Bd. of Comm'rs v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108

Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, Treasurer.

1. If by any direction of a Supreme Court of a State an entire cause '

mined, the decision, when reduced to form and entered m the ^d^ court, constitutes a final judgment, whatever may be its technica g tion, and is subject in a proper case to review by this where, upon appeal from an interlocutory order ma e y gtate Indiana, granting a temporary injunction, the upre direcreversed the order and remanded the cause to the owe tions to dismiss the complaint. of a State \2. Unless restrained by provisions of its constitution, the g

possesses the power to direct a restitution to tax-payers of a county, or other municipal corporation, of property exacted from them by taxation, into whatever form the property may be changed, so long as it remains in possession of the municipality. The exercise of this power infringes upon no provision of the Federal Constitution.

Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.

By an act of the legislature of Indiana, passed on the twelfth day of May, 1869, counties and townships in that State were authorized to aid in the construction of railroads, by taking stock in railroad companies, and making donations to them. Before giving the aid, it was necessary for the officers of the county, the board of commissioners, to consult the electors of the county upon the subject, and obtain their approval of the proceeding at an election called for that purpose. Such approval having been obtained from the electors of Tippecanoe county, the board of commissioners of the county, during the years 1871,1872, and 1873, subscribed and paid for stock in the a ayette, Muncie, and Bloomington Railroad Company, a rporation organized under the laws of the State, and engaged e tune in building a railroad passing through the county. e stock thus subscribed and paid for amounted to six though n six undred and ten shares, of the par value of fifty dollars

^°r ^em ^he company issued its certificates to the Was money which the stock was paid act C° by a special tax levied for that purpose. The could bemad C°^ec^ng ^be money before the subscription

The certificates thus issued were made assignable, and any lawful holder could present and surrender them to the proper company previous to Jan. 1, 1874, in sums equal in amount to any number of shares, and it was made the duty of the company to issue a certificate of paid-up capital stock to the amount of the certificate of taxes paid which was surrendered. For the stock unclaimed within the time designated a certificate was to issue to different townships in the county, for the benefit of the common-school fund. The act declared that the issuing of the stock to individuals or townships, as thus provided, should operate to cancel pro tanto the stock held by the county under the provisions of the act of May, 1869.

The present complaint was filed by the commissioners of the county in the Tippecanoe Civil Circuit Court, to restrain the treasurer of the county from issuing to tax-payers the certificates of taxes paid, as provided by the act of 1872. The treasurer had previously, against the remonstrance of the commissioners, issued a number of certificates to different parties, and declared his intention to issue certificates to all parties applying who were entitled to receive them under the act. In the complaint, the commissioners denied the power of the State to take t e stock, or any part of it, from them, and give it to individuals or their private benefit; and alleged, that by the issuing o t e certificates their right was made questionable, a cloud was cas upon their title, and the market value of the stock held I y t em was destroyed, and that they were deprived of their rig stockholders in the company. They, therefore, praye a temporary injunction be granted against the treasurer, an it might be made perpetual on the hearing.

The complaint was verified; and, after notice and argumen counsel, an order was made granting a temporay inj™c ^n’, prayed. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the S a, order, or the judgment, as it is termed in the la”^age record, was reversed, and the cause remande to e o nt with instructions to dismiss the complaint From is] g the cause is brought to this court on a writ of error.

Mr. Z. Baird, for the plaintiff in error.

Under the Indiana Code of Procedure, the judgment of the Supreme Court, reversing that of the inferior court, and remanding the cause with instructions to dismiss the complaint, determined the merits of the controversy. It was, therefore, a final judgment within the meaning of the act of Congress. Whiting v. The Bank of the United States, 13 Pet. 15; Forgay et al. v. Conrad et al., 6 How. 202 ; French v. Shoemaker, 12 Wall. 86 ; Atherton et al. v. Fowler et al., 91 U. S. 143.

The plaintiff in error is a municipal corporation, exercising delegated powers, legislative, executive, and judicial. 1 Gavin & Hord, 247 et seq. It lawfully acquired the stock in controversy, and became the owner thereof in its corporate name, and cannot be deprived of it in the manner prescribed by the act of Dec. 17,1872.

Where corporate powers are conferred, there is an implied contract between the State and the corporators that the property held under their charter shall not, without their consent, e taken and appropriated to other uses. Trustees of Dartmouth

v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Cooley on Const. Lim. > Dillon on Mun. Corp. 8; Armstrong et al. v. The Board of Commissioners of Dearborn County, 4 Blackf. 208; Edwards T’ aggers et al., 19 Ind. 406 ; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Crunch, 43.

nder the constitution of Indiana, and the peculiar powers latte^6^ uPon the board of county commissioners, the

Powers granted exclusively for public purposes are vested in the corporation in its public, political, or municipal character; but if the grant is for the purpose of private advantage and emolument, though the public may derive a common benefit therefrom, the corporation, quoad hoc, stands on the same footing as any individual or body of persons upon whom the like special franchises have been conferred. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra; Philips v. Berry, 1 Ld. Raym. 8; S. C. 2 T. R. 352 ; Allen v. McKean, 1 Sumn. 297; The People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 331; 2 Kent, Com. 275 (4th ed.) ; United States Bank v. Planters’ Bank, 9 Wheat. 907; Clark v. Corporation of Washington, 12 id. 40; Moodalay v. East India Co., 1 Bro. Ch. 469.

