Tyre & Spring Works Co. v. Spalding, 116 U.S. 541 (1886)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Tyre & Spring Works Co. v. Spalding, 116 U.S. 541 (1886)
Full caption
TYRE & SPRING WORKS COMPANY v. SPALDING.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 1, 1886
TYRE & SPRING WORKS COMPANY v. SPALDING.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.
Submitted January 8,1886.—Decided February 1,1886.
Under these provisions as to duties on imports, in Schedule E of section 2504 of the Revised Statutes (2d ed., p. 465): “ All manufactures of steel, or of which steel shall be a component part, not otherwise provided for : forty-five per centum ad valorem. But all articles of steel partially manufactured, not otherwise provided for, shall pay the same rate of duty as if wholly manufactured.” “Locomotive tire, or parts thereof: three cents per pound.” “ Steel, in any form, not otherwise provided for : thirty per centum ad valorem,” (p. 466), articles known as “steel tire blooms,” and which have passed through an important stage in the process of manufacture into steel tires, but are not shown to have been adapted or intended to be made into tires for the driving-wheels of locomotives, are dutiable at forty-five per cent, ad valorem.
Where a case is tried by a Circuit Court, without a jury, and that court makes a special finding of facts, but omits to find certain facts which a stipulation between the parties, made after the entry of judgment, states were shown by proof at the trial, this court, on a writ of error, can take notice only of the facts contained in the special finding.
The facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Percy L. Shuman for plaintiff in error.
J/?. Assistant Attorney-General Maury for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court.
The Chicago Tyre and Spring Works Company, an Illinois corporation, brought this suit against Jesse Spalding, Collector of Customs at Chicago, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, to recover moneys alleged to have been illegally exacted as duties on imported merchandise embraced in three entries made at the custom-house in Chicago in 1882. The declaration did not mention what the merchandise was. After plea, the parties stipulated in writing that the cause should be tried by the court without [p. 542] a jury. It was so tried, and on the 31st of January, 1884, the following entry, entitled in the suit and headed “ Judgment,” was made in the records of the court:
“ This day came the plaintiff and defendant, by their attorneys, and, the parties having heretofore filed their stipulation in writing, waiving a jury, and submitting the facts in issue to the court, and the court having heard the evidence and arguments of counsel, and duly considered the same, now finds that the steel-tire blooms, in the declaration mentioned, are produced by first casting a flat round ingot of steel, somewhat in the shape of a cheese or grindstone, with no hole through the centre. It is then reheated and hammered, so as to reduce its thickness, thereby compacting its grain or fibre; a hole is swedged through its centre; and it is then hammered on the horn or beak of an anvil, thereby expanding its circumference, and forming a grain or fibre in its circumferential direction, and, when intended for tires of driving-wheels, the rudiments of a flange are formed or swedged also upon the outer periphery of the circle., In this form these blooms are ready for rolling, and are imported at this stage of development. On arriving in this country, they are heated and placed in the rolling-machine, where they are rolled or spun into the size and shape adapting them for use for tires for locomotive driving-wheels or car-wheels, and, after being rolled, the inner and outer surfaces are turned and finished in a lathe. The court finds that, when imported, these blooms had passed through an important stage in the process of manufacture into steel tires, and are, therefore, articles of steel partly manufactured, and were, therefore, properly classified for duties as manufactures of steel, not otherwise provided for. The court, therefore, finds the issues joined for the defendant. And thereupon the plaintiff, by its attorney, moves the court for a new trial herein, and the court, being now fully advised upon said motion, overrules the same and awards judgment. It is thereupon considered and adjudged, by the court, that the defendant do have and recover of the plaintiff his costs in this behalf expended, amounting to------dollars and------- cents, and that he have execution therefor.”
On the same day the following stipulation, entitled in the cause and signed by the attorneys for the parties, was* filed:
“ It is hereby stipulated and agreed between the parties to the above-entitled cause, that, on the trial of the same, it was proved that the plaintiff imported the steel blooms mentioned in the pleadings and proofs in this case, at the port of Chicago, during the year 1882, and entered them at the custom-house as steel blooms, and that the same were assessed a duty of 45 per cent, ad valorem, by the defendant, collector, as ‘ manufactures of steel, not otherwise provided for,’ under the provisions of Schedule E, § 2504, Revised Statutes; that the plaintiff paid the duty levied thereon, under protest, and in apt time took an appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury, claiming therein that the blooms in question were not dutiable as manufactures of steel, not otherwise provided for, and were not specially provided for by name in, the tariff, but were dutiable at the rate of 30 per cent, ad valorem, as ‘ steel, in any form, not otherwise provided for,’ under the provisions of Schedule E of the same section; that the Secretary of the Treasury decided such appeal, affirming the action of the collector, and that this suit was afterwards commenced, in due time, to recover the fifteen per cent, duty alleged to have been collected in excess, and so paid under protest; that issue was joined, and, a jury having been waived in accordance with the statute, the case was submitted to the Court for trial; that the proof shows that the steel tire blooms in question are produced by first casting a flat round ingot of steel, somewhat in the shape of a cheese or grindstone, with no hole through the centre. It is then reheated and hammered, so as to reduce its thickness, thereby compacting its grain or fibre; a hole is swedged through its centre; and it is then hammered on the horn or beak of an anvil, thereby expanding its circumference, and forming a grain or fibre in its circumferential direction, and, when intended for tires, the rudiments of a flange are formed or swedged also upon the outer periphery of the circle. In this form, these blooms are ready for rolling and are imported at this stage of development. On arrival in this country, they are reheated and placed in the rolling-machine, where they are rolled or [p. 544] spun into the size or shape adapting them for use for tires for locomotive driving-wheels or car-wheels, and, after being rolled, the inner and outer surfaces are turned and finished in a lathe; the work which had been expended on them to bring them from the ingot stage to tire blooms is shown to have been equal to ten or fifteen dollars per ton; that these blooms are classed in trade and commerce with steel bars, steel ingots, steel billets, steel rail blooms, steel plates, and all sorts of forgings, and are forms of steel known in trade and commerce as steel tire blooms; that a steel casting which has been hammered ready for rolling is a bloom; that hammering an ingot to prepare it for rolling is called blooming, regardless of the shape into which the steel is made by rolling or hammering; that, when imported, these blooms were ready for rolling and were imported at this stage of development. And the Court, after hearing all of the evidence, found, that, when.imported, these blooms had passed through an important stage in the process of manufacture into steel tires, and are, therefore, articles of steel partly manufactured, and were, therefore, properly classified for duties as manufactures of steel, not otherwise provided for. And the Court found the issues for the defendant. That the plaintiff excepted to said finding of the Court, viz., that the blooms were properly classified for duties as manufactures of steel, not otherwise provided for, as not being in accordance with the evidence, and moved the Court to grant a new trial, which motion was overruled and judgment was entered for the defendant.”
There is no bill of exceptions, but the plaintiff has sued out a writ of error to review the judgment.
Schedule E of § 2504 of the Revised Statutes, 2d ed., p. 465, in force at the time of these entries, contains the following provisions as to duties on imports:
“ All manufactures of steel, or of which steel shall be a component part, not otherwise provided for: forty-five per centum ad valorem. But all articles of steel partially manufactured, or of which steel shall be a component part, not otherwise provided for, shall pay the same rate of duty as if wholly manufactured.”
“Locomotive tire, or parts thereof: three cents per pound.”
“ Steel, in ingots, bars, coils, sheets, and steel wire, not less than one-fourth of one inch in diameter, valued at seven cents per pound or less : two cents and one-fourth per pound; valued at above seven cents and not above eleven cents per pound: three cents per pound; valued at above eleven cents per pound: three cents and a half per pound, and ten per centum ad valorem.” p. 466.
“ Steel, in any form, not otherwise provided for: thirty per centum ad valorem.” p. 466.
The contention on the part of the plaintiff is, that the articles in question were merely steel blooms, not manufactured articles, or partially manufactured articles, but only forms of steel, called steel tire blooms, and, therefore, subject to a duty of 30 per cent, ad valorem, and not to a duty of 45 per cent, ad valorem.
The court, in the paper which contains the judgment, finds certain facts, evidently intended to be facts specially found, under § 649 of the Revised Statutes. On these facts it bases its conclusion of law, that the articles were properly classified for duties as manufactures of steel, not otherwise provided for,: and its judgment for the defendant. The stipulation in the record, above set forth, is a paper signed after the trial, intended to take the place and serve the purpose of a duly signed bill of exceptions. It states what was proved on the trial as to the importations, the entries, the assessments and payments of duties, the protests, the appeals, the action thereon, and the bringing of the suit in time. It then states what the proof showed, on the trial, as to the manner of producing the steel tire blooms in question, and as to their condition, when imported, and as to how they were treated on their arrival in this country. It then states what the proof showed as to the value per ton of the. work put on them from the ingot stage until they arrived at the condition in which they were imported ; and as to how they were classed and known in trade and commerce; and as to what a bloom and blooming are; but these last mentioned matters are none of them found as facts by the court, in its findings. The stipulation then states what the court found, as a conclusion of law, and that the
vol. cxvi— 35 [p. 546] plaintiff excepted thereto. On this state of the record, this court is authorized, under section 700 of the Revised Statutes, to determine whether the facts specially, found by the Circuit Court are sufficient to support the judgment; but it can take no notice of any facts not thus specially found, because they were not found by the court below, and this court, as an appellate court, cannot try an issue of fact. The stipulation, however, does not contain any agreement as to the existence of any facts, but merely a statement as to what the proof showed on the trial; and does not state that the parties agreed, in advance, on the facts found by the court, or how they were proved; but states that the court heard all the evidence. As to any facts stated in the stipulation to have been shown by proof at the trial, if they are not contained in the special findings, the only conclusion can be that the court did not find them to be facts. So, the case must be adjudicated on the special findings alone.
