Bank v. Cooper, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 171
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Bank v. Cooper, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 171
Full caption
Bank v. Cooper.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Majority
Strong (Justice)
Majority
Clifford (Justice)
Dissent
Davis (Justice)
Bank v. Cooper.
After an assignee in bankruptcy, aided by a creditor, has twice contested
before the District Court or its referee the claim of a person who has •been allowed to prove his claim, and, after all the evidence which could then or afterwards be produced, it has been twice decided that the claim was a valid one, no bill lies in the Circuit Court (either under the general provisions of the Bankrupt Act or under the second section of it, giving to the Circuit Court a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under the act) against either the assignee or the person who has been allowed to prove his claim, to have t e order allowing it reversed. Such a bill may be demurred to for Want of equity.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Northern District 0 New York; the case being thus:
On the 4th of February, 1870, the Troy Woollen Company adjudged a bankrupt by the District Court for the Northdistrict of New York, and on the 11th of March, 1870, one nppan became the assignee. Soon afterwards Cooper, p. 172 Bank v.* Cooper. [Sup. Ct.**
Vail & Co. proved a debt against the bankrupt amounting to $67,029, and on the 24th of July, 1870, filed the probate with the assignee. Subsequently, on the 29th of November, on petition of the First National Bank of Troy, which had also proved a debt against the bankrupt, the District Court made an order allowing them and the assignee to contest the validity of the claim of Cooper, Vail & Co. It was then referred to W. Frothingham, Esq., to take the proofs aud accounts respecting the claim, to determine its legality and amount, and to report his conclusions to the court. Permission was also given to the assignee, and to any creditor of the bankrupt, if they desired to contest the claim, to attend the proceedings before the referee, and it appears that the bank did attend, that evidence in opposition to the claim was submitted, and that the referee reported the whole of it as due from the bankrupt. To his report joint exceptions were filed on behalf of the bank and the assignee, and argued in the District Court upon the evidence taken before the referee. These exceptions were overruled, and on the 13th of July, 1871, the court made an order allowing the debt as proved by Cooper, Vail & Co., and directing the bank to pay the costs and expenses of the reference.
In this condition of things, the bank filed a bill in the Circuit Court below against Cooper, Vail & Co., and the assignee, to procure a reversal of the order. The bill, after setting forth the facts above stated, made a general averment that Cooper, Vail & Co. had no legal claim against the bankrupt; that they had fraudulently proved their claim; that they knew this when the exceptions were taken to the referee’s report as well as when the court made the decree allowing the debt, and that it was thus proved before the District Court. The bill then averred that the decree was erroneous, because there was no legal debt due by the bankrupt to Cooper, Vail & Co.; because the evidence before the court proved that there was no such debt, and because t e court should have disallowed it.
This was one aspect of the bill. It further charged that the assets in the hands of the assignee were insufficient o p. 173Oct. 1873.] Bank v. Cooper. ***
pay fifty cents on the dollar of the legal debts of the bankrupt, even if the claim of Cooper, Vail & Co. were disallowed, and it averred that the assignee refused to appeal from the decision of the District Court, or to allow the creditors to appeal in his name, stating that he was advised that the bank had a right to have the decree reviewed under section second of the Bankrupt Act, and that if the creditors desired a review they would have to take that course. It then charged that the assignee was guilty of neglect of duty in omitting to appeal from the decree of the District Court, and renewed the averment that the bankrupt wras not, and never was, liable for the debt proved against it by Cooper, Vail & Co., or for any part of it.
The prayer of the bill was that the decree made by the District Court might be “ reviewed, examined, revised, and annulled, and that the proof of debt filed with the assignee by Cooper, Vail & Co. might be rejected and expunged.”
The second section of the Bankrupt Act, through which it was alleged that the assignee had told the creditors if they wished relief they would have to resort, declares that the several Circuit Courts of the United States, within and for the districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be pending, shall have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under the act, and, except when special provision is otherwise made, may, upon bill, petition, or other process of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the case (as) in a court of equity.
Cooper, Vail & Co. demurred:
!• For want of equity.
2. For want of jurisdiction.
3. For want of privity between the complainant and the defendant.
;• That the matters had been adjudicated and that the adjudication was conclusive.
