Mail Co. v. Flanders, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 130
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Mail Co. v. Flanders, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 130
Full caption
Mail Company v. Flanders.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Mail Company v. Flanders.
1. The Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction under the act of March 12th, 1863, commonly known as the Abandoned and Captured Property Act, where both parties are citizens of the same State. 2. Although when a court has no jurisdiction it is in general irregular to make any order, except to dismiss the suit, that rule does not apply to the action of the court in setting aside such orders as had been made improperly before the want of jurisdiction was discovered, and restoring things to the state in which they were before the improper orders were made.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana; the case being this:
The act of March 12th, *1863, known as the Abandoned or Captured Property Act, directed that property abandoned or captured within the region lately in insurrection, should be turned over to agents of the Federal treasury, and by them sold at auction, and the proceeds paid into the treasury of the United States, &c. The act goes on to say:
“ Any person claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or captured property may prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims; and on proof to th« satisfaction of said court (1) of his ownership of said property, (2) of his right to the proceeds thereof, and (3) that he has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion, receive the residue of such proceeds.”
No special jurisdiction in the matter was given by this statute to the Circuit Courts, which if they had jurisdiction at all after the above-quoted provision from the statute, had it only under the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gives them (§ 11)jurisdiction where “the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State.”
With these statutes in force, the New Orleans Mail Company, a corporation of Louisiana, filed a bill in the nature of
* 12 Stat, at Large, 820.
Statement of the case.
a bill in equity, in the court below, against B. F. Flanders, a treasury agent, and one Fernandez, an auctioneer, both defendants, as appeared on the face of the pleadings, being citizens of Louisiana, setting forth that Flanders, pretending to proceed under the said Captured and Abandoned Property Act, had seized two steamboats, the one named Laurel Hill, the other Iberville, and that Fernandez, as auctioneer, was now about to sell them; and praying an injunction against the sale; praying also a writ of sequestration to the marshal, commanding him to keep the boats until the further order of the court. A preliminary injunction and a writ of sequestration were granted accordingly.
The defendant, Flanders, filed an “ answer and plea to the jurisdiction,” setting up that the steamers were captured property; that as such they had been delivered by the military authorities to him, as special agent of the treasury, under the act of Congress; and that he held the boats, and had advertised their sale, in his official capacity. He denied that the Circuit Court had any jurisdiction of the case made in the petition, on the ground that, by the act of March 12th, 1863, the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, the entire jurisdiction of that case was vested in the Court of Claims. He therefore prayed that the petition be dismissed.
The court entered a judgment thus:
“ For reasons orally assigned, it is ordered that the injunction herein sued out be made perpetual so far as the steamer Iberville is concerned, and that said steamer be restored to the plaintiffs.
“ But as regards the steamer Laurel Hill, considering that the court is without jurisdiction, it is further ordered that the injunction and sequestration be set aside and dismissed with costs, and that said steamer be turned over to B. F. Flanders, agent of the treasury department, as captured property.”
As this judgment was rendered “ for reasons orally assigned,” the grounds of this discrimination between the cases of the two vessels did not appear, nor the ground on which the court supposed it had any jurisdiction whatever p. 132182 Mail Company v. Flanders. [Sup. Ct.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
of the suit against the Iberville more than against the other.
From the judgment, in respect to the Laurel Hill, the mail company took this appeal. Of course, as the other vessel was restored to them by the judgment of the court, they had no ground of complaint against the decree in respect to her, and the other side not appealing, there could be no question as to the judgment given in respect to that vessel.
The case was submitted; Mr. Evarts declining to press the case for the appellant, as being a plain one against him.
