Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453
Full caption
Adams v. Burke.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Adams v. Burke.
• Where a patentee has assigned his right to manufacture, sell, and use within a limited district an instrument, machine, or other manufactured product, a purchaser of such instrument or machine, when rightfully bought within the prescribed limits, acquires by such purchase the right towseit anywhere, without reference to other assignments of territorial rights by the same patentee. • The right to the use of such machines or instruments stands on a different ground from the right to make and sell them, and inheres in the nature 0 a contract of purchase, which carries no implied limitation of the r'ght of use within a given locality.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Massae usetts; the case being thus:
26th day of May, 1863, letters-patent were granted p. 454to Merrill & Horner, for a certain improvement in coffin-lids, giving to them the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to others to be used, the said improvement.
On the 13th day of March, 1865, Merrill & Horner, the patentees, by an assignment duly executed and recorded, assigned to Lockhart & Seelye, of Cambridge, in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, all the right, title, and interest which the said patentees had in the invention described in the said letters-patent, for, to, and in a circle whose radius is ten miles, having the city of Boston as a centre. They subsequently assigned the patent, or what right they retained in it, to one Adams.
Adams now filed a bill in the court below, against a certain Burke, an undertaker, who used in the town of Natick (a town about seventeen miles from Boston, and therefore outside of the circle above mentioned) coffins with lids of the kind patented, alleging him to be an infringer of their patent, and praying for an injunction, discovery, profits, and other relief suitable against an infringer.
The defendant pleaded in bar:
“That he carries on the business of an undertaker, having his place of business in Natick, in said district; that, in the exercise of his said business, he is employed to bury the dead; that when so employed it is his custom to procure hearses, coffins, and whatever else may be necessary or proper for burials, and to superintend the preparation of graves, and that his bills for his services in each case, and the coffin, hearse, and other articles procured by him, are paid by the personal representatives of the deceased; that, since the date of the alleged assignment to the plaintiff of an interest in the invention secured by the said letters-patent, he has sold no coffins, unless the use o coffins by him in his said business, as above described, shall be deemed a sale ; has used no coffins, except in his said business as aforesaid; and has manufactured no coffins containing t e said invention; and that since the said date he has used in his business as aforesaid, in Natick, no coffin containing the inven tion secured by said letters-patent, except such coffins containing said invention as have been manufactured by said Lockhait ’ Seelye, within a circle, whose radius is ten miles, having p. 455city of Boston as its centre, and sold within said circle by said Lockhart & Seelye, without condition or restriction.”
The validity of this plea was the question in the case. The court below, referring to the case of Bloomer v. McQuewan* in which Taney, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, said:
“ When a machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of Congress.” ■
And referring also to some other cases, held that the plea was good. And from a decree which followed, dismissing, of course, the bill, this appeal was taken.
Mr. C. B. Goodrich, for the appellant; Messrs. B. H. Dana «nd L. S. Dabney, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented by the plea in this case is a very interesting one in patent law, and the precise point in it has never been decided by this court, though cases involving some of the considerations which apply to it have been decided, and others of analogous character are frequently recurring. The vast pecuniary results involved in such cases, as well as the public interest, admonish us to proceed with care, and to decide in each case no more than what is directly in issue.
We have repeatedly held that where a person had purchased a patented machine of the patentee or his assignee, this purchase carried with it the right to the use of that machine so long as it was capable of use, and that the expiration and renewal of the patent, whether in favor of the original patentee or of his assignee, did not affect this right. The hue ground on which these decisions rest is that the sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a Machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used in point of time.
The right to manufacture, the right to sell, and the right to use are each substantive rights, and may be granted or conferred separately by the patentee.
But, in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use. The article, in the language of the court, passes without the limit of the monopoly.* That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received, all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees.
If this principle be sound as to a machine or instrument whose use may be continued for a number of years, and may extend beyond the existence of the patent, as limited at the time of the sale, and into the period of a renewal or extension, it must be much more applicable to an instrument or product of patented manufacture which perishes in the first use of it, or which, by that first use, becomes incapable of further use, and of no further value. Such is the case with the cofiin-lids of appellant’s patent.
