R.R. Co. v. Pratt, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 123
Case details
Bluebook Citation
R.R. Co. v. Pratt, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 123
Full caption
Railroad Company v. Pratt.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Railroad Company v. Pratt.
1. Though where goods received at one place are to be transported over several distinct lines of road to another and distant one, the liability of the common carrier first receiving them (where no special contract is made) is limited to his own line, yet he may subject himself by special contract to liability for them over the whole course of transit. And this is true of a railroad corporation possessed of the powers given to railroad corporations generally and subject to corresponding liabilities; such railroad corporations, ex. gr., as those incorporated under the general railroad law of New York.
2. If there is competent evidence of such a contract thus to carry, put before the jury, the weight, force, or degree of such evidence is not open for consideration by this court.
3. What amounts to competent evidence. This matter stated in a recapitulation of the evidence given in this particular case. A way-bill in which the heading spoke of the goods as goods to be transported by the first road, from the place of departure to the place at the end of the whole line, and at which the owner wished to have them delivered, held to be such evidence, whether looked upon as a contract, or as a declaration or admission.
4. Where in such a line of roads as that described in the first paragraph above, the common carrier owning the first road undertakes to carry goods over the entire line—part of the goods being put aboard the cars on his line, and a part to be put on at its termination and where the next road begins—the fare asked and agreed to be paid being, however, the fare usually asked and paid for the carriage over the whole line, and the contract being for transportation over the whole road and not for carriage to the end of the first line and then for delivering to the carrier owning the next road and for carriage by him—the fact that a part of the goods were put on the cars only where the second road begins, will not exonerate the owner of the first road from liability for their loss.
o. Where on such a line of road as that in the said first paragraph described, the second road posts its rules in the station-house of the first, a person furnishing goods for transportation “ through ” is not to be held as of necessity to have notice of them from the fact of such posting, and because he was often in the station-house of the first company where they were posted. Independently of which, his contract being with the first company only, and ¿¿ agreeing to carry for the whole distance, its rules are the rules that are to govern the case.
6. If a common carrier by rail is negligent and careless in furnishing cars and so furnish cars unsuitable for the case—even though they be cars for cattle, which cars the owner himself sees, and which cattle the owner himself attends—the carrier is not relieved from responsibility, even though there have been an agreement that he shall not be responsible.
Error to the Circuit Court for .the District of Massachusetts, in which court J. Pratt and H. Brigham, of Boston, sued, by process of attachment, the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad Company, a corporation of New York, to recover from that company damages for the loss of certain horses which Pratt, for the two parties, had put into the company’s cars on its road in the said State, and which had been burned to death, not on the said company’s road, but on the Vermont Central Railroad; a road in the State of Vermont, connecting with the former, but not belonging to the same corporation, but on the contrary belonging to a different corporation; to wit, a corporation of Vermont.
The case was thus:
In the northeastern part of New York there exists what is known as the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad. The road begins at Ogdensburg, about ninety miles west of Lake Champlain, and runs eastwardly through a place called Potsdam to Rouse’s Point on the said lake, at which point it strikes the boundary line between the States of New York and Vermont.
This Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad Company was incorporated under the general railroad law of New* York, and possessed the powers possessed by railroad corporations generally, and was subject to the same liabilities as they generally are.
At Rouse’s Point begins a new railroad, to wit, the Vermont Central Road; a different road, as already stated, and owned by a different corporation, one created by Vermont. The rails of the two roads, however, connect. This Vermont Central Road runs across the State of Vermont in a southeasterly direction till it comes towards the edge of Massachusetts, where it strikes.a third road, which, passing through Concord in that State, enters the city of Boston.
At the town of Potsdam, above spoken of as near the west end of the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain road, Pratt, already mentioned, a transporter of horses, went, in March, 1868, to one Graves,-who was the station agent at Pottsdam of the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain road, and informed him that he wished two good “stock cars” to carry certain horses for himself and Brigham to Boston. Pratt thus testified:
“I have been for twenty years in the habit of buying horses (one or two hundred a year), and of transporting them over the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain and the Vermont Central roads to Boston. I have known Graves five or six years as station agent at Potsdam. His office was in the freight-house. He always furnished me stock cars. This occurred from five to ten times a year. The cars thus furnished by him went without any change right through over these roads, and the arrangements made by him were always recognized by the roads through to Boston. A week before the horses for whose loss this suit is brought, were brought to Potsdam, Mr. Graves engaged to give me two good stock cars to carry them to Boston. He did at the time appointed give me two cars, and I took my horses to them. I objected to one of the cars. Graves said that I must take it or wait for a week, as no others than these were there. I took the car rather than wait, and repaired it as well as I could. I put in some hay—wet and rotten hay—to keep the horses from slipping. I always did that. One of the railroad hands and I put it in on this occasion ; and in full view of the office. This railroad hand had been in the service of the company for three or four years. I then told Mr. Graves that I wished to put in other horses at Rouse’s Point. He agreed to this. We agreed upon the price, $85 per car, through to Boston ; being the same price as if all the horses had been put in at Potsdam; the horses to be transported from Potsdam; some taken on there and some at Rouse’s Point. We had passes to go on the train which took our horses. I always put my horses in and go on the cars myself to take care of the horses, or else send a man. On this occasion Mr. Brigham was in charge all the way. 1 had no other man. You can’t go in the same car with the horses. A place called a box car was furnished for us. The way-bill was thus made out:
Way-bill of merchandise transported by Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad Company, from Potsdam Junction to Boston, via Concord, March Mth, 1868.
Name and resi-
dence. Description of articles. Weight. Freight. Total Remarks.
