Collins v. Thompson, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 246

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Collins v. Thompson, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 246
Full caption
Sidney E. Collins, Appellant, v. Drury Thompson, William E. Cleveland, and James Campbell’s Widow, Heirs, and Devisees.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Sidney E. Collins, Appellant, v. Drury Thompson, William
E. Cleveland, and James Campbell’s Widow, Heirs, and Devisees.
Where the complainant set up in his bill that a deed, power of attorney, and other writings, all which, as alleged, were executed in contemplation of a suit for the recovery of his patrimonial inheritance of which he had been unjustly deprived, were obtained by imposition and fraud, and also that a deed, exe cuted by him in the adjustment of the estate among the parties participating in the litigation to recover it, was obtained by like fraud and imposition, held, that upon the pleadings and proofs, the allegations are not sustained; on the contrary, the transactions in both respects referred to were fair, open, and unexceptionable.
This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama.
It wits a bill filed by Collins, to set aside certain agreements, upon the ground that he had been imposed upon and deceived by Thompson and the other defendants in error.
The facts are all stated in the opinion of the court.
The Circuit Court dismissed the bill, and Collins appealed to this court.
It was argued by Mr. Sewall for the appellant, and by Mr. Smith and Jfr. Benjamin for the appellees.
Collins v. Thompson et al.
The arguments of the counsel upon both sides were almost exclusively directed to the evidence, and how far it sustained the charges of fraud brought by Collins against Thompson and the other appellees. To apply these- arguments, it would be necessary to give at least an abstract of the evidence, which would throw no light upon any general questions of law or equity. They are therefore passed over.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama.
The bill was filed by Collins, to set aside certain convey ances of a tract of land situate in the city of Mobile, and particularly a deed from him to the defendants, bearing date the 15th February, 1851, on the ground of fraud and imposi tion in the procurement of said conveyances.
The pleadings and proofs are very voluminous, the plead ings alone covering nearly one hundred, and including the proofs, exceeding five hundred, closely printed octavo pages. The bill is very inartificially drawn, being stuffed with minute and tedious detail of what might have been proper evidence of facts constituting the ground of the complaint, instead of a concise and orderly statement of the facts themselves. This has led to an equally minute and extended statement of the grounds of the defence in the several answers of the defend ants.
In looking closely, however, into the case, and into the nature and grounds of the relief sought, and principles upon which it must be sustained, if at all, it will be found that the questions really involved, as well as the material facts upon which their determination depend, are few and simple, and call for no very extended discussion.
The father of Collins, the complainant, died in 1811, seized of an interest in the tract of land in dispute. He left three sons, the complainant being then some two years old. The tract subsequently passed into the possession of one Joshua ennedy, by collusion between Inerarity, the administrator of o ins the elder, and Kennedy, the latter also afterwards
Collins n. Thompson et al.
obtaining a deed of the land from the heirs at law by fraudu lent representations.
In 1844, Thompson, one of the defendants in the present suit, residing in the city of Mobile, and having some knowl edge of the original title of Collins to the land, and of the means by which the heirs had been deprived of it, visited the complainant, then residing in Texas, and being the only sur viving heir, with a view to purchase his title, or to obtain an arrangement with him in respect to it, so that a suit might he instituted for the recovery of the estate. An arrangement was agreed to accordingly, and a conveyance of the land executed by the complainant and his wife to Thompson; also, a power of attorney, authorizing him to institute suits for the recovery of the land—Thompson, at the same time, executing a bond of indemnity to the complainant against all costs and respon sibilities, in consequence of the suit. The complainant was to receive $10,000, in the event of a recovery. A suit was subsequently instituted in the name of the complainant against the heirs of Kennedy, in April, 1844, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama; was heard upon the pleadings and proofs at the April term of the court, in 1847, and a decree rendered in his favor; which, on an appeal to this court, was affirmed at the December term, 1850. The case, as reported in this court, will be found in the 10th How., p. 174.
The litigation extended over a period of some seven years; and, in the progress of it, besides Thompson, who had made the original arrangement with the complainant, three other persons had become interested, and had contributed their services and money in bringing it to a successful termination.
After the affirmance of the decree in this court, and con firmation of the title in complainant, all the parties concerned met in the city of Mobile, at the office of the solicitors, for the adjustment of their respective claims to the property recovere Its value had increased, during the progress of the suit, from about $100,000, according to the estimate, to some two or three times that amount. The complainant had origina y stipulated for the sum of $10,000. In this adjustment, one
Collins v. Thompson et al.
third of the whole estate was set apart to him, and one-sixth to each of the other four persons. Conveyances according to this division were executed on the 15th February, 1851. The complainant therefore, according to the general estimate, re ceived $100,000, and the other four associates $50,000 each.
Now, the fraud alleged in the bill, and which is mainly relied on for setting aside this adjustment and division of the estate between the parties, is placed upon two grounds: 1. In obtaining the deed of the land, powers of attorney, and other stipulations relating to the title, dated the 13th January, 1844, preparatory to the institution of the suit in which the property was recovered; and 2. In the adjustment and division of the property among the several parties above mentioned, after the recovery had taken place, and which was consummated by the deed of 15th February, 1851.
