Swain v. Seamens, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 254
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Swain v. Seamens, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 254
Full caption
Swain v. Seamens.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Swain v. Seamens.
1. A contract to build, on a lot sold upon mortgage, a mill fifty feet wide by one hundred and fifty long, is not, as a proposition of law, substantially complied with by building one that is seventy-eight feet wide by a hundred long, even though the purpose of the contract was to give tbe vendor security for the purchase-money of the lot, and though the mill of the latter dimensions have cost more and be better adapted to the purposes intended than such a one as was contracted for.
2. But if the vendor, having made an agreement that upon a mill of the former dimensions being built on the lot sold, he will accept policies of insurance on it for the amount of another mortgage collateral to one given on the property sold, and he does accept such policies, he cannot decline to enter satisfaction on such other mortgage because the mill was not of the dimensions contracted for. He waives by such acceptance of the policies all right to object to the variation in the construction.
3. Where a person tacitly encourages an act to be done, he cannot afterwar s exercise his legal right in opposition to such consent, if his conduct or acts of encouragement induced the other party to change his position, so that he will be pecuniarily prejudiced by the assertion ofsuchadver sary claim.
4. The statute of frauds cannot be set up as a defence to the performance o one formal item of an agreement, where the contract has been fully per formed by the party asking such performance, and, except as to sue remaining formal item, by the other party also.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wisconsin, in vhich court Seamens and others filed a bill against Swain, praying that a mortgage executed to him, Swain, by Medbery an wife, on certain lots, of which he, Seamens, and the ot ie were now owners, in Wisconsin, might be cancelle.
It appeared that in 1855, Swain sold to Medbeiy
one Aldrich real estate in Michigan for $52,400, of which $10,000 was paid in cash, and the balance, $42,400, secured by a mortgage on the lands, payable in instalments at different times; and that on this Michigan land, foundations had been made in the previous autumn, by driving piles for the erection of a saw-mill fifty by one hundred and fifty feet in size; that Medbery was then the owner of certain lots in Wisconsin; and that on the same day and in pursuance of articles of agreement preceding the sale, to give additional security to the extent of $6666.66, he and his wife executed to Swain a mortgage on these lots as additional security.
On the Wisconsin mortgage, Swain, on the same day that it was given, indorsed the following stipulation, which gave rise to this suit:
“It is hereby agreed, that if within two years from this date the large saw-mill, fifty by one hundred and fifty feet in size, shall be properly built and completed, upon the foundation commenced last fall, by driving piles, to accept in place of the within mortgage, security in proper fire insurance policy, or policies, on said large saw-mill, and thereupon to discharge the within mortgage.”
The stipulation above made was in pursuance of a contract made by the purchasers in the previous articles of agreement, to keep the buildings erected, and the large saw-mill to be erected, upon the premises, insured in some safely reputed fire insurance company or companies against fire, and i that they should assign the policy or policies to Swain, and j that in default thereof it should be lawful for him, Swain, to ; e°eet the insurance himself, and that the premiums and the costs and charges of his doing so, should be a lien on the
mortgaged premises.
The bill alleged that subsequently to the execution of the agreement indorsed by Swain on the mortgage, and within t e two years, there was built and completed upon the ichigan lands, and upon the foundation referred to in the a large not of 50 by 150 feet, but y 100; this mill, however, being larger and of greater ue and better adapted to the purposes intended than one of the p. 256dimensions originally contemplated; and that the said mill, as built and completed, was assented to and accepted by Swain as a compliance with the said written agreement indorsed on the Wisconsin mortgage; that in May, 1856, Medbery and Aldrich caused the new saw-mill to be insured in different companies named, to the extent of $6000; and that these policies of insurance were duly transferred and delivered to Swain, and accepted and assented to by him as a compliance with the agreement, and that he had them in possession; that in October, 1857, Swain caused the new mill to be further insured for one year in the name of Medbery & Aldrich, for his own use and benefit; that in September, 1858, he again caused the new saw-mill and other buildings on the premises to be again insured for one year in the name of Medbery & Aldrich, but for his own security, and paid out for premium $210; that all these insurances mentioned were obtained at the request of Swain, with the consent of Medbery & Aldrich, and upon the understanding that they should reimburse him the premiums; that in November, 1858, Swain and Medbery & Aldrich accounted respecting the amount due upon the mortgage, and that Medbery & Aldrich then paid him $15,236.06, in which sum was included, as paid by Swain during 1857 and 1858 for premiums on the new saw-mill and other property mentioned in the mortgage, the sum of $446.50, and interest.
That “ during the building and erection of the said large saw-mill upon the premises referred to in the written agreement aforesaid by said Medbery & Aldrich, the said defendant, Swain, was present at different times, and was informed by said Medbery & Aldrich, or one of them, of the intended or the then variation in the dimensions of said saw’-mill from 50 by 150 feet, as specified in said written agreement, and that the said mill, as was then being built or was then completed, would be of greater value and better adapted for the uses and purposes intended than it would e if built of said dimensions as specified in said written agiec ment, and that the said defendant was then and there as^e by said Medbery & Aldrich, or one of them, to consent to p. 257such alteration, and accept the mill as then being built, and since completed, in lieu of the one mentioned in said written agreement, and that the said defendant did then and there agree to accept, and did accept the said mill so being built, and afterwards completed, in lieu of the one mentioned in said written agreement, and as a compliance on the part of said Medbery & Aldrich with the said written agreement on his or their part.”
The mortgage on the Michigan property not being paid, Swain foreclosed it, and on a decree, finding $22,464 due, sold and purchased the premises for $19,600.
The answer denied that Medbery & Aldrich completed the mill substantially according to the agreement; denied that Swain consented to or acquiesced in the departure from the plan for constructing the mill; and, admitting that Swain did accept policies of insurance upon the mill which was built, denied that he did so in pursuance of the agreement, or that he accepted the policies as a compliance on the part of Medbery & Aldrich.
The statute of frauds of Wisconsin, it may be necessary hereto state, enacts,* that “no estate, or interestin lands, .,. . nor any power over or concerning lands, or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created or surrendered, . .. unless by deed or conveyance in writing, &c.and that “ the term
ands, shall be construed as coextensive in meaning with ands, tenements, and hereditaments;” and the terms “estate and interest in lands,” to embrace every estate and interest, freehold and chattel, legal and equitable, present and
uture, vested and contingent in lands as above defined.
Tbe right to have the cancellation prayed for, depended erefoie upon the following questions: • Was the mill constructed in substantial conformity with the agreement ?
2. If constructed differently, did Swain consent to or acquiesce in the departure from the original plan; or
*
Code of 1858. nn. fil.8 A15, VOL.ix.
Arguments.
3. Did Swain, after its construction, accept policies on the mill in pursuance of the agreement?
If any one of these questions were answered in the affirmative, then, obviously the mortgage was to be cancelled.
4. Unless, indeed, there was something in the statute of frauds, as above quoted, which interfered with such a conclusion.
The second and third questions were obviously questions of pure fact, and the court below, which decreed the cancellation, considered, as this court (on appeal from that decree) also considered, that the evidence made it clear, on direct proofs, that Swain had in fact acquiesced in the departure in the building of the mill, and moreover that after its construction he had accepted policies, by this means also waiving any objection to such variation.