Designation. Rate. Backcharges.
charges.
I |
J. Pratt, Boston, 1 car horses.................. 20,000 $85.00 $85.00 Coll.
1 man in charge, free, O’g. H. Brigham,. . . 1 car horses.................. 20,000 ... 85.00 ... 85.00 ............
1 man in charge, free.
40,000 $170.00 $170.00
“ I saw the bill at Potsdam after it was made out.”
The plaintiffs here put this question to the witness:
In these acts of Graves in furnishing cars and making arrangements for transportation through to Boston as testified by you, for whom did he assume to act ?”
The defendant objected to the question, asserting that the witness could be asked only as to what was said and done, and that the question was incompetent on this account, and as calling from the witness an expression of his own opinion or inference. The court admitted the question, and defendant excepting, the witness answered:
“He assumed to act for the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad Company.”
In consequence of the cars being broken and very much exposed, and sparks from the locomotive getting into them the hay took fire, and the horses were burnt to death. This took place on the road of the Vermont Central Company. Some of the horses were put in at Rouse’s Point.
No freight was paid on this particular occasion at Potsdam; and indeed it was generally paid, in transactions between these parties, in the depot in Boston.
The defendants produced Graves, the station master already mentioned. He testified that there were several cars at Potsdam when Pratt brought the horses to the station, and that he could have had his choice, and as he, the p. 127witness, supposed did have it; that all cars were examined before being sent off, and if unfit were reported; that the cars were “ billed ” as per the way-bill above shown; that the freight might have been paid in advance, but was not; that the witness knew of no hay put into the cars; that it was against the rules of the Vermont Central road to put any litter in them. Two men 'were allowed to go free, one in each car.
The defendants also put in evidence certain rules printed on a single sheet, entitled “Vermont Central Railroad Special Live-stock Tariff',’’ which after reciting certain rates of freight per ton, contained, under the head of “ Directions,” the following provisions:
“In consideration of drovers being permitted to ride free on the same train with their stock for the purpose of taking charge of it, it will, in all cases, be their duty, or that of shippers of live stock, to examine cars before loading, and if they accept them the stock will be at their risk of loss or damage occasioned by doors being displaced or otherwise. Hay, straw, and like combustibles will, under no circumstances, be allowed in a car with live stock. Persons violating this rule will not only suffer all loss which the same may cause to his or their own stock, but will be held responsible for all damage caused by such violation, whether it be to individuals or to the railroad.”
They then introduced evidence tending to show that these rules were posted up in the Potsdam station, and that the plaintiffs were often there, and so must have seen them. The plaintiffs denied being often in the station-house, and testified that they had never seen or heard of the said rules until after this loss occurred.
On the trial, the court having charged that the defendants would not be liable for a loss occurring on any other railway in the line unless, at least, they specifically and expressly contracted to transport the horses through or beyond their own road to where the accident happened; that otherwise they would be forwarders, and their liability would be discharged by safely delivering to the next road in the line, was asked by the defendants to charge further thus:
“ If the jury are satisfied that the plaintiffs at Potsdam Junction, when they took the car in question, knew of its defects, and that it was unsafe, and liable to catch fire and burn, having full opportunity to see and examine it, and that they did see and examine it, and had full knowledge of its condition, and either selected or accepted this when they might.have had another car; or if they consented to take this, and were allowed > to take it at their request and wish, they electing and proposing to do so, and insisting upon it rather than wait a reasonable time for another car, they by so selecting or accepting the car took their risk of these defects, and cannot recover for losses occurring because of them.”
In lieu of the charge requested, the court charged as follows:
“ The common carrier is bound to furnish suitable vehicles and means of transportation for the carriage of such articles as he undertakes to carry and transport. If he furnishes unsafe or unfit cars he is not exempted from liability by the mere fact that the shipper knew them to be defective and used them. Nothing less than an agreement by the shipper to assume that risk would have that effect. In this case, if the plaintiffs expressly agree to assume the risks of defective cars rather than to wait a reasonable time for other cars, they cannot recover.”
The jury found for the plaintiff, and the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad Company brought the case here on different causes of error, which were resolvable into these four questions:
1. Had the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad Company power or right to contract as a common carrier to transport the horses to Boston over another railroad, and beyond its own terminus?
2. Was there competent evidence given on the trial that the company did so contract in relation to the horses in question ?
3. Did the plaintiffs, by putting their horses into a car which they knew was defective and unsuitable, thereby assume the risk of such defects, and relieve the company from responsibility for the same?
Opinion of the court.
4. Was there error in admitting in evidence the way-bill made and forwarded with the property by the defendants, or in allowing the witness to state for whom the station agent assumed to act ?
Mr. C. H. Hill, for the plaintiff in error; Messrs. E. L. Pierce and A. Charchill, contra.
Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.
The several causes of error assigned present four separate principles, and we will consider the questions which they iaise in their order. The questions may be thus stated :
First. As to the power of the railroad company to contract as a common carrier for the transportation of property beyond the terminus of its own road.
The distinction between the liability of a carrier, in carrying goods upon his own line, and in forwarding them when the duty to carry is at an end, is well defined. In the language of Mr. Justice Davis, in Railroad Company v. Manufacturing Company,* “It is the duty of the carrier, in the absence of any special contract, to carry safely to the end of his line, and to deliver to the next carrier in the route beyond.” What constitutes a sufficient delivery to tie succeeding carrier is often a difficult question, but we ave no occasion to embarrass ourselves with it here.