It seems to us that, although the right of Lockhart & Seelye to manufacture, to sell, and to use these coffin-lids was limited to the circle of ten miles around Boston, that a purchaser from them of a single coffin acquired the right to use that coffin for the purpose for which all coffins are used. That so far as the use of it was concerned, the patentee had received his consideration, and it was no longer within the monopoly of the patent. It would be to engraft a limitation upon the right of use not contemplated by the statute not within the reason of the contract to say that it could only be used within the ten-miles circle. Whatever, theiefoie, may be the rule ■when patentees subdivide territorially their patents, as to the exclusive right io make or to sell within a
*
Opinion of Bradley, Swayne, and Strong, JJ., dissenting.
limited territory, we hold that in the class of machines or implements we have described, when they are once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied for the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees.
A careful examination of the plea satisfies us that the defendant, who, as an undertaker, purchased each of these coffins and used it in burying the body which he was employed to bury, acquired the right to this use of it freed from any claim of the patentee, though purchased within the ten-mil'e circle and used without it.
The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the plaintiff’s bill is, therefore,
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY (with whom concurred Justices SWAYNE and STRONG), dissenting:
The question raised in this case is whether an assignment of a patented invention for a limited district, such as a city, a county, or a State, confers upon the assignee the right to sell the patented article to be used outside of such limited district. The defendant justifies under such a claim. He uses a patented article outside of the territory within which the patent was assigned to the persons from whom he purchased it. The plaintiff, who claims under the original patentee, complains that this is a transgression of the limits of the assignment.
If it were a question of legislative policy, whether a patentee should be allowed to divide up his monopoly into territorial parcels, it might admit of grave doubt whether a vendee of the patented article purchasing it rightfully, ought to be restrained or limited as to the place of its use. ut the patent act gives to the patentee a monopoly of use, as well as of manufacture, throughout the whole United fates; and the eleventh section of the act (of 1836) expressly authorizes not only an assignment of the whole patent, or any UU prided part thereof, but a “ grant and conveyance of the CXc us^ve right under any patent, to make and use, and to
Opinion of Bradley, Swayne, and Strong, JJ., dissenting.
grant to others to make and use the thing patented within and throughout any specified part or portion of the United States.”*
If an assignment under this clause does not confer the same rights within the limited district which the patentee himself previously had in the whole United States, and no more, it is difficult to know what meaning to attach to language however plain.
On the 26th day of May, 1863, letters-patent were granted to Merrill & Horner, for a certain improvement in coffin-lids, giving to them the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to others to be used, the said improvement.
On the 13th day of March, 1865, Merrill & Horner, the patentees, by an assignment duly executed and recorded, did assign to Lockhart & Seelye, of Cambridge, in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, all the right, title, and interest which the said patentees had in the invention described in the said letters-patent, for, to, and in a circle whose radius is ten miles,‘having the city of Boston as a centre. By necessary consequence (as it seems to me), the right thus assigned consisted of the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the improved coffin-lid within the limited territory described; but did not include any right to make, use, or vend the same outside of those limits. As the assigned right to make the lids was a restricted right, limited to the territory; so the assigned right to use them was a restricted right limited in the same manner. Each right is conveyed by precisely the same language. A different construction would defeat the intent of the parties. For if the assignees, after making any number of lids within the limited district, could use them or authorize others to use them outside of the district, the balance of the monopoly remaining in the hands of the patentees might be rendered of little value.
If it be contended that the right of vending the lids to others enables them to confer upon their vendees the rig t
*
Opinion of Bradley, Swayne, and Strong, JJ., dissenting.
to use the lids thus sold outside of the limited district, the question at once arises, how can they confer upon their vendees a right which they cannot exercise themselves? The only consistent construction to be given to such an assignment is, to limit all the privileges conferred by it to the district marked out. It is an assignment of the manufacture and use of the patented article within that district, and within that district only.
