Case details
Bluebook Citation
Shot v. United States, 179 U.S. 87 (1900)
Full caption
GOOD SHOT v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Oct. 29, 1900
Syllabus—Opinion of the Court.
GOOD SHOT v. UNITED STATES.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT.
No. 447. Submitted October 22, 1900.—Decided October 29,1900.
A Circuit Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review upon writ of error the trial, judgment and sentence of an Indian to imprisonment for life founded upon a verdict rendered on a trial of an indictment of the Indian for murder, by which verdict the jury find the defendant “guilty as charged in the indictment, without capital punishment.”
The case is stated in the opinion.
Hr. Melvin Grigsby and J/>. & H. Wright for Good Shot. Hr. Assistant Attorney General Hoyt for the United States. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court.
Good Shot, an Indian, was indicted in the District Court of the United States for the District of South Dakota for the murder of Emily Good Shot, and, the indictment having been remitted to the Circuit Court, was arraigned and pleaded not guilty; was tried ; found “ guilty as charged in the indictment, without capital punishment; ” was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor in the penitentiary at Sioux Falls, in the State of outh Dakota for life; and a writ of error was duly sued out o t e Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review e judgment of the Circuit Court. The United States moved o ismiBs the writ for want of jurisdiction, whereupon the Circui ourt of Appeals certified to this court, on facts stated, ' $ question: “Has this Circuit Court of Appeals Td °^On rev^ew uPon writ of error the trial, judgment 11 sentence of an Indian to imprisonment for life founded M a verdict rendered on a trial of an indictment of the Inan or murder, by which verdict the jury find the defendant [p. 88] ‘ guilty as charged in the indictment, without capital punishment.’ ”
The certificate was duly transmitted to the clerk of this court, but not filed until October 15, 1900; and on October 17, Good Shot filed a petition praying that a certiorari might be issued requiring the entire record and cause to be sent up from the Circuit Court of Appeals. On the same day a certified transcript of an order of the Circuit Court of Appeals, entered October 15, purporting to vacate and annul the order certifying the case, and to recall the certificate, in view of the decision of this court in Fitzpatrick, v. United States, 178 U. S. 304, was filed.
In the case referred to we held that a conviction for murder, punishable with death, was not the less a conviction for a capital crime by reason of the fact that the jury, in a particular case, qualified the punishment, and that, in such circumstances, this court had jurisdiction under section 5 of the judiciary act of March 3,1891, providing therefor “ in cases of conviction of a capital crime.” It followed that Circuit Courts of Appeals did not have jurisdiction.
If we should dismiss the certificate because of the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals on October 15, or if we answer the question certified, the same result is reached, namely, the dismissal of the writ of error below. And in the posture of the case disclosed by the record, we think the better course is to answer the question, which we do necessarily in the negative.
As the Circuit Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction, the application for a certiorari must be denied. That writ may be issued by this court to the Circuit Courts of Appeals undei section 6 of the act of March 3, 1891, on application, and ordinarily after judgment, in cases in which judgments are made final in those courts by the section, and also where questions of law have been certified to this court by those courts for their guidance in disposing of such cases.
In this case there is no judgment in the Circuit Court of p-peals, and the sole question certified relates to the jurisdiction of that court, and it having been determined that jurisdiction does not exist, the writ of certiorari cannot properly be issu [p. 89] to require the court to send up a cause over which it has no jurisdiction for determination on the merits. The remedy is by writ of error from this court to the Circuit Court.
The question certified will he answered in the negative, and the petition for certiorari will he denied. So ordered.
AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING COMPANY v.
LOUISIANA.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.
No 38. Submitted October 10,1900.—Decided November 5,1900.
A state statute imposing a license tax upon persons and corporations carrying on the business of refining sugar and molasses does not, by exempting from such tax “planters and farmers grinding and refining their own sugar and molasses,” deny sugar refiners the equal protection of the laws within the Fourteenth Amendment.
This was a petition filed in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans by John Brewster, tax collector, against the merican Sugar Relining Company, a corporation engaged in e business of refining sugar and molasses, to recover the sum o $3500 per year as a state license tax for the years 1892 to 9, inclusive, alleged to be due under the act of July 9, 1890, of the State of Louisiana, enacted in 1890, entitled “ An act to evy, collect and enforce payment of an annual license tax upon a persons, associations of persons or business firms and corpora ions pursuing any trade, profession, vocation, calling or busiess, except those who are expressly excepted from such license y articles 206 and 207 of the constitution.” y t e ninth section it is enacted “ that for carrying on each cenlneSh n u ’ re^n’nS sugar and molasses . . . the lia be based on the gross annual receipts of each person, said b* 1->n Persons’ business firm or corporation engaged in appl ^Sln?SS’ as ^°bows: Provided, that this section shall not y 0 p anters and farmers grinding and refining their own [p. 90] sugar and molasses; . .. And provided further, that it shall not apply to those planters who granulate syrup for other planters during the rolling season.”
