Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 500

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 500
Full caption
Holyoke Company v. Lyman.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Holyoke Company v. Lyman.
1. By the settled law of Massachusetts, the rights of fishery in such rivers as the Connecticut, even above the point where it is navigable for boats or rafts, are public rights, and, unless there be some express provision to the contrary, are subject to such reasonable regulations as the State may make for their protection; including the right to require of persons who own or build dams, that they construct such fishways as will enable migratory fish to pass from the lower to the higher level of the water occasioned by such dams.
2. The provision of the Revised Statutes of Massachusetts, chapter 44, section 23, and General Statutes; chapter 68, section 41, declaring that acts of incorporation shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal, at the pleasure of the legislature; reserves to the legislature the authority to make any alteration or amendment of a charter granted subject to it, which will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grantor any rights vested under it, and which the legislature may deem necessary to secure either that object or other public or private rights.
3. After a manufacturing corporation, chartered with authority to construct and maintain a dam across a river, paying damages to the owners of fishing rights above, and whose charter does not expressly exempt it from maintaining the dam without a fishway, and is subject under the provision above quoted to amendment, alteration, and repeal at the pleasure of the legislature, has paid such damages and constructed the dam without a fishway, so as to- destroy the fishing rights above and to impair similar rights below (for the injury to which last no compensation has ever been made or provided), that corporation, or any other which purchases its dam under the authority of a subsequent statute, may be constitutionally required by the legislature to construct a fis - way in the dam to the satisfaction of commissioners appointed by the legislature for the purpose.
Error to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the ease being this:
The “General Laws”* of the State just named, provide that every act of incorporation passed since the 11th o March, 1831,
“ Shall at ah times be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal at the pleasure of the legislature.”
This general law being on the statute-book the legi^atur of the State in 1848 passed an act to incorporate the a eJ
*
Chapter 68, g 41; Revised Statutes, chapter 44, g 23.
Fails Company, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a dam across the Connecticut River, and of creating a water-power to be used by the corporation. The capital stock was fixed at $5,000,000, and it could hold $500,000 worth of real estate. The corporation was authorized and empowered “to construct and maintain a dam. across the river” at a point named, sufficient to raise the water to a height not exceeding one specified. The act in its fourth section read thus:
“The said corporation shall pay such damages to the owners of the present fishing rights existing above the dam which the said company is herein empowered to construct, as may be awarded by the county commissioners of the counties in which said rights exist.’’
And a mode was provided by which either the company “or any owners of the said fishing rights” might at.any time proceed to determine the damages done to them. Nothing was said about damages done to fishing rights below the dam, nor about making or maintaining, or not making and maintaining any “fishway.” No power was given to condemn the land of others for the site ot the dam or for any other purpose.
The Hadley Falls Company built at great expense a dam, but without any fishway in it. Before this dam was built shad were accustomed to pass up the river beyond the dam, and were of value to the private owners of riparian fishing rights for sale as food, and a source of income to such proprietors both above and below the dam. The dam, however, hy preventing the passage of the fish up the river, destroyed the fishing rights above. And compensation to a large amount was made to the owners of fisheries above the dam for the injuries done to their said rights.
After the dam was built, and owing to it, the number of shad in the river below decreased in a small but appreciable degree; the dam preventing them from passing to their ouner spawning-grounds above; and to some extent causing f eni not to return to the river after their annual passage to [p. 502] the sea. No owners of fishing rights belowthe dam had, however, ever claimed damages on this account.
On the 31st of January, 1859, the Hadley Company having failed, the same legislature passed an act incorporating the Holyoke Water-power Company, “for the purpose of upholding and maintaining the dam across the Connecticut River, heretofore constructed by the Hadley Falls Company,” and gave to the new corporation full power “ to purchase, take, hold, .receive, sell, lease, and dispose of all and any part of the estate, with all the water-power, water-courses, waterprivileges, dams, rights, easements, and appurtenances thereto belonging, or therewith connected, which have at any time heretofore belonged to the Hadley Falls Company.”
The part of the Connecticut River where this dam was constructed runs through the State of Massachusetts, and is not navigable.
In this state of things the legislature passed in 1866 and subsequently, certain statutes, which authorized the commissioners of fisheries of the State to examine the several dams on the rivers of Massachusetts, and after notice to the owners thereof, to determine and define the mode and plan upon which suitable and sufficient fishways should be con structed. The statute regulated the plans, methods, &c., and provided that if any proprietor of any dam should re fuse or neglect to agree with the commissioners to build t fishways for thirty days after a plan was duly furnish© to him, the commissioners might build the same at his expense. Under and in pursuance of this legislation, the o yo Company was required to build a fishway in The fishway required was one that would cost about $30,V, and, as appeared, would not diminish the watei-power the company, except when they desired to add to it y are known as “flash boards.” The company ie us comply with the requirement, contending that t e a incorporation to the two companies constitute co
that by the payment of damages to the 0. |^t0 rights above the dam the Holyoke Company a i » maintain “the dam,” theretofore constructed by e
Argument for the company.
Company, and that the acts of 1866, &c., were laws impairing the obligations of contracts, and so in violation of the Federal Constitution. The court below, on a proceeding authorized by the statute to make them do so, adjudged otherwise, and its judgment was now here for review.
Mr. F Chamberlin, for the plaintiff in error:
1. Where an absolute right to do an act is given, a contract is made that the State will do no act to impair that absolute right. Thus if an absolute grant of land is made, the State cannot thereafter annex a condition restricting its use; or if power is given to erect a bridge of a certain character, the State cannot cause the owner to make an alteration in it. The same rule will apply to a right given without any reservation to make a dam.
In The People v. Platt,* the State of Hew York had granted lands on both sides of the Saranac River, without any reservation of the river, or any restriction on the use of it expressed in the grant. By a statute subsequently passed, owners of all dams were required to make fishways, and it was held that such a requirement was unconstitutional as to the defendants, because the unrestricted use of the land and river was given, and it could not be afterwards restricted.
In Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge,^ a charter was granted to erect a bridge, with draws of a certain width, and it was held that a statute ordering draws of an increased width to be built was void. The court say:
“Nor can the legislature, without the assent of the defendants, in any way impair the original terms of the charter by annexing new conditions or imposing additional burdens, onerous in their nature or inconsistent with a reasonable construction of the compact.”
In West River Bridge Company v. Dix,\ this court gives the same construction of the clause of the Constitution about contracts on which we rely, and say :
The language and meaning of the inhibition were designed
Argument for the company.
to embrace proceedings attempting the interpolation of some new term or condition foreign to the original agreement, and therefore inconsistent with and violative thereof.”
Now in our case, we find an unreserved and unconditional right to erect and maintain a dam across the Connecticut River. Does not a statute that we shall erect a fishway at any cost which the State sees fit to require, interfere with our “perfect use and enjoyment of the thing granted ?”
It is evident, also, that in granting these charters the legislature had this principle in mind; for it made a provision which was intended to reach the very matter of fishways. It provided that damages should be paid to certain persons supposed to be affected.
Will it be said that although there is no express reservation at all in the grant, yet that in Massachusetts, in all charters authorizing the erection of dams, there is an implied reservation, of a right to require the grantees to make any jishways in those dams which the legislature may think desirable? The position is not tenable; for the courts of that State have laid down no such general principle. They have only dechired that owners of lands or privileges on streams, if they erect dams on them, do so subject to the usual rule that they must so manage them as not to interfere with the right of persons above or below, either to have the water flow, or to have fish pass.* But it follows not that when no reservation of power to cause fishways to be built has been made in the original contract, the State has power to “ interpolate such term or condition foreign to the original agreement.”
2. Even if in the State of Massachusetts there were an implied condition annexed to grants of power to build dams, the State, in the case at bar, has, by providing in our charter for this very right of fish passage, made another con
*
Stoughton ®. Baker, 4 Massachusetts, 522; Commonwealth v. Chapin,
5
Pickering, 199; Vinton t>. Welsh, 9 Id. 87; Commonwealth v. Essex > 13 Gray, 239.
