Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. 298
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. 298
Full caption
Phelps v. McDonald.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Majority
Swayne (Justice), joined by Miller (Justice)
Dissent
Field (Justice)
Phelps v. McDonald.
1. A., a British subject resident in this country, was duly declared a bankrupt by the proper district court, Dec. 10,1868, and the conveyance of his estate was in the usual form made by the register to an assignee. At that time he had a claim against the United States, of which the commission organized under the treaty between the United States and Great Britain of May 8,1871 (17 Stat. 863), took cognizance, and made an award for its payment. Held, that the claim passed to the assignee.
2. The statutory requirement, that all suits by or against an assignee in bankruptcy shall be brought within two years from the time the cause of action accrued, relates to suits by or against him with respect to parties other than the bankrupt.
3. Although a court of equity has not within its territorial jurisdiction the real or the personal property which is the subject-matter in controversy, it may, having the necessary parties before it, compel, by appropriate process, the performance of every act, which, if done voluntarily by them according tq the lex loci rei sitae, would give full effect to its decree « personam.
Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
This was a bill filed Sept. 8, 1874, by Thomas J. Phelps against Augustine R. McDonald. By an amendment, William White was made a defendant. It alleges that McDonald was on his petition declared a bankrupt by the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, Dec. 10, 1868; that Phelps was appointed assignee, and received, Feb. 12, 1.869, in due form the assignment of all the bankrupt’s real and personal estate ; that in the schedule of assets filed by the bankrupt appears this item: “ Claim against General Osborne, of U. S. Army, and others, for burning, in January and February, 1865, from one to two thousand bales of my cotton in Arkansas and Louisiana; ” that this is the only description of the claim, except that in the duplicate schedu e filed in the office of the register of said court the amount is stated at seven thousand to eight thousand bales, and the claim, with others, is designated as “ worthless; ” that McDona, March 17,1869, received his discharge from the court, and t a thereafter Phelps, having petitioned for; and obtained ww e to sell certain accounts, notes, and judgments of the ban rup sold them at public sale, White becoming the purchaser o uncollected accounts belonging to the estate for the sum p. 299twenty dollars; that the purchase was made for McDonald, with money furnished by him, and the claim transferred to him by White.
The bill further alleges, that, prior to the filing of his petition in bankruptcy, McDonald had a just and valid claim against the United States for certain cotton destroyed by the army during the late civil war; that being a British subject, although for many years a resident of this country, he prosecuted the claim before the joint British and American commission organized under the treaty of May 8,1871, between the United States and Great Britain; that the claim was finally adjudged to be valid; and that, Sept. 25, 1873, the commission awarded the sum of $197,190 “ to be paid in gold by the government of the United States to the government of her Britannic Majesty in respect of the above claim.”
To the bill of complaint is annexed as an exhibit McDonald s memorial to the joint commission, which shows his claim as one arising from purchases of cotton made by him in the insurrectionary States under permits from the Secretary of the Treasury and letters from the President of the United States, and alleges the subsequent repeal of the laws authorizing such permits before he could remove the cotton, and its final destruction by the Federal army.
The complainant insisted that this claim, thus arising from an alleged breach of an obligation of the United States to protect McDonald in the possession of the cotton destroyed, is not t at described in the schedule of the assets which were sold by e assignee to the defendant White, and afterwards assigned y im to McDonald; that the schedule did not describe a c aim against the United States arising from a violation of peru 1 s given by the President, and that the designation of it as ^wort less added to the description given was well calculated nns ead, that the rules of the joint commission required all d ?n^len^s Fainas to be stated, which McDonald did not aw* d Pr0Secuted hi8 claim upon his original title; that the was made to him on that title, and not on that derived and White from the assignee in bankruptcy; Dlain t 8a^ award ought rightfully to be paid to the comas assignee for the benefit of the creditors of said p. 300bankrupt, whose claims, as stated in his schedule, amount to $177,380, the only sum ever realized from his estate being the twenty dollars derived from the sale to White.
