judgment of the Ct. of Claims dismissing the petitioD i8 Reversed, Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 158
Case details
Bluebook Citation
judgment of the Ct. of Claims dismissing the petitioD i8 Reversed, Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 158
Full caption
The judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petitioD i8 Reversed, Semmes v. Hartford Insurance Company.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
The judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petitioD i8 Reversed,
Semmes v. Hartford Insurance Company.
In error to the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut.
Semmes sued the City Fire Insurance Company, of Hartford, in the court below, on the 31st of October, 1866, upon a policy of insurance, for a loss which occurred on the 5th day of January, 1860. The policy as declared on showed as a condition of the contract, that payment of losses should be made in sixty days after the loss should have been ascertained and proved.
The company pleaded that by the policy itself it was expressly provided that no suit for the recovery of any claim p. 159upon the same should be sustainable in any court unless such suit should be commenced within the term of twelve months next after any loss or damage should occur; and that in case any such suit should be commenced after the expiration of twelve months next after such loss or damage should have occurred, the lapse of time should be taken and deemed as conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim thereby so attempted to be enforced. And that the plaintiff did not commence this action against the defendants within the said period of twelve months next after the loss occurred.
1
A condition in a contract of insurance that no suit or action shall be sustainable unless commenced within the time of twelve months next after the loss shall occur, and in case such action shall be commenced after ths expiration of twelve months next after such loss, that the lapse of tima shall be taken and deemed as conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim, does not operate in case of a war between the countries of the contracting parties, as does a statute of limitations in like case. And under such a contract the term of twelve months, which it allowed the plaintiff for bringing his suit, does not, as it does in the case of a statute of limitation, open and expand itself so as to receive within it the term of legal disability created by the war and then close together at each end of that period so as to complete itself, as though the war had never occurred.
2
However, in the case of such a contract followed by a war, the disability to sue imposed on a plaintiff by the war relieves him from the consequences of failing to bring suit within twelve months after the loss.
To this plea there were replications setting up, among other things, that the late civil war prevented the bringing of the suit within the twelve months provided in the condition, the plaintiff being a resident and citizen of the State of Mississippi and the defendant of Connecticut during all that time.
The plea was held by the court below to present a good bar to the action, notwithstanding the effect of the war on the rights of the parties.
That court, in arriving at this conclusion, held, first, that the condition in the contract, limiting the time within which suit could be brought, was, like the statute of limitation, susceptible of such enlargement, in point of time, as was necessary to accommodate itself to the precise number of days during which the plaintiff" was prevented from bringing suit by the existence of the war. And ascertaining this by a reference to certain public acts of the political departments of the government, to which it referred, found that there was, between the time at which it fixed the commencement ° the war and the date of the plaintiff’s loss, a certain numei of days, which, added to the time between the close of the war and the commencement of the action, amounted to moie than the twelve months allowed by the condition of the contract.
udgment being given accordingly in favor of the company the plaintiff brought the case here.
The point chiefly discussed here was when the war began p. 160and when it ceased; Mr. W. Hamersley, for the plaintiff in error, contending that the court below had not fixed right dates, but had fixed the commencement of the war too late and its close too early, and he himself fixing them in such a manner as that even conceding the principle asserted by the court to be a true one, and applicable to a contract as well as to a statute of limitation, the suit was still brought within the twelve months.
The counsel, however, denied that the principle did apply to a contract, but contended that the whole condition had been rendered impossible and so abrogated by the war, and that the plaintiff* could sue at any time within the general statutory terra, as he now confessedly did.
Mr. R. D. Hubbard, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
It is not necessary, in the view which we take of the matter, to inquire whether the Circuit Court was correct in the principle by which it fixed the date, either of the commencement or cessation of the disability to sue growing out of the events of the war. For we are of opinion that the period of twelve months which the contract allowed the plaintiff for bringing his suit does not open and expand itself so as to receive within it three or four years of legal disability created by the war and then close together at each end of that period so as to complete itself, as though the war had never occurred.
