N.Y. & Balt. Transp. Co. v. Philadelphia, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 461
Case details
Bluebook Citation
N.Y. & Balt. Transp. Co. v. Philadelphia, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 461
Full caption
The New York and Baltimore Transportation Company, Appellants, v. the Philadelphia and Savannah Steam Navigation Company, Owners of the Steamship Keystone State.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
The New York and Baltimore Transportation Company, Appellants, v. the Philadelphia and Savannah Steam Navigation Company, Owners of the Steamship Keystone State.
In a collision which took place in the river Delaware, between a steamship and a barge which was in tow of a propeller, the latter was in fault. The lookout was not properly stationed, being in a place where his view was obstructed; and the propeller violated the rule which requires steamers ap proaching each other from opposite directions to port their helms, and pass each other on the larboard side. A propeller with a barge in tow is not within the rule which applies to sailing vessels, and which requires steamships to keep out of their way. Propellers have nearly the same speed as side-wheel steamers, and quite as much power, and must be subject to the same rules of navigation.
This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.
It was a case of collision between the steamship Keystone State and a barge called the A. Groves, jun., which took place on the river Delaware, whereby the barge was sunk in the river, and her cargo greatly damaged.
The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
The libel was filed by the New York and Baltimore Trans portation Company against the owners of the Keystone State. The District Court dismissed the libel, and the Circuit Court, upon appeal, affirmed the decree. The libellants then appealed to this court.
It was argued by Mr. Wharton and Mr. Schley for the appel lants, and by Mr. McCall and Mr. Campbell for the appellees. p. 462New York and Balt. Trans. Co. n. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
The points of fact averred by the respective counsel were stated briefly and clearly, and each position maintained by references to the evidence. They were as follows:
Points of Fact averred by the Libellants.
1. The Artisan, with her tow, was on the Jersey side of the channel, near the buoy on the lower end of Marcus Hook bar, steering a course having Christine Light on her starboard bow.
2. The opposing vessels were nearly opposite the same point on the Pennsylvania side, (viz: Naaman’s Creek,) when the steamship ported her helm.
3. By porting her helm, the steamship must have run across the channel.
The respondent’s witnesses cannot say what course the steamship was steering when she ported her helm.
4. The channel was from a half to three-fourths of a mile wide, and the speed of the steamship was from nine to ten miles per hour.
That speed was maintained until she reached the propeller, and she came in line with her by porting the helm.
5. There was no necessity for the steamship to port her helm, and it was one cause of the disaster. When she did it, she was aware of the presence of the Artisan.
6. If the steamship had kept her course without porting, the vessels would have passed.
7. The propeller did all that she could to avoid the disaster, and escaped. The tow was comparatively helpless, and suffered. She was struck on the starboard side, about thirty feet from her stern, in a diagonal line inclining thereto, her whole length being about eighty feet. A touch of tire wheel of the steam ship to starboard would have cleared the barge.
Points of Law relied on by Libellants.
1. The Artisan and her tow were not on an equality with the Keystone State, and the rules, whether statutory or judi cial, applicable to vessels on an equality with respect to ca pacity of self-management, are not applicable to the former. p. 463New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
The act of Congress of August 30, 1852, (10 Stat, at Large, 61—72,) applies only to passenger steamers.
See section 42.
Sp, also, the rules of the inspectors, under the authority of the 29th section, in the matter of vessels passing each other, signal lights, &c., embrace only the same class of steam boats, and are intended to avoid collisions between such ves sels.
Those rules were, however, obligatory on the Keystone State. The fifth rule of the Supervising Inspectors, adopted October 29, 1852, provides that it shall not be lawful for an ascending boat to cross a channel when a descending boat is so near that it would be possible for a collision to ensue there from.
This rule was violated by the steamer.
Although not bound by the statute, the propeller did adopt the dictates of prudence and good seamanship, by keeping in to the Jersey side of the channel, and leaving the centre of it free.
A tug with a tow in charge is at least as helpless, in com parison with a steamer, as a sailing vessel; and with respect to the latter, the rule is well settled, that the steamer meeting such a one must give way.
Fashion y. Wards, 6 McLean, 153.
There is nothing in our case to make it an exceptional one, or subject it to other rules of navigation.
The Keystone State could have avoided the collision, by either of two very simple modes. She could have stopped, her engines in time, or she could have put her helm to starboard, having the channel to her larboard free; and by the law of 1852, and the decisions of this court, she was bound to avoid the collision if possible.
2. It being night, and the steamer approaching the harbor, p. 464New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
it was her duty to proceed slowly and with caution. Not hav ing done so, she is responsible for the consequences.
The James Watt, 2 W. Rob., 271.
The Birkenhead, 3 W. Rob., 75.
3. Even if the libellants committed any fault, (which is, however, denied,) a small exertion on the part of the respond ents being sufficient to have prevented a collision, they were bound to make it.
The Genesee Chief, 12 Howard, 461; (ut supra.)
4. If both vessels were in fault, it was an error to throw the whole loss on the libellants; the damages should have been divided.
Brig James Gray v. John Frazer, 21 Howard, 184. Schooner Catharine et al. v. Dickinson et al., 17 Howard, 170.
The barge (the tow) followed the course of the Artisan, (the tug,) and obeyed her movements. She was entirely under her control. There is no evidence of any fault imputable to the barge; her being, therefore, the thing which actually came into collision with the steamer, makes no difference.
The James Gray, (ut supra,) 21 Howard, 194.
The question arises from the relative condition and action of the Artisan and the Keystone State.
Points of Fact averred by Appellees.
1. Independently of all regulations, and of the rules of the maritime law, the usage of the river requires that approaching steamers shall port their helms and keep to the right in pass ing- .
2. The vessels, steamer and propeller, with her tow, were, when first seen by each other, in or near the middle of the p. 465New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
ship channel, and the channel was of the width of three-quar ters of a mile. The river, from shore to shore, was wholly unobstructed, and no reason of any character is suggested which should have caused a deviation, on the part of the pro peller, from the law and usage which required the steamers to port their helms, and pass larboard to larboard.
3. The propeller, from the time the lights were first discov ered, was duly reported by the lookout, and, for the distance of two or three miles, was kept constantly and attentively in view by the pilot of the steamship. The helm of the steam ship was ported and the lights of the propeller kept a point or a point and a half on the larboard bow; when in close proximity, a wrongful change of direction on the part of those having charge of the propeller, by starboarding her helm, in stead of porting it as they should have done, ran her across the bows of the steamer, and caused the collision of the barge with the steamship.
