Case details
Bluebook Citation
Ripley v. Ins. Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 336
Full caption
Ripley v. Insurance Company.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Ripley v. Insurance Company.
One took out an accident policy of insurance on his life while “ travelling by public or private conveyance.” Having performed a part of his journey by steamer, which brought him to a certain village, he walked thence home about eight miles. Held, that while thus walking, he was not travelling by either public or private conveyance.
Error to the Circuit Court for the Western District of Michigan; the case being this :
On the 8th of May, 1869, one Ripley took out an accident policy of insurance on his life, “ good for one day,” for $5000. It stipulated for the payment of that sum to the legal repiesentatives of the assured, in the event of his death, from injuries effected through violent and accidental means; provided that the death was caused by an accident while t e assured was “ travelling by public or private conveyance.
After purchasing the ticket, the insured proceeded y steamboat to a village about eight miles from his resia
he
and from that village he walked home. While on his way
he
received injuries by violence, from the effects of whic died soon afterwards, and within the time limited ny tie policy. ...
The question was whether, when he received the he was “ travelling by public or private conveyance. court below held that he was not; and this holding was error complained of.
Argument for the representatives of the insured.
Mr. George Gray, for the plaintiff in error:
In Northrup v. The Railway Passengers' Assurance Company* the contract was against accident “ while travelling by public or private conveyance,” provided for the transportation of its passengers. Yet the company was held liable though the death was caused while the party was walking from a steamboat landing to a railway station, a distance of seventy rods. This case regards the walking as part of the original journey in the public or private conveyance, and wisely; for few persons on a long journey are all the time in the rail-carriages. The case does but carry out the injunction given by Cockburn, C. J., in Trew v. Railway Passengers’ Assurance Company.f
“We ought not to give to these policies a construction which will defeat the protection of the assured in a large class of cases.”
But, independently of this. The words “ private conveyance,” reasonably, and ex vi termini, include the case of a person pursuing a journey, or travelling, by means of his own personal powers of locomotion ; his limb< with their nwscles and tendons, bones and joints—the primitive universal “private conveyance” of man. “Conveyance” is the instrument or means of carrying or transferring anything from place to place. It is derived from con (with, by, al°»g), and via (the way).J It is used in this sense in the Scriptures, where it is said that the Saviour had “ conveyed himself away.”§ So in poetry,
“Love cannot, like the wind, itself convey To fill two sails, though both are spread one way.”
Howard.
And so in ordinary language and in everyday life. Should a coui‘t direct its officer to “ convey the prisoner to jail,” no One will doubt that the prisoner’s walking to the place des-
43 New York, 516; and see Theobald v. The Railway Passengers’ As-26 English Law and Equity, 432.
T 80 L. J. Exchequer, 317. t Webster. 8 John 5:13.
VOL. XV!.
Syllabus.
ignated would be a literal and exact compliance with the order. If one were to say to an intruder, “Cb/wey yourself away,” the speaker would have no idea but that the party should walk off; nor would the party himself expect that anything else was meant.
Mr. H. C. Robinson, contra.
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
That the deceased was travelling is clear enough, but was travelling on foot travelling by public or private conveyance ?
The contract must receive the construction which the language used fairly warrants. What was the understanding of the parties, or, rather, what understanding must naturally have been derived from the language used? It seems to us that walking would not naturally be presented to the mind as a means of public or private conveyance. Public conveyance naturally suggests a vessel or vehicle employed in the general conveyance of passengers. Private conveyance suggests a vehicle belonging to a private individual.
If this was the sense in which the language was understood by the parties, the deceased was not, when injured, travelling, within the terms of the policy. There is nothing to show that it was not.
Judgment affirmed.
Merrill v. Petty.
An appeal on a libel in personam for a collision by the owners of a schooner against the owners of a sloop that had been sunk in the collision, IS missed; the decree having been for $1292.84, and, therefore, “not ceeding the sum or value of $2000.” The fact that prior to this personam, the owners of the sloop had filed in another distric ® in rem against the schooner, laying their damages at $4781.84, an in the District and Circuit Courts below, both cases might have ee heard as one (a fact asserted by counsel but not apparent in the reco >
held not to affect the matter ; the cases never having been brought into the same district or circuit, nor in any manner consolidated.
On motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, the case was thus:
A schooner (the Mary Eveline) sailing down Hell Gate (towards New York), came into collision with a sloop (the Ethan Allen) sailing up (towards Connecticut), and sunk her. The owners of each vessel blamed the officers and crew of the other, and sought respectively relief in admiralty. The owners of the sloop which bad been sunk, accordingly filed a libel, in rem., against the schooner in the Southern District of New York, claiming $3489; while there being no res for the owners of the schooner to proceed against—the sloop being at the bottom of the East River—the owners of the schooner were obliged to proceed personally against the owners of the sloop. This proceeding, which was for $2100 damages, they instituted in the Eastern District of New York; the suit of Petty v. Merrill.
Owing to the docket in the Eastern District being lighter than that in the Southern, the personal proceeding was reached first, when, as was said in one of the briefs in the ease, and not denied in the other (though the fact thus alleged, and not denied, did not appear in the record), both eases by consent of counsel were heard together, on the same facts and the same proofs, without however any attempt to consolidate, in form, the two proceedings, or to transfer the proceeding in the Southern District into the Eastern one. However heard, the result of the matter was that the libel in rem, against the schooner (the proceeding in the Southern District), was dismissed in that district, while in the personal proceeding (that in the Eastern District) the owners of fhe sloop were there decreed guilty in $1792.84. Decrees were entered in the respective District Courts, accordingly. r°in both these decrees the owners of the sloop appealed to 1 e respective Circuit Courts of the Southern and Eastern Districts;
When the cases got to the respective Circuit Courts, the
Argument in favor of dismissal.
order of priority which had happened in the District Courts was reversed, and in the Circuit Courts the proceeding in rem—the one against the schooner (the case of The Mary Eveline')—was first called.* There again—more or less of necessity—the merits of both cases were again heard on the one appeal; and the Circuit Court for the Southern District was—as the District Courts in both had been before—of the opinion that the fault vras with the sloop. It accordingly affirmed the decree in its own District Court; that is to say, it dismissed the libel.
When the appeal from the District Court of the Eastern District in the personal proceeding (Petty v. Merrill) came up to be heard in the Circuit Court for that district, the Circuit Court, deeming itself concluded by the decree in the proceeding in rem, in the Circuit Court for the Southern District, did not hear the merits anew; but examining the matter of damages, and reducing these to the extent of $500, entered a final decree for $1292.84.
From both the decrees—the one in the Southern Circuit, The Mary Eveline, and that in the Eastern, Petty v. Merrill—the owner of the sloop, Merrill, appealed.
The present motion to dismiss was in the appeal in the personal proceeding, that from the Eastern District; and was made on the ground that the amount did not exceed the sum of $2000, and, therefore, that no appeal lay.
The reader will of course remember that by the 22d section of the Judiciary Act, the jurisdiction of this court would attach only
“ Where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2000, exclusive of costs.”
Mr. F. A. Wilcox, in support of the motion:
When judgment is obtained by a plaintiff or libellant the amount in dispute is the amount of the judgment, and that
the
* This happened because in the decree in the personal proceeding
the
matter had been referred to a master to assess damages; this delaying appeal in the Eastern District.
decides the question of the right to appeal.* Here the judgment appealed from is less than $2000; it is but $1292.84.
Mr. R. H. Huntley, contra, and against the dismissal.
1. The libel in this case is in the nature of a cross-libel. Both actions are brought to recover damages for the same collision; the facts and the witnesses are the same; the question to be determined is the same, viz., “Which was the faulty vessel in the collision ?” and both causes were tried together, and the merits of the collision in both have been argued as one.
2. The matter in dispute means the matter for which suit is brought, on which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and witnesses examined, f
3. In this case the amount in dispute is found by adding together $3489, the amount of libellant’s claim in the cause of The Mary Eveline, the libel in rem., and $1292.84, the amount decreed by the Circuit Court to the libellants in the personal proceeding, the cause of Petty v. Merrill, making in all the sum of $4781.84.
4. No case can be cited, where a cross-libel had been filed and the damages litigated were over $2000, in which the court denied jurisdiction.
5. If this court decides that it has discretion to entertain this motion, then the proper exercise of that discretion will be to postpone the decision of this motion until the hearing of The Mary Eveline, the proceeding in rem.