Argument for the company.
tract, which, upon our accepting it and paying damages, as we have done, exempts us from any further requirement. This right to have fish pass up and down rivers is a public right solely. No owner of land above or below a dam can maintain any action against the builder of a dam which injures his fishery, nor proceed against the dam as a nuisance, nor is the owner liable to indictment.* If, however, a provision for damages is inserted in a charter, it is clear that this additional consideration is paid for the relinquishment by the State of the right to thereafter demand fishways, or payment of other or further damages than those required; and a contract to that effect arises by necessary implication, as clearly as if it was expressed in terms. For how unjust it would be, where only an implied condition of building a fishway existed, to put in an express condition that all damages should be paid, and then force the plaintiff, by building fishways, to give back to the owners what he had already paid them for the loss of. Our view does not leave the State without remedy. It may in the exercise of its right of eminent domain take back this right, by paying for it, as in all other similar cases.
3. Then will it be said that there is a general statute of Massachusetts, existing when this charter was made, which reserves the right to alter, modify, or repeal any charter theretofore granted, and that the State has the powrer under this statute to take back any right it has given even for a valuable consideration? If this construction can be maintained all that a State has to do, in order to avoid the provision of the Constitution against the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts, is to pass a law saying hi substance: “In all contracts I may hereafter make I reserve the right to break them if I see fit.” The constitutional provision cannot be evaded in 'such a manner. But no such construction can be given to this statute.! The distinction is this: The legislature may, under certain [p. 506] circumstances, alter the charter, but they cannot do anything to affect or destroy any rights of property acquired under the charter; and if under such reservation they attempt to violate any contract they have made, they are met by a higher power than their own, which forbids it.
Mr. C. R. Train, Attorney-General of Massachusetts, contra.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Rivers, though not navigable even for boats or rafts, and even smaller streams of water, may be and often are regarded as public rights, subject to legislative control, as the means for creating power for operating mills and machinery, or as the source for furnishing a valuable supply of fish, suitable for food and sustenance. Such water-power is everywhere regarded as a public right, and fisheries of the kind, even in waters not navigable, are also so far public rights that the legislature of the State may ordain and establish regulations to prevent obstructions to the passage of the fish, and to promote the usual and uninterrupted enjoyment of the right by the riparian owners. Proprietors of the kind, if they own both banks of the water-course and the whole soil over which the water of the stream flows, may erect dams extending from bank to bank to create power to operate mills and machinery, subject to certain limitations and conditions, and may also claim the exclusive right of fishery within their territorial limits, subject to sue regulations as the legislature may, from time to time, ordain and establish. Persons owning the whole of the soil constituting the bed and banks of the stream are entitled to the whole use and profits of the water opposite their lan, whether the water is used as power to operate mills an machinery or as a fishery, subject to the implied condition that they shall so use their own right as not to injure tie concomitant right of another riparian owner, and to sue regulations as the legislature of the State shall piescn e. Where such a proprietor owns the land on one side on y o the stream, his right to the land and to the use of the wa e, [p. 507] whether used as power to operate mills and machinery or merely as a fishery, extends only to the middle thread of the stream, as at common law, and is subject to the same conditions and regulations as when the ownership includes the whole soil over which the water of the stream flows. Authority to erect dams across such streams for mill purposes results from the ownership of the bed and the banks of the stream, or the right to construct the same may be acquired by legislative grant, in cases w’here the legislature is of the opinion that the benefit to the public will be of sufficient importance to render it expedient for them to exercise the right of eminent domain and to authorize such an interference with private rights for that purpose. Lands belonging to individuals have often been condemned for such purposes, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, in cases where, from the nature of the country, mill-sites sufficient in number could not otherwise be obtained, and that right is, even more frequently, exercised to enable mill-owners to flow the water back beyond their own limits, in order to create sufficient power or head and fall to operate their mills. Concomitant with the authority to erect such dams for such purposes over the beds of water-courses, as resulting from the title to the banks and bed of the stream, is also the exclusive right of fishery, which also has its source in the same ownership of the soil, and the better opinion is that it is not divested or extinguished by any legislative act condemning the land to the use of another for mill purposes, unless the words of the grant conferring the authority to construct the dam plainly indicate that such was the intention of the legislature. Water rights of the kind, whether the streams are used for mill purposes or merely as fisheries, are justly entitled to public protection, as they are in many cases of great value to the community where they exist, but they are the source of many conflicting interests which the State legislatures as well as the couits have found it difficult to adjust, as appears from the countless efforts which have been made in that behalf without complete success.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
Certain persons, their associates and successors, on the twenty-eighth of April, 1848, were incorporated by the name of the Hadley Falls Company, for the purpose of constructing a dam across the Connecticut River, and one or more locks and canals, in connection with the said dam, to create a>water-power to be used for manufacturing and mechanical purposes, and also for the purpose of navigation, with all the powers and privileges and subject to all the duties, liabilities, and restrictions set forth in the thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes of the State.* Power and authority are given to said corporation to construct and maintain a dam across said river at South Hadley, at any point between the present dam of the proprietors of the locks and canals and the lower locks of the said proprietors, of a height sufficient to raise the water to a point not exceeding the present level of the water above the dam of the said proprietors; and the farther provision is that the corporation shall pay such damages to the owners of the present fish rights above the dam to be erected as shall be awarded by the county commissioner. Pursuant to the act of incorporation the stockholders accepted the charter, constructed the dam, paid certain damages to the owners of fish rights above the dam as constructed, and expended, as the respondents allege, more than two millions of dollars, including the cost of the dam and the damages paid to parties adversely interested, in constructing their improvements, and failed in business. New parties acquired the title to the dam and the other improvements, and on the thirty-first o January, 1859, the respondents, in this case, as such new proprietors, their associates and successors, were incorporated by the name of the Holyoke Water-power Company, and they were empowered to uphold and maintain the dam and other improvements constructed by the prior company, and to erect and maintain a water-power to be used for t e same purposes as those described in the prior charter, wi the same powers and privileges and subject to the same
* 8 Special Laws, 949; Revised Statutes, 328-366.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
bilities and restrictions.* Special power was conferred upon the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the council, by the act of the fifteenth of May, 1866, to appoint commissioners of fisheries in the said river and one other river, to hold their offices for five years unless sooner removed, and it was made their duty by the same act forthwith to examine the several dams on said rivers in said State, and after notice to the owners of the dams, to determine and define the mode and plan by which fishways shall be constructed, suitable and sufficient to secure the free passage of salmon and shad up said rivers during their accustomed seasons. Said commissioners are also authorized to agree with the proprietors of such dams to construct at their own expense said fishways according to the plans adopted, if the proprietors consent so to do, and if they fulfil the agreement and the fact is duly certified to the secretary of state, the provision is that the same, for the period of five years, shall be taken and deemed as in lieu of the fishways which such a proprietor is now required by law to keep and maintain for that purpose. Unless the proprietor of such a dam shall agree with the commissioners within thirty days from the time he is so furnished with the plan to build such fishway in the manner prescribed, the commissioners are authorized to construct the same in behalf of the State, and in that event the provision is that the expense shall be a charge against the owner of such dam, and the same may be recovered of the proprietor in an action of contract in the name of the State, or the commissioners may enforce the construction of such a fishway, by a bill in equity, to compel a specific performance.^ Due notice having been given by the complainants, as such commissioners, to the 'espondents as the owners of said dam, of their intention to examine the dam pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid acts ot the legislature, they proceeded to perform that duty and determined and defined the mode and plan in which
*
Private Acts, 1859, 225. t Sessions Acts 1866, 231; Id. 1867, 741; Id. 1869, 677-741.
