Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
Full caption
GITLOW v. PEOPLE OF NEW YORK.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
June 8, 1925
GITLOW v. PEOPLE OF NEW YORK.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
No. 19. Argued April 12, 1923; reargued November 23, 1923.—Decided June 8, 1925.
1. Assumed, for the purposes of the case, that freedom of speech and of the press are among the personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States. P. 666.
2. Freedom of speech and of the press, as secured by the Constitution, is not an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose or an immunity for every possible use of language. P. 666.
3. That a State, in the exercise of its police power, may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welware, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime or disturb the public peace, is not open to question. P. 667.
4. For yet more imperative reasons, a State may punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. P. 667.
5. A statute punishing utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, imports a legislative determination that such utterances are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized under the police power; and this determination must be given great weight, and every presumption be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute. P. 668.
6. Such utterances present sufficient danger to the public peace and security of the State to bring their punishment clearly within the range of legislative discretion, even if the effect of a given utterance can not accurately be foreseen. P. 669.
7. A State can not reasonably be required to defer taking measures against these revolutionary utterances until they lead to actual disturbances of the peace or imminent danger of the State’s destruction. P. 669.
8. The New York statute punishing those who advocate, advise or teach the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized government by force, violence, or any unlawful means, or who print, publish, or knowingly circulate any book, p. 653652 Counsel for Parties.
paper, etc., advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that organized government should be so overthrown, does not penalize the utterance or publication of abstract doctrine or academic discussion having no quality of incitement to any concrete action, but denounces the advocacy of action for accomplishing the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means, and is constitutional as applied to a printed “ Manifesto ” advocating and urging mass action which shall progressively foment industrial disturbances and, through political mass strikes and revolutionary mass action overthrow and destroy organized parliamentary government; even though the advocacy was in general terms and not addressed to particular immediate acts or to particular persons. Pp. 654, 672. 9. The statute being constitutional, it may constitutionally be applied to every utterance—not too trivial to be beneath the notice of the law—which is of such a character and used with such intent and purpose as to bring it within the prohibition of the statute; and the question whether the specific utterance in question was likely to bring about the substantive evil aimed at by the statute, is not open to consideration. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, explained. P. 670.
195 App. Div. 773; 234 N. Y., 132, 539, affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of New York, affirmed by the Appellate Division thereof and by the Court of Appeals, sentencing the plaintiff in error for the crime of criminal anarchy, (New York Laws, 1909, c. 88), of which he had been convicted by a jury.
Messrs. Walter Nelles and Walter H. Pollak, with whom Messrs. Albert De Silver and Charles S. Ascher were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs W. J. Weatherbee, Deputy Attorney General of New York, and John Caldwell Myers, Assistant District Attorney of New York County, with whom Messrs. Carl Sherman, Attorney General of New York, Claude T. Dawes, Deputy Attorney General of New York, Joab H. Banton, District Attorney of New York County, and John F. O’Neil, Assistant District Attorney of New York County, were on the briefs, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Sanford delivered the opinion of the Court.
Benjamin Gitlow was indicted in the Supreme Court of New York, with three others, for the statutory crime of criminal anarchy. New York Penal Laws, §§ 160, 161.1 He was separately tried, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division and by the Court of Appeals. 195 App. Div. 773; 234 N. Y. 132 and 539. The case is here on writ of error to the Supreme Court, to which the record was remitted. 260 U. S. 703.
The contention here is that the statute, by its terms and as applied in this case, is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its material provisions are:
“ § 160. Criminal anarchy defined. Criminal anarchy is the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means. The advocacy of such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a felony.
“ § 161. Advocacy oj criminal anarchy. Any person who:
“ 1. By word of mouth or writing advocates, advises or teaches the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized government by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means; or,
“ 2. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells, distributes or publicly displays any book, paper, document, or written or printed matter in any p. 655form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful means . . . ,
1
Laws of 1909, ch. 88; Consol. Laws, 1909, ch. 40. This statute was originally enacted in 1902. Laws of 1902, ch. 371.
“Is guilty of a felony and punishable” by imprisonment or fine, or both.
The indictment was in two counts. The first charged that the defendant had advocated, advised and taught the duty, necessity and propriety of overthrowing and overturning organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, by certain writings therein set forth entitled “The Left Wing Manifesto”; the second that he had printed, published and knowingly circulated and distributed a certain paper called “ The Revolutionary Age,” containing the writings set forth in the first count advocating, advising and teaching the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force, violence and unlawful means.
The following facts were established on the trial by undisputed evidence and admissions: The defendant is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party, a dissenting branch or faction of that party formed in opposition to its dominant policy of “ moderate Socialism.” Membership in both is open to aliens as. well as citizens. The Left Wing Section was organized nationally at a conference in New York City in June, 1919, attended by ninety delegates from twenty different States. The conference elected a National Council, of which the defendant was a member, and left to it the adoption of a “Manifesto.” This was published in The Revolutionary Age, the official organ of the Left Wing. The defendant was on the board of managers of the paper and was its business manager. He arranged for the printing of the paper and took to the printer the manuscript of the first issue which contained the Left Wing Manifesto, and also a Communist Program and a Program of the Left Wing that had been adopted by the conference. Sixteen thousand p. 656copies were printed, which were delivered at the premises in New York City used as the office of the Revolutionary Age and the headquarters of the Left Wing, and occupied by the defendant and other officials. These copies were paid for by the defendant, as business manager of the paper. Employees at this office wrapped and mailed out copies of the paper under the defendant’s direction; and copies were sold from this office. It was admitted that the defendant signed a card subscribing to the Manifesto and Program of the Left Wing, which all applicants were required to sign before being admitted to membership; that he went to different parts of the State to speak to branches of the Socialist Party about the principles of the Left Wing and advocated their adoption; and that he was responsible for the Manifesto as it appeared, that “he knew of the publication, in a general way and he knew of its publication afterwards, and is responsible for its circulation.”
There was no evidence of any effect resulting from the publication and circulation of the Manifesto.
No witnesses were offered in behalf of the defendant. Extracts from the Manifesto are set forth in the margin.2 Coupled with a review of the rise of Socialism, it p. 657condemned the dominant “ moderate Socialism ” for its recognition of the necessity of the democratic parliamentary state; repudiated its policy of introducing Socialism by legislative measures; and advocated, in plain and unequivocal language, the necessity of accomplishing the “ Communist Revolution ” by a militant and “ revolutionary Socialism ”, based on “ the class struggle ” and mo-
2
Italics are given as in the original, but the paragraphing is omitted. ‘ ‘ The Left Wing Manifesto ’ ’ “ Issued on Authority of the Conference by the National Council of the Left Wing. “The world is in crisis. Capitalism, the prevailing system of society, is in process of disintegration and collapse. . . . Humanity can be saved from its last excesses only by the Communist Revolution. There can now be only the Socialism which is one in temper and purpose with the proletarian revolutionary struggle. . . . The class struggle is the heart of Socialism. Without strict conformity to the class struggle, in its revolutionary implications, Socialism becomes either sheer Utopianism, or a method of reaction. . . . The dominant Socialism united with the capitalist are developing which verge on revolutionary action, and in which the suggestion of proletarian dictatorship is apparent, the striker-workers trying to usurp functions of municipal government, as in Seattle and Winnipeg. The mass struggle of the proletariat is coming into being. . . . These strikes will constitute the determining feature of proletarian action in the days to come. Revolutionary Socialism must use these mass industrial revolts to broaden the strike, to make it general and militant; use the strike for political objectives, and, finally, develop the mass political strike against Capitalism and the state. Revolutionary Socialism must base itself on the mass struggles 5'5627°—25----- 42 of the proletariat, engage directly in these struggles while emphasizing the revolutionary purposes of Socialism and the proletarian movement. The mass strikes of the American proletariat provide the material basis out of which to develop the concepts and action of revolutionary Socialism. . . . Our task ... is to articulate and organize the mass of the unorganized industrial proletariat, which constitutes the basis for a militant Socialism. The struggle for the revolutionary industrial unionism of the proletariat becomes an indispensable phase of revolutionary Socialism, on the basis of which to broaden and deepen the action of the militant proletariat, developing reserves for the ultimate conquest of power. . . . Revolutionary Socialism adheres to the class struggle because through the class struggle alone—the mass struggle—can the industrial proletariat secure immediate concessions and finally conquer power by organizing the industrial government of the working class. The class struggle is a political struggle ... in the sense that its objective is political—the overthrow of the political organization upon which capitalistic exploitation depends, and the introduction of a new social system. The direct objective is the conquest by the proletariat of the power of the state. Revolutionary Socialism does not propose to ‘ capture ’ the bourgeois parliamentary state, but to conquer and destroy it. Revolutionary Socialism, accordingly, repudiates the policy of introducing Socialism by means of legislative measures on the basis of the bourgeois state. ... It proposes to conquer by means of political action ... in the revolutionary (Footnote 2 continued on following pages.)