It is true that, in regard to the limitation imposed by statute, this court has held that the time may be so computed, but there the law imposes the limitation and the law imposes the disability. It is nothing, therefore, but a necessary legal logic that the one period should be taken from the other. If the law did not, by a necessary implication, take this time out of that prescribed by the statute, one of two things would happen: either the plaintiff would lose his right of suit by a judicial construction of law which deprived him of the right to sue yet permitted the statute to run until p. 161it became a complete bar, or else, holding the statute under the circumstances to be no bar, the defendant would be left, after the war was over, without the protection of any limitation whatever. It was therefore necessary to adopt the time provided by the statute as limiting the right to sue, and deduct from that time the period of disability.
Such is not the case as regards this contract. The defendant has made its own special and hard provision on that subject. It is not said, as in a statute, that a plaintiff shall have twelve months from the time his cause of action accrued to commence suit, but twelve months from the time of loss; yet by another condition the loss is not payable until sixty days after it shall have been ascertained and proved. The condition is that no suit or action shall be sustainable unless commenced within the time of twelve months next after the loss shall occur, and in case such action shall be commenced after the expiration of twelve months next after such loss, the lapse of time shall be taken and deemed as conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim.. Now, this contract relates to the twelve months next succeeding the occurrence of the loss, and the court has no right, as in the case of a statute, to construe it into a number of days equal to twelve months, to be made up of the days in a period of five years in which the plaintiff could lawfully have commenced his suit. So also if the plaintiff shows any reason which in law rebuts the presumption, which, on the failure to sue within twelve months, is, by the contract, made conclusive against the validity of the claim, that presumption is not revived again by the contract. It would seem that when once rebutted ally nothing but a presumption of law or presumption of act could again revive it. There is nothing in the contract which does it, and we know of no such presumptions of law. -t 01 does the same evil consequence follow from removing a solutely the bar of the contract that would from removing solutely the bar of the statute, for when the bar of the contract is removed there still remains the bar of the statute, an though the plaintiff may show by his disability to sue a cient answer to the twelve months provided by the con-
VOL. XIII.
tract, he must still bring his suit within the reasonable time fixed by the legislative authority, that is, by the statute of limitations.
We have no doubt that the disability to sue imposed on the plaintiff by the war relieves him from the consequences of failing to bring suit within twelve months after the loss, because it rendered a compliance with that condition impossible and removes the presumption which that contract says shall be conclusive against the validity of the plaintiff’s claim. That part of the contract, therefore, presents no bar to the plaintiff’s right to recover.
As the Circuit Court founded its judgment on the proposition that it did, that judgment must be
Reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Reiche v. Smythe, Collector.
Where an act of 1861 exempted from duty “animals of all kinds; birds, singing and other, and land and water fowls,” and a later act levied a duty of 20 per cent. “ on all horses, mules, cattle, sheep, hogs, and other live animals,” held that birds were not included in the terms “other live animals.” The second statute must be read by the light of the first. Error to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York; the case being thus :
The 23d section of the act of March 2d, 1861, chap. 68,* provides, that
“ The importation of the articles hereinafter mentioned and embraced in this section shall be exempt from duty:
“ ‘ Animals, living, of all kinds; birds, singing and other, and land and water fowls.’ ”
This provision being in force, an act of May 16th, 1866,t was passed, which provided—
« That on and after the passage of this act there shall be
f 14 lb. 48.
* 12 Stat, at Large, 193.
Argument in support of the ruling.
levied, collected, and paid, on all horses, mules, cattle, sheep, hogs, and other live animals imported from foreign countries, a duty of 20 per centum ad valorem’'
In this state of legislation, and after the passage of the second of the above-mentioned acts, one Reiche imported into New York a lot of canary and other birds, on which the collector exacted a duty of 20 per centum ad valorem, which was paid under protest. Reiche brought this suit in the court below to recover the money. The only inquiry was whether living birds at the date of this importation were dutiable.
The court below decided that they were, and judgment being given accordingly the importer brought the case here.