The bill then alleges that McDonald assigned said award to White, “ who took the same with full knowledge that said McDonald had no valid title thereto; ” that the United States paid to the agent of the British government in the city of Washington said award, and he is about to pay the same to McDonald. The bill prays for an injunction restraining McDonald and White, or either of them, from receiving said award, and for a decree that said fund be held in trust for the creditors of said McDonald, and be subject to the complainant s rights as assignee in bankruptcy.
Process was personally served on both defendants. They answered, and the complainant filed a replication. A temporary injunction was awarded. Subsequently, by consent of parties, a decree was made that one half of the amount of the award be received by the defendants to pay the expense of prosecuting the claim before the joint commission, and the other half placed in the hands of George W. Riggs, as receiver, to await the final action of the court; and that McDonald exe cute all orders, receipts, and acquittances necessary to enable the receiver to obtain the fund.
The defendants withdrew their answer and filed a demurrer, the grounds whereof are, in effect, that the court below ha no jurisdiction of the case, but that the exclusive jurisdiction remained with the District Court of the United States for t e Southern District of Ohio; that the bill was not filed within two years from the time when the cause of action accrue, that the claim against the United States did not give any rig of action either to McDonald or to the complainant as i signee in bankruptcy; that if it did, such right was in¡tor, did not pass to the assignee ; that it appears by the i an said treaty that no ground or right of action against t ® States ever existed in favor of said assignee by virtue o sigpment in bankruptcy. »
The special term of the court sustained the demu, decreed that the bill be dismissed, and that the ? over to the defendants the money in his hands. 1 p. 301plainant having appealed to the general term, where the decree was affirmed, he brought the case here.
Mr. F. P. Stanton and Mr. George F. Appleby for the appellant.
An assignee in bankruptcy may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the assets of the bankrupt. Johnion'i Assignee v. Bishop, 1 Woolw. 326; Lathrop, Assignee, v. Drake et al., 91 U. S. 516; Byster v. Gaff et al., id. 521; Durbank v. Bigelow et al., 92 id. 179; Claflin v. Houseman, Assignee, 93 id. 130.
The suit was not barred by the Statute of Limitations. The ■ right of the assignee as against McDonald did not accrue until ’ the award was made. Clark v. Clark et al., 17 How. 315.
McDonald had at the date of his petition in bankruptcy a claim against the United States for the destruction of his cotton. Its validity is averred in the bill, and is conclusively established by the decision and award of the commission. Comegys et al. v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193. Such a claim passes by the register s deed to the assignee in bankruptcy (Rev. Stat., sect. 5046), although it be incapable of enforcement by legal proceedings. Comegys et al. v. Vasse, supra; Milnor et al. v.
eiz, lb Pet. 221; Clark v. Clark et al., supra; Sheppard n. Taylor, 5 Pet. 707 ; Prevail v. Bache, 14 id. 95. Even if the und arising from the allowance of the claim had been in Engand and in the hands of the British government, that fact would not defeat the jurisdiction of the court below, to which e parties were amenable, and against whom a decree could e rendered and enforced by process in personam. 2 Story, Eq.
Jur., sect. 899 et seq.
William A. Cook and Mr. C. C. Cole, contra.
e assets of the bankrupt, including the claim in question, ^ere purchased by White, who transferred it to McDonald, in Th m J™-a Perfect title as against the assignee. posed6 been no concealment of the condition or the sup-
7 Va ^e claim, the case is not within the principle of eta?, IT How. 315. • 1. .. i. $ lme sale by the assignee this claim was worth-As °n^ a P08s^hility of a value.
e fund must be considered as being in England, the p. 302interest in, or the title to, a claim thereon did not by the assignment in bankruptcy pass to the assignee. Oakey v. Bennett, 11 How. 38 ; Lawrence’s Wheaton (2d ed.), pp. 162,163; Perry v. Barry, 1 Cranch, C. C. 204; Blaine n. Drummond, 11 Brock. 62 ; Hunt v. Jackson, 6 Blatchf. 349.
