Case details
Bluebook Citation
Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342
Full caption
Hanauer v. Doane.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Hanauer v. Doane.
1. Action will not lie for the price of goods sold in aid of the Rebellion, or with knowledge that they were purchased for the Confederate States government. 2. A promissory note, the consideration of which is wholly or in part the price of such goods, is void, and an action cannot be sustained thereon by a holder who received it knowing for what it was given. 8. Due-bills given for the price of such goods and passed into the hands of a person knowing the fact, will not be a good consideration for a note. 4. It is contrary to public policy to give the aid of the courts to a vendor who knew that his goods were purchased, or to a lender who knew that his money was borrowed, for the purpose of being employed m the commission of a criminal act, injurious to society or to any of its members.
Error to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. This was an action by Doane against L. & J. Hanauer, to
recover the amount of two promissory notes, dated in February, 1867. These notes were originally given by the said L. &• J. Hanauer, under the firm of L. Hanauer & Co., to one Hunter, in settlement of an account between them and the firm of Hunter & Oakes, which had mostly accrued in the years 1860, 1861, and 1862. A portion of this account was for items of private and family use; the residue was partly for supplies and commissary stores for the Confederate army sold by Hunter & Oakes to L. Hanauer, a recog nized supply contractor of the Confederate government; an partly for due-bills issued by Hanauer, as such contractor, 0 [p. 343] Dec. 1870.] Hanauer v. Doane. 848
other persons in payment of army stores and supplies, and taken up by Hunter & Oakes at Hanauer’s request, under a promise to redeem the same.
The question in the case was whether the notes sued on, having been given for the consideration mentioned, were valid.
The defendants asked the court to charge thus:
“ 1. If the jury find that Hunter & Oakes sold to L. Hanauer a quantity of goods and chattels knowing that the said Hanauer was purchasing them as supplies for the rebel army to carry on the war against the United States, and that the price of the same form a part of the consideration of the notes sued on, then they will find for the defendants.
“2. If they find that L. Hanauer, acting as a purchasing agent for the Confederate States, in rebellion, gave out notes or due-bills for supplies furnished the rebel army with the knowledge of the persons from whom such purchases were made, of the use to which the said supplies were to be put, and that, during the time when the said due-bills were in the course of being issued, the said Hanauer made an agreement with said Hunter & Oakes that the latter should take up said due-bills and charge them to said Hanauer, the said Hunter & Oakes knowing the purpose for which the same were issued, and that the price of said due-bills so taken up forms any part of the consideration of the notes sued on, then they will find for the defendants.”
The court refused so to charge, and charged as follows :
“If these due-bills were taken up by Hunter & Oakes, after they were issued to the parties to whom they were payable, and upon the promise of Hanauer that he would redeem them, then, as between Hanauer and Hunter & Oakes, the surrender by Hunter & Oakes to Hanauer of such due-bills so taken up by them, would constitute a good and sufficient consideration for the amount thereof. And this is the law, although you may nd that the parties to whom the due-bills were payable knew at the time of making the sale of supplies or property to L.
anauer that he intended to turn the same over to the rebel
> and that Hunter & Oakes had notice of these facts. To a ect the validity of the notes sued on, as to that part of the [p. 344] consideration made up of these due-bills, you must be satisfied that Hunter & Oakes were interested in furnishing the supplies to the rebel army for which the due-bills were given, or that what they did in the premises was done for the purpose or with the view of aiding in furnishing supplies to the rebel army, otherwise giving aid and comfort to the rebellion.
“ Then, as to the other item, comprising a part of the consideration of the notes sued, the account of Hunter & Oakes against Hanauer as supply contractor for supplies sold to Hanauer. It is asserted that Hunter & Oakes knew that the articles mentioned in this account were purchased by Hanauer to be turned over as supplies to the rebel army, and the defendant maintains that this knowledge of the use intended to be made by Hanauer of these goods made the sale illegal, and that the amount of these sales having been included in the notes sued on, they are illegal and void. This is not the law. Bare knowledge, on the part of Hunter & Oakes, that Hanauer intended or expected to turn the goods and property purchased from them over to the rebel army as supplies for said army would not make such sale of goods and property illegal and void. To make the sale of goods from Hunter & Oakes to Hanauer illegal and void, it must appear that Hunter & Oakes had some concern in furnishing the supplies to the rebel army, or that it was part of the contract between Hunter & Oakes and Hanauer that such goods should go to the support of the rebel army, or that the design of Hunter & Oakes, in making such sale, was to aid in furnishing supplies to the rebel army, or otherwise give aid and comfort to the rebellion. But if the goods were sold by Hunter & Oakes in the common and ordinary course of trade, and the only inducement to the sale of the goods on the part of Hunter, & Oakes was the price agreed to be paid by Hanauer for the same, then the sale was a legal and valid sale, although Hunter & Oakes knew that Hanauer intended or expected to turn such goods over to the rebel army.”