5. That the appeal was not within the time prescribed by law.
6. That the bill showed that the District Court had de-01 ed the questions presented by the bill, but that the bill p. 174** Bank v.* Cooper. [Sup. Ct.
did not set forth the facts, or the evidence upon which the order or decree of the District Court complained of was made, or any facts or evidence before the court when the order was made, or the grounds upon which that court based its said decision and order or decree.
7. That the bill of complaint did not set forth facts sufficient to enable the court to determine whether or not the District Court erred in making the order or decree complained of.
8. That the bill did not show that the District Court erred in making the order or decree in the bill complained of.
The Circuit Court sustained the demurrer, and the bank took this appeal.
Mr. E. F. Bullard, for the appellants; J. S. Stearns, contra.
Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.
The demurrer presents the question whether the complainants’ bill sets forth any equity sufficient to justify the court in granting the relief sought against the defendants.
No doubt when an executor or administrator colludes with a fraudulent claimant against a decedent’s estate, and refuses to take steps to resist the claim, any person interested in the estate may maintain an action against sue fraudulent claimant and the executor or administrator for the purpose of contesting the claim. Bills in equity of this nature have been maintained. And if an assignee in ban ruptcy, with knowledge, or with reason to believe that one claiming to be a creditor of the bankrupt had proved a debt against the bankrupt’s estate which had no existence, or which was tainted with fraud, should neglect or refuse to contest the allowance of such debt, there is no reason w y the other creditors,-having proved their debts, should no be permitted to interpose and seek the aid of a couito equity to annul the allowance. But the bill before us pie sents no such cage. The assignee has resisted the allowance of the debt claimed by Cooper, Vail & Co. He took Pal with the appellants in contesting the debt before the re eree p. 175Oct. 1873.] Bank v. Cooper. ***
towhose consideration it was submitted. He joined with them in filing exceptions to the report allowing the claim. There is no averment of any collusion between him and the claimants. The bill exhibits nothing which ought to cast discredit upon his fidelity to his trust. The referee decided against the appellants after hearing all the evidence they had to submit. The District Court reviewed his decision upon exceptions taken to it, and came to the same conclusion, allowing the debt claimed by Cooper, Vail & Co. Nor is it pretended that any new evidence exists which ought to lead the Circuit Court to any other conclusion than that at which the District Court arrived. In such a state of facts it cannot be maintained that it was the duty of the assignee to enter an appeal to the Circuit Court, or even to allow an appeal in his name. After two trials, in which he was aided by the appellants, after all the evidence had been made use of in opposition to the claim which could then be produced, or which can now be obtained, and after two decisions allowing the claim, he may well have concluded, as he did, that his duty to his trust did not require either expenditure of the bankrupt’s estate in farther litigation or the delay which might have been consequent upon an appeal. Thè bill, then, wholly fails in exhibiting any equity against the assignee.
It is equally’ without equity7 as against Cooper, Vail & Co. It is true the averment is made that they7 have no legal or valid claim against the bankrupt, and that their claim was fiandulently proved and made, but there is no allegation wherein the fraud consists, or of any step they have taken in the assertion of their claim which they might not lawfully ta<e. Such a general averment of fraud can be no foundation for an equity. Moreover, it is apparent that the only 'nud intended in the averments of the bill is the assertion 0 a claim which the complainants insist is not sufficiently sustained by evidence. They objected to the claim at the outset. They appealed to the District Court, and they were a owed to contest its validity. It was at*their instance a eiee was appointed to examine and report upon it. Be-Ore that referee they went to trial, without objection. When p. 176 Bank v.* Cooper. [Sup. Ct.**
defeated they brought the contest into court and renewed it there, but unsuccessfully. And they do not now allege that in either of these trials there was anything unfair, or that Cooper, Vail & Co. were guilty of any fraud in maintaining their claim, other than the assertion of its existence, or that they themselves made any mistake, or that they have any other case now than they had and urged before the referee and the District Court. Their only ground of complaint is that the referee and District Court came to a different conclusion from that which they think should have been adopted. The court thought the evidence established the existence of a debt due Cooper, Vail & Co. They are of a different opinion. They think the evidence did not establish the existence of such a debt, and, therefore, they have filed this bill in the Circuit Court to annul the action of the District Court. In effect they are seeking a new trial of a question of fact which has been decided against them, and this without averring anything more than that the District Court drew a wrong