First class. When the said gross actual receipts are $2,500,000 and over, the license shall be $3500.
This act was passed in pursuance of Article 206 of the state constitution of 1879, which reads as follows:
“ Art. 206. The general assembly may levy a license tax, and in such case shall graduate the amount of such tax to be collected from the persons pursuing the several trades, professions, vocations and callings. All persons, associations of persons and corporations pursuing any trade, profession, business or calling, may be rendered liable to such tax, except clerks, laborers, clergymen, school teachers, those engaged in agricultural, horticultural, mechanical and mining pursuits, and manufacturers other than those of distilled alcoholic or malt liquors, tobacco and cigars and cotton seed oil. No political corporation shall impose a greater license tax than is imposed by the general assembly for state purposes.”
Defence: First, that the business of refining sugar and molasses is exempt from the payment of any license tax, because it is one of those manufactures enumerated in Article 206 as entitled to exemption. Second, that the act of 1890 “ violates the Constitution of the United States, and is void in so far as it attempts to impose a license tax on this defendant, because said act denies to this defendant the equal protection of t « laws of the State, inasmuch as said act does not impose equa y a license tax on all persons engaged in the business of refining sugar and molasses, but discriminates in favor of planters w o refine their own sugar and molasses, and in favor of pan rs who granulate syrups for other planters during the ro mg season.” . ' . H The court, being of opinion that the business carri on
the defendant company was that of a manufacture), the petition. On appeal to the Supreme Court, that court of opinion that the defendant was not entitled to exemp under Article 207 of the constitution, (not now m fiues? which exempted certain manufacturers, and or ere a J [p. 91] ment for $3500 with interest and costs for the license tax for the year 1897. But, upon the attention of the court being called by a petition for rehearing to Article 206 of the constitution, above quoted, that court delivered a new opinion to the effect that the defendant was not a manufacturer, and therefore not entitled to an exemption by Article 206, and that the exemption of planters who refine their own sugar did not deprive the defendant of the equal protection of the laws. It further revised its judgment, and held the State entitled to recover for each of the years from 1892 to 1897, and rendered judgment for the sum of $3500, for each of said years. Whereupon defendant sued out a writ of error from this court.
J/r. John E. Parsons, Mr. Charles Carroll, Mr. Joseph IF. Carroll and Mr. H. B. Closson for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. E. Howard McCaleb for defendants in error.
Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court.
Motion was made to dismiss this writ of error upon the ground that the case did not present a Federal question, inasmuch as the question of illegal discrimination “ was not the principal matter litigated, but was put in the record for the purpose of obtaining this writ of error.” As, however, the proection of the Fourteenth Amendment was invoked in the answer, and, as this defence is at least plausible upon its face, e motion to dismiss must be denied; but, the case having a so een submitted upon the merits, we shall proceed to discuss e constitutional objection to the act.
def1S] SCai’Ce^T necessary to say that the question whether the en ant were a manufacturer within the meaning of the of JSlana COns^^u^on ono dependent upon the construction the st ,C°as^tu^on’ and that the interpretation given to it by tract a 6. p^reme ^ourt, raising as it does no question of condefen ]S °t ,1®a^or-T upon this court; but as that court held the busine^ Ja^e uPon the ground that it was engaged in the 88 o refining sugar, the further question is presented [p. 92] whether it is denied the equal protection of the laws because of the exemption from the tax of planters grinding and refining their own sugar and molasses.
The act in question does undoubtedly discriminate in favor of a certain class of refiners, but this discrimination, if founded upon a reasonable distinction in principle, is valid. Of course, if such discrimination were purely arbitrary, oppressive or capricious, and made to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations or other considerations having no possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers, such exemption would be pure favoritism, and a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes. But from time out of mind it has been the policy of this government, not only to classify for purposes of taxation, but to exempt producers from the taxation of the methods employed by them to put their products upon the market. The right to sell is clearly an incident to the right to manufacture or produce, and it is at least a question for the legislature to determine whether anything done to prepare a product most perfectly for the needs of the market shall not be treated as an incident to its growth or production. The act is not one exempting planters who use their sugar in the manufacture of articles of a wholly different description, such as con fectionery, preserves or pastry, or such as one which shou exempt the farmer who devoted his corn or rye to the ma mg of whiskey, while other manufacturers of these articles were subjected to a tax. A somewhat different question might arise in such case, since none of these articles are the natura p ucts of the farm—such products only becoming useful y 1 a commingled with other ingredients. Refined sugar, oweyei, is the natural and ultimate product of the cane,an^ ® steps taken to perfect such product are but inci en original growth. . .. was
With reference to the analogous right of impor a ion, said by this court at an early day in Brown v- X ri-bt Wheat. 419, that the right to sell was an incident to t o to import foreign goods, and that a license tax upon of imported goods, while still in the hands of t e imp
their original packages, was in conflict with that provision of the Constitution which prohibits a State from laying an impost or duty upon imports.