Mr. Hoar, for the United States, represented here by the appellees.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Authority was conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury, by the act of the twelfth of March, 1863, to appoint special agents to receive and collect abandoned or captured property in any State or Territory designated as in insurrection, by the proclamation of the President issued on the first day of July in the preceding year. Such property, so received or collected, may be appropriated to public use on due appraisement and certificate thereof, or may be forwarded for sale within the loyal States as the public interest may require; and the farther provision is that all sales of the property shall be at auction to the highest bidder, and that the proceeds thereof shall be paid into the treasury.* Officers or privates in the army, and officers, sailors, or marines in the navy, are required by the sixth section of the act to turn over to an agent appointed under that act, ah property taken or received from persons in such insurrectionary districts, or which they have under their control; and the same section also provides that the agent receiving such property shall give a receipt for the same to the person from whom it was received.!
Two steamboats, to wit, the Laurel Hill and the Iberville, were captured by our military and naval forces at New Or*
* 12 Stat, at Large, 820. f lb. 821.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
leans, in the month of May, 1862, shortly after our military occupation of the city became complete. Carefully examined the proofs show that the Laurel Hill was captured on the eighth of May of that year, in Bayou Jacquot, a small bayou connected with Bayou Plaquemines, situated in the parish of Iberville, on the right bank of the river Mississippi, one hundred miles above the city of New Orleans, and at that time within the military lines of the Confederate army. Our military occupation of the city became complete on the sixth of May of that year, and the proofs show the Iberville was captured on the twenty-second of the same month while lying at Greenville, which is situated on the left bank of the river, four and a half miles above the city, but below Camp Parapet, and was at that time within our military lines.
Captured under the circumstances explained, the two steamboats remained in the custody or subject to the control of our military authorities until the twenty-first day of December, 1865, when the proper officer in charge of the same turned the captured steamers over to the respondent, B. F. Flanders, as the agent of the Treasury Department appointed under the first section of the before-mentioned act of Congress. Pursuant to authority conferred by the second section of the act, the respondent, Flanders, employed the other respondent as an auctioneer to sell the steamboats, and the latter, by virtue of his employment, advertised the same for sale at public auction.
Based on these facts the complainants and appellants, on the ninth of January, 1866, filed their bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States, and alleged that they were the lawful owners of the respective steamboats; that the respondents had no right, interest, or claim in the same, and that a sale of the same as proposed would be a violation of their rights as such owners. They brought the suit to prevent the sale of the steamboats as proposed in the advertisement, and they accordingly prayed for an injunction to that effect, and they also prayed for a writ of sequestration, to be directed to the marshal, commanding him to take the steamboats into his possession and to safely keep the same p. 134until the further order of the court. Accompanying the bill of complainant was an affidavit of merits, and the record shows that both writs were granted as prayed, the complainants giving bond to the respondents to pay all such damages as should be adjudged against them if the processes were wrongly obtained.
Service having been made, the respondent, Flanders, appeared and filed an answer. He alleged that the steamers were captured by our military and naval forces, as before explained, and that he held the same as special agent of the Treasury Department. Besides pleading to the merits as aforesaid, he denied the jurisdiction of the court, and also
prayed that the injunction might be dissolved and that the
bill of complaint might be dismissed. Testimony was taken,
but further reference to it is unnecessary, as all the facts
proved which are material in this investigation have already
been stated. None of the other proceedings in the suit are
of any importance in the present state of the controversy,
except the final decree, which was to the effect as follows:
(1) That the injunction in respect to the steamer Iberville
be made perpetual, and that the steamer be restored to the
complainants. (2) That the orders granting the writs of
injunction and sequestration in respect to the steamer Laurel
Hill be set aside, with costs, and that the steamer be restored
to the respondent, Flanders, as the special agent of the
Treasury Department.