conclusion from the evidence. Very plainly they have made no case for equitable interference. There are some bills in equity which are usually called bills for a new trial. They are sustained when they aver some fact which proves it to be against conscience to execute the judgment obtained, some fact of which the complainant could not have availed himself in the court when the judgment was given against him, if a court of law, or of which e might have availed himself, but was prevented by fraud or accident unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own. But a court of equity will never interfere with a judgment obtained in another court, because it is alleged to have been erroneously given, without more. And such is substantial y this case. , But though the bill is destitute of equity, when considere as an original bill, it is contended that it may be regar e as an application for the exercise of the supervisory juris w tion of the Circuit Court authorized by the second section of the Bankrupt Act. That section declares that ‘ the se eral Circuit Courts of the United States, within and foi p. 177Oct. 1873.] Bank v. Cooper. ***
districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be pending, shall have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under this act, and, except when special provision is otherwise made, may, upon bill, petition, or other process of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the case (as) in a court of equity.” The complainants, having proved their debt against'the bankrupt, contend that they may be considered parties aggrieved by any order of the District Court allowing the probate of other debts against the same bankrupt, when the assignee refuses to appeal from the order, or allow an appeal to the Circuit Court. It is true their bill was not filed in the Circuit Court until about four months and a half after the order complained of was made. But the act of Congress prescribes no time within which the application for a review must be presented. An appeal is required to be taken within ten days. Not so with a petition or bill for a review. Undoubtedly the application should be made within a reasonable time, in order that the proceedings to settle the bankrupt’s estate may not be delayed, but neither the act of Congress nor any rule of this court determines what that time is. At present, therefore, it must be left to depend upon the circumstances of each case. Perhaps, generally, it should be fixed in analogy to the period designated within which appeals must he taken.* It is, however, to be observed that the bill does not charge any fraudulent collusion between the assignee and Cooper, Vail & Co. At most it charges neglect of duty ' by the assignee in omitting to contest the debt claimed, and m failing to appeal from a decree of the District Court allowing the debt. Whether this presents a proper case for a review under the second section of the Bankrupt Act need not now be decided. For should it be conceded that the complainants had a right to apply to the Circuit Court for a review7 of the order of the District Court, and conceded also at this bill may be regarded as such an application, the Question would still remain whether the court erred in disv I pittlefleld u The Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., Bankrupt Register,
missing it. Had the court, in the exercise of its superintending jurisdiction, heard the case and decided it, as the District Court did, the decision would have been final, and no appeal could have been taken to this court.* True, if the court had decided that it had no jurisdiction to review, this court might have entertained an appeal, not for the purpose of reviewing, but for the purpose of correcting an erroneous decision respecting the power of the Circuit Court, and enabling the complainants to be heard on their application. f But it does not appear that this bill was dismissed because the court thought it had no power to review the action of the District Court at the suit of these complainants. On the contrary, it rather appears the bill was dismissed because it presented no case that called for the exercise of the superintending jurisdiction of the court. The statute, though conferring the power, does not make it obligatory upon the Circuit Court to retry every decision of the District Court which a creditor supposing himself aggrieved may ask the court to retry. And it may well be that when, as in this case, a question of fact has been twice tried, and twice decided in the same way, when it is not averred that there has been any collusion between the assignee and the creditor who has proved a debt, or that the complaining party has any evidence which he has not already submitted, or that he has been hindered by any accident or fraud from presenting bis case as fully in the District Court as he can in another tribunal, when the substance of all he alleges is that, in his opinion, the court should have determined the facts differently, it may well be that the Circuit Court, in the exercise of its discretionary power, looking also at the delay of the application, may properly conclude that no sufficient case is presented calling for a retrial of the facts.
We do not perceive, therefore, in the action of the Circuit Court anything that requires correction, and the
Decree is affirmed.
*
Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wallace, 65; Tracey v. Altmyer, 46 New York)
598
f People v. New York Central Railroad Co., 29 New York, 418.
Twenty per Cent. Cases .
