Case details
Bluebook Citation
Wager v. Hall, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 584
Full caption
Wager et al. v. Hall.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Wager et al. v. Hall.
1. The transfer by a debtor who is insolvent, of his property, or a considerable portion of itj to one creditor as a security for a pre-existing debt, without making any provision for an equal distribution of its proceeds to all his creditors, operates as a preference to such transferee, and must be taken as prima facie evidence that a preference was intended, unless the debtor or transferee can show that the debtor was at the time ignorant of his insolvency, and that his affairs were such that he could reasonably expect to pay all his debts. 2. Such a transfer, if made within four months before the filing by the pai ty of a petition in bankruptcy, is in fraud of the Bankrupt Act, and void.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.
Hall, assignee of Lakin, a trader in Brodhead, Gieen County, Wisconsin, filed a bill in the court below against Wager & Fales, merchants, of Troy, New York, to set asi e a mortgage on lands in the said Brodhead, given by the sai bankrupt to them for $3000, to secure five payments, of $600 each, payable in six, twelve, sixteen, twenty, and twenty- out months, which mortgage and notes were executed Decern 15th, 1869, being twenty-four days prior to his filing his pe tition in bankruptcy, on the ground that it was given in vio lation of the Bankrupt Act. That act, in its 35th sectio thus enacts:*
“If any person, being insolvent, or in contemplation o ’ solvency, within four months before the filing of the peti' 1 or against him, with a view to give a. preference to any ere_______
* 14 Stat, at Large, 534.
person having a claim against him, -. . . makes any . . . pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance of any part of his property, . . . absolutely or conditionally, the person receiving such . . . pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, . . . having reasonable cause to believe such person is insolvent, and that such . . . pledge, assignment, or conveyance is made in fraud of the provisions of this act, the same shall be void, and the assignee may recover the property, or the value of it, from the person so receiving it, or so to be benefited.”
The admitted case, stated favorably for the bankrupt, seemed to be thus:
Prior to 1854, Lakin was a clerk in Troy, and while there made the acquaintance of Fales (one of the defendants), who was a clerk at the same time. In 1854, Lakin went to Janesville, Wisconsin, and for two years worked as a clerk in a grocery store. Then he was in partnership with one Williston, in the grocery business, in Janesville, until the spring ot 1858. Then he was a clerk for two years in Janesville and other places, during the last six months of which
he was in the hardware store of one Richardson, of Janesville. In I860 Richardson started a branch hardware store atBiodhead, about twenty miles west of Janesville, and put the same under the control of Lakin, who received half of the profits for his services. After about sixteen months Lakin bought out Richardson, and continued a general hardware business at Brodoa, making purchases of stoves from a firm in Troy, which
isfoimei fellow-clerk at Troy, Fales, had formed with one IRfiQ61 Un(^er th0 name Wager & Fales. His sales in Sa T3 were about ^15’000 a yeai’,and from 1864 to
10m $20,000 to $28,000 per year. His invoice of goods ian, taken in 1864, was $10,393.67. His invoice of goo s taken September 13th, 1865, was $8450.77. Soon heal. j v Set agOiDg a brancb 8t0re at Juda’ near Brodioo nJl18 Wb°le inventory, taken December 31st, 1867, was $23,978.97.
and ti ebruai^ ’ ^868, he sold out his entire stock of stoves ware to Spaulding & Brown, of Brodhead, for $6000, [p. 586] but continued to deal in hardware and agricultural implements.
Spaulding & Brown paid $2000 cash down, and for the balance gave their note of $4000, payable as fast as the stoves should be sold, and a considerable portion of this note remained unpaid January, 1870.
Up to April 1st, 1868, Lakin’s stock was in a rented wooden building, and then being in fear of fire, he resolved to build a brick store, and for that purpose borrowed, at that time, on long time, $3000 of his father-in-law, Hayner, to be secured by mortgage on the store, and began to build the store on lots which he then owned. Hayner superintended the building of the store, and it was completed near the close of the same year, costing, aside from the lots, $8500.
Hayner resided in Brodhead from April 1st, 1868, to June, 1869, when he moved to Woodstock, Illinois, but he did not receive his mortgage until August 27 th, 1869.
Lakin commenced buying stoves of Wager & Bales (whose mortgage it was now sought to set aside) as early as 1863, and continued to buy from $300 to $4000 per year from that time to and including 1867.
The debt for which Lakin gave the mortgage to Wagei & Bales, was mostly for stoves purchased by him in 1867 at four months’ credit. At the time of purchase it was agree that Lakin should pay interest on all bills after maturity. Wager & Bales permitted the account to run until the notes and mortgage were given, he in the meantime making some small payments.
Lakin sold but few of the stoves bought of Wagei Bales during 1867, nor until he sold out his stove business to Spaulding & Brown; and the fact that he failed to iea iz^ on the stoves, and that he desired to build a new brick < 3 during 1868, induced him to urge Wager & Bales to wai o^ him, and as their account was on interest, and there nothing else to be done amicably, they consented.
When his store was completed, which was near t ie c of the year 1868, he found it had cost about double w a
had expected, and as he had not realized on the stoves, he asked for further time, again promising to pay interest.
On the 1st of February, 1869, Lakin wrote Wager & Fales hoping that they would “ not get entirely out of patience with him or lose confidence in him,” excusing himself for non-payment, and telling them that he had “ a good stock of goods, in a good brick store, well insured, and was in a better and safer condition than ever before.”