4, Those on board the propeller appear to have had no lookout; utterly disregarded the lights of the steamer, which clearly indicated her direction; made no change of course of any kind u»til the collision was imminent, and then the wrongful movement above referred to.
5. The pilot of the steamship, on perceiving this wrongful movement, which brought both vessels in peril, ordered the helm hard a-port, and the steamship to be slowed and stopped, which orders were instantly complied with, and the steam ship was almost, if not entirely, at rest at the time of the col lision.
The effect of these orders, which were prudent and necessary, was to enable the propeller to go clear; but she, being still under full headway, brought the barge in contact with the steamship.
6. No timely precaution of any kind was used by the pro peller to avert the collision.
7. The steamship was proceeding up the river at a lower rate of speed than upon other parts of her voyage, and cau tiously, with pilot and lookout.
8. The barge was attached to the propeller by a hawser, drag VOL. XXII. 30 p. 466New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
ging behind her in a direct line, at the distance of 180 feet, in such manner that it was impossible for the pilot of the steam ship to see the barge until the moment of collision.
9. If the barge had been attached to the propeller’s side, or near her, or under her control, the collision would not have occurred, the propeller passing fully clear of the steamer, with a space of fifty feet intervening.
10. If the propeller had ported her helm, as required by law and the usage of the river, or had even slowed her speed, her tow would have cleared the steamship; and the fact that those on the propeller saw the red and white light of the steamer only, clearly exhibited the necessity for such movements; it necessarily follows, that when the bright and red light only are seen, the larboard side of the vessel is in view.
11. When those on board the propeller first saw the steamer, the propeller was above the buoy on the lower end of Marcus Hook. The channel below that point being on the western or Pennsylvania side of the river, gave to the steamship com ing up the middle of the channel the appearance of being toward the Pennsylvania side. This may account for the erroneous statement of some of the libellant’s witnesses, that the steamer was on the Pennsylvania side, and not in the mid channel.
Map Coast Survey.
12. The captain of the propeller states that she had the Christine light a little on her starboard bow, but before the collision, and before his wrongful order to starboard, the cap tain also says: We were near the middle of the river, steaming down. The latter statement must be taken as correct, espe cially in view of the respondent’s evidence. In any event, it would not be inconsistent with the fact that the steamer was in the middle of the channel.
Points of Law relied on by Appellees. \1. The act of Congress of 1852,10 Statutes at Large, 61—72, and the rules of the supervising inspectors appointed under the same, were applicable to the Keystone State, as a passenger steamer, and to the propeller also, if carrying passengers, as p. 467New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
set forth in the libel, so far as respects lights and move ments.
2. The admiralty rules are imperative—they are obligatory upon vessels approaching each other from the time the neces sity for precaution begins, and continue so long as they ad vance.
3. The rule laid down is, that when two steam vessels are approaching each other, each shall port, and go to the right, passing each other larboard and larboard.
This rule is imperative in English courts of admiralty, and fully adopted by the United States courts.
The Duke of Sussex, 1 Wm. Rob., 285.
The Gazelle, 1 Wm. Rob., 471.
The James Watt, 2 Wm. Rob., 271.
Wheeler v. the Steamer Eastern State, 2 Curtis, 142.
4. A propeller, whether carrying passengers or engaged and used only for towing, and when having a tow in charge, is still a steamer, subject to all the general rules applicable to steam ers; and the rule of law makes no such distinction as would require them to be considered with respect to other steamers as sailing vessels; on the contrary, a steamer with a tow in charge is bound to adopt the same rules with regard to a sail ing vessel as a passenger steamer; no distinction is recognised between them.
They are required also to have a lookout, charged specially with the duty.
5. It was the duty of the propeller to have a competent and vigilant lookout stationed at the forward part of the steamer, in the position best adapted to descry vessels at the earliest moment, actually and vigilantly employed in the performance of that duty.
New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
The James Gray v. the John Frazer, 21 How., 192.
6. No such condition of things existed at the time and place of the collision as required the speed of the steamer to he re duced more than that stated in the evidence. The distance from the port of Philadelphia was twenty miles, and there were no vessels at anchor, or otherwise to interfere with the full use of the whole channel.
7. The 5th rule of the supervising inspectors, adopted October 29th, 1852, is cited in appellant’s brief as providing, “that it shall not be lawful for an ascending boat to cross a channel when a descending boat is so near that it would be possible for a collision to ensue therefrom.” This rule (the appellants aver) was violated by the steamer. The rule cited refers exclusively to boats navigating the “ rivers falling into the Gulf of Mexico and its tributaries.”
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, in a cause of collision, civil and maritime.
It was a suit in rem against the steamship the Keystone State, brought by the appellants as the owners of the barge known as the A. Groves, jun., to recover damages on account of a collision which took place on the eighteenth day of Au gust, 1857, between the steamer and the barge on the river Delaware, whereby the barge was sunk in the river, and her cargo was greatly damaged.
At the time of the disaster the barge was in tow of a propel ler, called the Artisan, which was also owned by the appel lants, and to which the barge was attached by a hawser, about one hundred and seventy feet in length. It occurred between one and two o’clock in the morning, about twenty miles below the city of Philadelphia, to which port the steamer was bound on her return trip from Savannah, in the State of Georgia.
According to the case made in the libel, the propeller, with p. 469New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
the barge in tow, was on her way from the city of New York to the city of Baltimore, with her usual complement of freight. She was proceeding down the river, on the eastern side of the channel, and the steamer was coming up the river, on the opposite side of the channel, with ample room to have kept clear of the barge.
To show that neither the propeller nor the barge was in fault, it is alleged by the libellants that both those vessels had proper lights, and that the propeller had sufficient lookouts properly stationed on the vessel, and that they were vigilantly employed in the performance of their duties. They also al lege that the steamer, when about three-quarters of a mile distant from the propeller, changed her course more out into the stream of the river, heading diagonally across the channel, in the direction of the descending vessels, and ran with great force and violence against the barge, striking her on the star board side, near the after gangway, and cutting her down to such an extent that she immediately sunk in the river. In this connection they also allege that the barge, at the time of the collision, was laden with a cargo of merchandise, valued at seventy thousand dollars, and that the goods were damaged by the disaster to an amount equal to half their estimated value.