On the two points of law it was contended by Mr. J. M. Howard, for the appellant:
1. That the contract was clear and specific to properly build and complete a mill of a fixed, intelligible, and practicable size; and that this being so the court was bound to hold the parties to it; and so bound whether the mill really built was of greater value or of less than the one contracted to be built, the creditor having a right to stipulate for just such a mill as he pleased.
2. That the agreement to modify the stipulation as to the dimensions of the mill was an agreement which did, in truth, provide for the 44 surrender ” of one “ estate or interest in lands ” and for the creation ” of another, and was therefore void within the Wisconsin statute of frauds.
Mr. M. H. Carpenter, contra:
1. What was the spirit of the agreement? Swain was not contracting for a mill which he was to use. He had sol t land. What he had in view was security, and security alone. Precise dimensions were of no consequence to him, va was everything; because upon value depended his secun y, which was the subject of the agreement. The literal re-
Argument for the appellee.
quirements of the agreement would have been satisfied by the construction of a mill of any value, or of no value, provided it were 50 by 150 feet, for this is the only specification in the agreement in regard to the mill. This, however, would not have satisfied the spirit of the agreement. But if a worthless mill, 50 by 150 feet, would not have done this, then a mill of any dimensions, but of value sufficient to support an insurance equal to $6666.66, does do it; does satisfy this spirit. In other words, the true spirit of the contract, so far as regards Swain, was value, not form; and, if the mill actually constructed was of greater value than one constructed 50 by 150 feet would have been, and it could be insured to the amount of $6666.66, then such mill satisfied the agreement in its true spirit and according to the intention of the parties. But the point is not important. We do not urge it. The evidence, which the court will see absolutely demands affirmative answers to the second and third questions, renders any discussion of this first one useless. If Swain accepted the mill either by words, or by silence as expressive as words, or by receiving policies upon it, there is an end of the case.
4s io the statute of frauds, no question arises under it. The point seems to be faintly urged. A variation in an agreement as to the size of a saw-mill, is not a surrender of or a crea-
tion of an interest in land. If it were, then without insisting on what cases assert, that a written or sealed instrument, even when within the statute, may be varied as to the time or manner of its performance, or may be waived altogether by a subsequent parol agreement, the conclusive answer here is, that the contract was fully executed on the side of both parties, and that Swain, after standing by and witnessing t<e completion of the mill with its actual dimensions, and freeing to it, is equitably estopped from objecting to cancel moitgage upon the ground of change in the plan. The octrine that where a person encourages an act to be done,
in any way accepts it when done, he cannot afterwards fecti0186 h* 8 in opposition to such consent, is per-
y settled, and is applied in all cases where a party has p. 260by word or act given others reason to believe that if he had a right, he intended to waive it, and where such others would be prejudiced by his asserting his right. Authorities need not be cited for this horn-book law.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Subsequent to the removal of the case from the State court to the Circuit Court a new bill of complaint was filed by the consent of the respondent, so that it is not necessary to refer to the proceedings in the suit before the petition for the removal was granted.
Swain, the appellant and respondent, owned certain real estate situated in the State of Michigan, and on the fourteenth of April, 1855, he sold the same to John W. Medbery and James F. Aldrich for the consideration of fifty-two thousand dollars, as appears by the pleadings.
Pursuant to the terms of the sale the purchasers paid ten thousand dollars in cash when the deed was executed, and gave back a mortgage on the same real estate to secure the balance of the purchase-money, which was payable in instalments at different times. Medbery at that time was the owner of an undivided third part of certain lots situated in Milwaukee, in the State of Wisconsin, together with a flouring-mill erected thereon, called the Empire Mill, and he and his wife, on the same day and as a part of the same transaction, gave a mortgage of the same lots and mill to the appellant as additional security for the balance remaining unpaid of the purchase-money of the first-mentioned real estate.
Prior to the purchase and sale of the Michigan real estate the foundation for a saw-mill, fifty feet by one hundred an fifty feet, to be erected on the premises, had been commence, and the mortgagee, at the time the second mortgage was ex ecuted as additional security, stipulated and agreed with t e mortgagors therein that if the mortgagors in the first mor gage built and completed the saw-mill there described in a proper manner upon the foundation so commenced, wit in two years from that date, he would accept as security in t e place of that mortgage proper fire insurance policies on sa p. 261saw-mill, and would thereupon cancel and discharge the said second mortgage. Reference is made to the stipulation for its exact phraseology, as more fully set forth in the record, and it will be seen that it was duly executed under the hand and seal of the appellant, and was indorsed at large on the second mortgage which was given as additional security.
Substantial compliance on the part of the mortgagors in the first mortgage with all the conditions of that agreement, and within the time therein specified, is set up by the appellees and complainants; and they also allege that the mortgagors in the second mortgage subsequently sold and conveyed, by deed of warranty, all their interest in and to the said lots and mill, and that they, the complainants, afterwards became the purchasers of the same lots and mill; and they allege that at the time the suit was commenced they were the owners of the same in fee, as alleged in the bill of complaint. They do not claim that the mill built and completed, as aforesaid, was of the precise dimensions mentioned in the agreement, but they allege that it was of larger dimensions and of greater value, and that it was better adapted to the purposes to be accomplished; and they aver that the mill as built and completed was recognized and accepted by the appellant as a compliance with that agreement.
Based on these and other allegations the prayer of the bill of complaint is that the mortgage of the lots and mill, called the second mortgage for the purpose of identification, may e ordered and decreed to be cancelled and discharged, and t at the complainants may have such other and further relief as the nature of the case shall require.
Special reterence to the evidences of title exhibited by e complainants is unnecessary, as the parties before the earing in the Circuit Court entered into a written stipulai°n t at the complainants at the time the bill of complaint as ed were the owners in fee of the lots in question and of titl 0Ur^u^’Tn^^ located on the premises. Possessed of the e lof8 and mill as previously held by the mortgathe8’ 6, C^m ^he complainants is that the mortgage eon eld by the appellant should be cancelled and p. 262discharged, because, as they insist, the conditions of the stipulation and agreement indorsed on the same, providing for that result, have all been fulfilled.
Such is the claim of the complainants, but the respondent denies that proposition and every element of it, and he contends that the complainants have no claim to any relief, because he insists that the mortgagors in the first mortgage never fulfilled any of the conditions specified in that stipulation and agreement; that they never built and completed the saw-mill therein described; and he expressly denies that they ever procured the. policies of insurance, as alleged, or that he ever accepted the mill which they did build on the premises as a compliance with that stipulation and agreement.
Both parties were fully heard in the Circuit Court, and a decree was entered for the complainants cancelling and discharging the mortgage, and the respondents appealed to this court.
II. Relief cannot be decreed to the complainants on the ground that the mortgagors in the principal mortgage built and completed a saw-mill on the premises embraced in that mortgage, of the dimensions specified in the written stipulation and agreement which is indorsed on the second mortgage, as the bill of complaint concedes that they did not, in terms, comply with that condition, and the complainants do not claim in argument that the saw-mill which those parties built thereon was of that form or of those dimensions. Strict compliance, therefore, with the conditions of the stipulation cannot be maintained, as the proposition finds no suppoit either in the pleadings or proofs, but is contradicted by boti in every part of the record.