governments to prevent a revolution. The Russian Revolution was the first act of the proletariat against the war and Imperialism. . . . [The] proletariat, urging on the poorer peasantry, conquered power. It accomplished a proletarian revolution by means of the Bolshevik policy of ‘ all power to the Soviets,’—organizing the new transitional state of proletarian dictatorship. . . . Moderate Socialism affirms that the bourgeois, democratic parliamentary state is the necessary basis for the introduction of Socialism. . . . Revolutionary Socialism, on the contrary, insists that the democratic parliamentary state can never be the basis for the introduction of Socialism; that it is necessary to destroy the parliamentary state, and construct a new state of the organized producers, which will deprive the bourgeoisie of political power, and function as a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . Revolutionary Socialism alone is capable of mobilizing the proletariat for Socialism, for the conquest of the power of the state, by means of revolutionary mass action and proletarian dictatorship. . . . Imperialism is dominant in the United States, which is now a world power. . . . The war has aggrandized American Capitalism, instead of weakening it as in Europe. . . . These conditions modify our immediate task, but do not alter its general character; this is not the moment of revolution, but it is the moment of revolutionary struggle. . . . Strikes
Opinion of the Court. 268 U. 8.
bilizing the “ power of the proletariat in action,” through mass industrial revolts developing into mass political strikes and “ revolutionary mass action ”, for the purpose of conquering and destroying the parliamentary state and establishing in its place, through a “ revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat ”, the system of Communist Socialism. The then recent strikes in Seattle and Winnipeg3 were cited as instances of a development already verging on revolutionary action and suggestive of p. 659proletarian. dictatorship, in which the strike-workers were “ trying to usurp the functions of municipal government ”; and revolutionary Socialism, it was urged, must use these mass industrial revolts to broaden the strike, make it general and militant, and develop it into mass political strikes and revolutionary mass action for the annihilation of the parliamentary state.
3
There was testimony at the trial that “ there was an extended strike at Winnipeg commencing May 15, 1919, during which the production and supply of necessities, transportation, postal and telegraphic communication and fire and sanitary protection were suspended or seriously curtailed,”
At the outset of the trial the defendant’s counsel objected to the introduction of any evidence under the
Marxian sense, which does not simply mean parliamentarism, but the class action of the proletariat in any form having as its objective the conquest of the power of the state. . . . Parliamentary action which emphasizes the implacable character of the class struggle is an indispensable means of agitation. . . . But parliamentarism cannot conquer the power of the state for the proletariat. . . . It is accomplished, not by the legislative representatives of the proletariat, but by the mass power of the proletariat in action. The supreme power of the proletariat inheres in the political mass strike, in using the industrial mass power of the proletariat for political objectives. Revolutionary Socialism, accordingly, recognizes that the supreme form of proletarian political action is the political mass strike.. . . The power of the proletariat lies fundamentally in its control of the industrial process. The mobilization of this control in action against the bourgeois state and Capitalism means the end of Capitalism, the initial form of the revolutionary mass action that will conquer the power of the state. . . . The revolution starts with strikes of protest, developing into mass political strikes and then into revolutionary mass action for the conquest of the power of the state. Mass action becomes political in purpose while extra-parliamentary in form; it is equally a process of revolution and the revolution itself in operation. The final objective of mass action is the conquest of the power of the state, the annihilation of the bourgeois parliamentary state and the introduction of the transition proletarian state, functioning as a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . The bourgeois parliamentary state is the organ of the bourgeoisie for the coercion of the proletariat. The revolutionary proletariat must, accordingly, destroy this state. . . . It is therefore necessary that the proletariat organize its own state for the coercion and suppression of the bourgeoisie. . .. Proletarian dictatorship is a recognition of the necessity for a revolutionary state to coerce and suppress the
Opinion of the Court. 268 U. 8.
indictment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the Manifesto “ is not in contravention of the statute,” and that “ the statute is in contravention of ” the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This objection was denied. They also moved, at the close of the evidence, to dismiss the indictment and direct an acquittal 11 on the grounds stated in the first objection to evidence ”,
bourgeoisie; it is equally a recognition of the fact that, in the Communist reconstruction of society, the proletariat as a class alone counts. . . . The old machinery of the state cannot be used by the revolutionary proletariat. It must be destroyed. The proletariat creates a new state, based directly upon the industrially organized producers, upon the industrial unions or Soviets, or a combination of both. It is this state alone, functioning as a dictatorship of the proletariat, that can realize Socialism. . . . While the dictatorship of the proletariat performs its negative task of crushing the old order, it performs the positive task of constructing the new. Together with the government of the proletarian dictatorship, there is developed a new ‘ government,’ which is no longer government in the old sense, since it concerns itself with the management of production and not with the government of persons. Out of workers’ control of industry, introduced by the proletarian dictatorship, there develops the complete structure of Communist Socialism;—industrial self-government of the communistically organized producers. When this structure is completed, which implies the complete expropriation of the bourgeoisie economically and politically, the dictatorship of the proletariat ends, in its place coming the full and free social and individual autonomy of the Communist order. . . . It is not a problem of immediate revolution. It is a problem of the immediate revolutionary struggle. The revolutionary epoch of the final struggle against Capitalism may last for years and tens of years; but the Communist International offers a policy and program immediate and ultimate in scope, that provides for the immediate class struggle against Capitalism, in its revolutionary implications, and for the final act of the conquest of power. The old order is in decay. Civilization is in collapse. The proletarian revolution and the Communist reconstruction of society—the struggle for these—is now indispensable. This is the message of the Communist International to the workers of the world. The Communist International calls the proletariat of the world to the final struggle! ” p. 661and again on the grounds that “ the indictment does not charge an offense ” and the evidence “ does not show an offense.” These motions were also denied.
The court, among other things, charged the jury, in substance, that they must determine what was the intent, purpose and fair meaning of the Manifesto; that its words must be taken in their ordinary meaning, as they would be understood by people whom it might reach; that a mere statement or analysis of social and economic facts and historical incidents, in the nature of an essay, accompanied by prophecy as to the future course of events, but with no teaching, advice or advocacy of action, would not constitute the advocacy, advice or teaching of a doctrine for the overthrow of government within the meaning of the statute; that a mere statement that unlawful acts might accomplish such a purpose would be insufficient, unless there was a teaching, advising and advocacy of employing such unlawful acts for the purpose of overthrowing government; and that if the jury had a reasonable doubt that the Manifesto did teach, advocate or advise the duty, necessity or propriety of using unlawful means for the overthrowing of organized government, the defendant was entitled to an acquittal.
The defendant’s counsel submitted two requests to charge which embodied in substance the statement that to constitute criminal anarchy within the meaning of the statute it was necessary that the language used or published should advocate, teach or advise the duty, necessity or propriety of doing “some definite or immediate act or acts ” of force, violence or unlawfulness directed toward the overthrowing of organized government. These were denied further than had been charged. Two other requests to charge embodied in substance the statement that to constitute guilt the language used or published must be “reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite certain persons ” to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness, p. 662with the object of overthrowing organized government. These were also denied.
The Appellate Division, after setting forth extracts from the Manifesto and referring to the Left Wing and Communist Programs published in the same issue of the Revolutionary Age, said:4 “It is perfectly plain that the plan and purpose advocated . . . contemplate the overthrow and destruction of the governments of the United States and of all the States, not by the free action of the majority of the people through the ballot box in electing representatives to authorize a change of government by amending or changing the Constitution, . . . but by immediately organizing the industrial proletariat into militant Socialist unions and at the earliest opportunity through mass strike and force and violence,, if necessary, compelling the government to cease to function, and then through a proletarian dictatorship, taking charge of and appropriating all property and administering it and governing through such dictatorship until such time as the proletariat is permitted to administer and govern it. . . . The articles in question are not a discussion of ideas and theories. They advocate a doctrine deliberately determined upon and planned for militantly disseminating a propaganda advocating that it is the duty and necessity of the proletariat engaged in industrial pursuits to organize to such an extent that, by massed strike, the wheels of government may ultimately be stopped and the government overthrown . . .”
