Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schwenk, 94 U.S. 593
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schwenk, 94 U.S. 593
Full caption
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Schwenk.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Schwenk.
1. Where it is not a condition of a policy of life insurance that a statement of the age of the insured should accompany the proofs of his death, the party for whose benefit the insurance was effected, although no previous notice was given to the insurers that such evidence would be offered, is not estopped from proving at the trial of a suit on the policy that a statement of the age of the deceased accompanying such proofs, and differing from that made in the application, is erroneous.
2. An entry in the minute-book of a lodge of odd fellows, of which the deceased was a member, made prior to the issue of the policy, and showing his age as recorded by the secretary of the lodge in the usual manner of keeping its records, is not admissible as evidence of such age. It is merely hearsay.
Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
This action was upon a life policy, dated March 26,1867, procured by Anthony A. McDonough from the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, in the name and for the sole use and benefit of his wife, Mary D. McDonough. In case she died before him, the amount of the insurance was payable to her children, for their use, or, if they were under age, to their guardians, ninety days after notice and proof of his death. He died on the twelfth day of April, 1869, and she on the sixteenth day of April, 1868, leaving two children by him, and two by a former husband, who, by their guardians, brought this suit.
The application for insurance was signed by Mary D. McDonough and Anthony A. McDonough, at Reading, March 25, 1867. To the question, “ Place and date of birth of person whose life is proposed to be insured, — giving month and day ? ” the following answer was given : “ Ireland, Aug. 11, 1805.”
Age next birthday ? ” “ Sixty-two.”
The declaration contains the common counts in assumpsit, vol. iv. 38 p. 594setting forth the policy, the application, interrogatories, and answers. The defendant filed fifteen pleas. The first two put in issue the execution of the policy and alleged performance; the third, that the said Anthony A. McDonough was not bom in the year 1805. The remaining pleas set up misrepresentations and false allegations in the application as to the health and habits of the insured. The pleas were traversed by replications.
At the trial, the plaintiffs put in evidence the policy, proofs of death, and, by request of defendant’s counsel, the application for insurance, and then called Adam Schwenk, who swore that, within sixty days after the death of said Anthony, he gave all the proofs of it to Tilden, the agent of the company, who did not object to any matter of form.
The defendant having asked for a nonsuit on the ground that the affidavit of one Nolan, furnished with the proofs of death, showed that the deceased was between sixty-six and seventy years of age at the time of his death, the court, notwithstanding the objection of the defendant, that it had not prior to the trial received notice that such evidence would be offered, permitted the plaintiffs to call Nolan as a witness. He testified, in substance, that he had no positive knowledge of the age of the deceased, but that the age fixed by him in his affidavit was a mere impression, founded upon the appearance of the deceased. To the admission of this evidence the defendant excepted.
In the course of the trial, the defendant, in order to prove that the age of the deceased was different from that stated in his application, offered in evidence a certain entry or statement, dated Sept. 6, 1845, contained in the minute-book of Bernville Lodge of Odd Fellows, of which deceased was a member, and at one time secretary. The court refused to admit the evidence, and the defendant duly excepted. The jury found all the issues in favor of the plaintiffs, and, a judgment having been rendered in their favor, the defendant sued out this writ of error.
Mr. Michael Arnold for the plaintiff in error.
The court declined hearing counsel for the defendants in error.
Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court.
The issue, out of which arose both the questions brought here by this case for determination, was founded on a plea that Dr. McDonough, the person whose life had been insured, was older than he had been represented to be in the application for the policy. In that application, made March 25, 1867, his age was stated to be sixty-two at his next birthday. Accompanying the proofs of death furnished to the company by the plaintiffs below was an affidavit of one Thomas Nolan, that the death occurred on the 12th of April, 1869, and that the deceased was between sixty-six and seventy years of age at that time, according to the best judgment of the affiant. To explain the discrepancy between the statement of the affidavit and that made in the application, the plaintiffs offered to prove that the age of the deceased was different from that stated in the affidavit; and, for this purpose, they offered to prove by Nolan himself that he was mistaken, and that he had no knowledge upon the subject. This evidence the court received, notwithstanding an objection by the defendants (the ground of the objection being that no notice had been given to them prior to the trial that such evidence would be offered) ; and the admission of the evidence is the first error assigned.
