Davis v. Crouch, 94 U.S. 514
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Davis v. Crouch, 94 U.S. 514
Full caption
Davis v. Crouch.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Davis v. Crouch.
This court has no jurisdiction to re-examine the decree of the highest court of a State, reversing that of an inferior court, and remanding the cause for further proceedings.
Error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.
Hector Davis died during the late civil war, at Richmond, Va., leaving a will executed March 21,1859, as follows: —
“ Richmond, March 21,1859.
“ I, Hector Davis, of city of Richmond, State of Virginia, do hereby make this my last will and testament: Item 1st, I give to my nieces, Jannie, Sally, and Bettie Davis, the sum of $15,000, to be equally divided between them. I give to a servant-woman, Ann, of mine, her freedom, to be removed out of the State, with her four children, Jannie, Audubon, and Victoria, and after their removal the sum of $20,000, she, Ann, to have the interest on one-fifth of the amount, and the interest of the balance to be expended in raising the said children till they become of age; then the principal to be given them. I wish said amount to be invested in State stock by my executors, and applied as aforesaid.
“ I give my nephew, R. D. James, of Goochland, the sum of $5,000. Whatever balance I may be worth, I want given to my sister, Ann Crouch, and her children. I appoint R. D. James and Franklin Matthews my executors to this my last will and testament.
“ As witness my hand and seal.
“Hector Davis.
“ Witnesses: B. W. Elmore.
S. N. Davis.”
This will was admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of the city of Richmond, March 13, 1863, when James alone qualifie as executor. The servant-woman Ann and her children are t e present plaintiffs in error, and are known in the pleadings as Ann Davis, Jannie Davis, Audubon Davis, Victoria Davis, an Matilda Davis. They were removed at some time to P 1 delphia, but whether before or after the death of the testator, p. 515does not appear, though they seem to have been there during the war.
The estate was large, consisting of real property, slaves, bank and other stocks, a small amount of Confederate bonds, debts due the testator, and some furniture. All the parties interested in the settlement of the estate resided in the Confederate States during the war, except Ann Davis and her children.
The personal property, exclusive of debts due the estate, was valued at $91,020. Feb. 20, 1864, leave was granted the executor by that court, upon his petition therefor, to invest the cash on hand belonging to the estate in interest-bearing bonds or certificates of the Confederate States, or of the State of Virginia, or any other sufficient bonds or securities in that State. Under this order he invested, during the months of April, July, and November of that year, $33,508.82 of Confederate currency in Confederate bonds. A part of the slaves were sold, but nearly all the remainder of the personal and real property, except the debts, was retained during the war in the condition it was left by the testator at his death.
At the close of the war, proceedings were instituted in the Chancery or Circuit Court of the city of Richmond against the executor by the residuary legatees, looking toward a settlement of the estate; and, Nov. 9, 1865, the executor filed in that court a bill in chancery against all the legatees, including Ann Davis and her children, to have the whole estate settled up and distributed among the parties entitled thereto. In these proceedings the executor was ordered to render an account of his transactions before one of the commissioners of t e court, who was directed to take an account of all the assets e onging to the estate, and of all claims due by the same. A report was filed by the commissioner, Feb. 16, 1868, to which xceptions were taken both by the executor and the residuary egatees, and, May 19, 1869, the report was recommitted to commissioner, with the exceptions, for further examination, an a restatement of the accounts, if necessary. Nov. 16,1869, coi an^ her c^^ren appeared, and, by leave of the th \ • an answer to the bill of the executor, in which y c aimed their full rights, and particularly objected to the p. 516investments in Confederate bonds, as unauthorized and illegal, so far as they were concerned. A second report was filed by the commissioner, May 4, 1870, from which, with that of 1868, it appeared that the debts owing by the estate amounted to about $23,000; that there was in the hands of the executor United States currency to the amount of $14,188.54; that the estimated value of the real estate was $15,435 ; that the estimated value of Virginia State stock and furniture was $1,524; and that there were also in the hands of the executor debts due the estate, marked “ good ” or “ doubtful,” of the nominal amount of $40,000 and more. In stating the account, the executor was allowed a credit for his investments in Confederate bonds. Many exceptions were filed to the report by the residuary legatees, and, among others, because the executor was credited with the amount of these investments, and because he had not been 44 charged with every debt reported by him 4 good ’ and every debt reported by him 4 doubtful,’ unless he had obtained judgments upon them, because it was his duty to have obtained judgments against all who did not pay and were not deemed insolvent.”