Difficulties may, undoubtedly, be suggested in special cases. If the patented thing be an article of wearing apparel, sold by the assignee within his district, it is confidently asked, cannot the purchaser wear the article outside of the district? The answer to acute suggestions of this sort would probably be found (in the absence of all bad faith in the parties) in the maxim de minimis non curat lex.
On the other hand, the difficulties and the injustice which would follow from a contrary construction to that which I contend for, are very obvious, T^ake the electric telegraph, for example. Suppose Professor Morse had assigned his patent within and for the New England States. Would such an assignment authorize the vendees of his assignees to use the apparatus in the whole United States ? Take the planing machine: would an assignment from Wood worth of his patent within and for the State of Vermont, authorize the assignees to manufacture machines ad libitum, and sell them to parties to be used in other States ? So of Hoe’s printing press, and a thousand other machines and inventions of like sort.
Such a doctrine would most seriously affect not only the assignor (as to his residuary right in his patent), but the assignee also. For if it be correct, there would be nothing to prevent the patentee himself, after assigning his patent Within a valuable city or other locality, from selling the patent machine or article to be used within the assigned district. By this means, the assignment could be, and in numer ess instances would be, rendered worthless. Millions of o ars have been invested by manufacturers and mechanics ln ese limited assignments of patents in our manufacturing
Syllabus.
districts and towns, giving them, as they have supposed, the monopoly of the patented machine or article within the district purchased. The decision of the court in this case will, in my view, utterly destroy the value of a great portion of this property.
I do not regard the authorities cited as establishing a different doctrine from that now contended for. The remark of Chief Justice Taney, in Bloomer v. McQuewan, that “ when a machine passes to the hands of a purchaser, it is no longer ■within the limits of the monopoly; it passes outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of Congress,” is perfectly true in the sense and application in which the Chief Justice made it. He was speaking of time, not territory; of the right to use a machine after the original patent had expired and a renewal had been granted, not of using it in a place outside of the grant. All the effects mentioned by the Chief Justice would undoubtedly follow so far forth as it was in thd power of the vendor to produce them, but no further. And he would never have contended that those effects would follow any further than the vendor’s power to produce them extended. That is the very question in this case. How far did the assignee’s interest and, therefore, his power extend? In my judgment it was limited in locality, both as to manufacture and use, and that he could not convey to another what he did not have himself. I hold, therefore, that the decree should be reversed.
Philp et al. v. Nock. In a suit by a patentee, for damages against an infringer, the plaintiff can
recover only for actual damages, and he must show the damages by evi dence. They cannot be left to conjecture by the jury. Where he sought his profit in the form of a royalty paid by his licensees an t ere are no peculiar circumstances, the amount to be recovered will e r g ulated by that standard. Counsel fees cannot be included in the ver and an instruction which directed the jury to award to the P ain “such sum as they should find to be required to remunerate him tor loss sustained by the wrongful act of the defendants, and to him for all such expenditures as have been necessarily incurre J
Argument for the plaintiff in error.
order to establish his right” was held to be erroneous as too broad and vague, and as tending to lead the jury to suppose that it was their duty to allow counsel fees and perhaps other charges and expenditures equally inadmissible.
Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Nock brought an action in the court below against Philp and others to recover damages for the infringement of a patent granted to him by the United States for an improvement touching the lids of inkstands and the hinge whereby such lids are attached. The case came on to be tried in March, 1870, and therefore while the Patent Act of July 4th, 1836,* which in suits against infringers gives to patentees “the actual damages sustained” by them, was in force; a similar provision, however, being made in the subsequent Patent Act of July 8th, 1870.f The bill of exceptions showed that the plaintiff gave in evidence that during the term of the patent “ the defendants had sold inkstands having hinges that were infringements of the plaintiff’s patent, to the number of seventy-five dozen, and that the royalty which the plaintiff received for the use of his patent was at the rate of $2 per gross.” The testimony being closed, the court instructed the jury as follows:
“If the jury shall find a verdict for the plaintiff under the foregoing instructions, they will award him. such sum as they shall find to be required to remunerate him for the loss sustained by the wrongful act of the defendants, and to reimburse for all such expenditures as have been necessarily incurred by Iwn in order to establish his righty
To this instruction the defendant,excepted.
