St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423
Case details
Bluebook Citation
St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423
Full caption
St. Louis v. The Ferry Company.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
St. Louis v. The Ferry Company.
The ferry-boats of a corporation incorporated in one State, and carrj mg passengers, &c., forward and back across a river to a city situated in another State, are not taxable under a law taxing boats “ within the city,” in a case where the relation of the boats to the city was simply that of contact, as one of the termini of their voyage; and the place where they were laid up when not in use, and where their pilots and engineers resided, and where the real estate of the corporation including a warehouse was situated, was on the opposite shore and in another State. This is not altered by the facts that the boats were enrolled in pursuance of our navigation acts at the city; that the ferry company had an office there; that its president, vice-president, and other principal officers lived there; that the stockholders mainly resided there, and none in the State opposite; that there the ordinary business meetings of the p. 424directors were held, and its moneys received and disbursed, aid the corporate seal kept.
Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Missouri.
A statute of Missouri enacts that “ shares of stock and all other interests held in steamboats, keel-boats, wharf-boats, and all other vessels,” shall be taxable for State purposes; and by its charter the city of St. Louis has authority to tax all property within the city, so taxable.
In this state of statutory enactment the city authorities of St. Lotiis laid a tax on the value of all ferry-boats used by the Wiggins Ferry Company, in ferrying passengers and cargo on the Mississippi River, between the city of St. Louis, Missouri, and East St. Louis, in Illinois, on the opposite shore. The ferry company refused to pay the tax, on the ground that these boats were not “ property within the city,” and the question was whether they were so or not.
The case as found by the court below (to which it had been submitted under the act of March 3d, 1865),* was this:
The ferry company was incorporated by the laws of Illinois, and had its principal office in St. Louis, Missouri. There its president, vice-president, treasurer, superintendent, and other chief officers resided; there the ordinary business meetings of the directors were held, and there the seal of the corporation was kept. The company’s minor officers, such as engineers and pilots on its ferry-boats, resided in Illinois, opposite the city of St. Louis, where its real estate was situated, also its warehouse and some other property. The ferry-boats, when not in actual use, were laid up by the Illinois shore, and were forbidden, by a general ordinance of the city of St. Louis regulating ferries and ferry-boats, to remain at the St. Louis wharf or landing longer than ten minutes at a time. The city exacted from the company an annual ferry license, which was paid. It permitted the company to erect landing or wharf-boats at its wharf or public landing, for the convenience and exclusive use of its p. 425ferry-boats, for which wharf-boats the city charged the company a stipulated annual wharfage, which was also paid. The company was assessed and taxed for the value of these wharf-boats within the city limits, in addition to the ferry license and wharfage.
*
The reader wjio does not recall the provisions of this act may see them supra, towards the bottom of page 141.
The stockholders of the ferry company resided mainly in St. Louis. Some, however, resided in Ohio, some in New York, and some elsewhere, but none in Illinois. The meetings of the company as a corporation for the election of directors had been generally held in Illinois, but the meetings of the directors for the election of its officers and appointment of its employees had been generally held in St. Louis, Missouri. All the principal business of the company done by its directors, superintendent, and other agents, had been transacted in St. Louis. The money collected and received by it for ferriages and other dues were kept in St. Louis, and the books of the company were kept there, and some of the disbursements of the company were there made by its treasurer. The personal property belonging to the company, assessed for taxes by the city, for which these suits were brought, consisted solely of its already mentioned ferry-boats. On these as well as on its other property it was duly assessed in Illinois, and paid taxes there. The ferry-boats were enrolled at St. Louis under the laws of the United States; that is to say, under the acts of 1789 and 1792, which require every vessel to be registered in the district to which she belongs, and declare that her home port shall be that at or near to which her owner resides.
Upon this same state of facts, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in The City of St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Company* had adjudged that the company was bound to pay the tax.