At the hearing in the Circuit Court both these exceptions were overruled, and a decree entered confirming the report, with some modifications. From this decree Ann Davis and the residuary legatees took an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State, where the following judgment was entered April 22, 1873: —
“ This day came again the parties by their counsel, and the court, having maturely considered the transcript of the record of the decree aforesaid, and the arguments of counsel, is of opinion, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record, that the sai Chancery Court erred in overruling the appellant’s fifteenth exception to the report of Commissioner Evans; instead of doing whic, the said court ought to have recommitted the said report, as to the matter of the exception, to a commissioner of the court, wi instructions to make further inquiry, and report as to the debts o the estate of Hector Davis at the time of his death, by P?™0 ? residing in the State; whether any of said debts, and w io them reported as worthless or doubtful, are now available, or have been collected or secured by lien upon real estate or o p. 517wise, or by suits instituted since the death of the testator, and as to any other matters connected with said debts which the said commissioner might deem material, or concerning which either of the parties might require him to make inquiry and report; but the court is further of opinion that there is no other error in the said decree than as aforesaid. Therefore, it is decreed and ordered that so much of the said decree as is above declared to be erroneous be reversed and annulled, and the residue thereof affirmed; and that the appellee, R. D. James, pay to the appellants their costs by them expended in the prosecution of their appeal aforesaid here. And it is ordered that this cause be remanded to the said Chancery Court for further proceedings to be had therein, in conformity with the foregoing opinion and decree, which is ordered to be certified to the said Chancery Court of the city of Richmond.”
This judgment has been brought here by Ann Davis and her children upon a writ of error, and the executor now moves to dismiss the writ, because the judgment of the Court of Appeals is not the final judgment or decree in the suit.
Jfr. J. Randolph Tucker for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Conway Robinson, contra.
Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
Our jurisdiction upon writs of error to State courts is conned to the final judgment or decree in a suit in the highest court in which a decision in the suit can be had. Rev. Stat. 09. This, we think, is not such a judgment. It decides some of the questions involved in the controversy between the parties, but the suit itself has been sent back to the Circuit
^or further proceedings, in conformity to the opinion e with the record. In short, the judgment is one of reversal
.n W as we have uniformly held, is not a final judgment in the suit. McComb v. Commissioners, 91 U. S. 1; Parcels v.
20 Wall. 654; Tracy v. Holcomb, 24 How. 427. After On + Pr°ceedings which have been ordered in the Circuit and ’ SU«^ may aSain taken to the Court of Appeals, and another judgment rendered there. of °bject of the parties is to settle and distribute the estate estator under the direction of the court. The plaintiffs p. 518in error are only interested in securing the payment of their legacy. A statement of the accounts of the executor, upon the principles settled by the Court of Appeals, may produce a fund sufficient to satisfy them. The only question upon which our jurisdiction can be invoked arises out of the decision as to the liability of the executor to account for his investments in Confederate securities. As to this, the present plaintiffs in error, having been non-residents of the Confederate territory during the war, occupy a different position from the other parties; and, until the suit has been finally disposed of in the State courts, the fund ascertained, and the results of a decree ordering distribution known, we cannot tell whether they will be injuriously affected by the errors now complained of. They cannot bring the case here for the benefit of the other parties interested in the estate, except so far as the relief granted to them may indirectly operate to the advantage of the others. If in the end, upon the distribution of the estate under the principles of accounting as now established, they shall not be able to obtain payment of the amount due them, the case may be again taken to the Court of Appeals upon the future decree of the Circuit Court, and from there here, if necessary. Whether their interest in the convertible value of the Confederate currency invested in Confederate bonds for the purchase of State stock is sufficient to justify them in doing so, will be a matter for them to determine, after the final decree shall have been rendered.
In the present condition of the suit, however, we are compelled to dismiss the writ for want of jurisdiction.