1. The Twenty per Cent. Cases (13 Wallace, 576) affirmed, and the liberal view there taken of the joint resolution of 28th February, 1867, allowing to certain persons in the civil service of the United States at Washington, an additional compensation of twenty per centum upon their respective salaries as fixed by law, or, where no salary is fixed by law, upon their pay respectively, for one year from the 80th of June, 1866. declared to be the true view and applied to other cases essentially like those.
2. But not applied to the case of a person hired at Washington to do service outof Washington, nor to a contractor whocontracted todeliver finished work, and who employed another to do it for him.
3. An act passed on the 12th of July, 1870, repealing “all acts and joint resolutions, or parts thereof, and all resolutions of either house of Congress granting extra pay,” the act “ to take effect on the 1st day of July, 1870,” did not affect the rights given by the joint resolution above-mentioned.
Appeals in fourteen cases from the Court of Claims; the case being thus: On the 28th of February, 1867, Congress passed this joint resolution: * “That there shall be allowed and paid ... to the following
described persons, now employed in the civil service of the United States, at Washington^ as follows: To civil officers, temporary and all other clerks, messengers, and watchmen, including enlisted men detailed as such, to be computed upon' the gross amount of the compensation received by them; and employés, male and female, in the executive mansion, and in any of the following named departments, or any bureau or division thereof, to wit: state, treasury, war, navy, interior, post-office,attorney-general, agricultural, and including civil officers, and temporary and oil other clerks and employés, male and female, in the offices of the coast survey, naval observatory, navy yard, arsenal, paymaster-general, including the division of referred claims, commissary-general of prisoners, bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands, quartermaster’s, capitol and treasury extension, city post-office, and commissioner of public buildings, to the photographer and assistant photographer of the treasury de-
* 14 Stat, at Large, 569.
* Twenty per Cent. Cases. [Sup. Ct.**
partment, to the superintendent of meters, and to lamplighters under the commissioner of public buildings, an additional compensation of twenty per centum on their respective salaries as fixed by law, or where no salary is fixed by law, upon their pay respectively, for one year from and after the 3Qth day of June, 1866. Provided, That this resolution shall not apply to persons whose salaries, as fixed by law, exceed $3500 per annum.”
On the 12th of July, 1870,* Congress passed an act in these words:
“All acts and joint resolutions, or parts thereof, and all.resolutions of either house of Congress granting extra compensation or pay, be, and the same are hereby repealed, to take effect on the 1st day of July, 1870.”
Under the said joint resolution of 28th of February, 1866, fourteen different persons filed at different times—some of them after the passage of the repealing act—claims in the court below for the twenty per cent, given by the statute.
The first was employed by the bureau of yards and docks, as a machinist in the navy yard at Washington, upon daily wages at the agreed sum and price of $3.25 per day.
The second and third as coppersmiths on the treasury extension, upon daily wages. Under specific appropriations for the construction of the treasury extension, contracts were entered into for finished work, comprehending both materials and labor—materials separately, and labor by the day separately. The services in these two cases were rendered under the latter contracts.
The fourth and fifth as watchmen upon the capitol extension, at daily wages, their compensation changing during the year.
The sixth as a laborer upon monthly wages in the quartermaster’s department in the city of Washington.
The seventh was employed in the treasury extension as a laborer upon daily wages; working for part of the time a $1.75 per day, and for another part at $2 per day.
The eighth by the authority of the surgeon-general o
* 16 Stat, at Large, 250, § 4.
Oct. 1873.] Twenty per Cent. Cases. ***
the army, as a carpenter at the depot for receiving and distributing medical supplies in Washington.
The ninth was a watchman, laborer, and teamster by the quartermaster’s department at Washington.
The tenth was a laborer by the commissary department at Washington.
The eleventh was a laborer, upon daily wages, at the Washington arsenal.
The twelfth was in the secret service division of the Treasury Department, in the capacity of detective, at a monthly salary of $150 per month.
The thirteenth, one Hoffman, was employed by one of the quartermasters on duty in the department at Washington, by the day, as sexton at the Arlington Cemetery, near Washington, but in Virginia, and there rendered his services.
