Case details
Bluebook Citation
R.R. Co. v. Barron, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 90
Full caption
Railroad Company v. Barron.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Railroad Company v. Barron.
1. A railroad company, which grants the use of its road to another company, is responsible for accidents caused to passengers which it itself carries, by the negligence of the trains of the other company thus running by its permission.
2. When a statute—giving a right of action to the executor of a person killed by such an act as would, if death had not ensued, entitled such person to maintain an action for damages—provides, that the amount recovered shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow, and next of kin, in the proportion provided by law in the distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate; and that “ in every such action the jury may give damages as ihey shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to pecuniary injuries resultingfrom such death, $c., not exceeding, &c.,”—it is not necessary to the recovery that the widow and next of kin should have had a legal claim on the deceased, if he had survived, for their support.
8. Semble, that statutes of this kind are enacted, as respects the measure of damages, upon the idea that as a general fact the personal assets of the deceased would take the direction given them by the law governing the case of intestates. Hence any damages given must, as a general thing, be so distributed, even though the party have left a will not so devoting his property.
4. The damages in these cases must depend very much upon all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. And as when the suit is brought by the party himself, for injuries to himself, there can be no fixed measure of compensation for the pain and anguish of body and mind, nor for the loss of time and care in business, or the permanent injury to health and body, so when it is brought by the representative for his death, the pecuniary injury resulting from the death to the next of kin is equally uncertain and indefinite. In the latter and more difficult case, as in the former one, often difficult also, the result must be left to turn mainly upon the sound sense and deliberate judgment of the jury, applied, as above stated, to all the facts and circumstances.
Error to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the suit below having been one against a railroa company to recover damages for the death of a passengei killed by its negligence.
A statute of Illinois enacts:
“ Sect. 1. That whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, negle, default, is sucli as would, if death had not ensued, have en i [p. 91] the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or company or corporation which, would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages not withstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount to felony.
“ Sect. 2. Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representatives of such deceased person, and the amount recovered in every such action shall be for th3 exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person, and shall be distributed to such widow and next of kin, in the proportion provided by law, in relation to the distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate; and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to the wife and next of kin of such deceased person, not exceeding the sum of five thousand dollars.”
With this statute in force, Barron’s executor brought a suit against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, to recover damages for the death of his testator, occasioned by the negligence of the company in conveying him as a passenger.
The deceased was killed while in the act of leaving the car in obedience to the orders of the conductor, who appre.- ended an immediate collision with an express train that was coining up behind with great speed, and which struck c car with such violence in the rear as to split and drive it on each side of the baggage car in front. The Illinois company owned the road, but had granted or leased to the ic igan Central Railroad Company, of which the express ain was one of the line, the privilege of running their trams on this part of the road.
e testator was a bachelor, thirty-five years old, and had th« S at° °* ab°ut $35,000, all of which, as it was stated in att arSUiment’ he left by his will to his father. He was an had^^ Profession, but for four years prior „to his death His f6611 of the county court of Cook County, Illinois. vesuinT1 °^Ce bav*ng then recently expired, he had
’ or was about to resume, the practice of his proles- [p. 92] 92 Railroad Company v. Barron. [Sup. Ct.
Bion, with a fair promise, as the evidence tended to show, of doing as well as before he was elected judge. His professional income, prior to his election as judge, had been about $3000 dollars per annum.
The plaintiff was his father, and he left brothers and sisters; one of whom had formerly received some assistance from him for support.
The defendant’s counsel asked the court to charge the jury as follows
« 1st. That the statute under which the action was brought intends to give no damages for the injury received by the deceased, but refers wholly to the pecuniary loss which the next of kin may be found to have sustained. That it makes their pecuniary loss the sole measure of damages, and that the satisfaction of that loss is therefore the sole purpose for which an action of this kind can bo instituted, there being nothing to be allowed for bereavement. And that it is incumbent on the plaintiff, before he can recover anything more than nominal damages, to show by the evidence that there are persons in existence entitled to claim the indemnity given by the law, and that they have sustained a pecuniary loss justifying their claim.
“ 2d. That to entitle the plaintiff to recover anything beyond merely nominal damages, the parties for whose benefit the action is brought must be shown by the evidence to have had at the time of the death of Barron a legal interest in his life, and that by his death they have been deprived of something to which they had a legal right.
“3d. That if the persons for whose benefit this action is brought have received in consequence of the death of said Barron, and out of this estate inherited by them from him, a pecuniary benefit greater than the maximum amount of damages which could, under any circumstances, be recovered in t is action, then, as a matter of law, they have by the death of said Barron sustained no actual pecuniary injury for which con pen sation can be recovered in this action.
“4th. That if the collision of the two trains of cars in cuestión, and the death resulting therefrom, was occasioned so e y bv the carelessness or default of the persons in charge of express train, and that the defendant had no authority or com [p. 93] trol over such persons, but that they were wholly under the authority and direction of the Michigan Central Railroad Com< pany, then the defendant is not liable in this action, even for nominal damages.”
But the court refused so to charge the jury; aud charged as follows:
It is contended by the defendant that as Barron was never married, the next of kin, being his father, brothers, and sisters, had no claim on him for support or services, and therefore there could have been no pecuniary loss to them by his death.
We cannot adopt this construction of the law, but charge you that there can be a recovery if the deceased left no kin surviving him who had any legal claim on him if living, for support.
The cause of action is given in the first section of the act in clear and unmistakable terms. If the injured party, by the common law, had a right to sue if he had lived, then if he dies his representatives can bring an action.
Many individuals who lose their lives by the fault of persons and corporations are of age, unmarried, and have no next of kin dependent on them for support. We cannot suppose that the statute intended to give the representatives of such persons the right to sue in one section and make that right nugatory in the second section, by depriving them of all damages.
he policy of the law was evidently to make common carriers more circumspect in regard to the lives intrusted to their care.
ey were responsible at common law if through their fault roken limbs were the result, but escaped responsibility if death 6.?8.pe ’ remedy this evil and provide a continuing respon-81 ’ WaS °Pinion the court> the object of the law.
edo not think it requisite to prove present actual pecuniary OSS. It can rarely be done. The attempt to do it would subsitute the opinion of witnesses for the conclusions of the jury.
e facts proved will enable the jury to decide on the proper measure of responsibility. Some cases are harder than others, cases erpaW ^n^en<^8 that the jury shall discriminate in different rul68b here *8 n0 ^xed measure of damages, and no artificial e y which the damages in a given case can be computed.
the Ury are U0^ ^ke in consideration the pain suffered by no d ecea8ed> or the wounded feelings of surviving relatives, and amages are to be given by way of punishment.
In this case the next of kin are the parties who were interested in the life of the deceased. They were interested in the further accumulations which he might have added to his estate, and which might hereafter descend to them.
The jury have a right, in estimating the amount of pecuniary injury, to take into consideration all the circumstances attending the death of Barron—the relations between him and his next of kin, the amount of his property, the character of his business, and the prospective increase in wealth likely to accrue to a man of his age with the business and means which he had. There is a possibility in the chances of business that Barron’s estate might have decreased rather than increased, and this possibility the jury may consider. The jury also have a right to take into consideration the contingency that he might have married, and his property descended in another channel.
And there may be other circumstances which might affect the question of pecuniary loss, which it is difficult for the court to particularize, but which will occur to you. The intention of the statute was to give a compensation for the pecuniary loss which the widow (if any) or the next of kin might sustain by the death of the party; and the jury are to determine, as men of experience and observation, from the proof what that loss is.
In order to render a verdict for the plaintiff it is necessary that the defendant should have been in fault.
The Illinois Central Railroad Company engaged to carry Judge Barron safely from Hyde Park to Chicago, and as a common carrier was bound to the most exact care and diligence require for the safety of passengers...........
It is not a question which train was mostly in fault, but whet er the train of the defendant was in fault at all. It is for the jury to say from the evidence whether the employees of the Illinois Central road used the necessary degree of care and diligence m the management of their train on that morning. •
We understand that the road on which the accident 0C°urI? belonged to the defendants, and by its charter was under-its sole control to carry passengers and property, and if i a the trains of the Michigan Central to run o.er it underthe management of the agents of the Michigan Centra ’1 8 „ done in such a manner as not to interfere with the safety of th passengers of the defendant, and as to such passengers the
Argument for the railroad company.
of the Michigan Central road in running their train is the fault of the defendant.
Verdict and judgment for $3750 damages. The case was now here on exceptions to the charge as made, and on the refusal to charge as requested.
Mr. Tracy, for the railroad company, plaintiff in error:
1. The court erred in declining to charge as requested in the first proposition.
The intention of the act was to compensate the widow and next of kin of the person killed for the pecuniary injury to them occasioned by his death. If the death caused them no pecuniary injury, the act gave them no damages, for the compensation for that was to measure the damages.
The statute is in form like one passed in Hew York,* and frequently considered in the courts of that State. The decisions of these courts are pertinent then to this case. In JMms v. New York Central Railroad,^ it was held, that a usband as administrator of his wife, whose death was caused y t e act of another, and who had no children, and no near io atives but sisters, could not recover for damages resulting y er death to him, and only for pecuniary damages sustained by her next of kin. h v* Hudson River Railroad,]. that in an action J a8 admini8trator of a wife whose death was hilitv +kI \ 6 aC^ anot^er> leaving children, the possi„p a t i.6- c^ddreu w°uld have received an estate in-
Sn ‘ rv ?/• mot^ier 8 earoing8, could not be considered. who! V* ^eW Y°rk and Harlem Railroad Company,§ moZ “.y 0 gir‘ °f six °’d «led, leaving a exDla„Jhe cha.rSed in the words of the statute, and by Which in°fl ° tbe juiy that the damages were to be a sum next of kin eiF °pinion’ would be tbe pecuniary loss of the
t 23 New Yorktei5°8f P‘ 589’ ê 4‘
+ 24 Id. 471. g 3 E. D. Smith, 103.
dfi Railroad Company v. Barron. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the railroad company.
In the case at bar, there was no one of the next of kin who could properly be said to sustain any pecuniary loss by the testator’s death. Kone of his next of kin had any pecuniary interest in his life. Ko one stood in the relation to him that the mother did to her child, and whose duty it would be to furnish it care and nurture. Ko one in the relation that the minor child did to its mother, who could receive the benefit of its services until it became of age. His father was not dependent upon him,—not entitled to his future earnings, nor were his brothers and sisters, and, indeed, instead of a pecuniary loss to them his death gave them, or one of them, an estate of $35,000, which otherwise he could not then receive, and which he might never receive
In Pennsylvania, under a statute not unlike the one now before us, the Supreme Court of that State seems to have held* that the pecuniary damages to be assessed in the case of the loss of a minor son of the plaintiff’s was to be estimated by the value of his services during his minority, together with the actual expenses of his care while suffering from the injury before his death, and the funeral expenses incurred.
And in a casef where a widow brought her action for the death of her husband, the same court held that although the jury might be charged that “ much is left, and much always must be left to your sound discretion,” it was because this was but an addition to the instruction that “what the plaintiff had lost in a pecuniary point of view by the deat of her husband, namely, a reasonable support and subsist ence for herself,” was the rule to be observed.
The courts of Illinois have also examined the statute.
In Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Company v. Morris,1 there was no averment in the declaration of any facts s ow ing a pecuniary loss. The court held, that as no other
*
Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Kelly, 31 Pennsylvania State, 373: Same Plaintiff v. Zebe et ux., 33 Id. 318. . •j- Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Ogier, 35 Pennsy vania | 26 Illinois, 400.
Argument for the railroad company.
could be shown, the declaration should have alleged facts showing it.
2. The court erred in refusing to charge, as requested by the second prayer, that the plaintiff could recover only nominal damages until he had shown that the decedent’s next of kin had some legal interest in his life, and that, by his death, they had been deprived of something to which they had a legal right.
A “ compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death,” is within the discretion of the jury; but not a compensation for the affliction the death occasions, nor for the possibility that the deceased might, if he had lived, make presents to the relatives. If it had been shown that his next of kin were paupers, and he bound to support them, and that he could, and would do so from his earnings, and that’ his death deprived them of this support, and had this been pleaded, the jury would had something upon which to exercise their judgment in estimating a pecuniary loss. But no such thing was either alleged or shown. No one of his next of kin was alleged or shown to be dependent upon him.
As a matter of fact, it is plain that had the defendant ive and added to his property and then died unmarried, , whole would have gone to the father, not to the other relatives.
3. The court erred in refusing to charge, that so far as the o in of the testator inherited from him a greater pecuniary benefit than the maximum which they could re-death Cann°t Nave sustained pecuniary injury by his
nepinf gr°Und uPon which the recovery must be had, is If hiq^ Urv nex^ Nin, occasioned by his death, loss anP'j. Jn®cessarily and directly involved no pecuniary of anv of 1 <^rec^y money in their pocket, or that cuniary in’ ’ °P SUC^ ^ iem, have sustained no pe-
. * Jv<’ J • 4 Th
v court erred in refusing to charge as requested in [p. 98] 98 Railroad Company v. Barron. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the railroad company.
regard to the cause of the death and its effect in discharging the Illinois Central road.
If the jury believed that the death was occasioned solely by the carelessness or default of the company in charge of the express train,—the Michigan Company,—and that the defendants had no control over them, the very fact would preclude the idea of any negligence or carelessness of the defendant. Yet, by the refusal to charge as asked, the jury were left, notwithstanding such their belief, to find a verdict against the defendant for a negligence of which its servants were not guilty.
If the Michigan Company’s servants in charge of the express train were guilty of the entire fault of causing the collision, their negligence was a gross one, and the Illinois Central Company’s servants were innocent of any actual or permissive wrong; they violated no duty to the deceased. The company was not a warrantor of the lives of passengers against negligent or wilful acts wrongfully committed by another.
As to the charge actually given.
It was directly calculated to withdraw the provisions of the act from the jury’s consideration, and to leave them at liberty to assess damages arbitrarily, in the nature of punitive damages for the killing of the deceased, and irrespectively of any pecuniary injury to his next of kin.
It in effect instructed the jury that the father and brothers and sisters of an unmarried man of thirty-five years of age-one whose death, supposing him to reach the ordinary age of “ threescore years and ten,” was still thirty-five years distant—would be his next of kin at his death; a presumption strongly against probabilities; and that they thus ha a pecuniary interest in his further accumulations, and his prospective increase of wealth.
It invited the jury into a speculation as to whether e would or would not increase bis means, would or would not marry, and would or would not have and leave issue, in short, into a speculation resting on uncertainties compoun e with uncertainties, and probabilities not depending ipon
Argument for the executor.
any facts before them; and about which neither sense nor science could form any conclusion whatever. How far less precise and scientific is this than the view of the courts of New York, which have held that a supposed interest in the savings which a mother might by her exertions make to the increase of her husband’s estate, was not an element in assessing the pecuniary injuries sustained by her children in her death !
Mr. Lincoln Clark, contraf for the executor:
By the law as it was before the statute was passed, injury to the person might be compensated in damages if it was less than fatal : if death resulted, no action for damages would lie. There was a remedy for the lesser evil, but none for the greater. The object of thé statute clearly was to declare that a provision of law so unreasonable should no longer exist. The statute embraces no new idea or theory in reference to damages. It only extends the right of action for the purpose of securing compensation for the same kind of injuries, and imposing penalties for the same character o negligence; and to this all the provisions of the statute look.
Opposite counsel plant themselves upon this provision in e second section, “And in every such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resultingfrom death to the wife and next of kin, fc.” But if the action eie at common law for injuries to the person, would not th r th t0 da!ua$e8 be Precisely the same ? If it would, u • 6 8^a^e introduces no new rule, and damages would forfhVen m Case death upon the same principle, and But it ^ame reasons as in case of injuries to the person only, this th tt ^ever been pretended in any case, nor is it in of his l'f a $ deceased been injured to any extent short to him1 th Pecan*ary damages might not have been adjudged depend^ t°U* he was a man wealth and leisure, and not Qecesanri even upon the improvement of his estate for the es or the luxuries of life. It would not be said that
-^^feiLROAD Company v. Barron. [Sup. Ct
Argument for the executor.
I?e had «offered no pecuniary injury because of no such dep^hce.
The statute gives damages to the next of kin. What damages ? Damages of the same kind and for the same reasons as in case of injury to the person. Damages not dependent upon the necessities of the individual, but damages made up of all the. facts and circumstances which would naturally tend to prevent the accumulation of his estate, and deprive the individual of the means of doing better for his next of kin than otherwise he might do, and in presumption of law would do.
Opposite counsel took below the distinction, in the charges which they asked the court to give, between substantial and nominal damages. The language of the act is, “ in every such case the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation.” Is the court to presume that mere nominal damages would, in any case, be a fair and just compensation, in so far that it might, as a matter of law, instruct the jury that they could give no more? If not, then the jury are the judges as to what a fair and just compensation is.
Can it be inferred from the language of the act that the case is destitute of merits because the next of kin have no legal claim for support ? If this were so, then the children of a father killed could not have the benefit of the action i they had passed their majority and his guardianship an tutelage; and especially if they had separate estates, were better able to support themselves than the father was to support them; for, in such a case, there would be no lega claim for support. The next of kin is a comprehensive term, and must often include those who have no claim for sup port, and stand in distant relationship to the individual.
We thus infer that a recovery is not founded upon the idea of a legal claim for support, by showing that the action given by the statute is of the same nature as that given by t e con^ mon law for mere injuries to the person, and is to be gover by the same reasons; that pecuniary injuries lesu t in cases in kind, though they may not in degree. An w e
Argument for the executor.
the damages recoverable go to those who have a claim for support makes no difference. Those having no claim may be as palpably injured as those who have.
But the statute upon which the action is based has received a construction by the Supreme Court of Illinois. In the City of Chicago v. Major* the death was of a child four years of age, and the objection to a recovery was substantially the same as in this case, to wit, that the verdict of the jury must be for the present pecuniary loss, and that as the child left no widow nor next of kin who were directly injured by the death, in a pecuniary point of view, therefore no recovery could be had. But such was not the view taken by the court.
In a New York case, Oldfield v. The New York and Harlem Railroad Company^ the death was of a girl twelve years of age. The court refused to grant a nonsuit on the ground that there was no special damage.
The proposition of the plaintiffs in error, that44 no recovery can be had in this case because the plaintiffs, or those for whom the action is brought, gain more by the death t an the maximum of damages which can be recovered,” assumes what is untrue in fact. None of the beneficiaries of this action received anything by the death, except the father, who was the plaintiff and sole legatee.
But can it be supposed that the legislature designed to j-fCe 1 e to recover damages upon so uncertain a con-110n; man *8 billed in a railroad collision; he has prope eaves children; by his will he leaves all his prophJ ?°ther8, According to the argument, the children may thPv TageS aS f°r Pecuniary injuries, because by the death UhT ?ecuniary injury; that is to say, the man killed his ’ y he death’ been deprived of the power to direct that out a w'liSK°Uld g° t0 hi8 children5 but if he dies withdescenf1 * v ^.h* 8 Pr°perty goes in the regular course of ._ ’Or 1 aving made a will, he bequeaths his property
* 18 Illinois, 849.
102 Railroad Company v. Barron. [Sup. Ct,
Argument for the executor.
to his children, no recovery can be had, because by the death they have been benefited beyond the maximum of damages recoverable; that is to say, if the property descending or bequeathed is greater than that maximum. To this result the argument leads.
But the right to recover can be placed upon no such fortuitous circumstances. The presumption of law is, that a man’s next of kin are benefited by his life; that he can do better for them alive than dead; that his gains will accrue to them. These may be in greater or less degree; they may be none at all. However these things may be, the facts will speak for themselves, and produce their proper effects on the trial.