Probably the decision in the matter of the steamer Iberville was placed upon the ground that the steamer was captured within our military lines subsequent to the publication of the proclamation issued by the commanding general at the headquarters of the army, announcing that “ all the rights of property, of whatever kind, will be held inviolate, subject only to the laws of the United States.”*
Much difficulty, to say the least, would have arisen in sustaining that part of the decree if the respondents had p. 135appealed to this court, as the presiding justice held that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, but inasmuch as that part of the decree was in favor of the appellants, and the respondents did not appeal, the error, if it be one, cannot be corrected. Correction of the error is not sought by the appellants, and it is well-settled law that no one but an appellant can be heard in an appellate court for the reversal of a decree rendered in the subordinate court.* Appellees may be heard in support of the decree, but not for reversal, as it is the privilege of both parties to appeal if they see fit and comply with the conditions prescribed by law.f Captured as the steamer Laurel Hill was, within the military lines of the Confederate army, the proclamation of our commanding general, before referred to, afforded no support to that part of the claim of the complainants, but the presiding justice being of the opinion that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, did not examine the merits of the controversy. Both parties, as appears on the face of the pleadings, are citizens of the same State, and upon that ground this court is of the opinion that the bill of complaint was properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction.|
*
The Venice, 2 Wallace, 276; The Circassian, 2 Id. 150.
Where the Circuit Court is without jurisdiction it is in general irregular to make any order in the cause except to dismiss the suit, but that rule does not apply to the action of the court in setting aside such orders as had been improperly made before the want of jurisdiction was discovered. Prior to that the court, on motion of the complainants, had granted an injunction and issued a writ of sequestration, on which latter writ the marshal had taken possession of the steamer and held it subject to the order of the court. Evidently those writs were improvidently issued, and the p. 136court having come to that conclusion set them aside and ordered the steamer restored to the custody in which it was when the writ of sequestration was served.
*
The Mary Ford, 3 Dallas, 198. t The Williawi Bagaley, 5 Wallace, 412; Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Id 196, Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Peters, 484; Stratton v. Jarvis, 8 Id. 4; Buckingham v. McLean, 13 Howard, 150; Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 3 Peters, 318. J 1 Stat, at Large, 78; Sullivan v. Fulton Steamboat Co., 6 Wheaton, 450; Piquignot v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 16 Howard, 104; Hornthall v. Collector, 9 Wallace, 560.
Decree affirmed.*
The Eutaw.
When a case is within the jurisdiction of the court, and there has been no defect in removing it from the subordinate court to this, the court will not dismiss the case on motion made out of the regular call of the docket.
Motion to dismiss an appeal; the case being thus:
In March, 1867, Harris, Howell & Co. libelled the steamer Eutaw, in the District Court at New York, for repairs, supplies, advances, and labor and services to the vessel, at Wilmington, N. C. The answer denied generally the allegations of the libel. A reference was made by consent to a master to ascertain and report the amount due; “ the same proof of the payment and propriety of payment of bills to be made as if before the court.” The master, after admissions or proofs heard, found $4140.94; one item of this sum being $1000 for “ commissions at 2| per cent.,” and this item being allowed on an allegation of a custom of maritime countries, and of which, as prevalent at Wilmington, specific proofs were given or attempted, in the shape of affidavits from commission merchants of that place, and otherwise in more formal shape. This item, unlike most of the charges, was apparently not admitted, though it was not attempted specifically to be «As-proved, it being left to be judged of on the record and the law. The respondents not excepting, so far as the record seemed to show, to this item of $1000, or to any other item found in the report, nor moving any correction nor objecting to confirmation, the report was confirmed in May, 1868, by the District Court. From that decree the respond-
* This decree was made at the last term.
Argument in favor of dismissal.
ents appealed in about two years afterwards (March 19th, 1870), to the Circuit Court, assigning error in a general allegation, “ that the said decree is erroneous inasmuch as the said libellants were not entitled to the damages claimed in the premisesand in the prayer for an appeal stating that on the appeal the appellant “ intended to make new allegations and introduce the same and new and further proofs.” In the Circuit Court, no new allegations being made of record, nor further proofs introduced, the case was argued and taken into advisement. As was said in the briefs of one side, and not contradicted in those of the other, the court on one hearing (before Nelson, J.), set aside the report or decree, though afterwards, on reargument (before Woodruff, J.), affirmed it. Nothing of this difference of view between the judges appeared on the record.