Mr. B. H. Bristow, Solicitor-General, and Mr. C. H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States, and in support of the riding below:
It may be urged on the other side that inasmuch as Congress, in the act of 1861, named “ animals, living, of all kinds,” and in the same section also mentioned “ birds, singing and other,” &c., the intention was to recognize a lestricted meaning of thé word “animals,” as not including birds,” and to introduce and sanction such restricted meaning as a definition of the terms “living animals” and live animals” when used in the revenue laws; so that when, in the act of 1866, a duty was imposed upon all live animals, without mentioning birds, the legislature must be understood to have intended that the latter should not be included, but should remain exempt.
The answer is, that the various duty acts are too full of examples of tautology and repetition to warrant such a conc usion; that they often show needless particularity in enumeration, accompanied by general terms plainly including & same things also mentioned in detail. Thus, in section 7 of the act of 1861, a duty is imposed upon “ articles worn y men, women, or children, of whatever material compose, &c. ; and yet, notwithstanding these comprehensive evms, theie follow, in the same section, numerous p. 164particulars already clearly embraced in those terms, as “bracelets, braids, chains, curls, ringlets, braces, suspenders, caps, hats,” &c. Like repetitions are found in the 13th section of the act of July 14th, 1862,* and in schedule C, in the act of July 30th, 1846.f
The phrase, all “ other live animals,” as employed in the act of 1866, is clear, comprehensive, and explicit. The addition of the designation of birds, in a single instance, in a former act, is a casual circumstance of too slight significance to warrant a practical interpolation, in the later special statute, of an exception to its plain import.
Mr. Frederick Chase, contra.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
The act of 1866 in its terms is comprehensive enough to include birds, and all other living things endowed with sensation and the power of voluntary motion, and if there had not been previous legislation on the subject there might be some justification for the position, that Congress did not intend to narrow the meaning of the language employed. If it be true that it is the duty of the court to ascertain the meaning of the legislature from the words used in the statute and the subject-matter to which it relates, there is an equal duty to restrict the meaning of general words, whenever it is found necessary to do so, in order to carry out the legislative intention.^ And it is fair to presume in case a special meaning were attached to certain words in a prior tariff act, that Congress intended they should have the same signification when used in a subsequent act in relation to the same subject-matter.
This act of 1861 was in force when the act of 1866—the act in controversy—was passed, and it will be seen that birds and fowls are not embraced in the term “animals, and that they are free from duty, not because they belong to the class of “ living animals of all kinds,” but for the
f 9 Id. 44.
reason that they are especially designated. It is quite manifest that Congress, adopting the popular signification of the word “animals,” applied it to quadrupeds, and placed birds and fowls in a different classification. Congress having, therefore, defined the word in one act, so as to limit its application, how can it be contended that the definition shall be enlarged in the next act on the same subject, when there is no language used indicating an intention to produce such a result? Both acts are in pari materifl, and it will be presumed that if the same word be used in both, and a special meaning were given it in the first act, that it was intended it should receive the same interpretation in the latter act, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention.*
If it be used in a different sense in the act of 1866, its meaning instead of being extended is narrowed, for all animals not ejusdem generis “ with horses, mules, cattle, sheep, and hogs,” are excluded from the operation of the revenue laws. By the act of 1861, living animals of all kinds, whether domesticated or not, could be imported without paying a duty. The law of 1866 steps in and imposes a duty on domestic quadrupeds, leaving the act of 1861 applicable to all other quadrupeds, and to birds and fowls.
The case of Homer v. The Collector,^ is in principle not unlike this. The object of that suit was to ascertain whether, under the tariff act of 1857, almonds were placed in the category of dried fruits, on which a small duty was imposed. Lt was contended as the article was popularly classed among the dried fruits of the table, with raisins, dates, &c., and as it was not named specifically in the changes in the act of 857, that it properly belonged to the schedule providing or dried fruits. But the court held that as a duty had been imposed on almonds, eo nomine, in previous tariff* acts, the article was not, for revenue purposes, within the general erm of dried fruit, although in popular language and commercial usage such was its signification.
Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. •---------------------------
* Dwarris on Statutes, pp. 701-766. f 1 Wallace, 486.