In Pym v. The Great Northern Bailway Company* the plaintiff’s husband was killed. He was in the enjoyment of a life estate in land yielding an annual income of,£3864. Upon his death the estate passed under the entail to the eldest son, subject to a charge of £1000 per annum to the plaintiff (the wife), and £800 a year to the children. The deceased also left personal property to the amount of £3390, which was divided between the widow and the children. Now it may be that the widow and children derived a greater benefit by the death than they would by the life of the husband and the father. By the death they came to the enjoyment of ascertained amounts; but the jury gave damages in the sum of £13,000, and that, too, although the deceased was of no profession or business, and had no income or property other than that already mentioned. Upon what principle were such damages awarded ? Clearly upon the principle that had the father lived he might have used his income for the benefit of his family, though it would have been in his power not to do it. Had he lived and thus prevented his property from going to the entail, he could have done better tor his family than was done in the event of his death. n this is the presumption in every case, subject to e u inquiry as to the facts. Had Barron lived, bis next ot Ki
2 American Law Register, N. S. 234.
Argument for the executor.
might have realized by his life more than they did by his death; and this, no doubt, was the view which the jury took of the case under the instructions of the court. Was it wrong ?
The rule of the statute which gives damages for the value of the life lost, may be regarded as loose and indefinite. But the rule as to other injuries is equally loose and indefinite, as in the case of defamation of character, assault and battery of the person, breach of promise of marriage contract; and yet juries find no difficulty in awarding damages, and no doubt the injury and damages will be found to vary according to the dignity, character, and position of the person.
In The Pennsylvania Pailroad Company v. McCloskey,* the court say;
“ The damages must necessarily be measured by the value of the life lost, and not by the pecuniary loss which the representatives shall have thereby sustained. The sanction of the law lies in the duty of compensation for the value of the life destroyed, measured according to its own merits, and not according to the necessities of the kindred.”
The Pennsylvania statute does not essentially differ from that of Illinois.
In Licldns v. The New York Central Bailroad CompanyA the court say:
of aC^on can be maintained by the personal representatives I a, cceased person, whose death has been wrongfully caused or n e de^danfc’ ^ough the deceased left no husband or wife . m 8urviying who could ever have any legal claim «Pon such person if living, for services or support.”
pp ^1G ProPosition of the plaintiff' in error, that 11 no chipfl61* Ti* ke had if the colliding train was the most or chiefly to blame,” little need be said.
noia r contract on the part of the deceased was with the Illiroad} the defendant below. They owed him
23 Pennsylvania State, 530. । 28 Barbour, 41.
104 Railroad Company v. Barron. [Sup. Ct
the duty of safe conduct; they had a direct responsibility to him, and in this case no doubt exclusive ; and that responsibility they cannot avoid by leasing their road, or granting a license to another corporation to use it. It has been repeatedly decided that a railroad corporation can not avoid their responsibilities by leasing their road.*
Mr. Justice NELSOK delivered the opinion of the court.
There are only two questions raised in the course of the trial in the court below that it is material to notice.
It was insisted on the trial, in behalf of the defendants, that the express train was wholly in fault, and responsible for the injury. But the court ruled, that, considering the facts to be as claimed, still the defendants were liable; and this presents the first question in the case.
It will be observed the defendants owned the road upon which they were running the car in which the deceased was a passenger at the time of the collision, and that the train in fault was running on the same road with their permission.
The question is not whether the Michigan Company is responsible, but whether the defendants, by giving to that company the privilege of using the road, have thereby, in the given case, relieved themselves from responsibility ? The question has been settled, and we think rightly, in the courts of Illinois holding the owner of the road liable.] The same principle has been affirmed in other States.]
The second question is, as to the proper measure of dam-
ages- . .t. ,
The only direction on this subject in the statute is, tnai the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a air
*
Chicago & Rock Island Railway Co. v. Whipple, 22 Illinois, 105; Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Dunbar, 20 Id. 628. t The Chicago and Saint Paul Railroad Co. «-McCarthy, i20 IHnw > 885; Ohio, &c., Railroad Co. v. Dunbar, Id. 628; Chicago an Railroad Co. v. Whipple, 22 Id. 105. McElroj J Nelson v. The Vermont, &c., Railroad Co., 26 Vermont, 717, Me-® Nashua, &c., Railroad Co., 4 Cushing, 400.
Dec. 1866.] Railroad Company v. Barron. 105
and just compensation, regard being had to the pecuniary injuries resulting from the death to the wife or next of kin, not to exceed five thousand dollars.
The first section gives the action against the company for the wrongful act, if death happens, in cases where, if the deceased had survived, a suit might have been maintained by him. The second restricts the damages in respect both to the principles which are to govern the jury, and the amount. They are confined to the pecuniary injuries resulting to the wife and next of kin, whereas if the deceased had survived, a wider range of inquiry would have been admitted. It would have embraced personal suffering as well as pecuniary loss, and there would have been no fixed limitation as to the amount.
The damages in these cases, whether the suit is in the name of the injured party, or, in case of his death, under the statute, by the legal representative, must depend very much on the good sense and sound judgment of the jury upon all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. If the suit is brought by the party, there can be no fixed measure of compensation for the pain and anguish of body and mind, nor for the loss of time and care in business, or t ie permanent injury to health and body. So when the suit is iought by the representative, the pecuniary injury resu ting from the death to the next of kin is equally unceram and indefinite. If the deceased had lived, they may not aVe i.een benefited, and if not, then no pecuniary injury u ave resulted to them from his death. But the statute espect to this measure of damages seems to have been „ C,6 £U i°n *dea ^hat, a8 a general fact, the personal b,,8 ? t e deceased would take the direction given them uted aU<^ hence the amount recovered is to be distribfor i th ® wife and next of kin in the proportion provided dying intestfl8fplbUi^°f perS01?a! ProPertJ left by a person covprpj l Person injured had survived and rewhieb th 11 W0U^ have added so much to his personal estate, to hia aw’ 011 bis death, if intestate, would have passed i e an next of kin; in case of his death by the [p. 106] injury the equivalent is given by a suit in the name of his representative.
There is difficulty in either case in getting at the pecuniary loss with precision or accuracy, more difficulty in the latter than in the former, but differing only in degree, and in both cases the result must be left to turn mainly upon the sound sense and deliberate judgment of the jury.
It has been suggested frequently in cases under these acts, for they are found in several of the States, and the suggestion is very much urged in this case, that the widow and next of kin are not entitled to recover any damages unless it be shown they had a legal claim on the deceased, if he had survived, for support. The two sections of the act taken together clearly negative any such construction, as a suit is given against the wrong-doer in every case by the representative for the benefit of the widow and next of kin, where, if death had not ensued, the injured party could have maintained the suit. The only relation mentioned by the statute to the deceased essential to the maintenance of this suit, is that of widow or next of kin; to say, they must have a legal claim on him for support, would be an interpolation in the statute changing the fair import of its terms, and hence not warranted. This construction, we believe, has been rejected by every court before which the question has been presented. These cases have frequently been before the courts of II i nois, and the exposition of the act given by the learned judge in the present case is substantially in conformity wit those cases.*
Judgment affirmed.
*
City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Illinois, 349; Chicago and Bock; Island Railroad v. Morris, 26 Id. 400; 21 Id. 606?; Pennsylvama Railroad <0^ pany v. McCloskey, 23 Pennsylvania State, 526; Oldfield v. Harlem Railroad Company, 3 E. D. Smith, 103.
Hadden v. The Collector.
1. The title of an act cannot be used to extend or to restrain any positive provisions contained in the body of the act. It is only when the meaning of these is doubtful that resort may be had to the title, and even then it has little weight.
2. What is termed the policy of the government with reference to any par ticular legislation is too unstable a ground upon which to rest the judgment of the court in the interpretation of statutes.
3. On the 14th of July, 1862, Congress passed “An act increasing temporarily the duties on imports, and for other purposes.” The fourteenth section of the act provides that after the first day of August, 1862, “there shall be levied, collected, and paid on all goods, wares, and merchandise of the growth or produce of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, when imported from places this side of the Cape of Good Hope, a duty of ten per cent, ad valorem, and in addition to the duties imposed on any such articles when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production.” Upon the construction of the section,
Held; that the latter clause does not qualify the general language of the first clause “ on all goods, &c.,” so as to exclude from it the articles previously exempt It only provides that the duty laid by the first clause shall be in addition to existing duties imposed on such articles when imported directly from their places of growth or production; in ot er words, that such articles as already pay a duty when imported irectly from these places shall pay a further duty if imported from
p aces this side of the Cape; its object being to increase the duty upon e articles when not imported directly from their places of growth or
pro uction. The words “ any such articles ” do not mean all the artis embraced in the first clause, but only such of them as were already
subject to duty. J The section in question does not make a discrimination in favor of the por s o the Pacific, and thus contravene that clause of the Constitution ic requires that “all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
roughout the United States.” The terms “ beyond the Cape of Good not^th a™ empl°ye<i aa descriptive of the locality of certain countries, cate th11 P°sition with respect to ports of import. They indi-
tha i °cality of certain countries with reference to the position of the law-makers at the national capital.
cr2«;nhe+14111 of 1862’ Congress passed “an act in-
D1 emP°rarily the duties on imports and for other Parposes ” The 14th section was as follows :
e it further enacted, That from and after the day and [p. 108] year aforesaid [August 1st, 1862], there shall be levied, collected, and paid on all goods, wares, and merchandise of the growth or produce of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, when' imported from places this side of the Cape of Good Hope, a duty of ten per. cent, ad valorem, and in addition to the duties imposed on any such articles when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production.”
With this act in force the plaintiffs imported into New York from Liverpool several packages of raw silk, the growth or produce of Persia and China, upon which the ten per cent, duty was exacted. This duty was paid under protest, and a case being agreed on, the present action was brought in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York against the collector to recover back the amount The matter was the proper interpretation of the above section of the act of Congress, previously to the date of which it is admitted that the goods described were free of duty.
The following section of the act of 3d of March, 1863, was introduced into the argument as throwing light, perhaps, on the former:
“ Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That section fourteen of an act entitled 1 An act increasing temporarily the duties on imports, and for other purposes,’ approved July fourteenth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, be, and the same hereby is modified, so as to allow cotton, and raw silk as reeled from t e cocoon, of the growth or produce of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, to be exempt from any additional duty w en imported from places this side of the Cape of Good Hope, two years from and after the passage of this act. *
The questions were:
1. Whether the 14th section of the act of July, 1862, was applicable to goods hitherto free of duty; and
2. Whether this statute is reconcilable with the Cons1 u tion of the United States, which requires that “ all du ies,
* 12 Stat, at Large, 557.
imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”
The court gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiffs thereupon brought the case here on error.
Messrs. Slossonand Hutchins, for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Stanbery, A. Gr., and Mr. Ashton, Assistant A. Gr., contra.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.
This case arises upon the fourteenth section of the act of Congress of July 14th, 1862, entitled “An act increasing temporarily the duties on imports, and for other purposes.” That section provides that after the first day of August, 1862, “ there shall be levied, collected, and paid on all goods, wares, and merchandise of the growth or produce of countlies beyond the Cape of Good Hope, when imported from places this side of the Cape of Good Hope, a duty of ten per cent, ad valorem, and in addition to the duties imposed on any such articles when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production.”*
Soon after the passage of this act the plaintiffs made sevcia impoitations into the port of New York from Liverpool, ng and, of packages of raw silk, the product of Persia and ma, upon which the ten per cent, duty was exacted. This uy was paid under protest, and the present action was oUfe d against the collector to recover back the amount.
t e time the act was passed raw silk was not subject o any duty, aud lt was contended by the plaintiffs in the te tl ° °W’ an<^ contended by them here, that the four.' d 8e^^011 onty applied to such articles, the growth and then D M Cou^r^es beyond the Cape of Good Hope, as were no dn+ 6 ’ and not embrace articles upon which 110 duty wa8 imposed. lanffnncyP^rt °/ construction reference is made to the er sections of the act, where a duty is laid
* 12 Stat, at Large, 557.
upon articles previously exempt; to the title of the act; and to the supposed policy of the government.
It is true that some of the other sections, when providing for a duty upon articles previously exempt, express the intention of the legislature in this respect in language free from doubt. This fact, however, does not necessarily control the construction of a distinct and independent section. The fourteenth section relates to articles different from those covered by the other sections, and necessarily differs from them in its language, as it makes a discrimination, which they do not, in the duty imposed, according to the place from which the articles are exported.
The title of an act furnishes little aid in the construction of its provisions. Originally in the English courts the title was held to be no part of the act;—“ no more,” says Lord Holt, “ than the title of a book is part of the book.”* It was generally framed by the clerk of the House of Pailiament, where the act originated, and was intended only as a means of convenient reference. At the present day the title constitutes a part of the act, but it is still considered as only a formal part; it cannot be used to extend or to restrain any positive provisions contained in the body of the act. It is only when the meaning of these is doubtful that resort may be had to the title, and even then it has little weight. It is seldom the subject of special consideration by the legislature.
These observations apply with special force to acts of Congress. Every one who has had occasion to examine them has found the most incongruous provisions, having no reference to the matter specified in the title. Thus the law regu lating appeals in Mexican land cases to the District Courts of the United States from the board of commissioners, create under the act of March 3d, 1851, is found in an act entitled “ An act making appropriations for the civil and ^P10™ expenses of the government for the year ending, une > 1853, and for other purposes.”! The law declaring a the courts of the United States there shall be no exclus
*
Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Modern, 62. t 10 Stat, at Large, 98.
Dec. 1866.] Hadden v. The Collector. Ill
of any witness on account of color, nor in civil actions when he is a party to or interested in the issue tried, is contained in a proviso to a section in the appropriation act of 1864, the section itself directing an appropriation for detecting and punishing the counterfeiting of the securities and coin of the United States.*
During the past session, whilst a bill was pending before Congress entitled “A bill granting the right of way to ditch and canal owners over the public lands, and for other purposes,” all after the enacting clause was stricken out, and provisions establishing a complete system for the possession and sale of interests in mines were substituted in its place. And thus the most important act in our legislation relating to the mining interests of the country stands on the statute-book under a title purporting that the act grants a right of way to ditch and canal owners over the public lands, and for other purposes, j- The words “ for other purposes,” frequently added to the title in acts of Congress, are considered as covering every possible subject of legislation.
The supposed policy of the government is stated to be the encouragement of manufactures by imposing restrictions on goods manufactured in whole or in part abroad, and hence ’t is argued that it was against such policy to impose duties on the raw material.
Little weight can be given to considerations of this charge er ni the construction of the act. The encouragement of manufactures does not appear to have been the object of the
’ ut, on the contrary, its object was manifestly to in-ease t e revenues of the country, and it may well have supposed ^ie Jaw-makers that in many cases the ena bear a duty without decreasing the im-Lerests10115 °F ^n^ur^ous^ affecting the manufacturing in-
encpPolicy the government with refer-tain th,aUy l)ar^cu^ar legislation is generally a very uncer__ ln£’ UPon wbich all sorts of opinions, each variant
*13 Stat, at Large, 351. t 14 Id. 251.
112 Hadden v. The Collector. [Sup. Ct.
from the other, may be formed by different persons. It is a ground much too unstable upon which to rest the judgment of the court in the interpretation of statutes.
Looking to the section by itself, we find no little difficulty in its construction. The first clause declares that upon all goods, wares, and merchandise, the growth or product of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, when imported from places this side of the Cape, a duty of ten per cent, ad valorem shall be levied, and the latter clause does not qualify this general language so as to exclude from it the articles previously exempt. It only provides, as we construe it, that the duty laid by the first clause shall be in addition to existing duties imposed on such articles when imported directly from their places of growth or production; in other words, that such articles as already pay a duty when imported directly from these places shall pay a further duty if imported from places this side of the Cape; its object being to increase the duty upon the articles when not imported directly from their places of growth or production. The words “ any such articles” do not mean all the articles embraced in the first clause, but only such of them as were already subject to duty.
The amendatory act of March 3d, 1863, passed a few months afterwards, indicates very clearly the understanding of Congress that the ten per cent, was imposed as an additional duty, though in fact raw silk, as already stated, was at the time exempt. Its language is that the fourteenth section shall be modified so as to allow “ cotton and raw silk, as reeled from the cocoon, to be exempt from any additions duty when imported from places this side of the Cape o Good Hope for two years ” from the passage of the act.
The objection to the statute that it makes a discrimination in favor of the ports of the Pacific, and thus contravenes that clause of the Constitution! which requires that “ all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the nite States,” is not tenable. The ground of the objection is a
f Art. 1, 2 8.
* 12 Stat, at Large, 742.
Dec. 1866.] Shelton v . The Collector. 111
with reference to the Atlantic ports, goods which are the growth or product of Persia or China, are from countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, and are thus chargeable with duty, but with reference to the Pacific ports, they are from countries this side of the Cape, and thus not within the terms of the statute.
The answer to the objection is obvious and conclusive. The terms “ beyond the Cape of Good Hope” are employed as descriptive of the locality of certain countries, not their relative position with respect to ports of import. They are used to avoid the necessity of enumerating the countries which lie east of the Cape. il Beyond the Cape” and “east of the Cape” are often used in the acts of Congress as equivalent expressions. They indicate the locality of certain countries with reference to the position of the law-makers at the national capital. In a similar manner would the words “ beyond the Mississippi ” be construed if found in an act of Congress. They would be held to refer to the country west of the Mississippi, which, with reference to the egislators at Washington, would lie beyond that river.
Judgment affirmed.
Shelton v. The Collector.
tain thTa»CllandiSe receives damages during a voyage, proof to ascer-the soods fl01?6 TT be lodged at the custom-house of the port where 2. TheX land6d Within ten days after ^e landing,
damages must be ascertained before the goods are entered.
Circuit pa8e’ykich was brought up by a writ of error to the chuse t ?heUnited States for the District of Massa-Btatement mitted to tbe court below upon an agreed
ShX / rCt8> 8Kub8tantially as follows: plaintiffs hpln °’ ? e Plaintifis in error, who were also the island of CnX- lmP0rted a quantity of molasses from the vol a mt° the P°rt °f Boston- the time of the VOL. v, [p. 114] 114 Shelton v. The Collector. [Sup. Ct.
exportation from Cuba it was sound and sweet. Upon reaching Boston it was soured, having become so during the voyage. There was a material difference between the value of sweet and sour molasses both at the port of exportation and the port of importation,—sweet molasses being of the greater value. The molasses in question was entered at the full value of sweet molasses. The plaintiffs demanded to have the damage appraised and allowed in the computation of duties. The defendant caused the damage to be appraised, but afterwards (under instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury) refused to allow them, and duties were exacted by the defendant, and paid by the plaintiffs, under protest, upon th full value of the molasses.
It was agreed that if the court should be of opinion that damage by souring during the voyage of importation was a damage on the voyage, within the meaning of the provision of the fifty-second section of the act of March 2d, 1799, judgment was to be entered for the plaintiff's—otherwise for the defendant.
Upon this agreement the court below gave judgment for the defendant, and this writ of error was prosecuted to reverse it.
The fifty-second section of the act of March 2d, 17, above-mentioned, enacts:
“ That all goods, wares, and merchandise of which entry shal have been made incomplete, or which shall have received damay during the voyage, to be ascertained by the proper officers 0 port or district in which the said goods, &c., shall arrive, s a be conveyed to some warehouse or storehouse to be esign by the collector, in the parcels or packages containing same, there to remain at the expense and risk of the owne consignee, under the care of some proper officei, unti ep ticulars, cost, or value, as the case may require, sha ave ascertained: Provided, That no allowance for the damag any goods, wares, and merchandise that have been en er, on which the duties have been paid or secured to be Pal ’ for which a permit has been granted to the owner or thereof, shall be made, unless proof to ascertain such
Dec. 1866.] Shelton v. The Collector. 115
Argument for the United States.
shall bo lodged in the custom-house, &c., within ten days after the landing of such merchandise.”*
As having a certain bearing on the subject, reference may be made also to the twenty-first section of an act of March 1,1823, as follows :f
“That before any goods, wares, or merchandise which may be taken from any wreck shall be admitted to an entry, the same shall be appraised in the maner prescribed in the sixteenth section of this act; and the same proceedings shall be ordered and executed in all cases where a reduction of duties shall be claimed on account of damage which any goods, wares, or merchandise shall have sustained in the course of the voyage; and in all cases where the owner, importer, consignee, or agent shall be dissatisfied with such appraisement, he shall be entitled to the privileges provided in the eighteenth section of this act.”