Judgment having gone for the plaintiff, the defendant, Hanauer, brought the case here on exceptions to the charge; the question in this court being, of course, the same one as in the court below, to wit, whether the notes sued on, having been given for the consideration mentioned, were valid«
Messrs. Watkins and Rose, for the plaintiffs in error; Mr. A. H. Garland, contra.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. We have already decided, in the case of Texas v. White,* that a contract made in aid of the late rebellion, or in furtherance and support thereof, is void. The same doctrine has been laid down in most of the circuits, and in many of the State courts, and must be regarded as the settled law of the land. Any contract, tinctured with the vice of giving aid and support to the rebellion, can receive no countenance or sanction from the courts of the country. Are the notes in suit of this kind ? A portion of their consideration was stores and supplies furnished to the army contractor of the Confederate government, and another portion wras due-bills issued for the same consideration, and received by Hunter & Oakes with full notice of their character. If either of these portions of the consideration on which the notes were given was illegal, the notes are void in toto. Such is the elementary rule, for which it is unnecessary to cite authorities.
On the trial of the cause below, the judge, in charging the jury, instructed them that if Hunter & Oakes took up Hanauer’s due-bills for value, at his request and on the faith of his promise to redeem them, made after he had given them out for supplies, these due-bills would constitute a good consideration for the notes. We do not think that this was a correct statement of the law. If Hanauer had borrowed money from Hunter & Oakes to redeem the due-bills himself, the transaction would have been different, and the loan of money would have been legal, although Hunter & Oakes had known for what purpose Hanauer wanted the money. They would have been one degree farther removed from the unlawful transaction. But, instead of this, they ecame the holders of the due-bills, knowing for what purpose and on what consideration they had been issued; and
* 7 Wallace, 700.
hence their title was no better than that of the original holders. To vitiate this title it was not necessary, as stated by the judge, that Hunter & Oakes should have been interested in furnishing the supplies for which the due-bills were given; nor that what they did should have been done with the view of aiding the rebel cause. If the due-bills were invalid in the hands of the original holders, they were invalid in the hands of Hunter & Oakes. Whether they were invalid depends on the solution of the question whether the sales of supplies to Hanauer, for the use of the Confederate army, was, or was not, an illegal transaction. We think it was. But on this subject it is proper to examine the views of the judge at the trial.
With regard to that portion of the consideration of the notes which consisted of supplies sold by Hunter & Oakes to Hanauer for the Confederate army, the judge instructed the jury that bare knowledge on the part of Hunter & Oakes that Hanauer intended, or expected, to turn the goods over to the rebel army, would not make the sale illegal and void, but that, to make it so, it must appear that Hunter & Oakes had some concern in furnishing the supplies to the rebel army, or intended to aid therein. In this instruction we think the judge erred. With whatever impunity a man may lend money or sell goods to another who he knows intends to devote them to a use that is only malum prohibitum, or of inferior criminality, he cannot do it, without turpitude, when he knows, or has every reason to believe, that such money or goods are to be used for the perpetration of a heinous crime, and that they were procured for that purpose. In the words of Chief Justice Eyre, in Lightfoot v. Tenant,* if the man who sells arsenic to one who, he knows, intends to poison his wife with it, will not be allowed to maintain an action on his contract. The consideration of the contract, in itself good, is there tainted with turpitude which destroys the whole merit of it. . . . No man ought to furnish another with the means of transgressing the law, knowing that he
* 1 Bosanquet & Puller, 551, 556.
intended to make that use of them.” On this declaration Judge Story remarks: “The wholesome morality and enlarged policy of this passage make it almost irresistible to the judgment; and, indeed, the reasoning seems positively unanswerable.”* Can a man furnish another with the means of committing murder, or any abominable crime, knowing that the purchaser procures them, and intends to use them, for that purpose, and then pretend that he is not a participator in the guilt ? Can he wrap himself up in his own selfishness and heartless indifference and say, “ What business is that of mine ? Am I the keeper of another man’s conscience ?” Ko one can hesitate to say that such a man voluntarily aids in the perpetration of the offence, and, morally speaking, is almost, if not quite, as guilty as the principal offender.