It is denied by the respondents that the circumstances at tending the collision are truly stated in the libel. On the contrary, they aver that it was occasioned wholly through the fault and gross negligence of those in charge of the descend ing vessels. To lay the foundation for that theory, they allege that while the steamer was proceeding up the river at mid-channel, in the regular course of her voyage, and when about four miles below Marcus Hook, the second mate, pilot, and lookout of the steamer, discovered lights directly ahead, which appeared to be about three miles distant; that the steamer continued her course up the channel, keeping the lights on her larboard bow, but as near ahead as was practica ble; that after continuing that course for some time, and when about a mile distant from the lights, they were found to be the lights of the propeller, and appeared to be at mid-channel. p. 470New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
Orders were then given by the pilot of the steamer to port her helm, so as to bring the lights of the propeller a point on the lar board bow of the steamer; and the order was forthwith obeyed. At that time the steamer, as alleged in the answer, was head ing northeast by east; and she continued on that course, keep ing the lights of the propeller one point on her larboard bow, until she approached within three hundred yards of the lights, when the propeller suddenly starboarded her helm, and at tempted to cross the bows of the steamer. On seeing the pro peller change her course in that direction, the pilot of the steamer gave the signal to slow and stop in immediate succes sion, and the orders, as alleged, were promptly obeyed. Those orders were so far carried into effect that the propeller passed on her course without injury; but the barge was dragged by the hawser directly against the bows of the steamer, and there by received the damage, as alleged in the libel.
Such is the substance of the pleadings, respecting the cir cumstances attending the collision, so far as it is necessary to examine them at the present time.
After the hearing in the District Court, a decree was entered for the respondents, dismissing the libel; and on appeal to the Circuit Court, that decree was affirmed—whereupon the libel lants appealed to this court.
As appears by the proofs, the steamer, at the time of the collision, was well manned and equipped, and was in charge of a branch pilot, fully qualified to conduct and manage steam vessels on that river. She was a side-wheel steamer, of fifteen hundred tons burden, engaged in carrying freight and pas sengers, and had proper lights and sufficient and vigilant lookouts. They discovered the lights of the propeller when she was three miles distant, and continued to watch the lights till the collision occurred. On the other hand, the propeller was a vessel of one hundred and twenty-two tons burden, and the tonnage of the barge was about the same.
Three men, the master, the wheelsman, and one of the watchmen, were on the deck of the propeller at the time of the collision. All of the other hands, including the pilot, were below. Of those on deck, the master was standing for“ p. 471New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
ward of the pilot-house, but the watchman was standing aft the house, which he admits was higher than his head, so that he could not see over it. His position for a lookout was clearly an improper one, as the view forward was entirely obstructed by the house of the vessel. Chamberlain and al. v. Ward and al., 21 How., 570. Lookouts stationed in po. sitions where the view forward, or on the side of the vessel to which they are assigned, is obstructed by the lights or any part of the vessel, do not constitute a compliance with the requirement of the law.
To constitute such a compliance, they must be persons of suitable experience, properly stationed on the vessel, and act ively and vigilantly employed in the performance of that duty.
In this case, however, it appears that the steamer was actually seen by the master, who was in charge of the deck, ju season to have adopted every necessary precaution to have avoided the disaster, but he admits that he did not pay much attention to the approaching vessel. When he first saw her he says she was proceeding right up the river, but adds, that in the course of five minutes she changed her course, and ran from the western towards the eastern shore, which is the theory set up in the libel. According to the evidence, the speed of the steamer was nine or ten miles an hour, and that of the propeller was seven or eight miles an hour, with an ebb tide. At the place where the collision occurred, the channel of the river is about three-fourths of a mile wide, and the evidence shows that there is a cove or bend in the river below, so that a vessel coming up the river in the night-time would appear to an inattentive or casual observer, standing on the deck of a descending vessel, as being near the western shore, when in point of fact she was at mid-channel. Witnesses on both sides were examined as to the character of the night, and they generally agree, that while it was somewhat cloudy, there were intervening stars, and that it was not unusually dark.
Two propositions were chiefly relied on by the libellants. In the first place it was insisted in their behalf, that the pro peller, with the barge in tow, ought to be regarded in the p. 472New York and Balt. Trans. Co. v. Phil, and Savannah Steam Navigation Co.
same light as a sailing vessel, and that it was the duty of the steamer to keep out of the way. No authority w^s cited in support of the proposition, and we are not aware of any de cided case that favors that view of the law. Steamers are required to keep out of the way of sailing vessels, upon the ground that their power and speed are far greater than vessels of the latter class, and because those in charge of them can more readily and effectually command and appropriate that power and speed so as to avoid a collision, when it would be impossible for the sailing vessel to keep out of the way. St. John v. Paine, 10 How., 583. The Genesee Chief, 12 How., 463. Steamship Co. v. Rumball, 21 How., 384. None of the reasons on which the rule is founded, as applied to sailing vessels, exist in a case like the present. Propellers have near ly the same speed as side-wheel steamers, and quite as much power. Whether they obey the helm as readily or not, may admit of a question, but there is not sufficient difference in that behalf to justify any discrimination whatever in the appli cation of the rules of navigation. If they take other craft in tow, those in charge of them ought to augment their vigilance in proportion to the embarrassments they have to encounter, especially when they do not see fit to slacken their speed.
It is insisted, in the second place, that the collision was occasioned through the fault of the steamer; that she changed her course and attempted to pass the bows of the propeller, as is alleged in the libel.
On the part of the respondents, this proposition of facts is denied, and they insist that the fault was committed by the propeller, in omitting to port her helm and go to the right. Be yond question, the law is well settled that steamers approaching each other from opposite directions are respectively bound to port their helms and pass each other on the larboard side.
No attempt was made at the argument to controvert the proposition, and it is too firmly established by decided cases to require any argument in its support. The Duke of Sussex, 1 Wm. Rob., 285. The Gazelle, 1 Wm. Rob., 471. The James Watt, 2 Wm. Rob., 271. St. John v. Paine, 10 How., 558. The Oregon v. Rocca, 18 How., 572. Wheeler v. the
Adams v. Preston.
Eastern State, 2 Cur. C. C., 142. Much testimony was intro duced on the one side and the other upon this point, and it is somewhat conflicting. All that can be done under the cir cumstances with any possible advantage to either party will be to state our conclusions upon the evidence. After a care ful examination of the depositions, we think it is clearly proved that both vessels as they approached each other were near mid channel. Most of the witnesses on board the steamer expressly affirm that she was near mid-channel when the lights of the pro peller were first discovered, and they all agree that her helm was not changed, except for the purpose of bringing the lights of the propeller one point on her larboard bow, until the pro peller starboarded her helm, and attempted to cross the bows of the steamer. That movement of the propeller was a direct violation of the rules of navigation, and was entirely without any excuse. Her master may have been deceived as to the course of the steamer, by the slight bend in the river; but if so, it is the misfortune of those who employed him that he was not better acquainted with the navigation, or more at tentive to his duty.