On the 4th of March, 1869, Lakin, having again excused himself for non-payment, and begged patience, after repeated requests for payment by Wager & Fales, who say they have already waited “very patiently,” requested Wager & Fales to send him a statement of his account, and “ several notes running as long a time as they could afford to let them, and that he would stamp, sign, and return them,” and do his best to meet them when due. The matter rested in this way until one Johnson, who had for several years been the travelling agent of Wager & Fales, and was then their partner, came West and saw Lakin with a view of getting money from him. Lakin asked for more time. Johnson told him e would give him time, but if he gave him long time that he ought to give a mortgage on his real estate. Lakin was reuctant to give a mortgage, and stated that he was perectly responsible, more so than when the debt was incurred, an that if his matters were closed up under the hammer, e would have $15,000 over and above his debts, and offered to.tuin out notes against other parties, three dollars to one, but said that the times were hard, and that he depended upon fin mers for collection. The matter was left open at a m s special request and on his assurance that a mort-is ge would injure his credit, and on his promise to pay certain stipulated sums monthly. ga^W J°hnson home, and about September,. 1869, he Lal/ Hgei & ^a^es a ^©tailed account of his interview with res ^em that he considered Lakin honest and in he re(pired some time to make him easy dutv t U81uess matters, and that he thought it was their y Q accommodate him by giving him time, for the [p. 588] reasons that he had bought a great many stoves of them, and paid them a great deal of money, and probably would again, and was partly a Trojan, and out of their friendship for him; and then if he would give a ten per cent, mortgage, that would close up the account on the books of the old firm of Wager & Fales, now about to be reconstituted, with him, Johnson, as a partner. In this Wager & Fales concurred.
The matter remained in that way until some time in October or November, 1869, when Wager & Fales sent the matter to Richardson to put in shape; the same Richardson already mentioned as the old principal of Lakin at Janesville, in 1860, and who was a friend as well of their own. Richardson and Lakin agreed upon terms, and Lakin was to get an abstract of title, execute the papers, and return them; but upon Richardson’s submitting the proposition to Wager & Fales, they objected to certain portions of it, and Richaidson informed Lakin that the matter must rest until he heard further from Wager & Fales. When he did hear, Lakin consented to their terms, and on the 15th of December, 1869, the mortgage and notes were given.
During the year 1869, including the last four months of that year, Lakin was in the habit of stating to all who ques tioned him in regard to his condition, that he was wort from $12,000 to $15,000 over and above his debts and liabilities. .
So far as to the mortgage sought by this bill to es aside.
Now as to the circumstances under which the petition bankruptcy was filed. . 7,
About the 1st of September, 1869, that is to sa^bout months prior to filing it, Lakin owed a certain azio ‘ $2400. During that four months Nazro sold him over $ worth of goods, and Lakin paid him during t e sa over $400. His last purchase was ovei $20U, 20th, vember 26th, 1869, and his last payment Decern
On the 26th of December, 1869, a friend ^^^h he mg at Brodhead, went to Woodstock with a e
had just received from a friend in Chicago, saying that a report had been sent by some one in Brodhead to the Mercantile, Agency in Chicago, that Lakin had made an assignment of his property to his father-in-law, Mr. Hayner. Lakin went to Janesville and told his attorney of the report, gave him what, according to his own account, he supposed, at the time, to be a true statement of his affairs, that he owed about $12,000 besides what he owed Hayner on the mortgage above mentioned, and that he had goods, notes, accounts, and real estate, which in his opinion were worth $28,000 or $30,000, and asked for advice. His attorney advised him to make a statement of his affairs to his creditors, ask them for an extension, if necessary; telling them there was no truth in the report of the assignment, and to get his friends to indorse for him; the attorney saying that thus he thought there would be no trouble in arranging matters. Almost immediately some of his creditors, including an agent of hazro, came to Brodhead to investigate his concerns. He and Nazro’s agent made a statement of his condition, and on December 27th or 28th, 1869, and after a consideiable investigation, found that his debts were much laiger than he had ever stated, and, as he alleged, much arger than he had ever supposed; being at least $23,000. akin then saw his attorney again, and told him how he ia found matters, and was advised to send a full printed statement of his condition to each of his creditors. Lakin made and sent out such a statement, dated January 1st, 1870, and it showed his debts to be $26,447.73.
akin, then in company with Nazro’s agent, again coune with his attorney, who advised him that as Nazro s one of his largest creditors and a man of great business xpenenee, iie had better go to Milwaukee with the agent, Lak'C° t 61 ^azro’and he so. Nazro then requested
widiUf ° f° 'nt° volantai7 bankruptcy. Lakin expressed a
he tl ° Wasbest for his creditors, but told Nazro
wonlri°U^lt h* 8 Cl’®ditors would get more money if they
over p 86 e^.SOme one as assignee, and that he would turn
very mg he had to such assignee for the benefit of [p. 590] his creditors. Nazro told Lakin that the securities lie had given stood in the way of that, and that unless he went into voluntary bankruptcy, he would himself file a petition and force him into bankruptcy. Lakin then saw his attorney, and filed his petition in bankruptcy January 8th, 1870.
Lakin’s books were in a bad condition, and had been kept very loosely for years. The result was that his schedules in bankruptcy, dated February 2d, 1870, showed his debts to be $28,450.
Lakin’s particular friend, Richardson, was on his paper during most of the last six months of the year 1869, and a company with which he was connected was a general creditor at the time of the failure. Lakin’s father-in-law, Sayner, and his particular friend, Williston, were on his paper to a considerable amount at the bank at the time of his failure. A brother-in-law was a general creditor for $1083. Several of his most intimate friends were general creditors.