Reply: Several claims, although the same defendant may have to pay them, cannot be added to make jurisdiction, although united in the same suit.|
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Power to re-examine the decrees of the Circuit Courts, removed there by appeal from the District Courts, was con-
Phillips’s Practice, 74. j- Lee v. Watson, 1 Wallace, 337.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
ferred upon this court by the 22d section of the Judiciary Act, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2000, exclusive of costs. Such decrees, however, could only be removed here under that act by virtue of a writ of error, but the subsequent act allowing the removal to be made by appeal in cases of equity, of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize, contains the same limitation that the matter in dispute “ shall exceed the sum or value of $2000, exclusive of costs,” and also provides that such appeals shall be subject to the same rules, regulations, and restrictions as are prescribed in law in case of writs of error.*
Damages are claimed by the libellants, as the owners of the schooner Mary Eveline, against the respondents, as the owners of the sloop Ethan Allen, in a case of collision civil and maritime. They allege in their libel that the collision occurred on the 20th of September, 1868, in East River, under the following circumstances: That-the schooner was beating down the river bound for the port of New York, the tide being ebb and the wind about southwest; that she had taken the channel to the east of Blackwell’s Island, another schooner being just ahead of her, sailing in the same direction ; that the respective schooners had beaten out the tack to the eastward, running as near the west shore of Long Island as they could safely go; that the other schooner, being ahead, wrent about first on the westward tack, towards the other shore, and was just in the act of going about again on her eastward tack as the schooner of the libellants went about; that it became necessary for the schooner of the libellants, in order to avoid the other schooner, to go to the leeward and pass under the stern of the other schooner, as she was making her westward tack, and they allege that their schooner had just passed the stern of the other schooner when the sloop was seen sailing up the channel to the east-
* 1 Stat, at Large, 84; 2 Id. 244; The San Pedro, 2 Wheaton, 140; United States v. Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 111; Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dallas, 328; The Sloop Betsey, lb. 16; The Admiral, 3 Wallace, 612.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
ward of Blackwell’s Island, distant about a hundred yards on the port-bow of the schooner, sailing before the wind near the centre of the channel six or seven miles an hour, with her mainsail and jib set and going at full speed; that the schooner of the libellants was at that time going about and following the other schooner, with her head to the wind, with the head-sheetsflowing and her helm hard-a-lee; that the sloop, instead of keeping out of the way, as she clearly should have done, by luffing and keeping off, as she was under full headway with her mainsail and jib set, ran into and against the schooner of the libellants, striking her cat-head against the stem of the schooner, knocking her forefoot off and splitting the stem and doing other serious damage to the schooner; that owing to the sudden and confused orders given by those on board the sloop, keeping oft’ and immediately luffing, it became impossible to avoid the collision, and that the same occurred wholly through the fault and negligence of the sloop and of those in charge of her navigation, and that it was not in any way the result of fault on the part of the schooner or of those in charge of her deck.
Service was made, and the respondents appeared and filed an answer, in which they allege that the circumstances attending the collision are not truly stated in the libel; that the collision did not occur through any fault, negligence, or mismanagement of the sloop, or of those in charge of her navigation, or through or by the sudden and confused orders given by her officers, as charged in the libel, but solely by reason of the fault, negligence, and mismanagement of those in charge of the schooner; that the sloop was sailing through East River on the east side of Blackwell’s Island, against a strong ebb-tide, the wind being south-southwest, blowing a whole-sail breeze; that for the purpose of securing the benefit of an eddy-tide she was standing near the shore with her boom on her port-side; that while she was so standing on a steady course the two schooners were standing across the river on the same side of the island, to the westward; t e foremost and windward of the two, having beaten out [p. 344] her tack, went about just abreast of the sloop at a safe distance; that the other, though to the leeward, continued on her tack after the one ahead went about, and in such a position as entirely prevented the sloop from luffing or avoiding her in any other way; that she continued her course without change until she arrived at a point ahead of and off the starboard bow of the sloop, when she put her helm down to go about, and while in the act of luffing into the wind ran into and upon the sloop, striking her at the cat-head, on her starboard side, breaking and crushing in her planking, and causing her to sink in a few minutes, and that the sloop and her cargo became a total loss.