In the findings, the articles are described as “ steel tire blooms; ” not only steel and blooms, but steel tire blooms. This would indicate that they were steel blooms having some purpose in connection with tires. It is then set forth how they are produced. A flat round ingot of steel, somewhat in the shape of a cheese or a grindstone, is cast, but without a hole in its centre. It is then reheated and hammered, so as to reduce its thickness, thereby compacting its grain or fibre. A hole is then swedged through its centre, and it is then hammered on the horn or beak of an anvil, thereby expanding its circumference, and forming a grain or fibre in its circumferential direction. It is plain, so far, that the articles are being put into a shape in which they can be worked into tires, either for the driving-wheels of locomotives or for car-wheels, depending on their size, shape and weight. The findings go on to say, that, “when intended for tires of driving-wheels, the rudiments of a flange are formed or swedged also upon the outer periphery of the circle.” This is not a statement as to whether these particular blooms were intended to be tires for driving-wheels or for car-wheels. It is then stated that the blooms are ready for rolling and are imported at this stage.
Then it is said: “ On arriving in this country, they are heated and placed in the rolling-machine, where they are rolled or spun into the size and shape adapting them for use for tires for locomotive driving-wheels or car-wheels, and, after being rolled, the inner and outer surfaces are turned and finished in a lathe.” But this is not a statement as to whether these particular blooms were adapted or intended to be made into tires for driving-wheels, or for car-wheels, or for both, or some for one and some for the other.
It is not found by the court that these blooms were partly manufactured tires for the driving-wheels of locomotives. On the contrary, the concluding statement in the findings is, that “ these blooms had passed through an important stage in the process of manufacture into steel tires.” They may all have been blooms of which only tires for car-wheels, and no tires for driving-wheels, could have been made, or were intended to be made. The collector and the Secretary of the Treasury may have so decided. Those decisions stand and are conclusive, under § 2931 of the Revised Statutes, until the contrary is shown in a suit. Arnson v. Murphy, 115 U. S. 579. The contrary is not shown. The case is not one of a doubt as to the meaning of the statute, or of a doubt as to what statute applies to a specific article ; but is one of a failure of the importer to show that the decisions of the collector and of the Secretary as to the rate and amount of duties were erroneous. These views also meet the suggestion of the plaintiff, that, if these steel blooms were partially manufactured locomotive tires or parts of tires, they were dutiable at three cents per pound. The stipulation states that the protest was that the articles were not specially provided for by name in the tariff, but were liable to the thirty per cent, duty, and not to the forty-five.
It being assumed, as it must be on the findings, that these blooms were adapted and intended for tires for car-wheels, and not for driving-wheels, it is clear, we think, that they were partially manufactured tires of that character, and were not otherwise provided for, and were subject to forty-five per cent, duty, and were not subject to thirty per cent, duty, because, though [p. 548] forms of steel, they were provided for under the forty-five per cent, clause.
It is conceded by the Government, that, if these blooms were ordinary steel blooms, that is, merely hammered steel castings, they would not be articles of steel partially manufactured or liable to forty-five per cent, duty, but would be liable to only thirty per cent. duty. But the hammering on the horn of the anv*il formed a grain or fibre circumferentially, and this is what the court, in its findings, called the “ important stage ” through which the blooms had passed, “ in the process of manufacture into steel tires.”
Judgment affirmed.
OTIS v. OREGON STEAMSHIP COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
Submitted »January 25,1886.—Decided February 1,1886.
If a record shows on its face that a Federal question was not necessarily involved in the decision of a case in a State Court, and does not show affirmatively that one was raised, this court will not go out of the record to the opinion of that court, or elsewhere, to ascertain whether one was in fact decided. Moore v. Mississippi, 21 Wall. 636, affirmed and applied.
This was a motion to dismiss a writ of error for want of jurisdiction. The facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. George M. Adams for the motion.
Mr. John II. Sessions and Mr. John R. Abney opposing.
■ Mr. Chief -Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. This is a suit brought December 12, 1878, by the Oregon Steamship Company, the defendant in error, against George K. [p. 549] Otis, the plaintiff in error. The complaint alleges that on the 2d of March, 1874, Otis, as agent of the Steamship Company, entered into “a certain steamboat contract” with the United States for carrying the mails between San Francisco, California, and Portland, Oregon, from June 1,1874, to June 30,1878, at the rate of $25,000 per annum; that the Steamship Company performed the contract, and that Otis received $97,131.38 on account of the service, which was the full amount due after certain deductions provided for in the contract were made; that of this amount he paid the company $83,675.24, and is entitled to retain $2500 as his agreed compensation, but that he neglects and refuses to pay over the balance, being $13,456.25, and for this judgment is asked. Otis, in his answer, admits the making of the contract as set forth in the complaint, but denies that he made it as agent for the Steamship Company. He also admits that he has received the amount of money which is stated, and that he has not paid over the balance claimed to be due.
The ease was tried by a referee, who found that the contract was made by Otis as agent for the company, that the company had performed the service, that Otis had received the money as charged, and that there was due from him the amount claimed. Upon the filing of the report Otis excepted to the findings in these words:
“ The defendant excepts generally to the findings of the referee of fact and law, and to each and every such finding save only such as were requested by the defendant. The defendant further specially excepts severally to each and every finding, and to each and every part of each and every such finding, designated in his report by the following numbers, namely, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th.”
Neither in the pleadings, nor in the evidence, nor in the findings, nor in the exceptions as shown by the record, was there any title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, or a law, or authority of the United States. The sole issue in the case was as to the agency of Otis. The Steamship Company alleged that he made the contract as its agent, and this he denied. There was no sug-
Syllabus.
gestion of the illegality of such an agency. The only dispute was as to the fact of its existence.
In Moore v. Mississippi, 21 Wall. 636, 639, it was held that “ if the record shows on its face that a Federal question was not necessarily involved, and does not show that one was raised, we will not go out of it, to the opinion or elsewhere, to ascertain whether one was in fact decided.” That rule governs this case. There is not in the record the least suggestion of a Federal question. We will not look into the opinion, therefore, which has been annexed to the record below, in obedience to our Rule No. 8, section 2, to ascertain whether such a question was in fact decided. The only issue in the case was as to the agency, and that did not depend on the Constitution or any law of the United States. The contract was entered into by Otis, and it was performed by the company. Otis collected the money, and his liability depends, not on the effect of his contract, but on the fact of his having received the money for the Steamship Company.
The motion to dismiss is granted.
BARRY v. EDMUNDS.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OK THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.
Argued January 7, 8,1886.—Decided February 1,1886.
A suit cannot properly be dismissed by a Circuit Court of the United States as not substantially involving a controversy within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the facts when made to appear on the record, create a legal certainty of that conclusion.
Where exemplary damages beyond the sum necessary to give a Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction are claimed in an action for a malicious trespass, the court should not dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction simply because the record shows that the actual injury caused to the plaintiff by the trespass was less than the jurisdictional amount.
It is settled in this court that in an action for a trespass accompanied with malice, the plaintiff may recover exemplary damages in excess of the amount of his injuries, if the ad damnum is properly laid.
This was an action of trespass brought by the plaintiff in error. The declaration set out the cause of action as follows: ♦ “ Robert P. Barry, plaintiff, complains of E. G. Edmunds, defendant, of a plea of trespass on the case, for this, to wit: that the plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Fauquier County, Virginia; that he owns property in said county, and that he was duly and lawfully assessed with the sum of fifty-six dollars and thirty-four cents as taxes upon said property, to be paid to the State of Virginia for the year 1884; that said taxes, by the laws of said State, were not leviable for prior to the first day of December, 1884, but if not paid prior to said last-named date were leviable for, after said date.
“ That, by a further provision of the laws of said State, if the taxes assessed for the year 1884 are not paid on or before the first day of December, 1884, the person owing the same becomes liable to pay, in addition thereto, a further sum of five per centum upon the amount of the tax so due.
“ That the plaintiff did not pay his said tax prior to the first day of December, 1884, and thereby became liable to pay an additional sum of two dollars and eighty-one cents, making the plaintiff thus liable after the 1st day of December, 1884, for the sum of ($59.15) fifty-nine dollars and fifteen cents.
“ That the defendant is the treasurer of Fauquier County, in the State of Virginia, and as such it is made his duty, by the laws of Virginia, to collect all taxes due to the said State by residents of said county; that in the month of June, 1885, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant, in payment of his said taxes, fifty-nine dollars, in coupons and lawful money of the United States, the two together constituting the full amount due for said taxes; that each one of the said coupons was cut from a bond issued by the State of Virginia, under the authority of the provisions of an act of her General Assembly, approved March 28, 1879, entitled ‘An act to provide a plan of settlement of the public debt; ’ that each one bore upon its face the contract of the State of Virginia that it should be received in payment of all taxes, debts, and demands due to said State, and that each one was due and past maturity.
“ That the defendant refused the said coupons and money in
Statement4 of Facts.
payment of the plaintiff’s taxes; that he refused to receive the same in payment of his taxes because an act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, approved January 26,1882, entitled • An act to provide for the more efficient collection of the revenue, to support government, maintain the public schools, and to pay interest upon the public debt,’ forbade him to receive them, and because another act of the General Assembly of said State, approved January 14, 1882, entitled ‘ An act to prevent frauds upon the Commonwealth and the holders of her securities in the collection and disbursement of revenue,’ likewise forbade him to receive them.
“ That on the — day of June, 1885, the defendant, unlawfully, maliciously, and against the will of the plaintiff, entered upon the premises of the plaintiff, situated and being in the county of Fauquier, Virginia, with force and arms, and against the will of the plaintiff, and, acting as said treasurer aforesaid, did levy on and forcibly seize and carry away valuable personal property belonging to the said plaintiff, to wit, one valuable horse, of the value of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, for the purpose of selling the same, and thus compelling the plaintiff to pay his taxes in another medium than that already offered by the plaintiff.