So far as to the admitted case.
1. To show that Lakin was at the time of giving the mort gage to Wager & Fales insolvent, and that he gave them the mortgage with a view to give them a preference over is other creditors, the assignee called five witnesses, wiose evidence tended to show that for one or two yeais puor o the failure, Lakin had found it difficult to raise moneyto pay certain claims against him, and at times had been uua to do so and been protested; that he used moneys m hands as treasurer of the school district, and also as i urer of the church, and also moneys held by him in and in a fiduciary capacity, and that they and some o
Brodhead regarded him irresponsible, but t^at ul « same time he was doing a business of from $15, 0 ’ per year, and pretended to be worth ^’00°J’^’^thetime, all his debts. Two of these witnesses had, duung reported him to mercantile agencies as insolvent.
To rebut this evidence, and to show that w a ey have been Lakin’s actual condition, he uever,J)^ unable failure, had any idea of stopping business, oi
Argument for the debtor.
to pay all his debts, or that the mortgage would operate as a preference to Wager & Fales, but that he gave the mortgage to obtain a long extension so that he would not have to crowd his own creditors, or sell property for less than it was worth to pay his debts, and that this extension would give him more money to use in his business and pay other debts, the defendants called nine witnesses, whose evidence in addition to the facts, as above stated, tended to show that Lakin as treasurer of the school district and the church received no compensation, but by a sort of consent of the board of trustees used the moneys as he pleased, they drawing on him for the amounts as they might desire to use it; that there was no defalcation with either.
2. To show that Wager & Fales at the time of receiving this mortgage had reasonable cause to believe that Lakin was insolvent, and that the mortgage was made in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, the assignee called one witness. His evidence tended to show that he had had a conversation with the defendant, Wager, in November, 1869, in which Wager stated that he had made up his mind that akin was insolvent, but that the witness stated that he had recently been in Brodhead and that Lakin had assured him t »at he had property enough to pay all his debts, and he 1 ought Lakin would pay dollar for dollar.
This testimony was contradicted by Wager.
hi addition to this there was the positive evidence of six witnesses, that Lakin had all the time represented himself 0 e woith from $12,000 to $15,000 over and above his e s, and that they all believed it. le r C1°U1^ below decreed that the mortgage was fraudu-
> an should be discharged of record. The defendants •‘ppealed to this court. •
I Gassady an(L TF Merill, for the appellant: & p. i biakin make the mortgage with a view to give Wager
The8 a Pleference over bis other creditors? selectpa^01^S .a ™ew *° a preference”—were exnro<sa iQ th* 8 c^ause of the statute because they a ought a condition of things which the clause
Argument for the debtor.
would not express without them, and hence they are not to be rendered insignificant by construction.
Lakin could not give a mortgage “ with a view to give Wager & Fales a preference over his other creditors,” without recognizing the fact, or in other words knowing, or at least believing, that he had not sufficient property to pay all his debts, and hence that in so far as he secured them in excess of their proportionate share of his estate, he would take from others a corresponding amount of their proportionate share of his estate, and thus prevent an equal distribution of his estate which in his mind—his view—at the lime was less in value than the amount of his liabilities. A view to give a preference, therefore, as used in this clause, is nothing more nor less than a mental picture, a vision of an amount of indebtedness by the debtor exceeding the value of all his property, and a purpose to prevent an equal distribution by paying or securing some creditors at the expense of otheis. If Lakin had the picture in his mind—the vision then he necessarily had some intent or belief as to the effect of giving the mortgage, and hence his intent or beliet is in the question. The giving of a mortgage, or doing any other act J a debtor which would operate as a preference with such a picture in his mind, and with such a purpose, would esta lish an intent to give a preference.
But it is idle to talk about a man giving a mortgage wi a view to give a preference to some of his creditors ovc others, when at the time of giving the mortgage he ia u knowledge or belief that his property was less in va ue the amount of his liabilities. .
The case of Jones v. Howland,* a leading case in Massachusetts, seems to settle this case in our favor. T ia^ c ’ indeed, arose on section second ot the Bankrupt Act o But a fair analysis of that section and of section thir y-^ of the present bankrupt law, under which this case a will, we think, reveal the fact, that they mean to lay essentially the same rule as to the intent of the e, or, this is so the authorities sustain our position. _—-
* 8 Metcalf, 377, 386, 387.
Argument for the debtor.
lu Jones v. Howland the court say :
“If a party who fears or believes himself insolvent, but does not contemplate stoppage or failure, and intends to keep on, and make his payments, and transact his business, hoping that his affairs may be thereafter retrieved, and in that state of mind makes a sale or payment, without intending to give a preference, and as a measure connected with going on in his business, and not as a measure preparatory to, or connected with, a stoppage in business, such sale or payment is not void, as made in contemplation of bankruptcy, within the meaning of the second section of the United States Bankrupt Act of 1841, though he immediately afterwards became bankrupt.
“It is said that a man must be supposed to intend the natural result of his act. But this remark, though often treated as an axiom, is by no means an infallible proposition. The result is not always evidence of the supposed intent, When we look
back upon events that have happened, we stand in a different posi-
tion; we behold with a clearer vision as we embrace within our
glance tbe beginning and the end, the act and the consequences.