The Court of Appeals held that the Manifesto “ advocated the overthrow of this government by violence, or by unlawful means.”5 In one of the opinions p. 663representing the views of a majority of the court,® it was said: “It will be seen . . . that this defendant through the manifesto . . . advocated the destruction of the state and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . To advocate . . . the commission of this conspiracy or action by mass strike whereby government is crippled, the administration of justice paralyzed, and the health, morals and welfare of a community endangered, and this for the purpose of bringing about a revolution in the state, is to advocate the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means.” In the other7 it was said: “As we read this manifesto . . . we feel entirely clear that the jury were justified in rejecting the view that it was a mere academic and harmless discussion of the advantages of communism and advanced socialism” and “in regarding it as a justification and advocacy of action by one class which would destroy the rights of all other classes and overthrow the state itself by use of revolutionary mass strikes. It is true that there is no advocacy in specific terms of the use of . . . force or violence. There was no need to be. Some things are so commonly incident to others that they do not need to be mentioned when the underlying purpose is described.”
4
195 App. Div. 773, 782, 790. 6 Five judges, constituting the majority of the court, agreed in this view. 234 N. Y. 132, 138. And the two judges, constituting the minority—who dissented solely on a question as to the construction of the statute which is not here involved—said in reference to the Manifesto: “ Revolution for the purpose of overthrowing the present form and the established political system of the United States government by direct means rather than by constitutional means is therein clearly advocated and defended . . .” p. 154. 6 Pages 141, 142. 7 Pages 149, 150. 8 Exceptions to all of these rulings had been duly taken.
And both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals held the statute constitutional.
The specification of the errors relied on relates solely to the specific rulings of the trial court in the matters hereinbefore set out.8 The correctness of the verdict is not p. 664questioned, as the case was submitted to the jury. The sole contention here is, essentially, that as there was no evidence of any concrete result flowing from the publication of the Manifesto or of circumstances showing the likelihood of such result, the statute as construed and applied by the trial court penalizes the mere utterance, as such, of “ doctrine ” having no quality of incitement, without regard either to the circumstances of its utterance or to the likelihood of unlawful sequences; and that, as the exercise of the right of free expression with relation to government is only punishable “ in circumstances involving likelihood of substantive evil,” the statute contravenes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument in support of this contention rests primarily upon the following propositions: 1st, That the “ liberty ” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the liberty of speech and of the press; and 2nd, That while liberty of expression “ is not absolute,” it may be restrained “ only in circumstances where its exercise bears a causal relation with some substantive evil, consummated, attempted or likely,” and as the statute “ takes no account of circumstances,” it unduly restrains this liberty and is therefore unconstitutional.
The precise question presented, and the only question which we can consider under this writ of error, then is, whether the statute, as construed and applied in this case by the state courts, deprived the defendant of his liberty of expression in violation, of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The statute does not penalize the utterance or publication of abstract “ doctrine ” or academic discussion having no quality of incitement to any concrete action. It is not aimed against mere historical or philosophical essays. It does not restrain the advocacy of changes in the form of government by constitutional and lawful means. What it prohibits is language advocating, advising or teaching
‘the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. These words imply urging to action. Advocacy is defined in the Century Dictionary as: “ 1. The act of pleading for, supporting, or recommending; active espousal.” It is not the abstract “ doctrine ” of overthrowing organized government by unlawful means which is denounced by the statute, but the advocacy of action for the accomplishment of that purpose. It was so construed and applied by the trial judge, who specifically charged the jury that: “A mere grouping of historical events and a prophetic deduction from them would neither constitute advocacy, advice or teaching of a doctrine for the overthrow of government by force, violence or unlawful means. [And] if it were a mere essay on the subject, as suggested by counsel, based upon deductions from alleged historical events, with no teaching, advice or advocacy of action, it would not constitute a violation of the statute. . . .”
The Manifesto, plainly, is neither the statement of abstract doctrine nor, as suggested by counsel, mere prediction that industrial disturbances and revolutionary mass strikes will result spontaneously in an inevitable process of evolution in the economic system. It advocates and urges in fervent language mass action which shall progressively foment industrial disturbances and through political mass strikes and revolutionary mass action overthrow and destroy organized parliamentary government. It concludes with a call to action in these words: “ The proletariat revolution and the Communist reconstruction of society—the struggle for these—is now indispensable. . . . The Communist International calls the proletariat of the world to the final struggle!” This is not the expression of philosophical abstraction, the mere prediction of future events; it is the language of direct incitement.
The means advocated for bringing about the destruction of organized parliamentary government, namely, mass p. 666industrial revolts usurping the functions of municipal government, political mass strikes directed against the parliamentary state, and revolutionary mass action for its final destruction, necessarily imply the use of force and violence, and in their essential nature are inherently unlawful in a constitutional government of law and order. That the jury were warranted in finding that the Manifesto advocated not merely the abstract doctrine of overthrowing organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, but action to that end, is clear.
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and “ liberties ” protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States. We do not regard the incidental statement in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 543, that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no restrictions on the States concerning freedom of speech, as determinative of this question.9 It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the
freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 2 Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., § 1580, p. 634; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462; Fox v. Washington, 236
U. S. 273, 276; Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 206; Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 213; Schaejer v. ^United States, 251 U. S. 466, 474; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 332; Warren v. United States, (C. C. A.) 183 Fed. 718, 721. Reasonably limited, it was said by Story in the passage cited, this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might become the scourge of the republic.
That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question. Robertson v. Baldwin, supra, p. 281; Patterson v. Colorado, supra, p. 462; Fox v. Washington, supra, p. 277; Gilbert v. Minnesota, supra, p. 339; People v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 431; State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 275; State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 359; State v. Boyd, 86 N. J. L. 75, 79; State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 27. Thus it was held by this Court in the Fox Case, that a State may punish publications advocating and encouraging a breach of its criminal laws; and, in the Gilbert Case, that a State may punish utterances teaching or advocating that its citizens should not assist the United States in prosecuting or carrying on war with its public enemies.
And, for yet more imperative reasons, a State may punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own existence as a constitutional State. Freedom of speech and press, said Story (supra) does not protect disturbances to the public peace or the attempt to subvert the government. It does not protect publications or teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the government or to impede or hinder it in the performance of its governmental duties. State v. p. 668Holm, supra, p. 275. It does not protect publications prompting the overthrow of government by force; the punishment of those who publish articles which tend to destroy organized society being essential to the security of freedom and the stability of the State. People v. Most,
supra, pp. 431, 432. And a State may penalize utterances
which openly advocate the overthrow of the representa-
tive and constitutional form of government of the United
States and the several States, by violence or other unlaw-
ful means. People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 34. See also,
Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 375. In short this freedom does
not deprive a State of the primary and essential right of
self preservation; which, so long as human governments
endure, they cannot be denied. Turner v. Williams, 194
U. S. 279, 294. In Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 247 U. S. 402, 419, it was said: “The safeguarding
and fructification of free and constitutional institutions
is the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom
of the press rests, and that freedom, therefore, does not
and cannot be held to include the right virtually to
destroy such institutions.”
By enacting the present statute the State has determined, through its legislative body, that utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power. That determination must be given great weight. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623,
661. And the case is to be considered “in the light of the principle that the State is primarily the judge of regulations required in the interest of public safety and welfare; ” and that its police “ statutes may only be declared unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or p. 669Unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the State in the public interest.” Great Northern Ry. v. Clara City, 246 U. S. 434, 439. That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means, present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment within the range of legislative discretion, is clear. Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The State cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler’s scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People v. Lloyd, supra, p. 35, it was aptly said: 11 Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the State were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when there p. 670would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law.”
We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State unwarrantably infringing the freedom of speech or press; and we must and do sustain its constitutionality.
This being so it may be applied to every utterance—not too trivial to be beneath the notice of the law—which is of such a character and used with such intent and purpose as to bring it within the prohibition of the statute. This principle is illustrated in Fox n. Washington, supra, p. 277; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 624; Schaefer n. United States, supra, pp. 479, 480; Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239, 250, 251;10 and Gilbert v. Minnesota, supra, p. 333. In other words, when the legislative body has determined generally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration. It is sufficient that the statute itself be constitutional and that the use of the language comes within its prohibition.
