, a citizen of the United States, claimed fourteen boxes of merchandise shipped on board the Frances, by James Auchincloss, of Paisley, in Scotland, to A. &. J. Auchincloss, of New York, on their account and risk, with orders to remit the proceeds to the shipper *3601 ^or Payment’ The claimant *alleged, that the goods had been pre-
-* viously ordered by him through A. & J. Auchincloss, to be imported on his account and risk.
Further proof was ordered by the court below, to consist of the original order for the merchandise, and all the letters and correspondence relating to
The Frances.
it, and of all the proofs of property in the claimant. Under this order, the claimant produced a letter, dated Baltimore, 20th February 1812, signed by himself, and addressed to A. & J. Auchincloss, requesting them to order from their friends in Scotland, goods not exceeding in value 10004 sterling, to be shipped so soon as the orders in council should be revoked. On the 20th of September 1812, A. & J. Auchincloss wrote a letter to the claimant, advising him of the capture of the Frances, with the goods, said to be shipped on his account, to their address, and desiring him to take the necessary steps to have his property cleared.
To these letters were added affidavits of the claimant, tending to prove the property in him, together with an affidavit of Darius Hodson, that he forwarded the above last-mentioned letter to the claimant, at Providence, by his request; and that, when he took it from the file, it was a whole sheet directed to the claimant from New York, by J. Auchincloss, jun.; but that, in order to save postage, he, the deponent, tore off the outside leaf, not thinking, at the time, of its being of any importance. Upon this proof, the claim was rejected in the court below, and the property condemned to the captors.
In this court, the cause was argued by Jones, for the appellant, and Dexter, for the captors ; and on—
Tuesday, the 15th of March 1814 (absent, Marshall, Ch. J.), Washing - ton, Ch. J., delivered the following opinion of the court:—*This is i-*««-. the claim of William French to a part of the cargo of the Frances, L shipped by James Auchincloss, of Paisley, in Great Britain, to A. & J. Auchincloss, of New York, on their account and risk. By the correspondence between the consignor and consignees, which was exhibited to the court below, under an order for further proof, it is somewhat doubtful, whether these goods were to be sold as the property of the consignor, or of the consignees. In the letter from the former to A. Auchincloss, dated the 17th of July 1812, he says, “You will lose no time,to transmit,immediately on the receipt of the invoice by the Fanny, as well as by the Frances, to the full amount of the invoices ; as thereby, and no other way, is your credit and John’s to be restored here. Also remit, as I have often told you, to clear off your old debt: and, for God’s sake, let us have no more failing in the family. You will observe, that the goods per Fanny and Frances are principally bought upon a credit of three, four and five months ; this the consequence of failing.”
In another letter, of the same date, from the same to the same, he says, “ By this ship, the Frances, I have shipped you fourteen boxes of different kinds of goods, which I beg you will lose no time to dispose, as by early remittances, you will undoubtedly strengthen your credit.” In another part of this letter, he says, “ I beg you will lose no time to remit largely, say 3 or 4000 pounds. Remember the old cash account with the Paisley Banking Company.” These letters, so far as they throw light upon this transaction, intimate very strongly that A. & J. Auchincloss were to dispose of these goods upon their own account, and as the purchasers of them. But to produce a change of property from the shipper to the consignee, it was essentially necessary, that the goods should have been sent, in consequence of some contract between the parties by which the one agreed to sell, and the [p. 222] .361 SUPREME COURT [Feb’y
The Frances.