In considering the ruling of the court, it is first to be observed that nothing in the policy required that proof of the death of the person whose life was insured should be accompanied by proof of his age at the time of his death. There was, it is true, a memorandum, indorsed on and folded in the policy, that a certificate would be required from some intimate friend of the age of the person insured at the time of his death ; but the memorandum was no part of the contract, and it was not shown to either the court, the jury, or the counsel, before the verdict was lendered. Nolan’s affidavit, therefore, was no necessary part of t e proofs of death, and hence it was immaterial. Yet, having been furnished by the plaintiffs to the defendant, it was some evidence of the age of the person insured, though certainly not conclusive. There can be no reason why it was not open to correction, if it was erroneous. This is not denied by the plaini in error, and it could not be successfully. It has repeatedly een held that errors and omissions in the proofs of loss p. 596furnished to insurers, in cases of fire insurance, may be corrected or supplied at the trial. Tn McMasters v. The Insurance Company of North America, 55 N. Y. 222, the plaintiff had stated in his proofs of loss that he had other insurance on the same property, — a fact which, if true, avoided his policy, — and he had verified his statement by his oath. Yet he was held not to be estopped by the statement, and he was permitted to prove at the trial that the statement was a mistake. Hubbard v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 33 Iowa, 325, is to the same effect. So are the AEtna Fire Insurance Co. v. Allen, 48 Ill. 431, Comm. Fire Insurance Co. v. Huckenburger, 52 id. 464, and numerous other cases that might be cited. But it is contended that evidence to show Nolan’s affidavit was a mistake ought not to have been admitted, without notice to the insurers before the trial that such evidence would be offered; and in support of this position Campbell v. The Charter Oak Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 10 Allen (Mass.), 213, and Irving v. The Excelsior Insurance Co., 1 Bosw. (N.Y.), 500, are cited. In the former of these cases, it was held that, if an incorrect statement of a material matter has been made through mistake in a notice and proof of loss furnished to insurers, in compliance with a requirement in the conditions of insurance annexed to a policy, and no amended statement has been furnished to the insurers before the trial of an action upon the policy, the insured cannot be allowed to prove the mistake, and show that the facts were not as therein stated. But that case is very different from the one we have before us. There a true statement of the material fact in the proofs of loss was called for by the policy, and it was made a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability. The erroneous statement, therefore, was relied upon by the assured, as the notice required by the conditions of the policy, and as a necessary basis of his suit. It must have been, in substance, averred in his declaration; and, for these reasons, the insurers were misled in regard to a matter which the assured had obligate himself to state truly, as a condition precedent to his right to remuneration for his loss. But even in that case the court declined to say that the incorrect statement in the proofs o loss could not be corrected. All that was decided was that t e p. 597mistake and the correction could not be first made known to the insurers at the trial of the action to recover for the loss, and obviously for the reason that the correction then would be a surprise to them. Irving v. The Excelsior Fire Insurance Company is substantially the same. Neither of the cases can be considered as deciding that an insured js estopped by an erroneous statement of a fact in the proofs of loss furnished by him, even though a true statement of that fact be a condition of the policy. He may correct it, though not first at the trial. But, in the case we have in hand, it was not a condition of the policy that a statement of the age of the deceased should accompany the proofs of death. The insurer’s liability was independent of that. Nolan’s affidavit, therefore, was superfluous; and it was but a statement of his conjecture. He stated that, according to the best of his judgment, the person whose life was insured was between sixty-six and seventy years of age at the time of his death. This can hardly be regarded as a contradiction of the statement made in the application. The insurers ought not to have been misled by it; and it does not appear that they were. They alleged no surprise when the evidence was offered to show that Nolan had no knowledge on the subject, and that he was mistaken. We cannot, therefore, say there was error in receiving the evidence.
The second assignment is, that the court erred in rejecting the minute-book of a lodge of odd fellows, offered by the plaintiffs in error to show the age of Dr. McDonough, as recorded therein in the usual manner of keeping the records of the °dge. It might, perhaps, be enough to say of this, nothing in the bill of exceptions shows that the minute-book, had it been received, would have tended to prove the age was greater than it was stated to be in the application for the policy. But, waiving this, and conceding also, that, when a policy on the life of a husband has been issued for the benefit of a wife, his admissions made prior to its issue are admissible in evidence to contradict her statements in her application, we are of opinion t at none of the entries in the minute-book can be regarded as a m^ssi°ns of McDonough respecting his age. They were made by the secretary of the lodge before McDonough became a member of it, and they do not state that any p. 598representation of his age was made by him; much less, that he stated his age was as the secretary entered it. What was entered, then, was the declaration of a third party, not an admission by the person whose life was insured: it was mere hearsay, at best. It nowhere appears McDonough knew of the entry, or assented to it, when it was made, or that he ever afterwards acquiesced in it. True, he was subsequently elected secretary of the lodge, and then had the book of minutes in his charge. He may then have read the minutes, and thus have obtained notice that such an entry appeared therein. But it would be going very far to hold such knowledge was any evidence of an admission by him that the statement of his age made in the entry was true.