The court below decided that the ferry company, being a corporation created by the State of Illinois, and the ferry-boats not being within the limits of St. Louis except as they habitually touched at its wharf for the delivery of passengers and cargo, was not taxable for its boats by the city, as prop
* 40 Missouri, 580.
erty within it. The fact that the principal business office of the company was in St. Louis, and that the ferry-boats were enrolled at the port of St. Louis, under the United States laws, did not, as the court below considered, essentially change the case. Judgment having been accordingly entered for the ferry company, the city excepted to the law as declared by the court upon the facts, and tendered its bill of exceptions, which was signed and sealed.
Mr. J. M. Krum, for the plaintiff in error:
Were these boats “within the city” of St. Louis? That is the only question in the case.
The enrolment at the port of St. Louis is not indeed conclusive as to the situs of the property. It may but indicate the domicile or home port of the vessels, but it is a circumstance to be considered in connection with the other facts in determining the question at issue.
What are these other facts ? The managers of the boats resided in St. Louis, and there received and disbursed the earnings of the boats, keeping their office there, and the ferry company itself keeping its principal office there. These facts, taken in connection with the fact that the boats had already been enrolled at the last-named port, lead to the conclusion that the property was “ within ” the city of St. Louis. It is manifest that all the practical, life-giving, and fiscal operations of this corporation were performed within the city of St. Louis. There was its head and the centre of its operations.
The payment of the tax in Illinois neither proves nor tends to prove that the situs of the property was in that State. Nor does the payment of a ferry-license to the city of St. Louis and of a wharfage tax on the wharf-boats of the company show anything contrary to our view. These are matters foreign to the question.
The question now before this court was adjudicated in The City of St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Company. The facts in that case were the same as in this'. That decision is a decision of the court of last resort of Missouri, construiig
Argument against the tax.
and giving effect to its laws in respect to property situate within and owned or claimed by a resident of the State. The refusal of the court below to conform its judgment to the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri is good ground for reversing the judgment in this case.
Messrs. M. Blair and F. A. Dick, contra:
The boats were not “ within the city.”
A corporation actually and permanently resides within the State by whose law it is created; and there has the legal status of a citizen and inhabitant of such State, where only its stockholders can assemble and act as one body.*
The officers and agents of the company who actually remain with and control the boats do not reside in Missouri, “ but opposite the city of St. Louis, where its real estate is situated, also its warehouse and some other property.” The boats when not running are laid up at the same place; and it is contrary to the city ordinance concerning ferry-boats, when on the St. Louis side, that they remain there “ longer than ten minutes at a time.” The point of departure on each trip of the boats was from the port where she was laid up and at rest. To that port each boat returned, and when it so returned, and not until then, was such trip at an end. Under such a state of facts there is no room for a constructive presence in St. Louis or a constructive possession of the boats by the general or fiscal officers of the company.
The home port of a vessel, when owned by one person, is that at or near which the owner usually resides; and this is not changed by her enrolment at another port, especially when the first-named port is not a port of enrolment. This company, as we have said, being created by Illinois, resides there, f
But there are higher grounds on which to rest the unlawulness of the tax. It is imposed upon a National vessel engaged in commerce between two of the States on a navigable
Insurance Co. v. Francis, supra, 210.
How^^d ^a*e’ Newberry, 808; Hays v. Pacific Steamship Co., 17 p. 428river. Vessels so engaged are subject only to National taxes and regulations, and are expressly withdrawn from State taxation. A tonnage tax is simply a tax upon vessels, and belongs exclusively to the National government under the provisions giving power to Congress to collect taxes and duties and to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States; and having belonged to the States before the adoption of the Constitution, was surrendered by them in the clause saying that “ no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage.” [The learned counsel went into a full argument on this point.]
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the ppinion of the court.
The plaintiff in error instituted five suits in the St. Louis Circuit Court for the recovery of taxes alleged to be due from the ferry company to the city. Upon the petition of the company they were removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for that district. In that court, by the consent of the parties, the causes were consolidated and thereafter proceeded to trial as one case. The counsel upon both sides entered into a written stipulation waiving a jury, and the cause was submitted to the court, pursuant to the act of Congress of March 3d, 1865. The court found the facts specially, and the finding is a part of the record. Judgment was given for the defendant. The city excepted and has brought the case here for review.