A verdict and judgment having been given for the plaintiffin the sum of $500 the defendants brought the case here.
J2. J), Mussey, for the plaintiff in error:
All the injury proved was that the defendants withheld royalty to the amount of $12.50. There was no evidence of any “expenditure” by Nock, and the instruction had no
* 5 Stat, at Large, 123. f 16 Id. 207. p. 462foundation in the evidence. Its inevitable effect upon the minds of the jury was to lead them to believe they might lump counsel fees, and such other expenditures as they inferred, and out of them make a total. The jury followed this evident lead of the court, and returned a verdict for forty times the amount proven.
Mr. Gr. IF. Paschall, contra:
The bill of exceptions does not show all the evidence in the case, but it may be gathered that the plaintiff below proved that the defendants had infringed his right by selling severity-five dozen inkstands. What further facts he proved is not stated.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
The measure of the damages to be recovered against infringers prescribed by the act of 1836 as well as by the act of 1870, is “the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff.” Where the plaintiff has sought his profit in the form of a royalty paid by his licensees, and there are no peculiar circumstances in the case, the amount to be recovered will be regulated by that standard. If that test cannot be applied, he will be entitled to an amount which will compensate him for the injury to which he has been subjected by the piracy. In arriving at their conclusion, the profit made by the defendant and that lost by the plaintiff are among the elements which the jury may consider. Where the infringement is confined to a part of the thing sold, the recovery must be limited accordingly. It cannot be as if the entire thing were covered by the patent; or, where that is the case, as if the infringement were as large as the monopoly. Counsel fees cannot be included in the verdict. The plaintiff must show his damages by evidence. They must not be left to conjecture by the jury. They must be proved, and not guessed at.
The instruction under consideration was too broad and too vague. The jury could have hardly doubted that it was their duty to allow the counsel fees paid or to be paid y
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
the plaintiff’, and perhaps other charges and expenditures equally inadmissible.
Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded to the court below, with directions to issue
A venire de novo.
Carlton v, Bokee.
1. Where a claim in a patent uses general terms of reference to the specification, such as “substantially in the manner and for the purpose herein set forth,” although the patentee will not be held to the precise combination of all the parts described, yet his claim will be limited, by reference to the history of the art, to what was really first invented by him. 2. General claims inserted in a reissued patent will be carefully scrutinized, and will not be permitted to extend the rights of the patentee beyond what is shown by the history of the art to have been really his invention. If made to embrace more the claim will be void.
o. One void claim, if made by inadvertence and in good faith, will not vitiate the entire patent.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland.
William Carlton et al., as assignees of Christian Reichmann, filed their bill in equity in the court below to restrain Howard Bokee from infringing a patent for an improvement in lamps, granted to Reichmann on the 21st of September, 1858, and reissued to Carlton and one Merrill on the 11th of August, 1868.
The court below dismissed the bill, and the complainant took this appeal.
The case can be gathered from the facts stated in the opinion of the court.
Messrs. J. H. B. Latrobe and B. R. Cards, for the appellant; essrs‘ C. F. Blake and C. M. Keller, contra.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY stated the facts and delivered the opinion of the court.
He lamp, as patented to Reichmann, was one of a large
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
number of attempts made about the time to utilize petroleum and its various products for purposes of illumination. The old lamps adapted to sperm oil, lard, and other gross and sluggish oils were unfitted for the use of so volatile and dangerous a substance. In them the flame was set close to the lamp, and the tube holding the wick was projected downward into the oil, so that the heat of the flame might be communicated thereto in order to render it more fluid and susceptible to the capillary attraction of the wick. Such an arrangement as this with petroleum would have produced a speedy explosion. This ar-
Fig. 1.
ticle required that the flame should be elevated as far as possible above the lamp and that the metallic wick tube should not communicate any heat to the fluid. This was one object to be attained in the burners required for thè use of the new illuminator. Another was some contrivance foi concentrating a current of air upon the flame itself, so as to consume as perfectly as possible all the rapidly escaping volatile gases, both as a saving of light and as a preventive of the disagiee able odors which they would otherwise diffuse.