1. It is insisted, on behalf of the complainant, that, at the time he executed the deed, powers of attorney, and the other writings, in 1844, he was unacquainted with the value of the property or the condition of the title; that Thompson, who procured these instruments, and the authority to commence the suit, was well acquainted with both; that he fraudulently depreciated the value of the property, and exaggerated the difficulties and expense attending the litigation, and thereby deceived the complainant. This is the substance of the charge.
There is, however, a very brief but most conclusive answer to it, upon the pleadings and proofs in the case. It is, that Mr. Justice Campbell, whose firm had been subsequently employed by Thompson to bring the suit against the heirs of Kennedy, declined the retainer, and refused to have anything to do with it, unless the complainant should not only be made sole plaintifl in the suit, but should have a substantial interest in the estate sought to be recovered; should attend as the party in interest in conducting the proceedings, and take part in the preparation for trial; and insisted that the preliminary arrangement made by Thompson, including the deed of the property and agreement for the payment of the $10,000, 6 ould be abrogated and given up. All of which was agreed to by Thompson and the other parties concerned; and the
Collins v. Thompson et al.
suit was commenced and carried on to a final determination, under this new arrangement. The complainant attended, and participated in the preparation of the case, assisted in procuring and in the examination of the witnesses, and admits, in his bill, that he attended every term of the court at Mobile, while the cause was pending, and until the decree in his favor.
The whole arrangement, therefore, between the parties, in respect to the property, entered into with a view to the insti tution of the suit, which is complained of, having been given up, and a new one substituted, which was not only unexcep tionable, but highly equitable and just, as concerned the com plainant, the charge of fraud and imposition depending upon it, even if originally it had any foundation, falls with it. We’ shall not stop to inquire into the merits or justice of that ar rangement, for, having been given up, they are wholly imma terial in any view of the case, as presented upon the evidence before us.
2. The remaining ground of fraud relied on in the bill is, that on the day of the arrival of the complainant at the city of Mobile, from his residence in Texas, and which was his first visit to the city after the judgment in his favor in this court, he was requested to attend at the office of the solicitors, in the evening, and attended accordingly, where he met the defend ants, and was then, for the first time, informed that they had been interested in the prosecution of the suit, and had ex pended much time and money in the litigation, and were therefore expected to participate in the division of the prop erty recovered. That complainant was taken by surprise when the suggestion was made at the meeting, by the solicitor, that, in the division, one-sixth part of the estate should be given to each of the defendants, and including Primrose, and only one-third to himself. That he was unprepared to act with judg ment in the matter, having been wholly unadvised of the object of the meeting, or of the persons who were to be present; that no time was given him for reflection or counsel; that he was ignorant of the value of the property, and incapable of acting understandingly upon the subject, and had no information as to the amount he was thus suddenly7 called on to give away.
Collins v. Thompson et al.
That a deed was immediately prepared by the solicitor, to carry into effect the division as suggested, and was executed; and that this meeting was arranged by preconcert, and after consultation between the defendants and others, for the pur pose of entrapping and deceiving the complainant. The deed referred to is that of 15th February, 1851, which is sought to be set aside.
This is the second ground of fraud substantially as charged in the bill; and it will be necessary to look into the answers and proofs in the case, with a view to see if it is sustained.
The answer of Thompson, which is responsive to this partic ular charge, is a denial of every material fact and circumstance upon which the allegation of fraud rests. It states, that one or two days after the arrival of the complainant at Mobile, he requested him (the respondent) to go with him to the office of the solicitor that evening; that he had made an appointment with the solicitor to meet the respondent, and other persons interested in the suit, there, in order to come to an under standing and adjustment of their respective interests. The ■matters of the adjustment formed the subject of their conver sation during the afternoon, and down to the time of the meet ing. That the respondent explained to him the understanding he had with bis; associates, the other defendants, the services they had rendered in the suit, and the advances of money made therein; that, after all the parties had assembled at the office, the subject was again talked over at length, and, in the Course of the conversation, the solicitor was referred to, and desired to suggest what, in his judgment, would be a reasona ble adjustment and division of the property. Whereupon, he suggested a division into six parts—two parts to the complain ant, and one to Thompson and each of his three associates; t at this appeared to be generally acquiesced in, and it was proposed by some one that the papers should be drawn and executed. But the solicitor objected, and advised them to postpone the execution,7 and ¡reflect upon the matter, and en they had come to.a determination among themselves, it wou d be time enough to make out the papers; that the comP ipant expressed great .pleasure and. satisfaction at the divis-
Collins v. Thompson et al.
ion; other of the parties were not satisfied. But, in a few days, all met at the office of Primrose, one of the parties in interest, when the deed of the 15tn of February, 1851, was voluntarily executed, carrying into effect the division.