The manner of appraisement referred to as provided in the sixteenth section, and the privileges provided in the eighteenth section, were not material to the issue in this case.
M.r. Staribery, A. G-., and Mr. Ashton, Assistant A. Gr..for tne collector:
Goods which have been completely entered, under what ever circumstances such entry has been made, are not entie to any allowance for damage, from whatever cause, un-ess proof of such damage has been furnished within ten W'th6r ^ie goods, and other action had. ent °p t a,8tatutory exception, the general law regulating j - 0 $oods and assessments of duties would of course suit w’thh Tj1 dama»e; and the exception claimed in this to -° 8’ express terms, its benefits where “proof tom hm ai” damaSe” has n°t been “lodged in the cus-Of suT Lthe ?Ort “ Within teu da^ aft- the landing W'hich themerC ?nd?8e’ * Here is a condition precedent, ease, y its omission to mention it, shows has not [p. 116] 116 Shelton v. The Collector. [Sup. Ct
1
Stat- at Large, pp. 665, 666. t Id. 786.
been fulfilled by the importer. The entry was regular and complete, and it follows that the entire fifty-second sectior is inapplicable, except as by its proviso it prohibits the al lowance claimed.
But any provision of the act of 1799 favorable to the plaintiffs was repealed by the act of 1823.
The act of 1823 declares that “ no entry shall be admitted until after appraisement of goods taken from any wreck; and the same proceedings shall be ordered and executed in all cases where a reduction of duties shall be claimed on account of damage which any goods, wares, or merchandise shall have sustained in the course of the voyage.”
If, therefore, under section fifty-two of the act of 1799 the importers could have claimed the benefit of any appraisement of damages to their goods, “sustained in the course of the voyage,” after they had procured them to be entered at the custom-house (with or without the lodgement therein of proof within ten days after landing), under the terms of this section, it is manifest they could not have the benefit of such an appraisement now, since the act of 1823 thus expressly prohibits the admission of the very entry they made. Therefore, if the importers chose to forego this prohibition of entry, by entering the goods according to invoice, they must su mit to the consequences of their voluntary action.
Whenever, in fact, the invoice has been the basis of an entry at the custom-house, complete or incomplete, or when ever an entry has been made with a specific valuation, t ere is no power to reduce the corresponding assessment o. duties.
As an importer is not, in any case of damage in the cours of the voyage, imperfect data, wreck, &c., obliged m. entry before appraisement, under the statutes cite, reason of the rule binding him to abide his entry is pa p ble.
No opposite counsel appeared.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court. The question presented for our determination in this case [p. 117] is a purely statutory one, and it must be decided by the light of the laws of Congress, which relate to the subject.
The 52d section of the act of March 2d, 1799, declares that goods, of which an incomplete entry has been made, or which shall have received damage during the voyage, to be ascertained by the proper officers, shall be conveyed in the parcels or packages containing them to some warehouse, to be designated by the collector, and that they shall remain there at the expense of the owner or consignee, under the care of some proper officer, “ until the particulars, cost, or value, as the case may be, shall be ascertained.” The proceedings touching the appraisement, in case of damage during the voyage, are particularly prescribed. The proper deduction is also provided for, whether the goods are charge able with a duty ad valorem, or a specific duty. The section concludes with a proviso, that no allowance shall be made for the damage on any goods and merchandise which have been entered, and on which the duties have been paid, or secured to be paid, and for which a permit has been granted, unless the proof to ascertain the damage shall be lodged in the custom-house within ten days after the merchandise was landed.
The act of the 3d of March, 1823, provides that, before goods taken from a wreck shall be entered, they shall be appraised in the manner prescribed by the 16th section of ne act, and that the same proceedings shall be had, in all es, where a reduction of duties is claimed on account of amage which any goods may have sustained in the course of a voyage.
It provides further, that in all cases, when the owner or
With the aPPraisement, he may avail of the privileges given by the 18th section of the
“eiCTary ‘° advert t0 the 16til and 18th sections rial tn H, 1C° aF They embrace details in nowise mate-are ineI„!iQq”8?°n1Underoon8ideration. In so far as they to the ffoods* 5'1 W m°de °f a®oertaining the damage toe goods prescribed by the act of 1799, the former ah [p. 118] 118 Shelton v. The Collector. [Sup. Ct
must yield to the latter, and it is to that extent repealei. But this in no wise affects the limitation of the time, fixed by the act of 1799, within which the proof of the damage must be lodged in the custom-house.
The plaintiffs were clearly not entitled to recover, because it did not appear that this requirement of that act had been complied with. It was neither agreed nor made to appeal aliunde that any proof was filed within the ten days.
There is another objection, which is equally conclusive The statute of 1823 requires the damage to be ascertained before the goods are entered at the custom-house. This order of proceeding was attempted to be inverted by the plaintiffs. They entered the molasses regularly at the in voice price, and then insisted upon an appraisement of the damage, and a corresponding reduction of the duties, and the latter being refused, paid the full amount under protest. The protest was unavailing. The claim for an appraisement, and for the consequent reduction of the duties, came too late. The door to relief was then closed, and no power but the legislature could reopen it. The right was one which i 6 importers might assert or waive at their option. The entry of the goods was such a waiver, and it was final. T ere was no power in the executive department of the govern ment competent to restore it. We place our decision upon two grounds : , ,
One—that the requisite proof was not lodged in tae_cus tom-house within the time prescribed by the act of 17 •
The other—that the molasses was completely entere • fore the proceedings authorized by the act of 182 we demanded and taken.
The Judgment below is
J 6 Affirmed.
Stanley v. Colt.
1. Whether words in a devise constitute common law conditions annexed to an estate, a breach of which or any one of which, will work a forfeiture, defeat the devise, and let in the heirs, or whether they are regulations for the management of the estate, and explanatory of the terms under which it was intended to have it managed, is a matter to be gathered, not from a particular expression in the devise, but from the whole instrument.
2. The word Provided, though an appropriate word to constitute a common law condition, does not invariably and of necessity do so. On the contrary, it may give way to the intent of the party as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument, and be taken as expressing a limitation in trust.
Ex. Gr. Where a testator devised real estate to an ecclesiastical society for its use or benefit: “ Provided, that said real estate be not hereafter sold or disposed of,” and in connection and continuation added numerous minute directions in the nature of regulations for the guidance of trustees whom he appointed to manage it, and with a view to the greatest advantage of the Society—
Held, that the latter, being to be regarded as mere limitations in trust, the 1 w?mer WaS a *n trust also; not a common law condition.
ere, under a will, in some respects peculiar, a devise was made to a society or its use and benefit, but the possession, superintendence, and irection of the estate, and the letting, leasing, and management of the same, was given to trustees who were invested with power to perpetuate heir authority indefinitely-the only active duties of the society being to receive the rents and profits for its use and benefit-
Held,that the legal estate was in the trustees, not in the society.
cerv to AUr! °f C.°nneeticut has the P°wers of an English court of chanthoLh it L a / fjeal eState deVised t0 charitable purposes-even in cat \ by the dGVise’that the estate sha11 “«ver besoldor circnm r6 laPSe °f time’ °r ChangeS in the condition of the property, itv to a^ TS att6nding H’make H P^dent and beneficial to the chartafcn/eZ T inVeSt the Proceeds in °ther securities; 5. Where the le * °^eVer’ 1 at no diversion of the gift be permitted. a power dit t °Ut teaSOnS at large for the exercise of such reinvestment of ft S° deViSed’ and Provides for the secure to the estate sold this™0^8 S&me USGS &S directed the wiU as lature has exercised thTpower“”04
the year 1702 or earlier, and down to the year 1818, [p. 120] and afterwards, with some unimportant alterations, there existed and was in force in Connecticut a statute thus:
“ That all such lands, tenements, hereditaments, and other estates, that either formerly have been, or hereafter shall be, given and granted, either by the General Assembly of this Colony or by any town, village, or particular person or persons, for the maintenance of the ministry of the Gospel in any part of this Colony, or schools of learning, or for the relief of poor people, or for any other public and charitable use, shall forever remain and be continued to the use or uses to which such lands, tenements, hereditaments, or other estates, have been, or shall be, given and granted, according to the true intent and meaning of the grantors, and to no other use whatsoever; and also be exempted out of the general lists of estates, and free from the payment of rates.”
This act being thus in force, William Stanley, of Hartford, Connecticut, in October, 1786, made his will in the material parts as follows:
“Imprimis. I give and bequeath unto the Second Church of Christ, in Hartford, such sum, to be paid out of the profits or rents of my real estate as hereafter mentioned, as shall be necessary to purchase a silver tankard of the same weight and dimensions, as near as conveniently may be, of that one formerly given said church by Mr. John Ellery, deceased; the same to be procured by my trustees, hereafter named, and pre sented to the officers of said church, to be kept forever for the use and benefit of said church, and my said trustees are to cause my name, coat of arms, the time of my death and my age, thereon to be engraved.
“Item. I give and devise unto my niece, Elizabeth Whitman, one piece of land, &c., also one other piece of land lying, c> and is part of the farm that formerly belonged unto my honore father, Colonel Nathaniel Stanley, deceased, and lies in the sou p ■wst corner of said farm, and butts on a highway, unto t e Elizabeth, and to her heirs and assigns forever, prom e 8 jhail not make any claim upon my estate for any services for me. .
“ Item. I do also give and devise unto my sister igal [p. 121] Dec. 1866J Stanley v. Colt. 121
use and improvement of all my real estate (except that part thereof given unto her daughter Elizabeth) daring her natural life, with this reserve, that she shall not cut any of the trees growing in that lot called Eocky Hill lot.
“Item. After the decease of my said sister, Abigail Whitman, I give and devise the whole of my real estate, of every kind and description, except which is hereinbefore given unto my niece, Elizabeth Whitman, unto the Second or South Ecclesiastical Society, in the town of Hartford, to be and remain to the use and benefit of said Second or South Society and their successors forever; Provided that said real estate be not ever hereafter solo or disposed of, but the same be leased or left, and the annual rents or profits thereof applied, to the use and benefit of said Society, and the letting, leasing, and managing of said estate to be under the management and direction of certain trustees hereafter named by me, and their successors to be appointed in manner as hereafter directed. And it is my will that the first rents, profits, or avails issuing from said real estate shall, by my trustees after it comes to their possession, be applied to the purchasing of the aforesaid tankard. And it is my will that so much of the rents, profits, or avails next issuing out of my real estate, my said trustees shall reserve in their 'own hands as shall be sufficient to purchase and pay for the one-half part of the price of a proper ell for the meeting-house in said Second Society, of the same weight and dimensions of that in the North Meeting-House, in sai town of Hartford, and be applied by my said trustees foi at purpose j provided that the other part be procured by sub cription or otherwise without taxing the inhabitants of said d‘ r'd and case said Second Society shall ever hereafter be vi ed, it is my will that my said real estate be not divided, but rG and forever t° the said Second Society, and such * 80Ciety aS shall hereafter secede or be divided therepqfatare ere.by excluded from all the use and benefit of my said ® so devised as aforesaid to said Second Society. esfnf t, 01 tbe best management and direction of my said real suverint^ aPPoint my friends, W. Ellery, &c., trustees to benefit n/’ ST’ ma'na9e ^id real estate for the use and unto themRai econd Society in manner as above directed, and «ate their rU8tee8’1 do 8ive authority and power to nomimanner t0 8aM trU8t’ which is to be done in th. ^nner and form following, viz.: That immediately after m [p. 122] 122 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct
decease, they shall nominate and appoint some meet person or persons, as occasion may require, into said trust and office; so be it that at no time more than three persons shall act in said trust or office or belong thereto at the same time. And all persons successors hereafter to said trust and office shall at all times in future have like power to superintend, direct, and manage said estate for said society, and in like manner to nominate and appoint their successors in said trust and office, and toper petuate said trust for the benefit and use of said society as occasion may from time to time require. And the aforesaid real estate or any part thereof shall not be rented or let for a longer term or lease than thirty years before the expiration of the same, and said trustees and their successors shall have full power to let and lease said estate, and to do all other legal acts for the well ordering and management of said estate under the limitation and i* strictions as herein is before expressed.”
The ecclesiastical society named in the devise above quoted was established by authority of the State of Connecticut for the support of the Gospel ministry and the maintenance of public worship, and with power, for that purpose, to hoi real estate.
After the death of Stanley and his sister Abigail, who had the life-estate, and whose death occurred prior to the year 1800, it took possession of the premises, and down to 1852 the society and trustees managed them in the manner directed in the will, appropriating the income from time to time to the purposes of the society. During the whole time the premises were untaxed, the only ground for the exemp tion being the provision in the act of 1702, quoted on p
120. In the year 1852 the legislature of Connecticut, upon the application of the society and of the trustees, passe resolution reciting a memorial by the church and trus ee, showing the will, possession of the land, &c.
“Also showing that the said land has on it a great numb buildings, owned by the tenants, built of wood, and in a ec state; that the land on which they stand has, by t e ap$ about three-fourths of a century, become valua e, s which is in the central part of the city of Hart or, a [p. 123] Dec. 1866.] Stanley v. Colt. 123
valuable to be improved profitably in any other way than by the erection on them of permanent brick or stone blocks of buildings; that the lessees cannot safely erect such buildings, because of the uncertainty of their tenure, and because they would thereby place themselves in the power of the owners, and that the owners have not the means, and could not lawfully contract debts for the purpose of building; that other parts of the estate are subject to other embarrassments arising from the restrictions of the will, so that said property has become unproductive, and the income greatly reduced, and the object of the testator in devising the property to the society frustrated; that those embarrassments, both to the owners and occupants, consequent on the restrictions in the will, are not likely to be removed, but will be increased by time, unless said land can be sold and conveyed in fee simple, and the proceeds suitably invested.
And praying the Assembly to authorize a sale and conveyance of said land, under such guards and provisions as will secure the application of the proceeds according to the true intent and meaning of said will, as per petition on file.”
This legislative record thus proceeded:
“This Assembly having inquired into the facts stated in said memorial, find the same to be true; and do further find that the st valuable portion of said estate is situated in a central part sai city of Hartford, is covered with unsuitable wooden m mgs, and it is for the interest of the people of said city that use u and valuable buildings should be built thereon, and
„grant the prayer thereof; and it is therefore vith 8a’d trustees and their successors, together herehv :kEobin8On’ as agen*> ^all have power, and they are morial ?nzed’to sed an<t convey the said lands in said me-from timo^ 8UCh Parts or proportions thereof as may and snffio- *me be advantageously sold, and to execute good enantsTf - ed8 thereOf * fee simPle> with ™ without covjeet to Iio 8eiZln and warranty> 011 ^e part of said society, sub-And th* °F incumbrance8J if any shall lie upon said property, agent, invested °^eed8 8uch 8ales shall be, by the trustees and real estate nf d ki ^00<^ and 8ufficient bonds and mortgages of interest of\aid°U ° the Value °f the amount invested; and the i proceeds shall be paid over to the treasurer of
Argument for the heirs.
said society, and shall be appropriated to the use of said society in the same manner, and subject to the same use, as the rents or income of said property are by said will required to be appropriated, and for no other uses or purposes whatever. And all mortgages or investments made as aforesaid from time to time, and whenever such loans or investments shall be shifted or changed, the securities shall be taken in the name of such trustees and their successors, and expressed to be for the use and benefit of said society, according to the will of William Stanley, deceased : Provided, however, That before any person or persons shall proceed to make sale of said lands, or any part thereof, he or they shall become bound, in a good and sufficient bond, to the judge of probate for the district of Hartford, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duty in the premises; and said trustees shall also give the like bonds for the faithful performance of their trust.”
The heirs at law of Stanley had no notice of any of these proceedings.
The trustees and agent accordingly, in August, 1852, by deed reciting the legislative proceeding, and purporting to be made in virtue of their said capacity of trustees an agent, and of the powers conferred by the act, sold an conveyed, with special warranty, to one Colt, “all the rig t, title, and interest that said Second Ecclesiastical bocieh, &c., have or ought to have in or to the above-descn e tract of land,” one of the tracts devised. .
Colt having entered into possession, the heirs at aw o Stanley now brought ejectment against him for the pr ises. The court instructed the jury that on the case p • sented the defendant was entitled to their verdict; andju g-ment having gone accordingly, the case was now error.
Messrs. W. M. Evarts and C. E. Perkins, for the heirs at law. The case is of general importance. A full argument wi
be allowed.
Three questions arise: ; „ □ I. Had the society power under the will itself, to s convey this property to Colt without incurring a to.tei™
Argument for the heirs.
II. If it had not such power under the will, was it enabled so to do by the act of the legislature of 1852?
III. If the society had no power to convey from either source, what consequence results from its violation of the condition of the devise ?
That the legal estate is in the church must, we suppose, be conceded. The devise is, in plain terms, to it in fee: “ I give and devise the whole of my estate. . . unto the Second or South Ecclesiastical Society... to be and remain to the use and benefit of said Second or South Society and their successors forever.” No legal estate is given to the trustees. They are but to “superintend, direct, and manage.” This is exactly what any mere agent of restricted powers would o i d to any estate, of which confessedly the fee would be in his constituent. Mere directions to^one person to superintend, direct, and even to manage, cannot carry to him the legal estate given in plain, appropriate, and even technical terms to another in fee; even assuming that it might do so, if the legal estate were left undisposed of;—which we do not admit. Inference cannot control direct expression. The trustees were to have no powers but what were necessary to the office of superintendence, direction, and management of an estate that was never to be “ divided,” ut which was “ to remain entire and forever to the said econ Society. ’ The legal estate then was given to the church. °
The heirs of Stanley say then:
J’ SOciet^’ under the Provisions of the will, could not wi out violating the condition upon which they held
® and thus incurring a forfeiture of their title.
t e v t e °bvious intent of the testator and by the legal ditin i W words U8ed> this devise is of an estate upon conthp ba $U+ S^uen^’ a breach of which destroys all right of society in the property. soci'ph? 1 8boW8 that the testator meant to deprive the should ah 6 POW?r 8ell. He meant that this property Heved in the hands of the society. He bee pioperty would increase in value, and from
Argument for the heirs.
a sure increasing fund would supply the society’s increased wants, while if the land was sold and the money invested, the society would receive no larger amount a hundred years thereafter, than at that day. He also desired that he should be remembered in connection with this society forever. He had an obvious pride of family name and estate, and an attachment plainly to this particular Second or South Church. He desires his “arms” and name to be put upon a sacramental tankard, “to be kept forever.” He leaves to his niece a piece of land that belonged to his “honored father, Colonel Nathaniel Stanley, deceased.” To his sister, he leaves for life another piece, “ but she shall not cut any of the trees.”
The bulk of the real estate he leaves in fee to the church, separating the real estate from all power to manage it, and giving neither to the devisee nor to the trustees a power to sell the estate; but, on the contrary, showing that he meant it should never be sold or disintegrated. He looks forward to the possibility of a division of the religious body, and provides against any division of his estate from even that cause; declaring that if the society should “ ever hereafter be divided, his real estate left to the existing body should “be not divided, but remain entire and forever to the said Second Society.”
The courts in Connecticut have held, that where Jan was devised to an ecclesiastical society, the intent of the donor s shown by that very act to be that it should not be sold.
The means adopted by the testator to accomplish this in tent, are the most effectual that could be conceived for is purpose. He did not intrust the accomplishment of his object to the society, to the legislature, or even to courts o equity. He determined to make it the interest of thr socwty and its members to use the gift as he directed, by causino forfeiture to follow their misuse.