Writ dismissed.
The “Edith.”
1. Under the maritime law, there is no lien upon a vessel for materials furnishe and work done in repairing her at her home port. 2. A creditor, claiming the benefit of the provisions of the statute of New or,
passed April 24,1862, which purport to give such a lien, must, whet er be invalid or not, — a, point which the court deems it unnecessary m case to decide, — take it subject to all the conditions which they unp^ and he loses it if it be not enforced within the time prescribed.
seizure has been seasonably made, a bond in conformity to them, when executed and delivered to him by the owner, is a substitute for the lien, and works a discharge of the vessel.
8. The District Court can marshal the fund in its registry only between lien-holders and owners.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District df New York.
In July, 1870, Buckman & Co., having done work and furnished materials amounting to S3,597.37 in repairing the “ Edith,” while she was lying in navigable waters in her home port of New York, claimed a lien on the ship for materials and repairs, under an act of the State of New York, entitled “ An Act to provide for the collection of demands against ships and vessels,” passed April 24, 1862. Acts of 1862, p. 456. The requisite notice was filed the twenty-seventh day of July, 1&70, a few days after the vessel had left that port. Some time after her return, the precise period not appearing, proceedings were instituted by the firm, and an attachment was issued to the sheriff of the city and county of New York, who, after seizing her, discharged her on a satisfactory bond for the claim having been given on behalf of the owner. On the first day of April, 1871, she was libelled in the District Court of the United States, sitting in admiralty, and sold under a decree rendered on the 8th of the following month. After satisfying the decree and subsequent costs, there remained $31,176.82 in the registry of the court. On the 17th of the latter month, the firm filed their petition in that court, praying that so much of the fund as was necessary be applied to the payment of the amount so due them, which they claimed was, at the time it accrued, a lien on the “ Edith,” she being a domestic vessel beonging to the port of New York. At the time of filing the petition, a suit by the firm on the bond, which had been given to e ease her from the attachment, was pending in the State court.
e petition was resisted by Sedgwick, the assignee in bankruptcy of the owner of the “ Edith,” and by Tyler. To the er more than the amount of the fund was then due c 6 owner’ wh° had executed a mortgage therefor on ee our^hs of the vessel, Jan. 11, 1870. The instrument recorded the same day in the New York custom-house, and p. 520a copy of it filed in the office of the register of the city and county of New York. There was also a prior mortgage on one-half of the vessel.
The District Court decided that Buckman & Co. had not a lien on the ship, nor any title to such fund as between them and the assignee in bankruptcy and the mortgagees.
The petition of Buckman & Co. was dismissed; and they appealed to the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, where a decree of affirmance was passed. They then appealed to this court.
Mr. F. A. Wilcox for the appellants.
Mr. E. P. Wheeler, contra.
Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court.
Assuming that, by virtue of the provisions of the statute of New York, of April 24, 1862, 4 Gen. Stat. 632, the appellants had a lien upon the ship for the repairs made and materials furnished by them, it is a vital question whether that lien remained in existence when the ship was sold on the eighth day of May, 1871. If it had expired, or if it had been discharged before that day, it is useless to examine the other questions raised in the case; for, however they might be determined, the decree made in the court below must necessarily be affirmed.
The repairs having been made upon a domestic vessel in her home port, there was no lien for them by the maritime law, and, therefore, whatever right the appellants had to a lien is that which was given to them by the laws of the State. The statute undoubtedly gives a lien, but not one of unlimited duration. The first section declares that debts contracted for work done or materials furnished in the State, for repairing sea-going or ocean-bound vessels, shall be a lien upon such vessels, and be preferred to all other liens thereon, except mariners wages. But the second section declares that “ such debt shall cease to be a lien at the expiration of six months after the said debt was contracted, unless at the tiirje when said six months sha expire such ship or vessel shall be absent from the port at which such debt was contracted, in which case the said ien shall continue until the expiration of ten days after such ship or vessel shall next return to said port.