But the man who is doing the act may contemplate a very diff-
erent result. His judgment may be biassed by his wishes, and
sanguine feelings may be the cause of overlooking difficulties,
w ich to a more quiet temperament might appear insurmount-
a le. Disappointments also may take place which were not
anticipated. The experience of others is rarely a guide to an
embarrassed man, and he goes on with the hope of relief, even
against hope. To infer, therefore, a design to give a preference
to a favoied creditor, and in the immediate expectation of bank-
Ptcy, fiom the mere fact of insolvency, is by no means a cern mfeience nor such as the jury would be necessarily bound to w iora the debtor’s knowledge of his insolvency. The evi-the a^8° and establish, as a fact, the design to give
1 e erence a fact too important to be left upon conjecture.” Th En ].e.COUl*' ln above opinion follows the best considered ^gts cases,* and these cases have been adopted by this
wall & Taunton, 545; Morgan y. Brundrett, 5 Barne-Same Case 2 Atkinson v- Brindall> 2 Bingham’s New Cases, 225; Gibbins n ’ Phiiv ’ r •®artsllorn v. Slodden, 2 Bosanquet & Puller, 582; Bingham,’408 PS’ BarneWaU & Creswell, 529; Belcher v. Prittie, 10
VOL. XVI.
Argument for the debtor.
court as containing the “ sounder rule.”* Hence this court takes the same view as the court did in Jones v. Howland. The doctrine stated in that case has moroever been cited with approval or substantially followed in many of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States.
2. Did Wager & Fales, at the time of receiving the mortgage, have reasonable cause to believe that Lakin was insolvent ?
There is no evidence that Wager & Fales had any knowledge that Lakin owed any debt except their own, and we submit, as a matter of law, that the mere fact that Wager & Fales held an account against Lakin which had been due nearly two years, under the circumstances stated, is not sufficient to establish as a matter of fact that they had reasonable cause to believe that he was insolvent. . 3. Did Wager & Fales when they received the mortgage have reasonable cause to believe that Lakin made it in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act?
It is very evident that the question whether the moit-gage was made by Lakin in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, is entirely a dififerent question from the one whether at the time he had the ability to pay his debts as they became due in the ordinary course of business; and oi Wager & Fales to have reasonable cause to believe the one, is entirely a different question than for them to have reason able cause to believe the other.
The evidence is overwhelming that Wager, I ales, o n son, and Richardson were at the time of receiving the mor gage each and all convinced from what they knew in ie°a, to Lakin, and what he had told them, that he was woi from $10,000 to $20,000, over and above his debts, and, is no evidence in the case tending to show that t ej any reasonable cause to believe that he owed any consi ble amount of debts aside from their own, muci the amount of his debts was in excess or equal to t of his property.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Preferences as well as fraudulent conveyances, if made within four months before the filing of the petition by or against the bankrupt, are forbidden by the Bankrupt Act, but three things must be proved in order that the transaction may come within that prohibition and be affected by it as an illegal payment, security, or transfer: (1.) That the payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance was made within four months before the filing of the petition by or against the bankrupt and with a view to give a preference to some one of his creditors, or to a person having a claim against him or who was under some liability on his account. (2.) That the person making the payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance was insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency at the time the preference was given or secured. (3.) That the person receiving such payment, pledge, assignment, or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, had reasonable cause to believe that the person making the payment or giving or securing such preference was insolvent, and that the payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance was made in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act.*
On the 15th of December, 1869, the insolvent debtor named in the bill of complaint executed to the respondents a ceitain deed of mortgage of that date, of the following paicels of real estate, situate in the town of Brodhead in t iat State, and known as the north one-third of lot one in oc < one hundred and one, also all of lot three in block one uu led and one, also the north half of the south half of Dlwk seventy-nine, also the east half and the southwest ?Uarter of bloek two hundred and six, also all of block one rniii i e and forty-two, it appearing that all of these several to e s of real estate were conveyed by the insolvent debtor res DaJtnent of five notes which he gave to the _ P 1 eu^8’ the same date, payable to the respondents
cammon v. Cole, 5 National Bankruptcy Register, 259.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
or order as follows: one for $600, payable in six months; one for $600, payable in twelve months; one for $600 payable in sixteen months; one for $600, payable in twenty months, and one for $600 payable in two years, and all with interest at the rate of 10 per cent.
Prior to that date, to wit, on the 27th of August of the same year, the insolvent debtor mortgaged the first-named parcel of real estate, which is his new brick store and lot, to Andrew P. Hayner, the father of his wife, to secure the payment of three notes of that date which he gave to the mortgagee, of the following tenor: one for $1287.87, payable in three years; one for $1000, payable in two years, and one for $1000, payable in three years, all with interest annually at the rate of 10 per cent.
Twenty-four days after he gave the mortgage to the respondents he filed his petition in bankruptcy, and on the 2d of February7 following he was adjudged a bankrupt. His creditors made an examination into his affairs soon after he gave the mortgage to the respondents, when it was made to appear that he was hopelessly insolvent, which induced him to. make an effort to compromise with his creditors, but without any success, and he then filed the petition to be a judged a bankrupt, and on the 4th of March in the same year the complainant was duly7 appointed the assignee in bankruptcy of his estate.