The fourteenth, one Bell, was a plate-printer in the bureau of engraving and printing in the Treasury Department. He was paid the market price for his work, the price being neither a salary nor a per diem compensation, but a fixed rate for the work done; that is to say, per one hundred sheets of face printing and per one hundred sheets of back printmg. In the performance of his duties he employed and . paid an assistant, but the pay of the assistant was received directly from the disbursing officers of the treasury, and was
educted by them from the amount earned by the claimant,
he amount paid him after such deduction was $1184.30, for
twenty per cent, of which the court below entered judgment.
Each of the fourteen claimants was paid the highest rate of wages commonly paid for services such as his.
The Court of Claims gave judgment, proformd, in all the cases, for the claimants, and the government brought the cases here.
joint resolution of February 28th, tioi be We^ here t° state, had been a matter of ques°n in this court on a previous occasion in the cases known e Iwenty per Cent. Cases;* and the court then said that
* 13 Wallace, 576.
*** Twenty per Cent. Cases. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the government.
persons are “properly in the civil service, if they were employed by the head of the department, or of the bureau, or any division of the department charged with that duly, and authorized to make such contracts, and fix the compensation of persons employed, even though the particular employment may not be designated in any appropriation ” act. It added, that “many persons not employed as clerksand messengers of the departments are in the public service by virtue of an employment by the head of the departmentor by the head of a bureau of the department authorized by law to make such contracts, and such persons are as much in the service, within the meaning of the joint resolution, as the clerks and messengers employed in the rooms of the department building."
Mr. John Goforth, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States:
In The Twenty per Cent. Cases, already reported, the salary or pay was fixed directly or limited indirectly by law; and was a fixed and arbitrary rate of compensation; and the person employed had no part in naming the amount to be paid him. In the cases now here, the compensation was not fixed or limited by any law or by the head of any department or division, but wras the highest ruling rate in the market for similar labor, and was fixed by the person employed, and changed by him as the market changed. The wages were under the restriction of no statute, and the services were such as might be rendered to any employer.
In the former Twenty per Cent. Cases, this court, in its opinion, said:
“ Certain described persons and classes of persons are plainly entitled to the benefit of the provision, whether regarded as officers or as mere employes, and it is no valid argument agains that proposition to show that there are or may be other employés or persons in the civil service here who are not within that description, as the terms of the enactment are special an do not extend to every employment in that service, but only o the described persons and classes of persons therein mentioned. p. 183Oct. 1873.] Twenty per Cent. Cases. ***
The claimants in the present cases belong to classes different from those in the case cited. Some are connected with the military service, and not with the civil at all.
The last two claimants are clearly excluded. One, Hoffman, performed his work outside the limits of Washington; and one, Bell, was a contractor for finished work.
The repeal of the joint resolution of February 28th, 1867, prevented the officers of the treasury after its passage from paying the twenty per cent., and left the Court of Claims without jurisdiction of any action for the recovery of anything thereunder. It is true that statutes in general apply only to cases that may hereafter arise. Such an act as this—an act repealing other acts, &c.—cannot in its nature operate on future acts. It applies to existing acts.
Messrs. N. P. Chipman, J. Daniels, and A. P. Culver, contra, relied on The Twenty per Cent. Cases, and the language showing its intended scope, as conclusive.
As for the act of July7 12th, 1870, they7 argued that the real purpose of that act was to cut off a general class of extra compensation which had crept into various statutes; the cutting off* of which in future, Congress thought advisable; and, for obvious reasons, that it could have no reference to a case where the compensation had been allowed, and where presumably (as in the great majority of cases in fact) it had been received three years before.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Additional compensation is claimed by the respective appellees, as employés in the civil service of the United States ni this city, by virtue of the joint resolution of the 28th of e mary, 1867, which provides that twenty per cent, addilonal compensation shall be allowed and paid to certain casses of such employés in Washington, as therein desig-
ivil officers, whose annual salaries do not exceed $3500, an a^ clerks, whether temporary or permanent, and messen°eis aud watchmen, are specifically named in the resolution, p. 184* Twenty per Cent. Cases. [Sup. Ct.**
including enlisted men detailed as such, and the provision is that the additional allowance shall be computed upon the gross amount of the compensation received by such employé as fixed by law, or where no salary is fixed by law, upon the pay of the employé for that fiscal year, and that the benefit of the resolution shall extend to employés, male and female, in the executive mansion and in any of the following named departments, or any bureau or division thereof, to wit: state, treasury, war, navy, interior, post-office, attorney-general, and agricultural, and including civil officers and all clerks and employés, male and female, in the offices of the coast survey, naval observatory, navy-yard, arsenal, paymaster-general, bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands, quartermasters, capitol and treasury extension, city post-office, and commissioner of public buildings; to the photographer and assistant photographer of the Treasury Department, to the superintendent of meters, and to lamp-lighters under the commissioner of public buildings.