From this decree, made March 19th, 1870, the case was brought here by appeal two months afterwards and now stood No. 403, a number quite far on upon the list, and making the case, if left to be heard in ordinary course, not likely to be reached for a considerable time.
The 23d rule of this court declares:
“ In all cases where a writ of error shall delay the proceedings on the judgment of the inferior court, and shall appear to have been sued out merely for delay, damages shall be awarded at the rate of 10 per centum per annum on the amount of the judgment, and the said damages shall be calculated from the date of the judgment in the court below until the money is paid.”
Jfr. G. Donohoe, in support of his motion to dismiss:
No exception was taken to the proceedings or proof before the commissioner and none before the court against the report. No definite defence is set up in the answer. In order to allow an appeal or hearing on it, the appealing party should point out specifically what the defence is, and what he objects to.*
To adopt any other rule would be to allow a party to let
*
Commauder-in-Chief, 1 Wallace, 43
Argument against dismissal.
a decree go against him, in fact stand by and tacitly admit the claim, and then, when he had misled the court and counsel, attempt on some defect of evidence, or, in fact, on evidence not returned or accidentally omitted, to raise points not raised before. The court will not even hear by consent points not raised on the record.*
The appeal being evidently for delay, and there being no point really taken on the record, the case should be affirmed for want of a point to argue, or dismissed with costs. The ten per cent, damages given by the 22d rule for such appeals, while in part a punishment to the appellant, do not pay the appellee in what he suffers by them. He has to pay counsel and be out of his money. Such appeals, on the contrary, are disastrous to business men.
Mr. T. M. Wheeler, contra:
The reference required “ the same proof of payment, and propriety of payment of bills to be made, as if made before the court.”
It is not necessary to take an exception to the report of the commissioner.f
The appeal to the Circuit Court does point out an error, “ in saying that the decree of the District Court is erroneous, inasmuch as the libellants were not entitled to the damages claimed in the premises.” The error will appear from an examination of the record.
The court will not, on this motion, examine the merits of the case. That there is good ground for appeal is evident from the fact that two judges of the Circuit Court differed in opinion. The record will show that some of the payments were not legally proved, and that payment of some of the bills was not proper, and that therein the report did not conform to the order of reference. The item for commission on the cargo, amounting to $1000, is among the class of which we speak. It was not properly proved and is not p. 139a legal charge. On thia point the appellant has a right to be heard by this court. It would not now be proper to make an argument nor would the court hear it on this motion.
*
Bradstreet v. Potter, 16 Peters, 817. f Murray v. Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 64; Himely v. Bose, 5 Id 318.
Reply. Nothing should be on the calendar that does not contain points to argue. It misleads parties lower on the calendar and will render uncertain the date of argument of cases having merits; for no one but the appellant, in cases like the present one, can tell whether it is intended to argue them or not when called. The class will increase when once tolerated, and the thing will end in the calendar of this tribunal being put, like the calendars of some of our State courts now are, beyond the control of the court.
The only reason the case was before two judges below was, that neither before the first nor the second judges did the appellant in the circuit submit any points or make any argument; he simply submitted his record, as he did in the district, and left the court, as he does here, to find an excuse for non-payment.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Cases regularly on the calendar, whether brought here by writ of error or appeal, if within the jurisdiction of the court are required to be heard when reached in the regular call of the docket, and they cannot be heard before they are reached except when they are advanced by the order of the court.
Where the case is one not within the jurisdiction of the court the writ of error or appeal may be dismissed on motion, and certain defects in removing the cause from the subordinate court into this court entitle the party who prevailed in the court below to the same remedy.
Motions to dismiss are non-enumerated motions, and they niay be filed by leave of court in any case on the calendar before the case is reached in the regular call of the docket, and they are entitled to preference on Friday in each week during the sitting of the court, as provided in the twenty-
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
seventh rule, but they do not give either party any right to be heard upon the merits of the controversy.