Congress, too, has repeatedly acted upon the principle of the Louisiana statute. Thus, after having imposed by act of August 2,1813, a license tax upon the retailers of wines and spirits, for the purpose of providing for the expense of the war with Great Britain, it was further enacted by an act of February 8,1815, c. 40, 3 Stat. 205, that it should not be construed “ to extend to vine dressers who sell at the place where the same is made, wine of their own growth, nor shall any vine dresser for vending solely where the same is made, wine of his own growth, be compelled to take out a license as a retailer of wines.” So, too, in the Internal Revenue Act of July 1, 1862, c. 119,12 Stat. 432, a license tax was imposed (sec. 64) upon retail dealers in all goods, wares and merchandise, but with a proviso, in section 66, that the act should not be construed “ to require a license for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise made or produced and sold by the manufacturer or producer at the manufactory or place where the same is made or prouced, to vinters who sell, at the place where the same is made, wine of their own growth; nor to apothecaries, as to wines or spirituous liquors which they use exclusively in the preparation or making of medicines for lame, sick or diseased persons. Another paragraph of the same section (64) exempts 18 W^° Se^ Pro^uc^s their own stills, from a tax as wholesale dealers in liquors. While no question of the power ongress is involved, these instances show that its general oes not differ from that of the act in question, and that
^crimination is based upon reasonable grounds. crim in cour^ has had repeated occasion to sustain dis-this T|10US • upon reasons much more obscure than a m’nni ■ 1U1 ™Railroad Company v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, vehiPipC1f3 °r ?Pance was sustained declaring that no car or Frederick^117 belonging to or used by the Richmond, or nronplL d aUd Potoraac Railroad Company shall be drawn other comn Steara ” Up?n a certain street, although no pany was named in the ordinance, the court held [p. 94] that as no other corporation had the right to run locomotives in that street, no other corporation could be in a like situation, and that the ordinance, while apparently limited in its operation, was general in its effect, as it applied to all who could do what was prohibited. “ All laws should be general in their operation, and all places within the same city do not necessarily require the same local regulation. While locomotives may with very great propriety be excluded from one street, or even from one part of a street, it would be unreasonable to exclude them from all.” In Pembina Mining Co. n. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, it was decided that the equal protection clause did not prohibit a State from requiring, for the admission within its limits of a corporation of another State, such conditions as it chooses, though in that case it exacted a license tax from such corporations, which it did not exact from corporations of its own creation. In Missouri Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 127 IT. S. 205, it was said that this clause did not forbid special legislation, “ and when legislation applies to particular bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional liabilities, it is not open to the objection that it denies to them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the same conditions.” To the same effect is Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578.
The power of taxation under this provision was fully considered in BelTs Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, in which it was said not to have been intended to prevent a State from changing its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property altogether; may impose different specie taxes upon different trades or professions; may vary the ra s of excise upon various products; may tax real and persona es tate in a different manner; may tax visible property on y an not securities; may allow or not allow deductions for in e ness. “ All such regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and genera usa° ’ are within the discretion of the state legislature or the P^P of the State in framing their constitution.” See so
In Pacific Express Company v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, a state statute defining an express company to be such as carried on the business of transportation on contracts for hire with railroad or steamboat companies, did not invidiously discriminate against the express companies defined by it, by exempting other companies carrying express matter in vehicles of their own. This case is specially pertinent to the one under consideration. See also Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 857; Columbus Railroad v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Indiana, 165 U. S. 304; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194.
The constitution of Louisiana classifies the refiners of sugar for the purpose of taxation into those who refine the products of their own plantations, and those who engage in a general refining business, and refine sugars purchased by themselves or put in their hands by others for that purpose, imposing a tax only upon the latter class. To entitle a party to the exemption it must appear (1) that he is a farmer or a planter; (2) that he grinds the cane as well as refines the sugar and molasses; (3) that he refines his own sugar and molasses, meaning thereby t e product of his own plantation. Whether he may also re’ne the sugar of others may be open to question ; although by i s express terms the act does not apply to planters who granu,a syrup for other planters during the rolling season. The iscrimination is obviously intended as an encouragement to agncu ture, and does not deny to persons and corporations en-laws m a general refini“g business the equal protection of the
.• jud£ment of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana is
tu - T Affirmed.
*
Justice Harlan concurred in the result. this caseUSTICE WHITE did not participate in the decision of
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