The fair result of the American cases limits the carrier’s lability as such, when no special contract is made, to his own line, although there are cases which hold the liability continuing the same throughout the whole route, and 8,ic is the English doctrine. A discussion on this point is unnecessary, as the judge on the trial held the rule as we ave stated it, and as was most favorable to the defendants,
ciaiged the jury that the defendants were only liable upon a contract to be proved that they had assumed a liability beyond that imposed by law. ^J^jlefendants were an incorporation organized under
* 16 Wallace, 324.
vol. xxn. 9
Opinion of the court.
the general railroad law of the State of New York. They possessed the powers given to corporations generally and were subject to the corresponding liabilities.*
Assuming the case to stand upon the general principles applicable to the question, the doctrine that a railroad company may subject itself to the obligations of a carrier beyond its own line, has been distinctly held in the State of New York, where this contract was made; in the State of Massachusetts, where its performance was to be completed, and in the State of Vermont, where the alleged injury occurred.!
In the case of Bartis v. Buffalo and St. Lawrence Railroad, supra, it was held that this principle applied to connecting roads extending beyond the limits of the State. The single exception to this holding, so far as we are aware, is in the State of Connecticut, where the contrary has been held by its Supreme Court.!
This case, however, does not stand upon the general principle only. By the statutes of New York§ it is enacted as follows: “ Any railroad company receiving freight for transportation shall be entitled to the same rights and subject to the same responsibilities as common carriers. Whenever two or more railroad companies are connected together, any company owning either of said roads receiving freight to be transported to any place on the line of either of said roads so connected shall be liable as common carriers for the delivery of such freight at such place. In case any such company shall become liable to pay any sum by reason of the
*
New York, Laws of, 1848, p. 221; Same, Laws of, 1850, p. 211. t Bissell v. Michigan Railroad, 22 New York, 258; Buffett v. Troy and Boston Bailroad, 40 Id. 168; Root v. Great Western Railroad, 45 Id. 52 ; Burtis v. Buffalo and St. Lawrence Railroad, 24 Id. 269; Hill Manufacturing Co ®. Boston and Lowell Railroad Co., 104 Massachusetts, 122; Feital «■ Middlesex Railroad, 109 Id. 398; Noyes®. Rutland and Bennington Kai - road Co., 27 Vermont, 110; Morse v. Brainerd, 41 Id. 550; Railroad Co.®. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wallace, 324; Evansville and Crawfordsvil e road Co. ®. Androscoggin Mills. . . 22 J Converse v. N. and N. Y. Transportation Co., 33 Connecticu, > Id. 502. . „fi7 g Statutes of 1847, 299, g 9; 2 Revised Statutes, 5th edition, 69Ö, « ■
Opinion of the court.
neglect of any other company or companies, the company paying such sum may collect the same of the company by whose neglect it became so liable.” This statute is declared by Rappallo, J., in Hoot v. Great Western Railroad* to be declaratory merely.
We do not see that there is room to doubt the power of the company to make the contract in question.
Second. Was there evidence in this case that the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad Company did contract as a common carrier to transport this property beyond its own terminus over other roads to Boston. ?
The weight, the force, or the degree of the evidence is not before us, if there was competent evidence, on which the jury might lawfully find the existence of the contract alleged.f
Both the authority of Graves, the station agent, to make the contract, and the evidence of Pratt and others of the making of the contract,'were questions of fact for the consideration of the jury. If the jury have found in the plaintiffs favor on these points, upon evidence legally sufficient to justify it, this court cannot interfere with their findings. . The evidence on both these points may properly be considered at the same time. Pratt testified that he had for many years been in the habit of transporting horses over the defendants’ road.to Boston, to the number of two hundred a year, and that Graves had been the station agent at Potsdam for five or six years; that nearly a week before the present shipment Graves engaged to give him on that day two good stock-cars to carry his horses to Boston, and that the cars furnished by Graves had always come over these roads and delivered the horses in Boston, and that the arrangements made by him were recognized by the other roads; that Graves’s office was in the Potsdam freight-house, and that he paid the freight through, sometimes at Potsdam
* 45 New York, 524. t Dirst v. Morris, 14 Wallace, 484; Mills v. Smith, 8 Id. 27.
Opinion of the court.
and sometimes at Boston; that on this occasion he agreed with Graves upon the price through to Boston, viz., $85 a car, and that a way-bill was made out for the horses and cars to Boston at the price mentioned. Other witnesses give testimony in corroboration, which it is not necessary to refer to. Graves testified that he was the station-master at Potsdam, and that the cars were billed from Potsdam to Boston, via Concord, as per bill; that the price agreed upon was not paid in advance, but it might have been.
The way-bill was headed thus: “ Way-bill of merchandise transported by Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad Company from Potsdam Junction to Boston via Concord, March 28th, 1868.” It describes the two cars with horses, and as consigned to Pratt & Brigham, at Boston.
We see no sound objection to the admission of this way-bill as evidence. If a written contract, it was not only evidence, but the best evidence of what the contract was. It was exhibited to Pratt before the cars were started, as a part of the transaction.
If not a contract, it was an act done and a declaration made by the agent in the very act of transacting the business, and as a part of it, which brought it within the principle of the res gestae.
This evidence shows that the oral engagement was “ to carry his horses to Boston,” not to carry to Rouse’s Point and thence to forward to Boston, but “to carry” as well and as fully over the Vermont and Massachusetts roads as over the Ogdensburg road.
Again, a specific price was agreed upon for transportation over the whole route. This was in accordance with the practice, and whether paid at Potsdam or at Boston was unimportant. This practice had been continued for years, and the jury had the right to hold the contract to be the same, without reference to prepayment or postpayment. The jury were justified in inferring that where a carrier fixes a price for transportation over the whole route, that he makes the entire contract his own. One who carries simply over his own line, and thence forwards by other lines, would ordi-
Opinion of the court.
narily, the jury may say, make or collect his own charges and leave the remaining charges to be collected by those performing the remaining service. Receipt of the entire pay affords a fair presumption of an entire contract.