No crime is greater than treason. He wTho, being bound by his allegiance to a government, sells goods to the agent of an armed combination to overthrow that government, knowing that the purchaser buys them for that treasonable purpose, is himself guilty of treason or a misprision thereof. He voluntarily aids the treason. He cannot be permitted to stand on the nice metaphysical distinction that, although he knows that the purchaser buys the goods for the purpose of aiding the rebellion, he does not sell them for that purpose. The consequences of his acts are too serious and enormous to admit of such a plea. He must be taken to intend the consequences of his own voluntary act.
The decision of Chief Justice Eyre, in the case above referred to, has been followed in several other English cases. It was followed by Lord Ellenborough in Langton v. Hughes^ where a druggist sold.drugs of a noxious and unwholesome nature to a brewer, knowing that they were to be used in his brewery, contrary to law, and it was held that he could not recover the price. It was also followed by Chief Justice Abbott, in Cannan v. Bryce,X where it was held that money [p. 348] lent to a man to enable him to settle his losses on an illegal stockjobbing transaction, could not be recovered back. Said the Chief Justice: “If it be unlawful in one man to pay, how can it be lawful for another to furnish him with the means of payment ? . . . The means were furnished with a full knowledge of the object to which they were to be applied, and for the express purpose of accomplishing that object.” In that case the lender had no interest whatever in the unlawful transaction, and was only connected withit, as Hunter & Oakes were in this case, by knowing the object for which the money was borrowed. These cases were followed by the Court of Errors of New York, in the case of De Groot v. Van Duzer.* Chancellor Walworth, in that case, observes that, “those cases in which an independent contract has been held void from a mere knowledge of the fact of the illegal end in view, proceed upon the ground that the party having such knowledge intended to aid the illegal object at the time he made the contract.”
*
Story’s Conflict of Laws, g 253. f 1 Maule & Selwyn. 598. ♦ 8 Barnewall & Alderson, 179.
There are cases to the contrary; but they are either cases where the unlawful act contemplated to be done was merely malum prohibitum, or of inferior criminality; or cases in which the unlawful act was already committed, and the loan was an independent contract, made, not to enable the borrower to commit the act, but to pay obligations which he had already incurred in committing it. Of the latter class was the case of Armstrong v. Toler;] of the former, those of Hodgson n. Temple,] and others cited in the argument. In Hodgson v. Temple, where a buyer of spirituous liquors was known to be carrying on a rectifying distillery and a retail liquor shop at the same time, contrary to law, the vendor of the spirits was held entitled to recover the price. Sir James Mansfield said: “ The merely selling goods, knowing that the buyer will make an illegal use of them, is not sufficient to deprive the vendor of his just right of payment; but to effect that, it is necessary that the vendor should be a sharer in the illegal transaction.”
* 20 Wendell, 390. f 11 Wheaton, 258. f 5 Taunton, 181.
Syllabus.
This seems to have been the view taken by the judge who tried this cause below, and which he applied to this case. In our judgment it is altogether too narrow a view of the responsibility of a vendor in such a case as the present. Where to draw the precise line between the cases in which the vendor’s knowledge of the purchaser’s intent to make an unlawful use of the goods, will vitiate the contract, and those in which it will not, may be difficult. Perhaps it cannot be done by exact definitions. The whole doctrine of avoiding contracts for illegality and immorality is founded on public policy. It is certainly contrary to public policy to give the aid of the courts to a vendor who knew that his goods were purchased, or to a lender who knew that his money was borrowed, for the purpose of being employed in the commission of a criminal act, injurious to society or to any of its members. This is all that we mean to decide in this case
Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered.
[See the next case.]
Thomas vl City of Richmond.
1. "Where the issue of bills as a currency (except by banking institutions) is prohibited, a municipal corporation has no power, without express authority, to issue such bills; and if it does issue them, the holders thereof cannot recover the amount, either in an action on the bills themselves, or for money had and received.
2 Especially is this so, where the receiving, as well as issuing, of unlawful bills is expressly prohibited.
8. A law authorizing and requiring the redemption of such bills, passed by the legislature of one of the late Confederate States in aid of the rebellion, cannot be recognized or enforced.
• Semble, that a bank or other private corporation issuing bills contrary to law, might be compelled to pay the holder in an action for money had and received, although the bills themselves were void, if the receiving of the bills were not expressly prohibited.
• But if the receiving as well as issuing were prohibited, both parties would be in pari delicto, and no action could be sustained for the amount of the bills.