.Restatement of the case in the opinion.
the fishway should be constructed therein, suitable and sufficient to secure the free passage of salmon and shad over the dam and up the river during their accustomed seasons. They also furnished the respondents with the plan and specifications of such fishway, and tiled a copy of the same in the office of the secretary of state, and requested the respondents to construct such a fishway or to agree with them as such commissioners to comply with that requirement, but it appears that the respondents refused and neglected so to do, insisting that the State had no power or right to require them to build such a fishway. Entirely different views were entertained by the complainants, and they instituted the present suit to compel the corporation respondents to comply with that requirement, and the State court entered a decree for the complainants.* Dissatisfied with that decree the respondents sued out the present writ of error and removed the cause into this court.
Ample power was vested in the first company to hold real estate, not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars in value, but their act of incorporation did not give the company any authority to condemn the real estate of another to any extent or for any purpose. They were required to “ pay such damages to the owners of present fish rights existing above the dam” as should be awarded by the county commissioners of the counties in which said rights existed, and they might at any time apply to said commissioners to proceed, ascertain, and determine the damages to said fish rights, subject, however, to an appeal to a jury from such assessment, as in cases of assessment of damages for land taken for big ways. Damages for injuries to fish rights above the darn were to be ascertained and assessed, but no authority was conferred to condemn the land of another for the site of t e dam or for any other purpose, nor was any provision ma e to ascertain and assess the damages to fish rights below t dam, nor does either charter contain a provision exempting [p. 511] the builders and owners of the dam from the obligation to construct suitable and sufficient fishways for the free passage of fish up the river during their accustomed seasons.
*
Commissioners on Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water-power C > Massachusetts, 451; Weston v. Sampson, 8 Cushing, 347.
Noue of these propositions are controverted, but the respondents insist that the acts of the legislature under which they have been required to make the fishways in question, impair the obligation of the contract contained in the charter incorporating their grantors, and that those acts are inoperative and void as contravening the article of the Constitution which prohibits the States from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
Such a charter, when accepted by the corporators, is undoubtedly a contract that the powers, privileges, and franchises granted shall not be restrained, controlled, or destroyed without their consent, unless a power for that purpose is reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation or in some prior general law, in operation at the time the act of incorporation was passed.* Private charters of the kind are held to be contracts, because they are based for their consideration on/ the liabilities and duties which the corporators assume by accepting the terms therein specified, and the general rule is that the grant of the franchise on that account can no more be resumed by the legislature or its benefits diminished or impaired, without the assent of the corporators, than any other grant of property or legal estate, unless the right to do so is reserved in the act of incorporation or by some immemorial usage or general law of the State, which was in operation at the time the charter was granted.f Charters of private corporations duly accepted, it must be admitted, are executed contracts, but the iiferent provisions, unless they are clear, unambiguous, and fee of doubt, are subject to construction, and their true intent and meaning must be ascertained by the same rules of interpretation as other legislative grants. Repeated de-
2 ^r.tmouth Allege v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 709-712: Wales v. Stetson, 2 Massachusetts, 146.
t Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wallace, 218.
cisions of this court have established the rule, that whenever privileges are granted to a corporation, and the grant comes under revision in the courts, such privileges are to be strictly construed against the corporation and in favor of the public, and that nothing passes but what is granted in clear and explicit terms.* Whatever is not unequivocally granted in such acts is taken to have been withheld, as all acts of incorporation and acts extending the privileges of corporate bodies are to be taken most strongly against the corporations.f
Evidently the right of fishery, as well as the right to use the water of a stream for mill purposes, is the subject of private ownership, and when held by a good title, the one as much as the other is a vested right, and both alike are entitled to public protection, and are subject, in a certain sense, to legislative regulation and control. Difficulties, in every case, attend the proper adjustment of such rights, as the complete enjoyment of the one may interfere with the corresponding enjoyment of the other, but the presumption is, in construing any regulation upon the subject, that the framers of the regulation did not intend to allow either party to disregard the rule that he should so use his own property as not to injure the property of the owner of the other right.
Ownership of the banks and bed of the stream, as before remarked, gives to the proprietor the exclusive right of fishery, opposite his land, as well as the right to use the water to create power to operate mills, but neither the one nor the other right nor both combined confer any right to erect obstructions in the river to prevent the free passage of the nsn up and down the river at their accustomed seasons, as such obstructions would impair and ultimately destroy all such rights owned by other proprietors both above and below the obstruction on the same stream. Authoritative support to [p. 513] these views is found in the judicial decisions and legislative enactments of the State throughout her history, commencing even before the Revolution,«and continued in an unbroken series to the present time.*
*
Rice ®. Railroad Co., 1 Black, 880; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 544. t Sedgwick on Statutes and Constitutional Law, 339; Lees v. Cana om pany, 11 East, 652.
Undoubtedly each proprietor of the land adjoining such a river or stream has in that State a several or exclusive right of fishery in the river immediately before his land, to the middle of the river, and may prevent all others from participating in it, and will have a right of action against any who shall usurp the exercise of it without his. consent, but the Provincial Statute of 8 Anne, ch. 3 (A.D. 1709),+ prohibited all persons, “ without approbation or allowance,” from placing in or across rivers or streams any weir, hedge, or other incumbrance to obstruct the free passage of fish in the proper seasons of the year. Persons who erect or build a dam across any river or stream where the salmon, shad, alewives, or other fish usually pass up into the natural ponds to cast their spawn, were required by the Provincial Statute of 15 George II, ch. 6 (A.D? 1741), to make a sufficient passageway for the fish to pass up such river or stream, and the owners of dams, so constructed that such fish could not conveniently pass up the river or stream, were required to make such a passageway and keep it open for a certain period in each year, as therein prescribed.^ Laws of the kind, requiring the owners of dams across the rivers and streams of the State, to build fishways and keep) them in repair, have been passed, in numerous instances, since the State constitution was adopted, many of which are still in full force. uch laws usually require the owners of the dam to build >e fishway at their own expense, and subject their doings 111 that behalf to the approval of some supervisory board 01 committee.§ Reference was made at the argument to some thirty-five or forty statutes of the kind, passed at dife>ent periods, commencing the year the constitution of the [p. 514] State was adopted (1780) and coming down to the present time, covering a period of more than ninety years.* Statutes also encouraging mftls by authorizing their owners or occupants to overflow the lands of other persons, by paying such damages as may be assessed in the mode prescribed, are also of very ancient origin, and have received the sanction of the courts of the State throughout the whole period of her history.f
*
Commonwealth v. Chapin, 5 Pickering, 204. T 1 Provincial Laws, 162. t Ib 297; Ib. 17 Geo. II (A.D. 1743),313; Ib. 19Geo.II (A.D.1745), 321. aws of Massachusetts, Appendix, 1020-1026. V0L- xv- 83
Public rights, in all jurisdictions, are subject to legislative control, and it is settled law in Massachusetts, and has been for a century and a half, including her colonial history, that the right of fishery in such rivers as the Connecticut and Merrimac, even above the point where they are navigable for boats or rafts, and the right to erect and maintain dams to create water-power for mill purposes, are public rights, and that the owners of such rights are bound by such reasonable regulations as the State may make and ordain for their protection and enjoyment.