The fund was under the control of the British government to be distributed, and the decree of a court in this country could not operate upon it. Treaty of 1871, art. 12; Story, Eq. Pl., sect. 489. Were the law otherwise, the court below could have no jurisdiction, except on the ground of fraud, trust, or contract, and neither is alleged in the bill. Blake's Case, 1 Cox, 393; Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148.
Mb. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal in equity from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The case was decided in that court upon a demurrer to the bill and amended bill of the complainant. The demurrer was sustained and the bills were dismissed. The complainant is the appellant, and the action of the court below is brought before us for review.
The demurrer admits the facts alleged. The question is only as to their sufficiency to entitle the appellant to the relief which he seeks. Without reproducing the case in detail as it is in the record, we shall address ourselves to the salient points which it presents for our consideration.
A chose in an action lies at the foundation of the controversy. It is thus described by McDonald in the schedu e of his assets filed with his petition in bankruptcy. ai against General Osborne, of U. S. Army, and others, for burning, in January or February, 1865, from 1,000 to 2,00 a es o my cotton in Arkansas and Louisiana.
The late bankrupt law provided that as soon as an was appointed, the judge or register should convey to im the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt. ev. . sect. 5044. And that there should vest in the assign, among other things, all the bankrupt s “ rights o acio property, real or personal, and for any cause o ac io he had against any person arising from contract, or r unlawful taking or detention or injury to his prope y
Comegys et al. v. Vasse (1 Pet. 195) has an important bearing upon this case. It arose under the bankrupt law of April 4, 1800. 2 Stat. 19. The fifth and sixth sections authorized the commissioners to convey to the assignees “all the real and personal estate, of every nature and description, to which the said bankrupt may be entitled, either in law or equity, in any manner whatsoever.”
Under this act Vasse was declared a bankrupt and received his certificate of discharge. He had been an underwriter, and as such received from those whom he had insured and indemnified assignments of their claims against France, Great Britain, and Spain. In his return of his effects to the commissioners, pursuant to the statute, he named the claims against France and England, but not the claim against Spain. The omission was supposed to have been honestly made, because there was then not the slightest spes recuperandi with respect to that country. The claim was regarded as hopelessly worthless.
More than twenty years later, under a treaty between Spain and the United States, an award was made for its payment. There, as here, the money was demanded by the bankrupt and y his assignees, and the same lines of argument to which we ve listened in this case were pursued by the counsel in that case with consummate learning and ability. The judgment of t e court was delivered by Mr. Justice Story. It sustained e demand in behalf of the creditors, and is exhaustive and
conclusive.
t is needless for us in this case to go over the same field of iscussion. A few remarks, however, grounded chiefly upon
th^ a^hority will not be out of place. It will be observed St&t ® against Spain, and the claim against the United xi a, 8’ ere *n question, rested upon the same foundation, and eac was surrounded by like circumstances.
e.re 18 no element of a donation in the payment ultimately gifts iT 8UC^ Cases’ Nations, no more than individuals, make the d • m°ney t0 foreign strangers. Nor is it material that whichlm, ?an.n°t be enforced by a suit under municipal law Pavme r °^Ze8 suc^ a Pr°ceeding. In most instances the
0 t e simplest debt of the sovereign depends wholly p. 304upon his will and pleasure. The theory of the rule is that the government is always ready and willing to pay promptly whatever is due to the creditor. It is but a short time since our government could be sued, and it can be done now only under the special circumstances defined by the statute. It is enough that the right exists when the transfer is made, no matter how remote or uncertain the time of payment. The latter does not affect the former. Nor has an adverse decision any final effect. If the demand be just, and recognized as valid by the law of nations, the claimant, or his government, if the latter choose to do so, may still press it upon the attention of the alien government.