Reichmanu’s burner, illustrated in Figure 1, was intended to accomplish these main objects as well as some subsidiary ones, which will
hereafter appear. It consisted of several distinct parts, bined and arranged in a particular manner. irs,
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
wick-tube (indicated in the figure by the letter c) attached to the cap or stopper of the lamp, and rising above the same one or two inches, more or less, according to the size of the burner, but not projecting into the lamp below. Secondly, ratchet-wheels attached to the side of the wick-tube on a small shaft (y), for raising and lowering the wick. Thirdly, a slide or sleeve (i) fitted to slip up and down over the wick-tube, and sufficiently tight to stay in any position thereon, and furnished with arms (o, o), two or more, for supporting above the wick-tube a dome or deflector (m). Fourthly, the dome aforesaid, having an oval or oblong slot for the flame to pass through, so that part of the flame might be above the dome and part below it. The object of this dome was to collect and concentrate the air upon the flame, in order to make it burn more brightly and consume the hydro-car-bon and other gases which emanated from the petroleum. It also acted as a deflector of the light proceeding from the lower part of the flame, whereby it was thrown downward towards and around the lamp, whereas the light from that part of the flame above the dome was all thrown upward or horizontally about the room. Fifthly, around the periphery of the dome several narrow slips of the metal (/i) were turned up, to act as arms or supports to the glass chimney of the lamp, and between these arms spaces were cut out of the edge of the dome, to allow air to pass up between the dome and chimney for the purpose of guiding the flame and feeding it with additional oxygen. Sixthly, the chimney itself (p), which was placed inside of and upon the said arms or supports, and held in its position thereby.
This was the combination of elements of which Reichinanns burner consisted, and it will be perceived that the c limney was so elevated that the flame of the lamp below e dome was exposed on every side, and a current of air or a rapid movement of the lamp would extinguish it. This was the great defect of the burner, which prevented its intro-, notion into general use, and rendered it of little value. The principal advantage which Reichmann in his patent claimed or it was that it allowed the light from the under side of v °l. xvn. 30
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
the deflector to be reflected or thrown downward upon the table or lamp. This was effected by the use of upright, slender arms to support the dome, so that the space around and underneath the dome was left open and uninclosed. He also claimed some less important advantages in his arrangement of the ratchet-wheels for raising1 the wick, and one or two other things of no importance in this controversy.
The patent had but one claim and that amounted to the general combination of elements referred to and their peculiar arrangement. It was in these words:
“ What I claim as new and desire to secure by letters-patent is, in combination with the lamp, the slotted, open, bell-shaped cap (t. e., the dome), when so constructed, arranged, and operating as to allow light to be deflected downwards, substantially in the manner and for the purpose herein set forth and explained.”
In order to understand how narrow this claim really was, it is necessary to know a little of the history of the art. Two well-known burners are conceded to have been in use before Reichmann’s invention, which have a material bearing on his claims; the Vienna burner and Stuber’s burner. These have been exhibited to us.
The Vienna burner, shown in Figure 2, contained the flat wick-tube, the ratchet-wheel attached thereto (but covered
and not exposed as in Reichmann’s), and a slotted dome above the wick for the flame to pass through, and a chimney; but the dome was not supported by slender arms, as in Reichmann’s, but was connected with a gallery, which supported the chimney and surrounded the wick-tube an dome, and rested on the lamp or cap below, so that a the light of the flame below the dome was inclosed and lost and could not issue out as in Reichmann’s burner. e drawing shows the doipe (<z), the surrounding galleiy ( ), and the lower part of the wick-tube (c). .
The Stuber burner, invented by John Stuber in 185, an made in considerable quantities in that and the fol owi o years at Utica, New York (shown in Figure 3), was an im-
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
Fig. 2.
Fig. 3. Fig. 4.