He used apt words to carry out this intention.
In construing wills, courts are governed by certain wej [p. 127] Dec. 1866.] Stanley v. Colt. 127
*
Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Connecticut, 411.
Argument for the heirs.
settled rules. One of these rules, the seventeenth in Mr. Jarman’s series, is :*
“ Where a testator uses technical words, he is presumed to employ them in their legal sense, unless the context clearly indicates the contrary.”
The obligation of the rule is nowhere more recognized than in Connecticut, where in G-old v. Judson,\* the court say: “We are bound* to suppose the testator used language in its usual legal sense.”
The word Provided is a technical word: its meaning has been settled by innumerable decisions, and it has always been held that a devise to A., provided he should or should not perform certain acts, is a devise upon a condition subsequent, and the estate vests in A., subject to being divested if he does or does not perform the acts specified.
This is the rule in Connecticut.
In *Wright v. Tuttle,\* Swift, J., says:
“There is no word more proper to import or express a conition, than the word provided, and it shall always be so taken un ess it appear from the context to be the intent of the party mat it shall constitute a covenant.”
words were cited and approved in the subsequent ease ot plch y. Atwater,§ and in *Wheeler v. Walker.\\* fir jS ^ec'18^on is the more obligatory, as it has been afmed by subsequent Connecticut decisions,^ and has, ever thft weie made, been considered as fixing the law in the State of Connecticut on this subject. will dpC^S-e ^ai being in relation to the construction of a deciHinI1811r^<real e8^ate> tbi8 court will govern itself by the ns of Connecticut on this point.**
*
Jarman on Wills, vol. ii, T Connecticut, 625 v 10 «MOonwetta.^41,: t 4 Day, 326. * * Jatisön^Chew nwT t 8 491’ &nd OtheM vnew> 12 Wheaton, 167.
Argument for the heirs.
But this construction of the word provided is not confined to Connecticut; it has always been so held both in England and this country from the earliest time.
Cornyns, in his Digest,* says :
“ Divers words of themselves make an estate upon condition, as ‘sub conditions, 1 proviso semper' and the word proviso makes a condition, though joined with other words, as ‘provided always and it is covenanted,’ ‘ provided and it is agreed,’ and therefore if the word proviso be the speaking of the grantor and obliges the grantee to any act, it makes a condition in whatever part of the deed it stands, and though there be covenants before and after, it is not material.”
This is in relation to deeds. In relation to wills, he says:f
“ So words in a will make a condition which will not make it in a deed. So a devise to A. provided, and my will is that he keep it in repair, makes a condition; so there shall be a condition in a will though there be no words that the estate shall cease, as a devise to a wife, provided that she shall have a rent only if she departs out of London.”
Similar decisions as to the effect of the word “provided have been made in most if not all the States, and in England.
In Hooper v. Gummings, a case in Maine,! the expression was “provided they (the grantees) fence the land and keep it in repair.” The question arose whether this word create a condition, and the court say :
“We may assume that the proviso in the deed created a condition subsequent, and in this we are sustained by most i no all the authorities ancient and modern.”
In the New Hampshire case of Chapin v. School,§ the court
say:
“ The usual words of a condition subsequent are so that vided,’”&c. ________ ___
*
Vol. 8, p. 86, Condition A 2. t PaSe J 45 Maine, 359; and see Marston v. Marston, 45 Id. g 35 New Hampshire, 450.
Argument for the heirs.
In another case, Wiggin v. Berry, from the same State,* a devise was to a town “ provided ” they would pay the taxes on the land and devote the net profits to keeping a school for the benefit of the inhabitants. The town did not comply with these conditions, and the court held that this was a devise upon condition, that the town had forfeited their title, and the land went to the testator’s devisees. This case seems to be directly in point.
In Massachusetts, Attorney- General v. Merrimack County, the court say:
“The words ‘provided,’ ‘so that,’ and ‘upon condition that,’ are the usual words to make a condition.”
In Hayden v. Stoughton,\ a case in the same State, the devise was to a town for a school-house, “ provided said school-house is built by said town within one hundred rods of the place where the meeting-house now stands.”
In this case the school-house was not built, and the court held that the land upon entry by the heirs reverted to them.
It is an important case in many respects, and will be referred to hereafter. u So in Hadley v. Hadley,§ the court held that the words provided and “ on condition,” had the same effect in making a devise conditional. r,^n^jn ^awson v. School District,|| in speaking of a conditional estate, they say;
tat USUa,l and Proper technical words by which such an ees granted by deed are ‘ provided, so as, or on condition.’ ”
To the same effect are cases in New York and Pennsyl»ania."
e English case of Tattersall v. Howell,** the same word
■;■■■------— _____ ______
<r Ca J i? ’
State, 232- 1 Selden’125 ’ Picklev- McKissick, 21 Pennsylvania
* * 2 M ’ M^Klsslck v- Pickle, 16 Id. 140.
z Merivale, 26.
Vol. v.
&
,
| 14 G™? ’ 612- t 5 Pickering, 534.
'I 7 Allen> 128.
Argument for the heirs.
“ provided ” was used, and the court held it created an estate upon condition.
The usual and legal effect of this word “ provided,” being therefore to create a conditional estate, subject to forfeiture by a breach of the condition, this court will give it such a construction here.
There is another rule oi jonstruction—the eighteenth of Mr. Jarman’s series,* and strongly enforced, as a true rule of law, in an important casef by Lord Chancellor Sugden—applicable to this question.
“ Where a word is used in one devise in a will with a particular meaning, and is again found in a subsequent devise used m the same manner, it is to have the same effect.”
Tn one devise in this will, the testator devises certain lands to Elizabeth Whitman, “provided she shall not make any claim upon my estate for any services done for me.
There can be no doubt but that this is a devise upon condition subsequent, upon the breach of which a forfeiture would ensue.J
Will it be argued, that this condition is void, as a restriction of the power of alienation ? The law is not so.
1st. It has always been held in Connecticut by an unin terrupted chain of decisions, that under the act of 1702, sue a restriction is valid.
In New Haven v. Sheffield,§ decided in 1861, the court say.
“ The chief object in the enactment of that statute was n so much to exempt certain estates from taxation as to con and perpetuate the estates referred to in it.
And this expression was affirmed and approved in the very latest case on the subject, Brainard v. Colchester,\\ ecl 1863, and see Hamden v. Rwe.^______
*
Jarman on Wills, vol. 2, p. 527 (side page 744). f Ridgeway v. Munkittrick, 1 Drury & Warren, 84. t Rogers Law, 1 Black, 253 i Sackett v. Mallory, 1 Metcalf, 355, S-ton ». Brownlow, 4 House of Lords Cases, 1-183. | 30 Connecticut, 171. II 31 Id. 407. 1 24
Argument for the heirs.
This court will hold itself bound by the decisions of the State of Connecticut on this subject.*
2d. Apart from this statute of 1702, it is conceived that such a devise to an ecclesiastical society is good.
In many of the cases hereinbefore and hereinafter cited, similar devises were held to be valid.
In Brattle Square Church v. Grant, a Massachusetts case,j" the devise was on condition that the land should never be sold, but the minister should always reside on it. In considering the question whether the devise was void as violating the rule against perpetuities, the court say:
“ A grant of a fee on condition only creates an estate of a base or determinable nature in the grantee, leaving the right or possibility of revester vested in the grantor. Such an interest or right in the grantor, as it does not arise and take effect upon a future uncertain or remote contingency, is not liable to the objection of violating the rule against perpetuities, in the same degree with other conditional and contingent interests in real estate o an executory character. The possibility of reverter, being a vested interest in real property, is capable at all times of being released to the person holding the estate on condition or his grantee, and if so released vests an absolute and indefeasible th 6 r ere^°' §rant or devise of a fee on condition does not ere ore fetter and tie up estates so as to prevent their aliena-
.• an thus contravene the policy of the law, which aims to e free and unembarrassed disposition of real property.”
WaS a^n by the same court in Austin v.
geport,^ where there was a grant of land to a parish narf°n i-10n that ifc be forever used as a site for a church in an m part for SUppOrt of min^g^er,
j ’ u.t P°int is not an open one here.
V* Care^^ ln court, an important case, fully vidimr P°mt takeU WaS’that tbe devise t0 a charity proas makinan U°ne °? ^an(^ ahooid ever be sold, was void ^___J__PerPeluity contrary to law; but the court unan- [p. 132] 132 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct
Argument for the heirs.
imously held that a devise to a charity could be made in perpetuity, and say:
“ The direction in the will that the real estate should not be alienated, makes no perpetuity in the sense forbidden by the law, but only a perpetuity allowed by law and equity in the case of charitable trusts.”
Similar decisions exist in New York,* North Carolina,! Kentucky,^ and other States. §
II. This act of 1852 was void upon three grounds:
1st. No State legislature has power to alter the express conditions of a will. Such an attempt is contrary to the principles of natural right and justice which no legislature can contravene.
In Hooker v. Canal Co.,|| a Connecticut case, the court say:
“ The fundamental maxims of a free government require that the right of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.”
They cite and approve the expressions of Marshall, C. in Fletcher v. Peck
“ And it may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power,” &c.
This whole subject is fully treated in the late decision o Booth v. Woodbury,** where it is expressly held that the egislature can pass no laws contrary to the “principles of natur justice.” . ,
All these cases, and the jurisprudence of Connection__
Pennsylvania
Y
> [p. 133] Dec. 1866.] Stanley v. Colt. 133
*
Williams v. Williams, 4 Selden, 535, 554, 555. f State v. Gerard, 2 Iredell’s Equity, 210. J Curling v. Curling, 8 Dana, 38. g See Wiggin u. Berry, 2 Foster, 114; Brown ^Hummell,.6 State, 86; Grissom v. Hill, 17 Arkansas, 483; Franklin v. ■| 14 Connecticut, 152; and see Gas Co. v. Gas Co., 25 Id. 38, kiss v. Porter, 30 Id. 418. * it«
1
5 Crunch, 185. .. 32 Connect»!, W
Argument for the heirs.
this subject, are in harmony with and in fact founded upon the case of Calder v. Bull,* a case which went from Connecticut to this court; and the expressions in Goshen v. Stonington are almost identical with those of Mr. Justice Chase, where he says:
“I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State legislature, or that it is absolute and without control, although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the constitution or fundamental law of the State.”
But both in this court and many of the State courts the same rule is applied.f
A case quite in point is Brown v. Hummel,^. in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. There a devise of land was made to an orphan asylum, with a provision that the land be never sold, but the rents and profits only be applied to the use of the asylum. The legislature, by a special act, directed that part of the land be sold.
The court held unanimously that the act was void and unconstitutional.
If the legislature can, by a special act, dispense with the performance of one condition of a devise, they can with any.
Such an act as this is different from those enabling or ea ing acts often passed, such as those authorizing a sale minors lands, or those of lunatics, &c. In all such cases ey merely remove a personal disability.§ Acts, too, will be on the other side in which power has been given to corporations to sell, where in the gifts to them no such wer was expressly given. Such cases are from the pur-
* 3 Dallas, 386. vine’s?^Ji n°r’ 9 Cranch’43; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 627; Ir-32 Id 34. pA ennsylvania State, 256; Shoenberger v. School District, «ontlaii S v DaViS’ 2 DeVereUX & Battle’ 461i Hatch - Ver’ ««gent’. University Moy<,r’ &c ’ 10 B"bour. 223i California,!. ? ‘ Wllliams, 9 Gill & Johnson, 365; Billings v. Hall, 7 t 6 Pennsylvania State, 86.
Pennsylvania Stah^Td 2TSelden’ 358 > Shoenberger v. School District, 32 y vania State, 34; Leggett v. Hunter, 5 E. P. Smith, 445.
134 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the heirs.
pose. To say nothing about the constitutionality or safety of this sort of legislation in general, it may he noted that in many cases the legislature has only aided an intent of a donor left unexpressed or but insufficiently given, or cases in which perhaps the legislature was itself the donor. But can any case be found where, without the assent of the heirs, a power to destroy the identity and substance of the gift has been given in any case where it was plain that the testator meant to keep the land in specie, forever undivided in the corporation, beneficiary, and devisee? What is proper to be done in any case where heirs may have an interest, and what the legislature of Connecticut itself has done, may be seen in the Acts of Connecticut, May Sessions, 1850, at page 82. There Thaddeus and Eunice Burr, she owning it, had granted a lot for a parsonage. An act reciting that the land was not now and never could be wanted for a parsonage, and that a sale was desirable and expedient, authorized a sale. But how ? It declares the sale is to be made “ with the assent of the heirs of the said Eunice;” and the act authorized the heirs to release a condition in the deed, in the presence of witnesses; and such release, it was enacted, “shall operate to foiever estop said heirs, and all claiming under them. This is t e right way; and in no other way, assuredly,in a case like t e present, could a sale be authorized and the right of proper y in the heirs be duly respected.
It will be argued that a legislature has power as parent patrice to interfere and authorize a sale of land in cases i e the one at bar; but the authorities say that the legis a ur in this country have no such power.
In Moore v. Moore,* a Kentucky case, the court say:
“We do not admit that the commonwealth as parens patria can rightfully interfere, unless there has been an eschea » and then she can become absolute and beneficial owner. here are regulated by law, and if any person has a claimi P 1 erty ineffectually dedicated to charity, the commonwe^^
* 4 Dana, 366; and see Lepage ®. McNamara, 5 Clarke (Iowa), White v. Fisk, 22 Connecticut, 31 (54).
Dec. 1866.] Stanley v. Colt. 135
Argument for the heirs.
no prerogative right to decide on that claim and dispose of the property, as the King of England has been permitted to do.”
2d. This act of 1853 is void, as depriving the plaintiffs of property, contrary to the constitution of the State of Connecticut.
That instrument declares that no person shall he “deprived of property but by due course of law.”
It is not pretended that in this case any compensation was made, nor were any of the plaintiffs cited to appear, or informed by notice in any way, of the proceedings.
By this act, property was taken from the heirs. They had a conditional or contingent interest, being a right to enter upon and hold this property for a breach of condition, which right this act would deprive them of.
The case of Hayden v. Stoughton* in Massachusetts, affirmed iu Austin v. Cambridgeport,and in Proprietors v. Grant,\ is in point. In that case there was a devise to a town upon condition that they erect a school-house, which they neglected to do, and the land was thereby forfeited. An action to recover it was brought by the heirs of the residuary devisee, and the court held that there was a contingent interest left in the devisor, which by the residuary devise ne gave to the residuary devisee.
This accords with the law in Connecticut.
In Smith v. Pendell,§ in that State, the court say:
bipt ’ therefore, was more than a naked possithn 7 k that °f an heir aPParent > was an interest in the estate, ug a contingent one. Such an interest is descendible.”
«n?168® keirs, therefore, had an interest in this real estate, the Staie constitution this act is void.
e say further that it is void as contrary to the
* 6 Pickering, 628. . O1 T, on_
1
8 Grav -I _ T 21 Id. 215. Bobertso/à n ’ 860 a\S° Ullderhi11 ”• Bailroad Co., 20 Barbour, 455; and oertson v. Fleming, 4 Jones,s E » JV Connecticut, 112.
Argument for the heirs.
Constitution of the United States, which, prohibits a State from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
It has been held from an early day in Connecticut that by the law of 1702, the State made a contract with all devisors of lands for the purposes mentioned in that act, and that all acts of the legislature affecting such devises in any way con trary to such act are void.
This question first arose in 1826, in the case of Atwater v. Woodbridge*
The last clause of the act of 1702, exempts the property named in the act from taxation, and the question was whether an act of the legislature taxing such property was valid. The court say:
“ The government (by this act) made a contract with all such persons as might be disposed to give their property7 to these religious purposes and charitable uses, that it should be forever exempted from taxation.”
The question again arose in 1829 in Osborne v. Humphrey,] and was again argued at great length by some of the ablest counsel in the State. The court held, in a very well-considered opinion, that an act affecting this exemption from taxation was contrary to this clause of the Constitution o the United States, and based their opinion upon the case o New Jersey v. Wilson,$ in this court, and quote and a rm the words above cited from Atwater v. Woodbridge.
These cases have been affirmed by decisions in Connecti cut down to the present time.§
The decisions of this court equally establish the proposi tion, especially the case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,\\ where Marshall, C. J., says:
“ These gifts were made not indeed to make a profit for t e donors or their posterity, but for something in their opinion o
* 6 Connecticut, 230. f ? 11 Id § Parker®. Redfield, 10 Connecticut, 490; Landon v. Litebfiew, _ 251; Hart v. Cornwall, 14 Id. 228; Seymour v. Hartford, 21 Id. , Haven v. Sheffield, 30 Id. 160; Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Id. 40.
Dec, 1866.] Stanley v. Colt. 137
Argument for the heirs.
inestimable value, for something which they deemed a full equivalent for the money with which it was purchased. The consideration for which they stipulated is the perpetual application of the fund to its object in the mode prescribed by themselves."
The act of 1852, in fact destroyed this contract. The contract was that the land when so given, should forever remain and be continued to the use or uses to which such lands, &e., have been or shall be given and granted, according to the true intent and meaning of the grantors. This was the principal object in view in passing the act.
In New Haven v. Sheffield* the court says,—its words being cited and approved in Brainard v. Colchester,the last case on this subject in Connecticut,—
The chief object in the enactment of that statute was not so much to exempt certain estates from taxation as to confirm and perpetuate the estates referred to in it with certain attending privileges.”
Now the “true intent and meaning” of the testator was as expressed in his will, that the land “should not ever thereafter be sold or disposed of,” and if so sold it should revert to his heirs.
In the Dartmouth College case, Marshall, C. J., referring o e substitution, made in that case, of the will of the a e for the will of the donors, says:
oartlnL Chanfe may be f°r the a(lvantage of this college in eral h / v ™ay b°. for tbe advantage of literature in gensive’ of th * n° accor^n^ wdl of the donors, and is subvertaken ” a COn^rae^ on the faith of which their property is
Provision» Af^kUed that thlS devise doea not e(>me within the poses as « °f 17°2, because ifc ia not for such pur-point meutloued therein? Let us consider that
* 80 Connecticut,
t 31 Id. 407.
Argument for the heirs.
The objects specified are “for the maintenance of the ministry of the Gospel in any part of this colony, or schools of learning, or for the relief of poor people, or for any other public and charitable use.” This is a devise for the “ maintenance of the ministry of the gospel.” It is a devise to an Ecclesiastical Society, established “ for the support of the gospel ministry and the maintenance of public worship.” The lands are always to be kept by the society, and the rents are to be applied in the first place to purchase a tankard (obviously for sacramental purposes); to assist in purchasing a bell to summon the congregation to religious exercises; and the remainder of the annual rents and profits were to be applied during all time to the “ use and benefit of said society.”
Now as the sole object for which said society was established was the support of the Gospel ministry and the maintenance of public worship, and the rents were to be applied by the society for its use and benefit, they must necessarily be applied for the maintenance of the Gospel, as the society could not apply them to any other use.
But this expression of the statute has received a construction by the courts of Connecticut, and words much less apt than those in the will have been held to come within its air meaning and intendment.
The question first arose in Parker v. Pedfield* Thewor^s there used were “ for the support and maintenance o> church.” It was objected that this expression did not bring the case within the statute, but the court decided that it And the view was even more strongly taken in an on Litchfield^ where the expression was “ one lot with the i-visions and commons to be and remain forever to an the use and improvement of the first minister and his succ in the work of the ministry in said place.” . . ,
There are decisions in other States in similar cases sustain this construction.