The language of the way-bill is quite expressive. It describes “ merchandise transported . . . from Potsdam to Boston.” Transported or carried are equivalent terms, and quite distinct from the idea of forwarding. Whether looked upon as a contract, or as a declaration, or an admission simply, the way-bill furnishes evidence that the Ogdensburg company undertook to carry the horses to Boston.
In Root v. Great Western* in speaking of the contract to transport as a common carrier over other lines, the court say: “Such an undertaking may be established by express contract, or by showing that the company held itself out as a carrier for the entire distance, or received freight for the entire distance, or other circumstances indicating an understanding that it was to carry through.”
We think there was competent evidence before the jury that the company undertook to carry this property to Boston, and the jury having found, such to be the fact, the other companies are to be deemed the agents of the defendants, 01 whose faults they are responsible.
TAirrf. The loss, it is contended, arose from the defective condition of the car in which the horses were placed, wherey it was exposed to danger from fire. It is said that Pratt was aware of the defective condition of the car; that he voluntarily made use of it, and that the risk of loss by its use thus became his and ceased to be that of the company. J-ne judge charged the jury that it was the duty of the carnei to furnish suitable vehicles for transportation; that if e urnished unfit or unsafe vehicles he is not exempted rom lesponsibility by the fact that the shipper knew them e defective and used them; that nothing less than a iee agreement by the shipper to assume the risk would uave that effect.
¡Supra, p. 131.
Opinion of the court.
There was a- conflict in the testimony upon the point whether other cars were to be had. Pratt testified that he was compelled to take these cars or wait with his horses for a week. The station-agent testified that there were other cars which Pratt might have had if he preferred them.
The authorities sustain the position taken by the judge at the trial.
In New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. Merchants' Bank,* Mr. .Justice Nelson says: “ If it is competent at all for the carrier to stipulate for the gross negligence of himself and servants or agents, in the transportation of goods, it should be required to be done at least in terms that would leave no doubt as to the meaning of the parties.”
To this effect are the New York and Massachusetts cases before cited.
In Railroad Company v. Manufacturing Company} it was declared that the court did not intend to relax the rule by which the liability, of carriers was established. In Railroad Company v. Lockwood} the following, among other propositions, were reiterated and established by the unanimous judgment of the court:
1st. That a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsibility when such exemption is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law.
2d. That it is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the negligence of himself or his servants.
The judge at the trial in this case might have gone much further than he did, and have charged that if the jury found the company to have been negligent and careless in furnishing cars, they would not be relieved from responsibility, although there had been an agreement that they should not be liable therefor.
Fourth. It is contended that there was error in the admission of evidence on the trial. The admission of the way-
* 6 Howard, 344, 383. f 16 Wallace, 318. f 17 Wallace, 357.
Opinion of the court.
bill we have considered, and we think it was properly admitted.
When the plaintiff, Pratt, was on the stand as a witness the following question was put to him: “ In these acts of Graves in furnishing cars and making agreements for transportation through to Boston, as testified by you, for whom did he assume to act ?” This question was objected to by the defendants, and the objection was overruled. We think this question was erroneous in its form, and that, as insisted by the defendants, he should have been asked to state only what was said and done. The error was, however, harmless. That Graves was acting for the Ogdensburg company was disputed by no one. All that had been testified to, showed it. Graves himself testified that he was so acting, and there was no evidence or pretence to the contrary, either on the trial or the argument. The question is as to the effect of his acts, and not as to whether he acted for the company. His authority has not been repudiated by the company at any time or in any form. We have often held that we will not reverse a judgment on account of an error which clearly appears to have produced no injury.
Two suggestions are made by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error which require consideration.
The first is that the rules of the Vermont Central road forbade the use of combustible material in the cars on their road, and that if known to the plaintiffs, and the contract were made in reference to them, the presence of this material in the car while on their road was a bar to the action. The answer to this suggestion is, first, that there is no competent evidence of such contract and agreement; and second, that the contract was made with the Ogdensburg road alone. The shippers were strangers to the rules as well as to the owners of the Vermont road. Their dealings were with the Ogdensburg road only, one of whose agents aided in putting the litter into the car, and the rules of which company were not violated by that act.
The second suggestion is that some of the horses injured were not placed in the cars till they wrere at Bouse’s Point,
Syllabus.
beyond the terminus of the defendants’ road. The contract was in substance for transportation over the Ogdensburg road of all the horses. For the convenience of the shipper he was allowed to put them on board at different points. This was an incidental circumstance merely, and does not affect the contract. If it receives the full price for the transportation of all the property from Potsdam to Boston it is evidently to the advantage of the company if it escapes the danger incident thereto for a portion of the distance. The power to contract for the whole distance of all the horses, and the making of such contract, and the receipt of the compensation specified, fix the rights of the parties. The precise details of its performance are not essential.
Judgment affirmed.
St. John v. Erie Railway Company.
A railroad company, built originally with money contributed as stock, subsequently borrowed money, issuing its' bonds at five several dates and
giving five several mortgages to secure them. It also borrowed money,
issuing bonds for which it gave no mortgage; unsecured bonds. It
finally proved insolvent, and proceedings to foreclose the last two mort-
gages were had. The stockholders and creditors now entered into an
agreement for the adjustment of its liabilities, and pursuant to the
agreement the road was sold under the proceedings of foreclosure to
. trustees, who transferred all its property subject to all the existing
mortgage liens to a new corporation authorized by the legislature, with
an agreement confirmed by legislative act, by which it was agreed that
the. stockholders of the old company should be stockholders—common
stockholders—in the new; and the unsecured creditors of the old one
be stockholders preferred. This agreement was carried out, and the
parties further agreed—
“Such preferred stock shall be entitled to preferred dividends out of the net earnings of said road (if earned in the current year, but not otherwise), not to exceed seven per cent, in any one year, payable semi-annually, after payment of mortgage ¿Merest and delayed coupons in full."