Judgments rendered by the Court of Claims, involving controversies of a like character, were removed into this court by appeal on a former occasion,* when it became the duty of this court to examine the joint resolution in question and to determine what, in the judgment of the court, is its actual scope and true intent and meaning, as applied to the several cases then before the court.
Attempt was then made in argument to convince the court that the words of the resolution, “in the civil service of the United States,” as there employed, should be restricted to persons filling offices or holding appointments established by law, but the court rejected that narrow construction of the phrase and unanimously decided that neither a commission nor a warrant of appointment is necessaiy o entitle an employé to the benefits of the joint resolution, provided he was actually and properly employed in the executive mansion, or in any of the departments, or in any bureau or division thereof, or in any of the offices speci p. 185cally designated in the said joint resolution; that persons so employed here are properly to be regarded as employes in the civil service of the United States within the true intent and meaning of that phrase as there used, if they were employed by the head of the department, or of the bureau or any division of the department, charged with that duty and authorized to make such contracts and fix the compensation of the person or persons employed, even though the particular employment may not be designated in an appropriation act.
*
Twenty per Cent. Cases, 13 Wallace, 576.
Such was the unanimous opinion of the court as to the true construction of the joint resolution under consideration on that occasion, and the court, with equal unanimity, adheres to that conclusion in the cases before the court.
Many persons, not employed as clerks or messengers of a department, are in the public service by virtue of an employment by the head of a department, or by the head of some bureau of a department or division thereof authorized to make such contracts, and such persons are as much in the civil service of the United States, within the meaning of the joint resolution, as the clerks and messengers employed in the rooms of the department building.*
Much discussion of that topic, however, is unnecessary, as the question was explicitly determined in our former decision, to which reference is made for a full exposition of the present views of the court upon that subject.
Grant all that, still it is insisted that the joint resolution as been repealed since that decision was made, and that J e effect of the repealing act is to bar the right of recovery 1Q all of the cases under consideration; in support of which pioposition reference is made to the fourth section of the Ppropriation Act of the 12th of July, 1870, which enacts tiat all acts and joint resolutions or parts thereof, and all reso u*i° DS of either house of Congress granting extra com-
I jj States v. Belew, 2 Brockenbrough, 280; Graham v. United States, Bawle 380; Commonwealth v. Sutherland, 3 Sergeant & p. 186*** Twenty per Cent. Cases. [Sup. Ct.
pensation or pay, be and the same are hereby repealed, to take effect on the 1st day of July in the same year.*
Two propositions are submitted by the United States, based upon that repealing act, to show that the respective appellants in these cases cannot recover: (1.) That the repeal of the joint resolution prevents the officers of the treasury from paying the additional compensation after the date of its passage. (2.) That the repealing act, even if the resolution created an implied contract and gave jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to enforce it, divested the Court of Claims of all jurisdiction in such controversies.
Both of the propositions, as it seems to the court, overlook the material facts of the case, all of which are undisputed. They are as follows: (1.) That the joint resolution ceased to be operative at the end of the fiscal year in which it was enacted. (2.) That such additional compensation is allowed only for that year. (3.) That the claims in these cases are only for such additional compensation during that fiscal year. (4.) That the joint resolution ceased to be operative at the close of that fiscal year. (5.) That the right to such additional compensation became fixed and vested when the year’s services were faithfully performed. (6.) That the repealing act, which it is supposed constitutes a bar to the cause of action in these cases, did not become a law until more than three years after the right to the additional compensation had become fixed and vested, and the joint resolution had ceased to be operative in respect to prospective services.
Viewed in the light of these suggestions grave doubts arise whether the repealing act in question applies at all to the joint resolution, as it is difficult to believe that Congress would deem it necessary to repeal a provision which had expired by its own limitation more than three years before they acted upon the subject.