Proof of strict performance failing, the next proposition of the complainants is that the saw-mill which those mortga gors did build constitutes a substantial compliance with the conditions of that stipulation, but it is not possible to deci e as a conclusion of law that a saw-mill seventy-eight feet in width by one hundred feet in length is a substantial CO®P1 ance with an agreement which required that the saw nn
be constructed should be of the dimensions described in that instrument, even though it be shown that it cost more and was of greater value and better adapted to the purposes to be accomplished, as the appellant having stipulated that the saw-mill to be built should be fifty feet in width by one hundred and fifty feet in length, had a right to stand upon the contract and to insist that it should be fulfilled according to its terms.
Substantial performance, it is true, is all that is required to satisfy any such agreement, and it may also be conceded that in the adjudication of controversies growing out of building contracts slight differences in the dimensions between the building constructed and the terms of the contract niay, under many circumstances, be overcome by a reasonable application of that rule, but the differences in the case before the court are far too great to fall within that principle, as the effect would be to make a new contract and substitute it in the place of the stipulation executed by the parties. '
III. Suppose neither of those propositions can be sustained, still the complainants contend that the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed, because they insist that the appellant acquiesced in the departure from the plan and dimensions as specified in the written instrument, and that he expressly accepted the said mill which those parties built and completed as a compliance with that stipulation.
Considerable conflict exists in the proofs upon that subject, an in view of that fact it becomes necessary to examine with some care the circumstances attending the transaction as bearing upon the probabilities, of the case. Duplicate agreements were executed between the parties to the beforenientioned deed of conveyance for the purchase and sale of t e ands therein described six months before the deed of e same and the mortgage back, as aforesaid, were signed elivered, by which the appellant agreed to sell, and the ba^668 an(l the mortgagors in the mortgage agieed to purchase, those tracts of land, with certain ceptions, which are unimportant in this investigation, and
Case restated in |he opinion.
also with certain reservations, of which two only need be noticed:
1. He reserved the house where he resided and the premises connected therewith for his benefit for one year from the date of the agreement.
2. Also the use and occupancy of the shop and fixtures connected with the same then in the possession of his brother, a deaf-mute, together with the use of the water “ as now used, or in a similar way,” so long as the said brother chooses to occupy the same, “ to be free of rent, let, or unnecessary hindrance, otherwise than if in the way of other important improvements it may be removed” sufficiently to be out of the way, “ and where he can have the same use and privileges as before.”
By the terms of the agreement as amended the purchasers were to pay ten thousand dollars in cash, and they were to give their bond for forty-two thousand dollars for the balance of the purchase-money, together with a mortgage back of the whole real estate purchased to secure the payments, and they also covenanted to give a good and satisfactory security upon other property” for the sum of six thousand six hundred and sixty-six and two-thirds dollars. They also agreed to keep an insurance in some safe insurance company upon the insurable property on the premises, to the amount of one-third of its value, for the benefit and security of the mortgagee. No provision was made for any insurance upon the “ other property” to be conveyed to the appellant as additional security, but when the mortgage back was execute, six months later, it was therein stipulated that the mortgagors should “well and truly keep the buildings erected, and the large saw-mill to be erected, upon the premises, insured in some safely reputed fire insurance company or companies against loss by fire, and that they should assign the said policy or policies to the appellant or his assigns, and it contained the further stipulation that in defau thereof it should be lawful for the appellant or his assigns to effect the said insurance, and that the premiums pai or effecting the same and the costs and charges should be a ien on the said mortgaged premises.
Evidently the deed of conveyance and the two mortgages, together with the stipulation indorsed on the second mortgage, must be construed together, as they constitute parts of the same transaction; and reference may also be made to the written agreement for the purchase and sale of the real estate embraced in the deed, as that agreement remained in force when the other instruments were drafted and until the transaction was finally closed.
Security it is stipulated shall be accepted “ in proper fire insurance policy or policies on said large saw-mill in place of the within mortgage,” but the amount of the insurance to be procured as the substitute for the mortgage security is not specified, and without reference to the instrument which provided for the sale and purchase of the real estate included in the deed of conveyance it would be difficult if not impossible to define that amount, but when the several instruments relating to the transaction are considered together all ambiguity at once disappears.
Viewed in the light of those suggestions the intention of the parties appears to be plain, as it is quite evident that the second mortgage constitutes the “ security upon other property for the amount which the purchasers of the real estate agieed to give to the appellant as the seller thereof in addition to the mortgage back of the premises included in the deed of conveyance.
IV. Two conditions precedent are annexed to the supposed right of the mortgagors in the second mortgage to emand that the mortgage should be cancelled and disarge, and unless it is shown that they were waived or modified by mutual consent they must both be fulfilled or “fifaPPe^ant mus^ Prevail: (1.) That the large saw-mill, ty y one hundred and fifty feet in size,” was properly m coippleted upon the foundation previously cominfi1106 a *wo years from the date of the stipulation insure °n secou(I mortgage; (2.) That proper fire thou^T ?°^c^es 011 8a^ saw-mill to the amount of six were e<^ an(^ sixty-six and two-thirds dollars piocuied for the benefit of the appellant, in one or the p. 266other of the two modes provided in the instrument of mortgage.
Undoubtedly the obligation to procure the policies rested on the mortgagors, but authority to procure them in case of the default of the mortgagors was vested in the appellant, and if he exercised that authority and actually procured the policies to that amount as security for their indebtedness he cannot set up the non-performance of that condition as an answer to this suit. They might procure the policies, or if they did not he might procure them, and in that event the premiums paid and the costs and charges incurred were made a lien on the mortgaged lands, and if he exercised the privilege conferred and procured the policies he is bound by his own act.
1. Compliance with the first condition is not shown, as the mill actually built is seventy-eight feet in width by one hundred feet in length, and not one hundred and fifty feet in length as described in the written stipulation, and the decree therefore must be reversed unless it satisfactorily appears that the appellant acquiesced in the change made in the plan and dimensions of the mill or accepted it after it was completed, as contended by the complainants.
Constructed as the mill was of different dimensions from the plan specified in the stipulation, it could not be erected throughout upon the foundation previously commenced, but it appears that it was erected on the same site, and that it is connected with the same water-power, and that no greater alterations were made in the foundation previously commenced than the change in the plan and dimensions of the mill required; and the proofs show to the entire satisfaction of the court that the mill as constructed cost nearly twice as much as it would if the plan indicated in the stipulation ha been followed, and that it is of greater value, and that in view of the site and surrounding circumstances, it is muc i better adapted to the purposes to be accomplished.
Intended for three gangs of saws with other machinery incident to such a saw-mill of modern construction, it &eems reasonable to suppose that the increase in the width o
mill, as compared with the dimensions given in the stipulation, would much more than compensate for the diminution in the length of the structure, as the length is still sufficient, and the effect of the alteration is to give more space where it is most needed.
Even the answer alleges that the second mortgage was given as a performance of the agreement to furnish addi-
tional security, and the appellant admits that he agreed to accept the policies of insurance on the saw-mill in the place of the mortgage, provided the mill was built of the size specified in the stipulation and on the foundation commenced before the agreement for the sale and purchase of the real estate was executed, but he utterly denies that he acquiesced in the change made in the plan and dimensions of the mill, or that he ever accepted or agreed to accept the mill as built and completed. Three witnesses, however, testify to the contrary, and a fourth testifies that the appellant was two or three times at that place and once in the mill “ during the building of the mill,” and that he never made any objections to him or in his presence as to the change in the dimensions of the mill. Two of these witnesses are the mortgagors in the first mortgage, who built and completed the saw-mill; the third was a partner with them in the lumber business, and the fourth is the millwright who superintended the construction of the saw-mill and put in the machinery, and in the judgment of the court they are entitled to credit. They speak of his presence at the mill during the progress of the work and after the mill was completed, and the first three give the details of the conversation they had with him, showing to a demonstration that, if they are to be believed,.the appellant not only acquiesced in the change in the plan as proposed, but that e in terms accepted the saw-mil] erected on the premises as built and completed.