On the ninth of March, 1867, the appellees filed the libel in the District Court against the appellants, as the owners of the steamer Eutaw, her engine, tackle, apparel, &c., in a cause of action founded upon contract civil and maritime. By the se'cond article of the libel it is alleged that the steamer belonged to the port of New York, that she was engaged in the coasting trade, that in the months of November and December prior to the filing of the libel she was in the port of Wilmington, North Carolina, and that she was in need of supplies, repairs, advances, and necessaries for her voyage; that the master of the steamer applied to the libellants to make such repairs and to furnish such supplies and advances, and that they, the libellants, complied with the request, and that there is due to them for such repairs, supplies, and advances, the sum of four thousand dollars. They also alleged that the repairs, supplies, and advances were necessary and proper to render the steamer seaworthy and fit to perform her intended voyage, and that the same were furnished on the credit of the steamer as well as of the master and owners.
Process was served and the first-named respondent appeared and filed an answer, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other respondent with whom he was impleaded, denying all the allegations of the libel. Subsequent to the filing of the answer an order was passed referring the cause to a master to ascertain and report the amount due to the libellants. Testimony was taken on both sides and the parties were heard and the master reported that there was due to the libellants the sum of four thousand one hundred and forty dollars and ninety-four cents for the repairs, supplies, and advances made and furnished, as alleged in the libel. No exceptions were taken by either party to the report of the master, and on the ninth of May, 1868, the District Court confirmed the report and entered a final decree in favor of the libellants for that amount.
Dissatisfied with the decree, the respondent appealed to the Circuit Court, where the parties were again heard upon the same testimony. Apparently they were heard without any new reference of the cause and upon the general allegation of the appellant that the decree was erroneous and that the libellants were not entitled to the damages claimed in the libel and decree. Different conclusions, however, were formed by the circuit judge, as he adjudged that the decree of the District Court should be affirmed with costs, and it is from that decree that the original respondent appealed to this court.
Referring to the record, it appears that the decree in the Circuit Court was entered on the nineteenth of March, 1870, and the appeal was taken to this court on the nineteenth of May following. Such an appeal is not a supersedeas, but it cannot be dismissed, because no question is raised or presented in the record for the decision of this court.
Appeals are subject to the same rules, regulations, and restrictions as are prescribed in law in case of writs of error, and it is well-settled law that it is no sufficient cause to dismiss a writ of error that the record does not present any question of law for the revision of this court, as the writ of error when sued out under the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act brings up the whole record, and it is the right of the plaintiff in error to be heard and have an opportunity to show, if he can, that there is error in any part of the record.*
When a cause is brought here upon a writ of error sued out under that section, and all the proceedings are regular and correct, the judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, but the cause cannot be dismissed although there is no question presented in the record for revision, f
Apply that rule to the case before the court and it is clear that the motion must be denied, and it is equally
Minor et al. v. Tillotson, 1 Howard, 288; 2 Stat, at Large, 244. Taylor v. Morton, 2 Black, 484; Suydam v. Williamson, 20 Howard
clear that appeals in that respect are subject to the same rules, regulations, and restrictions as are prescribed in law in case of writs of error. Appeals of the kind are usually regarded as brought for delay, and it may become necessary to amend the second article of the twenty-third rule so that ten per cent, damages shall be allowed in addition to the interest provided for in the first article of that rule.
Motion denied.
Bigler v. Waller.
On a bill filed in the Circuit Court for Virginia, against A. and B., the administrators of both were substituted on the record as defendants; A. and B. themselves having died after the bill was filed, and suggestion of their deaths being made. In this state the cause was heard and judgment given for the defendants. The complainant appealed to this court, the appeal bond and the citation referring, however, throughout, to A. and B. as defendants in the case, and not referring in any way to their suggested deaths and the substitution of wtheir administrators. J. A. I., signing himself “ counsel for the defendants in this cause in the Circuit Court of the United States for Virginia,” acknowledged service of the citation.