Mere supererogation, however, it is said, cannot properly be imputed to the National legislature, and there would be
* 16 Stat, at Large, 250.
much force in the suggestion if the joint resolution had at that time been in operation and had been the only provision of the kind to which the descriptive words of the repealing act would apply, but the fact is plainly otherwise, as there are several acts of corresponding import which were in full force at that date, and which, it must be admitted, are unquestionably included within those descriptive words.* Enough appears in the repealing act itself to show that Congress did not intend to give it any retroactive effect, except as therein provided, as the act expressly enacts that the provision in question shall take effect on the 1st day of July next before the day it was approved, which affords a demonstration that Congress never intended that it should retroact to any other or greater extent, f
Courts of justice agree that no statute, however positive in its terms, is to be construed as designed to interfere 'with existing contracts, rights of actions, or with vested rights, unless the intention that it shall so operate is expressly declared or is to be necessarily implied, and pursuant to that rule courts will apply new statutes only to future cases, unless there is something in the nature of the case or in the language of the new provision which shows that they were intended to have a retroactive operation. Even though the words of a statute are broad enough in their literal extent to comprehend existing cases, they must yet be construed as applicable only to cases that may hereafter arise, unless the language employed expresses a contrary intention in unequivocal terms.J
Such a law, if passed by a State, and construed to have tie effect claimed for it in this case by the appellants, would e uneoiistitutional and void; but it is not necessary to discuss any such proposition in this case, as there is not a word ln the repealing act to support the conclusion that Congress
* 12 Stat, at Large, 587 ; 14 Id. 206; 15 Id. 77. f 16 Id. 250. 1 S ■Dwarr*s’ 161; Wood v. Oakley, 11 Paige, 403; Butler v. Palmer, ard 249^°’ Jarvis«. Jarvis, 3 Edwards, 466 ; McEwen v. Bulkley, 24 Howeog* _ ’ Harvey ». Tyler, 2 Wallace, 329; Blanchard«. Sprague, 3 Sumner, 5; United States «. Heth, 3 Crunch, 399.
*** Twenty per Cent. Cases. [Sup. Ct.
Opinion of the Chief Justice, and Swayne and Davis, JJ., dissenting.
intended to rescind any antecedent contract, or to enact any bar to the right of recovery in such cases where the service had been faithfully performed before the repealing act was passed.
Apply those rules to the cases before the court and it is clear the appellees in the first twelve are entitled to recover, as the finding of the court below shows that the claimant in each of those cases is included within the joint resolution as construed and defined by this court.
But the other two claimants, to wit, Hoffman and Bell, are not entitled to recover, the former because he was employed as sexton at the Arlington Cemetery, in the State of Virginia, and not “ in Washington,” and because, consequently, his claim is not within the words of the joint resolution. Nor is the latter, because he was not in the civil service of the United States within the meaning of that provision, as he was a plate-printer, working under a contract at an agreed rate “ per one hundred sheets of face printing and per one hundred sheets of back printing.” He employed an assistant, for whose compensation he was responsible; but the finding of the subordinate court shows that the assistant was paid directly by the disbursing officer, and that the sum thus paid was deducted from the gross earnings of the claimant. Suffice it to say that the claimant was a contractor, and that he employed another to do most or all of the work, and in the judgment of the court such a contractor is not entitled to the additional compensation allowed and directed to be paid by the joint resolution under consideration.
Judgment affirmed in the first twelve cases. Judgment reversed in the last two cases, and the causes remanded, with directions to dismiss the respective petitions.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE, in whose opinion concurred the CHIEF JUSTICE, and Mr. Justice DAVIS, dissenting from the judgment in the first twelve cases:
I dissent from the judgment of the court in these cases in p. 189favor of the claimants, and will give my views as briefly as may be. When the resolution giving the twenty per cent, was passed, nearly eight months of the year to which the allowance related had elapsed. The allowance was a mere gratuity. Hence there was no vested right arising from the resolution, and there could be none. But the resolution was operative in each case until the claimant was paid. When repealed, the gratuity which it gave fell with it. The repeal necessarily had that effect. I see no reason for giving the repealing section a more limited construction. It was intended to take away from all those who had not then been paid, the right to be paid thereafter. I think, therefore, that the judgments of the Court of Claims should be reversed.