Opposed to the statements of those witnesses is the negaive averment of the answer and the positive denial of the appe ant that any such interviews ever took place, or that e ever gave utterance to any such sentiments, but it is a p. 268sufficient response to those denials of the appellant to say that his testimony is not of a character to discredit the proofs introduced by the complainants. Attempt is also made to contradict the complainants’ witnesses as to the time when they say they saw the appellant at the saw-mill or in that vicinity, but the error, if it be one, is not sufficient to discredit the witnesses, as it is quite immaterial whether the interview was at the time stated or a week or two or even a month earlier. Other considerations, such as the necessity for the removal of the shop of the deaf-mute brother, are also invoked as tending to show the improbability that the appellant should have assented to the alteration in the plan of the mill, but it is unnecessary to enter into the details, as the court is of the opinion that the allegations of the bill of complaint in that behalf are fully proved by the direct proofs.
Next objection of the appellant is that the agreement to accept the mill as built and completed, even if made as supposed, was void as within the statute of frauds of that State, because it was not in writing; but it becomes necessary before considering that question to determine whether the second condition specified in the stipulation was fulfilled so that the mortgagors in the second mortgage, or those claiming under them, have the right, if the agreement to accept the saw-mill as built and completed is operative, to demand that the second mortgage shall be cancelled and dischaiged.
2. Whether the mortgagors in the principal mortgage kept the insurable property included in that mortgage insured oi not is not a question in this case, nor is it a question at t is time whether they kept the saw-mill insured as agieed m that instrument, but the question to be decided is whet ei the mortgagors, within two years from the date of the stipu lation, procured for the benefit of the mortgagee piopei fire insurance policies thereon to the requisite amount,, o whether the mortgagee within that period procure same for his own benefit, as required or permitte in second condition of that stipulation, when constiue in nection with the provision upon the subject containe in p. 269principal mortgage. Proper fire insurance policies might be procured for the purpose, as before explained, by the mortgagors or by the mortgagee, and inasmuch as the premiums paid and the costs and charges incurred were, in the latter event, to be added to and considered a part of the debt secured by mortgage, it cannot make any difference whether they were actually obtained by the one or the other of those parties. Such being the rule to be applied, the question presented for decision is purely one of fact depending upon the proofs in the case, the results of which, as they appear to the court, will be briefly stated.
Three policies of insurance on the saw-mill were procured, in the year 1856, by the mortgagors for the benefit of the mortgagee, to wit: two thousand dollars in the Ætna Insurance Company, two thousand dollars in the Washington Union Insurance Company, and two thousand dollars in the Jackson Mutual Insurance Company; and the proofs show that the policies were delivered to the appellant, and that he accepted them without objection. Added together, the sum is a fraction less than the required amount, but the policies were accepted without objection, and none is now made on that account.
Policies on the saw-mill were obtained, the succeeding year, by the appellant, for the same amount, to wit: fifteen undred dollars in the Phoenix Insurance Company, three t ousand dollars in the Washington Union Insurance Company, and fifteen hundred dollars in the Ætna Insurance ompany; and the proofs show that the premiums wrhich he Pai for the same were added to the mortgage debt, and weie ultimately adjusted by the mortgagors.
nsurance on the saw-mill for the year 1858 was also ob-aine by the appellant for the same amount, and the exhibits n tie record show that the money he paid for the premiums a ^8 rePa^ to him by the mortgagors. They also paid him th 16 T“"6 ^me f°urteen thousand six hundred and seventy-re® ollais and forty-three cents, which was indorsed on wh' nd g* Ven f°r the balance of the purchase-money, and lc was secured by the mortgage of the same real estate.
V. All of these policies, however, were for the term of one year, and the next objection is that they cannot be regarded as fulfilling the second condition of the stipulation on that account, as they wTould expire before some of the instalments of the bond fell due; but the objection is not entitled to weight for several reasons: (1.) Fire policies are usually issued for one year, and there is nothing in the stipulation to justify the conclusion that the policies were to be in any other than the usual form. (2.) When the first three were obtained they were accepted by the appellant without objection. (3.) He asked and obtained leave of the mortgagors to procure the future policies, and when he came to exercise that privilege he obtained them in the same form. (4.) Because, having been intrusted, at his own request, with the business of procuring the requisite insurance, it was his own fault if the business was neglected or was not properly transacted. (5.) He cannot impute fault to the mortgagors, as they paid on the mortgage a sum nearly equal to the anticipated cost of the saw-mill, especially as they had consented to leave the business of insurance to him, and as he was expressly authorized to add the premiums to the mortgage debt, and as all sums paid for that purpose were declared to be a lien on the mortgaged lands. (6.) If he desired that the insurance should be continued, and did not wish to transact the business, he should have given notice to the mortgagors; but the probability is that he felt less interest in the subject on account of the large payment which had been made on the mortgage debt.
VI. 1. Although the fee of the mortgaged premises remains in the mortgagor, under the laws of that State, till after foreclosure and sale, still no doubt is entertained that the stipulation to accept proper fire insurance policies on the saw-mill in the place of the mortgage was an agreement providing for the surrender of an “ estate or interest in lands,” and, therefore, was an agreement within the statute of frauds of that State.*
*
Eevised Stat., chap. 108, § 6, p. 615; Wood v. Trask, 7 Wisconsin, 572; Eussell v. Ely, 2 Black, 578.
Nothing is left for construction, as the subsequent act provides that the term “ lands” shall be construed as coextensive in meaning with lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and that the terms “estate and interest in lands” shall be construed to embrace every estate and interest, freehold and chattel, legal and equitable, present and future, vested and contingent.*
But the stipulation in this case to accept the policies of insurance on the saw-mill as security in the place of the second mortgage, and thereupon to cancel and discharge that instrument, is in writing, and having been executed as a part of the bargain of purchase and sale of the real estate, it rests upon a sufficient consideration, and is valid and binding. Argument upon that topic is unnecessary, as it is too plain for contention; but the suggestion which the appellant intends to make is that the agreement subsequently made to modify the stipulation as to the dimensions of the mill is within the statute of frauds of that State, and null and void. Views of the complainants are that an agreement, though in writing and under seal, may in all cases be varied as to time or manner of its performance, or may be waived altogether by a subsequent oral agreement; but the court is of a different opinion, if the agreement to be modified is within the statute of. frauds.