The answer of Cleveland, another of the defendants, is equally explicit. He states that the subject of the division was talked over at the office of the solicitor; that all expressed satisfaction at the division suggested, except Primrose, who objected to the allowance of two shares to the complainant, he insisting that the time and labor of others had chiefly contrib uted to the success of the suit, and that complainant had orig inally expressed a willingness to be content with a small sum; that the solicitor repelled the idea, and said, that although others had been chiefly instrumental in carrying the case through, the title was in the complainant, and he ought to have the largest share; that the solicitor advised the parties to consider the matter, and, if he could aid them, to call on him; that the deed carrying into effect the division was not executed till several days, and respondent thinks a week, after this, at the office of Primrose.
James Campbell, another of the defendants, states that, after the meeting at the office, the subject of the interests of the par ties was talked over; that upon the division suggested by the solicitor all concurred, except Primrose, who represented his claims higher than those of complainant; that he had ren dered greater services, and was entitled to a greater share. He depreciated complainant’s title to the estate, insisting that he alone could have made nothing out of it, and had always said he would be satisfied with some negroes and cattle; that the solicitor replied to him, that without complainant s title there could have been no recovery; and that, what ever others had done, still the title was in the complainant, and that he, the solicitor, had undertaken the suit with the distinct understanding and agreement that complainant was to have a substantial interest in the recovery. The respon ent denies that the deed was drawn or executed the evening of the meeting, nor until several days afterwards.
These several answers are directly responsive to the clargea
Collins v. Thompson et al.
in the bill, and are to be taken as true, unless overcome by the proofs. Instead of impeaching, the proofs are all in sup port of them.
Primrose, a witness on the part of the complainant, and who was one of the parties in interest, and present at this meeting, confirms the facts as above stated. In his answer to 43d interrogatory, he says, in substance, that, after conversa tion at the meeting relating to the subject before them, all seemed willing to leave the division to the solicitor, who there upon suggested one-third to the complainant, and one-sixth to each of the others; that he (the witness) objected, as giving too great a share to the complainant, and that he made some remarks about the condition of the title, when he and the others undertook the suit; that complainant at that time had said he would be satisfied with a comparatively small sum, and that the solicitor replied to him, that the title to the prop erty was in the complainant, besides making other observa tions which he (the witness) did not recollect.
This witness further says, in answer to the 43d cross interrog atory, speaking of the division, “All but myself did acquiesce. So far as I could judge, the complainant was satisfied, and I was disappointed.” “Judge Campbell maintained Collins’s right to two shares against me. The parties talked some of the matters over freely and considerably. It consumed a winter’s evening, or greater part of it.” “ I do know Collins was pleased, and considered the settlement fair, just, and lib eral towards him.”
Judge Campbell, the solicitor, has also been a witness in t e case. He states that, after some reference to the subject a* the meeting, and interchange of views, one of the parties stated that he was willing to abide by his opinion as to the 8 are he should be entitled to, and others indicated a wish t at he would make some suggestions as to the proper adjust ment. In answer to which, he suggested a division of the property into six parts, and that two should be assigned to e complainant; that Primrose expressed dissatisfaction, inth assigned the complainant was too large;
at is title was good for nothing, and that the success in the
Collins v. Thompson el al.
suit was owing to the ability with which it was prosecuted; that complainant did not expect so large a share; that he had said all he wanted was a few negroes and some cattle.
The witness further states, that he took pams to answer these objections; and, after some further conversation, the parties left his office; that he told them when they left to take into consideration what had been said, and that if he could be of any service to them, to call at his office again; that no agreement was arrived at that evening, and no papers drawn up of any agreement between the parties; that the deed of February, 1851, was not prepared by him till several days after this, and that he had not learned of its execution till the week after its preparation.
It is useless to pursue the inquiry further, as the proofs in the case are all one way, and show that there is no foundation whatever, not even colorable, for the charge of fraud set forth in the bill.
Besides the entire want of proof to sustain it, the evidence shows that possession of the property was taken by the parties jointly, after the settlement, in the summer of 1851. Exten sive and valuable improvements w'ere made in the course of the years 1852-’53, under the direction of the complainant and others. The sales in 1853 had amounted to $92,000, as stated in the bill.
The property continued under the joint management of the parties for the period of some three years, without complaint or dissatisfaction on the part of Collins; when suddenly, with out any apparent reason or changed condition of affairs be tween him and his associates, he seems to have taken up the delusion that he had been circumvented, and deceived into an inequitable settlement of the estate among the parties, in February, 1851, and for the first time set up a claim to the whole of it.
It is suggested in the bill, that the large sales made of t e property in 1852-’53 afforded the complainant the first evi dence of the great value of the estate; and it appears, from other portions of the case, that the increased and increasing value of the property had the effect to unsettle the views an
Collins n. Thompson et al.
opinions upon which he had acted in the settlement with his associates in February, 1851, and led to a strong desire to recall and review them.
But this suggested ignorance of the great value of the property at the time of the settlement is against all the proof in the case. His bill, filed against the heirs of Kennedy in April, 1844, for the recovery of this property, contains the following allegation: “Your orator charges that the said property was worth $20,000 and upwards in 1820, $75,000 in 1830, and is probably worth $200,000 at this time.”