The decree of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed with costs.
Mary Fort Adams, Administratrix of John Hagan, Jun.,
DECEASED, APPELLANT, V. JOHN S. PRESTON AND CAROLINE M. Preston his Wife. This court has never reviewed, the judgment of an inferior court of a State, where there was an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, upon a subject within the jurisdiction of such court, upon the allegation that its proceedings were irregular or illegal, and contrary to the law of the State. The present is such a case.
The Parish Court of New Orleans had exclusive jurisdiction over property ceded by insolvents, and the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over such insolvencies.
An allegation of fraud in a bill filed to review such proceedings in insolvency, which was afterwards abandoned, is not sufficient to give to the Circuit Court jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the State court.
Moreover, the complainant has no equitable claim to relief, his assignors having no mortgage lien on the property, when the judgments were assigned to the complainant.
Adams n. Preston.
This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana.
The facts in the case were complicated, and not to be un derstood by a brief narrative. The reader is therefore referred to the opinion of the court, in which they are historically re lated.
It was argued by Jfr. Taylor for the appellant, who also adopted a brief filed by Mr. Steele, and by Mr. Benjamin for the appellees.
Mr. Taylor made the following points:
I. A mortgage in the State of Louisiana, when duly inscribed in the register of mortgages, in the parish where the debtor has his domicil, will affect or bind the slaves of the debtor, no matter in what part of the State such slaves may be employed.
C. 0., 453, 454, 458, 461, 3246, 3247, 3248, 3250, 3216, 3238.
C. M. Hyams v. McH. Smith, 6 An., 363.
Patin v. Creditors, 9 L. R., 71.
Hooper v. the Union Bank of La. et al., 10 R. R., 63; 11 R. R., 20.
Cumming v. Bionalt, Curator, et al., 2 An., 794.
Crouch v. Lockett, 3 An., 121.
Bibb et al. v. Union Bank, 3 An., 324.
Spencer v. Amis, 12 An., 127.
Voorhies v. De Blanc, 12 An., 864.
II. No mortgage of any kind existed in favor of the heirs of Hampton upon the slaves, which are the object of the present action, on the 2d day of February, 1841, when they filed their intervention in the suit then depending in the Parish Court of New Orleans, wherein the syndics of the creditors of Thomas Barrett were plaintiffs, and Robert Bell was defend ant, or at any time thereafter, nor did any privilege exist on them in favor of the heirs of Hampton; and these slaves were then affected by and subject to the judicial mortgages result ing from the judgments duly recorded against Thomas Barrett in the parish of New Orleans, where he had his domicil.
Adams v. Preston.
C. C., 3333.
Transcript, 104 to 108.
C. C., 2216, 3246, 3247, 3248, 3250, 3238,3289,3317,3318,
3290.
III. The proceedings had in the case of the Syndics of the Creditors of Thomas Barrett against Robert Bell, in the Par ish Court of New Orleans, upon the intervention of the heirs of Hampton, filed therein, were and are, so far as to the mort gage rights of the Union Bank on the property of the insol vent Barrett, res inter alios acta, and can have, in law or equity, no effect in sheltering the slaves in question from pursuit, when the object is to subject them to the operation of the ju dicial mortgages which existed in favor of that bank, at the time of making such intervention. Neither was there any thing in the proceedings in the case of Thomas Barrett v. his Creditors which could have had any such effect.
Bullard and Curry’s Dig., 479, and seq., secs. 44,10,11,12, 44, 45, 46, 15, 16, 31, 35.
Brown v. Kenner, 3 M. R., 278.
Saul v. Creditors, 7 N. 8., 425.
Rivers v. Hemstack, 2 R. R., 187.
Egerton v. Creditors, 2 R. R., 201.
Corion v. Millaudon, 3 An., 664.
Gravin v. Lafon, 7 N. S., 613.
Pandelly v. Creditors, 9 L. R., 387.
Morgan v. Syndics, 4 L. R., 174.
Morgan, Dorsey, & Co. v. their Creditors, 19 L. R., 84. Sue. of A. Petay vin, 10 R. R., 118; 1 An., 92. C. C., 1169,1170. Robert v. Creditors, 2 An., 535. Lee v. Creditors, 2 An., 994. West v. Creditors, 3 An., 532. Williams v. Nicholson, 5 An., 720.
Mr. Benjamin made the following points:
I. The bill must be dismissed, for want of proper parties. This objection was taken in the court below, and is insur mountable.
Adams v. Preston.
The bill prays to annul a judgment rendered in a suit be tween the syndics of Thomas Barrett and Robert Bell, and the heirs of Wade Hampton intervening; yet neither of the orig inal parties to that suit is before the court, and only one out of the three intervening parties.
It seeks to set aside a sale made by Barrett’s syndic and Robert Bell to the three heirs of Wade Hampton; yet none of the vendors are before the court, and only one of three pur chasers is made party.
The bill attempts to excuse the want of parties that it admits to be necessary, by averring them to be beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
This excuse cannot avail.
II. The Parish Court of Hew Orleans was vested by law with full power over all the property ceded by the insol vent, and over the respective claims of the creditors. This jurisdiction has been exercised, and the regularity of the pro ceedings and legality of the action of that court cannot be re viewed in this court, which has no jurisdiction over the settle ment of insolvencies in the State courts.
Any error or illegality in the proceedings of the Parish Court should have been corrected by appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Fonvergne et al. v. City of Hew Orleans, 18 How., 471.
That the law of Louisiana vested in the Parish Court full and exclusive jurisdiction over the property surrendered, and the distribution of its proceeds amongst the creditors, is too clear to admit of dispute.
Insolvent Law of Louisiana, 1817.
Insolvent Law of Louisiana, 13th March, 1837.
Act of Louisiana Legislature, 1826.
All the property previously owned by the insolvent be comes vested in the creditors, represented by the syndic as their trustee.
Adams v. Preston.
Schroeder v. Nicholson, 2 L. R., 354.
Morgan v. Creditors, 7 L. R., 62.
Dwight v. Simon, 4 An., 492.
And all creditors who are parties to the insolvent proceed ings are absolutely prohibited from seeking remedies in any other court, even of the State of Louisiana, than that in which the insolvency is pending.