The new company now worked the road, and for a considerable time paid to the preferred stockholders seven per cent, out of its net earnings, and of course after payment of mortgage interest and delayed coupons.
Statement of the case.
However, in the course of managing its affairs it afterwards—that is to say after the making of the above-mentioned agreements—leased new roads, some of which were not profitable ; and borrowed large amounts of money which it spent in the repair and equipment of the road; all in a mode quite regular. And paying its interest on the old debts, rent for the new roads, and interest on the additionally borrowed money, it could not pay anything more.
A “preferred stockholder ” now filed a bill to have full payment of his dividends from the net earnings, prior to any payment on account of the new leases or additionally borrowed money; bis view being that his rights were to be determined by the state of things which existed when his stock was issued, and were not affected by the leases taken and the money borrowed afterwards.
Held, That this was not a true view of the case; and that the last and italicized clause above, “ after payment of mortgage interest and delayed coupons in full,” •was controlled by the previous word “ net,” which meant “that which remained as net profit after the deduction of all charges or outlay.” The bill was accordingly dismissed.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York; the case was thus:
By an act of the legislature of New York of the 24th of April, 1832, a corporation known as the New York and Erie Railroad Company was created. The road which the company built extended from Piermont, a town on the west side of the Hudson, some sixty miles north of New York, and just above the line which divides the State there from New Jersey, to Dunkirk on Lake Erie. To reach Piermont from the city of New York by rail, the company ferried its passengers and freight across the Hudson to Jersey City, opposite to New York, and carried them from its depot there northward alongside of the Hudson, upon roads in New Jersey which it rented.
The company had also other rented roads.
The money put into the road as capital stock being insufficient to complete it and carry it on, it issued five successive sets of bonds, amounting in the aggregate to $20,000,000.
he first set was secured by a lien upon the road given by statute. The other sets were secured by mortgages, accordu>g to the order of their issue. It also issued bonds, not thus secured, to the amount of $7,000,000. In 1859 the
Statement of the case.
company became bankrupt. Proceedings in foreclosure were instituted to enforce the last two mortgages, and a receiver was appointed.
In this state of things, on the 22d of October, 1859, the shareholders and creditors of the company entered into an amicable agreement providing for the adjustment of its liabilities. In pursuance of this agreement all the property and effects of the company, including the then existing leases of the roads rented, were sold under a decree in the foreclosure suits, and bought in by trustees for the benefit of the parties in interest, pursuant to a clause in the agreement. A new corporation, under the name of the Erie Railway Company, was organized, pursuant to acts of the legislature of New York of the 4th of April, 1860, April 2d, 1861, and March 28th, 1862, and all the property of the old company bought by the trustees was transferred to it, subject however to all the liens and incumbrances upon it which subsisted before the foreclosure and sale. The agreement above mentioned of the 22d of October, 1859, was incorporated into the decree of sale, and was recognized and sanctioned by the several acts of the legislature under which the new corporation was organized. It was also made a part of the articles of association or charter of that company. Its obligatory effect in this case was not questioned. The third article declared:
“The capital stock of said company is divided into common capital stock and preferred capital stock. The whole amount of said common stock of said company is 115,500 shares, each of the par value of $100, being in amount equal to the outstanding capital stock of the New York and Erie Railroad Company. The whole amount of the preferred capital stock of said company is to be equal to the amount of the total unsecured and judgment debt of the New York and Erie Railroad Company, with interest thereon as provided by the contract referred to in said acts, and by the provision of the said act, passed April 2d, 1861, when ascertained pursuant to the provisions of said act.
The fifth article of the agreement was as follows: “Such of us as are holders of the convertible sinking fund
Statement of the case.
and other unsecured bonds of said company hereby agree to exchange our respective bonds for preferred stock of like amount with the principal of our bonds, with coupons now overdue, and for two years in advance added, and to deposit our bonds with said trustees to be so exchanged, receiving therefor receipts. Such preferred stock is to be entitled to preferred dividends out of the net earnings (if earned in the current year, but not otherwise), not to exceed 7 per cent, in any one year, payable semi-annually, after payment of mortgage interest and delayed coupons in fully
The act of April 2d, 1861, in its fourth section, thus enacted:
“ Section 4. Said preferred stock shall be entitled to preferred dividends out of the net earnings of said road if earned in the current year, but not otherwise, not to exceed seven per cent, in any one year, payable semi-annually, after payment of mortgage interest and delayed coupons in full. And the holders thereof may vote personally or by proxy at all meetings of the corporation, in the same manner as the holders of common stock, but not otherwise.”
In virtue of these arrangements, one St. John became the holder of three hundred shares of the preferred stock.
After the issuing of the preferred stock the new company took leases of several additional roads, some of which proved profitable and others not so; and borrowed £1,000,000, for which it gave sterling bonds bearing interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum, payable in gold. The money was borrowed for the repair and equipment of the roads of the company, and was expended accordingly.
The company paid the “delayed coupons,” and a dividend of five per cent, on all the preferred stock for the year 1863, and seven per cent, annually thereafter until the year 1868; but after that time paid nothing upon that stock. On the contrary, it paid, in preference, the rents on the leases, the new as well as the old, and the interest on £1,000,000 sterling loan, as well as on the old secured $20,000,000.