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
provement on the Vienna burner, in this, that the gallery was so low as to leave a considerable open space under the dome for the reflected light to pass out in a downward direction, and the dome was supported by slender arms (rf), but these arms were attached to the gallery and not to a sleeve fitted on to the wick-tube. It differed, therefore, from Reichmann’s in these respects: the chimney was supported on a low gallery instead of the dome itself, and the dome was supported by arms (d) attached to this gallery instead of arms attached to a sleeve on the wick-tube.* Therefore, with these burners before us, all the invention we can discover in Reichmann’s burner is the peculiar mode of supporting his dome by slender arms attached to a sleeve fitted on to the wick-tube, and the elevation of the chimney on the outer edge of the dome. The latter peculiarity, as we have seen, is a defect which rendered the burner nearly useless.
The lamp made and sold by the defendants is substantially exhibited (in a sectional view) in Figure 5, which was patented to L. J. Atwood, October 13th, 1863. The dome and chimney are lifted from their place on the cap of the lamp to show the parts.
The allegation of the complainants that the defendant uses Reichmann’s invention of peripheral springs (m) around the edge of the dome (A) for steadying his chimney we regard as fallacious. The transformation by a mere trick of words and vague generalities of the arms or supports used by Reichmann to sustain his chimney into peripheral springs may be ingenious, but it cannot stand the test of sobei con sideration. It is not pretended that Reichmann produce anything more than the arms or supports shown in his ong inal patent, marked k in Figure 1. These were mere slips o
* The Figure 4 shows another form of Stuber’s invention. In F'g upright strips of metal embrace the exterior of the chimney so as to stand steadily. In Figure 4 an ornamented crown-piece with large ope reducing the quantity of metal embracing the chimney to not grea than what is in the “ upright strips of metal,” seen in Figure, per o & same functions that the last do in the burner illustrated by t e sai
—Eep.
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
metal turned up around the edge of the dome, such as had been in common use for a great period of time. All that Reichmann did new in this regard was to elevate his chimney on the top of the dome. This, in fact, rendered his lamp in the main useless, and the defendant does not copy it, but slips his chimney down around the dome and places it on a platform perforated with holes, which rests upon the cap of the lamp and answers to the bottom or floor of Stuber’s gallery. He thus surrounds the flame with the chimney below as well as above the dome and prevents it from being extinguished by drafts of air without obstructing the issue of the light from below the dome. In this respect his lamp is more like Stuber’s than Reichmann’s. It is true that he keeps his chimney from coming in contact with the dome by surrounding the latter with a fine spiral spring or metallic fringe (m), but this has no resemblance or analogy to the supporting arms appended by Reichmann to his dome.
The question whether the defendant’s burner, which is called the Comet, contains the other peculiarity of Reichmann’s burner, namely, the supporting of the dome by slender arms attached directly to a sleeve fitted snugly upon the wick-tube, admits of more discussion. The dome was supported by slender arms both in Stuber’s and Reichmann’s lamps, but in the former the arms were attached to the surrounding gallery on which the chimney rested, and which was slipped over a raised portion of the base (/) to which the wick-tube was affixed and there held in place by a bayonet fastening, whilst in Reichmann’s burner the arms were attached to a sleeve, fitted directly upon the wick-tube so snugly as to support the dome and chimney firmly and steadily, as before described. Now, in the Comet burner of the defendant, the arms supporting the dome (/¿), Figure 5, are attached to the platform before mentioned, which answers the place of the gallery floor in Stuber’s burner, and t e central portion of which is perforated with an opening ot (i) so as to pass down over the wick-tube when being P aced on the lamp; around this slot or opening the platorm is raised next to the wick-tube in a conical form (y), so
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
that the top edge of the raised part touches the wick-tube, and thus helps to give steadiness to the dome and chimney. The arms are attached to this raised part. But this raised portion of the platform is very far from being Reichmann’« sleeve, which was a pecu-
Fig. 5.
liar characteristic in his lamp, and the sleeve arrangement was all that Reichmann pretended to have produced. Its generalization in the reissued patent is simply effected by a dexterous use of words and vague generalities. We are constrained to hold, therefore, that the Comet burner is not an infringement of Reichmann’s original patent or of the invention which is exhibited in his original specification.