In a case entitled In re Trustees,], in New or, . was a devise to trustees to support scholars o a sc o,
* 10 Connecticut, 490. t H Id. 257-8. I 31 New Yo
Argument for the heirs.
it was held to be a devise to the school within the meaning of the act of 1806, which speaks of property devised for the use or benefit of a school; citing the well-known case of Attorney-General v. Tancred, from Ambler,* where it was held that a devise to a trustee for sundry students of Christ College was valid under the mortmain acts as in effect a devise to the college.o
In McDonagh's Executors v. Murdoch,^ this court say:
“All the property of a corporation like Baltimore is held for public uses, and when the capacity is conferred or acknowledged to it to hold property, its destination to a public use is necessarily implied.”
So in Massachusetts, Brown v. Porter,\* and in Pennsylvania, McGirr v. Aaron.§*
The decision in Seymour v. Hartford, in 21st Connecticut,|| will be relied on as opposed to this view, and to show that a devise must follow the exact words of the statute to come under it.
In that case the conveyance of the land was made to the society in fee, and expressly stated to be “ without any manner of condition. It was asserted that the mere conveyance to an ecclesiastical society brought the land within the act, so that a could not be taxed.
AC0U.rt 8ay they affirm all the preceding cases au e principles upon which they are founded. They then th? 1 a Question of exemption from taxation, y shall construe the conveyance strictly and so as not to
twX„ +nUCh e?empti0n8‘ Aud the? fiud a distinction be-had b th an^ former cases, that in them “ the donor Droncrt 6 expre88 terms of the grant, impressed upon the thp rn- y- f perpetual sequestration for the maintenance of ministry, &c.” They say:
th? i8 t0 be found in the deed of Mrs. Burnham, —’---- er hand, the deed expressly declares the gift is a
*
Page 851. 7777 Z-----------------------------------------
2
1 Pennsylvania, 49. { Pa^l^’ Massachusetts’ 93
Argument for the heirs.
Bure and absolute fee simple, without any manner of condition. Of course the grantor does not require that the property should be sequestered, or kept, or used for the maintenance of the ministry, nor does she declare any particular intent whatever, unless the general character and corporate powers of the society imply one, which we think is not the case. . . . We are unable to distinguish this grant from any absolute purchase made by the society generally, or from any unqualified gift made to it. . . . We discover in Mrs. Burnham’s deed nothing but an unqualified transfer of property, which may be used at the pleasure of the grantees; no restriction, no sequestration, for any public object. The society may do with it as they please; they may sell it, or use it, or give it away, without being liable to any one.”
The case at bar differs therefore entirely from the case of Seymour v. Hartford in the very points mentioned by the court as the ones in which that case differed from those theretofore decided. This property was sequestered and restricted. If the donor had any intent, it was that this land should be perpetually sequestered for the use of the society. If Mr. Stanley had merely devised this property io tk society, saying no more, it might be argued that Seymour y. Hartford applied, especially if he had said that he devised it “ without any manner of condition,” instead of annexing, as he has done, this express condition to it, and repeating it over and over.
But if this devise does not come under the expression, “ for the maintenance of the ministry of the Gospel, it cer tainly does under that of “ other public and charitable use.
III. This devise being upon condition that the society should not sell and convey this land, and they av?£> broken the condition, what is the effect of such violation-Of course, that the heirs of the devisor may enter, decia the devise forfeited by the breach, and recover the proper y
devised. j :n
In Hayden v. Stoughton,\ already cited, and affir
f 5 Pickering, 528.
* Hamden v. Rice, 24 Connecticut, 355.
Argument for the purchaser.
Brigham v. Shattuck* and again in Austin v. Cambridgeport,] land was given for a school-house, provided it was built in a certain spot. It was not so built, and the residuary devisee entered for breach, and brought this action to recover the land. The court held the devise conditional, and found that there had been a breach, and thereby the estate was forfeited and went to the claimants.^
It may be argued that even if the society have broken the condition of the devise, the land is not thereby forfeited, but that a court of chancery, either under the principle of cy pres or its authority over trusts, is the only power that can interfere with the sale. But in Connecticut the courts of chancery have not adopted and do not apply the principle of cy pres.§ And this court will follow the rule in Connec ticut.||
Nor would the principle of cy pres, qy its jurisdiction over trusts, ever empower a court of chancery to authorize or relieve against a breach of the condition of a devise.
Messrs. B. R. Curtis and W. W. McFarlane, contra, for the purchaser:
The importance of the case, spoken of on the other side, is a mitted, and the invitation to argue it fully is accepted.
e heirs cannot recover, unless they can show that the devise was upon some condition, or that there was some limitation made in the will in their favor.
It is not sufficient to show that the lands have been die J"0111 tbe U8e for which they were devised, or that ya not been enjoyed by the beneficiaries in the parcuar manner described by the testator; for where lands
«eon evised to a charitable use in fee simple, the heir
. s’ 10 Cushing, 129. II p lte”' Flsk’ 22 Connecticut, 31 (54). | ontam v. Ravenel, 17 Howard, 384. De Thenili’n(ftltln 4 GiU’ 394 ’ Gilmau v- Hamilton, 16 Illinois, 225;
ts v. Be Bonneval, 5 Russell. 289.
Argument for the purchaser.
has no more interest in and no more right to the lands than he has when they are devised to an individual in fee simple, either directly or in trust. The public have an interest in the execution of public charities, and the beneficiaries have an interest, and if the directions contained in the will of the testator, either as to the manner of enjoyment or the objects who are to be benefited by his bounty, are departed from, either the public or the beneficiaries, if they are sufficiently certain, and have a sufficient vested interest, may have a remedy.
But the heir has no interest and no right, and therefore can have no remedy.
There are certain elementary rules that are to be applied in order to determine whether such a condition has been created.
1. That it depends upon the intention of the testator, to be gathered, not from particular phrases having a technical import, but from an examination of all the provisions of the will which can have any bearing on the matter in question.
2. That although the law allows testators to impose conditions subsequent, a breach of which will create a forfeiture, yet the law deems it improbable that testators will o so, and therefore leans against any construction vyhic would result in such a condition. Courts will not give it that effect by construction.*
Words of proviso and condition will be construed in o words of covenant when such is the apparent intention an meaning of the parties.! . ,
Formerly courts of law did not recognize or admi power of the court of chancery to enforce the performance of covenants and the execution of trusts, and there words which would not now be construed to import a 8
*
Mary Portington’s case, 10 Coke, 42 a; Worman t>. Teagard ’ g (N. S.) 880; Newkerk v. Newkerk, 2 Caines, 345; Wright v. Law Times, 507; 8. C., 4 Id. 221. jffiekf Clapham®. Moyle, 1 Levinz, 155; 8. C., 1 Ke e, , on erson,-27 Maine, 106; Shepherd’s Touchstone, 122, 2 ra tracts, 23.
Argument for the purchaser.
condition were allowed to have that effect when such a construction was necessary to give a remedy.*
Charities are favored in law, and they have always received a more liberal construction than the law will allow in gifts to individuals; and the same words in a will, when applied to individuals, may require a different construction when applied to a charity, f
But there is a preliminary question which, if answered one way, would seem to be decisive of the case in any aspect of it, and that question is, In whom was the legal title to the estate which was devised vested by the will?
We contend that the legal estate vested in the trustees, for the following reasons:
1. It is a rule of law that where trustees are named in a will it is not necessary that the testator should say in terms that he gives the legal estate to them. Nor that he should describe the quantity of legal estate which he intends to give them. If trustees are named the law looks to see what powers are conferred upon them and what duties are required of them, and then considers that it was the testator’s intention to give them such a legal estate as would enable them to execute those powers and discharge those duties.]:
2. Such powers are conferred upon these trustees and such uties required of them as to make it necessary that they s ould take a legal estate, to enable them to execute those powers and perform those duties.
^8 will is inartificial, and, perhaps, confused, but reading a° ^ns^rumen^—taking all its provisions together,—e n t the testator appoints three of his friends trusts, at to these trustees he gives the possession of this a, e«8 at.e' tankard is to be bought from the first uis issuing from his lands, “ by my trustees after itcomes the’r PO8se®81on- ’ • • • He provides that they are to hold Drofits 6 \° ren^ ^le saine’ and receive the rents and P, and to do all other legal acts for the well ordering
t wSt’;.cX"’, f Story’s 21165 [p. 144] 144 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the purchaser.
and management of said estate. The office, powers, and duties of the trustees, like the trust, are made perpetual.
The trustees, and they alone, are to have the possession of this estate. The trustees, and they alone, are to have the power to lease and manage it. They are to collect the rents. They are to pay them over to the society; and, of course, to enable them to discharge these duties, and execute these powers, “ and to do all other legal acts for the well managing of the property,” it was necessary that they should take the legal estate, and therefore the law will presume that the testator intended them to take it, and will declare accordingly.
In order to show that there has been any breach of condition by reason of the alienation of this land, the plaintiffs themselves must show that the legal title was vested in trustees.
The conveyance of this land purports to have been ma e by four persons, three of whom were trustees under t is will, and a fourth was a gentleman nominated by the legislature, to represent the public interest. Upon these our persons, the legislature, by their act, undertook to con er the authority to make this conveyance, and when they ma e the conveyance they say they act by force of authority con ferred upon them by the legislature. .
The defendants contend that this act of the egis a was unconstitutional and void. ...
They are obliged to say so, for if the act was constitutional, then the sale was legal, and passed a title to t e pr
If the act was unconstitutional and void, and t e g title was in the corporation, it still remains there, has been no sale, and consequently no breach o c
The corporation could be divested of the ega by a conveyance made in the name of the corp°™ ’ggly under the seal of the corporation, by some person xp authorized by the corporation to make it. to
The agents of the corporation, as such, hav Ponvey. convey the real estate of the corporation. But t
Argument for the purchaser.
ance was not made by these persons under any authority conferred on them by the corporation. They did not affix the seal of the corporation. They say in the deed that they act by virtue of authority conferred upon them by the act of the legislature.
If then, by the terms of the will, the legal title vested in the society, and if the act of the legislature is void, the legal title still remains in the society, and there has been no breach of condition.
We have said that the plaintiffs, in order to recover, must show that the devise was upon some condition, the breach of which would be attended by a forfeiture.
We submit now, that upon the whole will, and looking at all its provisions, no such condition can be found. It is true that the word “ Provided” in certain connections, and under certain circumstances, is competent to raise a condition, and it is equally certain that the same word, used in a different connection, and under different circumstances, will not create a condition. The court will therefore seek to discover the intention of the testator in this particular, not by considering what legal force some particular word in t e will might have in the abstract, but by looking at all t e provisions of the will, and the connection in which the word is used, and thus from an examination of the whole, will ascertain the sense in which the word was probably employed by the testator.
°f thi8 wil1’ H is Plain that the Second or hnn 7. esiastlcal Society were the objects of the testator’s bnnn/\1UJe8^eCt t0 ^and’ and that he intended this bounty to be perpetual. nehiaZ.’ lf+We ^eep in View tbis intention to create and pernectpd a iT °F soc^ety’8 benefit, a trust which he ex • his Dnrnn°Ul? ^d”™ forever’ and consider that it was also istratinn 8<p •? glV! Very Particular directions for the admin-this word°« then observe the connection in which ^stator couldr°V1+18 U8ed’wil1 be evident, that the the plaintiffs UVe U8e^ ^be word in the sense set up by
VOI,, y.
146 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct
Argument for the purchaser.
The testator, in the beginning of the will, after the decease of his sister, Mrs. Whitman, devises his real estate except, &c., to the Second or South Ecclesiastical Society, “to be and remain to the use and benefit of said Seconder South Ecclesiastical Society, forever.” But the society is not to have the management and control of this property: no power to lease it and receive the rents and profits directly. The entire management of it the testator gives to certain trustees to be appointed by him, and these trustees are to execute their trust according to his directions; therefore the testator, after the words last quoted, and in the same sentence, proceeds to give those directions, and says:
“Provided, that said real estate be not ever hereafter sold or disposed of, but the same be leased or let, and the annual rents or profits thereof applied to the use and benefit of said society, and the letting, leasing, and managing of said estate to be under the management and direction of certain trustees hereafter named by me, and their successors, to be appointed in like man ner as hereinafter directed.”**
It will be observed that every word here quoted is directíy and essentially connected with this word “ provided, w ic is supposed to create the condition. If there is any&f 1 tion here, then it is plain that there are several conditions, and if a breach of one would cause a forfeiture of the esta e, it must be admitted that the same result would follow rom a breach of any other. The plaintiffs say there is a con tion against alienation, the breach of which wil c^u8® forfeiture of the estate. If so, there is a condition t a estate shall be leased or let, and also that the ^nnua re and profits shall be paid to the society, and a so a leasing, letting, and managing of the estate s a e the direction of trustees appointed by the testator, ner as hereinafter directed,” the breach of either o w w ditions would likewise cause a forfeiture of t ® es ’ it is most improbable that the testator shou ave___
.............—~---------------- n 121.
* The directions are found in the next paragraph. See tupr »
Argument for the purchaser.
this estate to this society, and endeavored to impress upon his bounty perpetual duration, and should have hedged it about by so many careful and minute directions as to its control and management, and should at the same time have intended that the society should forfeit the estate in case his trustees whom he had appointed to control and manage the estate, and in whom the legal title was vested, should be guilty of a breach of trust in violating any of these provisions. Such could hardly have been the intention. The true interpretation, in this particular, is this : The testator here creates a trust for the letting, leasing, and managing of this estate, and appoints trustees. It was his intention to give directions to those trustees for the management of it; they were not to sell but only to lease it, and the language which is supposed to raise the condition, occurs in the course of the directions he gives to his trustees, and was not used with any intention of creating a forfeiture in case the trustees should fail to obey those directions, or commit a breach of trust. Thus we find these words:
“ And said trustees and their successors shall have full power to let and lease said estate, and to do all other legal acts for the well ordering and managing of said estate, under the limitations Md restrictions as hereinbefore expressed.”
Now these limitations and restrictions are, that they should not sell, that the estate should not be divided in case part ot the society should secede, that they shall lease the estate, ,U ht n°^ giVe a lease f°r more than thirty years. Unou e y he desired that these directions should be strictly f testator intended that the society should or eit the estate in the event that the trustees should displau8ibnit° ^le8° direetions, cannot be maintained with any
case t0 Precedents. In the recent Massachusetts cover r + V a writ of entry was brought to rer ain rea^ estate and water power, the title to which
Argument for the purchaser.
the plaintiff claimed had reverted to him by reason of the breach of a condition annexed to the land. The clause in the deed which was claimed to raise the condition, was as follows:
“ Provided said draw shall be so built as to answer for a street to the railroad, and Spring Street is to be opened three rods wide across said farm, to the south line of said railroad, and the said Stearns is to make the road.”
The court decided that this clause did not raise a condition, the breach of which would be attended by a forfeiture of the estate, and among other things they say:
“ It is true, as the demandant contends, ‘provided’ is an apt word to create a condition, and it is often used by way of limitation or qualification only, especially when it does not intro duce a new clause, but only seems to qualify or restrain the generality of a former clause.”
Such is the connection in which the word is used, and such its office in the case at bar.
A recent English case is Wright v. Wilkin* A testator, after bequeathing legacies, devised to the defendant and to his heirs, &c., “all the real estate,” and all the “residueo his personal estate,” upon this express condition:
“ That if my personal estate should be insufficient for the pur pose, they do and shall within twelve months after my decease, pay and discharge the legacies before bequeathed, and confident that he will comply with my wish, it being my P ticular desire that the above legacies shall be paid, and e make chargeable all my said real and personal estate wi payment of the aforesaid legacies.”
It was held in the K. B.,f and afterwards on appealI in the Exchequer Chamber, that the devise was not upo condition, the failure to comply with which create
* 2 Best & Smith, 232, and see Mayor, &c., of South v‘ Att°T *
General and others, 5 House of Lords Keports; 14 Bevan, 367.
t 2 Best & Smith, 232.
bee. 1866.] Stanley v. Colt. 149
Argument for the purchaser.
feiture, but merely a charge or trust in favor of the legatees, and that although the words “ upon this express condition,” if they had stood alone, would have created one, yet when the testatrix went on to say, that she trusted to his good faith and honor to pay them, and very much desired that they should be paid, and when afterwards she said she made them a charge upon her personal and real estate, that was inconsistent with the idea that she intended the property should be taken away by condition, because there was a trust to be fulfilled, and that inconsistency was so great that they held that these words, “ upon this express condition,” must yield, and the trust must be fulfilled, but the legal estate must remain unaffected by the words of condition.
Important deductions are to be drawn from these decisions. They say (as we submit the law clearly is),
1st. That the case is not to be decided by looking to particular provisions in the will, but by looking at the whole will to ascertain the intention of the testator. . 2d. That words much stronger than those used in the will in question, will be controlled, if the court can see that there was an intention to create a trust, and that the trust will be e eated if the words shall be held to create a condition instead of a trust.
That there was an intention to create a trust here, does io a mit of controversy. The testator appoints trustees hoi i68 PerPei;aating the trust, for the use and t° e society* Could it then have been his intention to b Sanie ^lme that he created this trust, and said it was dpft>e^er?et?a1, t0 inSert a Provision by which it could be defeated at the will of the trustees?
alienation1*8 & con^^on i® v°id as being in restraint of
°r an inan)01^'inary devise, either to an incorporation prorwtv •Ua/a C°nditi0n aSain8t any alienation of the Policy of thlTaw merely Void as contrary to the
Tins is not a devise under the statute of Connecticut, as [p. 150] 150 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct,
Argument for the purchaser.
argued on the other side. If it were, that statute has not empowered devisors to make such conditions.
1. Upon the question whether this devise is within the statute of Connecticut we rely upon Seymour v. Hartford.* That was the case of a deed of land to this same society by Anne Burnham, dated July 7th, 1762. The land was conveyed in these words:
“I therefore by these presents fully, freely, and absolutely give, grant, release and confirm unto the said South Church or Society called Congregational, and to their successors forever, all the aforesaid house, homestead, and premises, with their appurtenances, to have and to bold unto them and their successors forever, as a good, sure and indefeasible estate in fee simple, without any manner of condition.”
A part of the land included in this deed came by sundry conveyances to the plaintiff. The town of Hartford had laid a tax on it, and compelled him to pay the tax. The plaintiff then brought this action to recover back the money thus paid, claiming that this land was not liable to taxation, on the ground that by the deed of Anne Burnham it was granted “ for the maintenance of the ministry7 of the gospel, or for some other public and charitable use, within the meaning of the statute of 1702, and therefore by the express terms of that statute was exempt from taxation.
This claim was not sustained by the court, and it was de cided that the mere fact that the conveyance was to an ec clesiastical society did not bring it within the provisions o the statute. That the statute requires the grantor to dedicate the property to some of the particular uses therein specified, and the general character and corporate Power of an ecclesiastical society do not imply that it is de ica e to any of those uses; for whatever implication mig drawn from the general character and limited powers o corporation at the time when the grant is made, ye^ character and those powers might be thereafter essen__
* 21 Connecticut, 481.
Argument for the purchaser.
changed by the legislature. That the statute requires the grantor to declare the use, and he cannot leave it to the law to do it for him.
It was therefore decided in that case that a grant of land to this society, or to any ecclesiastical society, without any other declaration of the use than may be implied from the character of the grantee, is not within the statute, because it is not a dedication or sequestration of land to any of the uses specified in the statute. That case is decisive of the case at bar, for the material facts are the same in both.
But if the devise were within the statute of Connecticut, a condition in restraint of alienation would not be a valid condition, the breach of which would work a forfeiture, because that statute does not authorize a grantor or devisor to impose such a condition.
In order to show that it does, the plaintiffs must maintain and must show to the court that this statute not only repealed the statutes of mortmain existing in England before the emigration of our ancestors, and which upon general principles would be brought over to this country by them, ut aut orized any proprietor of land to sequester it forever, o render it inalienable forever, and to take it out of commerce forever.
This, we submit, cannot be shown.