The bill of exceptions was unnecessary. The facts having been specially found by the court, they are before us for examination as if they were embodied in the special verdict of a jury. The question presented for our consideration, as prescribed by the statute, is, whether they are sufficient to support the judgment. The bill of exceptions gives them no effect which they would not have had without it, and raises no question which would not have been as well presented if it had not been taken.
The controversy relates to taxes imposed by the city upon the ferry-boats of the defendants, used in conveying freight
Dec. 1870.] St. Louis v. The Ferry Company. 42G
and passengers across the Mississippi River between the city of St. Louis and the opposite Illinois shore. The company was required to pay a specific sum for a license, and a tax was imposed upon its wharf-boat, attached to the city landing. Both were duly paid. Payment of the taxes upon the ferry-boats was refused, and the several suits, consolidated into the one before us, were instituted by the city to recover the amount claimed to be due.
In the jurisprudence of th,e United States a corporation is regarded as in effect a citizen of the State which created it. It has no faculty to emigrate. It can exercise its franchises extra-territorially only so far as may be permitted by the policy or comity of other sovereignties. By the consent, express or implied, of the local government, it may transact there any business not ultra vires, and, “ like a natural person, may have a special or constructive residence, so as to be charged with taxes and duties or be subjected to a special jurisdiction.”* It is for the local sovereign to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which its presence by its agents and the conducting of its affairs shall be permitted.!
It has been said that the power of taxation for the purposes of the commonwealth is a part of all governmental sovereignty and is inseparable from it. It is for the legislature to decide what persons and property shall be reached by the exercise of this function and in what proportions and by what processes and instrumentalities taxes shall be assessed and collected. The authority extends over all persons and property within the sphere of its territorial jurisdiction. Wnen called into activity there can be no limit to the degree of its exercise except what is found in the wisdom of the lawmaking power and the operation of those conservative principles which lie at the foundation of all free government.!
*
Glaize v. South Carolina Railroad Co., 1 Strobhart, 72; Cromwell’s Executors ». Charleston Insurance and Trust Co., 2 Richardson, 512. t Bank of Augusta». Earle, 13 Peters, 588; Lafayette Insurance Co. v French, 18 Howard, 405 t McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 428; Providence Bank n billings, 4 Peters, 563.
Where there is jurisdiction neither as to person nor property, the imposition of a tax would be ultra oires and void. If the legislature of a State should enact that the citizens or property of another State or country should be taxed in the same manner as the persons and property within its own limits and subject to its authority, or in any other manner whatsoever, such a law would be as much a nullity as if in conflict with the most explicit constitutional inhibition. Jurisdiction is as necessary to valid legislative as to valid judicial action.
In the eye of the law personal property, for most purposes, has no locality. Mobilia sequuntur personam; immobilia sitwn. Mobilia non habent sequelam. In a qualified sense it accompanies the owner wherever he goes, and he may deal with it and dispose of it according to the law of his domicile. If he die intestate, that law, wheresoever the property may be situate, governs its disposal, and fixes the rights and shares of the several distributees.* But this doctrine is not allowed to stand in the way of the taxing power in the locality where the property has its actual situs, and the requisite legislative jurisdiction exists. Such property is undoubtedly liable to taxation there in all respects as if the proprietor were a resident of the same locality.f The personal property of a resident at the place of his residence is liable to taxation, although he has no intention to become domiciled there.J Whether the personal property of a resident of one State situate in another can be taxed in the former, is a question which in this case we are not called upon to decide.§
Upon looking into the enactments under which the taxes in question were assessed, it is obvious that their purpose
. p. 431was not to tax the property through the proprietor, but to tax the things themselves by reason of their being “ within the city.” The point for us to decide, therefore, is, whether they are covered by the legal provisions under which the taxes were imposed. If the taxing officer acted without authority the taxes were invalid, and the city is not entitled to recover in this action.
*
Story’s Conflict of Laws, § 379; Broom’s Maxims, 501, 502; In re Ewin, 1 Crompton & Jervis, 156. f International Life Assurance Company v. Commissioners of Taxes, 2 Barbour, 318; Hoyt v. The Commissioners, 23 Id. 228; Story’s Conflict of Laws, 550. + Finley ». Philadelphia, 32 Pennsylvania State, 381. g Wilson v. The Mayor of New York, 4 E. D. Smith, 678 : Hoyt v. The Commissioners, 23 New York (Court of Appeals), 228.