All of the notes secured by the mortgage to the icspon dents were given by7 the insolvent debtor for a debt w ic had been past due more than two years, and which t le in^ solvent contracted for stoves purchased by him as stoc1 trade. His purchases were made on a credit of foui mon. , and the record shows that the respondents, in repeate stances, called upon him for payment and had seveia sent their agent to effect that object without muc SUCC Small amounts were paid, but the insolvent de tor stantly asked for further indulgence, offering as a ieas his failure to meet his contracts that business was u, that it was impossible to collect what was due rom tomers.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
More than a year before the execution of this mortgage, he sold out his stock of stoves to other parties and abandoned that business, limiting his trade to that of a retail hardware merchant, and during that same year he built the new brick store which he mortgaged to his father-in-law three or four months before he gave the mortgage to the respondents.
Precisely what sum the store cost does not appear, but it must have been as much as $6000 or $8000, as the evidence shows that he owed more than $14,000 when he gave the mortgage in question, a large portion of which had been due for a long time.
Convincing evidence was also introduced showing that for a year or two he had been hard pressed for money by many of his creditors, and that his notes in repeated instances had been protested for non-payment, and it also appears that he bad borrowed money at banks by means of indorsers and been obliged to get the same renewed, and he had used trust funds in his hands to pay pressing demands, and when called upon to repay the amount he was obliged to ask for delay.
Some of the notes given for the stock of stoves he had used to secure past-due debts and such portion of the consideration as had been paid he had expended in his business. Part of the money required to build the store, to wit, the sum ot $3000, he borrowed of his wife’s father, agreeing at the time to give him a mortgage of the premises when the store was completed, but the mortgage was not executed until the next season, and it appears that the respondents, when they heard of that mortgage through their agent, also demanded a similar security, which the insolvent debtor for a time refused to give, pleading as an excuse for declining the request that it would injure his credit. Witnesses were also examined to show’ that his credit was not in good repute, ut it is unnecessary to enter into those details, as the proofs aie°f the most satisfactory character that he did not pay his e ts when the obligations fell due and that he suffered his notes to go to protest.
othing need be added to show that the means of ascerinuig the condition of his affairs were at hand, as his other [p. 598] creditors, when they instituted inquiries upon the subject, shortly after the insolvent debtor gave the mortgage to the respondents, found no difficulty in learning that he owed more than the value of his property, and that he had been insolvent for two years. Enough, and more than enough has been remarked to show that the mortgagor was insolvent when he executed the mortgage to the respondents, as the fact is admitted both by the mortgagor and the mortgagees.
Preferences of one creditor over another are prohibited by the Bankrupt Act, if made within four months before the filing of the petition, and the complainant, as such assignee, prays that the mortgage may be declared fraudulent and void, and that the same may be. decreed to be given up to be cancelled, or that the respondents may be required, in due form of law, to execute and deliver to him, as such assignee, a satisfaction, release, and discharge of the mortgage. Proofs were taken, and the parties having been heard, the Circuit Court entered a decree for the complainant, and the respondents appealed to this court.
Made, as the mortgage was, within twenty-four days next before the petition in bankruptcy was filed, and for the express purpose of securing to the respondents the payment of a large debt long overdue, the first material allegation to be proved may be considered, in view of the evidence already referred to, as fully established. Discussion to show that the effect of the mortgage was to secure a preference over all of the creditors of the bankrupt, except his wife’s father an the firm secured by one of the notes given by the purchasers of the stoves, is unnecessary, as that proposition is self-evi dent; and the allegation that the mortgagor was insolven at the time may also be considered established, as it is fu J proved and stands confessed. Sufficient has also been remarked to show that the conveyance in mortgage was ma e with a view to give a preference to the respondents over a his other creditors, except such as he had previously secure in the modes »previously explained.
Evidence of the most satisfactory character was introduced to show that the insolvent debtor had reasonable cause to believe that he was insolvent, and in view of all the circumstances the conclusion of the court is that he knew that he was insolvent in the sense of the Bankrupt Act. Creditors were constantly pressing him for payment, and he was notoriously unable to comply with their just demands. Extensions were asked, which were sometimes granted and sometimes refused, and it appears that considerable of his paper went to protest. Such a conveyance, under such circumstances, could hardly be made by one deeply insolvent unless with a view to give the grantee a preference over other creditors, who were without any security, as the law authorizes the presumption that a person of ordinary intelligence intends what is the necessary and unavoidable consequence of his acts.
Insolvency, as used in the Bankrupt Act, when applied to traders, does not mean an absolute inability of the debtor to pay his debts at some future time, upon a settlement and winding up of his affairs, but a present inability to pay in the ordinary course of his business, or, in other words, that a trader is insolvent when he cannot pay his debts in the oidinary course of business as men in trade usually do, and such must be the conclusion, even though his inability be not so great as to compel him to stop business.*
Reference is made by the respondents to the case of Jones v. Howland,] which it is insisted lays down a different rule, uppose it be admitted that the opinion in that case affords some support to the suggestion, still it is only an apparent ncousistency, which is easily reconciled, as the case arose upon the prior Bankrupt Act, which did not declare such a ■onvejance void, unless it was made in contemplation of bank-
1 cy and for the purpose of giving the creditor a preference or priority over the other creditors of the bankrupt.^ What Sai by the judge w’ho gave the opinion in that cas-e,
ine I'M n McConnell, 11 Allen, 562 ; Thompson v. Thompson, 4 Cash-ing, 134; Barnard v. Crosby, 6 Allen, 331.
t » Metcalf, 877-385.