All persons, say the Supreme Court of that State, in the case of Stoughton v. Baker£ who may build a darn for mill purposes, on a stream annually frequented by fish, do it under an implied obligation to keep open sufficient sluices and fishways for the passage of fish at the proper seasons, and that the grant of the right to erect a dam, if made by the legislature, is to be construed to be under the same implied condition to keep open the fishways* unless such implication is excluded by an express provision exempting the grantees from such an obligation. By the statement of facts in that case it appears that the defendants’ dam was an ancient dam; that they deraigned their title from the origina [p. 515] proprietor, who acquired his right thereto in 1633 by a grant from the town within whose limits the mill-site was then situated; that the grant included the mill privilege and a weir adjoining the mill, and the exclusive right of fishery ; that the grant was subsequently confirmed by the legislature, and that no fishway was ever made through the dam until the year 1789, when one was constructed at the expense of third parties, pursuant to a resolution passed by the legislature of the State; that on the fifteenth of March, 1805, the legislature appointed a committee to examine the dams on that river and to order such alterations to be made in the fishways as in their opinion would be sufficient for the convenient passage of the fish at said dam. Three-fourths of the expenses were to be borne by the owners of the dams and one-fourth by the towns interested in the fisheries. Suitable fishways were accordingly constructed, and the towns having paid the whole expense instituted a suit to recover one-fourth of the expense of the owners of the dam. Able counsel appeared on both sides, and the opinion of the court was delivered by’’ Chief Justice Parsons, all of the other justices concurring. Based on these facts it was contended for the defendants that the original grant was a bar to the claim, but the court, conceding that the grant as confirmed amounted to a franchise of a several fishery, nevertheless held that the franchise could not be construed to include the right of excluding all fish from passing above the weir, t e court giving as a reason for the conclusion that the value of a fishery in such a stream depends upon the shoals 0 fish that enter the river and pass to the ponds above to cast their spawn, adding that if none were allowed to pass, c public would lose their supply, and that the fishery would ecome of little or no value. Evidence was introduced tendlngto show that the franchise of the exclusive fishery was ost by non-user, but the court held that the said franchise,
*
Vinton v. Welsh, 9 Pickering, 90; Angell on Waters (6th ed-), J2; Washburn on Easements (2d ed.), 501; Peables v. Hannaford, 18 ain, 106; Parker v. Mill Dam Co., 20 Id. 853. , t 1 Provincial Statutes, 12 Anne, ch. 1 (A.D.1709), 160; lb. 12 Anne,c. (A.D. 1714), 181; Ancient Charter, 388-404; 2 Laws of Massachusetts, Revised Statutes (1836), 676; Angell on Waters (6th ed.), 664; as on Easements, 332; Murdock v. Stickney, 8 Cushing, 119. J; 4 Massachusetts, 528.
br^^ n°t WOU^ be no objection jto the right of the Pu ic to have a convenient passageway for the fish to as-
e river to the ponds. They also held that the origpropiietor took a fee in the mill-privilege, and that he [p. 516] had the right to erect the dam to raise water sufficient to operate his mill, but that the right to build a darn for the use of a mill was subject to the following limitations: (1.) That the proprietor must make compensation to the owners of the lands above the dam for damages occasioned by overflowing their lands. (2.) That he must so construct the dam that the fish will not be interrupted in their passage up the river to cast their spawn, adding that every owner of a water mill or dam holds it on the condition that a sufficient and reasonable passageway shall be allowed for the fish.* Substantially the same questions were presented to the Supreme Court of the State in the case of Vinton v. WefôAJ in which the opinion of the court was delivered by Chief Justice Parker, and the decision was in the same way and to the same effect. He decided that the owners of dams across such rivers, as well as the owners of such fisheries, hold their property subject to such regulations as the legislature from time to time shall prescribe for the preservation of the fish, basing his conclusion chiefly upon the fact that the colonial and provincial governments, as well as the government of the State under the State constitution had exer cised the right of prescribing such regulations from the first settlement of the country to the date of the decision in t at
case.J . .
Litigations upon the subject ceased for a time, u e same questions thirty years later were again piesente o the Supreme Court of the State in the case of Commonwea v. Essex Company,§ in which the opinion of the comt w delivered by Chief Justice Shaw, as the organ of the w o court. Special reference is made in that, opinion o prior decisions of the court upon that subject, an a leading cases here referred to are approved and t ie P°1 tions decided are reaffirmed, the court announcing_____ [p. 517] lowing conclusions: That from the earliest times the right of the public to the passage of fish in rivers and the private rights of riparian proprietors, incident to and dependent on the public right, have been subject to the regulation of the legislature; that the mode adopted by the legislature, whether by public or private acts, to secure and preserve such rights, has been by requiring, in the erection of dams, such sluices and fishways as would enable these migratory fish, according to their known habits and instincts, to pass from the lower to the higher level of the water occasioned by such dam,- so that, although their passage might be somewhat impeded, it would not be thereby essentially obstructed. It appears in that case that the company was duly incorporated with power to construct a dam across the Merrimac River at Lawrence, subject to the condition, among other things, that they should construct suitable fishways in their dam for the passage of migratory fish; that they app ied to the county commissioners, requesting them, after ue notice, to prescribe the mode in which they should construct such fishways in their dam; that such notice was given and a hearing had, and that the commissioners did prescribe the mode in which the company should comply ffit tl at requirement, and that the company did construct oci b ways in their said dam according to the mode and Pau so pieseribed; that the fishways, however, as conucte, proved to be unsuitable and insufficient to provide convenient passageway for the fish.* Circumstances ocask f '&]SU 8e^u®n^y nia(le it necessary7 for the company to tur °‘P ea'e ^-° ’llcrea8e their capital stock, and the legislapn ’ 111 gating their application, also provided that the own?ail\8«°u^- liable for all damages occasioned to the Ded’>n«. n S rights above the dam by the stopping or imfiaid da P^8Sage of the fish up and down the river by the couiitvn * aU • 8UCh damages should be assessed by the existed lssionera of the county in which such fish rights
*
Burnham®. Webster, 5 Massachusetts, 266; Nickerson®. 12 McCurdy, 5 Id. 824; Cottrill v. MyrioK, Id. 212; Commonwealth v. Maine, 229. J Commonwealth ®. Chapin, 5 Pickering, 204. f 9 Pickering, 92. g 13 Gray, 248.
’ VIU» to the respective parties the right to apply
* 8 Special Laws, 470.
for a jury to make such assessment in the manner provided for the recovery of damages from laying out highways.* Having accepted the amendatory act, the company availed themselves of that provision and caused the damages to the fish rights existing above the dam to be assessed, and they paid the several assessments to the owners of the same, amounting to the sum of twenty-six thousand dollars, “as damages for hindering or impeding the passage of fish by their said dam, with the aforesaid fishways therein, as previously7 constructed.” Such fishways did not admit of the usual and unobstructed passage of the fish, as required by the law of the State and the seventh section of their act of incorporation. Complaints subsequently arose and the company was indicted for such neglect and the case came to trial, and the jury, under the rulings and instructions of the court, found the defendants guilty, and they excepted to the rulings and instructions of the court and the case was heard before the full court. Unquestionably the case was fully considered, and the court in the first place reaffirmed all of their previous decisions upon the subject, which hold that persons who build a dam for mill purposes on a stream frequented by migratory fish, do it under an implied obligation to keep open sufficient sluices and fishways for the passage of the fish in their accustomed seasons, and that every grant to erect such a dam is to be construed as under the same implied condition, unless such implication is excluded by an express provision to that effect. Still the court held that the legislature had the power to regulate the public right, and in view of the fact that the amended charter substitute a new proceeding for the recovery of damages by the owners of the fish rights, and that the same, as assumed by the court, had been executed, the court also held that t e amended charter had in it all the elements of a contract executed by one party and binding on the other, and that it was not competent for the legislature, even under the power reserved in a prior general law, to amend, alter, or iepea
* 8 Special Laws, 990.
any such charter to require the proprietors of the dam, without any change of circumstances, to construct the fishways, which by the terms of the amended charter they had been exempted from any obligation to construct, basing their opinion upon the ground that the right acquired under that provision had become vested by a legitimate exercise of the power granted.*
Vested rights, it is conceded, cannot be destroyed or impaired under such a reserved power, but it is clear that the power may be exercised, and to almost any extent, to carry into effect the original purposes of the grant and to protect the rights of the public and of the corporators, or to promote the due administration of the affairs of the corporation.!
Had it appeared in that case that the amended charter contemplated the assessment of damages for fish rights owned below the dam as well as those owned above the dam, the opinion would certainly be more satisfactory, as in that event the theory assumed by the court that all the parties damaged in their fisheries had been indemnified by the owneis of the structure would be correct.^ Fish rights be-ow a dam, constructed without passageways for the fish, are liable to be injured by such a structure as well as those owned above the dam, as the migratory fish, if they cannot ascend to the head waters ofithe stream at their accustomed seasons will soon cease to frequent the stream at all, or in greatly diminished numbers.