The net earnings of the company during the year 1868, a ter deducting the interest paid on the mortgage debts ex-
Statement of the case.
isting when the preferred stock was issued, were so inconsiderable that payment of all the rents and of interest on the sterling bonds absorbed more than all of them. If no rents and no interest upon the sterling bonds had been paid during that year, there would have been more than enough of the net earnings left to pay the dividends claimed by the complainant. If no interest had been paid on the sterling bonds, and no rents under the leases made since the preferred stock was issued, there would have been enough remaining to have paid a small part of the dividends; but no part of such dividends could have been paid without leaving unpaid some part of the interest upon the sterling bonds, and of the rents under the leases made since the preferred stock was issued.
To explain the matter by figures—The rents payable for the old leases, assumed in 1862, $372,000
“ “ “ new leases made after 1862, 376,000 Interest, &c., payable on the £1,000,000 sterling gold
bonds,.................................................................. 388,500
---------- $1,136,500
The net earnings for 1868, of the main road and of all
the rented roads, after deducting interest ($1,286,- 000) on the old, that is to say the secured bonds, was $680,000 The preferred stock, both in 1862 and 1869, was about $8,536,000.
In the keeping of the accounts of the company, the leased roads were treated as part of the whole road. No separate accounts of each were kept. Coal traffic, however, passing over one of them, taken after 1862, was stated to be very profitable.
In this state of things St. John filed in 1869 a bill in the court below against the company, asserting that he was entitled to have full dividends paid to him before any part of the net earnings were applied in payment of the interest on the sterling bonds and the rents under the leases of roads after 1862 to the new corporation. His position was that his rights were to be determined by the state of things which existed when his stock was issued, and that they were not affected by the leases taken and the bonds issued by the company afterwards.
Argument for the preferred stockholders.
The company on the other hand insisted that this interest and the rents of all the leases were necessarily to be first fully paid.
The court below wras of the company’s view, and dismissed the bill. St. John took this appeal.
Mr. D. B. Eaton, for the appellant:
I. Both the circumstances surrounding the parties when the contract was made and the language of the contract itself support the view which we take.
1. to surrounding circumstances. The now preferred stockholders were, prior to the contract, creditors; and, to say nothing of their right to attack mortgagees, they could get judgments on their bonds, which would secure to them payment immediately after payment of what was due on the mortgages, and take precedence of all future obligations to pay rent on new roads or interest on new loans. With the right to get judgments on their bonds, and so to come in immediately after the mortgagees, it is unreasonable to suppose that they meant to open a measureless space between themselves and the mortgagees by giving the company power not only to create an unlimited number of leases, but power also to create enortndus amounts of debt; to let in, prior to themselves, other unsecured bond creditors and the lessors of new roads leased—both to an indefinite amount—and to put in those persons—strangers—instead of themselves, next to the mortgagees; to expose themselves, in short, not only to enterprises untried, but to obligations unlimited. It is to suppose more according to what these bond creditors would have naturally done, if we suppose that ln giving up the valuable right which they did give up, they Want to secure for themselves a certain and abiding position next to the then existing mortgagees upon the net earnings of the company well defined: to get a right to a dividend rom specific net earnings from specific property next after he payment of specific mortgage interests, and that while ey deprived themselves of the power of seizing the road and everything belonging to it on execution, and gave up
Argument for the preferred stockholders.
the chance of getting the principal of their debt, they did not, as creditors, waive their then existing right of priority to interest. The state of the road, its income and outgoes, were before them; and on the prospects thus presented they could act intelligently. But on the view taken by the opposite side, they were out at sea, and dashing ahead without chart or compass, in waters where there were no soundings, and in a fog where they could discern nothing before them.
2. The la.ngua.ge of the contract conforms with the probabilities indicated by surrounding circumstances. Had the company’s now views been those of the parties to the contract, it would have been sufficient to have said that the holders of the unsecured bonds should have a preferred stock. That, of itself, would, in law and common understanding, mean a stock entitled to a preferred dividend. Or if the parties desired to be pleonastioally certain, they might have added that the holders of “such preferred stock should be entitled to preferred dividends, eaich year, if earned.” But the language is very different. “Preferred stockholders” are to have “preferred dividends” out ot “ net earnings,” after payment of “ mortgage-interest,” not “ before dividends on common stock.” . The reading of the other side assumes that the makers of the agreement thought that, except for language to the contrary, a preferred dividend would be payable before mortgage-interest; an assumption impossible to make, conceding to the persons who drew the contract any knowledge of the law at all.
The fact that the existing security may be called “ stock,” and that its holders may vote with the common stockholders is unimportant. The security, however, is not called stock, but is called preferred stock, and its holders are preferred stockholders. The only question is, to whom and to what are they preferred? Suppose that the contract declared in terms that what the preferred stockholders were to receive should be paid in preference to rent on new leases, or interest on new debts? How then ? Would the calling that on which they are to receive a payment preferred stock impair their rights ? Plainly not. Indeed, are
Argument for the preferred stockholders.
not debt and stock often used as convertible terms ? Do we not speak continually of stocks of the States, and of the United States, meaning debts due by them respectively? Certainly we do. Indeed this very court does so. In the Bank Tax Case* Nelson, J.,delivering its unanimousopinion, speaking of the New York Banking laws says:
“Theassociation is required to deposit . . . stocks of the State of New York/’
And again :f . *
“Now when the capital of the bank is required to be invested in stocks, and among others in United States stock.”
The court is here speaking of State debts and United States debts.