V’ U was decided that thia f rr<! °k t2 Was Vlrtually a re-enactment of the statute
Elizabeth. or to th 8^tutes of mortmain a devise to a corporation was void fSe ° a eorPora^on’ whether lay or ecclesiastical,
1709 ex2°nneCtlC}lt statute> commonly called the statute of Court 16R4Pa88eid the Oetober se88ion of the General un, 1684, and was as follows:
Uque concLenmentsgitSisOf learning and the Promoting of pub--------- 1 ’ U 1718 Ofdered by this court, that for the
17 Connecticut, 181.
nt s Com., 10th ed., 842; Shelford on Mortmain, 850.
152 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct.
Argument for the purchaser.
future, that all such houses and lands as are, or shall, by any charitable persons, be given or purchased for, or to help on, the maintenance of the ministry or schools, or poor, in any part of this colony, they shall remay ne to the use or uses for which they were given forever, and shall be exempted out of the list of estates, and be rate free, any former law or order notwithstanding.”
The history of this law is instructive upon the question of its interpretation, and shows, we think, that we are correct as to the object of it.
The charter granted by Charles II constituted the only title of the colony to the lands within its limits, the Indian titles which they had acquired from time to time previous to the grant of the charter being, as Governor Andross said, no better than “ the scratch of a bear’s paw.”
The colonial legislature or General Court had, however, before the grant of the charter, assumed to make numerous and large grants of land to townships, individuals, and for public, charitable, and pious uses. The charter convey to the colony in fee simple all the lands within its boundaries, but at the time the statute in question was passed, the gian s made by the colonial legislature before the chartei was granted had not been confirmed. The efforts which wer being made to deprive them of their charter create « greatest anxiety and alarm in the colony. While they we in no danger of losing their charter, a confirmation 0 grants by the colonial legislature was not deemed impor a, as soon as the people discovered that they were in ang of losing their only muniment of title, they ^ee^e portant to confirm them by law, while they yet a p to do so. . .. wa9
Under these circumstances the statute in qu® , passed, at the session of the General Court he m
In February of the ensuing year, James II the crown, and at the following May session o _ Court, another statute was passed, of the following
“ This court, for the prevention of future trouble, a
Argument for the purchaser.
every township’s grants of lands, as it hath been obtained by gift, purchase, or otherwise, of the natives, or grant of this court, may be settled upon them, their heirs, successors and assigns forever, according to our charter granted by his late majesty of happy memory; this court doth order that every township in this colony shall take out patents for their said grants of the Governor and Company, &c.
“ The like course may be taken for all farms granted to any person or persons whatever within this colony.”*
The fears of the colony were well founded, for in June of the same year, a quo warranto was issued to the Governor and Company of Connecticut, citing them to appear before the king within eight days of St. Martin, but this writ was not served until after the day named for their appearance had passed. On the 21st of December of the same year another writ was issued, citing them to appear before the king within eight days of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin.
These facts, some of which are matter of history and others gathered from the records of the colony, show beyond any question, that the object of this statute was to conrm existing grants to the uses specified in the statute, and o authorize future grants to the same uses by exempting em from the operation of the English statutes of mortmain, and placing them on the same footing merely as grants of land to individuals, or for any other lawful purpose, and not with any view to render lands so granted forever inalienable.
Tt i8 said that because this statute was in conflict with the m Ju 8taAUt?8 of mortmain, and might on that ground be
T a C lt^ona^ cau8e of complaint against the colony, it was rec°rded with the other public acts at the time it tho ’ Ut ^hheld from record for several years, until reBpeOt t0 the charter had ceaaed- » first thn. among the public acts in the revision of 1702, and the XT6 \° Cal'ed the 8tatute of 1702' In tho revision _ phraBeology of the act was slightly changed.!
* 8 Trumbull’s Col. Rec 179 77
c* 17y' t See supra, p. 120. Rep. [p. 154] 154 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct,
Argument for the purchaser.
The words of perpetuity employed in it are those only which in substance are employed in all deeds and grants, and such as it is customary and proper to employ where titles are to be confirmed by statute, and where natural 01 artificial persons incapable of holding lands are authorized by law to do so.
Our views in regard to the object and true construction of this statute are further confirmed by the history of a case that arose very soon after the act was passed.
In 1689, John Liveen, of New London, died, leaving a will made just before his decease, by which he bequeathed and devised the greater part of his estate to the “ministry of New London,” to be improved for them by his executors who were General Fitz John Winthrop and Major Edward Palms. The executors treated the devise as void, on the ground that it was within the English statutes of mortmain, and they contended that the Connecticut statute of 1684 was void, because in conflict with the laws of England.
A suit was brought against the executors by the town of New London on behalf of the ministry, and the town recovered judgment. The cause was taken by appeal to Englan, and was in litigation there for several years, but the records of the colony do not disclose the result.
We have already shown that the Connecticut statute o charitable uses has been held by the Supreme Court of that State to be substantially a copy of the statute of Elizabet concerning charitable uses. Both should therefore receive the same construction; but it has never been held in ng land that lands given to charities were thereby rendere m alienable. On the contrary, it has always been the pracice of the Court of Chancery to order a sale of such lands w* a sale is shown to be for the interest of the beneficiaries.
The Connecticut statute being a re-enactment of t e s a ute of Elizabeth, should, as we have said, upon genera p
♦ Parke’s Charity, 12 Simons, 329 J Bx parte the Governor, lish Law and Equity, 145; Attorney-General ». „f Finelly, 145; Attorney-General v. Kerr, 2 Bevan, 4^. , York’s Case, 1" Id. 495; Ke Colsten Hospital, 27 Id. 17.
Argument for the purchaser.
ciples receive the same construction, and it always has re ceived the same construction by the legislature of the Colony and of the State, in the exercise of the jurisdiction in regard to the sale of charity lands, exercised in England by the Court of Chancery.
The records of the State show that between the years 1670 and 1862, five hundred and seventy-five private acts, authorizing the sale of lands, were passed. A great number of these acts were for the sale of charity lands.
Charities are under the perpetual guardianship of the sovereign power. The general superintendence of them in England is delegated to the Court of Chancery.*
In Connecticut this superintendence is mainly exercised by the legislature. In Connecticut, as in England, it is a rule of public policy to require trustees for a charity to obtain the assent of the public authority exercising this guardianship to a sale of charity estates, in order to protect the charity against imprudent sales. This alone is the object of the law. It is a rule established for the protection of the cestui que trust.. Lands, as we have endeavored to show, are not rendered inalienable by being given to charitable uses, but set apart as constituting a fund to be used in a provident and judicious manner, to promote the object for which they are given, and this provident and judicious manner as much requires a sale, when by chance of circumstances the property ecome unproductive, but can be made productive by a , as under other circumstances it requires the property to be preserved and kept. itahi hen ^tute says, therefore, that lands given to charhavAU8eS “ 8l!a11 forever remain to the uses to which they intent een,°r 8 alJ be given or granted, according to the true whatever ” ?^ninS of the grantors, and to no other use land ahrt/iA1 18 understood not as meaning that the Bay that h never be sold, not as giving the donor power to never be a a* Providing and declaring that the fund shall ¿!2^rted^m the use to which it may be dedi
Argument for the purchaser.
cated, subject, however, to such changes from time to time as the interest of the society may require.
A statute which rendered all charity lands forever inalienable, or which gave the donor power to render them so by imposing conditions against alienation, would be so clearly contrary to public policy, that the court would never so construe it if it admitted of any other rational interpretation.
We say in the next place that it cannot be presumed that this testator intended to impose a condition against a legislative sale, even if he did against a sale by his trustees or by the society.
When this will was made the charter of Charles II waa the organic law of the State. Under this charter the General Assembly had the same power of legislation as the Parliament of Great Britain.*
The testator knew that whatever his wishes might be in regard to a sale, the legislature had power to authorize a sale, and that a sale by authority of law would not work a forfeiture. ,
It must therefore be assumed that he made his will and imposed this condition (if it be a condition) in subordination to the power of the legislature to order a sale.f
III. Assuming that this was a conditional devise, and that the condition was valid if, as we have endeavored to show, a the time when this will was made, and when the trusts o the will took effect, the legislature had power to authorize a sale, and to control, in this respect, the intention of t e tator, it must be admitted that the legislature possesse same power when it did authorize a sale, unless in t. e m time it had been deprived of it by some constitutions r-striction. It is for the plaintiff to show that by some। p vision in the Constitution of the United States or o State of Connecticut, the legislature of Conn^tlc" .
prohibited from the exercise of this power, an a tn question was therefore void. _____ [p. 157] Dec. 1866.] Stanley v. Colt. 157
*
Starr v. Pease, 8 Connecticut, 548; Pratt v. Allen, 13 Id. + Clark’s Executors v. Hayes, 9 Gray, 429.
Argument for the purchaser.
Courts will not declare an act of the legislature void, unless it is a clear and unequivocal violation of the Constitution.*
The constitution of the State of Connecticut is not a grant of legislative power; it is merely a limitation imposed upon pre-existing power, f
Assume that it is beyond the scope of legislative power to pass a law taking away or impairing a vested right of property, and that upon general principles, such a law would be void, the question remains, whether the act in question is of that character.
A right of property, in order to be within the protection of this principle, must not only be a vested right (not a mere possibility), but it must also be a beneficial interest. If, as we assert, the legal title of the land vested in the trustees, the heirs of the testator could have no beneficial interest in a breach of condition by the trustees. J
Suppose there had been no act of the legislature, and the heir at law had entered for condition broken, all he would gain by an entry would be the naked right to hold the legal estate for the beneficiaries till a court of chancery should exercise the power of appointing new trustees. th ^ere^'ore’ if the court should come to the conclusion that the legal estate was vested in these trustees to hold upon rust, and that there was a breach of a condition attached v a?,. estate, and an entry by which the heir vested se with that legal estate, but for the act of the legislate there cannot be the least difficulty in saying that the breach control that interest either before or after
leaniVf cour\ should come to the conclusion that the insist th a<.'n society> an(l not in th® trustees, we dition n a • ± vlr8 a5 laW °* ^ie testator, by virtue of a con^Jgainst alienation, would not in that case, before con-
’ania State, 160.elfair’ * ‘Dallas’ 114 ’ Sharpless v The Mayor, 21 Pennsyl-
t vvmie, io dickering,Pit M8‘ ST*333. Alten’13 “• U9-
Argument for the purchaser.
dition broken, have an interest in the property beyond the control of the legislature.
Admitting that the power of the legislature is so far limited and restricted by general principles of law that it cannot, by any act of legislation, destroy or impair a vested and beneficial right in property, it would not follow that the act in question was void.
The plaintiffs, in order to show to the court that this act was void, must go much further than this, and maintain that the power of the legislature is so limited and restricted that any act is void, the effect of which would be to destroy or impair (for whatever cause) not a vested and beneficial interest in property, but the most remote and contingent interest. The interest of which they say this act deprives them was both contingent and remote, a mere possibility of reverter, and so little regarded by the common law that it could not be conveyed or devised.*
This the plaintiffs cannot show.
It cannot be maintained that the legislature of Connecticut has any less power to unfetter estates by cutting off remote and contingent interests of this character than the Court of Chancery in England.
Yet in Platt v. Sprigg, reported by Vernon,f trustees were ordered to join in cutting off a contingent remainder to t e heir at law. Again: In Fruwin v. Coulton, in 1st Eqm y Cases Abridged,^ also in Winnington v. Foley, in 1st' Williams.fi Tipping v. Piggot, in 1st Equity Cases Abridged,|| is a very strong case. There the trustees, without any or of the court, joined in making a new settlement, there y cu ting off a contingent remainder to the heir at law. a a filed by the heir at law to have this new settlement set asi the court declined to set it aside, the chancellor saying, although it was an imprudent thing for the trustees o without the sanction of the court, yet as he approve settlement he would not disturb it.
• Smith .. Pendell, 19 Connecticut, 111; 4 Kent’s Com. 11,12’, , Vol. 2, p. 303. J Page 386. g Page 636. If»««88
Argument for the purchaser.
lu these cases the right of which the heir at law was de prived by the court was a mere naked possibility.
In this case the right of which he has been deprived by the legislature was the same.
In this country, laws affecting such contingent rights in property have never been held to be beyond the scope of legislative power. Cases sustaining such laws are very numerous. We shall refer to only a few of them.
Thus it has been held that the legislature might take away a contingent right of dower or courtesy.*
Also, the contingent right of the husband in the choses in action of the wife.f
Also, the possibility of reverter to the owner of the fee, in land taken for a street in a city, on the ground that the interest thus taken is too remote to be deemed an interest, in property of any value.J
So an act of the legislature by which an estate in fee tail was declared to be a fee simple in the grantees of the tenant in tail, who were infants, and which authorized a sale of the land, was declared valid.§
So a law empowering a court of equity to order the sale of real estate owned in common, where partition would not, in the opinion of the court, be advantageous to the owners.|| And so, a statute validating the levy of execution in cases where the levy was void, for the reason that the officer had included in his return fees not allowed by law4
It must be admitted that the act under consideration in the ast case was not only retrospective, but affected essentially vested rights of property; yet inasmuch as those rights of
Wilbnr°99 Nr01^’12 Indiana’ 37 » Thurber & Stevenson v. Townsend & Wilbur, 22 New York, 517.
Barb°Ur’ 46 Maine’ 9 5 Clarke v- McCreary, 12 Smedes and
\ ”• Kerr> 27 New York, 188. “ MH! v. Lockwood, 3 Blatchford, 56. II Richardson v. Monson, 23 Connecticut, 94. Mather^. ChaXneUl.^ ** ’’ 8tCnington’ 4 I<L 209 *
Argument for the purchaser.
property were not unjustly affected, the act was declared to be valid.
So a private act of the legislature, divorcing a woman from her husband, was held to be valid, though its effect was to deprive a creditor of the husband of a vested estate in the lands of the wife acquired by the previous levy of an execution on the husband’s estate therein.*
These last three cases arose in Connecticut. In Massachusetts and in Pennsylvania! it has been decided that a law which changed the tenure of estates by declaring all joint tenancies to be tenancies in common, was constitutional and valid.
Private acts authorizing tenants for life and trustees to support remainders, to sell real estate devised, and convert the same into personal estate, to be held subject to the same provisions and trusts as the land, are numerous, and have always been sustained, though in opposition to the will of the testator; and although the effect was to compel those in remainder to take personal estate instead of the real esta e devised, and in which they had both a vested and valuable interest.^
It cannot be denied that in each of the cases just referre to, and given in the note below,! the law took away or mo i fied and controlled interests in property more immediate an tangible than any which the plaintiffs had under the wi in question.
From the whole tenor of Mr. Stanley’s will it is apparen that this society was the sole object of the testator s boun y in respect to the land in question, and that this con i 10 (if there be a condition) was imposed for the purpose o pi tecting the society in the enjoyment of it, and not to ena the heir at law to deprive them of it.
*
Starr v. Pease, 8 Id. 541. , „ pjckerf Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Massachusetts, 568; Annable v. a c, ing, 363, and Bambaugh v. Bambaugh, 11 Sergeant & ®a^e’ ’ ^7. 80-t Norris v. Clymer, 2 Barr, 284; Blagg v. Mills,A8 0.. G hier v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 3 Gushing, ,
Argument for the purchaser.
There is no limitation in favor of his heirs at law, no devise over, nor any other provision in the will tending to show that the testator ever intended or expected that his heirs at law would succeed to the estate in any event.
From the authorities already cited it appears that it is the constant practice of the legislature where the power has not been delegated by the legislature to the courts, and of the courts where the power has been delegated, to authorize a sale of the lands of infants, idiots, lunatics, and others, who are not sui juris. This is done in the exercise of a tutelary authority on the part of the legislature as parens patriot. C. J. Parker, of Massachusetts, says that “ this power must rest in the legislature in this commonwealth, that body being alone competent to act as the general guardian and protector of those who are incompetent to act for themselves.”*
Now the power to authorize the sale of the lands of a charity is derived from the same source, and rests upon the same principles. A charity is never, so to speak, sui juris; it is under perpetual guardianship, and its guardian is the tate. It is for this reason that the trustees are primct facie guilty of a breach of trust in selling the estate of a charity without authority derived from the State. And we submit t at it is not in the power of a donor to a charity so to fetter tne State as to prevent the sovereign power from authorizing a aw ul disposition of the estate given to the charity, its war., when it is clearly made to appear that it will be for interest of the charity. This never has been done, and contend that it cannot be done. We do not mean to wv\. State may divert the fund from the use to anth -1 18 g* veiK What we say is, that the State may timn°riZe 8U°i m°changes in the property from time to as may be found to be necessary and proper, and that
setts General rr •^■assachusetts, 328; and see Sohier ». Massachu-
Cochran v. Van i ’ °larke v‘ Van Surlay, 15 Wendell, 436; & Rawle 191 - Eat tt 365 ’ BambaugR ®- Bambaugh, 11 Sergeant ter> 19 ¿w York’ 445* Hutchman’ 14 Id- See also Leggett v. Hun.
T01fc T* 11
J 62 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct
Argument for the purchaser.
it is not iii the power of a donor to provide that this shall not be done.
Even if this were a law impairing the obligation of any contract, how could it avail the plaintiffs ? If there is any compact it is that the land shall forever be devoted to pious or charitable uses. Is the heir at law asking to have this compact observed and performed ? Is he intending to devote the land to those uses? Clearly not; he is seeking to recover the land, not for the use of the society, in order that the supposed compact may be executed, but for his own private use.
The courts of Connecticut, in some early cases, involving the right of the State to tax such land, may speak of the exemption contained in the statute as a compact or pledge on the part of the State that lands given should be forever exempt from taxation. These decisions have, we think, recently been overruled, and in Brainard v. Town of Colchester,* the court say, that “ there is nothing in the language of the statute which makes it differ from ordinary statutes specifying what should or should not be subject to taxation.
The notion that any general law of the State is in the natu re of a compact between the State and the citizen, is er roneous, and there is no force in the suggestion that this statute of 1702 created anything in the nature of a compact between the State and any one. ,
The power which the legislature of Connecticut exercise in this case it has exercised unquestioned for two hun re years, and this in itself would be a sufficient vindication o its right to continue to exercise it. .
There is an additional consideration, growing out oi long-continued practice of the legislature in passing s acts as this, of so much importance as to have been eeme worthy of special consideration by courts in sinn ar c That consideration is the effect which a decision aga1?! validity of this act would have in unsettling other ti land. In Davidson v. Johonnot,-\ the court declares
I 7 Metcalf, 388.
*31 Connecticut, 409.
Dec. 1866.] Stanley v. Colt. 163
the vast amount of property now held under titles derived from similar legislative acts should lead us to proceed most cautiously iu the investigation of this subject, and to deal with it in a liberal spirit when called upon judicially to declare that this course of legislation conflicts with the constitution, and that all the special acts of this character are of no validity. And in Norris v. Clymer,* a case in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Chief Justice Gibson, speaking of the consequences in his own single State, says :
“It is not above the mark to say that ten thousand titles depend on legislation of this stamp, for many of those statutes contained provisions for more than twenty distinct estates, and could not the ruin that would be produced by disturbing them be arrested by anything less than a convention to effect a constitutional sanction of them, the consummation would not be dearly bought.”
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action of ejectment by the heirs of William tanley to recover for breach of condition a tract of land, situate in the city of Hartford, devised by the ancestor to an ecclesiastical society and their successors, on the 7th October, 6, and one of the principal questions in the case is w ct er or not the devise was upon a condition, which, when io en, would let in the heir, or was a limitation or trust, e teach of which would work no such consequence, the material parts of the will are as follows:
give and devise the whole of my real estate, of every g: ,.aa description, . . . unto the Second or South Eccleto th Ca °Clety’ ^1G t°wn Hartford, to be and remain tbow USe aUd bcHciit °f Second or South Society and liirntnf,UCCeSSOrS f°rever«” Then comes the condition or be not °n Revise: “ Provided, that said real estate leased erea^er 80^ or disposed of, but the same be tofliAnaL 6 ^ie annual ronts or profits thereof applied _______au benefit of said society, and the letting, leasing.