It is clear that the question in such cases is entirely different from that involved in those cases where the statute merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive evil, without any reference to language itself, and it is sought to apply its provisions to language
10 This reference is to so much of the decision as relates to the conviction under the third count. In considering the effect of the decisions under the Espionage Act of 1917 and the amendment of 1918, the distinction must be kept in mind between indictments under those provisions which specifically punish certain utterances, and those which merely punish specified acts in general terms, without specific reference to the use of language.
used by the defendant for the purpose of bringing about the prohibited results. There; if it be contended that the statute cannot be applied to the language used by the defendant because of its protection by the freedom of speech or press, it must necessarily be found, as an original question, without any previous determination by the legislative body, whether the specific language used involved such likelihood of bringing about the substantive evil as to deprive it of the constitutional protection. In such cases it has been held that the general provisions of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance of the defendant if its natural tendency and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might prevent. Schenck v. United States, supra, p. 51; Debs n. United States, supra, pp. 215, 216. And the general statement in the Schenck Case (p. 52) that the “ question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils,”—upon which great reliance is placed in the defendant’s argument—was manifestly intended, as shown by the context, to apply only in cases of this class, and has no application to those like the present, where the legislative body itself has previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character.
The defendant’s brief does not separately discuss any of the rulings of the trial court. It is only necessary to say that, applying the general rules already stated, we find that none of them involved any invasion of the constitutional rights of the defendant. It was not necessary, within the meaning of the statute, that the defendant should have advocated “ some definite or immediate act or acts ” of force, violence or unlawfulness. It was sufficient if such acts were advocated in general terms; and it was not essential that their immediate execution should
Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting. 268 U. S.
have been advocated. Nor was it necessary that the language should have been “ reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite certain persons ” to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. The advocacy need not be addressed to specific persons. Thus, the publication and circulation of a newspaper article may be an encouragement or endeavor to persuade to murder, although not addressed to any person in particular. Queen n. Most, L. R., 7 Q. B. D. 244.
We need not enter upon a consideration of the English common law rule of seditious libel or the Federal Sedition Act of 1798, to which reference is made in the defendant’s brief. These are so unlike the present statute, that we think the decisions under them cast no helpful light upon the questions here.
And finding, for the reasons stated, that the statute is not in itself unconstitutional, and that it has not been applied in the present case in derogation of any constitutional right, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting.
Mr. Justice Brandeis and I are of opinion that this judgment should be reversed. The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word 1 liberty ’ as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States. If I am right, then I think that the criterion sanctioned by the full Court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, applies. 11 The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substan- p. 673652 Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting.
tive evils that [the State] has a right to prevent.” It is true that in my opinion this criterion was departed from in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, but the convictions that I expressed in that case are too deep for it to be possible for me as yet to believe that it and Schaefer v. United States, 251U. S. 466, have settled the law. If what I think the correct test is applied, it is manifest that there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on the part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant’s views. It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sensei is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.
If the publication of this document had been laid as an attempt to induce an uprising against government at once and not at some indefinite time in the future it would have presented a different question. The object would have been one with which the law might deal, subject to the doubt whether there was any danger that the publication could produce any result, or in other words, whether it was not futile and too remote from possible consequences. But the indictment alleges the publication and nothing more.
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268 U. S. Decisions Per Curiam, Etc.
DECISIONS PER CURIAM, FROM APRIL 14, 1925, TO AND INCLUDING JUNE 8, 1925, OTHER THAN DECISIONS ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI.
No. 328. Peter Sain et al. v. Cypress Creek Drain - age District. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. Submitted April 13, 1925. Decided April 20, 1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389, 393; Morrison n. Watson, 154 U. S. Ill, 115; Harding n. Illinois, 196 U. S. 78, 86; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v.- McDonald, 214 U. S. 191, 192; Cleveland & Pittsburgh R. R. Co. v. Cleveland, 235 U. S. 50, 53. Mr. Lamar Williamson for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Charles T. Coleman for defendant in error.
No. 13, Original. State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, United States, Intervener. In Equity. Orders entered April 27, 1925.
The motion of the State of Texas for leave to file a reply to the replications of the State of Oklahoma and the United States to the amended counter-claim of the State of Texas relating to the interstate boundary along the 100th meridian is granted, and the reply tendered with such motion is ordered filed.
The joint motion of the State of Oklahoma, the State of Texas and the United States respecting the making up and printing of the record on such counter-claim and the submission and hearing of the issues pertaining thereto is granted; the Clerk is directed to make up and print the record as requested in the motion; and the hearing on the counter-claim is fixed for Monday, November 2, next, after the cases heretofore assigned for that day.
Decisions Per Curiam, Etc. 268 U. S.
No. 154. Crew Levick Company v. The City of Philadelphia, to the use of J. Joseph McHugh. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania. Argued April 20, 1925. Decided April 27, 1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction upon the authority of § 257 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 5-6. Mr. David Wallerstein with whom Mr. W. B. Saul was on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Glenn C. Mead for defendant in error.
No. 220. Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Fagan Bourland et al. It is ordered by this court that the opinion heretofore filed be amended by inserting after the words “ franchise ” in the last sentence of the opinion the words t( or indeterminate permit.” Petition for rehearing denied. [See 267 U. S. 330.]
No. 404. Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company v. Mrs. Alice S. Dupuis. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted April 27,1925. Decided May 4,1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 5-6. Mr. W. M. Barrow for defendant in error in support of the motion. Mr. E. H. Randolph for plaintiff in error in opposition to the motion.
No. 13, Original. State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, United States, Intervener. In Equity. Orders entered May 11, 1925. Announced by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, See ante p. 252.
268 U.S. Decisions Per Curiam, Etc.
On consideration of the report made by Joseph M. Hill, Esquire, as special master, under paragraph 8 of the order of January 19, last, and of the exceptions of the Durfee Mineral Company to such report, it is ordered:
1. The exceptions are overruled and the report is confirmed;
2. The claim of T. P. Roberts and A. H. Britain to the royalty interest in the impounded proceeds of the oil and gas taken from receiver’s wells 152, 153 and 154 is sustained and the claim of the Durfee Mineral Company to such royalty interest is denied;
3. The receiver is directed to pay out of such royalty interest the following costs incurred in the determination of those claims: To Joseph M. Hill, $2,250.00 for services as special master and $223.36 for expenses; and to the clerk of this court the clerk’s costs and printing charges in so far as they may exceed the advance payments made by Roberts and Britain and the Durfee Mineral Company under paragraph 8 of the order of January 19, last;
4. The net balance of such royalty interest remaining after making the required deduction for receivership expenses and paying the costs named in paragraph 3 of this order shall be paid by the receiver to Roberts and Britain as the rightful claimants;
5. No allowance shall be made to either Roberts and Britain or the Durfee Mineral Company by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred and paid in producing witnesses before the special master and having the evidence reported;
6. All moneys advanced for costs under paragraph 8 of the order of January 19, last, by claimants other than Roberts and Britain and the Durfee Mineral Company shall be refunded to such claimants by the clerk. If the advance payments which were made by Roberts and Britain and the Durfee Mineral Company exceed the clerk’s costs and printing charges, the excess shall be returned to them in equal proportions.
Decisions Per Curiam, Etc. 268 U. S.
No. 13, Original. State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, United States, Intervener. In Equity. Orders entered May 11, 1925. Announced by Mr. Justice Van Devanter.
On consideration of the fourteenth report of the receiver it is ordered:
1. The accounts, disbursements and transactions of the receiver shown in the report are approved;
2. The receiver is directed to apply to receivership expenses the balance of approximately $6,800.00 remaining in his hands to the credit of the river-bed wells;
3. The receiver is directed to pay to the several claimants interested in the Texas or flood-plain wells the balance remaining in his hands to the credit of such wells and heretofore reserved to meet possible receivership expenses;
4. The receiver is instructed, as soon as may be convenient, to make any needful preparation for promptly closing the receivership; to store the books of account, records and files of the receivership with the Security Storage Company of Washington, D. C., in such manner as will make them readily accessible to the clerk of this Court; to pay the storage charges thereon in advance for a period of three years; to deliver such books, records and files as so stored to the clerk of this court; and to make and submit a final report covering his disbursements and transactions since the fourteenth report.
No. —, Original. The State of Louisiana v. The State of Mississippi. May 11, 1925. Motion for leave to file a bill of complaint herein granted; and process ordered to issue returnable on Monday, October 5 next. Messrs. Robert Ash and John Dale for Louisiana. No appearance for Mississippi.
268 U. S. Decisions Per Curiam, Etc.
No. 783. James C. Davis, Agent, etc., v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., etc. Error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Argued May 4, 1925. Decided May 11, 1925. Per Curiam. Affirmed upon the authority of Davis, Agent, v. Newton Coal Co., 267 U. S. 292; and United States v. Archibald McNeil & Sons, 267 U. S. 302. Mr. Duncan K. Brent, with whom Messrs. Francis R. Cross and A. A. McLaughlin were on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Otto A. Schlobohm and William B. Symmes, Jr., for the defendant in error, submitted.