The statutes of the United States equally use the terms debt and stock as convertible. One of them,]: ex. gr., re, lating to a 3 per cent, loan, says:
“Any part of the principal of the said debt or stock, bearing an interest of 3 per cent., as shall be unredeemed, shall,” &c.
Then the use of the word “stock” is nothing, and the only question is, does the contract, as expressed, mean what we assert that it does mean ?
In settling that meaning it is to be noted that these preferred stockholders never sustained the ordinary relations of stockholders, general or preferred. They began as creditors. They never subscribed for stock, nor paid instalments, nor took part in creating a corporation, nor had an opportunity to share in unlimited profits, nor agreed to assume any of the ordinary risk of stockholders, nor bargained for so large a vote as to be able to protect themselves, but from the beginning relied on a peculiar contract lelation, due notice of which they caused to be conspicuously published to all the world. They are in part creditors and ]n part stockholders, and not technically either. They have the rights which their contract gives them, and a name will
* 2 Wallace, 207. , f Page 208. I Act of March 3d, 1795, ch. 286 [ex], g 12 ; and in many other places.
Argument for the preferred stockholders.
not make those rights greater or less. Modern business and legislation have created relations which, according to the narrow views of the old laws and decisions, would be anomalons, and in them a person may be in some sense and at the same time a creditor and a stockholder. Such is the case of every preferred stockholder.
There is no use of considering what would be ©ur condition in case of insolvency, and who would be then preferred. What has that condition to do with our rights during solvency ? Wh will consider the case of insolvency when it arises.
It is matter of common knowledge that the Erie Railway has been largely built by English capital. The agreement whose meaning is now under consideration was doubtless made in all its parts by representatives of English capitalists. The expressions of English statutes/the views of English writers, and the decisions of the English courts may be looked to with more than common deference in interpreting it. Now, in the English law, preferred stock is commonly called debenture stock, the word debenture coming obviously from debere, to owe. So the dividends on preferred or debenture stock are commonly called interest; and the English law declares them to “ rank next to interest payable on the mortgages or bonds for the time being,”* though it admits of course that the holders of it cannot require repayment of what they have paid for it.
Noris there anything in the use of the word “dividend” which of itself impairs our argument. If it was said, in terms, that the “dividend” on preferred stock was to be paid out of net earnings from existing roads, and next after mortgage-interest, and prior to rent on any new leases, and prior to interest on any new loans, the meaning and the case would be clear. The word “dividend” then is unimportant. And the only question is whether, in any way, the meaning and the case are clear? This so-called dividend, it
* 26 and 27 Victoria, chapter 118; Shelford’s Law of Railways, 4th edition, p. 206, 22, 23, 24, and 31.
Argument for the preferred stockholders.
will be noted, is to be declared from “ net earnings,” and is payable absolutely, each year, if earned, immediately after the mortgage-interest is paid. The payment may be called a dividend, but it is more analogous to interest.
If every common stockholder should be present and vote to have any such surplus of net profits used for some other designated purpose, this would confessedly not impair the claims of preferred stockholders to receive it.
In the case of Maryland v. Railroad Company, very lately decided by this court,*, the State of Maryland was, by a contract with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, entitled to have and receive a perpetual dividend of six-per cent, per annum (upon $3,000,000 which the State lent to the company), out of the profits of the road. Does any one doubt that this made a debt from the company to the State in case any profits were made ? And that calling the money to be paid a dividend was nothing?
Noi is there anything in the expression “ net earnings” which impairs our argument. Of course “net earnings” are gross earnings after the deduction of every sort of cost, charge, and expense of administering and working “ the road. ’ But what road ? That is the question to be settled. The language is “ the net earnings of the said road.”
oes the said road” mean the road then known as the road of the Erie Railway Company—the road, and the only road, which had been before the contracting parties—with its then leased roads,—or does it mean that road—that “ said oad -with a score of dififerent, distant, and most unprofit-
! nnA°a<38’ Worked int0 it8 corpus as a part of it, and with i ,000,000 of debt created to equip and use them ? That we say, is the question.
The case made by the pleadings is a little obscure as to
at road or roads absorbed the $5,000,000 borrowed. But •at vast sum is not shown to have been expended on the line
08 existed when the preferred stock was created. That line must have been completed and equipped, and it could never
* Supra, p. 105.«
VOL. XXII.
Argument for the preferred stockholders.
have been expected that such sums would- be borrowed to use on such a road. Without doubt the money was expended in great measure on the newly leased lines.
II. Now, the defendant should have kept separate accounts of its newly leased roads, and been prepared to sustain their losses or demonstrate their profits. The plaintiff is entitled to have counted as gross earnings on the line as it existed when his stock was created, all the money thereon received and earned, and from this can be deducted only the expenses of operating such line, including, of course, rents payable for any portion of it. Such accounts are easily kept. On that basis the plaintiff will take his chances of a dividend, as the contract provides, and will regard his prospects as greatly improved. The company denies that right, and refuses such account and payment. This rule of separate accounts is the English rule. In Corry v. Londonderry^ where there were five classes of stockholders, the court held that the company must keep separate accounts, and that the discretion of the directors over expenditures was limited by the rights conferred on preferred shareholders. Where net profits were pledged, as here, it was held they could not be diminished by subtracting from them “money raised under the borrowing powers,” and that “ money procured for the purpose of completing the line cannot be paid out of profits.”
A material part of the reasoning of this case has been sustained by Taft v. The Hartford Railroad,^ in this country.