* 2 Barr, 284.
164 Stanley v. Colt. [Sup. Ct
and managing of said estate to be under the management and direction of certain trustees hereafter named by me, and their successors, to be appointed in manner as hereafter directed.” And, after appointing three trustees, and prescribing the manner of the appointment of their successors, and prescribing also their authority and duties, the testator adds: “ And the aforesaid real estate, or any part thereof, shall not be rented or let for a longer term or lease than thirty years before the expiration of the same.” And another part of the will is as follows: “ And, in case said Second Society shall ever hereafter be divided, it is my will that my real estate be not divided, but remain entire and forever to the said Second Society; and such part of said Second Society as shall hereafter secede or be divided therefrom are hereby excluded from all the use and benefit of my real estate, so devised as aforesaid to the said Second Society.”
These are the several clauses in the will relating to the management of the estate, following the proviso, and which, taken together, constitute the conditions, limitations, or qualifications annexed to it, and to the enjoyment of the estate by the society.
All of them may not be equally important, but we are bound to assume that each and all of them were regar e by the testator as material in the regulations which he as seen fit to adopt and carry into his will.
These conditions or limitations following the piovisoare briefly— . , be
1. The estate is not to be sold or disposed of, but leased by trustees, and the rents paid over to the some y.
2. The leases are not to exceed thirty years in any
3. The estate is not to be divided in the event of a division
of the society; and— . .r]iafpe8
4. It is to be managed and directed exclusive y y who are appointed in the will, and by their successo, surviving trustees to appoint when a vacancy happens.
The question, is, whether these are stnet <« W
conditions annexed to the estate, a breac o w, [p. 165] Dec. I860.] Stanleÿ ü. Colt. 166
any one of them, will work a forfeiture, defeat the devise, and let in the heir; or, whether they are regulations for the guide of the trustees, and explanatory of the terms under which he intended the estate should be managed, with a view to the greatest advantage in behalf of the society ?
The difference between the two interpretations and the consequences flowing from them, is very material. As we have seen, a condition, if broken, forfeits the estate, and forever thereafter deprives the society of the gift; and not only this, but the heirs become seized of the first estate, and avoids, of course, all intermediate charges or incumbrances, and takes also free and clear all the expenditures and improvements that may have been laid out on the property.
On the other hand, if these limitations are to be regarded as regulations to guide the trustees, and explanatory of the terms upon which the devise has been made, they create a trust which those who take the estate are bound to perform; and, in case of a breach, a court of equity will interpose and enforce performance. The estate is thus preserved and devoted to the objects of the charity or bounty of the testator, even in case of a violation of the limitations annexed to it.
raudulent or unfaithful trustee will be removed, and ano er appointed to his place. A diversion of the fund will e arrested, and an account compelled for any waste or improvident use of it.
8pCaki"S of conditions, observes, that what now6 °.k aw.was deemed a devise upon condition would * / PC1 /P8’ a^mo8t every case, be construed a devise in taln.P01\ rUSt’ and’this construction, instead of the heir can emn Vanta^® the condition broken, the cestui que trust In th Pe an ° 8ervance the trust by a suit in equity.* Beneb th«?“! °f V’ “ thu Ven’s and in that approved of this observation of Mr. Sugden, look; Tk C0n8trued a devise, on express condition in intoft ! "'Sh the Whole will> and regarding the tof ‘he testator as falling within this rule. The court
* 1 Sugden on Powers, 123, 7th London ed.
relied very much upon the words following the condition as explaining away the strict common law meaning of the term, and as importing a meaning inconsistent with a strict interpretation. This judgment was affirmed in the Exchequer.
It is true that the word “proviso” is an appropriate one to constitute a common law condition in a deed or will, but this is not the fixed and invariable meaning attached to it by the law in these instruments. On the contrary, it gives way to the intent of the parties as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument, and has frequently been thus explained and applied as expressing simply a covenant or limitation in trust. Several cases were referred to, on the argument, to this effect, and many more might have been added.
In looking at the explanatory part of the will in this case, it will be seen that the testator had in his mind a settlement of the estate in trust for the beneficiaries, and with this view established a code of regulations to guide the trustees in the management of it that would continue through all time, and which is wholly inconsistent with the idea that the estate might be defeated by a breach of any one of them. Alter appointing the three trustees, he adds: “ I do give authority and power to nominate their successors to said trust, whic is to be done in the manner following: That immediately after my decease they . . . shall appoint some meet persons, ... as the occasion may require, into said trus or office, so be it that at no time more than three persons sha act in said trust or office; . . . and all persons, successors hereafter to said trust and office, shall at all times in future have like power to superintend, direct, and appoint their sue cessors in said trust and office, and to perpetuate said true for the benefit and use of said society, as occasion may ro® time to time require.” And he closes by saying that said trustees and their successors shall have full powe lease the estate, and “ do all other legal acts for the we ordering and management of said estate, under the in11 tions and restrictions as hereinbefore expressed.
This interpretation of the devise was sought to be avoi
Dec. 1866.] Stanley v. Colt. 167
on the argument, by separating all the limitations and restrictions in respect to the enjoyment of the estate from that forbidding the sale or disposal of it, thereby conceding that they were limitations in trust, but insisting that the other • constituted a condition for a breach of which a forfeiture was incurred. But the difficulty in the argument is that the same clause embraces not only the prohibition to sell, but enjoins the duty to lease, and the application of the rents to the use of the society, and also the management of the estate by the trustees, and which management contains the prohibition to lease for terms not exceeding thirty years. The separation is, therefore, not only arbitrary, but in disregard of the express words of the testator. The injunction to lease is as positive as that not to sell, and both are embraced in the same clause; and if the term “proviso” is to be construed as a condition in respect to the one, it must consistently be so construed in respect to the other. And the same observations are also applicable to the other limitations.
This devise to the Ecclesiastical Society is in some respects peculiar. The possession, management, and control of the estate are given exclusively to the trustees, who, according to the regulations, are invested with power to perpetuate their authority indefinitely. The only active duties of the society—the beneficiaries—is to receive the rents and profits for their own use and benefit. Of course, the trustees, subject to the limitations and restrictions annexed to the enjoyment of the estate, possess all the power and dominion over it that belongs to an owner, and are bound to a<e the same care of it and exercise the same attention, si, and diligence in its management that a prudent and vigilant owner would exercise over his own. They are rent the property, collect the rents, and pay them
0 society, to protect the possession, prevent waste, « n A* ta?eS are paid’ and’in the words of the testator, er acts tbr the well-ordering and manage-and pa <• 7 thus in the exclusive possession r0 o t e property, and having devolved upon them [p. 168] the manifold duties incident thereto, it is quite clear that the trustees are clothed with the legal estate.
Mr. Jarman states the general principle: “ The mere fact that they are made agents in the application of the rents is sufficient to give them the legal estate, as in the case of a simple devise to A. upon trust to pay the rents to B.; and it is immaterial, in such case, that there is no direct devise to the trustees, if the intention that they shall take the estate can be collected from the will. Hence, a devise to the incent that A. shall receive the rents and pay them over to B. would clearly vest the estate in A.”* The same effect where the duty is devolved upon them to pay taxes and make repairs, f And it is laid down generally that whenever a trust is created a legal estate sufficient for the execution of the trust shall, if possible, be implied.^ Indeed, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the trustees in the present case to execute their various and multiplied duties over this property without being clothed with the legal estate, under a mere naked power.
The distinction between a power and a trust is marked and obvious. Powers, as Chief Justice Wilmot observed, are never imperative; they leave the act to be done at the will of the party to whom they are given. Trusts are always imperative, and are obligatory upon the conscience of the party intrusted.§
Our conclusion is, that the construction urged by the plaintiffs, of the will, importing a condition, a breach of which forfeits the devise, is not well founded.
There is another ground of defence to this action that we are of opinion is equally conclusive against the plaintiffs.
On an application of the society and trustees to the legislature of Connecticut to be permitted to sell the premises in question, setting out the reasons at large in support of it, the application was granted, and an act passed accordingly-
* 2 Jarman on Wills, 202, Perkins’s Ed. f Id. 201, and cases cited. J Lewin on Trusts and Trustees, 164. § 2 Sugden on Powers, 588.
TKis act authorized the trustees, together with a third person, to sell the lands in the manner therein prescribed, and to invest the proceeds at interest, in bonds and mortgages of real estate of double the value of the amount invested, appropriating the interest to the use of the society, in the same manner, and subject to the same use, as the rents or income of said property are by the will required to be appropriated.
The defendant is in possession under the title derived from a sale in pursuance of this act of the legislature.
In England, and in this country where a court of chancery exists, a charity of the description in question is a peculiar subject of the jurisdiction of that court, and in cases of abuse, or misuse of the charity by the trustees or agents in charge of it, this court will interpose to correct such abuses, and enforce the execution of the charitable purposes of the founder. So, by lapse of time, or changes as to the condition of the property and of the circumstances attending it, have made it prudent and beneficial to the charity to alien the lands, and vest the proceeds in other funds or in a different manner, it is competent for this court to direct such sale and investment, taking care that no diversion of the gi t be permitted. Lord Langdale, the master of the rolls, o served, in 2 he Attorney-General v. The South Sea Company * 1S ^hat *n ordinary cases a most important part of th18 Preserve the property, but it may happen that e purposes of the charity may be best sustained and prof ahcoating the specific property. The law has not or i en the alienation, and this court, upon various occatho3^}^^1 a V*ew promote interests of charities, has not
°ug t it necessary to preserve the property in specie, but has sanctioned its alienation.”! erci^ J P0^er> the State of Connecticut, it appears, is exacts^f +/ '3 ^e^is^ature> as in the present instance. Many __ e ghul have been referred to in the argument, ex* 4 Bevan, 458. " °» LawofMOTtma^n687USt9 &nd TrUStee®’ 373’ and cases’ and Shclford [p. 170] tending through a long series of years down to the present time.
We cannot doubt that the power exists in the legislature, and it is not for this court to revise the facts upon which it has seen fit to exercise it.
Mr. Justice DAVIS dissented.
Judgment affirmed.
The Dashing Wave.
1. A neutral, professing to be engaged in trade with a neutral port, under circumstances which warrant close observation by a blockading squadron, must keep his vessel, while discharging or receiving cargo, so clearly on the neutral side of the blockading line as to repel, so far as position can repel, all imputation of intent to break the blockade. Neglect o that duty may well justify capture and sending in for adjudication, though, in the absence of positive evidence that the neglect was wilful, it might not justify a condemnation.
2. Where a party, whose national character does not appear, gives his own money to a neutral house, to be shipped with money of that house an in their name, to a neutral port in immediate proximity to a blockade region, and an attorney in fact, on capture of the money and libel of it as prize, states that such neutral house are the owners thereof, and t a “no other persons are interested therein,” the capture and sending in will be justified; though in the absence of proof of an enemy s charac ter in the party shipping his money with the neutral’s, a condemns ion may not be.
3. On a capture of a vessel unobservant, through mere carelessness, o duty first above mentioned, and containing money shipped under circumstances just stated, a decree was made restoring the vesse cargo, including the money; but apportioning the costs and exPen^ consequent on the capture ratably between the vessel and the com, empting from contribution the rest of the cargo.
During the late Rebellion, and while the coast oftbe on ern States, including that of Texas to the mouth of t e Grande, was under blockade by the United States,the as ing Wave, a British-owned brig, was captured at and0?^ a United States gunboat, off the mouth of that river, t
Dec. 1866.] The Dashing Wave. 171
viding stream between the United States and Mexico, a neutral, and libelled as prize of war in the District Court of New Orleans. The vessel was employed as a general ship on a voyage from Liverpool to Matamoras, a Mexican town on the Rio Grande, directly opposite to Texas. She had been freighted at Liverpool in 1862 with an assorted cargo, consigned by ten or more shippers to various persons and firms described as resident at Matamoras. There was no contraband aboard. The most remarkable shipment was one of £12,000 gold coin, in the name of Lizardi & Co., British subjects of Liverpool. By claim put in after the libel filed for Lizardi & Co., by their agent at New Orleans, it was claimed as their property, it being stated that no other persons were interested therein. Correspondence found on board the captured vessel showed, however, that £7000 of the £12,000 were owned by one H. N. Caldwell, and had been shipped to the Matamoras consignee for the purchase of cotton either in Texas or Matamoras on the joint account of Lizardi & Co. and Caldwell.
The residence and business of Caldwell were not fully disclosed in the record. It did not appear that he was a British merchant, nor that he had any commercial domicil in Mexico, nor yet that he was a rebel enemy. He had apparently married in England shortly before the vessel sailed, and was on board with his wife and servant at the time of capture, he nationality of the wife and servant the captain stated to e English; but he did not know what that of Caldwell was.
hey were all permitted to go ashore with their luggage by t e boarding officer. Caldwell had, apparently, no interest in the vessel or cargo. He appeared, by the letters, to have een engaged in cotton transactions, and to have proposed .° izardi & Co. the plan of shipping all the gold to Mexico as their own property. Caldwell made no claim for any part of the gold, nor did he personally appear in any way in the case.
n the proofs in preparatorio the place of capture, as repecting the middle or dividing line of the Rio Grande, appeared doubtful.
The 1)ashing Wave. [Sup. Ct
Argument for the United States.
The testimony of naval witnesses, examined under an order which had been obtained by the captors for further proof as to the place of capture and the character of the cargo, asserted that the vessel, when seized, was on the northern, thairis to say, the American side, of the boundary line, and in our waters. The master swore to the contrary.
In point of fact, as appeared by a Coast Survey chart, on which her exact position was marked by a witness of the captors, the master was wrong. The vessel was in waters actually blockaded. The position of the vessel made access to our coast, then in possession of enemy rebels, and under blockade, as easy as to that of Mexico, a neutral. (See chart opposite, inserted for convenience, laterally.)
The District Court at New Orleans made two decrees: one restoring the vessel and cargo—a decree from which the United States now appealed; the second refusing damages and ordering payment of costs and charges (exceeding $12,000) by the claimants—from which decree the claimants appealed.
Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney- General, for the United States:
1. The position of the vessel, even if in Mexican waters, was so dubious as justly to expose her and her cargo to condemnation for violating blockade. She had no right to put herself in a position where she could, by night or in a moment when the blockading fleet was distant, land her cargo on the coast of Texas, a coast unquestionably blockaded.
2. There should be no final decree of restitution without further proof adduced by the claimants touching the com mercial domicil and nationality of Caldwell.
The record contains no evidence in favor of the neutra character of Caldwell, but, on the contrary, it strongly sag gests that he was a hostile person. His presence on boar the captured vessel with his wife and servant; the professe^ ignorance of the master and mates of the nationality an business of the party; the suggestion, in his correspon once with Lizardi & Co. that the gold,—of which he himse owned the largest part,—should be covered and consign6, [p. 173] Sketch showing the position of vessels.
Argument for the claimants.
in the bill of lading, as the neutral property of the British house; the previous commercial dealings of the party as inferable from his correspondence; the rash or false statement by the attorney that no one but the Lizardis were interested in the gold, are sufficient, in a prize court, to warrant inference of his unneutral character, in the absence of clear proof to the contrary.
If the claimants should neglect or fail, upon an order for further proof being made, to establish the neutral character of this party, then the entire property claimed by Lizardi & Co. will be confiscable by reason of the attempt of those parties to cover property of hostile ownership.
In the Phoenix Insurance Company v. Pratt* the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a neutral master, who was the general agent for a cargo of neutral ownership, subjected the whole property of the principal on board the vessel to condemnation, by attempting to cover in his own name other goods of hostile ownership in the same vessel.
Mr. Marvin and Mr. Evarts, contra; Mr. Evarts for Lizardi f Co. :
I. As to the vessel and cargo generally.
1. Neither the vessel nor the cargo was engaged in breaking blockade, for no blockade existed at the mouth of the Rio Grande at the time of the capture.!
2. There is no evidence of the existence of any enemy interest in either ship or cargo, and the court will not presume such interest to exist in a trade between one neutral port an another.
3. Anchoring in even American waters would of itsel e no cause of forfeiture, either under any principle of inter national law or under any act of Congress. The Rio Gran e and the waters leading into and from it are common to t e use of both Mexico and the United States, and their use as not been prohibited to neutrals.^
* 2 Binney, 308; see also Earle v. Rowcroft, 8 East, 126. f See the Peterhoff, supra, p. 28. i The Schooner Fame, 3 Mason, 147; 5 Wheaton, 874.
Dec. 1866.] The Dashing Wave. 175
Argument for the claimants.
II. J.s to the.£12,000 gold coin.
1. There is no support for a surmise that the consignment was not what the documents show it to be; one, namely, from the shippers, Lizardi & Co., to their consignee, at Matamoras, there to be employed as the means of commercial transactions intrusted to him.
It is not perceived that any question of enemy property arises upon the special employment or application of this capital, indicated in the correspondence; which, on the contrary, confirms the integrity of the transaction of the consignment of the specie, and its employment as destined to the actual and active care of the commercial house at Matamoras, to which it was addressed, and in the commerce of that place.
That this money might be applied by the consignee under his instructions from, and accountability to, Lizardi & Co., to trade in cotton, and for account of Caldwell, seems unimportant in its bearing on the question of prize or no prize. Trade in cotton at Matamoras was wholly lawful, no matter what the origin, or who the vendor of the cotton. Nothing appears to expose Caldwell, or his connection with or interest in the possible transactions in which the specie might be used, to any other construction or consequences than would apply to Lizardi & Co.
The opportunity for further proof has been asked for and e tained by the captors, and no damnatory evidence has been produced by them.
2. The capture was wholly unjustifiable, and the restitu-10n ecreed should have been attended with damages and costs. ®
When captors intercept an open prosecution of an appary awful trade, and visitation exhibits every trait of neutrality, and the commerce thus indicated is not thZ’ constantly engaged in by our own vessels, damln ^le Prize courts demands the infliction of captor 68 cos^8 as a check to the speculative cupidity of he features of this case are not distinguishable [p. 176] from those of the Magicienne, intercepted in her voyage to Matamoras, and brought into Key West. She was promptly restored, the diplomatic claim for damages immediately recognized, and, upon adjustment, paid by authority of an act of Congress.*
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
Two decrees were rendered in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, the first, directing restitution of the vessel and cargo; the second, refusing damages, and ordering payment of costs and charges by the claimants. The United States appealed from the first; the claimants took an appeal from the second.
The proofs show that the Dashing Wave was a neutral vessel, bound from Liverpool to Matamoras, with a cargo of general merchandise and coin, no part of which was contraband.
It is clear, therefore, that the decree of restitution must be affirmed.
The only question which requires much consideration relates to the rightfulness of capture. And this question resolves itself into two:
1. Was there anything in the position of the Dashing Wave, at the time of capture, which warranted the opinion of the captors that she was engaged in breaking the blockade? and—
2. Was there anything in the papers on board the brig, relating to the cargo, which justified the seizure?
It is claimed for the captors that she was taken in Texan waters, lying convenient to the blockaded coast. The pre paratory evidence left her position in much uncertainty, u the. testimony taken under the order for farther proo,® connection with the chart upon which her position is mar e by one of the witnesses, establishes it beyond reasona. doubt. She was anchored north of the line between
* Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part 11, pp> 511, 513, 565, 58, 636.
Mexican and Texan waters, with as easy access to the land on the rebel as on the Mexican side.
We think it was the plain duty of a neutral claiming to be engaged in trade with Matamoras, under circumstances which warranted close observation by the blockading squadron, to keep his vessel, while discharging or receiving cargo, so clearly on the neutral side of the boundary line as to repel, so far as position could repel, all imputation of intent to break the -blockade. He had no right to take, voluntarily, a position in the immediate presence of the blockading fleet, from which merchandise might be so easily introduced into the blockaded region.
