Ryan v. Carter, 93 U.S. 78

On the 13th of October, 1800, Dodier asked of the then Spams Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Louisiana a concession o *ve hundred arpens of land; and, on the 14th of that month, Lieutenant-Governor ordered that he should be put m posse p. 79sion of the land requested. A survey and plat of the land so ceded was made by Soulard, surveyor under the Spanish government, and certified by him Dec. 10, 1800, and recorded by him in the record-book of surveys. Dodier duly filed and presented his claim to the board of commissioners for adjusting land-titles in the District of Orleans, Territory of Louisiana, who, on the thirty-first day of July, 1810, issued to him the following certificate: —

Dodier died in 1823, leaving heirs-at-law, under whom the plaintiffs claim title. Dodier and wife conveyed a part of the land by deed, bearing date Jan. 18, 1805, to Louis Labeaume, who died in 1821, having devised the property to his wife, by w 1 made in 1817; and by mesne conveyances her title passed to the defendant Carter. He, and those under whom he claims, ave been in the open, notorious, and undisputed possession of e demanded premises for thirty-five years before the commencement of this suit. In 1818, on the petition of Labeaume, partition was made between him and the heirs of Dodier; but p. 80the land in controversy is not within the boundaries of the tract described in the report of the commissioners in said partition suit to be set off to Labeaume.

Argued by Mr. Daniel T. Jewett for the plaintiffsin error, who cited Magwire v. Tyler, 8 Wall. 650 ; Gibson 13 id. 92; Guitard^. Stoddard, 16 How. 494; Clarke v. Mum p. 81merle, 36 Mo. 620; Glasgow v. Hortiz, 1 Black, 600; Strother n. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410. Mr. Montgomery Blair, contra.

’ aPply to and affect the title to the land in controversy. vol. hi. „ J p. 82The United States stipulated that the inhabitants of the ceded country should be protected in the free enjoyment of their property; and in discharge of this obligation, and with a view to ascertain and adjust their claims to land, Congress passed acts in 1805, 1806, and 1807. As the board progressed in its investigations, it was found that the enforcement of the rules prescribed for its guidance excluded from confirmation a large number of meritorious claims, and more liberal provision was made for them by the act of June 13, 1812. Its first section declares “that the rights, titles, and claims to town or village lots, out-lots, common field-lots, and commons in, adjoining, and belonging to the several towns and villages (naming them), in the Territory of Missouri, which lots have been inhabited, cultivated, or possessed, prior to the twentieth day of December, 1803, shall be, and the same are hereby, confirmed to the inhabitants of the respective towns or villages aforesaid, according to their several right or rights of common thereto, provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect the rights of any person claiming the same lands, or any part thereof, whose claims have been confirmed by the board of commissioners for adjusting and settling claims to lands in the said Territory.” It does not require the production of proofs before any commission or other tribunal established for that special purpose, but confirms, proprio vigore, the rights, titles, and claims to the lands embraced by it, and operates as a grant, to all intents and purposes. Repeated decisions of this court have declared that such a statute passes the title of the United States as effectually as if it contained in terms a grant de novo, and that a grant may be made by a law, as well as by a patent pursuant to a law.

The court below found that the lot of ground, now known as Survey 422, was an “ out-lot ” of the village of St. Louis, with definite boundaries and location, prior to and at the date of t 6 acquisition of Louisiana by the United States, and that Dodier was in possession of it, and an inhabitant of the village. . follows that the confirmation became complete, and veste m him a legal title, valid against the United States, and all Per sons claiming under it by a subsequent patent, unless his case p. 83was taken out of the enacting clause by the proviso that the act shall not affect any confirmed claims to the same lands. How “ affect ” them ? If in the sense of simply acting upon them, then his title is excepted from the operation of the act. But this exception is not within the reason of the proviso, and the court is at liberty to adopt another construction, if it may be fairly done, by giving full and just effect to the words used.