2. Numerous authorities sanction the principle advanced by the complainants in cases not within the statute of frauds, and which fall within the general rules of the common law, and in such cases it is held that the parties to an agreement, though it is in writing, may, at any time before the breach °f it, by a new contract not in writing, modify, waive, dissolve, or annul the former agreement, if no part of it was within the statute of frauds.f
Reported cases may also be found where that rule is pro-
Ch ^ev’se^ Stat., chap. 108, | 6, p. 615; Stevens v. Cooper, 1 Johnson’s Hunt v. Maynard, 6 Pickering, 489; Browne on Frauds (2d ed.), § 430. ’
'Nugent’ 5 Barnewall & Adolphus, 64; Harvey v. Grabham,
j & E1Hs’ 73 ’ Enaerson Slater, 22 Howard, 42; Brown on muds (2d ed.), § 409.
mulgated without any qualification; but the better opinion is, that a written contract falling within the statute of frauds cannot be varied by any subsequent agreement of the parties, unless such new agreement is also in writing. Express decision in the case of Marshall v. Lynn,* is that the terms of a contract for the sale of goods falling within the operation of the statute of frauds cannot be varied or altered by parol; that where a contract for the bargain and sale of goods is made, stating a time for the delivery of them, an agreement to substitute another day for that purpose must, in order to be valid, be in writing.!
Suggestion may be made that all the cases were cases at law; but the same rule prevails in equity, as appears by the highest authority.^
Regarded, therefore, as a mere executory agreement to accept the mill when built and completed, it is clear that the statute of frauds would be a good defence to a suit for the breach of it; but it cannot be viewed in that light, as it was fully executed on the part of the mortgagors, and was in fact fully executed on the part of the appellant.
3. He is not sued for a breach of the agreement to accept the mill as built and completed; but the suit is to compel him to cancel and discharge the mortgage as agreed in the written stipulation. Called upon to plead to the bill of complaint, he sets up the defence that the dimensions of the mill vary from those specified in the stipulation, to which the complainants reply that he acquiesced in the change at the time the work was done, and that he accepted the mill as built and completed, and they prove the allegations to the
* 6 Meeson & Welsby, 109. f Clarke v. Russel, 3 Dallas, 415; Emerson v. Slater, 22 Howard, 42; Goss v. Nugent, 5 Barnewall & Adolphus, 58; Harvey v. GrabLam, Adolphus & Ellis, 73; Stowell v. Robinson, 3 Bingham’s New Cases, 928; Stead v. Dawber, 10 Adolphus & Ellis, 57; Falmouth v Thomas, 1 Cromp ton & Meeson, 109; Hasbrouck v. Tappen, 15 Johnson, 200; Blood v. Goo rich, 9 Wendell, 68. ,
J Emmet v. Dewhirst, 8 English Law and Equity, 83; same case, c Naughten &G.; 587 ; Stevens v. Cooper, 1 Johnson’s Chancery, 429; row on Frauds (2d ed.), § 422.
entire satisfaction of the court. They built and completed the mill seventy-eight feet in width by one hundred feet in length, at an expense exceeding thirty thousand dollars, and the appellant not only accepted it when completed as a compliance with the stipulation, but he also accepted the policies of insurance procured on it as security in the place of the second mortgage, and he cannot now be permitted to avoid the true issue, nor to divest the transaction of its real character in order that he may set up the statute of frauds.
VII. 1. Even part performance is often admitted in equity as an answer to the statute; but it is not necessary to invoke that principle in this case, as it is clear that the appellant acquiesced in the changes made in the plan, and that the mill, as built and completed, was accepted by him as a compliance with the stipulation.*
2. Estoppel is also set up by the complainants as an answer to the defence of the statute of frauds, and, in view of the facts, the court is of the opinion that it is a complete answer to that defence. He sold the real estate for fifty-two thousand four hundred dollars, received in cash ten thousand dollars, and the purchasers gave a mortgage on the same real estate for the balance of the purchase price. They paid towards the mortgage seventeen thousand six hundred and seventy-three dollars, exclusive of five hundred and seventy-six dollars and seventy-three cents for insurance premiums an for taxes, and erected the saw-mill at the cost of thirty-wo thousand dollars, and the record shows that the appel-ant foreclosed the mortgage, and, with two other persons, ecame the purchaser of the entire property and improveinents, subject to the mortgage, for the sum of nineteen ousand six hundred dollars, and has a decree for the del^lency °l two thousand eight hundred and sixty-four dolge aiJ e^even cents, for which he proposes to foreclose the g • rnoitgage now under consideration. of wl ey°nd doubt the mortgagors in the first mortgage,, one —Waa principal mortgagor in the second mort? 468. J ^Ur’ ed.), 759, 761; Browne on Frauds (;2ded.
v°n. ix.
Statement of the ease.
gage, built and completed the saw-mill in the full belief, induced by the conduct and declarations of the appellant, that it would be accepted as a compliance with the stipulation indorsed on the second mortgage. Taken as a whole, the proofs satisfy the court that his conduct and declarations led them to believe that he was content with the change made, and that he would readily acquiesce in their doings when the mill was completed, and, if so, he cannot be heard to allege or prove the contrary to the prejudice of their rights.*
Where a person tacitly encourages an act to be done, he cannot afterwards exercise his legal right in opposition to such consent, if his conduct or acts of encouragement induced the other party to change his position, so that he will be pecuniarily prejudiced by the assertion of such adversary claim.
Decree affirmed.
The Justices v, Murray.
1. The provision in the seventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law, applies to the facts tried by a jury in a
' cause in a State court. 2. So much of the 5th section of the act of Congress of March 3d, 1863, entitled “An act relating to habeas corpus and regulating proceedings in certain cases,” as provides for the removal of a judgment in a State court, and in which the cause was tried by a jury, to the Circuit Court of the United States for a retrial on the facts and law, is not in pursu ance of the Constitution, and is void.
Error to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York; the case being thus:
Patrie brought a suit for an assault and battery and false
*
Pi cleard v. Sears, 6 Adolphus & Ellis, 474; Freeman v. Cooke, 2 chequer, 654 ; Foster v. Dawber, 6 Id. 854; Edwards v. Chapman, 1 ee & Welsby, 231; Morris Canal Company v. Lewis, 1 Beasley, 323; Cary v. Wheeler, 14 Wisconsin, 285.
imprisonment against Murray and Buckley in the Supreme Court of the Third District of New York; to which the defendants pleaded the general issue, and pleaded further as a special defence that the said Murray was marshal of the Southern District of New York, and the said Buckley his deputy; and that, as such marshal, he, Murray, was, by order of the President, on or about the 28th August, 1862, directed to take the plaintiff into custody; that the said Buckley, as such deputy, was directed by him, the marshal, to execute the said order; and that, acting as such deputy, and in pursuance of his directions, he, Buckley, did, in a lawful manner, and without force or violence, take the said Patrie into custody; that during all the time he was in custody he was kept and detained in pursuance of said order of the President, and not otherwise.
Issue being thus joined, the cause was tried at the Circuit Court in Greene County, within the third judicial district, before a jury. The defendants appeared by counsel. No evidence was given on the trial, on the part of the defendants, in support of the special defence set up as being under the order of the President. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff and judgment was regularly entered upon the verdict on the 8th June, 1864.