On motion in this court to dismiss, the court acknowledging the obvious irregularity of both bond and citation, yet held,
1. That the acceptance by the counsel, J. A. I., in the circumstantial language above quoted, was a waiver of the irregularity in the citation.
2. That the irregularity, as respected the bond, did not necessarily exact a dismissal, which was accordingly ordered, only unless the appellant filed a sufficient appeal bond, in the usual form, within ten days, in the same sum as that required on the allowance of the appeal.
Motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction an appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia; the case being thus:
James Bigler filed a bill in the court below against William Waller and Robert Saunders. Pending the suit, Saunders died, and his death being suggested, a scire facias to revive the cause was issued, and returned executed on one Harrell, p. 143his administrator. The death of the defendant, Waller, was also afterwards suggested, and one W. G. Waller, administrator on his estate, moved for leave to appear and defend the suit. The court, accordingly, on the 3d of June, 1870, ordered that the suit should proceed against the said Harrell, and the said W. G. Waller, administrators, as already mentioned. In this state of the cause it was heard, and a decree given that Bigler, the complainant, pay to the said W. G. Waller, administrator of William Waller, a sum of money specified, and to the several defendants their costs. From that decree Bigler took an appeal to this court; the appeal being taken in assumed conformity to the second section of the Judiciary Act, which gives an appeal from the Circuit Court to this court, “ the citation being signed by a judge, &c., and the adverse party having at least thirty days’ notice.” And which further says:
“And every justice or judge signing a citation, &c., shall take good and sufficient security that the plaintiff in error shall prosecute his writ.”
By the already mentioned Judiciary or other acts of Congress, the appeal, if taken within a time limited (security being given in like manner), operates as a supersedeas. Prefixed to the appeal bond which Bigler, the appellant, gave in this case, were these words:
“SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
James Bigler
v. >
William Waller and Robert Saunders, j
Bond on appeal.”
The bond itself purported to be “given to the above-named William Waller and Robert Saunders in the sum of $20,000,” and was with a condition, reciting that “ the above-named James Bigler had prosecuted an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States to reverse the decree rendered in the above entitled suit by the Supreme Court of the United States” The
Argument in favor of dismissal.
condition of the bond was, that “ the above-named James Bigler shall prosecute his said appeal to effect, and answer all damages and costs if he shall fail to make good his plea.”
The citation was directed “ to William Waller and Robert Saunders” and imported that they were to appear pursuant to an appeal, “ wherein James Bigler is plaintiff and you are defendants.” On the citation was this indorsement:
“I hereby acknowledge service of the within citation.
“James Alfred Jones,
“ Counsel for the defendants In this cause in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Virginia."
In this court the appearance had been special.
Mr, Conway Robinson, in support of the motion:
1. There has been no proper citation to the “adverse party.” It was directed “to William Waller and Robert Saunders,” and therefore was without effect;* for both of the parties cited were dead, and appeared by the record to be dead before the decree. Nor has there been any waiver; the indorsement by Mr. Jones, who had been counsel for those who were defendants in the Circuit Court, not being intended as waiver, nor amounting to such; and there being no waiver by the counsel in the Supreme Court, where the appearance was, but a special one.
2. Neither had “ good and sufficient security” been taken, for the instrument was void by the common law, since both the persons named as obligees were dead, and appeared by the record to be dead before the decree.
After Catlett v. Brodie,} it was in one case said that “ the mode of taking the security, and the time of perfecting it, are matters of discretion to be regulated by the court granting the appeal.”^ ®subsequently where it appeared “ that no appeal bond was taken or approved by the judge signing the citation,” the appeal was dismissed.§ Other cases sup*
*
2
Boyce, &c., v. Grundy, 6 Peters, 777.
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
port this conclusion, where the appeal operates as a supersedeas.* In 1853, the court referring to the language above quoted from the Dos Hermanos said :f
“ This cannot apply to a case where the appeal operates as a supersedeas. It must be brought strictly within the provisions of the law.”