The great value of the property, compared with the consid eration paid by Kennedy, was a very material fact in the case. Besides, the complainant had spent much of the time pending that litigation in the city of Mobile, in which the property was situate, and must have been familiar with its value, present and prospective. He was then in the prime of life, and possessed of more than ordinary intelligence in business matters, as is apparent from his correspondence, to be found in the record.
Having succeeded in the recovery, and obtained possession of the estate, he seems to have forgotten the obligations he was under to his associates. Their exertions and means had been mainly instrumental in raising him from poverty to affluence. They had advised him of his claim or title to the property, collected the necessary evidence to establish it, em-» ployed the counsel, and even furnished him (Collins) with the means of support, and to enable him to co-operate in the prosecution of the suit pending the litigation. The suit was severely contested, and was of some seven years’ duration.
Still stronger evidence that, after his success, he was ready to forget his obligations to those mainly contributing to it, is the fact that his solicitor has not even escaped his insinuations of bad faith in his connection with the suit, though it was disclaimed on the argument by his counsel; thus contradict ing all his opinions and feelings, strongly and repeatedly ex pressed pending the suit, and long after its termination and the settlement between the parties. The solicitor had no in terest in the property or in its distribution. His fee was not
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
dependent upon it. He was, therefore, wholly disinterested in the matter, and well situated to act as the friend of all parties in the settlement.
As we have already stated, before the commencement of the suit, he refused to be connected with it, unless the complain ant should be permitted to have a substantial interest in the estate, and repudiated the arrangement by which he was to receive only $10,000. After the recovery, and in the settle ment among the parties, he stood firmly by this original understanding, and insisted that he should have a double share. So far as appears from the evidence, it is entirely owing to the sense of justice and firmness of Judge Campbell (the solicitor) that the complainant is now in the possession and enjoyment of some $100,000 of his patrimonial inherit ance, instead of the $10,000 for which he himself had stipu lated.
The decree of the court below is affirmed.
Joseph Kimbro, Plaintiff in Error, v. Cuthbert Bullitt, Thomas D. Miller, and Lloyd D. Addison, Partners in Trade under the name and style of Bullitt, Miller, & Co,
Where bills of exchange were drawn by the principal acting partner of a firm in the name of the firm, all the partners were responsible.
Whenever there are written articles of agreement between the partners, their power and authority, inter se, are to be ascertained and regulated by e terms and conditions of the written stipulations. But, independently of any such stipulations, each partner possesses an equal and general power an authority, in behalf of the firm, to transact any business within the scope an objects of the partnership, and in the course of its trade and business. Where partnerships are formed for the mere purpose of farming, one partner does not possess the right, without the consent of his associates, to draw or accept bills of exchange, for the reason that such a practice is not usua, nor is it necessary for carrying on the farming business. .
In the present case, the jury found that this was a trading firm, and their ve c is conclusive.
The right of the acceptors, who had paid the money, to recover from the rawers, cannot be affected by the fact that one of the drawers had applied the money to an unlawful purpose.
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the middle district of Ten nessee.
The suit was brought upon three bills of exchange, which were accepted and paid by Bullitt, Miller, & Co., the drawees, for the accommodation of the drawers, Dement, Kimbro, & Sons, of which firm Joseph Kimbro was a partner. This action was brought by Bullitt, Miller, & Co., against Joseph Kimbro alone. The place of business of the firm of Dement, Kimbro, & Sons, was in Mississippi. Kimbro resided in Ten nessee, and therefore was sued there.
The defence set up in the court below rested on two grounds, viz:
1. That Dement, the principal acting partner of the firm of Dement, Kimbro, & Sons, had no power to draw the bills sued on.
2. That the bills were drawn for the purpose of raising money to be laid out in the purchase of slaves to be carried into Mississippi for sale; which slaves were so carried in and sold, contrary to laws of Mississippi.
On the trial, the judge charged the jury in the following words:
“The court charge the jury that Dement, the principal acting partner of the firm of Dement, Kimbro, & Sons, had power to draw the bills given in evidence, according to the proof adduced to them, if true; that if the bills were accepted and paid at maturity by the plaintiffs for said firm, the de fendant, Joseph Kimbro, was responsible, and it mattered nothing to the plaintiffs how the proceeds of the bills were disposed of, as this was a fact the plaintiffs could not know, and were not bound to prove.”
This ruling was excepted to, upon which the case was brought up to this court.
It was argued by Mr. Benjamin for the defendants in error, counsel appearing for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Benjamin said:
VOL. XXII. 17
Kimbro n. Bullitt et al.
1. The charge that Dement had power to draw the bills was correctly given, and is sustained by the proof.
The witness, Ready, deposed that he knew the firm of Dement, Kimbro, & Sons, in or near Lexington, Holmes county, Mississippi; that Joseph Kimbro was a member of the firm; that the firm commenced business on the 1st January, 1853, and continued till the death of Dement, one of the partners, on the 3d October, 1853; that the business of the firm was farming, steam saw-mill, and general trading, and that Dement was the principal business partner.