As the act of Dec. 17, 1872, invades the right of private property and impairs the obligations of a contract, it is in vio-

lation of the Constitution of the United States, and void.

Mr. H. W. Chase and Mr. J. R. Coffroth for the defendant in error.

1. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana is not final. The order of the Circuit Court awarding an injunction was merely interlocutory, passed at a preliminary state of the proceedings, and not upon the final hearing of the case, an the action of the Supreme Court was had upon that order.

2. A county, being a political organization for public purposes, is under the complete control of the State. Within the e pressed constitutional restrictions, it or its property may e e with by the legislature as it deems wise and expedient, prov that the property be secured for the uses of those for w om a at whose expense it was originally purchased. ar mg o Mayor, ^c., 31 N. Y. 164; Lycoming v. Union, f6“1’ ’ 166 ; Grim v. Weinentery, 57 id. 488; Phladdpho 7.

64 id. 169; County v. County, 12 Ill. 1 ; Dennis v. Maynard, 15 id. 477; Love v. Schenck, 12 Ired. 304 : Louisville, ^c. Railroad Co. v. County Court, ^c., 1 Sneed, 637 ; Sharp v. Contra Costa Co., 34 Cal. 288 ; State v. St. Louis Co., 34 Mo. 546 ; City of Augusta v. North, 57 Me. 392 ; Wade v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 583 ; State v. Votaw, 8 Blackf. 2 ; Sloan n. State, id. 364; State Bank v. Madison, 3 Ind. 43 ; Groodrich v. Winchester, 26 id. 119 ; Maryland v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad Co., 3 How. 534 ; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 id. 511 ; Mulligan v. Corbins, 7 Wall. 487.

3. The stock in question was purchased by a fund raised for that specific purpose by the exercise of the taxing power. Dividing it among the tax-payers, in proportion to the amount hy them severally contributed, conflicts with no constitutional provision. The board had but a naked legal title. The individual tax-payers were alone beneficially interested. The road having been completed, all participation in the managenient of the company was wisely withdrawn from the county oard, which was organized solely for the administration of the affairs of the county.

Mr. Justice Field, after making the foregoing statement oi the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

In this court, also, the validity of the act of 1872 is the sole question presented. The act is assailed here, as in the court below, as authorizing an invasion of the right of private property, and as impairing the obligation of an executed contract. Were the transaction one between the State and a private individual, the invalidity of the act would not be a matter of serious doubt. Private property cannot be taken from individuals by the State, except for public purposes, and then only upon compensation, or by way of taxation; and any enactments to that end would be regarded as an illegitimate and unwarranted exercise of legislative power. And any attempt by the legislature to take private property from its grantee, and restore it to its grantor, would be in conflict with the constitutional inhi bition against impairing the obligation of contracts.

But between the State and municipal corporations, such as cities, counties, and towns, the • relation is different from that between the State and the individual. Municipal corporations are mere instrumentalities of the State, for the convenien administration of government ; and their powers may be qua fied, enlarged, or withdrawn, at the pleasure of the legislature. Their tenure of property, derived from the State for speci public purposes, or obtained for such purposes throug m. which the State alone can authorize, — that is, taxation, — is s far subject to the control of the legislature, that t e may be applied to other public uses of the mumcipah y those originally designated. This follows from .e tence< such bodies, and the dependent character of their ex

But property, derived by them from other sources, is often held, by the terms of its grant, for special uses, from which it cannot be diverted by the legislature. In such cases, the property is protected by all the guards against legislative interference possessed by individuals and private corporations for their property. And there would seem to be reasons equally cogent, in abstract justice, against a diversion by the legislature from the purposes of a municipality of property raised for its use by taxation from its inhabitants. There are probably provisions in the constitutions of the several States which would prevent any marked diversion in that way ; but whether a contract between the State and the municipality, within the protection of the Federal Constitution, is implied in such cases, that the property acquired shall not be diverted from the purposes of the municipality and appropriated to other uses, is a question we are not now called upon to determine. In the present case, it is not necessary for us to go over the ground, so ably explored by the judges of the Supreme Court of Indiana, and attempt to mark e ine within which the State may control and dispose of property eld by a municipal corporation, and beyond which its action S SU to the same restraints as are its dealings with the propf ° ^^viduals. It is enough that the present case is free om i culty. Here there is no attempted diversion of the operty from the purpose for which it was acquired: that purbv 6 aS accomPhshed. The money having been obtained contrihution from the inhabitants, the legislature time h^ °U have directed its restitution to them at any previo6 I°r\the SubscriPtion wâs made- If the road had been Unn an^ contemplated had thus become Num ary? SUC^ resthution would have been proper and just, lected wqS mT $ be nam®d where the return of taxes col-raised fo/ be °nly ^USt Proceeding to be taken. Money gency ceasin emer^ency may n°t he required by the emer-