6. The law as to the recovery of money paid on an illegal contract stated and defined.
Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia, on a suit upon certain notes issued during the rebellion by the city corporation of Richmond; the case being thus:
A statute Virginia passed in 1854, and reproduced in the code of 1860, thus enacts:
“ Section 15. All members of any association, or company, that shall trade or deal as a bank, or carry on banking without authority of law, and their officers and agents therein, shall be confined in jail not more than six months, and fined not less than $100, nor more than $500.
“ Section 16. Every free person,* who, with intent to create a circulating medium, shall issue, without authority of law, any note or other security, purporting that money or other thing of value is payable by, or on behalf of, such person, and every officer and agent of such person therein, shall be confined in jail/’ &c.
“ Section 17. If a free person pass or receive in payment any note or security, issued in violation of either of the two preceding sections, he shall be fined not less than $20 nor more than $100.”
“ Section 19. In every case where a note of a less denomination than $5 is offered or issued as nioney, whether by a bank, corporation, or by individuals, the person, firm, or association of persons, corporation, or body politic so issuing, shall pay a fine of $10.”
By the charter of the city of Richmond,! that city “ may contract or be contracted with,” and is endowed generally with a all the rights, franchises, capacities, and powers appertaining to municipal corporations.” The charter also provides that “ the council of the city may in the name and for the use of the city contract loans, and cause to be issued certificates of debt or bonds.”!
*
By the express provision of the enactment the word “ person ” includes corporation. f Chapter 54 of the code of 1849, p. 282, was followed by the act of March 80th, 1852 (Session Acts, p. 259), and the act of March 18th, 1861 (lb. 153) | Sessions Acts, 1852, p. 265, | 46; 1861, p. 169, g 75.
Argument for the note-holder.
In this state of things the city of Richmond, in April, 1861, upon the breaking out of the rebellion, passed an ordinance for the issue by the city of $300,000, of corporation notes of $2, $1, 50 cents, and 25 cents; and the notes were accordingly issued; the city receiving in exchange the bank notes of the State then in circulation, between which and gold the difference at the time, compared with what it became subsequently, was small; five per cent, to ten per cent.
On the 19th March, 1862, and the 29th of the same month and year, a so-called “legislature of Virginia,” the body being composed of representatives from parts of the State in rebellion against the Federal government, passed an act, by whose language the issue of the sort of notes in question was made valid, and the city obliged to redeem them.
In October, 1868, the rebellion being now suppressed, and the city refusing to pay the notes, one Thomas and others, holders of a quantity of them, brought assumpsit against the city of Richmond, in the court below, to recover certain ones which they held. The declaration contained a special count on the notes and the common money counts. The defendants pleaded the general issue and the statute of limitations. A jury being waived, the case was tried by the court, which found:
1st. That the notes were void when they were issued, because they were issued to circulate as currency, in violation of the law and policy of the State of Virginia, and,
2d. That the said notes were not made valid or recoverable by the acts of the 19th March, 1862, and 29th March, 1862, or either of them, because the said acts were passed hy a legislature not recognized by the United States, and in aid of the rebellion.
The court accordingly gave judgment for the defendant. To review that judgment the case was brought here by the plaintiff.
Conway Robinson, for the plaintiff in error:. 1. Under the powers which the city of Richmond had, by 1 charter, it might receive from those who would lend or
Argument for the note-holder.
advance it, the amount now in question, and might agree to refund it.
2. The amount has been actually received by the city in money or its equivalent. This money the city is under an obligation to refund, and there is a right of action for it as money lent or money received. “ It is not the policy of the law,” says Alderson, B., “ that he who has another man’s money may keep it.”*
Whether the notes be valid or void, the holders may recover on the money counts.! Under the statute of 9 Anne, c. 16, a note for money lent to game with was void; yet an action was maintained for money lent under a parol contract.J In A. D. 1760, where the bill of exchange included £300, lent by the plaintiff to Sir John Bland, at the time and place of play, though by force of the bill the plaintiff could not recover anything (the statute making that utterly void), yet the King’s Bench gave judgment for £300, under the common count for money lent.§
Whatever may be the structure of the statute of Virginia in respect to prohibition and penalty about small notes, it is not to be taken for granted that the legislature meant that contracts in contravention of it were to be void in the sense that they were not to be enforced in a court of justice.|| But if this were otherwise, prior enactments against small notes is repealed, by the act of March 19th, 1862, so far as in conflict therewith; and by the latter there is a release of forfeitures and penalties incurred before its passage; neither is there anything in Texas v. White,which should prevent the latter act having full effect.