If the thing be assigned, the right to collect the proceeds adheres to it, and travels with it whithersoever the property may go. They are inseparable. Vested rights ad rem and in re — possibilities coupled with an interest and claims growing out of property — pass to the assignee. The right to indemnity for the unjust capture or destruction of property, whether the wrong-doer be a government or an individual, is clearly within this category. Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S.* 392. The register’s deed in this case bears date Feb. 12,1869. The title then became vested in the appellant. Thereupon he stood in the place of McDonald, and was clothed with all the rights which had belonged to the bankrupt before he became sue On the 25th of September, 1873, within less than five years after the assignment, an award was made by the mixed com mission, sitting under the treaty between the United State and Great Britain, for the payment of $187,190 in satisfaction of cl Qii tyi
In the light of these considerations, it would be sheer fatuity to deny the substantial character and value of the claim a time of the transfer by the register s deed.
But it is insisted that the alleged sale under the order o District Court divested the title of the assignee. *
According to the bill, the order was to sell ‘ certain ac®° notes, judgments,” &c. The exhibit referred to as con a “ copies of the petition, order, and report of the sale “ the record. Whether the order was broad enough to i the claim in question, and whether the report s owe
was sold, are questions which, in the state of the record as it is before us, we are unable to determine. Doubts in such cases are to be, resolved against the pleader. But if the affirmative be conceded as to both these points, a fatal objection still remains. McDonald went into voluntary bankruptcy. His petition did not disclose that he was a British subject. We have given the description of the claim in the schedule filed with his petition. It was brief and vague, and gave no definite information. In a duplicate schedule filed with the register he pronounced it “ worthless.” In assigning to him exempted property, the register and assignee unite in saying, “ No other exemptions made, because there are no assets, except some old claims which upon their face called for large amounts, and upon inquiry I find them totally or entirely worthless.” He failed to make known that he bought the cotton under a permit from the Treasury Department, accompanied with an order from the President directing the officers of the army and navy to aid im in getting it beyond the lines of the insurgent territory, and that it was lost to him by reason of a sudden and unexpected change in the legislation of Congress, thus creating as strong an equity in his favor against the United States as could well exist.
. i/8 memorial to the mixed commission was sworn to on the t of November, 1871. In that document his losses are 8 ated with fulness and particularity. It is in striking con-rast with the meagreness of the schedules. When there had 'd^ ^ransler the claim, the rules of the commission pro. e ” m°de and manner of such transfer must be
* • The memorial was silent upon this subject. This soon to realize nearly $200,000 — was sold for $20! saidavers’ and the demurrer admits, that “the the 8a^e in the bill mentioned purchased nished^b ^.^l1® )re^ue®t °f said McDonald, and with money fur-
seated fi8 faSe the P°int in hand, as it is pre-the comphinlnf mUn aPPellees to the allegations of showing * Considering the sale in the light of this ^minctfum^ hesi?ate t0 h°ld invalid. We are not
V0L ix a t e Question may come again before the lower p. 306court, and perhaps before this court, upon the answers of the appellees and the testimony adduced by the parties, and that it may then be the hinge of the controversy. It is our purpose in such case to leave both courts unfettered by any thing in this opinion, and in all respects as free to decide, one way or the other, as if the subject had not been before considered by either tribunal.
The bankrupt law required that all suits by or against the assignee should be brought within two years from the time the cause of action accrued. Rev. Stat., p. 982, sect. 5057.
But this provision relates to suits by or against the assignee with respect to parties other than the bankrupt. In a case like this it has no application. If this were otherwise, the cause of action here did not accrue until the award was made and McDonald set up a claim to the fund awarded. Clark v. Clark, 17 How. 315.
Lastly, it is said that the suit is in effect a suit against the British government, and that hence the court below had no jurisdiction of the case.