Testimony was taken on both sides, and the District Court, having heard the parties, entered a decretal order in favor of the libellants, and sent the cause to a commissioner to report the amount of the damages. He made a report, to which the respondents filed several exceptions, some of which were sustained and others were overruled, and the court entered a final decree for the libellants, as corrected, in the sum of $1292.84 damages, and costs of suit. Appeal was taken by the respondents to the Circuit Court, but the Circuit Court affirmed the decree and the respondents appealed to this court.
Since the appeal was entered in this court the libellants, as appellees, have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, because the matter in dispute does not exceed the sum or value of $2000, exclusive of costs, as required by the 22 section of the Judiciary Act.
Much discussion of that question is certainly unnecessary, as the rule in this court has been settled for the peiiod o sixty years, that where the writ of error is brought by t e defendant in the original action, the matter in dispute is t ie amount of the judgment rendered in the Circuit Comt, as this court can only affirm the judgment’ rendered in t a court.*
*
Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Peters, 34; Wise v. Turnpike Co., 7 Crancb, 276.
Attempt was subsequently made, it must be admitted, to call in question the rule established in those two cases, but this court reaffirmed the rule in the most authoritative manner, deciding as follows: '
(1.) That the amount required is to be ascertained and determined by the sum in controversy at the time of the judgment in the Circuit Court, and not by any subsequent additions thereto, such as interest.
(2.) That where the plaintiff sues for an amount, exceeding $2000, if by reason o£any erroneous ruling of the court below he recovers nothing, or less than that sum, the sum claimed by the plaintiff in his writ and declaration in that state of the case, is the sum in controversy for which a writ of error will lie.
(3.) That if the verdict is given against the defendant for a less sum than $2000, and judgment is rendered against him accordingly, that, in that state of the case, nothing is in controversy between him and the plaintiff, if the plaintiff acquiesces in the judgment, beyond the sum for which the judgment is given, and consequently the defendant is not entitled to any writ of error.*
Supported as the rule suggested is by an unbroken series of decisions throughout the period mentioned, it would seem to be a work of supererogation to attempt to enforce it by any extended argument, especially as the rule is a necessary deduction from the act of Congress which provides that such jurisdiction may be exercised by this cpurt in the classes of cases mentioned, “ where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2000, exclusive of costs.”
Congress, it is conceded, has not expressly enacted that nual judgments and decrees in such cases shall not be reexamined here where the matter in dispute does not exceed
Knapp v. Banks, 2 Howard, 73; Winston v. United States, 3 Id. 771; ßogers v. St. Charles, 19 Id. 112; Udall v. The Ohio, 17 Id. 17; Olney
The Falcon, lb. 19; Gruner v. United States, 11 Id. 163; Brown v. annon, 20 Id. 55; Oliver v. Alexander, 6 Peters, 143 ; Spear v. Place, 11 oward, 522; Rich v. Lambert, 12 Id. 347; Clifton v. Sheldon, 23 Id. 481; anipson v. Welsh, 24 Id. 207 ; Seaver v. Bigelows, 5 Wallace, 208.
the sum or value mentioned, but inasmuch as the appellate power of the court is conferred by the Constitution, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make, the rule of construction is that the negative of any other jurisdiction in that respect is implied from the intent manifested by the affirmative description contained in that section of the Judiciary Act.*
Opposed to this conclusion is the statement in the answer that the respondents, before the present suit was commenced, filed a libel in the District Court for the Southern District of New York for the same collision against the schooner and all persons intervening in the suit, and the suggestion of the respondents in this suit is that the libel in this case is in the nature of a cross-libel, and that the amount in dispute should be ascertained by adding to the sum allowed as damages in the decree in this case the amount of the libellants claim in the libel in the other case, which was filed and the decree entered in the District Court for another district in the same circuit. Various reasons are mentioned in argument to show that the suggestion of the respondents may be adopted, but none of them have the support of any authority, nor do the counsel refer to any case as a precedent to warrant such a proceeding. Some of the reasons given are as follows:
(1.) That it was agreed between the parties that the two cases should be heard together, but the record contains no evidence of such an agreement, and if it did it could not avail the respondents, as it is settled law that consent cannot give jurisdiction. Several casesf expressly decide that the agreement of the parties cannot authorize this court to revise a judgment of an inferior court in any other mode of proceeding than that which the law prescribes.^
(2.) That the two cases were heard at the same time, before the District Court of the Eastern District, where this [p. 347] libel was pending. But that was a mere oral arrangement between the parties to expedite a decision, which neither did nor could have the effect to withdraw the other libel from the jurisdiction of the District Court in which the suit was commenced. One was a proceeding in rem and the other was a suit in personam., and it does not appear that any attempt was made to consolidate them or to discontinue one and transfer it into the court where the other was pending. On the contrary, though they were both heard at the same time, it appears that separate decrees were entered, each in the respective District Court where the suit was commenced. Separate appeals were also taken by the losing party in the District Court where the decree was entered, and the two appeals were separately entered on the calendar of this court.