Suppose the rule, however, to be correct, still it is quite ear that it does not control the case before the court for reasons given by the same court in rendering the decree ua it ere for re-examination by the present writ of error.
f°r bsb bac^ been constructed in that case nrnvL f6 rCt Passed incorporating the company, but they Ln • , Unsuitab,e aild insufficient, and the court in uoon * 6 yiews *be defendants rested their decision — e giound that the amended charter discharged them [p. 520] from the obligation to reconstruct such fishways, as the amended charter required them to make compensation for the injuries to the fish rights in the place of the prior obligation arising from the rules of the common law of the State and the terms of their original charter, the court holding that the government could not, without any change of circumstances, require the defendants to do the very acts which, by the terms of the amended charter, they had been exempted from doing, but the court declined to decide whether, if the fishways provided should prove to be wholly unfit and inadequate to their purpose the legislature could not by further legislation require the company to fulfil the original obligation. Sufficient appears to warrant the conclusion that no evidence was introduced in that case to show that the fish rights below the dam suffered any injury whatever, nor does it appear that the attention of the court was drawn to the fact that the river across which the .dam was built runs through more than one State.* Different rules perhaps may be applied in ascertaining the power of a State legislature to authorize permanent obstructions to the free passage of fish in a river flowing through two or more States, like the Connecticut or Merrimac, from the rules which should be applied in a case where the river across which the dam is constructed is wholly within the State which authorizes the structure, but it is not necessary to consider that question in this case, as it was not raised in the State couit nor was it presented here by either party.
*
Sessions Acts 1831,613. t Miller v. The State, supra, p. 478. t Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Maine, 484.
Fishways have never been constructed by the respondents in their dam, and they contend that they are not obliged to
make any such provision for the passage of the fish, as then charter does not create any such obligation; but the answer which the complainants make to that suggestion is decisive, that the charter does not contain any provision exempting them from that implied obligation, which arises in eveij such case by the common law of that State, unless the c at ter contains some provision which expressly negatives t a [p. 521] implication. Even suppose that is so, still they contend that the fourth section of the charter of their grantors should be construed as negativing any such implied condition, but the court is entirely of a different opinion, as that section makes no provision for any compensation to the owners of the fish rights below the dam, and the record shows that such fish rights, as well as those above the dam, are injured by the obstruction to the free passage of the fish in their accustomed seasons to the head waters of the river. Authority to construct and maintain a dam without a fishway, it is conceded, is not granted in terms in the charter, and it may be added that the charter does not contain any words to warrant any such implication. On the contrary, the terms and provisions of the charter are consistent with the theory that the legislature contemplated the construction of a dam with a convenient passageway for fish, so as not to impair unnecessarily the rights of the riparian owners either above or below the dam, and that the legislature, if the company failed to fulfil that obligation, may “compel them to do so y moie specific legislation.” Damages, it is true, were to e paid to “ the owners of present fish rights existing above t e dam, but the court here, in respect to that matter, concuis with the State court that the meaning of the sentence is satisfied by regarding it as providing for a partial inteiiuption and injury of those rights and not as contempating their utter destruction; that the legislature which grante the charter may well have supposed that a dam cross the liver at that place, with the best fishway that ou e constructed, would, to some extent, obstruct the ee passage of the fish, and may have intended by that prot0 re(lu’re the owners of the dam to make compensate for such injuries. cbarfeWe<^ rany reasonable light it is quite clear that the or ° respondents do not contain any stipulation nexpd t a° e*emPtin£> them from the implied condition an-the corn SUf- a £lant’ “ot Qualified by such a contract, that able and°ra erec^n» 8Uch a dam shall construct suit-convenient fishways for the free passage of the fish [p. 522] to the headwaters of the river in their accustomed seasons; and that the charter, in view of the fact that it contains no such exemption, is subject to the power reserved to the legislature by the general law, in operation when the charters were granted, that all acts of incorporation shall at all times hereafter be liable to be amended, altered, or repealed at the pleasure of the legislature. Such charters being subject to the implied condition to construct suitable fishways • for the free passage of the fish, it follows that the corporations are not exempt from that burden, and that the legislature under the reserved power to amend, alter, or repeal the charter, may pass laws to enforce that duty, as such a law does not impair any contract created by the charter or infringe any’right vested in the corporation.* Charters subsequently7 granted must be understood as standing just as they would if that reservation of the power to amend, alter, or repeal the same had been incorporated into each charter.! Power to legislate, founded upon such a reservation, is certainly not without limit, but it may safely be affirmed that it reserves to the legislature the authority to make any alteration or amendment in a charter granted, subject to it, that will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant, or any rights which have vested under it, which the legislature may deem necessary to secure either the object of the grant or any other public right not expressly granted away by the charter.|
*
Moor v. Veazie, 32 Maine, 353; Veazie v. Moor, 14 Howard, 571.
Such a charter, may doubtless be granted to build a dam across a river whose whole course is within the State grant-
ing the franchise, with a provision exempting the corpoiation from all obligation to construct such fishway for the free passage of the fish, as the enterprise of erecting a dam to create power to operate mills is so far public in its natuie that it is competent for the legislature to exercise the po^er of eminent domain to accomplish the purpose, if suitab e [p. 523] provision is macle to compensate the owners of the property or rights condemned under that power, but it may be more doubtful whether the legislature of a State can make a contract with such a corporation authorizing them to construct a dam across a river flowing through two or more States, which shall permanently exempt the grantees from all such obligation and destroy forever the rights of fishery in the river throughout its whole course from its source to its confluence with tide waters.
*
Revised Statutes, 366; Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wallace, 21 f Miller v. The State, supra, p. 478. J Commissioners on Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water-power o., Massachusetts, 451.
Concede, however, that the power to make such a contract exists, and that it is as boundless as the theory of the respondents assumes it to be, still the court here is of the opinion that the decree of the State court is correct and that it should be affirmed, as the charters under which the dam in this case was erected and is maintained do not contain any such exemption from the implied obligation to construct fishways for the free passage of the fish, nor any provision which prohibits the legislature from imposing that obligation under the power reserved to amend, alter, or repeal the charter.
Properly construed neither of the charters affords any support whatever to the theory of the respondents, as they do not contain any semblance of a grant to take and subvert the fish rights below the dam, nor is there anything in the provision requiring compensation to be made to the owners of the fish rights above the dam, which is not perfectly consistent with the theory that it was incorporated into the charter merely to compensate the owners of such fish rights for injuries which they would suffer from the obstruction, even if the customary fishways were constructed as required by immemorial usage and the express enactment of the legislature.
Decree affirmed.
The Nitro -glycerine Case.
[Parrot v. Wells, Fargo & Co.]
1. In 1866 the defendants, who were expressmen engaged in carrying packages between New York and California, by way of the Isthmus of Panama, received at New York a box containing nitro-glycerine to be carried to California. There was nothing in the appearance of the box tending to excite any suspicion of the character of its contents. It was received and carried in the usual course of business, no information being asked or given as to its contents. On arriving at San Francisco, California, its contents were leaking and resembled sweet oil. The box was then taken for examination, as was the custom with the defendants when any box carried by them appeared to be damaged, to the premises occupied by them, which were leased from the plaintiff. Whilst a servant of the defendants, by their direction, was attempting to open the box the nitro-glycerine exploded, injuring the premises occupied by them and other premises leased by the plaintiff to, and occupied by, other parties. The defendants had no knowledge of, and no reason to suspect, the dangerous character of the contents. They repaired the injuries to the premises occupied by them: Held, that they were not liable for the damage caused by the accident to the premises occupied by other parties. 2. Common carriers are not chargeable, in cases free from suspicion, with notice of the contents of packages carried by them ; nor are they authorized, in such cases, to require information as to the contents of the packages offered as a condition of carrying them.