The witness, West, confirmed the depositions of Ready, and added, that “Dement was the principal financier of the firm of Dement, Kimbro, & Sons, did the principal trading, bor rowed money, and paid it back, &c., in the name of the firm.”
The partnership articles, as introduced by defendant, pro vide for a copartnership between Dement, the defendant, Joseph Kimbro, and the two sons of the latter, “for the purpose of farming, and also of running a steam saw-mill—the parties of each part to furnish one-third of the capital stock of the partnership, or the said party of the second part to furnish two-thirds of said capital stock, on behalf of himself and his two sons, parties of the third part; and the said par ties are to furbish negroes or hands, stock, provisions for man and beast, and all necessary utensils, in the same proportion, and are to pay and defray the expenses of said copartnership, and share its profits in the same proportion; * * * and the said parties of the third part are to superintend—one of them the said farm, and the other the said mill; and the said party of the first part is to render them such needful assistance as he can, without any extra charge therefor; and at the expira tion of said two years, after paying the debts of said copart nership, the profits are to be equally divided between sai parties of the first, second, and third parts, &c.”
Botters, a witness for defendant, testified that “said firm, so far as I know, has never been held out by any of the Kim bros as having any more extensive powers than those con ferred by said articles—(Joseph Kimbro, senior, the defen an, left here for Tennessee either a day or two before or a daj or
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
two after said articles were signed, and did not return until next fall;) nor did ever said Dement do so with the knowl edge of defendant, so far as I know.”
“Planting and mill partnerships in this country are not numerous, and it is no easy matter to say what powers are by usage exercised by the several partners, without the express consent of their copartners in such partnerships; but among the few partnerships of the kind that have come to my knowl edge, where money has been needed, and the several partners cannot be consulted, the managing one raises the money on his own credit, and charges the same to the partnership.”
On the foregoing testimony, it is plain that even inter se there was such a trading partnership as authorized the draw ing of bills by one partner in the name of the firm; although the farming business might not authorize the exercise of such a power, running a saw-mill for two years necessarily required the purchase of the requisite stock of wood, and its re-sale as boards, planks, scantling, &c. The business of running a steam saw-mill is neither more nor less than a manufacturing business, requiring the purchase of raw material and sale of the manufactured article; all such partnerships are trading partnerships, in which the power to draw bills of exchange in the partnership name is vested in each partner.
In mining partnerships, and farming partnerships, it has been held that such powers are not vested in the partners; and the reason is, that their business is simply to sell the pro duce of the real estate, to make profits out of the soil by gathering its fruits; but wherever the business imports in its nature the necessity of buying and selling, the partnership is in its essence a trading partnership.
The general doctrine is admirably summed up in the opin ion of Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of a manufacturing partnership. ®
Winship v. Bank of the U. 8., 5 Peters, 529. it was held that one partner could bind the firm by a promissory note, where the partnership was for carrying on o usiness of farming and coopering.
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
And although there be no partnership in real estate, the parties being tenants in common, yet if they are common ten ants of timber land, and do a lumber business, they are trading partners in the timber cut from the land.
Coles v. Coles, 15 Johns. R., 160.
Partners in a steam saw-mill are bound by the note of the partnership given by some of the partners for partnership purposes.
Johnston v. Dutton, 27 Alabama, 245.
And even where the partnership is limited, a note by one of the partners, in the name of the firm, is prima facie for the firm’s account.
Holmes v. Porter, 39 Maine, (4 Heath,) 157.
See, also, Story on Partnership, sec. 102.
And it makes no difference as to the power of a partner to bind the firm, that the trade was a particular and limited trade.
Chitty on Bills, 10th Am. ed., p. 44.
2. But, independently of the question as to the powers of the partners in controversies inter se, as regards the present ease, where the holders of the bills are third persons, ignorant of the special partnership agreement, the partnership is bound, because it was actually engaged in general trading, and De ment, who signed the bills, was the ostensible principal busi ness partner. It was in the light of a general trading partner ship that this firm exhibited itself to the public; it adopted by its articles a partnership style or firm of “Dement, Kimbro, & Sons,” without any indication of a restriction in its busi ness; the fact of its carrying on a general trading business was proven by Ready and West, and the charge was, that un der this proof, if true, Dement’s signature of the bills in the firm name bound the firm. It was quite immaterial whether or not there existed a secret contract limiting his powers.
Story on Partnership, secs. Ill, 126, 130.
Collyer on Partnership, sec. 386.
Gow on Partnership, pp. 52 to 55.
3 Kent’s Commentaries, pp. 40 to 45.
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
Nicholls v. Cheairs, 4 Sneed, (Tenn.,) 229.
And in the above case of Cargill v. Cosby, the test of the power to draw bills and notes in the name of the firm is stated to be, whether the business was to “buy and sell.” It is plain that the business of a steam saw-mill cannot be conducted without buying and selling.