t 5 Stat, at Large, 442. [p. 600] which is supposed to be inconsistent with the more recent opinions of the court upon the same general subject, was said in construing the provision referred to in the prior law. He did say in that case that if the debtor honestly believes he shall be able to go on in his business, and with such belief pays a just debt without a design to give a preference, such payment is not fraudulent though bankruptcy should afterwards ensue; but the judge admitted in the same case that if the debtor, being insolvent and knowing his situation and expecting to stop payment, shall then make a payment or give security to a creditor for a just debt, with a view to give him a preference over other creditors, such payment or giving security is fraudulent. But the present Bankrupt Act avoids a conveyance, made with a view to give a preference, if the debtor at the time be in fact insolvent, although he may not contemplate bankruptcy in connection with the conveyance.* Such a conveyance, if made by a person actually insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency, to secure a pie-existing debt, said Hoar, J., “ may be avoided by the assignee if the mortgagee had reasonable cause to believe him insolvent at the time he took the mortgage, and that the conveyance was made to impede the operation ot the inso vent laws;” and he added that it is made primd, facie evi deuce of such cause of belief if the conveyance is not mace in the usual and ordinary course of business of the debtoi.T Nothing remains, therefore, to be re-examined except t ie issue whether the respondents had reasonable cause o lieve that the mortgagor was insolvent and that the convey ance was made in fraud of the provisions of theBan<iup Act. Proof that the respondents had actual knowlec ge the mortgagor was insolvent at that time is not ie(lulie support the prayer for relief, but the allegation in t a half is sustained if it appears that they had reasons e for such belief, as that is the language of the Ban iup Actual knowledge of the alleged fact is not ma e terion of proof in such an issue, nor is it necessary—----- [p. 601] should appear that the respondents actually believed that the mortgagor was insolvent, but the true inquiry is whether they, as business men, acting with ordinary prudence, sagacity, and discretion, had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, in view of all the facts and circumstances known to them at the time the conveyance was made.* Unless the debtor was in fact insolvent it cannot be held that such a grantee had reasonable cause to believe the allegation, but if it appears that th-e debtor was in fact insolvent as alleged, and that the means of knowledge were at hand, and that such facts and circumstances were known to the grantee as were clearly sufficient to put a person of ordinary prudence and discretion upon inquiry, it is well settled that it would be his duty to make all such reasonable inquiries to ascertain the true state of the case. Purchasers are required to exercise ordinary prudence in respect to the title of the seller, and if they fail to investigate when put upon inquiry, they are chargeable with all the knowledge which it is reasonable to suppose they would have acquired if they had performed their duty in that regard.f Creditors have reasonable cause to believe that a debtor, who is a trader, is insolvent when such a state of facts is brought to their notice respecting the affairs and pecuniary condition of the debtor as would lead a prudent business man to the conclusion that he is unable to meet his obligations as they mature in the ordinary course of business.| All experience
*
Forbes v. Howe, 102 Massachusetts, 435. j- Nary v. Merrill, 8 Allen, 452.
shows that positive proof of fraudulent acts, between debtor and creditor, is not generally to be expected, and it is for t at reason, among others, that the law allows in such conloversies a resort to circumstances as the means of ascer-
taining the truth, and the rule of evidence is well settled f at ciicumstances altogether inconclusive, if separately conded, may by their number and joint operation, especially eu co,l°b°rated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to [p. 602] constitute conclusive proof, which is a rule clearly applicable to the facts and circumstances disclosed in this record.* Apply those two rules to the present case and it may well be said that the argument is concluded, as it is difficult to resist the conclusion that thé respondents had actual knowledge that “the insolvent debtor was unable to meet his obligations as they matured in the ordinary course of his business.”! Such proof, however, is not required, as the only issue in this behalf is whether the respondents had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time they received the conveyance, testing the question under the rule prescribed by this court.J
*
Coburn ». Proctor, 15 Gray, 38. runtov pin^’ LUCaS’15 Wallace> 410 5 Scammon v. Cole, 5 National Bankruptcy Register, 263. t Toof v. Martin, 13 Wallace, 40.
Much discussion of the question whether the respondents had reasonable cause to believe that the conveyance was made in fraud of the Bankrupt Act may well be omitted, as the whole issue is substantially adjudged by the recent decision of this court, which is to the effect following: that the transfer by a debtor who is insolvent of his property, or a considerable portion of it, to one creditor as a security for a pre-existing debt, without making any provision for an equal distribution of its proceeds to all his creditors, operates as a preference to such transferee and must be taken as priniâ facie evidence that a preference was intended, unless the debtor or transferee can show that the debtor was at the time ignorant of his insolvency, and that his affairs weie such that he could reasonably expect to pay all his debts, and that a transfer by an insolvent debtor of his property, or any considerable portion of it, with a view to secure it to one creditor, and thus prevent an equal distribution among all his creditors, is a transfer in fraud of the Bankrupt Act.§ Knowledge of a given fact may be proved by ciicum
stances, even in an ordinary equity suit, where, from i nature of the pleadings, the testimony of a single witness
*
Castle V. Bullard, 23 Howard, 187. f Toof Martin’ 13 Wttllace’ 4 ’ t Coburn v. Proctor, 15 Gray, 38. i Toof v. Martin, 13 Wallace, 40; Nary v. Merrill, 8 Allen, ! calf v. Munson, 10 Id. 491 ; Scammon v. Cole, 5 National Ban rup J ister, 269.