3. Where there is nothing to excite the suspicion of a common carrier as to the contents of a package carried by him, it is not negligence on his part to introduce the package, when appearing to be damaged, into his place of business for examination, and to handle it in the same manner as other packages of similar outward appearance are usually introduced for examination and handled.
4. The measure of care against accidents, which one must take to avoid responsibility, is that which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use if his own interests were to be affected and the whole ris were his own.
Error to the Circuit Court for the District of California.
Parrot brought an action in the court below against cei tain defendants who composed the well-known firm of Wei s, Fargo & Co., express carriers, to recover damages for injuries to certain large buildings owned by him in the city o San Francisco, caused in April, 1866, by the explosion o [p. 525] nitro-glycerine whilst in charge of the said defendants. The action was originally begun in the State court of California, and was thence removed, on motion of the defendants, to the Circuit Court of the United States, where it was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, by stipulation of the parties, under the recent act of Congress.
The complaint contained four counts. The first, was for technical waste by the landlord against his tenant from year to year, based on a statute of California. The waste was charged to have resulted from negligently introducing an explosive substance, &c., and treble damages were claimed.
The other counts were for injuries to premises demised to the defendants, and to the reversionary interest of the plaintiff in premises demised to other tenants, caused by the defendants, by themselves and their servants carelessly, negligently, and improvidently introducing upon the premises occupied by them, a box containing the explosive substance, and so carelessly, negligently, and unskilfully examining, handling, moving, and striking the box as to produce the explosion of the substance, causing the injuries complained of.
The answer joined issue on all the material allegations of the complaint; also set up a lease under which defendants occupied, and a right to carry on the business of expressmen in the demised, premises; and also averred a repair of the emised premises, before suit brought, to the satisfaction of the plaintiff and with his approbation.
he facts of the case as found by the court were substantially these:
The plaintiff, being owner of the buildings injured, let, in ovembei, 1855, a portion of them—the basement and first oors with the vaults and banking fixtures therein, together with a brick warehouse in the rear—to the defendants for a erm of two years from the first of January, 1856. The lease th d'116* covenan^s that the lessees would not receive in sto ffemiSe<^ premises, either for their own account or on alcoh°l’ °l a^°W any Pei’son to plactf therein “ gunpowder, > oi any other articles dangerous from their [p. 526] combustibility;” that they would, during the term of the lease, “occupy the premises solely for the business of their calling,” which was that of bankers and expressmen, and at the expiration of their term would “quit and surrender the said demised premises with all the fixtures therein contained in as good condition as the reasonable use and wear thereof would permit, damages by the elements excepted.” The rent stipulated was $12,000 a year, payable in monthly instalments of $1000 each month in advance. The lease was on two occasions subsequently renewed on the same terms, once for two years from January, 1858, and again for two years from January, 1860. After the expiration of the latter term the premises were held over from year to year with the assent of the plaintiff, though without any special agreement on his part, and were thus held on the 16th of April, 1866, when the injuries complained of w7ere caused, the defendants paying rent in accordance with the terms of the original lease. The remaining portions of the buildings—being mostly portions above the part occupied by Wells, Fargo f Co. were at the time let to other tenants.
The premises occupied by the defendants were used by them for their business, as stipulated in the lease. They were engaged in the business of public express carriers m the States and Territories of the Pacific coast, and between New York and San Francisco by way of the Isthmus of Panama, using on the latter route the steamships of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, running between New Yoik and Aspinwall on the Atlantic side, and Panama and San Francisco on the Pacific side, to convey their express matter, and transporting the same across the isthmus by the Panama railroad. In 1866 the steamers left New York on the 1st, 11th, and 21st days of each month, and it was a regulation of the company that no express freight should be leceive at the wharf in New York on those days. Oil the afternoon of March 11th, 1866, and after the steamer sailing that clay had left for Aspinwall, a man brought to the w ar 10 which the steamer had taken her departure, a case o carried to California, and asked an employe of t e [p. 527] ants to receive it for that purpose. The employé informed him that it was too late to receive freight on that day, but that he could leave the case at his own risk and come the next day and get a receipt. He thereupon placed the case on the dock opposite the freight office of the company. The employé noticed at the time that the case had not been marked or strapped, as required by the regulations of the company, and called the man’s attention to the omission; whereupon he requested the employé to mark and strap the case at his expense. The case was accordingly strapped as required, and was marked with the proper address of the person for whom it was intended in California. Two days afterwards the man returned and obtained a receipt from the proper clerk of the company. The case remained on the dock where deposited till the next steamer left New York, when it was taken with other freight. At .the time tne case was presented it was clean and appeared to be in perfect condition. There was nothing in its appearance calculated to awaken any suspicion as to its contents. It required strapping and marking, and when this was done it was in proper condition for shipment. The case was an ordinary wooden box about two and a half feet square, and weighed three hundred and twenty-nine pounds. Nothing was said upon its delivery, or upon taking the receipt afterwaids, or at any other time, about the contents of the case to the defendants, or to any of their employés, nor were any questions subsequently asked by any one respecting the contents. The case was shipped for California with a large quantity of other express freight, amounting to several thousand cases, on the steamer that left New York on the 21st arch, 1866. It was carried to Aspinwall, thence transP rtec ovei the Panama railroad, resbipped on-a steamer at anama, and arrived in San Francisco on the 13th or 14th th fn * a^ernoou the 14th it was taken from ered8 ^aniei au^ P^ace4 upon the wharf, when it was discover coutents were leaking. These contents had had,^eaian^e svveet oil. Another box of similar size eu stained by the contents leaking and appeared to [p. 528] be damaged. On the 16th of April, in accordance with the regular and ordinary course of the defendants’ business, when express freight is found to be damaged, the two boxes were taken to the defendants’ building, the premises in question, for examination. The agent of the steamship company was requested to send a representative to be present at the examination so that it might be determined, if possible, by inspection, -where the responsibility rested between the two companies for the injury to the case. A representative of the company accordingly attended, and in his presence, and in the presence of an agent of the defendants, and of other persons, an employe of the defendants, by their direction, with a mallet and chisel, proceeded to open the case, and while thus engaged the substance contained in it exploded, instantly killing all the parties present, and causing the destruction of a large amount of property, and the injuries to the buildings occupied by the defendants, for which the present action was brought. Upon subsequent examination it was ascertained that the substance contained in the case was nitro-glycerine or glonoin oil. The other box contained silverware.
Nitro-glycerine, according to the account given of it in t re record, in its pure condition, is a nearly colorless substance, but when impure it has the color and consistency of sweet oil. It is a liquid which, under some conditions, explo es with great violence, its explosion being produced by percussion and concussion, and by a high degree of pleasure, not by contact with fire. If a flame be applied it wi urn slowly without exploding, and if the flame be with will cease to burn. It will also explode upon being subjecte to a heat of 360-degrees Fahrenheit, and in explosion combustion takes place. When kept in closed vessels it gradual y decomposes, and in decomposing disengages gases, t P sure alone of which may cause an explosion. In the nitro-glycerine in some of the cans in the case a,
partially decomposed, generating gases and proc ucin® ^.g sure within the cans and a tendency to exp o e. . condition of decomposition the percussion or [p. 529] caused by opening the box with the mallet and chisel, operating in connection with the internal pressure, produced the explosion.