Tyler et al. y. Cred’s, 9 Rob. Rep., 373.
And not only is this so, but previously-existing suits in other courts are all required by law to be transferred to the court having jurisdiction of the insolvency, and. to be there cumulated with the insolvent proceedings.
Code of Practice, art. 165, sec. 3.
HL If, however, it be pretended that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the complainant’s demand, on the ground of the frauds charged in the bill, the answer is, that those frauds are denied in the answer, and not one scintilla of proof has been offered in support of them.
The allegation that it was a fraud to claim a mortgage, be cause, in complainant’s opinion, the effect of the mortgage had expired by lapse of time, without renewal of registry, is not worthy of serious refutation.
No attempt was made to prove any of the fraudulent combina tions charged in the bill, and indignantly denied by the answer.
Indeed, the charge, of fraud appears to be entirely aban doned, as not a word is said to support it in the elaborate brief filed by the counsel for appellant in this court.
IV. Should it be decided by the court that the foregoing points are not sustainable, and that the merits of the contro versy between the parties are open for examination, then it is contended, in behalf of appellees:
1. That complainant has no such mortgage rights as are alleged by him, because these mortgages were cancelled many years before he acquired the judgments assigned to him.
These mortgages were cancelled by consent of complain ant’s assignor.
Adams v. Preston.
Independently of this consent, they were cancelled by the syndics by virtue of power vested in them by law, and this was done on the 2d June, 1841.
Act of 1817, sec. 31.
It is true that this act directs the proceeds of the property to be kept subject to the same' rights in favor of mortgagees as they had on the property itself; but this mandate of the law, as to what is to be done with the proceeds of sale after the mortgage has been cancelled, cannot affect the legality of the erasure and cancellation ordered before the sale “ in order to effect it.”
These mortgages claimed by complainant were also ordered to be erased and cancelled by judgment of the court, rendered contradictorily with the Union Bank more than four years before the transfer by the bank to the complainant.
It is true that this last fact is not averred in the answer, and was not made a question by the pleadings, but it was proven by the record evidence introduced by complainant himself at the trial, and is conclusive against him.
The complainant seems to think that because the law pro vides that mortgages cease to have effect after a lapse of ten years from the registry, unless the registry be renewed, it is therefore in the power of a mortgagee to revive a mortgage legally cancelled and erased by the ex parte act of reinscribing it on the books of the mortgage office. No argument can be needed on such a pretension. If, however, the position of the complainant is misapprehended by us, we seek in vain for any other basis of his assertion in the bill, that he still holds the mortgages erased before his purchase of the judgments.
Observe, in the transfer from the bank to Hagan, the bank does not profess to sell any mortgage claims; does not pretend that there then, in 1849, existed any inscription of the judg ments, but simply transfers its claims without any warranty. The idea on which this suit was brought is plainly an after thought, and the suit itself purely a speculation in litigation.
Again: The appearance and action of the bank in the con curso or meeting of creditors, and fixing the terms of sale of the property, was a legal waiver of any right to follow the
Adams v. Preston.
property, and an agreement to look alone to the proceeds in the hands of their agents, the syndics.
Saul v. Creditors, 7 N. 8., 446, 447.
Finally, the sale of the property by order of court in the partition suit extinguished the mortgages, and left the parties entitled to them no other recourse than to claim the proceeds of the sale. The law is the same in probate and insolvent sales.
Fabre v. Hepp, 7 Annual, 5.
Gilmore v. Menard, 9 Annual, 212.
Kohn, Syndic, v. Marsh, 3 Rob. R., 48.
2. That the rights of the Union Bank, as judgment credit ors, were finally settled in the Parish Court; and that the judg ments therein rendered for the application of the proceeds of the sale to the payment of Hampton’s heirs, and the judg ments finally homologating the accounts of the syndics, are final and conclusive adjudications of the subject matter of this suit, and form res judicata against complainant.
Morgan v. Creditors, 4 La. R., 174.
Ory v. Creditors, 12 La. R., 121.
Lang v. Creditors, 14 La. R., 237.
Smith v. De Lallande, 1 Rob. R., 384.
Egerton v. Creditors, 2 Rob. R., 201.
Corion v. Millaudon, 3 Annual R., 664.
And it makes no difference that the price was not actually paid to the syndics, but retained by Hampton’s heirs in satis faction of their claim, as this was their legal right.
Gfoodale v. Creditors, 8 La. R., 302.
Rodriguez v. Dubertrand, 1 Rob. R., 535.
Robert v. Creditors, 2 Annual, 535.
3. That complainant’s claim is barred by prescription. It is important to remark that the complainant does not allege any recent discovery of the frauds charged in the bill, nor ignorance of the alleged frauds at a date immediately after they were committed, nor any difficulty in discovering them as soon as committed, if due diligence had been used.
Adams v. Preston.
Under these circumstances, the suit to annul the judgments and decrees of the Parish Court is barred by the lapse of one year.
Louisiana Code of Practice, 607, 613.
And the mere lapse of time, long acquiescence, and laches of the complainant and assignors, from the sale in 1841 till the filing of the bill, in 1853, coupled with the fact that the complainant is a mere assignee of a right to file a bill in equity for fraud, form a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the bill.
2 Story’s Eq. Juris., sec. 1520, and authorities there cited. Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Younge and Coll., 481. Ward v. Van Bottelen, 2 Paige Ch. R., 289. Warsham and al. v. Brown, 4 Georgia R., 284.
The complainant’s right to enforce his mortgage, even if it were valid, is prescribed by the lapse of ten years.
C. C., 3495, 3374, sec. 6; 3508, 3444.
Lawrason v. Minturn, 11 L. R., 256.
4. That the original inscriptions of the mortgages claimed by Hampton’s heirs were valid, and that the registry of the sale from Leroy Pope to Barrett created a privilege in their favor, and operated as a valid réinscription of the original mortgages.
C. C., 3315, 3316.
Mallard & Armistead v. Carpenter, 6 Annual R., 397. Sauvinet v. Landreaux, 1 Annual R., 220. Ells v. Simms, 2 Annual R., 251. Bonaffe v. Lane, 5 Annual R., 227.
5. And that the heirs of Hampton were legally and right fully recognised as entitled to the privilege accorded by law
to partnership creditors in the partnership assets.
C. C., 2806, 2794.
Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
We have given our best consideration to this record, in connection with the minute statement made from it by the counsel of the complainant, without having been able to find any cause for the reversal of the judgment.