The boats were enrolled at the city of St. Louis, but that throws no light upon the subject of our inquiry. The act of 1789, section 2,* and the act of 1792, section 3,f re-, quire every vessel to be registered in the district to which she belongs, and the fourth section of the former act, and the third section of the latter, declares that her home port shall be that at or near which her owner resides. The solution of the question, where her home port is, when it arises, depends wholly upon the locality of her owner’s residence, and not upon the place of her enrolment.^
The company has an office in Illinois. Its minor officers, such as engineers and pilots, lived in Illinois, where its real estate, including a warehouse, was situated. The company had also an office in St. Louis. Its president and vice-president and other principal officers lived in the city, and there the ordinary business meetings of the directors were held, and the corporate seal was kept. The court found that the boats, “ when not in actual use, were laid up by the Illinois shore, and were forbidden, by a general ordinance of the city of St. Louis regulating ferries and ferry-boats, to remain at the St. Louis wharf or landing longer than ten minutes at a time.” A tax was paid upon the boats in Illinois. Their relation to the city was merely that of contact there, as one of the termini of their transit across the river in the prosecution of their business. The time of such contact was imited by the city ordinance. Ten minutes was the maximum of the stay they were permitted to make at any one tune. The owner was, in the eye of the law, a citizen of
* 1 Stat, at Large, 55. + lb. 287. t 3 Kent, 133, 170; Hill The Golden Gate, Newberry, 308; S. B. Su P®nor, lb. 181; Jordan v. Young, 37 Maine, 276.
that State, and from the inherent law of its nature could not emigrate or become a citizen elsewhere. As the boats were laid up on the Illinois shore when not in use, and the pilots and engineers who ran them lived there, that locality, under the circumstances, must be taken to be their home port. They did not so abide within the city as to become incorporated with and form a part of its personal property.* Hence they were beyond the jurisdiction of the authorities by which the taxes were assessed, and the validity of the taxes cannot be maintained.f In our opinion, the facts found are sufficient to support the judgment.
It has been insisted ably and learnedly by the counsel for the defendant in error, that the taxes in question are taxes upon the tonnage of vessels engaged in interstate commerce, and are prohibited by the Constitution of the United States. No argument as to this aspect of the case has been submitted by the counsel upon the other side. We have not found it necessary to consider the subject, and we express no opinion upon it. Judgment affirmed.
United States v. Howell.
1. The sixth section of the act of February 25th, 1862, to punish the conn terfeiting of treasury notes is not void for repugnancy in its reference to uttering or passing such counterfeited notes. 2. Nor is an indictment pursuing the language of the statute bad because it describes the note passed by the prisoner as a false, forged, and counterfeit note of the United States, issued under the authority of that statute or of other statutes authorizing the issue of such notes. 8. The words “false, forged, and counterfeit,” necessarily imply that the instrument so characterized is not genuine, but only purports to be, or is in the similitude of such an instrument, and this implication is according to good usage and is supported by adjudged cases.
On a certificate of division between the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of California.
f Bail road Company v. Jackson, 7 Wallace, 262.
Howell was indicted for passing counterfeit treasury notes, under the sixth section of the act of February 25th, 1862,* which provides:
“That if any person or persons shall falsely make, forge, counterfeit, or alter, or cause or procure to be falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered, or shall willingly aid or assist in falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, or altering any note, bond, coupon, or other security issued under the authority of this act, or heretofore issued under acts to authorize the issue of treasury notes or bonds; or shall pass, utter, publish, or sell., or attempt to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or bring into the United States from any foreign place, with intent to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or shall have or keep in possession, or conceal with intent to utter, publish or sell, any such false, forged, counterfeited, or altered note, bond, coupon, or other security, with intent to defraud any body corporate or politic, or any other person or persons whatsoever, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine not exceeding $5000 and by imprisonment and confinement to hard labor not exceeding fifteen years, according to the aggravation of the offence.”