Mr. John A. Meredith, contra, for the city.*§
*
Bousfield v. Wilson, 16 Meeson & Welsby, 188; and see Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wallace, 81. f 4 Robinson’s Practices, ch. 87, 88, 89, p. 547, et seq. J Barjeau v. Walmsley, 2 Strange, 1249. § Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burrow, 1081; and see Sutton v. Toomer, 7 Barnwall & Cross (14 English Common Law), 416; Utica Insurance Company®. Scott, 19 Johnson, 6; Same plaintiff v. Kip, 8 Cowen, 24. || Harris v. Runnels, 12 Howard, 84; Sortwell, &c. v. Hughes, 1 Curtis,247. i 7 Wallace, 733.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
First. The court finds as a fact that the notes upon which the present action is brought were issued to circulate as currency; and, as matter of law, that this was in violation of the law and policy of Virginia, and that, therefore, the notes were void.
The first question is, whether the issue of notes as currency by the Common Council of the city of Richmond, in April, 1861, was against the law and policy of Virginia. The issue of notes as a common currency, or circulating medium, is guarded with much jealousy by all governments as touching one of its most valuable prerogatives, and as deeply affecting the common good of the people. Almost every State has stringent laws on the subject, and it may be said to be against the public policy of the country to allow individuals or corporations to exercise this prerogative without express legislative sanction. The State of Virginia, like all the other States, had a law of this kind in operation at the time the notes in question were issued. The issue of the notes in question was clearly in violation of this law; and it will be perceived that the 17th section makes the receipt of such notes in payment, as well as the issue and passing of them, a penal offence.
But the charter of the city of Richmond has been referred to for the purpose of showing that the Common Council had power to issue such notes. One of the grants of power relied on is, that the city is made a corporation with power to contract and be contracted with, and generally with “ all the rights, franchises, capacities, and powers appertaining to municipal corporations.” In a community in which it is against public policy, as well as express law, for any person or body corporate to issue small bills to circulate as currency, it is certainly not one of the implied powers of a municipal corporation to issue such bills. Such a corporation “ can exercise no power which is not, in express terms, °r by fair implication, conferred upon it.”* Another clause
* Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wallace, 830.
m. Xu. 28
of the charter to which reference has been made authorizes the council to borrow money and to issue the bonds or certificates of the city therefor. But this cannot be seriously urged as conferring the right to issue such bills as those now in suit. Such city securities as those authorized by the charter are totally different from bills issued and used as a currency or circulating medium. The distinction is well understood and recognized by the whole community. A power to execute and issue the one class cannot, without doing violence to language, be deemed to include power to issue the other. We do not hesitate to say, therefore, that the Common Council of Richmond had no power or authority to issue such paper, and that they could not hind the city thereby.
It is contended, however, that although the notes themselves should be deemed void, yet the city received the money therefor, and ought not, in conscience, to retain it; and, therefore, that the action can be maintained on the count for money had and received.
If the defendant were a banking or other private corporation, and had issued notes contrary to law, and had incurred penalties therefor, no penalty being imposed upon the receiver or holder of the notes, this argument might be sound. In the case of The Oneida Bank v. The Ontario Bank,* in which the defendant had issued post notes contrary to a statute of New York, it was held that the holder could recover the money advanced therefor. “ The argument for the defendant against this position,” says Chief Justice Comstock, “ rests wholly on the idea that Perry, in receiving the post-dated drafts, was as much a public offender as the bank or its officers issuing them. ... But such were not the relations of the parties. . . . Whatever there was of guilt, in the issuing of the drafts, it wTas the creature of the statute. . . . By that authority, and that alone, the bank is prohibited from issuing, but not the dealer from receiving; and the punishment is denounced only against the individual hanker,
* 21 New York, 496.