other to buy. Had the language of these letters been more explicit than it is, to prove that the intention of the consignor was to vest the right of property in the consignee, it would not have been sufficient to effect such a change, until the goods were received, or some evidence given of the agreement of the consignee to take them on his own account. No order from
A. & J. Auehincloss to the *consignor of this cargo, authorizing the
-1 shipment of it, was produced, or offered to be produced, in the court below ; and this court, therefore, is warranted in believing that none such was ever given. Indeed, no interest whatever in these goods is asserted to have existed in A. & J. Auehincloss, but the same is claimed by William French, a citizen of the United States, who, under the order for further proof, produced, in support of his claim, a letter from himself to A. & J. Auehincloss, dated the 20th February 1812, in which he requests them to order from his friends in Scotland, a quantity of goods, enumerated in the letter, not to exceed 1000Z. sterling, to be shipped as soon as the orders in council should be revoked, and adding, that he should consider the goods at his risk, from the time they should be shipped ; also an invoice of these goods, sent by A. & J. Auehincloss to William French, together with a letter from them, dated the 20th of September 1812, advising him of the capture of the Frances, with the goods shipped on his account, and recommending it to him to take the necessary steps to vindicate his right to the property. This letter made its appearance in the court below, with the outer leaf, on which the post-mark would have been placed, had there been any, tom off. To do away with the suspicion which this circumstance might well excite, the affidavit of Darius Hodson was produced, in which he states that he forwarded this letter to the claimant, at Providence, having first torn off the outer leaf, with a view to lessen the rate of postage.
The affidavit of the claimant is added, which is fully to the purpose of supporting his interest in these goods, so far as his order to A. & J. Auchincloss can vest such an interest in him. But passing over those observations which might fairly be made upon the mutilated state of the letter from A. & J. Auehincloss to the claimant, and the suspicious manner in which that circumstance is attempted to be explained, it may be observed, that the claim of William French is in no respect stronger than if it had been made by A. & J. Auehincloss. Admit, that he wrote to A. & J. Auehincloss the letter of the 20th February 1812, and received from them that of the 20th of September, the inquiry still remains to be answered, where is the order *3031 ^or *sbipment from A. & J. Auehincloss as the agent of the
J claimant? The truth is, that in whatever light this question is viewed, these goods were at the risk of the shippers, until they should be received by the consignee ; and consequently, were, by the capture, made good prize, as property belonging to the enemy.
Sentence affirmed.
The Frances, Boyer, Master: Gillespie’s claim.
Prize.—Domicil.
The commercial domicil of a merchant, at the time of the capture of his goods, determines the character of those goods—hostile or neutral.
This also was an appeal from the sentence of the Rhode Island Circuit Court, condemning certain goods captured on board the Frances, by the Yankee privateer.
These goods were shipped by Colin Gillespie, the claimant, who had been naturalized in the United States, and consigned to Archibald Bryce and Alexander Muirhead, for sale and remittance to the shipper, at Glasgow.
To ascertain the national character of the claimant, further proof was ordered by the court below, calling upon him to show how long, after his naturalization, he resided in the United States, before he went to Great Britain ? how long he had since resided in the United States, at any time or times ? how long in Great Britain ? what was the nature of his business in the latter country ? and in whom the property vested at the time it was shipped ?
Upon the production of this further proof, it appeared, that the property was vested in the claimant, at the time of its being shipped ; that he was a native of Great Britain ; that he emigrated to the United States in 1793 ; was naturalized in 1798; having, in the interim, returned to his native country, on mercantile business, in 1794 and 1796, and revisited the United States in 1795 and 1797 ; that he again returned to his native country in 1799, was there married and revisited the United *States, with his wife, in the same year; that he continued to reside in New York L until June 1802, when he once more returned to Great Britain, and resided there until November 1805, when he came to the United States (Mrs Gillespie having died in Scotland), formed a partnership with John Graham, of New York, and returned to Glasgow, in the same year, where he carried on the business of the partnership, under the firm of Colin Gillespie & Co.; that he remained there until the partnership was dissolved, and until the 2d of July 1813 ; on which day, he left the enemy’s country, and arrived in the United States with his family, in October 1813 ; that he kept house at Glasgow, and built a warehouse there, which he still owns, and kept his counting-house therein. He formed a determination to return to the United States, as he deposes, on being informed of the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain, which took place on the 18th of June 1812, and was known in England, about the 20th of July following, but was prevented, by his engagements and commercial concerns, from carrying that intention into effect, until the period above mentioned, still leaving some of his affairs unarranged.