The plaintiff sued the defendants, John S. Preston and
Adams v. Preston.
Caroline M. Preston his wife, as the joint possessors of one hundred and thirteen negroes, and their increase, to subject them, and the revenues which had been derived from their labor, to the payment of certain judgments which the plaintiff says he owns, as the assignee of the Union Bank of Louisiana. ; Those judgments had been obtained by that bank against Thomas Barrett, a resident of the city of New Orleans. Ho alleges that Barrett was the owner of the slaves when the judgments were obtained, and that, by reason of that fact, and the bank’s assignment to him, he had a judicial mortgage upon them, their increase and revenues, to pay the judgments.
The suit was brought in the third District Court of New Orleans, when the defendants were sojourners there; and being cited to answer, they appeared. Being citizens of the State of South Carolina, they removed the cause to the United States Circuit Court for the eastern district of Louisiana, in which it was filed on the chancery side of the docket. There the defendants filed a dilatory exception, in bar of the action against them; which being overruled, they were required to answer. And they did so.
They neither admit nor deny the original validity of the judgments against Barrett, nor the assignment of them to the plaintiff; and they admit that the one hundred and thirteen slaves had belonged to Barrett; but giving at the same time their narrative of the manner in which Barrett had acquired title to them, and the judicial proceedings under which they bought the property. They state, in their answer, that Wade Hampton, of South Carolina, being the owner of Whitehall plantation, in the parish of St. James, in Louisiana, sold it on the 8th April, 1829, to Leroy Pope, for $100,000, payable in twenty years from the first day of January, 1830, with interest at six per cent, per annum, payable annually. That the seller took from Pope a mortgage on the plantation, and also an obligation that he would add to the plantation seventy work ing hands, and mortgage them to Hampton, with their in crease, to secure the payment of Pope’s purchase and interest. Pope, on the 23d of February following, complied with his obligation, by mortgaging seventy working hands and thirty-
VOL. XXII. 31
Adams n. Preston.
one children to Hampton. He was then a resident of the parish of St. James.
Pope, two years afterwards, on the 18th March, 1838, sold the plantation and slaves to Thomas Barrett, of New Or leans, for $151,034. In payment, Barrett assumed to pay the debt of $100,000, and the accruing interest annually, to Hamp ton, and received the property, subject to the rights of Hamp ton upon the plantation and slaves. Two days afterwards, Barrett conveyed one-half of his purchase to Robert Bell, with an agreement that Bell’s interest should be considered as having attached from the day of Barrett’s purchase. Bar rett failed to pay the interest; and Hampton being dead, his heirs brought suits for it, and these judgments were obtained against him in January, 1838, March, 1839, and April, 1839. The judgments were recorded in New Orleans, where Barrett lived; but the mortgages and conveyances given to Hampton, and his conveyance of the plantation, were recorded, when they were executed,' in the parish of St. James, where the slaves were, and where Pope and Bell both lived.
Barrett became embarrassed, and applied for the benefit of the insolvent laws of Louisiana, on the 12th May, 1840. In the schedule of property surrendered to his creditors is found an item of Whitehall plantation and one hundred and fifty slaves, valued at $210,000, subject to the bond for $100,000, and the interest due thereon.
A meeting of Barrett’s creditors was held on the 15th June, 1840. Syndics were elected by them, with general discretion ary powers, particularly with the power to sue for the partition of any property whatsoever held and owned by the insolvent jointly with others, and to claim partition in kind or by sale; also, to appoint agents for the disposal of property out of New Orleans. Amongst the creditors at this meeting who elected the syn dics was the Bank of Louisiana, by its representative, its president. In October, after this meeting of the creditors, the heirs of Hampton intervened in the insolvent proceedings, claimed their rights under the mortgages upon Whitehall and upon the negroes; and they took a rule upon Magoffin and Morgan, the syndics of the creditors, to show cause why the
Adams v. Preston.
plantation and negroes should not be sold, and the proceeds applied to the payment of their claim. The rule was made absolute, by a judgment recognising their right as mortgagees, and ordering a sale of the property.
At a subsequent meeting of the creditors, at which the Union Bank of Louisiana was again represented by its presi dent, the creditors gave to the syndics a power to raise all mortgages recorded against the insolvent on any estate owned by him alone, or jointly with other persons, which had been surrendered to his creditors, with authority to make partition of the same with the co-proprietors, either amicably or judi cially.
Upon the petition of the syndics to the judge of the Parish Court of New Orleans, that act of the creditors was homolo gated, and the syndics were authorized by the court to do all which it empowered them to perform, by the votes of the creditors who appeared or who were represented at the meet ing.
In conformity with such powers, the syndics instituted a suit, alleging that Whitehall plantation and slaves had been purchased for the joint account of Barrett & Bell, and that an action of partition was necessary, to enable them to liqui date that special partnership. They also asked that the pro ceeds of the crop made on the plantation might be deposited in bank, subject to the order of the court; that an inventory and appraisement of the property should be made, and re turned into court; and that such proceedings might be had as would lead to a prompt and final settlement of the partner ship.
Bell united in this petition, and declared himself to be a creditor of the partnership; prayed for a settlement of its affairs, and for the allowance in his favor of a lien on the part nership property, for such sum as might be found due to him.
The heirs of Hampton intervened in this partition suit, stating their claims upon the property as mortgage creditors; and insisted that the property should be sold, subject to the assumptions, by whoever might become at the sale vendee, for the payment of their claim, principal and interest.
Adams v. Preston.
On the 6th of February, 1841, the court gave a judgment, sustaining the claims of Hampton’s heirs, and directing the sale of the property, with the condition, “ that the vendees should assume the payment to Mary Hampton, John S. Pres ton and wife, and John L. Manning and wife, of $100,000, payable on the 1st of January, 1856, with six per cent, inter est from the 1st of January, 1841; and, further, that it should be taken as a term and condition of the sale, that the pur chaser should specially mortgage and keep mortgaged the plantation to the intervenors, and the eighty-one slaves de scribed in the inventory, to them and their heirs and as signs.”
The property was advertised and sold by the sheriff, pursu ant to this judgment; was bought by the heirs of Hampton for $116,000; was paid for by surrendering to the sheriff the bond of Leroy Pope for $100,000, and by applying arrears of interest due on that bond to the payment of $16,000. An ac count was filed a few days afterwards, by the heirs of Hamp ton, of the whole amount due them, and after giving credit for the $116,000, and there was still remaining due $11,248.11J.