“ That on the day when the defendant so levied on the plaintiff’s property, and before he did so, the plaintiff again tendered to the defendant the said coupons and money in payment of his said taxes, but the defendant refused to receive the same in payment thereof; and the plaintiff was always ready and willing up to the moment of said levy to deliver to the defendant the said coupons and money in payment of his said taxes, but the defendant always refused so to receive the same.
“ That the defendant levied on the plaintiff’s said property and carried the same away, because the 18th section of the act of the General Assembly of Virginia, approved April 1, 1879, which is chapter 60 of the acts of the special session of 1879, commanded him so to levy upon the plaintiff’s property, notwithstanding said tender.
“ That, by reason of the contract of the State of Virginia set forth upon the face of said coupons, the plaintiff had a right to [p. 553] pay his said taxes with said coupons and money, and after he tendered the same to said treasurer his said taxes were, in point of law, paid and extinguished, and he held the said coupons and money for the defendant as his agent in that behalf thereafter.
“ That, when the defendant so levied upon and seized the plaintiff’s property, he knew that the Supreme Court of the United States had decided at its October Term, 1884, in the case of Poindexter n. Greenhorn, that a tender by a tax-payer of the State’s tax-receivable coupons, such as those tendered by the plaintiff in payment of taxes due the State, pays and extinguishes said tax,- and that any and all laws of said State commanding her treasurers to refuse the same, and commanding them to levy after said tender, are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and are, therefore, null and void.
“That the defendant, so knowing the law, levied on and seized the -plaintiff’s property in contempt of and defiance of the law, and with the deliberate intention of defying the Constitution of the United States and the judicial powers thereof.
“That there exists in the State of Virginia a very great political party, which comprises a majority of the voters in said State, which has for its aims and purpose to enact laws that will defeat and destroy the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in said case of Poindexter v. Greenhorn, and will defeat and destroy the protection afforded by the Constitution of the United States to tax-payers who seek to pay their taxes with said tax-receivable coupons.
“ That said party, being in control of the Legislature of the said State, has enacted a great number of statutes which are intended to have that effect, and it openly proclaims that it intends to enact all other and further statutes which shall be necessary to make it impossible for tax-payers to pay their taxes with said coupons.
“ That the defendant is a member of said political party, and sympathizes with and shares in its aims and purposes, and actively co-operates in every way in his power in every attempt to make it impossible for tax-payers to pay taxes due to said State with said coupons.
“ That, when he refused to receive said coupons in payment [p. 554] of plaintiff’s taxes, and when he levied on plaintiff’s property as aforesaid, he did it for the purpose of aiding and assisting his said political party in its attempts to defy and nullify the Constitution of the United States.
“ That he intended thereby to intimidate the plaintiff and make him afraid to rely upon the Constitution of the United States and the judicial power thereof for protection in those rights guaranteed to the plaintiff by said Constitution.
“ That he intended to make an example of the plaintiff, and thereby deter him and all others from relying upon the Constitution of the United States and the judicial power thereof for the protection in those rights guaranteed by the said Constitution; that in contempt of and defiance of the said Constitution and said judicial power the defendant made public advertisement in many parts of the county of Fauquier that he had levied on and seized plaintiff’s property, because plaintiff was delinquent as a tax-payer, and that he would sell the same at public auction, on a day named, at the court-house of said county ; that on the day named he did expose the said property to sale at public auction, at said court-house, in the presence of many of plaintiff’s neighbors, friends, and fellow-countrymen, and publicly proclaimed that plaintiff was a defaulter and delinquent tax-payer; that by reason thereof plaintiff’s credit and standing were greatly injured and his feelings cruelly wounded and mortified.
“ That the defendant well knew when he made said levy and sale that they were forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, but he did so trusting and believing that his said political party would enact statutes of its State of Virginia that would shield and protect him from all harm; that he made said levy and sale maliciously and with the purpose and intent to trample on the plaintiff’s rights under the law and do him all the injury in his power.
“ And the said plaintiff further says that he is a citizen of Fauquier County, Virginia; that he owns property in said county, and that he was duly and lawfully assessed upon said property with the sum of fifty-six dollars thirty-four cents, as taxes to be paid to the State of Virginia for the year 1884, [p. 555] which taxes, by the laws of Virginia, were not leviable for prior to the 1st day of December, 1884, but the same, if not paid prior to said last-named date, were leviable for after the said date; that by a further provision of the laws of said State, if the taxes assessed for the year 1884 are not paid on or before the 1st day of December, 1884, the person owing the same becomes liable to pay in addition thereto a further sum of five per centum upon the amount of the tax so due; that the plaintiff did not pay his said tax prior to the 1st day of December, 1884, and thereby became liable to pay an additional sum of $2.81, making the plaintiff thus liable after December 1, 1884, for the sum of $59.15; that the defendant is the treasurer of Fauquier County, in the State of Virginia, and as such it is made his duty, by the laws of Virginia, to collect all taxes due to the said State by residents and owners of property in said county.
“ That in the month of June the plaintiff tendered to the defendant, in payment of his said taxes, coupons for $------each, and $------, in lawful money of the United States, the two together constituting the sum of $59.15. That each one of said coupons was cut from a bond issued by the State of Virginia, under the authority and provisions of an act of her General Assembly, approved March 28, 1879, entitled 4 An act to provide a plan of settlement of the public debt; ’ that each one bore upon its face the contract of the State of Virginia that it should be received in payment of all taxes and demands due said State, and that each one was overdue and past maturity. That the defendant refused to receive the said coupons and money in payment of the plaintiff’s taxes. That he refused to receive the same in payment of his taxes, because an act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, approved January 26, 1882, entitled 4 An act to provide for the more efficient collection of the revenue, to support government, maintain the public schools, and to pay interest upon the public debt,’ forbade him to receive them, and because another act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, approved January 14, 1882, entitled 4 An act to prevent fraud upon the Commonwealth and the holders of her securities in the collection of [p. 556] revenue,’ likewise forbade him to receive them. That on the ----- day of June, in the year eighteen hundred and eighty-five, the defendant, unlawfully and against the will of the plaintiff, entered upon the premises of the plaintiff, situate and being in the county of Fauquier, Virginia, with force and arms, and against the will of the plaintiff, and, acting as said treasurer aforesaid, he levied on and forcibly seized and carried away valuable personal property belonging to the plaintiff, to wit, one horse, to the value of $125.00, for the purpose of selling the same, and thus compelling the plaintiff to pay his taxes in another medium than that already offered by the plaintiff; that on the day when the defendant so levied on the plaintiff’s property, and before he did so, the plaintiff again tendered to the defendant the said coupons and money in payment of said taxes, but the defendant refused to receive the same in payment thereof, and the plaintiff was always ready and willing, up to the moment of said levy, to deliver to the defendant the said coupons and money in payment of his said taxes, but the defendant always refused to receive the same.
“ That the defendant levied on the plaintiff’s said property and carried the same away because the 18th section of the act of the General Assembly of Virginia, approved April 1, 1879, which is chapter 60 of the acts of the special session of 1879, commanded him so to levy upon the plaintiff’s property, notwithstanding said tender. That by reason of the contract of the State of Virginia, set forth upon the face of said coupons, the plaintiff had a right to pay his said taxes with said coupons and money, and after he tendered the same to the said treasurer his said taxes were, in point of law, paid and extinguished, and he held the said coupons and money for the defendant as his agent in that behalf thereafter. That when the defendant so levied upon and seized the plaintiff’s property he knew that the Supreme Court of the United States had decided, at its October Term, 1884, in the case of Poindexter v. Greenhorn, that a tender by a tax-payer of the State’s tax-receivable coupons, such as those tendered by the plaintiff, in payment of taxes due the State, pays and extinguishes said tax, and that any and all laws of said State commanding her treasurer to [p. 557] refuse the same, and commanding them to levy after said tender, are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and are, therefore, null and void.
“That the defendant, so knowing the law, levied on and seized the plaintiff’s property in contempt of and defiance of the law, and with the deliberate intention of defying the Constitution of the United States and the judicial power thereof.
“ That in contempt of and defiance of the said Constitution and judicial power the defendant made public advertisement in many parts of the county of Fauquier that he had levied on and seized plaintiff’s property because plaintiff was delinquent as a tax-payer, and that he would sell the same at public auction, on a day named, at the court-house in said county. That on the day named he did expose the said property to sale at public auction, at said court-house, in the presence of many of the plaintiff’s neighbors, and friends, and fellow-citizens, and countrymen, and publicly proclaimed that the plaintiff was a defaulter and delinquent tax-payer.
“ That by reason thereof plaintiff’s credit and standing were greatly injured, and his feelings cruelly wounded and mortified. That whilst the said defendant was unlawfully and wrongfully upon the plaintiff’s premises, as aforesaid, he did many other wrongs and injuries to the plaintiff of a malicious nature, by all which wrongs and injuries the plaintiff has been injured and damaged six thousand dollars. And therefore he brings his suit.”
To this declaration the defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, alleging that, as the plaintiff and defendant were both citizens of the State of Virginia, the courts of that State had exclusive jurisdiction of the alleged cause of action.
The record showed the following action and judgment of the court:
“ This cause came on this day to be considered by the court upon a motion made by the plaintiff to set a day for argument of a demurrer to the special plea filed herein. Upon consideration whereof the court is of opinion that this suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within [p. 558] the jurisdiction of this court, for the reason that the amount of taxes due by the plaintiff to the State of Virginia was less than one hundred dollars, and the property levied on and seized by the defendant was worth less than two hundred dollars, and, therefore, that the matter in dispute in this cause does not exceed, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars ($500).