The general rule of law is, that a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the body of the act; and those who set up any such exception must establish it, as being within the words as well as the reason thereof. United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 165. Why should Congress wish to exclude Dodier’s title, if it did not conflict with any other, and was embraced by the general words of the statute ? If it was left incomplete by the act of 1807, and completed by the act of 1812, there was certainly no reason for excluding it. It was within the power of Congress to favor the inhabitants of villages over other claimants; and the fact that he had documentary evidence of his title to this out-lot, which the commissioners recognized and approved, affords no ground for supposing that Congress meant to deprive him of the benefit of another law dispensing with this evidence, and still meeting the requirements of his case. This would lead to unjust consequences; for it would discriminate between villagers, and put claims, supported by paper-title with possession, on a less favored footing than those resting only on cultivation and possession. Besides, such a purpose is inconsistent with the avowed object of the law, which is to confirm to the villagers, without discriminating in favor of any class, their rights of property, whether held in severalty or in common. If Congress had intended to exclude confirmed claims, the fair presumption is, that it would have, in terms, excepted them, or y some form of words declared their exclusion. But common airness required that successful claimants before the board of commissioners should, in any event, be protected, and that the general words of the law should be so limited as not to produce aconflict of title. It would have been wrong, in legislating for ^oeJU a^ants of ancient villages, to do any thing prejudicial ose who, having been invited to present their claims to the p. 84board, had obtained its approval of them. This was recognized by Congress; and, to guard against the possibility of conflict, the proviso was inserted. No known rule of law requires us to interpret it according to its literal import, when its evident intent is different. It may be that the words, taken in their usual sense, would exclude the case of Dodier; but if it can be gathered, from a view of the whole law, and others in pari materia, that they were not used in that sense, and if they admit of another meaning in perfect harmony with the general scope of the statute, it will be adopted as the declaration of the will of Congress. Especially is this so when this construction withdraws the least number of cases from the operation of the statute. It is unnecessary to give the various definitions of the word “ affect.” It is enough to say, that it is often used in the sense of acting injuriously upon persons and things; and in this sense, we are all of opinion, it was used in this proviso. This interpretation accords with the reason and manifest intent of the proviso. It unsettles no confirmed title, and secures to the inhabitants of the villages, according to their respective rights, the protection which Congress in its wisdom thought proper to afford them.

as ^rosaid. ’ must, therefore, mean such a service as • iJ6 the stay, if the proper security had been Wli *S extended only in respect to the security. °f Con^ a^erwar<^s occurred is equally indicative of the intention could -greSS' As the section originally stood, no execution until thSSUe, .W^?n wr^ error might be a supersedeas incr a exPlration of sixty days, the time allowed for perfected ser^d^^ leave. If the writ had been issued erve withotft the security required for a supersedeas, p. 92execution must still be withheld until the time had elapsed within which the further security might be given as a matter of right. This changed the law from what we held it to be in Commissioners v. Gorman, and at once, upon the discovery of the effect of what had been done, the amendment was adopted limiting the time to ten days, as it originally stood. Nothing was done, however, towards adapting the section as revised to the liberal construction of the act of 1872, indicated in Telegraph Company v. Eyser.

t does not appear that, upon the purchase of the notes in 1 t e plaintiff gave his note or other obligation which might t^h 8 ^nS^er subject him to liability. His agreement seems ave een an oral one merely, — to pay the amount agreed Pon, as should be required; and he had paid $500, and no more, n notice of the fraud was brought home to him. paper ar^amen^ ^he plaintiff in error is that negotiable and t] S°^ ^°r suc^ sum as parties may agree upon, entire a ' W e^er such sum is large or small, the title to the plainr# ?e i ?aSSeS purchaser. This is true; and if the a ought the notes in suit for $500, before maturity p. 94and without notice of any defence, and paid that sum, or given his negotiable note therefor, the authorities cited show that the whole interest in the notes would have passed to him, and he could have recovered the full amount due upon them. Fowler v. Strickland, 107 Mass. 552; Park Bank v. Watson, 42 N. Y. 490; Bank of Michigan v. Green, 33 Iowa, 140. The present case differs from the cases referred to in this respect. The notes in question were purchased upon an unexecuted contract, upon which $500 only had been paid when notice of the fraud and a prohibition to pay was received by the purchaser. The residue of the contract on the part of the purchaser is unperformed, and honesty and fair dealing require that he should not perform it; certainly, that he should not be permitted, by performing it, to obtain from the defendants money which they ought not to pay. As to what he pays after notice, he is not a purchaser in good faith. He then pays with knowledge of the fraud, to which he becomes a consenting party. One who pays with knowledge of a fraud is in no better position than if he had not paid at all. He has no greater equity, and receives no greater protection. Such is the rule as to contracts generally. In the case of the sale of real estate for a sum payable in instalments, and circumstances occur showing the existence of fraud, or that it would be inequitable to take the title, the purchaser can recover back the sum paid before notice of the fraud, but not that paid afterwards. Barnard v. Campbell, 53 N. 73; Lewis v. Bradford, 10 Watts, 82; Juvenal v. Jackson, 2 Harris, 529; id. 430; Youst v. Martin, 3 S. & R- 423, 430.

a not °a^eS are — that where a bona fide holder takes misappropriated, fraudulently obtained, or without p. 96consideration, as collateral security, he holds for the amount advanced upon it, and for that amount only. Williams v. Smith, 2 Hill, 301.