*
Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch, 318. f Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard, 393; Kelsey v. Forsyth, 21 Id. 8 > Montgomery v. Anderson, 21 Id. 386. J Mordecai v. Lindsay, 19 Id. 200.
Two suits, commenced and prosecuted as described, cannot be blended in this court without an open violation of the rule laid down by the late Chief Justice Taney, that“ parties cannot authorize this court to revise a judgment of an inferior court in any other mode of proceeding than that which the law prescribes.”*
They were not heard together in the Circuit Court, as t ns suit was still before the commissioner, but the suggestion is that the merits in both suits were by consent discussed at the same time. Suppose that is so, still the fact remains that the respective decrees of affirmance were entered at different times and of course in the respective districts where the appeals from the respective District Courts were pending. Nothing was done to consolidate the suits and separate appeals were allowed to this court.
Evidently this court has no jurisdiction, as the matter in depute, exclusive of costs, is less than $2000.
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
sloo ee?he n.ext case’ ’n which it was decided that the fault was not with the p, ut with the schooner ; the decree from which the appeal in the preng case was taken being thus practically reversed.]
Statement of the case in the opinion.
The Mary Eveline.
1. Though a sailing vessel having the wind is primd facie hound to adopt such a course as will prevent collision with other sailing vessels not having it, it is still the duty of these last in an emergency to make their courses so as not to render it difficult for the vessel having the wind to do her duty by rendering it doubtful what movement she should make. 2. This principle applied to a case where a vessel having the wind, in order to avoid a very strong tide (that in Hell Gate), was sailing so close to a shore wall that she could not safely have lessened the distance, and where the position of the other vessels in regard to a third vessel made it dangerous for the vessel having the wind to luff. 3. Under these circumstances the vessel having the wind held justified in having kept her course.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Southern District
of New York.
On the afternoon of September 20th, 1868, the sloop Ethan Allen and the schooner Mary Eveline came in collision while navigating the East River, near Blackwell’s Island. The sloop was sunk and her cargo was lost. Her owners filed their libel against the schooner and her owners, claiming as damages the value of the sloop and her cargo. The libe was dismissed in the District Court, and the decree was affirmed in the Circuit Court. The libellants appealed to this court.
Mr. R. H. Huntley, for the appellants; Mr. F. A. ^ox, contra,
Mr. Justice HUNT stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court.
The Ethan Allen was going eastward through Hell Gate, on her passage to some port in Connecticut. The wind was fresh and blowing from the southwest. She was runnm© against a strong ebb-tide, and for the purpose of avoi the strength of the tide was running close under the eas ein shore of Blackwell’s Island. Her hull was within a ou seventy-five feet of the wall of the island, and her sai s o^ her port side came within twenty or thirty feet of the is an
Statement of the case in the opinion.
The Eveline was sailing in the opposite direction, towards New York, and was close in company with the schooner Hawley, the latter being ahead. The two schooners were beating up against the wind. On the last tack before the collision the Eveline was so close to the Hawley that when the latter tacked the former was obliged to keep off so as to go under the Hawley’s stern. By the time the Eveline got well under way on the last tack the Hawley had crossed the river, and made her next tack near the Blackwell shore, and passed but a little way in front of the Allen. The Eveline passed on under the Hawley’s stern, keeping off" the wind forthat purpose. As she luffed to go about she ran directly into the Allen, striking her on the starboard b'ow. The answer admits that the Eveline took a direction to the leeward and astern of the Hawley, and that she just cleared her stern. It alleges, also, that the collision occurred through the sudden and confused orders of the Allen, and especially in this: that she first kept off" and then luffed, whereby it became impossible for the Eveline to avoid the collision. The primti facie duty of avoiding the collision no doubt rested upon the vessel having the advantage of the wind. She was bound to adopt such course as would protect all the vessels, assuming that the other vessels would do their duty also. It was, however, the duty of the other vessels so to make their courses as not to render it embarrassing or difficult for the sloop to do her duty, or to make it doubtful what she should do in the emergency. The schooners were bound to take leasonable precautions on their part. The sloop, although having the wind, was not a guarantor against collision.