In December following a writ of error was issued to the upreme Court of the Third District, to remove the cause to c Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern Disrict of New York. «The writ wTas issued under the 5th sec-ion of an act of Congress, passed March 3d, 1863, entitled n act ielating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating proceedgs in certain cases.” The 5th section of this act provides as follows:
be c J 8U1t °r Prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or shall militaT’T’6nCed any State court, against any officer, civil or ‘at an r' * Or.'^or anY arrest or imprisonment made’ . . . color of 'me the present rebellion, by virtue or under States’ authority by or under the President of the United 8is mo th ■ * • • • ‘ bo competent for either party, within
8 after the rendition of a judgment in any such cause, p. 276by writ of error or other process, to remove the same to the Circuit Court of the United States for that district in which such judgment shall have been rendered; and the said Circuit Court shall thereupon proceed to try and determine the facts and law in such action in the same manner as if the same had been there originally commenced, the judgment in such case notwithstanding.’ ”
The State court refused to make a return to the writ of error. Thereupon an alternative mandamus was issued by the Circuit Court of the United States, to which a return
was made setting forth the suit, trial, and judgment already
referred to. To this there was a demurrer and joinder;
and, after due consideration, the demurrer was sustained,
and a judgment for a peremptory mandamus rendered.
From this judgment a writ of error was taken to this court*
The case was argued on two occasions, and each time with
ability and care. On the first by Mr. A. J. Parker, for the
plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Evarts, then Attorney-General,
contra; and at this term, by Mr. Parker again, on one side as
before, and by Mr. Hoar, now Attorney-Général, with Mr. Field,
Assistant Attorney-General, on the other. On the second occa-
sion the argument was confined to two questions submitted
by the court:
1. Whether or not the act of Congress of March 3d, 1863,
providing for the removal of a cause, after judgment by a
State court, to the Circuit Court of the United States, for a new trial, is an act in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States?
2. Whether or not the provision in the seventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined p. 277in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law, applies to the facts tried by a jury in a cause in a State court ?
*
The alternative and peremptory mandamus against the Supreme Court of New York was allowed by consent of the counsel for the defendants, w a view to present the question raised and decided in the case. T e ircu Court had refused to issue it against the court, and issued it only again clerk. This is stated to prevent the case from being cited as an aut for the power, and without intending to express any opinion on this su - ject. S. N.
Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
This case has received the most deliberate consideration of the court. As we have arrived at the conclusion that the seventh amendment, upon its true construction, applies to a cause tried by a jury in a State court, this opinion will be confined to considerations involved in the second question submitted to us for argument at the bar. The decision of that in the affirmative disposes of the case.
The seventh amendment is as follows: “ In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the common law.”
It must be admitted that, according to the construction uniformly given to the first clause of this amendment, the suits there mentioned are confined to those in the Federal courts; and the argument is, perhaps, more than plausible, which is that the words, “ and no fact tried by a jury,” mentioned in the second, relate to the trial by jury as provided for in the previous clause. We have felt the full force of this argument, and if the two clauses were necessarily to be construed together, and to be regarded as inseparable, we
t ink the argument would be conclusive. But this is not t e view that has been taken of it by this court. In Parsons v’ edford et al.,* Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion 0 the court, referring to this part of the amendment, observed, « that it should be read as a substantial and independent clause;” and that it was “a prohibition to the courts ® t e United States to re-examine any facts tried by a jury n any other manner.” The history of the amendment conrms this view.f He further observed that “ the only modes
known to the common law to re-examine such facts was the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried, or the award of a venire facias de novo, by the appellate court, for some error of law that had intervened in the proceedings.”
Another argument mainly relied upon against this construction is that the ten amendments proposed by Congress, and adopted by the States, are limitations upon the powers of the Federal government, and not upon the States; and we are referred to the cases of. Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore;* Lessee of Livingston v. Moore and others;^ Twitchell v. The Commonwealth^ as authorities for the position. This is admitted, and it follows that the seventh amendment could not be invoked in a State court to prohibit it from re-examining, on a writ of error, facts that had been tried by a jury in the court below. But this would seem to be the only consequence deducible from these cases or from the principles they assert. They have no pertinent, much less authoritative, application to the question in hand. That question is not whether the limitation in the amendment has any effect as to the powers of an appellate State court, but what is its effect upon the powers of the Federal appellate court ? Is the limitation confined to cases of writs of error to the inferior Federal courts, or does it not also apply to writs of error to State courts in cases involving Federal questions ? The latter is the precise question for our determination. Now, it will be admitted that the amendment, in terms, makes no such discrimination. They are. “and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examine in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law.” It is admitted that the clause applies to the appellate powers of the Supreme Court of the Unite States in all common law cases coming up from an inferior Federal court, and also to the Circuit Court in like cases, in the exercise of its appellate powers. And why not, as i respects the exercise of these powers in cases of Federa cog
* 7 Peters, 243. f Ib- 55L $ 7 Wallace’ S21‘
nizance coming up from a State court? The terms of the amendment are general, and contain no qualification in respect to the restriction upon the appellate jurisdiction of the courts, except as to the class of cases, namely, suits at common law, where the trial has been by jury. The natural inference is that no other was intended. Its language, upon any reasonable, if not necessary, interpretation, we think, applies to this entire class, no matter from what court the case comes, of which cognizance can be taken by the appellate court.
It seems to us also that cases of Federal cognizance, coming up from State courts, are not only within the words, but are also within the reason and policy of the amendment. They are cases involving questions arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties, or under some other Federal authority; and, therefore, are as completely within the exercise of the judicial power of the United States, as much so as if the cases had been originally brought in some inferior Federal court. No other cases tried in the State courts can be brought under the appellate jurisdiction of this court or any inferior Federal court on which appel-ate jurisdiction may have been conferred. The case must be one involving some Federal question, and it is difficult to perceive any sensible reason for the distinction that is attempted to be made between the re-examination by the appellate court of a case coming up from an inferior Federal, an one of the class above mentioned coming up from a tate court. In both instances the cases are to be disposed ^ie 8ame system of laws and by the same judicial
in r* in the 82d number of the Federalist, speak-and 8 th6 re^a^on that would subsist between the National obs C0Ur^8 ^1G instances of concurrent jurisdiction, Delfi^’ Constitution, in direct terms, gives an aprated6 U1^s^c^on to the Supreme Court in all the enumeau o •Ca-8eS federal cognizance in which it is not to have oner oue’ without a single expression to confine its ions to the inferior Federal courts. The objects of p. 280appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone contemplated. From this circumstance, he observes, and from the reason of the thing, it ought to be construed to extend to the State tribunals. “ The courts of the latter will, of course, be National auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of National justice and the rules of National decisions.”
This idea of calling to the aid of the Federal judiciary the State tribunals, by leaving to them concurrent jurisdiction in which Federal questions might be involved, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, will be found to be extensively acted upon in the distribution of the judicial powers of the United States in the act of 1789, known as the Judiciary Act. Besides the general concurrent jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act, a striking instance of this is found in the 33d section of the act, which provides “that for any crime or offence against the United States the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any justice of the peace or other magistrate of any of the United States where he may be found, agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such State, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by this act has cognizance of the offence.” And a series of acts were also passed in the earlier sessions of Congress, conferring upon the State and county courts cognizance to hear and determine upon offences, penalties, an forfeitures, and for the collection of taxes and duties aiising and payable under the revenue laws, or under a direct tax or internal duties, and which were continued down till t e State courts refused to entertain jurisdiction of the same. The State courts of New York continued to exercise jurisdiction under these acts till as late as 1819. f
The reasons, therefore, for the application of this c ause
of the seventh amendment to cases coming up for review from the State courts were as strong as in cases from the inferior Federal courts, and the history of the amendment will show that it was the apprehension and alarm in respect to the appellate jurisdiction of this court over cases tried by a jury in the State courts that led mainly to its adoption.