Upon this evidence, the property was condemned in the circuit court; and an appeal was taken, by the claimant, to this court, where the cause was argued by Jones, Harper and Dexter, for the claimant; and Pinkney, for the captors.
Jones, for the claimant.—The goods in question were purchased early in July 1812, they were shipped on the 14th of that month, at which time, the declaration of war was not known in England. It does not appear, that the
The Frances.
claimant shipped any other goods than those in question. In less than a yeai- after he had received information of the war, he returned to the United States, with his family, thereby giving unequivocal evidence of the quo animo of his residence in Great Britain. In such a case, even the property of a neutral would be protected ; d fortiori, ought the property of one of our own citizens to receive protection. Cases of this kind are analogous to cases °f confiscation. If there be any particular period at which *we
J can consider this property as assuming a hostile character, it must be that, at which it would have been confiscable by the enemy, supposing the party to continue an American citizen. Had that period arrived ? Were the circumstances such as would have justified Great Britain in confiscating this property ? If not, surely the United States ought not to condemn it. Vattel, lib. 3, § 63.
This case may be considered in another point of view, viz., whether the case of a naturalized citizen returning to his native country, and carrying on trade, as in the present case, is distinguishable in its consequences, in the event of war, from that of a native citizen going to a foreign country and engaging in trade. We contend, that it is not. One authority, and one only, seems to favor the distinction ; and that is the case of La Virginie, 5 Rob. 99. But in that case, it does not appear that the American character of Mr. Lapierre was acquired by naturalization. It might and very probably did depend on domicil alone. We contend, that a person naturalized in this country, is as much a citizen of the United States, to all the intents and purposes of the present case, as a native. The naturalization law of the United States requires of the applicant for the privileges of naturalization, unqualified abjuration of allegiance to his former sovereign. The law of England on the subject goes to an equal extent. Naturalized and native subjects are looked upon as the same, to all legal purposes. Dawson's Lessee v. Godfrey, 4 Cr. 321.
A denizen may be made such for life or in tail; “ but one cannot be naturalized, either with limitation, for life or in tail, or upon condition ; for that is against the absoluteness, purity and indelibility of natural allegiance.” Co. Litt. 129 ay 2 Domat 376.
If, according to the doctrince of perpetual allegiance, on the return of a naturalized citizen to his native country, his former duties return, and his duties to his adopted country still continue, under what contradictory obligations would he be placed. This was Lord Hale’s doctrine, but it is now done away. Foster’s Crown Law 185, § 4. *It has been decided, in $ J England, in the case of Marryat v. Wilson, 1 Bos. & Pul. 430, that a natural-born subject of that country admitted a citizen of the United States of America, either before or after the declaration of American independence, may be considered as a subject of the United States, so as to entitle him to trade to the East Indies, under the 13th article of the treaty of 19th November 1794.”
Harper, on the same side, asked, whether the court, in the case of The Rapid, had decided the question, as to the difference between the British acts concerning letters of marque, prizes and prize goods, which authorize the capture of the property of inhabitants in hostile countries (and on which the British admiralty decisions are founded), and the act of congress
The Frances.
declaring war, which only gives a right to capture the property of British subjects.
Johnson, J., said, the court had fully considered that point and decided it in the case of The Rapid (ante, p.-155).
Pinkney, for the captors.—We contend, that the property even of a native American citizen, domiciled in an enemy country, at the time of the capture of such property, is liable to condemnation as prize of war ; and, ct fortiori, the property of a naturalized American citizen, a native of the enemy country, under like circumstances ; which is the case before the court, and which will be first considered.
It has been contended on the other side, that a person naturalized in the United States is as much a citizen of this country as a native, and that he continues to be so, though he return to his native country and there engage' in trade. It has been argued, that in order to become an American citizen, he must abjure his allegiance to his former government, that, consequently,, though he should return to his native country, he can no longer be considered as under the protection of that government: that his new allegiance tO’ the United States continues, and that our government is bound to protect him : that he is, therefore, to be considered in the *same light as a native citizen, and that his property is equally to be protected in case *- of war.