In Clark v. Clark (supra), where the contest was between the bankrupt and his assignee, touching a fund in the treasury derived from a foreign government, the Secretary, though not a party, was enjoined from paying it over until the rights of the contestants were settled in the suit then pending. t
In Millnor et al. v. Metz (16 Pet. 221), also, the fund m controversy was in the treasury. The Secretary re¡use recognize the claim of either party, and left them to a jus conflict by a judicial determination. The contest wasteni by a decree in the court below, which was affirmed y. court, perpetually enjoining one of the parties from receiving
the money. . , _
This objection assumes facts which have no existen. British government is in no wise, either in fonn or su a party to the record, and no final or coercive ju icia is sought except with respect to McDonald an •
the progress of the case below, George W. W gf pointed receiver, with authority to col ect e nCfi course he could do nothing without the voluntary ion of the just and eminent British agent, who was i p p. 307By consent of parties the fund was delivered to the receiver, and in the final decree brought here for review he was directed to pay it over to the appellees, less certain charges and expenses incurred in procuring the award, and he was thereupon to be discharged from his office. We have heard no objection from any quarter to the placing of the fund in the hands of the receiver. Certainly none has been suggested in behalf of the sovereignty whose rights are said to have been invaded.
But suppose, as has been suggested, that the money were in the British exchequer, at the seat of the home government, still the court below acquired jurisdiction of the parties and of the cause, and had an important duty to perform.
Such commissions as that which made the award here in question usually decide only as to the validity of the claim and the amount to be paid. It is rarely, if ever, within their jurisdiction to decide upon the ownership of the claim. They have no means of compelling the attendance of parties or witnesses, no rules of pleading or procedure applicable to such a case, and the foreign element in the tribunal, at least, cannot e supposed to have any knowledge of the law according to which the question is to be determined. The validity of the claim depends upon the law of nations; its ownership, upon * e local jurisprudence where the transfer is alleged to have been made.
Hence, Comegys n. Vdsse, Clark v. Clark (supra), and other e cases have arisen, involving conflicting claims to the fund awarded, and nothing else.
n this case, whether the money be here or abroad, the he have the question finally settled whether de'd A ^Ona^ has the better right. This court has twice Court / r * British subject can sue the United States in the sue th° n ^ms’ because an American citizen is permitted to of e British government by a petition of right. The act State^^n ’ ^earinS the court requires reciprocity. United 16 id 1*47 ee^ 178; Carlisle v. United States,
governm assignee were presented to the British were also** a Periti°n right, and the claim of McDonald
P esented, the parties, in the absence of any judicial p. 308determination, would doubtless be required to settle their controversy by interpleading, or in some other appropriate form of litigation. If the appellant shall be finally successful in this case, and the record should be presented with his petition, no such question could arise, and judgment in his favor must necessarily follow. Conceding the fund to be there, why should not this question of paramount right be settled in this case, rather than that the American claimant should be subjected to the delay, expense, and other inconveniences of a suit before a foreign tribunal? The adjudication would be as binding in one case as in the other.
Where the necessary parties are before a court of equity, it is immaterial that the res of the controversy, whether it be real or personal property, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal. It has the power to compel the defendant to do all things necessary, according to the lex loci rei sites, which he could do voluntarily, to give full effect to the decree against him.
Without regard to the situation of the subject-matter, such courts consider the equities between the parties, and decree in personam according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their decrees by process in personam. 2 Stoiy, Eq., sec. 899; Miller v. Sherry, 2 Wall. 249; Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 606.
The decree of the court below will be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to proceed in conformity to this opinion ; and it is ordered
Mr. Justice Miller, with whom concurred Mr. Justice
Field, dissenting. , . ,
The treaty under which the award was made, whic is ®
subject-matter of this suit, provides for the payment to iea
Britain of claims for injury to British subjects, and the awa
in this case in express terms orders the money to be pai
agent of that government in this country. Comegys .
and Claris v. Clark, cited in the opinion, are cases of aw
made in' favor of the United States for the use of its citi
While the money so awarded is properly a fund wit in p. 309jurisdiction of our courts, as are also our own citizens, I do not think those courts have any control over the British government or its agents in the distribution of the fund awarded to them.
It does not appear from any thing in the record, as I read it, that the fund in controversy has ever been voluntarily paid into court by the agent of that government. It is an indelicate attempt by the courts of this country to seize in transitu, for its own citizens, what by treaty this government has agreed to pay to another government for its subject.