Syllabus.
without corroboration would not be sufficient to establish the alleged fact, and if so it cannot be doubted that circumstances in a case like the present are sufficient to put the respondents upon inquiry, or even to show that they had reasonable cause to believe the alleged fact, that the conveyance was made in fraud of the Bankrupt Act. Their debt had been overdue for two years, and throughout that period they had pressed the insolvent debtor for payment, both in person and through their agent, and it is not doubted that if they had made the least inquiry they would have been as successful as his other creditors were, a few days later, in ascertaining that he was hopelessly insolvent. Beyond doubt they knew that he had mortgaged his new brick store and lot to his wife’s father, and when he finally consented to give them a mortgage on all or nearly all of hiè real estate, they were fairly put upon inquiry, and having neglected to make such they are justly chargeable with all the knowledge it is reasonable to suppose they would have acquired if they had performed their duty’ as required by law.
Decree affirmed.
[See the last preceding case, and also Buchanan v. Smith, supra, p. 277.]
Railway Company v, Prescott.
1- The proviso in the 21st section of the act of July 4th, 1864, amendatory ot the act of July 1st, 1862, to aid the Kansas Pacific Railway in the construction of its road, requiring the prepayment of the cost of surveying, selecting, and conveying the lands, requires the prepayment as to
g anted by the original act, as well as to those granted by the
amendatory one. > J • 2' Aern°mUgh?i!nd8 2*S°ld by the United States may be taxed before the gov-
went has parted with the legal title by issuing a patent, this principle
oaten/i Un er®tood as applicable only to cases where the right to the more JV°mp'ete’ and the suitable title fully vested without anything 3. Hence w/ &ny aCt d°ne going to the foundation of the right, comnanv to6 ‘A beeH a 1&r§e Srant ^as ex' gr’'to a great railroad
P y to aid m the construction of its road), if prepayment by the
grantee of the cost of surveying, selecting, and conveying the lands granted be required by the statute making the grant, before any of the lands “shall be conveyed,” or if the grant contain a proviso that any of the lands granted and not sold by the company within three years after the final completion of the road,'shall be liable to be sold to actual settlers under the pre-emption laws, at a price named per acre, the money to be paid to the company—no title (in the first instance unless there be the required prepayment, nor in the second instance at all) vests in the grantee in such a way as that a tax sale will divest the government title.
Error to the Supreme Court of Kansas; the case being thus:
An act of Congress passed in 1862, to aid what was afterwards known as the Kansas Pacific Railway Company, in the construction of its road, gave to the said company alternate sections of land on each side of the road, within certain limits, and provided that a patent should issue to the company only as each section of forty miles in length should be completed and accepted by the President. The act also contained a provision that any of these lands not sold by the company within three years after the final completion of the road, should be liable to be sold to actual settlers under the pre-emption laws, at a dollar and a quarter per acre, t e money to be paid to the company.
No part of the road having been built in 1864, the origin» act of 1862 was amended in the year last named, by extern ing the limits of the grant on each side of the road, and V several other provisions favorable to the company. But y the 21st section of the amendatory statute it wTas enacte
“ That before any land granted by this act shall be conve^ to any company or party entitled thereto under this act, er shall first be paid into the Treasury of the United bta of surveying, selecting, and conveying the same by the said compa or party in interest as the titles shall be required by said compa which amount shall, without any further appropriation, . • used by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, for prosecution of the survey of the public lands along the line 0 road, and so from year to year, until the whole shall be comp as provided under the provisions of this act.
With these statutes in force, the railway company filed its bill in one of the State courts of Kansas against one Prescott, to quiet the title to a tract of land in Kansas, to which it set up title only by virtue of the provisions of the above-quoted act of Congress of 1862. The defendant set up a tax title for taxes assessed in 1868, with a subsequent sale.
It was admitted on both sides that at the time the lands were assessed the company had completed the section of forty miles of road within which the lands lay, and that the President had accepted them; butthat in the present case payment of the costs of surveying, selecting, and conveying had never been made, and that no patent for the land had issued.
The primary question thus was, who was the owner of the land at the time it was assessed and taxed, the United States or the railway company? If the United States, then the land was not subject to State taxation, and the sale was void. It the railway company, it was, and there being in that case no question about the regularity of the sale, the title of the company had been divested.
And this primary question depended on others behind it, to wit:
1st. Whether in order to the procuring of a title into itself, it was necessary for the company to have paid the costs of surveying, selecting, and conveying the land ?
. Whether such a proviso as existed here, giving to t e government a contingent right to offer the lands to actual settlers under the pre-emption laws, did not prevent he lands so vesting in the company as to be liable to be sold for taxes?
The court in which the company’s bill was filed, referring tie octiine as admitted, that a right to a patent was sufcient to subject lands to taxation, considered:
hat wheie land is granted to a company for the sole Purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad, and the WaS coustlucted to the approval of government, the it ac(lu^red such an interest in the land as rendered
8u ject to taxation, even though it had not received a
Argument for the purchaser.
patent, and had not paid the cost of surveying, selecting, and conveying the same.
2. 1 hat the provision in a grant by the government “ that any of the lands so granted and not sold by the company within three years after the final completion of the road, should be liable to be sold to actual settlers under the pre-emption laws, at one dollar and a quarter per acre, the money to be paid to the company,” reserved no such interest in the government as would render the land not subject to taxation.
It accordingly decreed a dismissal of the bill, and that decree being affirmed in the Supreme Court of the State, the case was brought here by the company for review.