That a person so abjuring his native allegiance cannot claim protection from his former government, while he continues in the country of his adoption, is admitted ; but we contend, that if he voluntarily returns within the sphere of his original allegiance, he is as much a subject of his former government, as if he had never emigrated ; that the reciprocal duties of allegiance and protection, on the respective parts of the subject and the sovereign, are revived : he is no longei* a citizen of the United States. The two allegiances are incompatible, we admit ; the naturalization law of the United States clearly goes upon this idea ; but in case of the party’s return to his native country, it is the old allegiance which must prevail, and not the new, as is contended by the claimant. By his return, he has, in fact, consented to resume his former allegiance : for he must be presumed to have known the laws of his country, and that those laws would impose upon him his old duties in case of his return. He is now, as Sir W. Scott would call him, a redintegrated subject of his native country, and is liable to all his former obligations. He is now bound actively to support the government to which he has returned. In case of war he may be compelled to take up arms against the country he has adopted ; to pay taxes for the support of the war, &c., and this, not by arbitrary power, but of right. These obligations, it will be recollected, we contend, are the effect of a voluntary return. We do not mean to say, that if a naturalized citizen should enter the army of the United States, and be captured by the nation to which he formerly belonged, during a war between the two countries, he would, on being carried to his native country as a prisoner, incur those obligations. But in the case now before the court, the return of Gillespie, the claimant, to England, was entirely voluntary. Without regard, therefore, to the question of domicil, Gillespie was, according to the doctrine for which we have been contending, politically an enemy of the United States, at the time of the capture of the
The Frances.
Frances. If he was not an enemy, I should be glad to know, who can be considered as such. If he is not hostis, who has every hostile duty upon him, I am at a loss to know who is. *36R1 the war ha<^ been sudden, humanity might plead in behalf of
■* the claimant. But in this case, there was no surprise. War had been threatening for a long time previous to its actual declaration. No indulgence, therefore, on this ground, can be claimed.
The counsel for the claimant has cited Lord Coke in support of his doctrine of naturalization, but does not seem to have considered that, according to that author, a British subject can never become a citizen of any other country. The case of Marryat v. Wilson has also been cited. That case is, perhaps, entitled to some consideration ; but even there, the court had, at first, decided against Collet, and it was only upon the request of the American minister (Mr. King) that they consented to reconsider the case, when they finally decided in his favor.
2. If Gillespie was politically an enemy, at the time of the capture, the doctrine of commercial domicil is wholly immaterial in the present case. But as the court may not view the subject in the same light as we do, a few remarks on the latter point may not be unnecessary. We lay it down, then, .as an indisputed position, that the character of captured goods is decided by the commercial domicil of the owner, at the time of capture. And we contend, that Gillespie had a commercial domicil in Great Britain, at the time of the capture of the goods in question. It does not appear, that he had, in any manner, put himself in motion—in itinere, to return, before the capture. All the evidence, showing his intention to return, arose after that event. A ^hostile character, therefore, attached to the property, if not to the owner.
This is not a case of withdrawing funds : it is a case of trade, originating before the war, and continued after the war. Besides, the rule of with.drawal applies only to cases where the domicil of the party is not in the .enemy country, though his trade is carried on and his property situated ithere. See Coopman's Case, cited in The Vigilantia, 1 Rob. 12, 14 ; *3691 Escott's Case, cited in The Hoop, *Ibid. 170,201; The Madonna delle
-* Gracie, 4 Ibid. 161, 195.
It has been said, that at the time of the shipment of the goods in question, the war was not known in England, and that it would be a case of great hardship, under such circumstances, to subject this property to condemnation. But want of notice, in cases like this, is an excuse not known to the law of nations. See Whitehill's Case (referred to in the case of The Hoop, 1 Rob. 170, 201) : Whitehill was a British subject, had been at St. Eustatius only two days, and had no knowledge of the war, yet his property was condemned.