3. Independently of the legal presumption that the bills drawn in the partnership name were for partnership account, Ready’s testimony shows that Dement, the deceased partner, was at his house at about the date of the bills, with certain negroes; “spoke of them as firm negroes, and employed Nes bit to take them in charge and sell them, and keep) McAfee from having anything to do with them, or the funds arising from the sale of them; his object being to save Joseph Kim bro from loss, and to meet the liability to Bullitt, Miller, & Co., and to Boltqn, Dickens, & Co., incurred in the purchase of these negroes by the firm of Dement, Kimbro, & Co., in connection with Morgan McAfee and William M. Joy ne.”
The partnership articles show that negroes were necessary for their business, and that the parties promised to furnish them for carrying it on.
4. The only remaining point to be considered is the legality of the second charge of the judge, “that if the bills were ac cepted and paid at maturity by the plaintiffs for said firm, the defendant, Joseph Kimbro, was responsible, and it mattered nothing to the plaintiffs how the proceeds of the bills were dis posed of, as this was a fact the plaintiffs could not know, and were not bound to prove.”
It may be proper to premise that it is perfectly immaterial in the present case whether this charge was well founded in law or not, because the plantiffs’ replication to the defendant’s, fourth plea joined issue on the fact whether or not the bills were drawn and accepted for the purpose of raising money to purchase slaves for importation into Mississippi for sale con trary to law; and there is not a particle of evidence to support the plea, the only evidence on the point being that of Ready,
Kimbro v. Bullitt et cd.
(above referred to,) which establishes the purchase in Vicks burg.
But in point of law the instruction was clearly right.
The idea that money loaned or advanced cannot be recover ed because the borrower applies it to an unlawful purpose was never countenanced by any jurist.
It is true that ex turpi causa non oritur actio. But what is the contract now before the court? A contract for advancing money. There is nothing illegal in that. If the money was to be applied to an unlawful purpose, the illegality was in the application, not in the borrowing. The contract for pur chasing the slaves might be in contravention of law; and if so, would not be enforced in a court of justice; but, on the ground now assumed by plaintiffs in error, it would be in cumbent on the court to refuse to maintain an action for the price of goods sold, if the purchaser could prove that the vendor intended to raise money by the sale, to be applied to an unlawful purpose. The proposition will not bear an in stant’s examination. The whole doctrine on the subject was scrutinized and the true principles governing it settled by this court in 1826, and the law is now too well established to re quire any further citation of authorities.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes before the court upon a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the middle district of Tennessee. It was an action of assumpsit brought by the present defendants against the plaintiffin error, to recover the amount of three several bills of exchange, particularly described in the declaration. As exhibited in the transcript, the several bills of exchange bear date at Lexington, in the State of Mis sissippi, on the second day of April, 1853, and purport, re spectively to have been drawn and addressed to the original plaintiffs by one Morgan McAfee, and by Dement, Kimbro, & Sons. They were each for the sum of two thousand dollars, and were severally made payable to the order of the first-named drawer, by whom also they were duly endorsed. Two of them
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
were likewise endorsed with the firm name of the other draw ers. At the time the bills of exchange were executed, the original defendant was a member of the firm of Dement, Kim bro, & Sons; and it was conceded, in the pleadings and at the trial, that the bills of exchange were drawn and negotiated by the senior partner of that firm. All the members of that part nership, except the defendant, were citizens of the State of Mississippi at the time the suit was commenced, and were re siding out of the jurisdiction of the court; and for that reason, as alleged in the declaration, the other partners were not sued in this action. In the court below, the plaintiffs claimed to recover against the defendant, upon the ground that the firm, of which he was a member, were the drawers of the bills of exchange, and that they, the plaintiffs, had paid the amount, or the principal portion of the same, out of their own funds, as acceptors, for the accommodation of the drawers. Without attempting to give any very definite analysis of the several pleas filed by the defendant, it will be sufficient for the purposes of this investigation to state that he set up two distinct grounds of defence in answer to the claim of the plaintiffs:
1. To the merits of the claim he pleaded the general issue, and denied specially that he ever drew the bills of exchange described in the declaration, or that he ever authorized any one to draw them in his name, or in the name of his firm.
2. For a further defence, he also alleged, in his fourth plea to the amended declaration, that the bills of exchange were drawn and endorsed by Dement, and accepted by the plain tiffs, for the purpose of raising money to be laid out in the purchase of slaves, to be imported from some other State or Territory of the United States, for sale, into the State of Mis sissippi, which slaves he alleged to be afterwards purchased with the money and imported into the State, and there sold, according to the original intent, contrary to the form of the statute of that State in such case made and provided. To that P ea the plaintiffs replied, traversing the allegations of fact, and en er^ng an issue, which was duly joined. Some of the pleas resu ted in issues of law, all of which were ruled in favor of the
Kimbro v. Bullitt et aL
plaintiffs, and the defendants acquiesced in the rulings of the court.