No. 968. The United States of America ex rel. Omar Lenox Macklem v. Commissioner of Immigra - tion at the Port of New York. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Motion, May 4, 1925. Decided May 25, 1925. Per Curiam. Motion to admit to bail denied, and cause transferred to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, upon the authority of (1) the act of September 14, 1922, c. 305, 42 Stat. 827; Heitler v. United States, 260 U. S. 438, 439; (2) Farrell v. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 100; Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U. S. 580, 583; Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. Graham, 253 U. S. 193, 195. Mr. Isaac Shorr, with whom Messrs. Walter H. Pollak and Carol Weiss King were on the brief, for appellant. The Solicitor General, Mr. Assistant Attorney General Donovan and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely for the appellee.
No. 830. Banco di Roma v. Philippine National Bank. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted March 2, 1925. Decided May 25, 1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction on authorities cited. Mr. John T.
Decisions Per Curiam, Etc. 268 U. S.
Loughran for defendant in error in support of the motion. Mr. Carroll G. Walter for plaintiff in error in opposition to the motion.
No. 593. G. W. Coffee et al. v. Joseph F. Gray, Re - ceiver of the Tallulah Falls Railway Co. et al. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted April 20, 1925. Decided May 25, 1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; South Carolina n. Seymour, 153 U. S. 353; United States ex rel. Taylor v. Taft, 203 U. S. 461, 464, 465; United States ex rel. Champion Lumber Co. n. Fisher, 227 U. S. 445; Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Gilbert, 245 U. S. 162. Messrs. S. R. Prince, L. E. Jeffries and Sanders McDaniel for defendants in error in support of the motion. Mr. Hooper Alexander for plaintiffs in error in opposition to the motion.
No. 1155. George Cox v. The State of Florida; and No. 1156. Walker Bryant v. The State of Florida. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida. Decided May 25, 1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction ex mero motu, upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 5-6. Motion to proceed as poor persons denied. Mr. W. D. Bell for plaintiffs in error. No appearance for defendant in error.
No. 13, Original. The State of Oklahoma v. The State of Texas, The United States, Intervener. Filed May 25, 1925. Final report of receiver received and filed, on motion of Mr. John Spalding Flannery, in that behalf. p. 681268 U. S. Decisions Per Curiam, Etc.
No. 1089. R. 0. Bass v. The City of Clifton. Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Tenth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted May 11, 1925. Decided June 1, 1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Farrell v. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 100; Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U. S. 580, 583; Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. Graham, 253 U. S. 193,
195. Mr. W. A. Keeling for the defendant in error in support of the motion. Mr. J. Walter Cocke for plaintiff in error in opposition to the motion.
No. 909. First National Bank of Longview v. Henry Jackson. Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted May 25, 1925. Decided June 1, 1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 5-6. Mr. R. E. Taylor for defendant in error in support of the motion. Mr. F. H. Prendergast for plaintiff in error in opposition to the motion. See post, p. 699.
No. 1004. The National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. The City of Boston. Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted May 25, 1925. Decided June 1, 1925. Per Curiam. Transferred to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upon the authority of (1) act of September 14, 1922, c. 305, 42 Stat. 827; (2) Aspen Mining de Smelting Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 31, 37; Brown v. Alton Water Co., 222 U. S.
Decisions Per Curiam, Etc. 268 U.S.
325, 332-333; Metropolitan Water Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, 223 U. S. 519, 522; Union Trust Co. v. Westhus, 228 U. S. 519, 522-523; Shapiro v. United States, 235 U. S. 412, 416. Messrs. William Harold Hitchcock and John A. Sullivan for defendant in error in support of the motion. Mr. Robert H. Holt for plaintiff in error in opposition to the motion.
No. 1201. George Chaprales v. W. I. Biddle, Warden, Etc. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas. June 8, 1925. Per Curiam. Decree affirmed ex mero motu, upon the authority of Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U. S. 651; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219; McMicking v. Shields, 238 U. S. 99. Mr. Albert S. Marley for appellant. The Solicitor General and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely for appellee.
No. 430. Merriam & Millard Company v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. Error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted June 1, 1925. Decided June 8, 1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Baker v. White, 92 U. S. 176, 179; United States v. Beatty, 232 U. S. 463, 466; Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 370. Messrs. T. Byron Clark, Bruce Scott and Kenneth F. Burgess for the defendant in error in support of the motion. Messrs. Edward P. Smith and Francis S. Howell for plaintiff in error in opposition to the motion.
No. 538. St. Louis and Hannibal Railroad Company, v. Mary Jackman. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. Motion to dismiss or affirm sub-
268 U. S. Decisions Granting Certiorari.
mitted June 1, 1925. Decided June 8, 1925. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction, upon the authority of § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 5-6. Messrs. Daniel Bartlett, Thomas L. Philips and Matthew E. O’Brien for defendant in error in support of’the motion. Messrs. J. D. Hostetler, George A. Mahan, Dulaney Mahan, J. H. Haley and Richard F. Ralph for plaintiff in error in opposition to the motion.
PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI GRANTED, FROM APRIL 14, 1925, TO AND INCLUDING JUNE 8, 1925.
No. 1007. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Company v. Steamship Northern Star and Harry Luber. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. Mr. William E. Leahy for petitioner. Mr. Gerson C. Young for respondent.
No. 1011. Sacramento Navigation Company v. Mil - ton H. Salz, doing business as E. Saiz & Son. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted. Mr. H. H. Sanborn for petitioner. Mr. S. Hasket Derby for respondent.
No. 1085. Middleton S. Borland, Trustee, v. The United States. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals granted. Mr. Godfrey Goldmark for petitioner. The Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General Letts and Mr. Harvey B. Cox, Attorney in the Department of Justice, for the United States.
Decisions Granting Certiorari. 268 U. S.
No. 1086. A. J. Byars v. The United States. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted. Mr. Claude R. Porter for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1075. Dr. A. W. Boyd v. The. United States. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted. Mr. SamE. Whitaker for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1143. The Mosler Safe Company v. Ely -Norris Safe Company. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. Mr. Samuel Owen Edmonds for petitioner. Messrs. Julius M. Mayer and F. P. Warfield for respondent.
No. 866. Chicago and North Western Railway Company v. Alvin R. Durham Company et al. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan granted. Mr. R. N. Van Doren for petitioner. Mr. Julius J. Patek for respondents.
No. 1084. Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Association, etc., et al. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted. The Attorney General for the petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
268 U. S. Decisions Granting Certiorari.
No. 1098. William H. Edwards, Collector of In - ternal Revenue, Second New York District, v. Chile Copper Company. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. The Solicitor General and Mr. Alfred A. Wheat, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, for the petitioner. Messrs. Arthur A. Ballantine and George E. Cleary for respondent.
No. 1145. Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Company. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted. The Solicitor General and Mr. Olin M. Fuller, Attorney in the Department of Justice, for petitioner. Mr. J. F. Sullivan for respondent.
No. 1192. Morgan’s Louisiana and Texas Railroad and Steamship Company et al v. F. A. Cocke. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Messrs. Charles N. Burch, Harry McCall, H. D. Minor and Victor Leovy for petitioners. Messrs. Frederic H. Lotterhos and George Butler for respondent.
No. 1193. Lazarus G. Joseph et al. v. John Bordman et al. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands granted. Messrs. Henry D. Green, John W. Clifton and Marion Butler for petitioners. No appearance for respondents.
No. 1199. Leo A. Price, as Receiver in Equity op J. M. Gidding & Company, Inc., v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Decisions Granting Certiorari. 268 U. S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. Mr. Godfrey Goldmark for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1203. Charles V. Duffy, Former Collector of Internal Revenue, v. The Mutual Benefit Life In - surance Company. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Mr. John 0. H. Pitney for respondent.
No. 1208. Harman W. McMahon v. Montour Rail - road Company. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania granted. Mr. C. D. Scully for petitioner. Mr. Don Rose for respondent.
No. 1252. Frank E. Stripe et al., as Receivers in Equity of Johnson Shipyards Corporation, v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. Messrs. Ben A. Matthews and Harold Harper for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1256. Samuel A. Myers et al., Copartners as S. A. and H. Myers, v. Internatio nal Trust Company. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Superior Court for the County of Suffolk, State of Massachusetts, granted. Mr. Edward F. McClennan for petitioners. Mr. John R. Lazenby for respondent.