III. It will be said, doubtless, by opposing counsel, that our view of the law would obstruct all expansion of the company’s business, by preventing the company borrowing money or leasing roads. If such was the effect, the fact would be no reason for the court refusing us our right. Such a contract made by the company, and sanctioned by the courts and the legislature, as this has been, would be valid, however inconvenient it might be. But such is not the effect. The company may lease, and borrow, and ex-
* 29 Beavan, 263, 272, 273. f 8 Rho<}e Island, 310, 334, and 335.
pand, and the preferred stock no more obstructs them than does a mortgage. They must first give us a dividend, if there be net earnings to pay it, just as they must pay mortgage-interest.
Mr. W. W. McFarland, contra, for the company.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented in the present case depends for its.solution wholly upon the construction given to the fifth clause of the agreement of 1859, and the fourth section of the act of 1861. They are identical in effect as regards the point to be considered.
The original takers of the preferred stock were creditors. They abandoned that position and became stockholders. They thereupon ceased to be the former, and can only be regarded as the latter. They surrendered their debts and received in return stock of the same amount, which gave them a chance for annual dividends of seven per cent., and a voice by voting in the choice of those by whom the affairs of the company were to be administered. What they were to receive was not interest, but dividends; and they were to receive them in priority to the holders of the common stock. The latter could receive nothing until the former were satisfied. The maximum payable on the preferred stock was specified. It might be less, or nothing. It could not be more. The amount subject to the limit prescribed depended wholly upon the residue of the net earnings applicable in that way. The language employed is apt to express the relation of stockholders. None to express the relation of creditors is found in the instrument; and there is. nothing iom which the intent to continue that relation any longer can be inferred. If the mortgages were foreclosed and tiere were a surplus left insufficient to satisfy the general creditors, it is quite clear that the holders of the preferred stock could have no right to share in the fund.
The dividends were to be paid after the mortgage-interest and delayed coupons were paid in full.
Opinion of the court.
This clause was inserted doubtless out of abundant caution, to prevent the possibility of a claim being set up to the prejudice of the holders of the mortgage securities. Whether the restriction was necessary, for that purpose, we need not consider. The preferred dividends were to be paid out of’ “the net earnings of the road.” The lexical definition of nd is “ clear of all charges and deductions.”—Webster. “ That which remains after the deduction of all charges or outlay, as net profit.”—Worcester. The popular acceptation of the term is the same. There is no controversy between the parties on this subject. Such net earnings must have been earned in “ the current year.” There are these four specific limitations. There are no others. It is not said that the preferred dividends shall be paid next after the mortgage interest and delayed coupons, nor after, nor pro rata with anything else, nor before anything else except dividends upon the common stock. Beyond the four restrictions named, the matter is left to be regulated wholly by the principles of law and the discretion of the company. Suppose in this case the holders of coupons of the sterling bonds and the holders of preferred stock claimed payment at the same time and the fund was insufficient to meet both demands, can it be doubted that the rights of the creditor would be held paramount to those of the shareholder, and that the interest must be fully satisfied before a dividend could be paid ? The plainest principles of reason and justice as well as the law would require this result. A question is raised as to the source to which the phrase “ net earnings of the road” refers. The term road is used as an appellative, and was clearly intended to include the principal road and all its adjuncts. The complainant insists that the “net earnings” must be the net earnings of things as they were when the preferred stock was issued. We find nothing in the case, express or implied, to warrant this view. At the time referred to, the company held certain leases. If itvvas deemed best, and was found practicable, could not the company have rid itself of them ? If the complainant’s view be correct, this could not be done, at any rate not without the
Opinion of the court.
consent of the preferred stockholders. So if the company deemed it proper to take leases of other roads, in addition to those previously held, or in place of them, what was there to prevent it? Upon what ground can it be claimed that the category “ net earnings of the road ” was not intended to embrace the net earnings of all the business of the company for the time being, whether done upon one or many roads ?
There is nothing in the agreement or the statute, and we are aware of no legal principle which would authorize the stockholders in question to analyze the bhsiness, select out a part of it, and to say that the net earnings specified must be a predicate of that part, and of none other. The company had the right to conduct its operations, in good faith, as it might see fit; and it was from them and all of them that the materials for the computations of earnings were to be derived.
The only qualification prescribed in this connection is not as to the scope, means, or elements of the business, but is one in point of time. The net earnings from which the preferred dividends were to be paid must have been earned “in the current year.” Whether the business of such year were large or small, or of what it consisted, is immaterial. The corporation never agreed to be limited in the exercise of its faculties and franchises, and the complainant must abide the result. If errors were committed, and a loss ensued, a court of equity cannot relieve him. It is one of the chances of the enterprise in which he embarked.
The business of the road was a unit. If it had been disintegrated as proposed by the complainant, we apprehend it would have been found that the correlations of the main stem and the branches were such, and that the expenses and c aiges incident to the entire business and those of the seveia parts were so interwoven and blended, that an accurate ascertainment of the net profit of the main line and any of c auxiliaries, taken separately from the rest, would have een impracticable. An ancillary road may be short and J1® d but little income, yet by reason of its reaching to coal-
Syllabus.
fields, or from other local causes, its contributions to other roads of the series may be very large and profitable. Whether in this case the partial computation insisted upon could or could not have been made, the process was one upon which the company was neither bound nor had the right to enter.
We hold that the computation by the company for the year 1868 was made upon the proper basis, and that the complainant is concluded by it. We are of the opinion that the rents for that year, accruing under leases taken by the company after the issuing of the preferred stock, and the interest upon the sterling bonds for that year were properly paid, and that there were no net earnings earned in that year which could be properly applied in payment of preferred dividends. These views are fatal to the complainant’s case. We have carefully examined all the authorities referred to by his learned counsel. None of them are in hostility to the conclusions at which we have arrived.
Decree affirmed.