It is argued, however, that though the entry in the minute-book was the declaration of a third person, it was admissible on the principle of necessity; and we are referred to the line of decisions in which it is said to have been ruled that written entries or declarations of third persons are admissible as primary evidence after their decease, when they accompany, or are explanatory of, some material fact, or as secondary evidence, when the particular circumstances afforded reasonable assurance that the person who made them knew the fact stated, communicated it faithfully, and cannot be obtained to testify. Without pausing to inquire whether the doctrine asserted in these cases is as broad as the plaintiffs in error state it, the present case clearly fails to come within it. The secretary who made the entry in the lodge minute-book had, so far as it appears, no peculiar means of knowledge of Dr. McDonoughs age, and there is no proof that he was not living at the trial. For aught that appears, he might have been called as a wi ness.
Again, it is argued that a man’s age is one of the elements o his pedigree, and that, in proving pedigree, hearsay evidence is admitted. The argument is fallacious. It is true, the age o a person may become material in questions of pedigree; but even then the hearsay declaration of strangers, persons not relate by blood or marriage, are inadmissible to prove it. Moreover, the present case involves no question of pedigree. The proo of age was not offered for the purpose of showing parentage or p. 599descent, both of which were impertinent to the issue between the parties. The assignment of error cannot, therefore, be sustained. Judgment affirmed.
The “Stephen Morgan.”
1. A party who does not appeal from the final decree of a circuit court cannot be heard in opposition thereto, when the case is properly brought here by the appeal of the adverse party.
2. This court, concurring in opinion with the court below that both vessels were at fault, affirms the decree dividing the damages between them.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United. States for the District of Maryland.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. F. W. Brune and Mr. Arthur Gr. Brown for the appellants. Mr. I. Nevitt Steele and Mr. Thomas W. Hall, contra.
Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court.
Parties who do not appeal from a final decree of a circuit court which is regular in form cannot be heard in opposition to the decree when the cause is removed here by the opposite party, unless it appears that the proceedings in removing the cause were unauthorized or irregular. They may be heard in support of the decree, and in opposition to every assignment of error filed by the appellants. The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377; Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 494; Canter v. Insurance Company, 3 id. 318.
Where the decree was in favor of the libellant in the District Court for a salvage service in saving goods at sea, this court held, on appeal here by the owners of the goods, that the decree was conclusive upon the libellant as to the amount of salvage awarded ; that he could not, in the appellate court, claim any thing beyond that amount, since he had not, by any appeal on his part, controverted its sufficiency. Stratton n. Jarvis $ Brown, 8 id. 10.
Compensation is claimed by the owner of the steamship Carolina from the schooner “ Stephen Morgan,” her apparel, tackle, and furniture, for injuries caused to the steamship by p. 600the schooner in a collision which occurred between the two vessels during the early morning of the 3d of October, 1872, in the lower part of Chesapeake Bay, whereby, as the appellant alleges, the steamer was damaged to the amount of from $12,000 to $15,000.
Detailed description of the circumstances is given in the libel, from which it appears that the steamer, a vessel of eleven hundred tons burden, with a cargo of corn, was bound down the bay on a voyage from the port of Baltimore to Queenstown, Ireland, for orders, and that the schooner, a vessel of two hundred and fifty-nine tons, in ballast, was bound up the bay on a voyage from the port of New York to the port of Georgetown, in this district. Both the steamer and the schooner were in a seaworthy condition, well manned and equipped, and the evidence shows that they had competent lookouts, and that their signal-lights were properly displayed.
Certain errors of statement are exhibited in the description of the circumstances attending the collision, as given in the libel; but inasmuch as it is apparent that they were not made with intent to deceive, and that they did hot have the effect to embarrass the opposite party or the courts below, they cannot have the effect to prevent the libellant from recovering just compensation for the injuries which the steamer received, if the evidence is sufficient to show that the decree below is correct upon the merits.
Process was issued ; and the owners of the schooner appeared as claimants, and filed an answer.
Matters of fact are the chief reliance of the respondents; and, inasmuch, as the allegations of the answer show, in the judgment of the court, that the schooner was in fault, they will be given in considerable fulness.