268 U. S. Decisions Granting Certiorari.
No. 1261. The United States v. Butterworth -Jud - son Corporation. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted. The Solicitor General for the United States. Messrs. Eldon Bisbee and Bertram F. Shipman for respondent.
No. 1224. The United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, Garth Motor Company, Claimant. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. The Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General WUlebrandt for the United States. Mr. William S. Pritchard for claimant.
No. 1024. Continental Casualty Company et al. v. Alfred W. Agee, Administrator. June 8, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted. Messrs. James C. Jones, Lon 0. Hocker and Frank H. Sullivan for petitioners. Messrs. James H. De Vine and Charles R. Hollingsworth for respondent.
No. 1190. John Carlton Dysart v. The United States. June 8, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted. Messrs. J. W. Morrow and J. H. Hutchins for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1230. American Railway Express Company v. F. S. Royster Guano Company. June 8, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Special Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia granted. Messrs. Charles W. Stockton and Kenneth E. Stockton for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI DENIED OR DISMISSED, FROM APRIL 14, 1925, TO AND INCLUDING JUNE 8, 1925.
No. 946. A. Guckenheimer & Brothers Company et al. v. The United States. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. B. B. McGinnis for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 952. Adolph Paleais v. Lewis H. Safer. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Joseph G. M. Browne for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Levis for respondent.
No. 954. Citrus Soap Company of California v. Royal Lemon Products Company et al. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Mr. Barry Mohun for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
No. 961. Louis Abramson v. The United States. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. George B. Martin for petitioner. The Attorney Genteral for the United States.
No. 969. Charles Dick et al. v. Marx & Rawolle, Inc. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia denied. Mr. Frederick C. Bryan for petitioners. Mr. H. Winship Wheatley for respondent.
268 U. S. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
No. 974. Roswell 0. Johnson et al. v. The United States. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. 'Messrs. C. B. Tinkham and Thomas P. Littlepage for petitioners. No appearance for respondent.
No. 977. Eugene L. Norton et al. v. Frederick R. Babcock. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. William L. Ransom for petitioners. Messrs. Hartwell Cabell and B. F. Sturgis for respondent.
No. 979. Mahlon D. Thatcher, Trustee under the LAST WILL OF FRANKLIN A. LUCE, DECEASED, ET AL., ETC. v. The Chicago Railways Company et al. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Mr. Henry S. Robbins for petitioners. Messrs. Horace K. Tenney, Roger Sherman, James M. Sheean, and Charles S. Babcock for respondents.
No. 983. Keystone Brewing Company et al. v. The United States. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Henry A. Knapp for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1000. John F. Downs et al. v. The United States. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Merritt Lane for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
55Q270—25----- 44
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
Nos. 1012 and 1013. J. H. Mosely v. The United States. April 20, 1925. Petition for writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. John E. Garner for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1014. Schweyer Electric & Manufacturi ng Company et al. v. Regan Safety Devices Company et al. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Messrs. Irving M. Obreight and George Wharton Pepper,for petitioners. Messrs. John J. Kirby and A. V. Cushman for respondents.
No. 1020. Alice Cheney Baltzell v. John J. Mitchell, Formerly Collector of Internal Revenue. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. Robert H. Holt for petitioner. The Solicitor General for the respondent.
No. 1021. Hannah P. Weld v. John J. Mitchell, Formerly Collector of Internal Revenue. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. Robert H. Holt for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondent.
No. 1034. M. M. Elkan et al. v. Sebastian Bridge District. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Messrs. Thomas B. Pryor and Vincent M. Miles for petitioners. Mr. James B. McDonough for respondent.
268 U. S. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
No. 1057. Leon Israel et al., copartners doing busi - ness UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF LEON ISRAEL & BROS., V. Luckenbach Steamship Company, Inc. April 20, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Messrs. Charles C. Burlingham and Roscoe H. Hupper for petitioners. Mr. Peter 8. Carter for respondent.
No. 918. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Com - pany v. Eugenie Cognet et al. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. Carroll G. Walter for petitioner. Mr. Charles V. Imlay for respondents.
No. 990. Harry C. Grove, Otherwise Known as Hoppy Grove, v. The United States. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. Mr. Robert F. Leach, Jr. for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 999. Pete Lucis v. The United States. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. George D. Collins for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1035. Henry V. Cunningham, Trustee, v. Mer - chants National Bank. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Messrs. William R. Sears and Clarence M. Gordon for petitioner. Messrs Edward E. Blodgett and George S. Fuller for respondent.
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
No. 1038. D. J. Ahearn et al. v. The United States. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. Eric Lyders for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1043. Frank Miller v. The United States. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Messrs. Robert M. Golding and Joseph B. Fleming for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1061. J. S. Hughes v. The United States. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Mr. A. M. Beets for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1062. Hercules Powder Company v. J. F. Rich. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Messrs. Gould G. Rheuby and William R. Robertson for petitioner. Messrs. Heartsell H. Ragon and J. H. Thompson for respondent.
No. 1077. Boatmen’s Bank v. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Messrs. Lambert E. Walther, Sears Lehman, Walter H. Saunders, John S. Leahy and J. L. London for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
268 U. 8. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
No. 1082. C. C. Connally et al. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. J. H. Mize for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 1087. The Liberty National Bank of Roanoke, Virginia, v. James A. Bear, Trustee. April 27, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. Mr. James D. Johnston for petitioner. Mr. Harvey B. Apperson for respondent.
No. 1042. Toyo Risen Kabushiki Kaisha v. William D. Oelbermann et al., Copartners, etc. April 27,1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied for failure to file within the time prescribed by the statute. Messrs. Samuel Knight and Joseph K. Hutchinson for petitioner. Mr. S. Hasket Derby for respondents.
No. —. Howard v. Bailey, Judge. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari herein denied. Howard, pro se. No appearance for respondent.
No. 800. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail - way Company v. A. N. Murphy et al., Partners, etc. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma denied. Messrs. M. L. Bell, W. T. Dickinson, W. R. Bleakmore, A. T. Boys, Thomas P. Littlepage for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
No. 1015. Morris Orsatti v. The United States. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. Marshall B. Woodworth for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1023. Clarence T. Parker v. The United States. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. Earl W. Woods for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1032. Ellis C. Talmadge et al. v. The United States. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Messrs. H. Prescott Gatley and Edward M. Seymour for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1040. Lynn Storage Warehouse Company v. Mordka Senator. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Messrs. Benjamin N. Johnson, Hugh W. Ogden, and Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., for petitioner. Mr. Lee M. Friedman for respondent.
No. 1047. Kelly -Springfield Tire Company v. L. A. Bobo et al. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. John W. Preston for petitioner. Mr. Olen L. Everts for respondents.
No. 1048. Blanchard Lumber Company v. Jesse H. Metcalf. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari
268 U. S. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Mr. Fred F. Field for petitioner. Mr. Foye M. Murphy for respondent.
No. 1058. New York Dock Company v. Steamship Capitaine Faure, etc., et al. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Messrs. Joseph S. Auerbach and Charles H. Tuttle for petitioner. Mr. Roscoe H. Hupper for respondents.
No. 1074. Charleston, South Carolina, Mining and Manufacturing Company v. The United States. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Messrs. E. C. Brandenburg and William Wade Hampton for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1080. John L. Nounes et al. v. The United States. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. James W. Wayman for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1100. E. F. Swinney v. Gary Realty Company. May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri denied. Mr. Frank M. Lowe for petitioner. Mr. Armwell L. Cooper for respondent. t
No. 1110. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company v. John J. Howell . May 4, 1925. Petition for a writ of certio-
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
rari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Messrs. Allan McCulloh and Clifton P. Williamson for petitioner. Mr. John C. Robinson for respondent.
No. 449. Walter Ray Simmons v. William R. Fenton, Warden, etc.; and
No. 450. Walter Ray Simmons v. The State of Nebraska. May 11, 1925. Petitions for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska denied. Messrs. E. P. Holmes and Thomas P. Littlepage for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
No. 829. Manuel J. Jacobs v. Myra F. Jacobs. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of California denied. Messrs. Carlos P. Griffin and Eugene C. Brown for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 885. James C. Davis, Director General of Rail - roads, etc. v. Frank Griffith and L. D. Alexander. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma denied. Messrs. M. L. Bell, Thomas P. Littlepage, W. F. Dickinson, W. R. Bleakmore, and A. T. Boys for petitioner. Mr. Fred E. Suits for respondents.