The indictment contained two counts.
The first count charges that the defendant “ feloniously did pass, utter, publish, and sell, a certain false, forged, and counterfeited United States note, purporting to be a United States note issued under the authority of” said act, with intent to defraud, &c., well knowing the same to be false, forged, and counterfeited.
The second charged that the defendant “ feloniously did pass, utter, publish, and sell, a certain false, forged, and counterfeited treasury note, issued under the authority of” said act, with intent to defraud, &c., well knowing the same to be false, forged, and counterfeited.
Demurrer to the indictment and joinder. Afterwards, on argument, the following questions occurred:
“ 1. Whether the second count in the indictment, in manner and form as therein stated, is in itself repugnant.
* 12 Stat, at Large, 347.
VOL. XL
Argument against the statute.
“2. Whether the sixth section of the act is repugnant; and whether any person could, under the said act, be legally convicted of and punished for any offence whatever other than that of altering, and causing and procuring to be altered, and willingly aiding and assisting in altering a note, bond, coupon, or other security issued under authority of said act.
“ 3. Whether the fourth paragraph or clause of the sixth section of the act, which is in the words following, to wit:
“ ‘ Or shall pass, utter, publish, or sell, or attempt to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or bring into the United States from any foreign place, with intent to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or shall have or keep in possession, or conceal, with intent to utter, publish or sell, any such false, forged, counterfeited or altered note, bond, coupon, or other security, with intent to defraud, ’
&c., is repugnant.
“ 4. Whether the defendant could, under the said fourth paragraph or clause, be legally convicted of and punished for uttering or passing a forged or counterfeit note purporting to be a United States or treasury note issued under authority of said act.
“ 5. Whether he could, under the said fourth paragraph or clause, be legally convicted of and punished for any offence whatever, other than ‘ passing, uttering, publishing, or selling,’ &c., an ‘ altered note, bond, coupon, or other security,’ ” &c.
On each of which questions the opinions of the judges were opposed. Whereupon the disagreement was certified to this court.
Mr. D. T, Sullivan, for the prisoner:
First. The indictment is repugnant and inconsistent in itself.
How could the note be a “ false, forged, and counterfeit” note if it was issued under the authority of an act of Congress? The object of issuing treasury notes is that they may be “passed, uttered, published, and sold;” and how can the defendant, Howell, be guilty of a criminal act by doing that which it was the very object of the act should be done? The use of the adjectives “false, forged, and p. 435connterfeit” are inconsistent with and repugnant to the allega. tion that the note was issued under proper authority; nor are qualifying words of themselves, even if there be no repugnancy or inconsistency in the indictment, sufficient to make a criminal offence.
Second. The statute under which the indictment is framed, or at least so much thereof as relates to the charge of “ passing, uttering, publishing, and selling” the note in question, is repugnant and void.
The United Slates v. Cantrell* is in point. Cantrell was indicted under act of Congress of June 27th, 1798,f for “ uttering, passing,” &c., a ten dollar note, “purporting to be” a note “issued by order of the president,” &c., of the bank. The words “ purporting to be” were not in the statute, nor were there any words such as are usually found in statutes of this character; as, for instance, “ in the similitude of,” “in imitation of,” or others pointing against the disposing and putting off of notes which have not been issued by competent authority. The counsel for Cantrell made the objection which we take here, that the statute was fatally defective in not containing these or similar words, and the whole court, through Marshall, C. J., adjudged the objection to the statute to be well taken, and for that reason ordered that the judgment be arrested.
J/r. B. H. Bristow, Solicitor-General, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The judges of the circuit have certified to this court five questions arising on the indictment. The first question is, whether the second count of the indictment is bad as being in itself repugnant, and the four other questions relate to a similar repugnancy in the statute under which the indictment is framed. As the count to which the first question refers pursues the language of the statute, all the questions resolve themselves into the single one of whether the act, so far as it relates to altering and publishing forged or couu-
terfeit notes of the United States, is itself void for repugnancy.