“ And it appearing to the court that this being an action for damages, if the jury should render a verdict for ($500) five hundred dollars damages such verdict would be excessive, and the court would feel compelled to set it aside; the court is further of opinion that this court is, for that reason, also without jurisdiction of this suit.
“ The court is, therefore, for each of the aforesaid reasons, of opinion that it is required to dismiss this suit by the act of Congress approved March 3,1875, ‘ to determine the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from the State courts, and for other purposes;’ and this suit is accordingly hereby dismissed and stricken from the docket of the court, with costs.”
The plaintiff below sued out this writ of error to review that judgment. This case was argued with Chaffin v. Taylor, post 567; Royall v. Virginia, post 572; and Sands v. Edmunds, post 585.
Mr. William L. Royall and Mr. Daniel H. Chamberlain for plaintiff in error. Mr. James V. Brooke filed a brief for same.
Mr. R. A. Ayres and Mr. Walter R. Staples for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts as above reported, he continued :
It is not questioned but that the declaration discloses a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, if the amount or value of the matter in dispute exceeds five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, for it is a suit of a civil nature arising under the Constitution of the United States, and therefore within the words of § 1 of the act of March 3, 1875. 18 Stat.
The ground on which the suit was dismissed was, that within the meaning of § 5 of the act of March 3, 1875, it did not “really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction” of the Circuit Court; and that conclusion was founded on the facts stated in the declaration, that the amount of taxes due by the plaintiff to the State of Virginia was less than one hundred dollars, and the property levied on and seized by the defendant was worth less than two hundred dollars; and on the proposition of law, that it followed from these facts that the matter in dispute did not exceed, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, so that a verdict for any amount beyond that would be excessive, and for that reason to be set aside.
The order of the Circuit Court dismissing the cause on this ground is reviewable by this court on writ of error by the express words of the act. In making such an order, therefore, the Circuit Court exercises a legal and not a personal discretion, which must be exerted in view of the facts sufficiently proven, and controlled by fixed rules of law. It might happen that the judge, on the trial or hearing of a cause, would receive impressions amounting to a moral certainty that it does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the court. But upon such a personal conviction, however strong, he would not be at liberty to act, unless the facts on which the persuasion is based, when made distinctly to appear on the record, create a legal certainty of the conclusion based on them. Nothing less than this is meant by the statute when it provides that the failure of its jurisdiction, on this account, “ shall appear to the satisfaction of said Circuit Court.”
This is quite consistent with what was said in Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U. S. 669, 671. There the value of the property taken was stated in the declaration to be $100, while the damages for the alleged trespass were laid at $6000, and no circumstances of malice or of special damage were averred. It was said by the court: “ We cannot, of course, assume as a matter of law that the amount laid, or a less amount, greater than $500, is not [p. 560] recoverable upon the case stated in the declaration, and cannot, therefore, justify the order remanding the cause on the ground that the matter in dispute does not exceed the sum or value of $500. But if the Circuit Court had found, as matter of fact, that the amount of damages stated in the declaration was colorable, and had been laid beyond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery, for the purpose of creating a case removable under the act of Congress, so that, in the words of the 5th section of the act of 1875 it appeared that the suit ‘ did not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said Circuit Court,’ the order remanding it to the State court could have been sustained.”
It is true, indeed, that in some cases it might appear as matter of law, from the nature of the case as stated in the pleadings, that there could not legally be a judgment recovered for the amount necessary to the jurisdiction, notwithstanding the damages were laid in the declaration at a larger sum. In the early case of Wilson v. Daniel, 3 Dall. 401, 407, decided in this court in 1798, under the judiciary act of 1789, then in force, it was declared, by Chief-Justice Ellsworth, that, “ The nature of the case must certainly guide the judgment of the court; and whenever the law makes a rule, that rule must be pursued. Thus, in an action of debt on a bond for £100, the principal and interest are put in demand and the plaintiff can recover no more, though he may lay his damages at £10,000. The form of the action, therefore, gives in that case the legal rule. But in an action of trespass, or assault and battery, where the law prescribes no limitation as to the amount to be recovered and the plaintiff has a right to estimate his damages at any sum, the damage stated in the declaration is the thing put in demand, and presents the only criterion to which, from the nature of the action, we can resort in settling the question of jurisdiction. The proposition, then, is simply this: Where the law gives no rule, the demand of the plaintiff must furnish one; but where the law gives the rule, the legal cause of action, and not the plaintiff’s demand, must be regarded.”
The amount of damages laid in the declaration, however, in cases where the law gives no rule, is not conclusive upon the [p. 561] question of jurisdiction ; but if upon the case stated there could legally be a recovery for the amount necessary to the jurisdiction, and that amount is claimed, it would be necessary, in order to defeat the jurisdiction since the passage of the act of March 3, 1875, for the court to find, as matter of fact, upon evidence legally sufficient, “ that the amount of damages stated in the declaration was colorable, and had been laid beyond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery, for the purpose of creating a case ” within the jurisdiction of the court. Then it would appear to the satisfaction of the court that the suit “ did not really and substantially involve a dispute or' controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said Circuit Court.”
In the present case the Circuit Court has not found, as matter of fact, that the amount of damages stated in the declaration was colorable and had been laid beyond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery, for the purpose of creating a case within the jurisdiction of the court. Its action is not based on evidence of an attempted fraud upon the jurisdiction of the court, but upon the assumption, as matter of law, that upon the face of the declaration no recovery could be legally had of an amount sufficient to make the matter in dispute equal to that required to maintain its jurisdiction.
Such cases, as we have already seen, may exist, where a rule of law, as in certain cases ex contractu, in which the amount recoverable is liquidated by the terms of the agreement, fixes the limit of a possible recovery. Such was the case of Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 337, where it appeared “that in the progress of the cause an amendment was made in the amount of damages claimed for the purpose of bringing the case within the appellate jurisdiction of this court.” As was said in Hilton n. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165, 174, “it is undoubtedly true, that until it is in some way shown by the record that the sum demanded is not the matter in dispute* that sum will govern in all questions of jurisdiction, but it is equally true that, when it is shown that the sum demanded is not the real matter in dispute, the sum shown and not the sum demanded will prevail.” In Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 115 U. S. 611, an amendment was made increasing
vol. cxvi—36 [p. 562] the amount demanded as damages, under circumstances that rendered it apparent, as a matter of fact, that it was done merely to give color to the jurisdiction of this court.
No such fact or finding appears on the record in the present case, and the question recurs whether, as matter of strict law, it can be judicially declared that, upon the cause of action stated in the declaration, the plaintiff is precluded from recovering anything in excess of $500 as damages exclusive of costs.
The cause of action stated in the declaration is a wilful and malicious trespass, in seizing and taking personal property, with circumstances of aggravation and averments of special damage. The trespass is alleged to have been committed by the defendant, colore officii, under the pretended authority of void process, in open defiance of known law, accompanied by conduct intended to bring the plaintiff into public contempt and odium, and amounting to oppression in office.
It is quite clear that the amount of the taxes alleged to be delinquent, for non-payment of which the seizure was made, is immaterial. It is equally clear that the plaintiff is not limited in his recovery to the mere value of the property taken. That would not necessarily cover his actual, direct, and immediate pecuniary loss. In addition, according to the settled law of this court, he might show himself, by proof of the circumstances, to be entitled to exemplary damages calculated to vindicate his right and protect it against future similar invasions. “ It is a well established principle of the common law,” said Mr. Justice Grier in Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 362, 371, 11 that, in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff. We are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers; but, if repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of what the law is, the question will not admit of argument. ... In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and malicious or gross and outrageous, courts permit juries to add to the measured compensation of [p. 563] the plaintiff, which he would have been entitled to recover had the injury been inflicted without design or intention, something further by way of punishment or example, which has sometimes been called ‘ smart money.’ This has been always left to the discretion of the jury, as the degree of the punishment to be thus inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case.” In The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546, which was the case of a marine tort, Mr. Justice Story spoke of exemplary damages as “the proper punishment which belongs to such lawless misconduct.” In Tracy n. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 80, 95, it was said that “ where a ministerial officer acts in good faith, for an injury done he is not liable to exemplary damages; ” and this implies its converse, when his acts are not only illegal, but wanton, wilful, malicious, and oppressive. In Philadelphia, Wilmington de Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 214, Mr. Justice Campbell said: “Whenever the injury complained of has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely or indignity, the jury are not limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved person. But the malice spoken of in this rule is not merely the doing of an unlawful or injurious act. The word implies that the act complained of was conceived in the spirit of mischief or of criminal indifference to civil obligations.” In Milwaukee de St. Paul Railway Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 493, the rule was said to apply to actions on the case, for injuries arising from the negligence of the defendant. “ Redress commensurate to such injuries,” said Mr. Justice Davis, delivering the opinion o^ the court, “ should be afforded. In ascertaining its extent, thé jury may consider all the facts which relate to the wrongful act of the defendant and its consequences to the plaintiff; but they are not at liberty to go farther, unless it was done wilfully, or was the result of that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them. In that case the jury are authorized, for the sake of public example, to give such additional damages as the circumstances require. The tort is aggravated by the evil motive, and on this rests the rule of exemplary damages.” In Missouri Pacific [p. 564] Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 521, Mr. Justice Field said: “ It is the duty of every State to provide, in the administration of justice, for the redress of private wrongs; yet the damages which should be awarded to the injured party are not always readily ascertainable. They are in many cases a matter of conjectural estimate, in relation to which there may be great differences of opinion. The general rule undoubtedly is that they should be precisely commensurate with the injury. Yet in England and in this country they have been allowed in excess of compensation whenever malice, gross neglect, or oppression has caused or accompanied the commission of the injury complained of.” In the English Court of Common Pleas, it was held, in the case of Bell v. Midland Railway Co., 10
0. B. N. S. 287, that, where a railway company had obstructed a siding belonging to an adjoining landowner with a high hand and in violation of his rights under an act of Parliament, exemplary damages might justly be given. And the rule was applied in Emblem v. Myers, 6 H. & N. 54, against one who negligently and recklessly pulled down buildings on his own land so as to injure his neighbor with a view to make him give up possession. In that case Baron Bramwell said: “ If a plaintiff, in his particulars, claimed £500 because the defendant walked over his lawn the jury might award that amount if they thought it was done for the purpose of annoyance and insult.” In Johnson v. Hannahan, 3 Strobhart, 425, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, where the plaintiff sought to recover damages for an invasion of his close, accompanied, as he alleged, by circumstances of oppression and insult, refused to set aside a verdict for $3000, as excessive, although the actual and mere pecuniary loss, it was shown,.did not amount to $20. In Kolb v. Bankhead, 18 Texas, 228, which was an action of trespass for cutting down and carrying off timber from the land of another, where the defendant had wilfully or by gross negligence cut over his own line on the land of the plaintiff, it was said by the Supreme Court of Texas, that, “ in estimating the damages the jury were not confined strictly to mere compensation for the timber cut and removed. It was their right to [p. 565] look to the particular circumstances of the case, and give such damages as the facts were deemed by them to warrant, and as would, in their judgment, be adequate, not only for compensation, but also for prevention.”