The appellate jurisdiction of this court, after defining its original jurisdiction, is as follows:
“In all other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make.”
Mr. Hamilton, in the 81st number of the Federalist, after quoting the provision observes: “ The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely called in question in regard to matters of law, but the clamors have been loud against it as applied to matters of fact. Some well-inten-tioned men in this State, deriving their notions from the language and forms which obtain in our courts, have been induced to consider it as an implied supersedure of the trial y jury in favor of the civil law mode of trial.” And he then enters into an argument to show that there is no real ground or alarm or apprehension on the subject, and suggests some regulations by Congress by which the objections would be removed. He observes, also, that it would have been impracticable for the Convention to. have made an express exception of cases which had been originally tried by a jury, ecause in the courts of some of the States all causes were rle m this mode, and such exception would preclude the agV1 T°n matters of fact, as well where it might be proper w ere it might be improper. He then suggests that Conss as full power to provide that in appeals to the Su- k°Urt ^lere Adulcí be no re-examination of the facts c 6 * e causes had been tried by a jury according to the thatTh* 11 aW. m°de proceeding. Now, it is quite clear nnini j restrictions upon this appellate power by Congress, public ’ J Hamilton for the purpose of quieting the mm, had a direct reference to the revision of the p. 282judgments of the State courts as well as the inferior Federal, and what is significant on the subject is, that the amendment submitted in the first session of Congress by Mr. Madison adopts the restriction suggested by Hamilton, and almost in the same words. We will simply add, there is nothing in the history of the amendment indicating that it was intended to be confined to cases coming up for revision from the inferior Federal courts, but much is there found to the contrary.*
Our conclusion is, that so much of the 5th section of the act of Congress, March 3d, 1863, entitled “An act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating proceedings in certain cases,” as provides for the removal of a judgment in a State court, and in which the cause was tried by a jury, to the Circuit Court of the United States for a retrial on the facts and law, is not in pursuance of the Constitution, and is void.
The judgment of the court below must, therefore, be reversed, the cause remanded with direction to dismiss the writ of error and all proceedings under it.
Public Schools v. Walker
*
Wetherbee v. Johnson, 14 Massachusetts, 412; Patrie v. Murray, Barbour, 331.
1
The act of Congress of July 27th, 1831, relinquishes to the State of Mis souri the lots, commons, &c., reserved for the use of schools by the act of June 12th, 1812, and nothing else.
2
The act of 1812 excluded from the reservation which it made, all lota rightfully claimed by private persons, and the report of the Board o Commissioners under the act of July 9th, 1832, in favor of such ac aim and its confirmation by Congress, is evidence that it was rightful.
3
The fact that such a claim was barred by the limitation of the act of did not prove that it was not a rightful claim, nor prevent Congr from removing that bar, and allowing the claim to be prove an firmed. , , .. p
4
Such subsequent confirmation shows that the claim was a rig u > when the act of 1812 was passed, and that the lot claimed was no eluded in the reservation for schools. ______________
Error to the Supreme Court of Missouri; the controversy being one of those, quite numerous in this court, growing out’of the various acts of Congress intended to settle the land titles originating in the lands of Louisiana prior to its purchase by our government from France. The case was thus:
The President and Directors of the St. Louis Public Schools brought suit, in the St. Louis Land Court of Missouri, against Walker and another, to recover certain lands situate in the city of St. Louis.
The title of the plaintiffs, who represented the common schools of St. Louis, rested on two acts of Congress. The first of these was the act of June 13th, 1812,* the first section of which, after confirming the common field lots and commons to certain towns and villages, of which St. Louis is one, directs the deputy surveyor of the Territory to survey and mark the out-boundary lines of said several towns so as to include the out-lots, common field lots, and commons thereto respectively belonging.
The second section, under which the plaintiffs’ claim arose, enacted that:
All town or village lots, out-lots, or common field lots, inc uded in such surveys, which are not rightfully owned or claimed y any private individuals, or held as commons belonging to such towns or villages, or that the President of the United States may not think proper to reserve for military purposes, shall be, an the same are hereby, reserved for the support of schools in
respective towns or villages aforesaid; provided, that the 0 e quantity of land contained in the lots reserved for the pport of schools in any one town or village shall not exceed
wentieth part of the whole lands included in the general nrvey of such town or village.”
sectionOt^rkact was that of July 27th, 1831.f The second the om c aCt’ referrinS t0 the section just cited from the act of 1812, declares:
__ tbe United States do hereby relinquish all their right,
*2 Stat, at Large, 748. t 4 Id. 435.
title, and interest in and to the town and village lots, out-lots, and common field lots, in the State of Missouri, reserved for the support of schools in the respective towns and villages aforesaid, by the second section of the above-recited act of Congress, and that the same shall be sold or disposed of, or regulated for the said purposes, in such manner as may be directed by the legislature of the State.”
It was conceded that, by the survey made under the first section of the act of 1812, the lot in controversy was found to be within the out-boundary of the town of St. Louis and its common field lots, commons, &c. It was also admitted that by appropriate legislation of the State the plaintiffs have become invested with such right as the State could give by virtue of the last-recited act of Congress.
The surveyor-general at St Louis, on demand of the plaintiffs, on the 3d June, 1861, had caused this lot to be surveyed and certified to them, as a lot embraced within and covered by the reservation for school purposes, and on this survey and certificate and the acts aforesaid they rested their title.
Such was the plaintiffs’ case.
The defendant, who had been in possession by himself and those under whom he claimed from 1844 tffll the beginning of this suit in 1864, now asserted that this land was, at the time the act of 1812 was passed, rightfully claimed by Josep Brazeau, a “ private individual,” and was, therefore, not re linquished to the State by the act of 1831.
In support of this assertion he showed that, long be ore the act of 1812, Brazeau had filed with a board of commis sioners, organized under the act of 1805 to report on sue cases, his claim and the evidences of it furnished im y the colonial authorities. Though this first board o coin missioners reported against the claim because he la n proved the inhabitancy and cultivation prior to 18, w ' the act of 1805 required, yet Congress, which had nev made the reports of these commissioners final, ut in numerous acts regulating the various commissions app for this purpose, had reserved to itself the powei
or reject their reports, did by the third section of the act of 1812 provide for a further hearing on this question of inhabitancy and cultivation. It also in every act on the subject reserved from sale the lands for which claims had been filed with the recorder of land titles, whether confirmed or not.* Several changes were made in the tribunals authorized to act on these claims, and for a time there was none with such authority.
An act of 1824j' directed that individual claims should be presented before a court of the United States within two years, and that unless so presented they should be barred. The time was extended, by subsequent act, to May 26th, 1829. Brazeau did not present his claim under these directions.