The objection is, that if the note which the party is charged with passing was, in the language of the statute, “ issued under the authority of this act, or heretofore issued under acts to authorize the issue of treasury notes or. bonds,” it must necessarily be a valid or genuine note, and if it was not issued under the authority of some of these acts, the passing of the note is not made an offence by the law.
There is some degree of plausibility in this hypercriticism at first blush, which, if it were sound, would make the act void for want of any meaning, a result which one of the first canons of construction teaches us to avoid if possible, and which is at war with the common sense, which assures us that the purpose of the act was to punish the making of counterfeits of the notes and bonds described in the statute. Nor is the criticism philologically just. The offence is described as the passing of false, forged, or counterfeited notes or bonds issued under the authority of the statute. We are to give due weight to all the words employed in describing the instrument, and cannot reject the words false, forged, and counterfeited, if it is possible to adopt any reasonable construction which will permit them to stand. This is done by mentally supplying the ellipsis which is in general use in conversation or in writing in similar cases. We speak, for instance, of “ false diamonds.” According to the criticism we are considering this phrase has no meaning, because if the stones spoken of are diamonds they cannot be false, and if they are false they cannot be diamonds. But any one understands the meaning to be false stones which purport to be diamonds, or false similitude of diamonds. So we speak of a bank note. Now if the paper spoken of is a forgery it is not a bank note, which means an obligation of some bank to pay money. But here also the mind supplies the ellipsis which good usage allows, and understands that what is meant is a forged paper in the similitude of a bank note, or which on its face appears to be such a note. And in a similar manner we speak of a forged will, If the argu p. 437merit of defendant’s counsel is sound there can be no such thing as a forged will, receipt, note, or bond, because if forged they are void and therefore not notes, wills, bonds, &c. In fact the phrase “ void will” or “ void note,” is, according to this argument, a solecism, because the instrument cannot be at once the will or note of the party, and be void.
The use of the words false, forged, and counterfeit, in the statute, imply, therefore, when applied to any of the obligations of government mentioned, that it purports to be such an instrument, but is not genuine or valid. And so are the authorities. See 2 Russell on Crimes, 801; East’s Pleas of the Crown, 950.
It is conceded, that if the statute had, in describing the offences, called the instrument uttered a note, purporting to be issued under the authority of the statute, the difficulty would have been removed. In the case of Rex v. Birch and Martin, the indictment charged them “ with publishing as true, a false, forged, and counterfeited paper writing, purporting to be the last will of Sir Andrew Chadwick.” It was objected that the indictment was bad, because “ it should have been said that they forged a certain will,” which was the language of the statute, and not a paper writing purporting to be a will. “But,” says Mr. East, who, in his Pleas of the Crown,* makes a full report of the case, “ a variety of precedents were found, so that the judges held it to be good.” But it is apparent, from the exception taken, and from the language of East and of Russell, that the usual mode of charging the offence was to say that the prisoner had forged the will or other paper, and that either form is good.
The case of United States v. Cantrell is relied on as holding an opposite doctrine to that we have here presented. That case was submitted without argument, and the report says that the opinion of the court was that the judgment should be arrested for the reasons assigned in the record. These reasons are that the indictment was repugnant, because it
* Page 950.
charged the prisoners with having published as true “ a certain false, forged, and counterfeited paper, purporting to be a bank bill of the United States for ten dollars, signed by Thomas Willing, president, and G. Simpson, cashier.” And because the statute relating to the charge set forth in the indictment is inconsistent, repugnant, and void. In this statement, the words signed and purporting are italicized, and the court may have held the indictment bad because the former word was used, thus sustaining the objection made in Rex v. Birch and Martin. Or it may have held that the language of the indictment amounted to an averment, that the bill charged to be forged was signed in fact by the president and cashier of the bank, in which case it could not have been a forgery. Or it may possibly have thought that under the peculiar language of that statute, which differs materially from the one under consideration, they were bound to hold it void for repugnancy. However that may be, we do not consider the case, as it is reported, an authority for holding the statute void which we are called on to construe.
To the first and third questions, and the first branch of the second, we answer, No.
To the fourth and fifth, and the second branch of the second, we answer, Yes.