3. Even if the appeal be not dismissed, it should not be allowed to operate as a supersedeas when there has not been taken “ good and sufficient security ” by a proper bond.X Such terms should be imposed on the appellant as under the circumstances appear proper. There should at least be an order for the dismissal of the appeal, unless within such time as the court may prescribe there be given a proper bond with good and sufficient security.
Mr, W. F. Mattingly, contra,
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
The record shows that the appellant, on the fourteenth of June, 1866, instituted a suit in equity in the Circuit Court against William Waller and Robert Saunders, for the cause of action set forth in the bill of complaint. Among other things he alleged that he entered into an agreement in writing with William Waller for the purchase of certain real estate lying in the county of York and State of Virginia; that the said respondent, on the 10th of May, 1853, executed to the complainant a deed of the said real estate, and that the complainant, on the same day, made the cash payment as stipulated in the agreement, and gave to the respondent, at the same time, his obligation to pay the balance of the purchase-money at the times therein specified; that on the twenty-second of June, in the same year, the complainant
*
Stafford et al. v. Union Bank, 16 Howard, 140. t Adams, &c., v. Law, 16 Howard, 148. t Catlett v. Brodie, 9 Wheaton, 653; Stafford, &c., v. Union Bank, 1® toward, 140; Adams, &c., v. Law, Id. 148. ▼01. xu. 10
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
executed to the other respondent a trust deed of the prem« ises to secure the balance of the consideration which he agreed to pay for the real estate, as stipulated in that obligation; that he went into possession, made valuable improvements, and continued to make the stipulated payments until April, 1861, when the war broke out, and he was compelled to leave the State; that after he left the State, Waller authorized the other respondent, as such trustee, to make sale of the real estate, and the complainant alleges that the trustee effected the sale without publishing the notice required by the terms of the deed of trust, and that he satisfied the said obligation out of the proceeds of the sale, and has failed to account to the complainant for the balance of the proceeds; that Waller became the purchaser of the real estate at that sale; that he immediately took possession of the same, together with certain personal property of great value belonging to the complainant; that he sold the same and converted the proceeds to his own use, and applied the same to the payment of the balance due on the said obligation; that he also rented the real estate and received large sums of money as rents; that he, the complainant, subsequently succeeded, through the aid of our military authorities, in recovering possession of the real estate, but that he found it in a ruinous condition; that since that time, to wit, on the eleventh of November, 1865, Waller instituted a suit against him on the said obligation in the Supreme Court of the City and County of New York, to recover what he claims to be due thereon; that subsequently the other respondent posted up, in the county where the real estate is situated, a notice “ that he would, at the request of said Waller, in a few weeks, sell said real estate.”
Based on these and other similar allegations the charge is made that Waller may induce the trustee so to act in regard to the sale of the premises as to cheat and defraud the complainant; therefore he prays that the trustee may be enjoined from selling the said real estate, and that the said Waller may be enjoined from assigning his interest in the said obb' gation until the suit in the Supreme Court of the City and
Restatement of the case in the opinion.
County of New York is determined, and for an account, and that the respondents may be required to deliver up all deeds and papers in their possession concerning said sale.
Suffice it to say, without entering into details, that such proceedings were had that a decree was entered that the appellant should pay to William G. Waller, administrator of William Waller, deceased, the sum of seventeen thousand three hundred and seventy-seven dollars in coin, and costs, to the defendants.
Dissatisfied with that decree the complainant appealed to this court, which is the case involved in the motion.
Pending the suit here the appellees have appeared specially and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal upon two grounds: (1) Because the citation is addressed to the original parties, one or both of whom deceased before the final decree. (2) Because the bond given to prosecute the appeal is executed to a deceased respondent and not to the administrator in whose favor the decree was entered.
Undoubtedly the citation is irregular, as it should be addressed to the actual parties to the suit at the time the appeal was allowed and prosecuted. Where a party dies before the appeal is allowed and prosecuted the suit should be revived in the subordinate court, and the citation, as matter of course, should be addressed to the proper party in the record at that time.