We do not say that neglect of duty, in this respect, on the part of the brig, especially in the absence ofpositive evidence that the neglect was wilful, calls for condemnation; but we cannot doubt that under the circumstances described, capturing and sending in for adjudication was fully warranted.
The other question relates wholly to the papers concerning the shipment of coin. There is no evidence which affects with culpability any other part of the cargo.
The coin is claimed by Lizardi & Co., neutral merchants o Liverpool; but the proof shows that one H. N. Caldwe was the real owner of the larger part of it. A letter, dated August 17th, 1863, and addressed by Caldwell to Lizaf ? & s^es his intention, in view of “the uncertain a e of our political affairs,” to take gold to purchase cotton, 8 ea of taking goods to Mexico, if he can arrange for an w’th TC,e making, with certain credits in his favor nf aud £3000 which he had in bank, a total
£12,000, with which to operate. am 1 18ame feffer he further proposed that the whole thp Un S °U^ 8hipPe<l 1° J• Boman, of Matamoras, as
^^zar(h & Co. The next day Lizardi & Co. £300()W' G receipf from Caldwell of a check for the later L^ard^r^ tO ProPosals- Three da?s him of th ^°‘ addres8ed a letter to Roman, advising exnrosai e arran£enient with Caldwell, and distinguishing
PteS91y the «000 advanced by them from “the other
™"v' 12
178 The Science. [Sup. Ct
£7000 of the said gentleman.’* These letters were found on board the brig.
Caldwell was a passenger on the brig, but was allowed to leave before any question of his character was made. What was that character in fact? Was he a rebel enemy or a neutral ?
The tenor of his letter to Lizardi & Co., his proposal that the specie should be shipped as their property, when seven-twelfths of it belonged to himself; and especially the circumstance that he has never made claim in this suit to any part of it, except through Lizardi & Co., indicates that he was not a neutral, but an enemy.
On the other hand, there is no positive proof of his enemy character, though further proof was allowed to the captors.
This evidence, in our judgment, does not warrant condemnation of the specie, but it does, as we think, justify the capture.
We shall therefore affirm the decree of the District Court, restoring the vessel and cargo, but direct that costs and expenses consequent upon the capture, be ratably apportioned between the brig and the shipment of coin, and that the residue of the cargo be exempted from contribution.
Decree and Directions accordingly.
Note.
At the same time with the preceding appeal and cross appeal, and by the same counsel, were argued two cas^ one an appeal and cross-appeal, as the preceding, fro® District Court of the United States for the Eastern isr of Louisiana; the other, an appeal from the same cour.
The first case was that of
The Science.
The Science had been captured by the American war• s Virginia, on the same day as the Dashing Wave, an esse] decrees were entered in the District Court in respec and cargo, and similar appeals were taken.
Dec. 1866.] The Volant. 179
Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney-General, for the captors; Mr. Marvin contra, for the claimants.
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
The evidence is clear that the vessel and her outward cargo were neutral property, destined to neutral consignees at Matamoras, and that the cargo had been actually delivered as consigned.
Some of the proof tended to show that a portion of this cargo consisted of confederate uniform cloth; but there was none showing destination to enemy territory or immediate enemy use.
There was, therefore, nothing in the character of the vessel or of the outward cargo which warrants condemnation.
At the time of capture, the bark had the whole or a great part of her homeward cargo on board. It consisted of cotton and a small quantity of copper. The captain had not signed ills of lading, and, upon his preparatory examination, assigned this circumstance as a reason for not being able to give the names of the shippers at Matamoras or of the consignees at 'verpool. The presumption, arising upon the facts proved, is that it was neutral property, which must be restored.
he position of the Science, when her cargo was put on board, and when she was captured, is left in doubt by the depositions o the master and mate; but the testimony of two officers of e irginia, read as further proof, is explicit that she was in exan waters,* and no excuse is offered for being there.
e principles just declared in the case of the Dashing Wave quire, therefore, the affirmation of both decrees of the District Court.
And this is obdebed.
The second case was that of
The Volant.
RioCr^ ^°lant been captured, near the mouth of the —_ 6’On ^e 5th of November, 1863, by the United States
* See chart, supra, p. 173.—Rep.
Syllabus.
steamer Granite City, and, with her cargo, was condemned, by the decree of the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The case came before this court upon the appeal of the claimants.
Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States; Mr. Marvin, contra, for the claimants.
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
The proof shows that the brig was the property of a neutral merchant of the island of Jersey, fully documented as a British merchantman, and regularly cleared from London to Mata moras.
The cargo was shipped by the charterers of the vessel for neutral owners, and consigned to neutrals at Matamoras, but had not been discharged at the time of capture.
It consisted in part of bales of confederate uniform cloth, of the same mark and of corresponding numbers with like goods found on the Science; but there is no proof of unlawful destination.
The brig, however, anchored in Texan waters, near the coast, and remained there until captured.*
This circumstance alone did not warrant condemnation, though, in connection with the character of the cargo, it justified capture.
The decree of the District Court must be reversed; and a decree of restitution, on payment of costs and charges, must be entered instead of it.
Reversal and decree accordingly -
The Teresita.
I. A neutral vessel, at anchor, completely laden with a neutral car^’. the neutral side of a river dividing neutral from hostile water, was^ a blockaded coast, was captured as being subject to just suspicw an intent to break the blockade. . • of cap 2. The captain of the vessel (who was, however, absent at the time
*
See chart, supra, p. 173.—Kar.
ture), and the mate, being examined in preparatorio, testified that she was in neutral waters when captured. A stevedore, yet on board, that she had drifted to the place where she was taken, under stress of weather; he not knowing whether when captured she was in neutral waters or not.
Held, that this preliminary testimony warranted restoration.
8. Further proof having been allowed, it appeared that the vessel when captured was a quarter or a half mile within the hostile waters; the mate admitting this fact, but testifying that the vessel had drifted to the spot, its anchor and chain being too light, and he expressing as one reason for not returning to the former anchorage as soon as the wind became fair, that the captain was in port (about 36 miles distant), with the ship’s papers, and that he did not like to move the vessel without orders; and, as another, that the ship was fully laden and ready to sail, and had been seen by two blockading men-of-war, which did not disturb her, and that he thought the vessel might safely remain where she was till the captain returned; the mate proposing, also, if not captured, to return at once to the anchorage from which he had drifted. On this, Held, that the case for the captors was not improved by the further proof* and that with the restitution costs and expenses to be paid by the captors, was to be decreed.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Ashton, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States.
Air. Iteverdy Jihnson, contra, for the claimant.
The CHIEF JUSTICE stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court.
The hark Teresita was captured near the mouth of the io Grande, on the 16th of November, 1863, by the United a es steamer Granite City. The cargo consisted of one hundred and fifty-eight bales of cotton.
u eKWas. krought into New Orleans for adjudication; and, vp i eafln$’ ^ie District Court directed restitution of the vessel and cargo. car IT n0 questi°n °T the neutrality of the ship or her Texan U+ 14 WaS c^a^me(^ for the captors that she was in 8usnimZ»a T-* W^en caPtured, and therefore subject to just «uspicion of intent to break the blockade.
1 ain and the mate of the ship, in their preparatory [p. 182] .182 The Teresita. [b up. Ct.
depositions, testified that she was in Mexican waters; but the captain being on shore at the time, could not be certain]) informed as to this. A stevedore, who had been employed on board the vessel and had not been discharged, testified that she had drifted to the place where she was taken, under stress of weather. He did not know whether she was then in Texan or American waters. Her full cargo had been taken in at her former anchorage.
The preliminary hearing took place on this evidence, which, doubtless, warranted restitution.
Further proof, however, was allowed. It consisted of depositions by the captain and some other officers of the Granite City to the effect that the Teresita when captured was a quarter or half a mile north of the line, according to the bearings by the compass, and that the mate admitted that she was in Texan waters. But the same deposition showed that the mate declared that his vessel had drifted to the spot, his anchor and chain being too light; and assigned, as one reason for not returning to the former anchorage as soon as the wind became fair, that the captain was at Matamoras with the ship’s papers, and he did not like to move the vessel without orders; and, as another, that the ship was fully laden and ready to sail, and had been seen by two American men-of-war, which did not disturb her, and he thought, therefore, that she might safely remain where she was till the captain returned. It appeared, also, that the mate propose if not captured, to return at once to the anchorage from which he had drifted.
We are of opinion that, under such circumstances, tempo rary anchorage in waters occupied by the blockading vesse, does not justify capture, in the absence of other The case for the captors was not improved by the ur proof. The decree of restitution must be affirmed, and shall direct the costs and expenses to be paid by the cap o
Decree and direction according
The Jenny.
1. A vessel sailing through blockaded waters may be properly seized on suspicion of intent to break the blockade, when, in addition to the manifest bearing date as of a day when only a part of the cargo is laden, the bills of health and clearance point to one port as her port of des« tination, while the captain’s letter of instructions require him to stop at another not in the direct line to that place, for instructions; when both the vessel’s bills of health specify six men and no passengers, there being, in f$ct, one passenger; when the provisional certificate of registry represents as sole owner one person, and other papers another.
2. Condemnation decreed where a vessel, with a changed name and with papers open to suspicion, as above stated, and whose master had ten months before commanded a blockade-runner, was found sailing from the immediate proximity of the line separating neutral from blockaded waters (in fact from within the line), with an ownership which a complicated, obscure, and apparently contradictory history, left in doubt, where also the ostensible ownership was apparently but a mere cover; no claim for her being put in after capture and libel otherwise than by her captain, who put it in for the ostensible owners; he acting without instructions from them and only in his capacity of master; a part of the cargo being, moreover, more plainly still, enemy’s property.
3. In proceedings in libel against a ship and cargo as prize of war, the burden of proving neutral ownership of them is upon the claimants. When there is no proof of such ownership, and still more when the weight of the evidence is that the ownership is enemy ownership, condemnation will be pronounced.
Appeals from the District Court of the United States for t e Eastern District of Louisiana, decreeing restitution of the schooner Jenny and cargo, and decreeing costs and c aiges against their claimants; the questions involved being of fact chiefly.
Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States; Mr. Marvin, contra.
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the coart, in which the case is stated.
schooner Jenny, with a cargo of one hundred and y our bales of cotton, was captured by the United States s earner Virginia, in Texan waters, north of the Rio [p. 184] Grande, on the 6th of October, 1863, and was brought into New Orleans.
She was libelled as prize of war in the District Court for the Eastern District of .Louisiana on the 16th of October.
On the 7th of November John Johnson, the master of the schooner, put in four separate claims: one in behalf of Hale & Co., for the schooner; one in behalf of H. Fernstcin, for forty-four bales of cotton; one in behalf of Ruprecht & Fortner, for thirty-nine bales, and one in behalf of J. Rosenfeld, for seventy-one bales. On the 10th of December two other claims were filed: one by Charles Andre, in behalf of Augustine Stark, for the thirty-nine bales, and the other by Conrad Seiler, in behalf of R. M. Elkes, for the forty-four bales. No personal claim or test-affidavit was made by any of the parties alleged to have title in the vessel or cargo; and no evidence was put in of any authority in Andre or Seiler to represent Stark or Elkes. The authority of Johnson was derived from his character as master.
The seizure was made because she sailed from the blockaded coast of Texas, and because of the unsatisfactory nature of her papers.
Her manifest was dated September 17,1863, at which time her log-book showed that she had only part of her cargo on board; it appeared also from her manifest, her bill of health from the American consul, and her Mexican clearance, that she was bound for New York, whereas the captain s letter of instruction required her to stop at Nassau and conform to the instructions of Saunders & Co., of that place; both herb’8 of health specified six men, and no passengers, whereas, in fact, a passenger by the name of Mund was found on boar ; the provisional certificate of registry represented Hale & o., of Matamoras, as sole owners of the vessel, whereas, the captain’s instructions and other papers showed that C. F. Jenny was the owner. ,
These facts, doubtless, justified suspicion and warrante seizure. We must then inquire into the true character a ownership of the vessel and cargo, as shown by the prepa tory evidence.
Dec. 1866.] The Jenny. 185
It appears that the vessel was American built, and that ner original name was Southron; and a paper found on board showed that Johnson, her master, had commanded in December, 1862, a schooner engaged in running the blockade from Mobile to Havana.
The Southron was sold under order of the United States sequestration commission in Hew Orleans to one P. A. Fronty, and a register was issued to him on the 18th of March, 1863.
She was probably soon after sold by Fronty, though he still remained master, to one Julius Scblickum; for this person, on the 21st of April, made a bill of sale of her at Matamoras, to Hale & Co., of that place.
Hale & Co. do not seem to have taken possession of her; for, on the same day, an irrevocable power of attorney was made by that firm to one Jacob Rosenfeld, of Houston, in Texas, giving him or his substitute absolute control over the management and disposition of the schooner by sale or otherwise.
This paper was not signed by Hale & Co., but was drawn in their name, and signed by one John P. Molony, who, in a declaration of membership in the firm, dated six days later, represented himself as a partner.
'these documents were not framed and executed in this irregular way by accident. In a letter to Johnson & Co., at assau, Jenny called Hale & Co. “the pretended owners,” an complained that Molony refused to make out the papers, f H e’ ^e.nu^’ wished, simply remarking to him, “ You have u an irrevocable power of attorney to do or not to do
1t e schooner whatever you please. I shall never interfere with you or your acts.” ma]11 ^ay that the declaration of ownership was in? F a ri^8^ Provi8i°iml certificate of registry representhv m r t > master, and Hale & Co. as owners, was issued by the British vice-consul. Charlo^September, 1863, Rosenfeld transferred to DoweJx ‘ J^ny»of Matamoras, as his substitute, all the es e in him by the irrevocable power of attorney. [p. 186] And on the 17th of the same month, Jenny made a like transfer to Saunders & Co., of Nassau, as his substitute.
Jenny appears to have exercised control over the vessel much earlier; for he appointed Johnson in place of Fronty, on the 27th of May; after which the schooner made a voy age to Havana and back, with Rosenfeld as supercargo.
In all transactions connected with the last voyage, Jenny acted as apparent owner; while Rosenfeld appeared only as a shipper of cotton. In the letter to Saunders & Co., already quoted, Jenny authorized the sale of the schooner at Nassau, and directed the remittance of the proceeds to his firm in Switzerland. In case sale could not be effected at Nassau, he directed that the power and the papers of the ship should be transferred to Schlesinger & Co., of New York, the consignees there of the vessel and cargo, to whom he also wrote instructing them to sell the schooner, or, if not, to obtain a return cargo for her. In this letter he spoke of the vessel as “my schooner Jenny.”
This testimony leaves the ownership of the schooner in some doubt. The sale to Hale & Co. was most probably a mere cover. It is clear that, except in obtaining the British provisional registry, they never acted or held themselves out as owners; nor did they appear personally in this court to make claim for the vessel, or otherwise than through Johnson, who acted without instructions from them, and merely in his capacity as master. And he, in his preparatory deposition, said only, that the Jenny belonged to them, as far as he knew, but he did not know exactly.
Their irrevocable power of attorney to Rosenfeld, veste in him all the powers of owner, and made him owner in effect. After the transfer of the power, Rosenfeld was con stantly connected with the schooner as supercargo and ship per of cotton. On the other hand, the conduct of Jenny and his apparently absolute control, indicates ownership o her. He may have acted, and probably did act under some arrangement with Rosenfeld, or they may have been connec e in ownership. The former supposition is strengthen 5 the circumstance that Jenny disappeared i from all appaieD [p. 187] connection with her, immediately after capture; while Hale & Co., the grantors of the Jenny to Rosenfeld, wyere brought forward as ostensible owners.
Thus far as to the vessel. We have already referred tc the claims for the cargo.
One of the claims was in behalf of Rosenfeld, who was« presented in a new character. In the power of attorney executed at Matamoras, he was described as a resident of Texas. In the claim made in New Orleans, he was represented as a resident of that city, absent in Matamoras. The claim in his behalf was for the seventy-one bales. It is remarkable, if he was in fact a resident of New Orleans, that he has never claimed otherwise than through Johnson, and never made any test affidavit at all. The truth, we apprehend is, that he was what the power of attorney declared him to be,—a resident of Texas,—and therefore, at that time, a rebel enemy of the United States.
The remainder of the cargo seems to have been shipped in good faith at Matamoras.
We are next to inquire what was the course, position, and conduct of the vessel at the time of capture, as shown by the preparatory evidence and the further proof.
She had recently come down the Rio Grande from Matamoras. She was observed two days before the capture anchored in Texan waters, near the coast of Texas.* She was probably there when she took on board the seventy-one bales belonging to Rosenfeld, which she received from lighters. When she left her anchorage, the Virginia sent a boat to inteicept her, and she was brought to by a shot or two from this boat. The mate of the Jenny says she was at this ime about a mile from the shore. The officers of the Virginia make her distance from shore three miles or more, an her place from three to five miles south of the Ric wande.
. hat are the conclusions of law from these facts ? In ictness the Jenny, having taken on part of her cargo off
* See chart, supra, p. 173.—Bep.
188 Ex parte The Milwaukee Railroad Ct. [Sup. Ct
Syllabus.
the blockaded coast and having sailed from that coast, wa? attempting to run the blockade when captured.
But we are not inclined to condemn the vessel on this ground, much less the forty-four bales and the thirty-nine bales, which were taken on board at Matamoras.
But it is an undoubted principle that in a case of libel as prize of war, the burden of proving the neutral ownership of the ship and cargo is upon the claimants. In this case satisfactory proof is made of neutral ownership in the cotton laden at Matamoras. But there is no proof at all of such ownership in the seventy-one bales put on board from lighters; and no satisfactory proof of such ownership in the schooner. On the contrary, the weight of the evidence is that these bales were owned by a rebel enemy; and that the same rebel enemy, either alone or in association with Jenny, who makes no claim, owned the schooner.
It results that the forty-four bales and the thirty-nine bales must be restored to the claimants represented by the master, without contribution to costs or expenses, and that the seventy-one bales and the schooner must be condemned.
The decree below must be reversed and a decree entered
In conformity with this opinion.
Ex parte The Milwaukee Railroad Company.
1. A case being properly in this court by appeal, the court has a right to issue any writ which may be necessary to render its appellate jurisdiction e fectual. 2. Accordingly, it will issue the writ of supersedeas if such writ be necessar for that purpose; the circumstances otherwise making it proper. 8. It will issue this writ rather than attain the same end by issuing am darnus to the court below, in a case where the issuing of a man a would.control judicial action in a matter apparently one of discre > as ex gr. the approval or rejection of a bond offered for the cour proval. r ed to \1. Hence, where, after an appeal to this court, the judge below re us approve a bond for a supersedeas, because all the sureties were non dents of the district, this court (though not agreeing with sue
the opinion that mere non-residence within the district was a sufficient reason for rejecting a bond, if, in all other respects, it were unobjectionable) declined to issue a mandamus to compel the judge to approve the bond and allow a supersedeas, considering its right to do this doubtful; but ordered that on filing a bond to be approved by the clerk of this court, a supersedeas should issue from this court.
Petition for a writ of mandamus.
The Circuit Court for the District of Wisconsin having rendered a decree in favor of J. T. Soutter, survivor, &c., against the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company and the Milwaukee and Minnesota Railroad Company, on the 5th March, 1867, for $40,000, and ordered a sale of the road mortgaged to secure the debt, the last-mentioned company prayed an appeal to this court, which was allowed. For the purpose of staying proceedings on the decree, they offered a bond, in the penalty of $50,000, within the ten days allowed for that purpose, which the district judge declined to approve, but upon which he made the following indorsement:
“ March 16, 1867.
“ The counsel of complainant having objected to the allowance of this bond for supersedeas, on the ground that all the sureties are non-residents of the district,Jor this reason this bond is not approved for a supersedeas.
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