It is proper next to inquire as to the bearing of the reissued patent on the question in litigation between the parties. The defences made by the defendant against this reissue are, first, that it was obtained illegally, wrongfully, and by false pretences, and because it seeks to claim things of which Reichmann was not the original and first inventor; secondly, that the original patent itself was void, be-
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
cause the only thing in it which Reichmann had any pretence of inventing was anticipated by a man by the name of Michael Collins, as early as 1843.
The specification of the reissued patent describes the burner of Reichmann substantially as was done in the original patent, being interspersed, however, with observations as to the uses and objects of particular parts, evidently borrowed from subsequent experience and events. The single claim of the original patent is expanded into seven distinct claims. The first three of these claims, taken with the qualifications which they contain, and limited as they must be by the state of the art at the time when the original patent was applied for, amount to precisely the same thing and to no more than the one claim of the original patent. The first is for a combination of only two elements, it is true, the flat wick-tube and the dome, which combination is found in both the Vienna and Stuber burners; but a qualification is added, that the combination is to be “ under the arrangement substantially as shown and described, so that, while directly con nected with each other, the said parts shall allow light to pass out or be reflected from between them, as set forth.” Thus it is made essential to the invention here claimed, not only that the two elements named should be present, but that they should have the arrangement described in the patent, and should have a direct connection with each other, and
that the light should be reflected from between them. All
these things exist in the Stuber burner except one. In that
burner the wick-tube and the dome are not directly con-
nected together. The dome is first connected with the gal-
lory and the gallery with the wick-tube. So that the claim
is leduced to the same thing which was claimed in the orig-
inal patent. The same may be said of the second and third
caimg. jf they mean anything more than the claim in the
original patent they are void. Being identical with that
ey are needlessly multiplied, and by exhibiting a seeming
0 claims to which Reichmann was not entitled they are cal-
OQatedto confuse and mislead. We think it proper to re-
1 orate our disapprobation of these ingenious attempts to
Statement of the case and opinion of the court.
expand a simple invention of a distinct device into an all-embracing claim, calculated by its wide generalizations and ambiguous language to discourage further invention in the same department of industry and to cover antecedent’inventions. Without deciding that a repetition of substantially the same claim in different words will vitiate a patent, we hold that where a specification by ambiguity and a needless multiplication of nebulous claims is calculated to deceive and mislead the public, the patent is void.
The fourth claim was clearly anticipated by the burner of Stuber. It is in the following words:
“ A lamp-burner composed of two groups of elements, the first consisting of the base with its wick-tube and wick-adjusting rack and pinions; the second of a chimney-holder, deflector, and such other parts as may be needed for the proper combustion of the fluid so as to produce an illuminating flame, the two groups being united by friction, and the latter when in position in the burner being supported by the former without the intervention of any mechanical device whereby the two may be rigidly connected together, substantially as and for the purposes herein shown and set forth.”
Everything here claimed is found in Stuber’s burner. If this claim is valid Stuber could be enjoined. The addition of a bayonet fastening by Stuber does not destroy the identity of his lamp with the alleged invention described in this claim. It follows that this claim is void for this reason, without reference to other objections which have been suggested in relation to it. One void claim, however, does not vitiate the entire patent, if made by mistake or inadvertence and without any wilful default or intent to defraud or mislead the public. Giving to the complainants the whole benefit of this indulgence there is still nothing in the remaining claims which the defendant is called upon to answer. They are merely for combinations of parts in the original burner of Reichmann which the defendant does not use unless t e pretence of a claim to peripheral springs as distinguishe from Reichmann’s arms and supports can be sustained. e have already seen that this cannot be done.
Syllabus.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Comet burner is no infringement of Reichraann’s reissued patent so far as that patent is valid.
This view of the case makes it unnecessary to discuss the question relating to the alleged invention of Collins. Whilst his conduct and testimony and that of the other witnesses who testify to his invention are susceptible of much criticism, we think it proper to say that we should feel great difficulty in disregarding it altogether. If the models presented by him were really his invention at the time sworn to, the Beichmann patent has no foundation whatever to stand on. But waiving the discussion of this question we feel bound to affirm the decree of the Circuit Court for the reasons above stated.
Decree affirmed.*