Notice is required by law, and where none is given and the failure to comply with the requirement is not waived, the appeal or writ of error must be dismissed, but the defect may be waived in various ways, as by consent or appearance or the fraud of the other party. Service of the citation may be made upon the attorney of record of the proper party.* Unquestionably the attorney of record may also waive service, and acknowledge notice on the citation, as in that behalf he represents the party.f
On the citation in this case is the following indorsement: p. 148“ I hereby acknowledge service of the within citation. James Alfred Jones, counsel for the defendants in this cause in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Virginia.”
*
Bacon et al. v. Hart, 1 Black, 38. t Grosvenor v. Danforth, 16 Massachusetts, 74; Adams v. Robinson, 1 Pickering, 461.
Viewed in any reasonable light it seems to the court that the attorney knew that the appeal was allowed by the court and was prosecuted by the appellant, which is the only purpose intended to be effected by the citation. Having been counsel in the cause the party signing that certificate must have known that the suit had been revived, as that proceeding took place before the final decree was entered. Such a service would be sufficient beyond all doubt if there had been no error in the form of the citation, and as that objection is merely a formal one we are all of the opinion that it must be considered as waived by the circumstantial language of the certificate signed without objection by the attorney of record in the Circuit Court.
2. Appeals from decrees of the Circuit Court to this court are allowed where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and the provision is that such appeals shall be subject to the same rules, regulations, and restrictions as are prescribed in law in case of writs of error.*
Good and sufficient security must be taken by every justice or judge who signs the citation, that the plaintiff in error shall prosecute his writ to effect and answer all damages and costs if he fail to make his plea good; and in order that the writ of error may operate as a supersedeas and stay execution the writ must be served by a copy thereof being lodged for the adverse party, in the clerk’s office where the record remains, within ten days, Sundays exclusive, after the judgment was rendered or the decree was passed.! Such a service is not required in an appeal, but the requirement ;s that the appeal must be taken and allowed, in cases where it is required to be allowed, within the same period of time, and
* 2 Stat, at Large 244. f 1 Stat- at LarSe’ 85, p. 149in both cases, that is whether the cause is removed by writ of error or by appeal, the plaintiff in error or the appellant must give the required security within the ten days, Sundays exclusive, in order that the writ of error or appeal may operate as a supersedeas. “ What is necessary is that the security be sufficient, and when it is desired to make the appeal a supersedeas the security must be given within ten days from the rendering of the decree.”* Unless taken within the ten days an appeal cannot be made to operate as a supersedeas, but a party appealing within that time may not desire that the appeal shall have that effect, and in that event all that can be required of him is that he shall give good and sufficient security for costs, including “just damages for delay.”!
Argument to show that the bond in this case is irregular and defective is unnecessary, as it is clear that it should be given to the opposite party or parties in the suit, but it does not-follow, by any means, that the appeal must be dismissed. On the contrary, it is the constant practice of the court to allow such defects to be obviated by granting leave to the appellant or plaintiff in error to file a new bond within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, in view of all the circumstances when the application is made.J
Even if the appeal is not dismissed it is suggested by the appellees that it should not be allowed to continue to operate as a supersedeas, because the appeal bond or the required “good and sufficient security” was not given within the ten days from the date of the decree, but it is a sufficient answer to that suggestion at this time to say that no such question is before the court. Such a question may arise hereafter, but the decision of the court at present is that the motion to dismiss must be granted unless the appellant file a sufficient appeal bond in the usual form within ten days in the same sum as that required by the Chief Justice who allowed the appeal.
t Bule 32; 1 Stat, at Large, 404. t The Dos Hermanos, 10 Wheaton, 306; Brobst v. Brobst, 2 Wallace, 96.
Leave is granted to the appellees to file such a bond, but the court does not decide what the effect will be nor that it is or is not competent for this court in such a case to grant a supersedeas, as no such application is before the court.