The channel was some 650 to 750 feet in width. The schooners were each 160 feet in length, occupying one half of the width of the channel. The Allen was close to Blackwe 1 s Island. Her position there was not only the best for eiself, but in thereby giving to the schooners nearly the
whole of the channel, was the best position on their account.
e kept steadily on her course as near to the island as she cou d safely pass. The vessels had been in sight for some Jme and each well understood the position of the other.
The answer alleges that the Allen should have avoided the difficulty by luffing or keeping off. It does not, however, specify which she should have done. Her hull was within seventy-five feet of the island,wall, and her sails within twenty or thirty feet of the wall. This was, of itself, a hazardous proximity. It would have been very unsafe to have lessened this distance. The evidence is that she was running as close to the shore as it was safe for her to do. She could not, therefore, have kept off. If she had luffed, she would have brought herself out into the narrow channel, where the Hawley and the Eveline were both beating across in front of her, and the danger of a collision would have been much greater than by adopting the course she did.
We are of the opinion that, under the circumstances, the Allen did right in keeping hei course, and that the fault was with the Eveline rather than with the Allen. If the Eveline had tacked when the Hawley did, she would have avoided the collision. This would have brought her out of the way, leaving the passage next to the island clear for the Allen. Again, she should not have changed her course by keeping away on the last tack, thus rendering necessary a larger sweep to go about and bringing her nearer to the Allen, when her course could not be changed. If she was at this point in a position of embarrassment it was her own fault. She saw it in advance, should have known it, and avoided it, by keeping further to the leeward of the Hawley, or by making her tack at an earlier period. She cannot shi t upon another the consequence of an embarrassment produced by her own fault.
The captain of the Eveline, did not expect the Allen o luff into the channel. He testifies that he supposed s e would go to the Blackwell Island side, and that there was plenty of room for her there. He acted upon this theory» in which we think he was greatly in error, and the collision was the result. . . ,
On the most of the points of the case there is, as is usua in collision cases, a great conflict of evidence. Upon a care [p. 351] ful review of the testimony, we think the error was with the schooner Eveline, and that the libel should not have been dismissed.
Decree reversed and record remitted with instructions to enter judgment for libellants, and for further proceedings
In accordance with this opinion.
[See the preceding case.]
Marqueze v. Bloom.
A case brought here as within the 25th section of the Judiciary Act dismissed ; neither the record nor the opinion of the Supreme Court, which was in the records, showing any question before that court, except one relating to the interruption of a “prescription” (statute of limitations) set up as a defence, and the opinion showing that this question was decided exclusively upon the principles of the jurisprudence of the State.
On motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.
Marqueze & Co. brought this suit in the Fourth District ourt of the Parish of Orleans, in Louisiana, on the 19th of pril, 1866, against Bloom, Kahn, and Levi, trading as oom, Kahn & Co. The petition was for the recovery of haoney alleged to be due to the plaintiffs, for certain merc andise sold to the defendants during the first six months 0 1861, amounting with interest, to $1045. The defend-an s, except Levi, pleaded the prescription of three years, time the same prescription, averring that at the
me o the sale of the goods and since, until the commence^le re«^ed in the city of New Orleans. le istrict Court gave judgment against all the defendants, no J11-°ne aPPea^e<lto the Supreme Court, and the judgment
as to him was reversed.
it a °Pini°n °* ^he Supreme Court was in the record, and ppeared that the only question before that court related
Syllabus.
to the interruption of prescription, and that this was decided exclusively upon the principles of the jurisprudence of the State.
The CHIEF JUSTICE :
No Federal question is referred to in the record or in the opinion. We have, therefore, no jurisdiction of the case,* and the writ of error must be
Dismissed.
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