No. 980. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Company v. M. W. Sullivan, as Administrator. May 11, 1925. .Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Brenton K. Fisk for petitioner. Mr. Hugo L. Black for respondent.
268 U. S. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
No. 986. William Parmenter v. The United States; No. 987. David Baker v. The United States; No. 988. Max Corrigan v. The United States; and No. 989. James Quick v. The United States. May-Il, 1925. Petition for writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. W. F. Connally, with whom Mr. William Henry Gallagher was on the brief in No. 989, for petitioners. The Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General Willebrandt for the United States.
No. 1027. William A. Price et al. v. The United States. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Messrs. Joseph Kreamer and Joseph Siegler for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1033. Leon Fox v - The United States. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. George B. Martin for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1049. Jacob Marcus et al., Individually and as Copartners, etc. v. Pillsbury Flour Mills Company et al. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Lowrie C. Barton for petitioners. Mr. George B. Gordon for respondents.
No. 1071. John T. Porter Company et al. v. Java Cocoanut Oil Company, Limited. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Messrs. Warren Olney, Jr., J. M. Mannon, Jr. and A. Crawford Green for petitioners. Messrs. Alfred Sutro, F. D. Madison, H. D. Pillsbury and Oscar Sutro for respondent.
No. 1072. Byron A. Corey v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Company. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana denied. Messrs. Louis P. Donovan, P. J. McCumber and Homer Sullivan for petitioner. Mr. George E. Hurd for respondent.
No. 1076. The Western Automobile Insurance Company v. George S. Robbins et al. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Messrs. Mitchell D. Follansbee and Fred Barth for petitioner. Messrs. James W. Good and Dwight S. Bobb for respondents.
No. 1088. Minnie L. Bellamy v. Willie G. Pitts et al. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. W. A. Gunter for petitioner. Mr. C. P. McIntyre for respondents.
No. 1131. Henry Mandel et al. v. The United States to the use of Wharton & Northern Railroad Company. May 11, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. James D. Carpenter, Jr. for petitioners. Messrs. Charles Campbell, Jr. and Frederic B. Scott for respondent.
268 U. S. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
No. 369. Municipal Assembly of Arroyo, Porto Rico v. Successors of C. & J. Fantauzzi. Motion submitted April 30, 1925. Decided May 25, 1925. Motion to quash writ of certiorari in this cause granted. Mr. E. B. Wilcox, with whom Mr. C. Dominquez Rubio was on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. Francis E. Neagle, with whom Mr. Eugene Congleton was on the brief, for respondent.
No. 859. James C. Davis, Director General, etc. v. Catherine Lind, Administratrix. May 25,1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Ha,milton County, State of Ohio, denied. Messrs. George Hoadly, Judson Harmon and Edward Colston for petitioner. Mr. Edward M. Ballard for respondent.
No. 887. Emelie W. Peacock v. Mabel G. Reinecke, Collector, etc. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Messrs. Herbert Pope, James J. Forstall and E. Barrett Prettyman for appellant. The Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General Willebrandt for appellee.
No. 909. First National Bank of Longview v. Henry Jackson. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari herein denied. Mr. F. H. Prendergast for plaintiff in error. Mr. R. E. Taylor for defendant in error. See ante p. 681.
No. 975. Tampico Banking Company, S. A. v. R. S. Barber. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Messrs. Hampton Gary and Challon B. Ellis for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
No. 978. Little Six Oil Company v. Marie T. Emer - son et al. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. A. D. Lipscomb for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
No. 1016. The Commerce -Guardian Trust & Sav - ings Bank v. The State of Michigan et al. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan denied. Messrs. Lee H. Schminck and George W. Ritter for petitioner. No appearance for respondents.
No. 1051. St. Louis -San Francisco Railway Com - pany v. Harry F. Stitt. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma denied. Messrs. John F. Sharp, W. F. Evans, E. T. Miller, C. B. Stuart, M. K. Cruce and Ben Franklin for petitioner. Mr. Washington E. Hudson for respondent.
No. 1056. Chickasha Cotton Oil Company v. Homer N. Chapman et al. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Messrs. H. C. Coke and M. M. Crane for petitioner. Mr. Joe A. Worsham for respondents.
No. 1094. The District of Columbia v. Catherine H. Bauer. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari .to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia denied. Messrs. F. H. Stephens and Robert L. Williams for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
268 U. S. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
No. 1095. J. L. Walker v. W. W. Wilkinson, Trustee. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. E. C. Brandenburg for petitioner. Mr. Mark McMahon for respondent.
No. 1096. J. L. Walker v. W. W. Wilkinson, Trustee. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. E. C. Brandenburg for petitioner. Mr. Mark McMahon for respondent.
No. 1099. Alexander Cummings v. Wilson & Wil - lard Manufacturing Company et al. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. Leonard S. Lyon for petitioner. Messrs. Ford W. Harris and G. Benton Wilson for respondents.
No. 1108. J. L. Walker v. W. W. Wilkinson, Trustee. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. E. C. Brandenburg for petitioner. Mr. Mark McMahon for respondent.
No. 1109. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company et al. v. W. W. Wilkinson, Trustee. May
25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. E. C. Brandenburg for petitioners. Mr. Mark McMahon for respondent.
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
No. 1120. W. Garland Grace et al. v. The United States. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Frank J. Looney for petitioners. No appearance for respondent.
No. 1154. Guaranty Bank & Trust Company v. Texas Sulphur Company. May 25, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. A. D. Lipscomb for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 614. William Locke Paddon v. Una Margaret Locke Paddon. June 1, 1925. On petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of California. Dismissed for want of prosecution. Messrs. Walter C. Clephane, J. Wilmer Latimer and Morris Bien for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 1079. Robert T. Brown, Jr., v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Messrs. Erle Pettus and James A. Cobb for petitioner. The Solicitor General and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely for the United States.
No. 1111. American Shipbuilding & Dock Corpora - tion, Claimant of the Barge Amsadoc, etc., and American Surety Company, v. John Rourke & Sons. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. George T. Cann for petitioners. Mr. A. A. Lawrence for respondent.
268 U. S. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
No. 1115. W. H. L. Newingham et al. v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. Mr. Bernard B. McGinnis for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1118. Charles Schopp v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Alexander S. Drescher for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1119. Southern Pacific Company v. Viola Mas - sey, as Administratrix of the Estate of Arthur Ralph Massey, deceased. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeals, Third Appellate District of the State of California, denied. Messrs. William H. Devlin and Robert T. Devlin for petitioner. Mr. Francis Carr for respondent.
No. 1128. William Van Engelen v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. James G. Moore for the petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1147. The People of the State of New York ex rel. Internatio nal Bridge Company v. State Tax Commission. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of New York denied. Mr. Adelbert Moot and Miss Helen Z. M. Rodgers for petitioner. Messrs. Albert Ottinger and Frederic C. Rupp for respondent.
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
No. 1152. S. C. Grigsby et al., Administrators of R. L. Grigsby, deceased, v. The Southern Railway Company. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. W. T. Kennerly for petitioners. Mr. Charles H. Smith for respondent.
No. 1158. S. J. Craig v. W. S. Langmade, as Executor, etc., et al. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas denied. Mr. Joseph M. Stark for petitioner. Mr. H. 0. Caster for respondents.
No. 1188. Edgar F. Hiatt v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. Mr. James W. Noel for petitioner. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1189. Marion E. Marks v. Carl Bauers et al., etc. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. Mr. A. I. Moulton for petitioner. Mr. Elton Watkins for respondents.
No. 1194. Acme Foundry & Machine Company v. The Oil Well Improvements Company. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. Messrs. Charles Ray Dean and Luther Ely Smith for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 1211. Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Company, a June 1, 1925.
268 U. S. Decisions Denying Certiorari.
Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Messrs. Daniel MacDougald and E. M. Underwood for petitioner. Mr. George C. Bedell for respondent.
No. 1212. General Baking Company v. James H. Gorman. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. Messrs. Julius M. Mayer, F. P. Warfield and Ellis W. Leavenworth for petitioner. Mr. Daniel W. O'Donoghue for respondent.
No. 1218. States Oil Corporation v. T. J. Gil - breath. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Barry Mohun for petitioner. Messrs. R. N. Grisham and J. S. Grisham for respondent.
No. 1222. Mrs. Vannye Gilmer, Administratrix, etc. v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the ‘ Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. Lomax M. Smith for petitioner. Messrs. Charles W. Burch, H. D. Minor and Marion G. Evans for respondent.
No. 1223. Vapor Car Heating Company, Inc., et al. v. Gold Car Heating & Lighting Company et al. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Otto Raymond Barnett for petitioners. Messrs. William A. Redding and Arthur C. Fraser for respondents.