It is unnecessary, however, further to multiply authorities on this point. The precedents are indefinite in number, and the application of the rule as uniform as the circumstances of the cases are various. There was clear error in the Circuit Court in its ruling, as matter of law, that there could be no lawful recovery, in such a case as that stated in the declaration, of an amount equal to that which is necessary to support the jurisdiction of the court. The same error was repeated in acting upon the statement, that a verdict, if rendered for that amount, would be excessive and set aside for that reason—a statement which could not, at any rate, be judicially made before such a verdict was in fact rendered. It adds, indeed, to the principal error, if any distinction can be made, that which consists in encroaching upon the province of the jury. For nothing is better settled than that, in such cases as the present, and other actions for torts where no precise rule of law fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount by their verdict. In Whipple n. The Cumberland Manufacturing Co., 2 Story, 661, 670, Mr. Justice Story well expressed the rule on this subject, that a verdict will not be set aside in a case of tort for excessive damages “ unless the court can clearly see that the jury have committed some very gross and palpable error, or have acted under some improper bias, influence or prejudice, or have totally mistaken the rules of law by which the damages are to be regulated ”—that is, “ unless the verdict is so excessive or outrageous,” with reference to all the circumstances of the case, “ as to demonstrate that the jury have acted against the rules of law, or have suffered their passions, their prejudices, or their perverse disregard of justice to mislead them.” In no case is it permissible for the court to substitute itself for the jury, and compel a compliance on the part of the latter with its own view of the facts in evidence, as the standard and measure of that justice, which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional tribunal to award.
The case of Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wilson, 244, was an action of trespass and false imprisonment against the defendants, who were four of the King’s messengers in ordinary. They justified the alleged trespass under a warrant of. the Earl of Halifax, then one of the principal Secretaries of State, requiring them to arrest the plaintiff as the author of some seditious libels, and to seize his books and papers. There was a verdict for the plaintiff for £1000 damages, and a motion for a new trial on the sole ground that the damages were excessive. The court (Pratt, afterwards Lord Camden, being Lord Chief Justice) said: “ Can we say that £1000 are monstrous damages as against him who has granted an illegal warrant to a messenger, who enters into a man’s house and prys into all his secret and private affairs, and carries him from his house and business and imprisons him for six days; it is an unlawful power assumed by a great Minister of State; can anybody say that a guinea per diem is sufficient damages in this extraordinary case, which concerns the liberty of every one of the King’s subjects; we cannot say the damages of £1000 are enormous.” The dignity and value of the right assailed, and the power and authority of the source from which the assault proceeds, are elements to be considered in the computation of damages, if they are to be, not only compensation for the direct loss inflicted, but a remedy and prevention for the greater wrong and injury involved in the apprehension of its repetition. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wilson, 205.
The section of the act of March 3, 1875, under which the Circuit Court acted in dismissing the present action confers a beneficial authority to be wisely exercised in defeating collusive and fraudulent experiments upon its jurisdiction; but the discretion it confers is judicial, proceeding upon ascertained facts according to rules of law, and subject to review for apparent errors. For the reasons already given we are not able to uphold its exercise in the present instance, and
The judgment dismissing the action is accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to take such further proceedings therein as the law requires and in con* formity with this opinion.
CHAFFIN v. TAYLOR.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA.
Argued January 7, 8, 1886.—Decided February 1,1886.
At the former hearing of this case, Chaffin v. Taylor, 114 U. S. 309, every question of law was decided which is raised by the pleadings filed below after the judgment of reversal at that hearing.
Whatever has been decided on one writ of error cannot be re-examined, on a subsequent writ of error brought in the same suit. Supervisors v. Kennicott, 94 U. S. 498, again affirmed.
A former judgment in this case rendered against the plaintiff in error by the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia was reversed by this court, a report of which will be found in 114 U. S. 309.
The record at that time showed the state of the pleadings as follows :
The declaration was in trespass de bonis asportatis; the defendant justified the taking, &c., as treasurer of Henrico County, charged by law with the duty of collecting taxes due the State of Virginia on property and persons in said county, alleging that the property was lawfully seized and taken for taxes due from the plaintiff to the State, which, on demand, he had refused to pay.
To this plea the plaintiff replied a tender in payment of the taxes, when demanded and before the trespass complained of, of the amount due in coupons cut from bonds of the State of Virginia, receivable in payment of taxes by virtue of the act of the General Assembly of that State, passed March 30, 1871.
To this replication the defendant demurred, specially on the ground, first, that, by the act of January 26, 1882, he was forbidden to receive coupons in payment of taxes; and, second, that, by the act of March 13, 1884, an action of trespass would not lie in such a case ; the two acts referred to being set out in the report of the opinion of this court in the case of Poindexter V. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 275.
On this demurrer judgment was rendered for the defendant, which was reversed by this court, for the reasons set out in the opinion in the case of Poindexter v. Greenhorn, ubi supra, on the ground that the statutes referred to were unconstitutional, null and void, as impairing the obligation of the contract entered into by the State with the holders of its bonds in the act of March 30, 1871.
The cause was remanded, with directions to proceed therein in conformity with law and the opinion of this court. The mandate being received and entered of record in the Circuit Court of Henrico County, that court, against the objection of the plaintiff, on motion of the defendant, permitted the latter to file a rejoinder to the replication, as follows:
“ And the said defendant, by his attorney, as to the replication of the plaintiff, says: That the said plaintiff ought not to have or maintain his aforesaid action against him, because he says that at the time the said plaintiff offered to the defendant, as treasurer and collector of taxes for the county of Henrico, in payment of the taxes of the said plaintiff for the year 1883 due to the State of Virginia, a paper or instrument in print, writing, or engraving purporting to be a coupon detached from a bond of the Commonwealth of Virginia, issued under the act of assembly of 1871, entitled ‘ An act to fund the public debt/ he, the said plaintiff, demanded that the said defendant should receive the same, together with a small sum of national bank currency, in full for said taxes due by the plaintiff for the year 1*883, and gave him, the said plaintiff, a receipt in full discharge of said taxes, notwithstanding the act of the General Assembly^ approved January 14,1882, which provides that, whenever any tax-payer or his agent shall tender to any person whose duty it is to collect or receive taxes, debts, or demands, due the Commonwealth any papers or instruments in print, writing, or engraving purporting to be coupons detached from bonds of the Commonwealth issued under the act of 1871, entitled ‘ An act to fund the public debt,’ in payment of any such taxes, debts, and demands, the person to whom such papers are tendered shall receive the same, giving the party tendering a receipt, stating that he has received the same for the purpose of [p. 569] identification and verification; he shall at the same time require such tax-payer to pay his taxes in coin, legal-tender notes, or national bank bills, and upon payment give him a receipt for the same; in case of refusal to pay, the taxes due shall be collected as all other delinquent taxes are collected. The said defendant, as treasurer and tax collector for the county of Henrico, as was his duty, did, on account of said act of January 14, 1882, refuse to comply with the demands of the said plaintiff, but was willing and ready to receive, and is still ready to receive, the said paper or instrument in print, writing, or engraving purporting to be a coupon detached from a bond of the Commonwealth, issued under the act of 1871, entitled ‘An act to fund the public debt,’ and give said plaintiff a receipt for the same, for the purpose of identification and verification, at the same time receiving from the said plaintiff his taxes in coin, legal-tender notes, or national bank bills, giving him a receipt for the same, as required by said act of January 14, 1882, and for the purpose herein set forth. But the said plaintiff was not willing to comply with said act of January 14, 1882, and did not comply with the same, as by law be was required to do; and he refusing to pay his taxes aforesaid, the defendant, as treasurer and tax collector for the county of Henrico, as was. his duty under the law, proceeded to collect the taxes from the said plaintiff in the manner set forth in the plea of the defendant heretofore filed, and as provided for in said act of January 14, 1882, and this he is ready to verify.”
The cause was finally submitted on a demurrer to this rejoinder, when the court being of opinion, as the record recites, that the judgment and opinion of this court in this cause did not preclude and forbid the defendant from pleading in bar the act of assembly of January 14, 1882, set forth by him in his rejoinder, and that the Constitution of the United States did not make said act of assembly null and void as a defence to the defendant in this action, rendered judgment on the demurrer in favor of the defendant. A petition to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error to that judgment was denied, and the cause is now brought here again for review.
This case was argued with Barry v. Edmunds, ante, 550; [p. 570] Royall v. Virginia, post, 572; and Sands v. Edmunds, post, 585.
Mr. William L. Royall and Mr. Daniel H. Chamiberlavn for plaintiff in error.