The repairs in this case were made upon the ship in the month of July, 1870, and on or before the 22d, for the ship cleared on that day, and sailed from the port a day or two afterwards. The lien, therefore, expired in January, 1871, unless the ship was then absent from the port of New York. If she was then absent, the lien expired at the end of ten days after her next return. It does not appear in the record exactly at what time she did return; but, in the petition of the appellants for an appeal to this court, it is averred that she was libelled in the southern district of New York, at the suit of another party, on the 1st of April, 1871, was duly attached, and was sold by virtue of a decree obtained in that case. It is the proceeds of that sale, made May 8, 1871, which are now in the registry of the District Court, and the petition of the appellants for payment out of the proceeds was not presented until May 17. How, then, can it be maintained that the statutory lien for the debt had not expired ? It is argued the presumption is that the ten days next after the return of the ship had not elapsed when the appellants filed their petition. Were it possible that any such presumption could be accepted, it would be a presumption of fact, and there is quite enough in the case to overcome it. The ship was libelled in admiralty, as we have noticed, on the 1st of April, 1871. She was duly seized, a decree against her was made, and under it she was sold on the 8th of May. It is hardly possible that the seizure, decree, and sale could have been made within ten days. It could not have been, if in accordance with the usual course of admiralty practice. As the seizure was made in the southern district of New York, it would be an inadmissible presumption that the ship had not returned to the port of New York more than ten days prior to the sale, or certainly more than ten days prior to the 17th of ay, when the appellants filed their petition. And this is not a 1. The evidence shows that, after the return of the ship, the appellants caused an attachment to be issued out of the Supreme ourt of New York, in virtue of which the sheriff of the city an county seized the ship, and a satisfactory bond was given, a owed by. the statute of the State, and the ship was disth^^/ * • This must have been before the marshal had taken e s ip mto custody under the process of the Admiralty Court. p. 522The sheriff could not have attached her after the marshal’s seizure. It is reasonably clear, therefore, that she had returned to the port of New York more than ten days before she was sold. This is the.result of affirmative proof.
But, were there no such proof, the burden of showing the contrary would rest upon the appellants. Six months having expired after the repairs were made to the ship, they had no lien, unless the ship was absent from the port at the expiration of that period, and then only during ten days after her next return. The lien during those ten days was a special privilege given to them by statute, — an exceptional right. Hence, it was incumbent upon them to show that such a right existed, and, by proof, to bring themselves within the exception. This is always the rule when a party claims a peculiar right given by a statute, — a right not common to all, and which is given only when a prescribed state of facts shall exist. Such proof the appellants have not adduced, and, therefore, they have failed to show that their statutory lien had not expired before they presented their petition for payment, and even before the ship was sold.
And were this not so, still, on the facts of the case as exhibited by the record, it must be held that the lien was discharged.
It is almost superfluous to remark, that whatever lien the appellants ever had, they held it subject to all the provisions of the statute which gave it to them. They sued out an attachment against the ship, after her return to New York, for the recovery of the claim they now set up. The ship was seized by the sheriff of the city and county, and, a satisfactory bond having been given according to the provisions of the lien law, the ship was discharged from the custody of the sheriff, and from the attachment. Upon that bond a suit has been brought, which is now pending. The effect of such an attachment an bond is plainly declared by the statute. The twelfth section enacts, that, “ upon such bond being executed and delivere to such attaching creditor or his attorney, ... no further pro ceedings against the said vessel so seized shall be had un ei the provisions of this title, founded upon any demand seCU^® by such bond.” The bond is thus made a substitute for the lien, and its purpose and effect are to work a discharge ° vessel. It matters not that the statutory provisions for en o p. 523ing the lien have been adjudged invalid, because beyond the power of the State legislature. If they are invalid, it may be doubted whether all the provisions purporting to give a lien are not also invalid, because inseparable from the prescribed means of enforcing it. But without deciding that, we may remark, that clearly the State had power to enact that the lien it created should terminate, if a bond was given in place of the vessel; and the creditor claiming the lien must take it, subject to the conditions imposed.
It need hardly be added, that though a proceeding in rem and a petition for payment of a claim out of proceeds of a sale remaining in the registry are distinct things, — the former proceeding on the ground of a lien, — yet no one except an owner is entitled to payment out of the registry, unless he has a lien upon the fund therein. The court can marshal the fund only between lien-holders and owners. Decree affirmed.