55627°—25-----45
Decisions Denying Certiorari. 268 U. S.
No. 1226. Joseph DiCarlo v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Thomas L. Newton for petitioner. The Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General Donovan for the United States.
No. 1227. Joseph Ruffino v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Messrs. Ernest W. McIntyre and Thomas L. Newton for petitioner. The Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General Donovan for the United States.
No. 1231. Union Petroleum Steamship Company v. William H. Edwards, Formerly Collector. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Delbert M. Tibbetts for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondent.
No. 1237. I. A. Silverberg et al. v. The United States. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. W. F. Weeks for petitioners. The Attorney General for the United States.
No. 1245. Washburn Crosby Company v. France Milling Company. June 1, 1925.'Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Messrs. William J. Hughes, Edward S. Rogers, Harry D. Nims and Minturn DeS. Verdi for petitioner. Mr. Samuel E. Darby for respondent.
268 U. S. Cases Disposed of Without Consideration by the Court.
No. 1253. Philip Leschnik v. Catherine C. Frier, as Trustee of the Estate in Bankruptcy of Sol J. Leschnik. June 1, 1925. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Mr. Ben A. Matthews for petitioner. Catherine C. Frier, pro se.
CASES DISPOSED OF WITHOUT CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT, FROM APRIL 14, 1925, TO AND INCLUDING JUNE 8, 1925.
No. 358. William, Inman & Stribling v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. April 20, 1925. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia. Dismissed with costs on motion of Mr. C. E. Cotterill, with whom Mr. Harry W. VanDyke was on the brief, for appellants. Messrs. Hollis N. Randolph and Robert S. Parker for appellee.
No. 189. Buffalo Union Furnace Company v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Cor - poration. April 27, 1925. Error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Dismissed with costs, on motion of Mr. John Lord O'Brien for plaintiff in error. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Donovan for defendant in error.
No. 507. American Express Company v. Farming - ton Shoe Manufacturi ng Company. May 4, 1925. Error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Dismissed with costs, on motion of Mr. Austin N. Pinkham for plaintiff in error. Messrs. William C. Resen and Lee M. Friedman for defendant in error.
Cases Disposed of Without Consideration by the Court. 2G8 U. S.
No. 888. Patrick J. O’Shaughnessy et al. v. The United States. May 4, 1925. Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama. Writ of error dismissed as to plaintiff in error John McEvoy, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General Beck in behalf of counsel for the plaintiffs in error. Mr. Harry H. Smith was on the brief, for plaintiff in error McEvoy.
No. 1164. The United States v. Herbert H. Mc - Govern, Jr. May 11, 1925. Error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Dismissed, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General Beck, for the plaintiff in error. Mr. Herbert H. McGovern, Jr. pro se.
No. 927. Andres Fuentes v. The Director of Pris - ons. May 11, 1925. On petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. Dismissed, pursuant to section 4, rule 37. Mr. Adam C. Carson for petitioner. No appearance for respondent.
No. 970. Humble Oil & Refining Company et al. v. K. Kishi et al. May 11, 1925. On petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Dismissed, pursuant to section 4, rule 37. Mr. R. L. Batts for petitioners. No appearance for respondents.
No. 1254. Albert Ottinger, as Attorney General of the State of New York v. New York and Queens Gas Company. Motion filed May 23, 1925. Decided May 25, 1925. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Docketed and dismissed with costs, on motion of Mr. Robert E. Coulson for the appellee. No appearance for appellant.
APPENDIX.
ORDER AMENDING EQUITY RULES. MAY 4, 1925.
Equity Rules 10 and 30 (226 U. S. Appendix) are amended hereby to read as follows:
10
DECREE FOR DEFICIENCY IN FORECLOSURES, ETC.
In suits for the foreclosure of mortgages or for the enforcement of other liens a decree may be rendered for any balance found to be due over and above the proceeds of the sale or sales; and execution may issue for the collection of the same as is provided in rule 8 when the decree is solely for the payment of money. Such a deficiency decree may be so rendered and enforced whether the plaintiff owns the debt or is a trustee or agent for another or others who own it, as often is true when the debt is evidenced by notes or bonds. Where the plaintiff is such trustee or agent, any money collected on the execution shall be paid to him as such representative, and he shall pay it to the owner of the debt if there be only one, and if there be more shall distribute it pro rata among them according to. their respective interests.
30
ANSWER—CONTENTS—COUNTERCLAIM
The defendant by his answer shall set out in short and simple terms his defense to each claim asserted in the bill, omitting mere statements of evidence and avoiding general denials, but specifically admitting, denying, or explaining p. 710the facts upon which the plaintiff relies, unless he is without knowledge, in which event he shall so state, and this shall be treated as a denial. Averments other than those of value or amount of damage, when not denied, shall be deemed confessed, except as against an infant, lunatic, or other person non compos and not under guardianship, but the answer may be amended, by leave of the court or judge, upon reasonable notice, so as to put any averment in issue, when justice requires it. The answer may state as many defenses, in the alternative, regardless of consistency, as the defendant deems essential to his defense.
The answer must state in short and simple form any counterclaim arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit, and may, without cross bill, set up any set-off or counterclaim against the plaintiff which might be the subject of an independent suit in equity against him, and such set-off or counterclaim, so set up, shall have the same effect as a cross suit, so as to enable the court to pronounce a final decree in the same suit on both the original and the cross claims.
When in the determination of a counterclaim complete relief can not be granted without the presence of parties other than those to the bill, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants if they are subject to its jurisdiction.
ORDER AMENDING RULE OF THE COURT. MAY 4, 1925.
It is now here ordered by this court that section 7 of Rule 24 of this court be amended so that the entire section will read:1
In pursuance of the act of March 3, 1883, authorizing and empowering this court to prepare a table of fees to
• 1 The revision of all the rules of the court, adopted June 8, 1925, and effective July 1, 1925, was printed in Vol. 266 U. S., pp. 643 et seq. The rule amended by the above became rule 29 of the revision.
be charged by the clerk of this court, the following table is adopted:
For docketing a case and filing and indorsing thetranscript of the record, ten dollars.
For entering an appearance, twenty-five cents.
For entering a continuance, twenty-five cents.
For filing a motion, order or other paper, twenty-five cents.
For entering any rule, or for making or copying any record or other paper, twenty cents per folio of each one hundred words.
For transferring each case to a subsequent docket and indexing the same, one dollar.
For entering a judgment or decree, one dollar.
For every search of the records of the Court, one dollar. For a certificate and seal, two dollars.
For receiving, keeping, and paying money in pursuance of any statute or order of Court, two per cent, on the amount so received, kept, and paid.
For an admission to the bar and certificate under seal, ten dollars.
For preparing the record or a transcript thereof for the printer, in all cases, including records presented with petitions for certiorari, indexing the same, supervising the printing, and distributing the printed copies to the justices, the reporter, the law library, and the parties or their counsel, ten cents per folio of each one hundred words; but where the necessary printed copies of the record as printed for the use of the court below are furnished, charges under this item will be limited to any additions printed here under the clerk’s supervision.
For making a manuscript copy of the record, when required under rule 10, twenty cents per folio of each one hundred words, but nothing in addition for supervising the printing.
For issuing a writ of error and accompanying papers, five dollars.
For a mandate or other process, five dollars.
For filing briefs, five dollars for each party appearing.
For every printed copy of any opinion of the court or any justice thereof, certified under seal, two dollars.
This order shall apply to causes filed here on or after June 9, 1925, but not to causes filed prior to that date.
BANKRUPTCY ORDER. MAY 25, 1925.
It is ordered by the court that General Order in Bankruptcy No. 8, entitled “ Proceedings in partnership cases,” and Bankruptcy Form No. 2, entitled “ Partnership petition,” be, and are, abrogated and annulled. Order announced by Mr. Justice Sanford.
Summary Statement of Business of The Supreme Court of the United States for October Term, 1924.
Original Docket.
Cases pending at beginning of term.................................................. 24
New cases docketed during term........................................................ 1
Cases finally disposed of..................................................................... 3
Cases not finally disposed of................................................................ 22
Appellate Docket.
Cases pending at beginning of term.................................................. 438
New cases docketed during term......................... 853
Cases finally disposed of...................................................................... 758
Cases not finally disposed of......................................................... 533
The number of pending cases, original and appellate, was thus increased by 93.
Interlocutory decisions, and adverse decisions upon applications for leave to file, as in mandamus, prohibition, etc., are not here included.