Mr. R. A. Ayres and Mr. Walter R. Staples for defendant in error.
• Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the above reported language, he continued :
The rejoinder which the Circuit Court of Henrico County permitted the defendant to file tendered no issue of fact, but one of law merely; and every question of law in the case had been covered by the former judgment of this court in this case. The proper action of the Circuit Court of Henrico County upon the mandate of this court would have been to have entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff, and proceeded to an assessment of his damages.
The act of January 14, 1882, set up in the rejoinder, is the same that was considered by this court in Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, where it was adjudged that, as an amendment to the law regulating the proceeding by mandamus to compel the acceptance by the officers of the State of tax-receivable coupons in payment of taxes, it was not a law which impaired the obligation of the contract under the act of March 30,1871.
The same act was necessarily considered in the opinion of the court in Poindexter v. Greenhorn, 114 U. S. 270, as it was claimed in argument on the part of the defendant in error that the case then under consideration ought to be governed by the decision in the case of Antoni v. Greenhorn, ubi supra, on the ground that the remedies provided by the subsequent acts of January 26, 1882, and of March 13, 1884, were, like that pro* vided by the act of January 14, 1882, adequate, and therefore exclusive.
But we expressly pointed out that the last-named act of January 14,1882, the one set up and relied on in the rejoinder of the [p. 571] defendant, had no application to the case, so far as the decision in Antoni v. Greenhow, ubi supra, upheld it, because the present action was not one to specifically compel the tax collectors to receive coupons in payment of taxes, but proceeded on the ground that after the tender of coupons, in pursuance of the law of March 30, 1871, the tax collector in distraining property for the payment of the tax as still delinquent was guilty of a trespass.
In Antoni v. Greenhorn that question was not decided. The court there said: “ The question we are now to consider is not whether, if the coupon tendered is in fact genuine and such as ought, under the contract, to be received, and the tender is kept good, the treasurer can proceed to collect the tax by distraint or such other process as the law allows, without making himself personally responsible for any trespass he may commit, but whether the act of 1882 violates any implied obligation of the State in respect to the remedies that may be employed for the enforcement of its contract if the collector refuses to take the coupon.” p. 774. And again: “In conclusion, we repeat that the question presented by the record is not whether the tax collector is bound in law to receive the coupon, notwithstanding the legislation which, on its face, prohibits him from doing so, nor whether, if he refuses to take the coupon and proceeds with the collection of the tax by force, he can be made personally responsible in damages for what he does, but whether the obligation of the contract has been impaired by the changes which have been made in the remedies for its enforcement in case he refuses to accept the coupons.” p. 782.
The question that was not decided in Antoni n. Greenhoro was the very question decided in the present case, and in the case of Poindexter v. Greenhow, where the grounds of the judgment are set out in full. It was there decided that the tax-payer had a contract right to pay his taxes in coupons, that a tender of them for that purpose, as to subsequent steps to collect the tax as delinquent, was equivalent to payment, and that a seizure of property under a levy thereafter for their non-payment was a trespass, notwithstanding any act of the General Assembly to the contrary, for such an act, being in breach, of
Syllabus.
the obligation of the contract of the State, is unconstitutional, and therefore null and void.
The rejoinder of the defendant allowed to be filed after the judgment of reversal, therefore, sought again to draw in question the very matter which had been already finally adjudged by this court in the same case. It did not deny the genuineness of the coupons tendered, nor the fact of tender, and the question of law broadly decided on the demurrer to the replication necessarily involved every defence, arising as matter of law, that could be made upon any existing acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, for the whole law of the case, as to the plaintiff’s legal right to recover on his cause of action, was presented by the pleadings, and was concluded by the judgment of reversal.
As was said in Clark v. Keith, 106 IT. S. 464, “ that question is no longer open in this case, for the reason that it has long been settled that whatever has been decided here on one writ of error cannot be re-examined on a subsequent writ brought in the same suit. This rule was distinctly stated in Supervisors v. Kennicott, 94 U. S. 498, where numerous authorities are cited, beginning as early as Himely v. Hose, 5 Cranch, 313.”
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeals and of the Circuit Court of Henrico County, Virginia, are therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the said Circuit Court, with instructions to take further proceedings in accordance with law, and in conformity with this opinion.
ROYALL v. VIRGINIA.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA.
Argued January 7, 8, 1886.—Decided February 1, 1886.
An assessment made by a statute of Virginia a condition precedent to obtaining a license for pursuing a business or profession within the State, is a tax, debt, or demand within the meaning of the act of that State of March 30,
1871, making coupons on the bonds of the State receivable for “taxes, debts, dues and demands due the State.”
The “ separate revenue license,” which persons authorized and licensed to practise as attorneys at law in the courts of Virginia are required by the statutes of that State to obtain before practising, is a tax laid for revenue, and not an exaction for purposes of regulation.
When a statute of a State imposes license taxes for purposes of revenue upon persons pursuing lawful occupations and professions within the State, and a State officer charged with the duty of issuing licenses thereunder, acting in obedience to a statute of the State which is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, refuses to issue such a license to a person who has duly tendered the amount required by law to be paid for it, the person tendering the payment, if otherwise qualified to pursue the occupation, is not required to proceed by mandamus to compel the issue of the license, and to await the result of those proceedings before entering upon the pursuit or occupation.
After lawful tender to the proper State officer of the requisite amount of coupons (receivable by the terms of the act of the State of Virginia of March 30, 1871, in payment of taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the State) for a “ separate revenue license,” by a person otherwise duly authorized and licensed to practise as an attorney at law, and after refusal by that officer to receive the same or to issue the “separate revenue license,” the person so making the tender may at once enter upon the practice of his profession; and any law of the State subjecting him to criminal proceedings therefor is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
The plaintiff in error was convicted, in the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, of the misdemeanor under the laws of Virginia of practising law as a lawyer without having first obtained a license so to do from the commissioner of the revenue.
To the information the plaintiff in error filed the following plea:
“ And for a plea in this behalf the said William L. Royall comes and says that he is an attorney-at-law, duly licensed and qualified to practise law in the courts of the State of Virginia, under the laws of said State, and th&t he has been such for more than five years; that on the 1st day of May, 1884, he paid to Samuel C. Greenhow, who is the treasurer of the city of Richmond, Virginia, twenty-five dollars and seventy-five cents, and received from him and the commissioner of the revenue a revenue license as a lawyer for one year from that date; that he has not practised his profession as a lawyer in [p. 574] the courts of said State between the 1st day of May, 1885, and the 11th day of July, 1885; that on the 11th day of July, 1885, he tendered to Seaton G. Tinsley, who is the deputy for Samuel C. Greenhow, one coupon for fifteen dollars and ten dollars in United States Treasury notes, in payment of his license tax as an attorney-at-law for the ensuing year, and seventy-five cents in silver coin for the fee of the commissioner of the revenue; that said coupon was cut from a bond issued by the State of Virginia under the provisions of an act of the General Assembly, approved March 30, 1871, entitled ‘An act to provide for the funding and payment of the public debt; ’ that it was overdue and past maturity, and bore upon its face the contract of the State of Virginia that it should be received in payment of all taxes, debts, demands, and dues due to the said State ’ that when he made said tender he demanded of said Greenhow a certificate in writing stating that he had deposited with him said coupon and money, but the said Greenhow, by his said deputy, refused to receive said coupon and money for any purpose whatever, and refused to give him said certificate or any other certificate; that he refused to receive said coupon and money, because an act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, approved February 7th, 1884, forbade him to receive said license tax in coupons, and because the 112th section of an act of the General Assembly of said State, approved March 15th, 1884, provides that all license taxes shall be paid in current money of the United States, and not in coupons; that thereupon the defendant made the affidavit hereto attached, marked ‘ A,’ and presented it to R. B. Munford, who is the commissioner of the revenue for the city of Richmond, and demanded of him a revenue license as an attorney-at-law, and at the same time he presented to the said Munford the paper hereto attached, marked ‘ B,’ and at the same time he offered to pay the said Munford any and all fees that he was entitled to receive before issuing said license, but the said Munford refused to issue to defendant a license as an attorney-at-law; that thereafter defendant accepted the employment of a client who was being prosecuted for a misdemeanor in this honorable court, and assisted in his defence, and thus practised his profession as a [p. 575] lawyer without a revenue license, but said professional act was done after defendant had made the efforts hereinbefore described to obtain a revenue license, and this he is ready to verify.”
The affidavit referred to in the plea set forth the facts of the tender, and the paper marked “ B ” was the usukl form of an application for a revenue license.
To this plea the Commonwealth filed a general demurrer, which was sustained by the court, on the ground that the defendant had no right to practise his profession as an attorney-at-law after the tender of the coupons and money, as described in the plea, without first having obtained a license therefor. The defendant then pleaded not guilty, and a trial was had, resulting in a verdict finding the defendant guilty and assessing his fine at $30.
During the progress of the trial a bill of exceptions was duly taken, as follows:
“ Be it remembered that on the trial of this cause the same was submitted to the jury upon the following agreed statement of facts, to wit:
“ ‘ It is admitted as evidence in the case of the Commonwealth v. Royall that said Royall did not practise his profession as attorney-at-law between May 1, 1885, and July 11, 1885, and that on the latter day he tendered to the treasurer of the city of Richmond a coupon issued by the State of Virginia under the provisions of the act of March 30, 1871, for the sum of $15.00 and $10.75, lawful money of the United States, in payment of his license tax for the ensuing year, and demanded his license of the proper officer; that said coupon was receivable in payment of all taxes, debts, and demands due said State; that said tender was refused; that thereupon the defendant practised his profession as an attorney after said tender, but not before, without revenue license, but the said defendant has for more than five years been duly licensed to practise law under the laws of Virginia. It is further agreed that the license tax on the defendant as an attorney-at-law is twenty-five dollars ($25).’