Prior to the collision, the mate had charge of the deck of the schooner; and the respondents allege that the weather was fair, and that it was clear overhead, with a slight mist or haze on the water ; that the wind, from about southwest-by-south, was. blowing a fresh and steady breeze ; that the schooner was on her port tack, with all her sails set, except her main top-sail and jib top-sail; that her speed was about seven or eight knots an hour; that the mate, about ten minutes after he took charge p. 601of the deck, directed the man at the wheel to change the course of the schooner from north-by-west-half-west to north-by-west, which, as the respondents allege, was her proper course up the bay. Ten minutes later, as the respondents allege, the lookout saw a bright light ahead, about a point or a point and a half on the starboard bow of the schooner, and that the mate, who was standing aft to the leeward of the spanker-boom, saw the light about the same time, and looked at it through the glass. Though the morning was clear, the mate came to the conclusion that the vessel showing the light was at anchor, because he could only see the white light, and he thought the vessel was distant about a mile and a half, or two miles.
Estimates of the kind are necessarily more or less uncertain ; but the answer states that the schooner was then a little above the light-house, and nearer to the western than the eastern shore of the bay; and the respondents admit that the schooner had plenty of room to sail and manœuvre on each side of the place where the vessel showing the light appeared to be at anchor. When the mate first looked at the light, he told the man at the wheel that it was a ship at anchor, and he directed the helmsman to let the schooner luff about a point; and that being done, the statement is, that the light was brought to bear about two points on the schooner’s starboard bow. Both of those orders were promptly obeyed; and the answer states that the helmsman, after the order to luff was executed, steadied the schooner, and “ let her run ” for a short time; when the mate, thinking that the schooner might not fairly clear the ship, told the man at the wheel to luff a little more, so as to allow plenty of room.
Throughout those manœuvres, both the mate and the lookout of the schooner supposed that the light ahead was shown by a vessel at anchor ; and they never discovered their mistake until the steamer approached so near that they could see her smoke-stack without the aid of the glass. Alarm and confusion immediately ensued on the deck of the schooner, as sufficiently appears from the allegations of the answer. Obviously the peril was imminent ; and the answer states that the mate, fearing that a collision would occur, ordered the helmsman to put e wheel hard a-port; and that the master came on deck at p. 602that moment, and asked the mate what was the matter; and being told that there was a light on the lee bow, the master looked under the boom, and, having seen the light, ordered the wheel to be put hard down, which was immediately done. Under the order given just before by the mate, the wheel had been turned only a few spokes to port, when the master gave the order to put the wheel hard down, which being promptly obeyed, the schooner began to luff ; and at the moment of collision, which presently ensued, she was still coming into the wind, and her sails were shaking. Almost immediately after the helm of the schooner was put hard a-starboard the collision occurred, the schooner striking the steamer abaft the fore-rigging and a little forward of midships.
Testimony was taken on both sides ; and the parties having been fully heard, the District Court decided that both vessels were in fault, and that the joint loss and damage should be equally divided between the owners of the two vessels. Pursuant to that decretal order, the loss and damage sustained by each were ascertained, and a final decree rendered in favor of the libellant, for the sum of $5,295, with costs and interest. Immediate appeal was taken by both parties to the Circuit Court, where additional testimony was taken; and the parties having been again fully heard, the Circuit Court reduced the damages to be awarded, and in all other respects affirmed the decree of the District Court. Due appeal to this court was taken by the respondents; but the libellant acquiesced in the decree of the Circuit Court.
Two errors, it is alleged by the appellants, were committed by the Circuit Court, as follows: 1st, That the court erred in awarding damages to the libellant, inasmuch as the allegations of the libel, if true, showed that the alleged collision could not have occurred. 2d, That the court erred in adjudging that the schooner was in fault.
Substantial accuracy in pleading should be observed by the libellant; and it is proper to remark, that a departure from that requirement, with intention to deceive, may constitute a bar to recovery, unless the faulty party is relieved from its consequences by leave of the court. Defects of the kind, when discovered, should be cured by amendment in all cases where the imperfection is calculated to deceive or mislead.
Incorrect allegations as to the position and course of the steamer are doubtless contained in the libel; but it does not appear that the inaccuracies were intended to deceive, or that they had the effect to mislead, the opposite party or the court. Specific objection to the libel on that account was not taken in the answer, nor does it appear that the errors in the allegations occasioned any embarrassment to the respondents in preparing the case for hearing.
Material errors undoubtedly occurred in the libel, but the respondents corrected the same in their answer; and, inasmuch as the hearing upon the merits was full in each of the courts below, the court here is not inclined, to sustain that defence. The Syracuse, 12 Wall. 173.