The discovery of this substance was first announced at Paris, in 1847, but, prior to 1864, experiments with it w’ere confined almost entirely to the laboratory of the chemist. It was manufactured only in small quantities for scientific purposes. In that year a gentleman in Europe by the name of Noble suggested that it might be used for blasting purposes, and in the following year he made experiments with it, demonstrating its extraordinary power, and succeeded in introducing it to a limited extent into some of the European quarries and mines. An account of its properties was also published during that year in England and in a scientific periodical in New York. In 1866, a few weeks before the explosion which has given rise to this case, a shipment of the article from Noble arrived in San Francisco. .Eflforts* were making by the consignees to draw public attention to it for blasting purposes, when the explosion at the office of the defendants took place. A second shipment from the same person to the same consignees, made from Hamburg by the steamer “European,” exploded on the 8th of April, 1866, at Aspinwall, destroying the steamer and other property. This was eight days before the explosion at the defendant’s express office, and the news had not then reached San Francisco. Notwithstanding the efforts of Noble to biing his nitro-glycerine into notice in 1865, and the two shipments mentioned made by him early in 1866, at the time the case in question was shipped at New York and received at San Francisco, nitro-glycerine was not generally nown to the public as an article of commerce. The explosions at Aspinwall and San Francisco, and subsequent ones occurring at Sidney and in England, attracted the atention of scientific men to the subject, and led to more ie ul investigation and experiment and to general knowle go of its properties,
Ihe couit found that neither the defendants, nor any of
VOL. XV. 34
the employés of the defendants, or of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, who had anything to do with the package in question, nor the managing agent of the defendants on the Pacific coast, nor any of those killed by the explosion, knew the contents of the case in question, or had any means of such knowledge, or had any reason to suspect its dangerous character, and that they did not know anything about nitro-glycerine or glonoin oil, or that it was dangerous; that the case had the appearance of other cases usually received in the ordinary course of the defendants’ business, and was received and handled by their employés in the same way that other cases of similar appearance were usually received and handled, and in the mode that men of prudence engaged in the same business would have handled cases having a similar appearance in the ordinary course of business, when ignorant of their contents, and with similar means of knowledge as that possessed by the defendants and their employés in this instance; and that there was no negligence on the part of the defendants in receiving the case, or in their failure to ascertain the dangerous character of the contents; and in view of the condition of their knowledge, of the want of means of knowledge, and the absence of any reasonable ground of suspicion, there was no negligence in the handling of the case at the time of the explosion.
The defendants either repaired or paid for the repairs (to the amount of about $6000) of the premises occupied by themselves, except a portion of certain repairs made by the plaintiff, which were necessarily made in connection with repairs made to those portions of the premises occupied by the other tenants of the plaintiff, and which the defendants omitted to pay for by mistake.
For the amount thus omitted to be paid, and interest, the court gave judgment for the plaintiff, but held that the de fendants were not liable for any damage caused by the ex plosion to other portions of the buildings of the plainti, leased to and occupied by other tenants.
To review this judgment the plaintiff sued out a writ o error ¡from this court.
Argument for the landlord.
Messrs. R. M. Corwine and, B. JR. Curtis (with whom was Mr. Quinton Corwine), for the plaintiff in error:
The question is, are Wells, Fargo & Co. liable for injuries to those parts of the building not rented by them? We assert that they are.
I. They are liable under the covenants of the lease. They were tenants holding over, under the covenants of a written lease, and were bound to keep all those covenants as much as if the original lease were still running.
One of those covenants was that they would “ not receive in the demised premises, either for their own account or on storage, or allow any person to place therein, gunpowder, alcohol, or any other articles dangerous from their combustibility.”
So, too, there is the other covenant: “ at the expiration of the said term to quit and surrender the said demised prem-. ises, with all fixtures thereon contained, in as good a condition as the reasonable use and wear thereof will permit, damages by the elements excepted.” How is a room,(or how are certain apartments in, part of, and inseparable from an immense and splendid structure rendered in as good a condition as they were, when the whole immense and splendid structure laving been blown to pieces, the room is rebuilt, a separate t ing, with all the rest of the edifice piled up in ruins around Where the demised premises are so connected with—so part of a whole edifice—that they can never be restored in as good a condition as they were, unless the whole be so os ored, a covenant to restore the demised premises in as tli° h COn^^on as they were taken, is a covenant to restore y °le, ceitainly so where the whole has been destroyed the plaintiff’s act. the waiving this ground of covenant, we assert that e en ants were still liable for all the injuries to the know th’ W ^ey have produced. They were bound to in? inf e ?ature the property which they were introductakes h demised premises. Every person who undert° cond ^8HleS9 which the public is concerned is bound it with care, and if for want of that care injury
Argument for the landlord.
occur, to repair the injury. Can any one doubt that if this explosion had occurred on the vessel in which the box had been, that Wells & Fargo would have been liable for all injury done? They had accepted this unknown thing from a stranger, and they themselves shipped it; for they were, in truth, the shippers. So here they put it into the demised premises; no way differing in this respect from the ship, for they were their own consignees. Public carriers, shipping thousands of boxes upon steamers where many people are constantly at sea, without the least means either of preventing accidents which the dangerous contents of the boxes may produce, or of alleviating the injuries produced by such accidents, and where nothing but a knowledge on their part of what they do can protect travellers from catastrophes by explosion, ignition, and poison, are bound to know what they do. They put what they please on the ship. No one supervises them; and they remain on land. No promise to the public—no contract with any one—could place upon them a higher moral obligation to inform themselves than that which their business imposes upon them; for they are daily shipping articles, which may include articles like this, of a frightful power, easily brought into action, and where, if their power is brought into action at all, the consequences are awful indeed. Certainly men exercising such an employment, as do these sort of shippers, are bound to observe and exercise the usual and necessary precautionary and prudential steps which govern the conduct of everyone. Where the rights of others are so vitally concerned meie ignorance of the effect of their acts will not excuse them. What is known to others, even although not of universa notoriety, they7 should be presumed to be convei sant wit If they might know the character of property intruste t them and neglect to inform themselves, they must su the consequences of neglect. In the reckless disiegai human life commo?, by land and water in our country, an^ where so many lives and so much valuable piopeity involved and liable to destruction by the introduction, vessels and into storehouses, of dangerous compoun s, pn
Argument for the landlord.
policy demands the establishment and enforcement of these rules.
If, however, the defendants are not to be held to the most rigid rules of accountability for this frightful catastrophe, still their liability is absolute, because they were sufficiently put upon inquiry.
1st. The box was delivered at the dock of defendants, in New York, at an unseasonable hour and day, and this fact was remarked upon by the agent of defendants, who likewise called attention to the unsafe condition or fastenings of the box. Assuming that the person who delivered it was ignorant of the company’s rules or regulations, the courts will presume that defendants’ agent was versed and practiced in them, and that he was conscious of their violation when he received and receipted for this box. There was no explanation offered as to why the box was brought there at that improper time, nor was any question asked.
2d. The name of the party who delivered the box was not given, and, so far as the bill of exceptions or the finding of the court discloses, it was not asked for.
3d. Neither was the box strapped, marked, or weighed. But, even if the man who received it was inexperienced and so ignorant that he did not understand the rules, the box remained with the company two days before the person who delivered it called for his regular receipt. Thus there was ample time for the facts to be reported to the officers by the party who acted for the company in the receipt of it, in order that he might be instructed as to his course when the person who delivered it called again. But the shipping c erk, in the face of these suspicious circumstances, gave f e company’s regular receipt for the box to the party when he called, some days after leaving it. Had these facts been repotted to the officers, it is not at all impossible that the nature of the contents of this box would have been carefully ruquited into. Each of these omissions was a violation of rules of the company. Certainly they were, taken to-get er, suspicious, because unusual circumstances, which 8 ould have put the defendants upon inquiry. That they [p. 534] did not inquire is only a fact which shows neglect on their part.
Mr. 8. M. Wilson (who argued the case thoroughly on the precedents, English and American), contra.
Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
It appears from the record that the court finds, that neither the defendants, nor any of their employes, nor any of the employes of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, who had anything to do with the case of nitro-glycerine, knew the contents of the case, or had any means of such knowledge, or had any reason to suspect its dangerous character, and that they did not know anything about nitro-glycerine, or that it was dangerous. And it also appears that the court finds, that tjjiere was no negligence on the part of the defendants in receiving the case, or in their failure to ascertain the dangerous character of the contents; and in view of the condition of their knowledge, of the want of means of knowledge, and the absence of any reasonable ground of suspicion, that there was no negligence in the handling of the case at the time of the explosion.