“ Thereupon the defendant moved the court to instruct the jury as follows:
“ ‘ If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant did not practise his profession of attorney-at-law between the 1st day of May, 1885, and the 11th day of July, 1885, and that on the 11th day of July, 1885, he tendered to the treasurer of the city of Richmond a coupon for $15.00, issued by the State of Virginia under the provisions of the act of assembly approved March 30, 1871, which coupon, by provisions of said act, was. receivable for all taxes, debts, and demands due said State, and ten dollars and seventy-five cents, in lawful money of the United States, in payment of his license tax, which said tax is $25, and 75 cents commissioner’s fee, for the then ensuing year, and that said tender was refused by said treasurer, then they are instructed they must find the defendant not guilty.’
“Which instructions the court refused to give. To the court’s action in refusing which instructions the defendant excepts, and tenders this his first bill of exceptions, and prays that this his bill of exceptions be signed, sealed, and made a part of the record; which is accordingly done.”
Judgment was entered on the verdict for the payment of the fine, and execution awarded. The record contained the following :
“ And, at the instance of the defendant, the court certifies that in the record and at the trial of this cause there was drawn in question the validity of section 86 of chapter 34 of the Code of Virginia of 1873, and an act of the General Assembly of said State, approved February 7, 1884, entitled ‘An act to regulate the granting of licenses for the exercise of any privilege,’ and the 112th section of an act of the General Assembly of said State, approved March 15, 1884, entitled ‘ An act to provide for the assessment of taxes on persons, property, and incomes,’ &c., upon the ground that, so far as they undertake to inflict punishment upon the defendant for practising his profession as an attorney-at-law without a license, after having tendered the State’s tax-receivable coupons in payment of his license tax, they are repugnant to section 10 of article I. of the Constitution of the United States.
“ But the court being of opinion that the defendant had no right to practise the profession of an attorney-at-law without [p. 577] a license after he had tendered payment of his license tax in coupons, decided and gave judgment that said section of said code and said acts of the General Assembly are not repugnant to section 10 of article I. of the Constitution of the United States in that behalf, and it decided and gave judgment in favor of the validity of said section of said code and said act of assembly.”
The Supreme Court of Appeals denied a petition praying for an allowance of a writ of error, and to reverse that judgment this writ of error was prosecuted.
This case was argued with Barry n. Edmunds, ante, 550 ; Chaffin v. Taylor, ante, 567; and Sands v. Edmunds, post, 585.
Mr. William L. Royall and Mr. Daniel IT. Chamberlain for plaintiff in error.
Mr. R. A. Ayres and Mr. Walter R. Staples for defendant in error.
Me. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts as reported above he continued:
The Virginia Code of 1873, Title 12, ch. xxxiv, § 60, provides that “ no person shall, without a license authorized by law, practice as an attorney at law;” and § 61, that “every attorney at law, in addition to being licensed, sworn and admitted to prosecute or defend actions or other proceedings in the courts of this commonwealth, on the retainer of clients, shall obtain a revenue license, and no person shall act as attorney-at-law, or practise law in the courts of this commonwealth, without a separate revenue license.” This revenue license, it will be observed, is different from and in addition to the license to practise law, given only to such as on examination, as to their character and acquirements, are found to be duly qualified therefor. The amount of this revenue license was fixed by an act of March 15, .1884, at $15 for those who had been licensed to practice for less than five years, and at $25 for all others. Section 86 of ch. 34 of the Virginia Code of 1873 provides that vol. cxvx—37 [p. 578] “any person who shall engage in or exercise any business, employment or profession, without a license, if a license be required by law, or shall in any manner violate the license or revenue laws of the State, if no specific fine is imposed for such violation, shall pay a fine of not less than thirty dollars nor more than one thousand dollars.”
The act of February 7,1884, Acts of Virginia, 1883-84,120, enacts that no application for a license to do any business, or to follow any profession, trade or calling in that State, shall be made, and if made shall not be considered, except upon compliance with its provisions, which, among other things, require that the amount of the assessment prescribed by law as a condition precedent shall accompany the application, in gold or silver coin, United States Treasury notes or national bank notes.
Section 112 of the act of March 15, 1884, Acts of Virginia, 1883-84, 603, also provides that “ applications for licenses shall be made, and all taxes assessed by chapter one of this act shall be paid in lawful money of the United States, in the mode and subject to the provisions of an act to regulate the granting of licenses, approved the seventh day of February, eighteen hundred and eighty-four,” &c.
By the terms of the act of March 30, 1871, the coupons tendered in this case were made receivable for “ all taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the State,” and this stipulation, as has been repeatedly decided by the Court of Appeals of Virginia and by this court, constituted a' contract between the coupon-holder and the State of Virginia, the obligation of which the State is forbidden to impair by the Constitution of the United States, and any law of the State which would have that effect if enforced, is thereby annulled and made void. To this point are the cases of Antoni v. Wright, 22 Grattan, 833; Wise v. Rogers, 24 Grattan, 169, and Clarke v. Tyler, 30 Grattan, 134, in the Court of Appeals of Virginia; and in this court the cases of Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, and Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114' U. S. 270. In Hartman v. Greenhow, ubi supra, it was shown that the consideration for this stipulation was a surrender by [p. 579] its creditors of one-third of their claim against the State. In Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 IT. S. 769, 775, it was said : “ The right of the coupon-holder is to have his coupon received for taxes when offered; ” and, “ Any act of the State which forbids the receipt of these coupons for taxes is a violation of the contract and void as against coupon-holders.” p. 771. In Poindexter v. Greenhorn, 114 IT. S. 270, 281, no point in which was reopened in the argument of this cause, it was said : “ It is well settled by many decisions of this court that for the purpose of affecting proceedings to enforce the payment of taxes, a lawful tender of payment is equivalent to actual payment, either being sufficient to deprive the collecting officer of all authority for further action and making every subsequent step illegal and void;” a proposition founded on the authority of Woodruff v. Trapnail, 10 How. 190 ; United States v. Lee, 106 IT. S. 196 ; Bennett v. Hunter, 9 Wall. 326 ; Tacey v. Irwin, 18 Wall. 549; Atwood v. Weems, 99 IT. S. 183; and Hills v. Exchange Bank, 105 IT. S. 319.
That charges, or, as they are called in the statutes, assessments made by law as conditions precedent to obtaining licenses for pursuing a business or profession, are included within the meaning of the words, “taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the State,” as used in the act of March 30,1871, does not seem to admit of reasonable doubt. In Clarke n. Tyler, 30 Grattan, 134, it was adjudged by the Court of Appeals of Virginia that a fine imposed for a violation of law could be discharged under this provision in coupons in lieu of money. So that upon the authority of that case the very fine imposed by the Hustings Court of Richmond upon the plaintiff in error for practising law without a revenue license may lawfully be paid and discharged in the very coupons which were tendered in payment of the license itself and refused. Surely such an anomaly cannot be justified or admitted. The payment required as a preliminary to the license is in the nature and form of a tax, and is a due to the State which it may demand and exact from every one of its citizens who either will or must follow some business avocation within its limits, to the pursuit of which the assessment is made a condition precedent. It is an occupation [p. 580] tax, for which the license is merely a receipt and not an authority, except in that sense, because it is laid and collected as revenue, and not merely as incident to the general police power of the State, which, under certain circumstances and conditions, regulates certain employments with a view to the public health, comfort, and convenience. In the latter class of cases the exactions may be either fees or fines, as they are proportioned to the expense of regulation, or laid as a burden upon and a discouragement to the business, and not taxes which are levied for the purpose of raising public revenue by means of a contribution either from the person or the property or the occupation of all citizens in like circumstances. It was, therefore, in the character of a tax that the payments were required and made for licenses issued under the internal revenue acts of the United States. McGuire v. The Commonwealth, 3 Wall. 387. Speaking of them in the License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471, Chief-Justice Chase said: “ The granting of a license, therefore, must be regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax,” &c., and that “this construction is warranted by the practice of the government from its organization. . . . They were regarded merely as a convenient mode of imposing taxes on several descriptions of business, and of ascertaining the parties from ■whom such taxes were to be collected. . . . But, as we have already said, these licenses give no authority. They are mere receipts for taxes.” The license under the laws of Virginia, required from the plaintiff in error, cannot be distinguished from those of the class just referred to, issued under the internal revenue laws of the United States.
We are referred to the case of Sights v. YamaUs, 12 Grat. 292, as defining a license under the laws of Virginia in a different sense. We think, on the contrary, that it is not only consistent with the view we have taken, but strongly in corroboration of it. In that case, the amount assessed as a condition of the license is expressly designated to be a tax. It was an exaction made by the municipal government of the city of Wheeling, under a law which expressly authorized it, in reference to houses of entertainment, to grant or refuse licenses, and the case was one of that class. The language of the city [p. 581] charter was: “ They shall further have authority to regulate the manner in which such houses or places shall be kept, and to levy and collect taxes thereon, in addition to any tax which is or shall be payable on the same to the State.”
The law of Virginia, however, on this point was definitely settled in accordance with the view we have here taken, in the case of Quid v. City of Richmond, 23 Grat. 464, followed by Humphreys v. City of Norfolk, 25 Grat. 97, and The Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Richmond, 26 Grat. 1.