Evidence was then introduced on both sides upon the issues involving: the merits of the claim, and the court instructed the jury that Dement, the principal acting partner of the firm, had power to draw the bills given in evidence according to the proof adduced to them, if true; that if the bills were accepted and paid at maturity by the plaintiffs for the firm, the defend ant was responsible, and it mattered nothing to the plaintiffs how the proceeds of the bills were disposed of, as that was a fact the plaintiffs could not know, and were not bound to prove.
Under the charge of the court, the jury returned their ver dict in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount claimed, deduct ing certain admitted credits, according to the account exhib ited in the transcript, and the defendant excepted to the in structions of the court. It is obvious, on the first reading of the instruction, that it contains two distinct propositions, and no doubt is entertained that both were intended to be contro verted by the exceptions. In the first place, it affirms that the evidence adduced, if found to be true, was sufficient to show that the acting partner of the firm, of which the defendant was a member, had power to draw the bills of exchange described in the declaration. According to the proofs introduced by the plaintiffs, the firm commenced business at Lexing ton, in the State of Mississippi, in January, 1853, and the partnership was continued, without interruption, until the third day of October, of the same year, when it was terminated
by the death of the senior partner. They also proved, by two witnesses, that the firm was engaged during that period in farming, carrying on a steam saw-mill, and in general trading. Both of these witnesses testified that the senior partner,.who drew the bills of exchange in question, was the active business partner of the firm; and one of them added, that he did the principal trading, and borrowed money, and paid it back in the name of the firm.
Their partnership agreement was introduced by the defen ant. It bears date on the fifth day of January, 1853; and t e
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
partnership was formed, as recited in the instrument, to con tinue for the term of two years, for the purpose of farming and of carrying on a steam saw-mill. By its terms, one-third of the capital stock was to be furnished by the senior partner, one-third by the defendant, and the remainder by his two sons. Those five persons constituted the firm, under the name and style before mentioned. And it was further stipu lated that negroes or hands, stock, provisions, »and all neces sary utensils, should be furnished by the respective parties, according to their interest in the capital stock, and that they should defray the expenses of the copartnership and share its profits in the same proportions. They also designated'the farm to be carried on, and stipulated that the steam saw-mill should be located at such place as a majority of the partners in interest should determine.
After the partnership agreement was executed by the par ties, it was deposited with a third person; and it appeared from his deposition, taken by the defendant, that it remained in his possession from that period to the time of his examina tion. In the same deposition, the witness testified that the firm, so far as he knew, had never been held out by the de fendant as having any more extensive powers than those con ferred by the partnership agreement.
Some attempt was made by the defendant to prove that it was the usage, in partnerships of this description, when money was wanted to carry on the business, and the several partners could not be consulted, for the managing partner to raise it on his own credit, and charge it to the partnership; but the proof was not sufficient to show any such general usage.
Such was the substance of the evidence on which the charge of the court was based, and we think it was of a character to justify that part of the instruction under consideration. Our reasons for that conclusion will now be briefly stated.
That one of several partners composing a trading firm has power to draw bills of exchange, unless restricted from so c oing by the terms of the copartnership agreement, is a prop osition which, it is presumed, no one will dispute. Whenever cie aie written articles of agreement between the partners,
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
their power and authority, inter se, are to be ascertained and regulated by the terms and conditions of the written stipula tions. But, independently of any such stipulations, each part ner possesses an equal and general power and authority, in be half of the firm, to transact any business within the scope and objects of the partnership, and in the course of its trade and business.
Acts performed by one of the partners, in respect to the partnership concerns, and in the usual course of its business, differ in nothing, so far as their legal consequences are con cerned, from those transactions in which they all concur; and for the reason, that, by the commercial law, each partner of a trading firm is presumed to be intrusted by his copartners with a general authority in all the partnership affairs. Accord ingly, it was held, in Hawkin v. Bourne, (8 Mee. and Wels., 710,) that one partner, by virtue of the relation he bears to the firm, is constituted a general agent for another, as to all mat ters within the scope of the partnership dealings, and has con ferred upon him, by virtue of that relation, all authorities necessary for carrying on the partnership, and all such as are usually exercised in the business in which they are engaged. Any restriction which, by agreement among the partners, is attempted to be imposed upon the authority which one partner possesses, as a general agent for the other, is operative only between the partners themselves, and does not limit the authority as to third persons, who acquire rights by its exer cise, unless they know that such restrictions have been made.
Contracts made by one of several partners, in respect to matters not falling within the ordinary business, objects, and scope of the partnership, are not binding on the other part ners, and create no liability to third persons, who have knowl edge that the partner making the contract is acting in viola tion of his duties and obligations to the firm of which he is a member. But whenever credit is given to the firm, within the scope and objects of the partnership, and in the course of its trade and business, whether the partnership bo of a genera or limited nature, it will bind all the partners, notwithstan ing any secret stipulations or reservations between themselves,
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
which are unknown to those who give the credit. Harrison r. Jackson, 7 Term., 207; Pinkney v. Hall, 1 Salk., 126; Lane v. Williams, 2 Vern., 277; Swan v. Steele, 7 East., 210; Byles on Bills, p. 31; 3 Kent Com., p. 40; Story on Part., sec. 105; Collyer on Part., sec. 401.