A rule was then taken on both the plaintiff and defendants, by the heirs of Hampton, for them to show cause why the ac count should not be approved, and their demand against the partnership of Barrett & Bell be liquidated, at the sum of $11,248.11J; and why the same should not be paid out of any money belonging to the partnership.
Upon the rule a judgment was rendered on the 23d April, 1844, according to its purport, declaring that, after having credited the account with $116,000, there was still due to the heirs of Hampton, by the partnership of Barrett & Bell, the sum of $11,248.11|, and a judgment was passed in their favor for that sum, against Mrs. Caroline Bell, the heir of Robert Bell, and J. B. Hullen, who had been elected the syndic of the creditors in the place of Magoffin and Morgan. A repre sentative of the Union Bank was present, and voting for Hullen.
A final judgment was afterwards rendered, settling all mat ters in dispute between the parties to the suit. The proceeds
Adams v. Preston.
of the crop were appropriated to the payment of legal charges; and, that being insufficient for that purpose, the heirs of Hamp ton were required to pay $2,020.51, in satisfaction of them—it being declared that the legal charges were higher in rank than their privilege upon the copartnership fund. The heirs paid the amount, and that was a final settlement of all the matters in controversy between plaintiff, defendants, and intervenors.
Contemporary with the proceedings in the partition suit, the matters connected with Barrett’s insolvency were con cluded in the same court.
Among other acts done by the syndics, Magoffin and Mor gan, was their petition to the Parish Court of Hew Orleans to be discharged from their office of syndics in the insolvency of Thomas Barrett and Thomas Barrett & Co. They annexed to their petition an account of the collections and disbursements which had been made by them since their last account had been filed. They showed that they were, as syndics, parties to a number of suits, which were still pending; refer particularly to the partition suit instituted by them, and still pending, against Robert Bell, as the partner of Barrett; pray that the creditors of the insolvent may be ordered to meet to elect other syndics, on account of their not being able to act longer in that capa city, as their private affairs compelled them to leave the State of Louisiana. , .
The court gave an order upon this petition, that the par ties interested show cause, within ten days from the publica tion of the order, why the accounts of the syndics should not be homologated, why the funds stated by the syndics should not be distributed in accordance therewith, and why the syn dics should not be discharged. And it further ordered, that a meeting of the creditors should be held on Wednesday, the 9th May, to elect another syndic in place of Magoffin and Morgan.
Such a meeting was held. James B. Hullen was elected by the creditors sole syndic, with all the powers which had been conferred by the creditors at former meetings upon Ma goffin and Morgan. They were then discharged by the court from their functions as syndics, upon their paying the bal-
Adams v. Preston.
ances in their hands to the parties entitled thereto, reserving to themselves, however, whatever claim they might have on the sale of the Whitehall plantation; and James B. Hullen was confirmed as sole syndic of Barrett and Thomas Barrett & Co. This order was given by the court on the 20th May, 1842.
Seven days after the meeting of the creditors had been held, pursuant to the order of the court, Christopher Adams, jun., president of the Union Bank, filed a paper in the court, acknowledging himself to be fully cognizant of all the pro ceedings of the meeting; that he was present at it; that the bank was a creditor; that Hullen had been unanimously elected by the creditors sole syndic, in place of the former syndics, on the same terms and conditions that they had been, with the same powers which the creditors had conferred upon the former syndics. And further shows, that at the meeting on the 9th May, 1842, he had voted for the dispensation of Hullen from giving the security required by law to be given by syndics.
This narrative discloses the connection of the Hamptons with the proceedings of the syndics, and in the partnership suit which they had brought against Bell to settle his claim as a partner in the purchase of the Whitehall plantation and slaves. Thus matters remained for nine years, no one supposing that there was any irregularity in the judicial proceedings under which the heirs of Hampton had bought the property, the bank all the time acquiescing in the result. Indeed, nothing was done without the knowledge of the bank; everything that was done was with its approbation. The record shows that every step taken by the syndics for the settlement of Barrett’s insolvency was in conformity with the powers which the cred itors had given to them. But nine years after the final and conclusive settlement of the whole matter in controversy, the president and directors of the bank assigned to the plaintiff in this suit five judgments, which the bank had obtained against Thomas Barrett in 1838 and 1839. Upon this assignment it is that the plaintiff now claims that these judgments were a mortgage upon the Whitehall plantation and slaves. He
Adams v. Preston.
alleges that all the proceedings in the Parish Court of the parish and city of New Orleans, in the matter of the insol vency, were irregular; that the disposition of property surren dered by Barrett for his creditors, and the creditors of Thomas Barrett & Co., “were irregular, insufficient, null, and void,” and had been procured by fraudulent combination between the heirs of Hampton with Bell, and with the syndics of the creditors, for the purpose of defrauding the Union Bank par ticularly. He also alleges that the Union Bank has not been a party to the suit of the syndics, and that neither the bank nor himself are in any way bound by its proceedings. And the fraud with which he charges the defendants is, that they claimed as creditors of Barrett, under the mortgage which Leroy Pope had made- to their ancestor, Hampton, when the plantation was bought from him, and which Barrett assumed to pay when he purchased from Pope, well knowing at the time that the efficacy of the inscription of the mortgages upon both plantation and slaves had expired, according to law, without any renewal of the registry of them. The defendants deny, in their answer, the fraud charged, or fraud of any kind, in their intervention in the proceedings in insolvency. No attempt was made to prove it; consequently, the plaintiff’s whole case depends upon his assertion that there are irregu larities in the suit, and in the rendition of a judgment, and under which the heirs of Hampton purchased the property at sheriff’s sale, which made that judgment a nullity. The plain tiff is the assignee of the Union Bank, and the argument in support of his claim as assignee is, that he is entitled to a judgment, subjecting the property to the payment of the judgments which the bank had obtained against Barrett, un less the mortgages of the bank were extinguished by the sale made by the sheriff to the heirs of Hampton, and unless the settlement between the syndics, Robert Bell, and the heirs of Hampton, upon the judgments rendered in the cases of the syndics and Bell, are res judicata.