Much discussion of the second defence is unnecessary, as both the proofs and the allegations of the answer show that the schooner violated the sailing rules enacted by Congress. Steamships, under the circumstances described, are required to keep out of the way of sailing-ships; but the correlative rule is, that the sailing-ship shall keep her course, subject to certain qualifications, which have no application in the cause before the court. 13 Stat. 61.
Sailing-vessels approaching a steamer are required to keep their course, on account of the correlative duty of the steamer to keep out of the way, in order that the steamer may know the position of the object to be avoided, and that she may not be baffled or led into error in her endeavor to comply with the requirement. Steamship Company v. Humball, 21 How. 384.
Three changes of course were made by the schooner, in violation of that rule, which is all that need be remarked on the subject, except to say that the failure of the steamer to perform her duty to keep out of the way is no defence for the schooner in violating the express command of the sailing rule. Beyond a 1 doubt, the steamer might have kept out of the way; and it is clear that the decree below, adjudging both vessels in fault, was correct. AU that the steamer did in the outset was to change er course one point; and the evidence satisfies the court that, i she ever did any thing more to prevent a collision, it was not one in season to be of any avail. Porting the helm a point w en the light of a sailing-vessel is first observed, and then p. 604waiting until a collision is imminent before doing any thing further, does not satisfy the requirements of the law. The Carrol, 8 Wall. 302.
Other support to that conclusion might be invoked ; but it is quite unnecessary, as the owner of the steamer did not appeal, and cannot be heard, except in defence of the decree. Airey v. Morrill, 2 Curt. C. C. 8; Allen v. Hatch, 2 id. 147 ; Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 196; The Quickstep, 9 id. 672.
Both vessels having been in fault, the settled rule in this court is, that the damages must be divided. The Atlas, 93 U. S. 319.
Viewed in any light, it is clear that the decree below was correct, and that there is no error in the record.
Decree affirmed.
Glenny v. Langdon.
Where a party prosecutes a suit as a representative creditor, and the other creditors, until notice to the contrary, have the right to rely upon him to protect their interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, a notice by the appellees of a motion to dismiss an appeal where he is the appellant, served upon counsel representing him and the other creditors, is insufficient and irregular, if it does not specify the time when such motion will be made, although he may have entered into a stipulation with the appellees consenting to a dismissal of the appeal on their paying the costs.
Motion to set aside an order dismissing an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohi.
Mr. J. L. Miner for the appellant, in support of the motion. Mr. Stanley Matthews, contra.
Mb. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
The bill in this case shows upon its face that the suit was prosecuted by Glenny as a representative creditor, and that the other creditors named had the right to rely upon him for the protection of their interest, until notice to the contrary. On Saturday, the 13th January, Glenny, at Cincinnati, Ohio, p. 605entered into a stipulation with the defendants, consenting to a dismissal of the suit on their paying the costs. A copy of this stipulation was, on the same day with its execution, served, at Cincinnati, on the counsel representing the complainant and those interested with him in the litigation, accompanied by a notice that a motion had been filed to dismiss the appeal in accordance therewith; but no time was named for the hearing. On the same day, the counsel for the defendants forwarded the stipulation to the clerk, with the request that it be docketed in accordance with the practice of the court. In the letter transmitting the motion it was intimated that there might be opposition, and in that event a request was made for notice, and information as to the practice in such cases.
On Tuesday, the 16th of January, the stipulation was presented to the court by Mr. Carpenter, at the request of the clerk, made upon the authority of the letter transmitting it, and the suit was dismissed. On Monday, the 15th January, the counsel for the complainant wrote the clerk from Cincinnati, asking him not to delay printing the record on account of the motion, and intimating that the motion would not be sustained. A memorandum was made upon this letter by the clerk, to the effect that he replied on the 20th January, giving notice of the dismissal on the 16th. The letter of the clerk in reply did not reach the counsel, and he had no notice of what had been done until about the first of this month, and immediately thereafter the present motion was made.
Under the circumstances, we think the motion to dismiss was improvidently granted, and the order to that effect entered ,an. 16, is, therefore, set aside. The notice of the motion was insufficient and irregular, as it designated no time for the hearlng> It is evident, also, that the counsel for the complainant supposed, as he properly might, that he was to have further information of the time when the motion would be called up.
o other questions argued upon the present motion are decided, ut the cause is reinstated, and the parties placed in the same condition they would be if the order of dismissal had not been entered. Motion granted.