In the case of Humphreys v. The City of Norfolk, ubi supra, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, referring to the previous case of Quid n. City of Richmond, said: “ The objection was made in that case that a power to license involves in its exercise the power to prohibit without such license; and that such power vested in a municipal corporation is incompatible with the rights of attorneys conferred by their general license to practice in any and every part of the State. This objection did not prevail. Judge Anderson, upon this point, speaking for the entire court, conceded that the city authorities could not prohibit attorneys at law, already licensed, from practicing their profession within the city limits. The exercise of the vocation was, however, a civil right and privilege, to which are attached valuable immunities and pecuniary advantages, and is a'fair subject of taxation by the State and by municipal corporations. The power to impose a license tax upon the profession is included in the general power of taxation given by the sixty-ninth section of the charter, and is not taken away by subsequent limitations.” “ The principles settled by that case,” continued the court, “ are decisive of this. In neither case is the attempt made to prohibit the exercise of the business or vocation. The license required by the corporation is merely a mode of assessing the tax; if it be reasonable and just, it matters but little by what name it is called. The power to impose fines and penalties for a failure to pay the tax required is not only an incident to the power of taxation, but is expressly conferred by statute.”
That the party complying with the statutory conditions is entitled as of right to the license, is conclusive that the pay-
Opinion of the Court,
ment is a tax laid for revenue and not an exaction for purposes of regulation, Mayor &c. v. Second Avenue Railroad Co., 32 N. Y. 261; State v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. (4 Yroom), 280; 2 Dillon Municipal Corporations, 766, ch. XIX., § 768. The occupation, which is the subject of the license, is lawful in itself, and is only prohibited for the purpose of the license; that is to say, prohibited in order to compel the taking out a license, and the license is required only as a convenient method of assessing and collecting the tax. Cooley on Taxation, 407. Such a license fee was held to be a tax by this court in the cases of Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, and Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. We think it entirely clear, both from the nature of the case and upon authority, that the payments demandable by the State for the license applied for by the plaintiff in error are taxes within the meaning of the act of March 30, 1871, in discharge of which coupons were receivable by its terms, and that the plaintiff in error must be regarded, after making the tender alleged, in the same situation in law as if he had tendered gold or silver coin or other lawful money of the United States.
Admitting this, it is still contended, on behalf of the Commonwealth, that it was unlawful for the plaintiff in error to practice his profession without a license, and that his remedy was against the officers to compel them to issue it. It.is doubtless true, as a general rule, that where the officer, whose duty it is to issue a license, refuses to do so, and that duty is merely ministerial, and the applicant has complied with all the conditions that entitle him to it, the remedy by mandamus would be appropriate to compel the officer to issue it. That rule would apply to cases where the refusal of the officer was wilful and contrary to the statute under which he was commissioned to act. But here the case is different. The action of the officer is based on the authority of an act of the General Assembly of the State, which, although it may be null and void, because unconstitutional, as against the applicant, gives the color of official character to the conduct of the officer in his refusal; and, although at the election of the aggrieved party the officer might be subjected to the compulsory process [p. 583] of mandamus to compel the performance of an official duty, nevertheless the applicant, who has done everything on his part required by the law, cannot be regarded as violating the law if, without the formality of a license wrongfully withheld from him, he pursues the business of his calling, which is not unlawful in itself, and which, under the circumstances, he has a constitutional right to prosecute. As to the plaintiff in error, the act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia forbidding payment of his license tax in its coupons, receivable for that tax by a contract protected by the Constitution of the United States, is unconstitutional, and its unconstitutionality infects and nullifies the antecedent legislation of the State, of which it becomes a part, when applied, as in this case, to enforce an unconstitutional enactment against a party, not only without fault, but seeking merely to exercise a right secured to him by the Constitution. It is no answer to the objection of unconstitutionality, as was said in Poindexter n. Greenhow^ ubi supra, “ that the statute, whose application in the particular case is sought to be restrained, is not void on its face, but is complained of only because its operation in the particular instance works a violation of a constitutional right; for the cases are numerous where the tax laws of a State, which in their general and proper application are perfectly valid, have been held to become void in particular cases, either as unconstitutional regulations of commerce, or as violations of contracts prohibited by the Constitution, or because in some other way they operate to deprive the party complaining of a right secured to him by the Constitution of the United States.”
In the present case the plaintiff in error has been prevented from obtaining a license to practice his profession in violation of his rights under the Constitution of the United States. To punish him for practicing it without a license thus withheld is equally a denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States, and the law, under the authority of which this is attempted, must on that account and in his case be regarded as null and void.
As the sum demanded for the license is a tax, the provision for the punishment of one who persues his profession without a [p. 584] license is a part of the revenue system of the State, and is a means merely of enforcing payment of the tax itself, or of a penalty for not paying it. It is legally equivalent to a civil action of debt upon the statute, and its substantial character is not changed by calling the default a misdemeanor, and providing for its prosecution by information. The present case, therefore, stands precisely, so far as the constitutional questions arising in it are affected, as if it were a civil action, in which the Commonwealth of Virginia was plaintiff, seeking to recover the amount due on account of the tax and penalty. In that aspect no one would doubt that it would be a perfect defence that the defendant had previously paid the demand, or, what we have held to be legally equivalent, had tendered the amount in the coupons of the State, receivable in payment by an irrepealable contract, but which the appointed authorities of the State had wrongfully refused to receive. Such, as we conceive it, is the present case. The State of Virginia has sued the defendant for the recovery of a tax which he offered to pay, when it became due, in its own coupons, which by the law of its contract were receivable in satisfaction of the demand. Certainly the State cannot be permitted to recover against its own contract from the other contracting party, as to whom the only default alleged is that he has performed the contract on his part.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, and of the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, are accordingly reversed, and the cause is rema/nded to said Hustings Cov/rt, with instructions to tahe further proceedings therein in accordance with law and in conformity with this opi/nion.
SANDS v. EDMUNDS.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA.
Argued January 7, 8, 1886.—Decided February 1,1886.
After lawful tender to the proper State officer of the requisite amount of coupons (receivable by the terms of the act of the State of Virginia of March 30, 1871, in payment of taxes, debts, dues and demands due the State), for a “separate revenue license” by a person otherwise duly authorized and licensed to practice as an attorney-at-law, and after refusal by that officer to receive the same, or to issue the “ separate revenue license,” the person so making the tender may, by mandamus, compel the officer to receive the coupons, and to deliver them to the proper official for identification and verification according to the terms of the act of that State of January 14, 1882.
The plaintiff in error filed in the Circuit Court of Fauquier County a petition for & mandamus against the treasurer of that county, as follows:
“ The petition of Wm. H. Sands respectfully represents that he is an attorney-at-law, regularly and duly licensed to practice law in the courts of the State of Virginia according to the laws of said State.
“ That on the 8th day of September, 1885, he tendered to E. G. Edmunds, who is the treasurer of the county of Fauquier, and the officer whose duty it is to collect all license taxes due said State in said county, in payment of his license tax as an attorney-at-law for the ensuing year, fifteen dollars in lawful money of the United States and seventy-five cents in like money for the commission of the revenue’s fee, in compliance with the provisions of the acts of assembly, approved February 7th, 1884, entitled ‘ An act to regulate the granting of licenses for the exercise of any privilege.’
“ That, at the same time, he tendered to the said treasurer a certain coupon for fifteen dollars, which coupon was cut from a bond issued by the State of Virginia under the provisions of an act of her General Assembly, approved March 30, 1871, entitled ‘ An act to provide for the funding and payment of the public debt.’
“ That said coupon was overdue and past maturity, and bore upon its face the contract of the State of Virginia that it should be received in payment of all taxes, debts, and demands due said state.
“ That, at the same time, he demanded the said treasurer should receive said coupon along with said lawful money for the purpose of identification and verification, in manner and form as required by an act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, approved January 14, 1882, entitled ‘An act to prevent fraud upon the Commonwealth and holders of her securities in the collection of her revenues.’
“ That the said treasurer received said lawful money tendered by your petitioner, and gave him the certificate provided for in said act of February 7, 1884, but he refused to receive said coupon as demanded by your petitioner, and he refused to receive it for any purpose whatever. Your petitioner claims that he had the right to have said treasurer receive said coupon and deliver the same to the judge of the county court of Fauquier, and that it was your petitioner’s right to prove said coupon before a jury in said court and thereupon to have his said money returned to him, and that said treasurer did your petitioner a great wrong and injury when he refused to receive said coupon.
“ That he refused to receive same because said act of February 7, 1884, requires all license taxes to be paid in money only and not in coupons, and because the 112th section of an act of the General Assembly of Virginia, approved March 15, 1884, entitled ‘An act to provide for the assessment of taxes on persons, property, incomes, &c.,’ requires all license taxes to be paid in money only, and not in coupons.
“ That both of said acts in this particular are repugnant to section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore null and void. That your petitioner has not been licensed to practice law so long as five years.
“ Your petitioner therefore prays that a mandamus nisi may be issued commanding the said E. G. Edmunds, treasurer aforesaid, to show cause why a peremptory mandamus shall not issue commanding him to receive said coupon, and deliver [p. 587] it to the judge of the County Court for identification and verification, according to the terms and provisions of said act of January 14, 1882.”
The prayer for the writ was denied by the Circuit Court of Fauquier County, and on application to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia that judgment was affirmed by a refusal to allow an appeal. To reverse that judgment this writ of error was prosecuted.
This case was argued with Barry v. Edmunds, ante, 550; Chaffin n. Taylor, ante, 567; and Royall n. Virginia, ante, 572.
Mr. William L. Royall and Mr. Daniel H. Chamberlain for plaintiff in error.
Mr. R. JL. Ayres and Mr. Walter R. Staples for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts as above reported, he continued:
The right of the plaintiff in error to pay his license tax as a lawyer in coupons, receivable for taxes, as described in his petition, is affirmed by the opinion and judgment in the case of Royall v. The State of Virginia, just decided, ante, 572. His remedy to have them received for verification and to recover back the money paid for his license, is secured to him by the terms of the act of January 14,1882, which, for such purposes, was upheld by this court as a valid enactment in Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769.
On the authority of these decisions Thejudgments of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia and of the Circuit Court of Fauquier County, Virginia, are reversed, and the cause is remanded to said Circuit Court, with instructions to take further proceedings according to law and in conformity with this opinion.
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