As to the fact, that public treaties frequently allow a particular time for the respective subject of both parties to withdraw in case of war, it may be observed, that this is only providing against the exercise of a right which the contracting parties would otherwise have had. But these mutual concessions do not alter the nature or effect of the domicil. At all events, Gillespie ought to have put himself in motion to return to the United States, immediately upon knowledge of the war. This he does not appear to have done : and according to Sir W. Scott, nothing but the
The Frances.
actual force of the government is a sufficient excuse for the neglect. But no such excuse has been offered.
On either of the grounds, therefore, which have been taken in this argument, we conceive that the property in controversy must be condemned.
Harper, in reply.—It is the nature of the trade, not the place of residence, which determines the hostile or neutral character of the trader.
We must still insist, that a naturalized citizen of the United States is a citizen to every intent, the right to be president of the United States only excepted, which exception but proves the general rule.
It is said, on the part of the captors, that a naturalized *Ameri- pgyg can citizen ceases to be such, when he returns to his native country. L Suppose, then, while absent in his native country, a descent should be cast upon him in this—would he be considered by our courts as an alien, so as to deprive him of the estate so cast upon him ? Again, suppose, in case of war between the two countries, he should enlist himself under the banners of our enemy, and be found in arms against us, should we not consider him as a traitor, and treat him accordingly ? If he chooses to take such double responsibilities upon himself, it is his business to reconcile them : we can only consider him as an American citizen.
We might admit, perhaps, that by a return to his native country, in time of war, he must be considered as having abandoned his rights as a citizen of the United States, in relation to trade : still, however, he could not throw off his duties. But Gillespie returned in time of peace. He, therefore, did not assume new duties incompatible with those he owed to this country. He assumed only that temporary allegiance to the government of Great Britain, which every other stranger in that country owed. Upon the breaking out of the war, perhaps, new duties might arise, inconsistent with his duties as an American citizen. Yet, in that case, a reasonable time ought to be allowed him to remove ; and if he made every reasonable exertion to return to the United States, and especially, if he did actually return, in less than a year after being informed of the existence of the war, which is the fact, he must be considered as having retained his American character.
The domicil of the owner, at the time of capture, is not the criterion whereby to determine the character of the property captured, in all cases. If it be so generally, this case ought to be an exception. Gillespie was lawfully in England, at the breaking out of the war : he cannot be presumed to have known that war would take place ; it is impossible that he should have known it; such a presumption is unreasonable. ’WhitehiWs Case has been cited on the other side ; but the counsel for the captors is mistaken us to the facts of that case. Whitehill knew of the war, and that St. Eustatius was hostile, at the time he went there; which essentially distinguishes it from the case now before the court.
*Pinkney referred to the history of the times, to show that Whitehill had no knowledge of the war, when he went to St. Eustatius. L
Harper.—If Whitehill did not know that war had actually been declared, he knew that measures had been taken which may be considered as equivalent to a declaration. The capture took place in February. He knew that
Vowles v. Craig.
letters of marque had been issued in December preceding, and that a long irritation had existed between the two governments. He knew also, that the trade in which he was engaged, was a trade frowned upon b.y his own government. In the present case, the circumstances were entirely different. 5 Rob. 220, 247.
Saturday, March 12th, 1814. (Absent, Livingston, J.) Marshall, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court, as follows :—Colin Gillespie, a naturalized American citizen, residing in Glasgow, claimed sundry goods, shipped on his own account, as his property. This claim depends entirely on his national character, and is decided in the case of The Venus (ante, p. 253). The sentence of the circuit court, condemning the property of the claimant, is affirmed.
Sentence affirmed.
1
See Livingston v. Barringer, 15 Johns. 471 ; tell v. Savoy, 17 S. & R. 104; Murphy v. CampVanWyckv. Wright, 18 Wend. 157; Macken- bell, 4 Penn. St. 480; Davison v. Mills, 32 Id. 302.
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