Apply these principles to the facts disclosed in evidence, and it is clear that the power of the acting partner was ample to authorize him to draw the bills of exchange in the name of the firm, unless it can be shown that the firm of which he was a member was not one falling within the general rules of law defining and regulating the rights and obligations of partners engaged in the transactions and business of trade.
All partnerships, says Chancellor Kent, are more or less limited; and there is none that embraces, at the same time, every branch of business. Such limitations are generally to be found in the terms and stipulations of the articles of co partnership; but they may arise from general usage, or, to a certain extent, from the character of the business, and the nature of the objects to be accomplished.
Partnerships are sometimes formed by those who are inter ested in real estate, for the mere purpose of farming; and in respect to that class of business arrangements, it has been held, that one of the several partners does not possess, by virtue of that relation merely, the right, without the consent of his associates, to draw or accept bills of exchange, for the reason that such a practice is not usual, nor is it necessary for carrying on the farming business. Collyer on Part., (ed. 1848,) sec. 402; Greensdale v. Dower, 7 Barn, and Cres., 635; Dickerson v. Valpy, 10 Barn, and Cres., p. 138, per Little dale, J.
In the case last named, it was held that a certain mining company fell within the same exception; and, on the facts disclosed, no doubt the question was well decided. But the mere circumstance that the business consists in making profits out of real estate, as in working a stone quarry, will not necessarily take the case out of the operation of the general Thicknesse v. Brownilow, 2 Cromp. and Jerv., 425.
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
Farming partnerships, when strictly confined to that pur pose, are held to be within the exceptions to the general rule upon the ground, as assumed by the counsel for the plaintiffs, that their principal object is to make profits out of the soil, by gathering its fruits, and that the partners are in no proper sense engaged in trade; but wherever the business, according to the usual mode of conducting it, imports, in its nature, the necessity of buying and selling, the firm is then properly re garded as a trading partnership, and is invested with all the powers and subject to all the obligations incident to that re lation. McGregor v.' Cleaveland, 5 Wen., 475; Winship v. Bank of United States, 5 Pet., 529; Baker v. Wheeler, 8 Wen., 505; Coles y. Coles, 15 Johns. R., 160; Johnston v. Dutton, 27 Alabama Rep., 245; Hedley v. Bainbridge, 3 Q. B., 321.
Another answer, however, may be given to the objection to this part of the instruction, which is entirely conclusive against it. According to the evidence, farming was not the sole business of the partners composing this firm. They were also engaged in running a steam saw-mill, for manufacturing purposes; and common observation will warrant the remark, that those who engage in that business always want capital to carry it on, and frequently find it necessary to ask for credit. Like those engaged in other branches of manufac tures, they buy and sell, and have occasion to remit money and collect it from distant places.
Two witnesses also testified at the trial that this firm was engaged in general trading; and there was no evidence in troduced by the defendant to contradict their statements. Whether the witnesses were entitled to credit, and whether, in point of fact, this firm was a trading firm; were questions which were properly submitted to the jury. By the verdict, both questions were found in favor of the plaintiff, and the finding of the jury is conclusive.
2. One other point only remains to be considered, which arises out of the second proposition contained in the charge of the court- It was to the effect, that if the bills of exchange were accepted and paid at maturity by the plaintiffs for the
Kimbro v. Bullitt et al.
firm, then the defendant was responsible, and it mattered nothing to the plaintiffs how the proceeds were disposed of.
No evidence was offered by the defendant in support of the issue raised by his fourth plea to the amended declaration, and there was none in the case tending to show that the pro ceeds had been applied to any illegal object, or in any manner misappropriated, Such being the fact, it is obvious that this part of the instruction became entirely immaterial; which, of itself, is a sufficient answer to the objection.
But another answer may be given to the objection, which perhaps will be more satisfactory; and that is, we think it was clearly correct. It will be observed, that this part of the charge was based upon the theory that the bills of exchange were drawn by the firm of which the defendant was a member; and properly so, for the reason that the question of authority to draw them had been disposed of in the preceding part of the charge.
In considering this objection, then, it must be assumed that the bills were drawn by the firm, and that they were duly accepted and paid by the plaintiffs at maturity, on account of the firm; and if so, it is not perceived how their right to recover the amount can be affected by the fact that one of the drawers applied the money to an unlawful purpose. Where a contract grows immediately out of and is connected with the illegal or immoral act of the party claiming the benefit of it, courts of justice will not lend their aid to enforce it. Arm strong v. Toler, 11 Wheat., 258.
But the illegal act, if any, in this case, was performed by one of the drawers of the bills, and not by the acceptors. Sup pose one of a firm should borrow money of a third person, in t e name of the partnership, and apply it to an unlawful pur pose, it surely could not defeat the right of the lender to recover on the contract.
Regarding this point as too clear to be the subject of dis pute, we forbear to pursue the discussion.
After a careful examination of the exceptions, we think they cannot be sustained. The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed, with costs.
Clark et al. v. Bowen et al.
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