These positions are in themselves an abandonment of the charge of fraud, originally made, and for no other purpose than to give to the Circuit Court jurisdiction of the case
Adams v. Prestön.
against the defendants, and without which the court could not have taken jurisdiction. With what propriety, then, can this court now be called upon to review a judgment of the Parish Court of New Orleans for any irregularity or illegality in the proceedings of that court, if either ex isted, when there could have been an appeal to the Su preme Court of Louisiana for its correction? This court has never done so in any case in which the subject matter of a suit, being within the jurisdiction of a State court, upon the allegation that its judgment had been given contrary to the law of a State. See the cases of Fonvergne et al. v. City of N. O., 18 Howard, 471; Gaines v. Chew et al., 2 Howard, 619, 644; and Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Peters, 174. The Parish Court of New Orleans had, by law, full power over all the property ceded by the insolvent, and over the claims of each of the creditors. It exercised its jurisdiction, and the legality of its judgment cannot be questioned by this court. Besides, the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over the set tlement of insolvencies in the State courts. The Parish Court had not only jurisdiction, but exclusive jurisdiction, over the property surrendered, and the distribution of it among the creditors of the insolvent. By the laws of Louisiana, the property surrendered becomes vested in the creditors, repre sented by the syndics as their trustee. Schroeder v. Nichol son, 2 Lou. R., 354; Morgan v. Creditors, 7 Lou. R., 62; Dwight v. Linn., 4 An., 492. And the creditors of an insol vent who become parties to the insolvent proceedings are prohibited from seeking remedies in any other court of the State of Louisiana. Jacobs v. Bogart, 7 Rob. Rep., 162; Marsh v. Marsh, 9 Rob. Rep., 46; Tyler et al. v. Creditors, 9 Robin son. It is also declared, in the Civil Code, (art. 165, sec. 3,) “that, in all matters relative to failures, all suits already com menced, or which may be subsequently instituted against the debtor, must be carried before the court in which the failure has been declared; ” and “where a party claims from the syn dics goods which had been surrendered by an insolvent, the suit may be brought before the court where the concurso is pending.” 2 Robinson, 348.
Adams v. Preston.
The want of jurisdiction, then, in the courts of the United States, to review the proceedings of the Parish Court of New Orleans, in a case of insolvency, is, of itself, sufficient to pre vent the court from giving to the plaintiff a decree in this suit.
There are, however, other grounds sufficient, to be found in the record, from which we have concluded that the plaintiff’ has neither an equitable claim against the defendants in this proceeding, nor any right, under the law of Louisiana, to sub ject the property in controversy to the judgments of which he is the assignee. But we shall confine ourselves to the discus sion of one of them.
The judgments of the Union Bank, if they ever had at any time mortgage rights against the Whitehall plantation, and the slaves upon it, better than the mortgages given by Leroy Pope at the time of his purchase, and which were assumed by Barrett when he bought the property, and which were equally obligatory upon Bell, when himself and Barrett formed their particular partnership in respect to that property, those judg ments had been legally cancelled before they were assigned to the plaintiff by the bank. It will be found, at pages 20 and 21 of the record, that the assignor of the plaintiff united with the other creditors in giving to the syndics the power to raise all mortgages granted by or recorded by Thomas Barrett, or Thomas Barrett & Co., on any real estate owned by Barrett, jointly with other persons, and surrendered by him to his creditors, with power also to effect partitions of the said prop erty with his co-proprietors, either amicably or judicially, &c., &c.
The creditors, too, authorized the syndics, or either of them, to vote, deliberate, and give their opinion for them, at any
subsequent meeting of the creditors of Barrett, or Thomas Barrett & Co. And the powers so’given to the syndics were homologated by the judge of the Parish Court of New Oreans. Under such a power, the syndics might have erased the judicial mortgages of the bank in the fair and bona fide discharge of their relation to the creditors as their trustees, aud the bank would have been bound by their action. But
Adams v. Preston.
they proceeded, according to law, to have the judicial mort gages of the bank cancelled; and they were cancelled on the 1st of February, 1841. This cancellation was made by the syndics, in conformity with the thirty-second section of the act of February, 1817, entitled, “An act relative to the volun tary surrender of property, and to the mode of proceeding, as well for the direction as for the disposal of debtors’ estates,” &c., &c. The erasure and cancellation of mortgages may be made in Louisiana, by consent or by order of the court. Arti cles 3335, 3336. In this instance, the erasure was made by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; when by the latter, it has the effect of a res judicata. 7 Rob., 382, 518; 11 Rob., 171. After the erasure so made, there can be no subsequent réinscription of a mortgage. That which was made in 1848 revived no lien upon the property which the bank’s mortgages may have had before they were erased. But there was another erasure of the bank’s judicial mortgages in a suit brought by Barrett against it, before its assignment was made of its judgments against Barrett to Hagan, the plaintiff. Rec., 83, 88, 94, 99,103. It was done by a court having com petent jurisdiction, and it concluded the right of the bank to convey its judgments to the plaintiff as judicial mortgages, though they might be transferred as judgments to entitle the assignee to a participation in any unadministered proceeds made from the sale of the property surrendered by the insol vent for his creditors. But neither the réinscription of 1848, nor the assignment to the plaintiff’, could have the effect to give to the plaintiff any claim upon property of the insolvent which had been sold under the judgment of a court having jurisdiction in insolvency. The property now claimed by the plaintiff’, as subject to his assignment, had been recognised by the judgment of the Parish Court to be subject to the claims of the heirs of Hampton; had been ordered by the court to be sold by the sheriff’; had been sold by him, and adjudicated to the purchasers; and the consideration money of the purchase had been accounted for by the sheriff to the syndics of the in solvent, and by them accounted for to the court, in strict ac cordance with its order, nine years before the bank made an
Howland et al. v. Greenway et al.
assignment to Hagan. The sale could not have been in any way subject to the judicial mortgages of the bank, nor could it in any way affect the property purchased by the defendants. Indeed, there can be no doubt that, after the appearance of the bank in the concurso of the creditors, and its acquiescence with them in fixing the terms for the sale of the property of the in solvent, it must be taken as a waiver by the bank of all its rights to pursue it for the payment of its judgments against Barrett, the insolvent, and that it would look to the proceeds of its sale, as the other creditors did, for the satisfaction of their respective claims. Egerton v. Creditors, 2 Rob., 201; Saul v. Creditors, 7 K. 8., 446, 447. Without pursuing the discussion further, we have concluded that the bank, when it assigned its judgments to the plaintiff, had no mortgage lien on the Whitehall planta tion and slaves to transfer; that the language of the assign ment, interpreted by the acknowledged acts of the bank in the insolvency, cannot mean any such transfer, and that the judg ment and sale under the partition suit barred the bank from making such an assignment, and the plaintiff from any such claim as he has made in his bill.
We direct the affirmance of the decree of the Circuit Court.