The question presented to us is, whether upon this state of facts the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the injuries caused by the explosion to his buildings, outside of that portion occupied by the defendants under their lease. For the injuries to that portion the defendants admit their liability, as for waste committed, under the statute. Immediately after the accident they repaired that portion with the sanction o the plaintiff, and placed the premises in a condition as goo as they were previously. It appears, however, that a part of the expenses incurred were by mistake paid by the p am tiff in settling for repairs on other buildings. For the par thus paid the court gave judgment for the plaintiff un er the first count, and the defendants take no exception to i action in this respect. , i To fasten a further liability on the defendants, and ho
them for injuries to that portion of the buildings not covered by their lease, it was contended in the court below, and it is urged here, that, as matter of law, they were chargeable with notice of the character and properties of the merchandise in their possession, and of the proper mode of handling and dealing with it, and were consequently guilty of negligence in receiving, introducing, and handling the box containing the nitro-glycerine.
If express carriers are thus chargeable with notice of the contents of packages carried by them, they must have the right to refuse to receive packages offered for carriage without knowledge of their contents. It would, in that case, be unreasonable to require them to accept, as conclusive in every instance, the information given by the owner. They must be at liberty, whenever in doubt, to require, for their satisfaction, an inspection even of the contents as a condition of carrying the packages. This doctrine would be attended m practice with great inconvenience, and would seldom lead to any good. Fortunately the law is not so unreasonable. It does not exact any such knowledge on the part of the carrier, nor permit him, in cases free from suspicion, to require information as to the contents of the packages offered as a condition of carrying them. This was ruled directly by the Common Pleas in England in the case of Crouch v. The London and Northwestern Railway* The proposition that a carrier is, in all cases, entitled to know the nature of the goods contained in the packages offered to him for carnage, is there stated to be unsupported by any authority, and one that would not stand the test of reasoning.
In .Brass v. Braitlandrf it was held by the Queen’s Bench t at it was the duty of the shipper,-when he offered goods ich were of a dangerous nature to be carried, to give nome of their character to the owner of the ship, the Chief thT^’ ^e^ver^n& ^1G opinion of the court, observing a it would be strange to suppose that the master or a e> aving no reason to suspect that goods offered to him
* 14 Common Bench, 291.
f 6 Ellis & Blackburn, 485. [p. 536] for a general shipment may not be safely stowed away in the hold, must ask every shipper the contents of every package.”
The case cited from the Common Pleas recognizes the right of the carrier to refuse to receive packages offered without being made acquainted with their contents, when there is good ground for believing that they contain anything of a dangerous character. It is only when such ground exists, arising from the appearance of the package or other circumstances tending to excite his suspicions, that the carrier is authorized, in the absence of any special legislation on the subject, to require a knowledge of the contents of the packages offered as a condition of receiving them for carriage.
It not, then, being his duty to know the contents of any package offered to him for carriage, when there are no attendant circumstances awakening his suspicions as to their character, there can be no presumption of law that he had such knowledge in any particular case of that kind, and he cannot accordingly be charged as matter of law with notice of the properties and character of packages thus received. The first proposition of the plaintiff, therefore, falls, and the second, which depends upon the first, goes with it.
The defendants, being innocently ignorant of the contents of the case, received in the regular course of their business, were not guilty of negligence in introducing it into t eir place of business and handling it in the same manner a other packages of similar outward appearance weie usua.y handled. “ Negligence ” has been defined to be “ the omission to do something which a reasonable man, gui e those considerations which ordinarily regulate t e con u of human affairs, would do, or doing something w i prudent and reasonable man would not do. * t mus determined in all cases by reference to the situa 10; knowledge of the parties and all the atten an stances. What would be extreme care under one c ____ , [p. 537] of knowledge, and one state of circumstances, would be gross negligence with different knowledge and in changed circumstances. The law is reasonable in its judgments in this respect. It does not charge culpable negligence upon any one who takes the usual precautions against accident, which careful and prudent men are accustomed to take under similar circumstances.*
*
Blyth v. Birmington Water Works, 11 Excheque, Sherman and Redfield, g 6. t 2 Clifford, 18.
The case of Pierce v. decided by Mr. Justice Clifford, in the Circuit Court of the District of Massachusetts,- furnishes a pertinent illustration of this doctrine. There a general ship was put up for freight. Among other freight offered and taken was mastic, an article new in commerce, and which was so affected by the voyage that it injured other parts of the cargo in contact with it, and caused increased expenditure in discharging the vessel. The« court held the shipper and not the charterer liable, and observed that “the storage of the mastic was made in the usual way, and it is not disputed it would have been proper, if the article had been what it was supposed to be, when it was received and laden on board. Want of greater care in that ehalf is not a fault, because the master had no means of nowledge that the article required any extra care or attention beyond what is usual in respect to other goods.”
his action is not brought upon the covenants of the lease; it is in tiespass for injuries to the buildings of the plaintiff, a the gist of the action is the negligence of the defendants: nnless that be established, they are not liable. The mere th^ t laL?lljury has been caused is not sufficient to hold
G?1' ki ° Ot?e *8 resPorisible for injuries resulting from una?c^enb wbilst engaged in a lawful business. A it aig* ng negligence as a ground of action must prove om' 8h°w that the defendant, by his act or by his win lT’ aS v’°^ate(t some duty incumbent upon him, c has caused the injury complained of. stan/1 Cases between passengers and carriers for injuries d upon a different footing. The contract of the carrier [p. 538] being to carry safely, the proof of the injury usually establishes a primd facie, case, which the carrier must overcome. His contract is shown, primd facie at least, to have been violated by the injury. Outside of these cases, in which a positive obligation is cast upon the carrier to perform safely a special service, the presumption is that the party has exercised such care as men of ordinary prudence and caution would exercise under similar circumstances, and if he has not, the plaintiff must prove it.
Here no such proof was made, and the case stands as one of unavoidable accident, for the consequences of which the defendants are not responsible. The consequences of all such accidents must be borne by the sufferer as his misfortune.
This principle is recognized and affirmed in a great variety of cases—in cases where fire originating in one man s building has extended to and destroyed the property of others; in cases where injuries have been caused by fire ignited by sparks from steamboats or locomotives., or caused by horses running away, or by blasting rocks, and in numerous other cases which will readily occur to every one. The rule deducible from them is, that the measure of care against accident, which one must take to avoid responsibility, is that which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use if his own interests were to be affected, an the whole risk were his own.*
And the principle is not changed whether the injury com plained of follows directly or remotely from the act 01 con duct of the party. The direct or remote consequences of the act or conduct may determine the form of the action, whether it shall be case or trespass, where the foims o t common law are in use, but cannot alter the piinciple ^P which liability is enforced or avoided. In Brown v. ent a, which was before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, action was in trespass for an assault and batteij.___
*
Hoffman v. Tuolumne County Water Co., 10 California, 413, Wolf St. Louis Indep. Water Co., Ib. 541; Todd ®. Cochell, 17 Id. • f 6 Cushing, 295.
Syllabus.
fendant was trying to part two dogs, fighting, and in raising his stick for that purpose accidentally struck the plaintiff in his eye, injuring it severely. The court, Mr. Chief Justice Shaw delivering the opinion, held that the defendant was doing a lawful and proper act, which he might do by the use of proper and safe means; and that if in so doing, and while using due care and taking all proper precautions necessary to the exigency of the case to avoid hurt to others, the injury to the plaintiff occurred, the defendant was not liable therefor, and that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish a want of due care on the part of the defendant. In Harvey v. Dunlap* which was before the Supreme Court of New York, the action was trespass for throwing a stone at the plaintiff’s daughter, by which her eye was put out. It did not appear that the injury was inflicted by design or carelessness, but on the contrary that it was accidental, and it was held that the plaintiff' could not recover. “ No case or principle can be found,” Biaid Mr. Justice Nelson, in denying a new trial, “ or, if found, can be maintained, subjecting an individual to liability for an act done without fault on his part;” and in this conclusion we all agree.
Judgment affirmed.
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