or the officers, agents, and members of the association. . . . If the issuing of the drafts was prohibited, and if they were also void, Perry, nevertheless, had a right to demand and recover the sums of money which he actually loaned to the defendant.” This is in accordance with the general principles of law on this subject. Lord Mansfield, in Smith v. Bromley, as long ago as 1760, laid down the doctrine, which has ever since been followed, in these words: “ If the act be in itself immoral, or a violation of the general laws of public policy, both parties are in pari delicto, hut where the law violated is calculated for the protection of the subject against oppression, extortion, and deceit, and the defendant takes advantage of the plaintiff’s condition or situation, then the plaintiff shall recover.”* In that case the plaintiff had given the defendant money to sign her brother’s bankrupt certificate, and she was allowed to recover it back, the law prohibiting any creditor from receiving money for such a purpose. Whilst the general principle has been frequently recognized, the application of it to particular cases has been somewhat diverse. Mr. Frere, in his note to Smith v. Bromley,\ thus sums up the result of the cases: A recovery can be had, as for money had and received (1st) where the illegality consists in the contract itself, and that contract is not executed—in such case there is a locus poenitentice, the delictum is incomplete, and the contract may be rescinded by either party; (2d) where the law that creates the illegality in the transaction was designed for the coercion of one party and the protection of the other, or where the one party is the principal offender and the other only criminal from a constrained acquiescence in such illegal conduct—in such cases t ere is no parity of delictum at all between the parties, and t e party so protected by the law, or so acting under compu sion, may, at any time, resort to the law for his remedy, __ ough the illegal transaction be completed.!
* 2 Douglas, 696, n. f Ib> 697> a< Nisi p6" 6 CaSeS co^ected in 2 Comyn on Contracts, 108-131; 1 Selwyn’s * 12] riltn 3 Phillips on Evidence, 119; 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, ’ > P-120; Chitty on Contracts, 550, 552, 553, and notes.
Now, in cases of bills, or other obligations, illegally issued by a banking or other private corporation, which has received the consideration therefor, it would enable them to commit a double wrong to hold that they might repudiate the illegal obligations, and also retain the proceeds. Hence, where the parties are not in pari delicto, actions are sustained to recover back the money or other consideration received for such obligations, though the obligations themselves, being against law, cannot be sued on. The corporation issuing the bills contrary to law, and against penal sanctions, is deemed more guilty than the members of the community who receive them whenever the receiving of them is not expressly prohibited. The latter are regarded as the persons intended to be protected by the law; and, if they have not themselves violated an express law in receiving the bills, the principles of justice require that they should be able to recover the money received by the bank for them. But if the parties are in pari delicto, as, if the consideration as well as the bills or other obligation is tainted with illegality or immorality, as it would be if loaned or advanced for the purpose of aiding in any illegal or immoral transaction, or if the receiving as well as passing or issuing the bills is forbidden by law, then the holder is without legal remedy, and the parties are left to themselves.
But, in the case of municipal and other public corporations, another consideration intervenes. They represent the public, and are themselves to be protected against the unauthorized acts of their officers and agents, when it can be done without injury to third parties. This is necessary in order to guard against fraud and peculation. Persons dealing with such officers and agents are chargeable with notice of the powers which the corporation possesses, and are to be held responsible accordingly. The issuing of bills as a currency by such a corporation without authority is not only contrary to positive law, but, being ultra vires, is an abuse of the public franchises which have been conferred upon it, and the receiver of the bills, being chargeable with notice of the wrong, is in pari delicto with the officers, and shoul [p. 357] have no remedy, even for money had and received, against the corporation upon which he has aided in inflicting the wrong. The protection of public corporations from such unauthorized acts of their officers and agents is a matter of public policy in which the whole community is concerned. And those who aid in such transactions must do so at their peril.
According to these principles no recovery could have been had against the city, either on the bills themselves or on a claim for money had and received. It was against the law of the State to issue them. It was a penal offence in both the person who paid and the person who received them, and they were issued by a municipal corporation which had no power, and which was known to have no power to issue them.
It was insisted further, however, that the legislature, in March, 1862, passed laws which authorized, and even required, the city to redeem these bills. But,
Secondly. The court found that these laws were passed by a legislature not recognized by the United States and in aid of the rebellion, and, therefore, that these notes were not made valid thereby.
The fact thus found, that the laws referred to were passed in aid of the rebellion, is conclusive on the subject. We have already decided, in Texas v. White,* and just now in the case of Hanauer v. Doane,] that a contract made in aid of the rebellion is void, and cannot be enforced in the courts of this country. The same rule would apply, with equal force, to a law passed in aid of the rebellion. Laws made for the preservation of public order, and for the regulation of business transactions between man and man, and not to aid or promote the rebellion, though made by a mere de facto government not recognized by the United States, would be so far recognized as to sustain the transactions which have taken place under them. But laws made to promote and aid the rebellion can never be recognized by, or receive the sanction
* 7 Wallace, 700. f The preceding case; supra, 342.
of, the courts of the United States as valid and binding laws. To recognize them as such would be derogatory to the dignity and authority of the government of the United States, and would be setting too light an estimate upon so great an offence.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access