Mr. I. Gr. Mohler, in support of the ruling below:
We submit as a preliminary point, worthy of consideration, whether the 21st section of the amendatory act of 1864,—requiring that before any of the lands granted by “ this act” should be conveyed to the company the cost of surveying, selecting, and conveying said lands, shall first be paid into the Treasury of the United States by the company, &c.,—is not limited to lands acquired by virtue of that act. The language is “ this act.” Independently of that the original act of 1862 required no such prepayment, and the government cannot disregard a statute which made a grant—an executed contract—and annex new conditions to the grant by a subsequent enactment. If this point is well taken, then as the title here is derived under the original act (the act of 1862), the requisition does not apply to this particular case.
But independently of this:
1. A legal title is confessedly unnecessary to give to a State a right to tax. “ The right to a patent once vested, says this court, in Stark v. Starrs,* “ is equivalent, as respects the government dealing with the public lands, to a patent issued; and when issued, it relates back so far as may be
* 6 Wallace, 402.
necessary to cut off intervening claimants, to the inception of the right of the patentee” Indeed the whole foundation of the plaintiff’s case is a title in himself. He sets one up, and if he has no title, of course, he can maintain no bill to have his title quieted.
2. Now the grant attached, and a good equitable title vested upon the compliance by the company on which the grant itself was made; that is to say, upon the completion of any forty consecutive miles of road, accepted by the President. The 21st section of the amendatory act does not prevent an equitable title from vesting. It only declares that “before any land granted by this act shall be conveyed,’ certain small expenses shall be paid. It assumes that the land has been “granted,” i. e., that the grant has attached; but withholds a patent, or evidence of legal title, till the small expenses mentioned are discharged.
3. The court below was equally right, as to the effect of the proviso in the original statute of 1862, opening to actual settlers under the pre-emption laws any of the lands not sold within three years. The effect of an opposite construction would be to render the act nugatory and void, and consequently destroy the grant, for government cannot grant away any portion of the public lands, and yet still own them. This proviso is in the nature of a saving clause in a statute; but a saving clause in a statute, where it is directly repugnant to the purview or body of the act, and cannot stand without rendering the act inconsistent and destructive of itselt, is to be rejected.
Mr. J. P. Ushur, contra, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The original act of 1862 was amended in 1864 by extending the limits of the grant on each side of the road, and by several other provisions.
A question is raised whether the provision in the twenty-fiist section ot the amendatory statute of 1864—by which it 18 declared that before any of the lands granted by the act [p. 608] should be conveyed to the company, the cost of surveying, selecting, and conveying said lands should first be paid into the Treasury of the United States by the company or party in interest—requires this prepayment of the cost of surveying for the lands granted by the original act, or is limited to the lands acquired by the extension of the grant.
Looking to the whole scope of the amended act, and to the provision that the money so paid was to constitute a fund for the continuance and completion of the entire surveys along the road where none had been made, we are of opinion that no patent could rightfully’ issue in any case until the cost of survey had been paid. None of the road had been built when the amendatory act was passed. No right had vested in any tracts of land, and the power, as W’ell as intent, of Congress to require such payment cannot be contested.
While we recognize the doctrine heretofore laid down by this court, that lands sold by the United States may be taxed before they have parted with the legal title by issuing a patent, it is to be understood as applicable to cases where the right to the patent is complete, and the equitable title is fully vested in the party without anything more to be paid, or any act to be done going to the foundation of his right.
The present case does not fall within that principle.
Two important acts remain to be done, the failure to do which may wholly defeat the right of the company to a patent for these lands.
The first is the payment pf the costs of surveying. It is
admitted that this has never been done in the present case. If the company have such an interest in these lands that they can be sold by the State under her power of taxation, then the title is divested out of the government without its consent, and the right to recover the money expende in the surveys is defeated. As the government retains tie legal title until the company or some one interested in t e same grant or title shall pay these expenses, the State can not levy taxes on the land, and under such levy sell an [p. 609] make a title which might in any event defeat this light of the Federal government reserved in the act by which the inchoate grant was made.
Another important and declared purpose of Congress would he equally defeated by the title thus acquired under the tax sale, if it were valid.
It is wisely provided, that these lands shall not be used by the company as a monopoly of indefinite duration. The policy of the government has been for years to encourage settlement on the public land by the pioneers of emigration, and to this end it has passed many laws for their benefit. This policy not only favors the actual settler, but it is to the interest of those who, by purchase, own adjacent lands, that all of it should be open to settlement and cultivation. Looking to this policy, and to the very large quantity of lands granted by this statute to a single corporation, Congress declared that if the company did not sell those lands within a time limited by the act they should then, without further action of the company, or of Congress, be open to the actual settler under the same laws which govern the right of pre-emption on government lands, and at the same price. Any one who has ever lived in a community where large bodies of lands are withheld from use, or occupation, or from sale except at exorbitant prices, will recognize the value of this provision. It is made for the public good, as well as for that of the actual settler. To permit these lands to pass' under a title derived from the State for taxes would certainly defeat this intent of Congress. It makes no difference in the force of the principle, that the money paid by the settler goes to the company. The lands which the act of Congress declares shall be open to pre-emption and sale are withdrawn from pre-emption and sale by a tax title and possession under it, and it is no answer to say that the company which might have paid the taxes gets the price paid by the settler. •
For these reasons we think that though the line of the road had been built and approved by the President, so far
VOL. XVI. 39
Syllabus.
as to authorize the company to obtain a patent for this land, if they had paid the cost of survey and the expenses of making the conveyance, yet the neglect to do this and the contingent right of offering the land to actual settlers at the minimum price asked for its lands by the government, forbid the State to embarrass these rights by a sale for taxes.
Judgment reversed, and the case remanded to the State court with instructions to proceed in conformity to this opinion.
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