Finally, however, by an act of 1832,J another commission was organized. The recorder of land titles, in whose office all the old undetermined cases like Brazeau’s still remained on file, and two other commissioners, were directed by this act of 1832, to examine all those unconfirmed claims in his office, and classify and report them to Congress. They were o report what claims would have been confirmed under panish laws and usages, and what were, in their opinion, destitute of merit under that rule. And while no new claim Ms to be admitted, they might raise new testimony in addi-10n to that already on file in such cases. This commission passed favorably on Brazeau’s claim, the necessary proof of occupancy and cultivation having been made, and reported d to Congress, and that body confirmed the claim by act of July 4th, 1836.§ ait he k°uis Land Court gave judgment for the defend-1, and the Supreme Court having affirmed, the case was uow here for review.
rpi
fn n Was e^ah°rately argued by Messrs. Blair and Dick, 7 i in error. They relied largely: —le *act that Brazeau had not presented his claim of 1807 °L1805’ 5’ 2 Stat- at -Large, 327; act of 1806, § 5, lb. 39L; act
t Mav 442 5 aCt °f 1811’ 6 and 10> lb- 664-5-T May 26th, 4 Stat, at Large, 52. t JuV 9th, lb. 565. S’ 2 r TH 197 p. 286as directed to do by the act of 1824, and its supplement; that not having done so his power to establish a right was barred, and ended in 1829; that being then without any rightful claim, the act of 1831 vested the title in the State for the use of the schools.
2d. On the survey made by the surveyor-general and mentioned, supra, p. 284, as part of the plaintiffs’ title, and upon this declaration made by this court in Kessell v. Public Schools,* as to the legal effect of such a document:
“We are furthermore of opinion, that the certificate of the surveyor-general above set forth, and which was accepted by the grantees, is record evidence of title, by the recitals in which the government and the board of school directors are mutually bound and concluded. And this instrument, declaring that the land described was reserved for the support of schools, and the courts of justice having no power to revise the acts of the surveyor-general, under these statutes, it is not open to them to inquire whether the lands set apart were, or were not, lots of the description referred to in the statutes. The parties interested have agreed that this was a school lot, and here the matter must rest, unless some third person can show a better title.”
Messrs. Todd, Glover, and Shepley, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
It is not to be denied that if the lot in question was one of the class which, by the act of 1812, was reserved for the support of schools, that the title was vested in the State by the act of 1831, and by the State in the plaintiffs.
On the other hand, if the lot in question was not of the class reserved for support of schools by the act of 1812, then nothing in the act of 1831 has any effect upon it, and w ever may be the true owner, neither the State or schoo 1 rectors acquired any interest by the act of 1831.
Nothing can be plainer than that the act of 1831 was intended to relinquish the title which remained in the Unite States to the same lots and lands which had been reserve
for the support of schools by the act of 1812, and it relinquished title to nothing else. The one act is the exact complement of the other. The one reserved a class of lots, fields^ and commons for the support of schools-; the other relinquished io the State the title of the lands and lots so reserved for the same purpose. We are compelled, then, to look to the act of 1812 to ascertain precisely what was reserved.
This presents no patent ambiguity, for “ all town or village lots, out-lots, or common field lots,” included in such surveys, are so reserved, with the exception of three classes. These are:
1st. Such as are rightfully owned or claimed by any private individuals.
2d. Or held as commons belonging to such towns or villages.
3d. Or that the President may think proper to reserve for military purposes.
If the lot in question was covered by either of these exceptions, then it was not reserved by the act of 1812, and was not relinquished to the State by the act of 18^31.
The inquiry is still further narrowed in the present case by the fact that it is only claimed to be excluded from the c ass reserved, because it was rightfully claimed by a private individual.
Itwill, be seen by reference to the statement of the decnc ants title, that at the time the act of 1812 made an ex-
ception of lots rightfully claimed by private individuals, oseph Brazeau was asserting a claim before the proper tria^V01 hi8 claim was never abandoned; an t at, finally, a competent tribunal, authorized by Congress, decided his claim to be a rightful one, and that Con-
®s, y statute, confirmed this decision. w n ess it is shown in some other way that Brazeau’s claim for it a one, we think the plaintiffs have no title; to th 1V°° C^ear t?r argument that no land was relinquished sch the aef °f 1831 which was not reserved for ri?htf‘Su act °f 1812, and is equally clear that no land y claimed by a private individual was so reserved.
Two propositions are urged with zeal and ability, as counteracting the effect of Brazeau’s claim, on the rights of plaintiffs.
1. It is said that, by virtue of the act of Congress of 1824,* and other amendatory acts, his claim was barred.
The act of 1824 directed that all such individual claims should be presented before a court of the United States, and that unless presented to the court within two years they should be barred; and though the time was subsequently extended, Brazeau did not present his claim within it.
It may be conceded that between this time and the passage of the act of 1832 organizing another board, Brazeau had no claim which he could lawfully assert to this land; and it is said that while his claim was in this condition, the act of 1831 vested the title in the State for the use of schools.
But as the act of 1831 only relinquished the title to lots reserved by that of 1812, and as that reserved none rightfully claimed by private individuals, we must inquire whether the fact that Brazeau had failed to assert his claim within the time limited by Congress, proved that his claim was not rightful. For as a board of commissioners has said that, it was rightful, and as Congress has also said it was, this proposition can only be refuted by holding that his failure to assert it for a time, and the declaration of Congress that he could not be heard to assert it afterwards, proved that it was not rightful.
We do not think it had this effect. If it be treated as a statute of limitation, it is not the doctrine on which such statutes are founded, that lapse of time proves the wrongfulness of the claim. They are made for the repose of society and the protection of those who may, in that time, have lost their means of defence. It is a mere declaration of t ie law-making power to the plaintiff, that having voluntan j slept so long upon his rights, he shall not now be pei mitte to assert them, to the injury of individuals and the disturbance of society..
* 4 Stat, at Large, 52.
In the class of cases before us, the act was nothing more than the declaration of the sovereign power, who at the same time held the fee of the land, that if you establish your equitable claim to the land within a certain time, I will confer the title; if you do not, I will not afterwards hear you assert it. But it was competent for the sovereign, after this forfeiture had occurred by laches, to release it, to consent to hear the claimant, and to give him another chance to prove the rightfulness of his claim. And this is what Congress did by the act of 1832.
It is a little remarkable that Congre.ss did not require in this act that these parties who had been barred by the former acts, should now appear and renew their claim, but it directed the recorder of land titles, in whose office all the old cases like Brazeau’s still remained on file, and two other commissioners, to examine all those unconfirmed claims and classify and report them to Congress. They were to report what claims would have been confirmed under Spanish laws and usages, and what were, in their opinion, destitute of merit under that rule. And while no new claim was to be admitted, they might receive new testimony, in addition to that already on file in such cases.
It is very clear that Congress, by this act, intended to reuu>ve the restriction on the right to assert these claims impose by the act of 1824, so far as it concerned those that a been filed in due time with the recorder. We can enth^u n° their right to do this, and we do not see
at t ey lost this right by a gratuitous relinquishment of
e interest of the United States in lots not rightfully claimed
J apy private individual. They still had, as we think, the
fto pertain whether these old claims, long known and
% e public files, were rightful claims or not.
by th 18 Sa^ 8Urvey made for plaintiffs of this lot
of tbn SUlVe^0r’£enerab aild his certificate that the lot was
conpl.86 reserved for Public schools by the act of 1812. is We7e’a'ldCa"nOtbedisPuted-
should. lo\bno'v any statute or of any rule of law which
S o it this effect. The survev is madfi pt 'narfp. bv
v °l. IX.
an officer who has no control of the evidences of claims filed with the recorder of land titles.
Being an officer of the government, it is possible that this certificate of a survey, which he is authorized to make, may bind the United States, but we cannot see how it can determine, conclusively, the rights of private persons, which are not considered by him, and still less the rightfulness of a claim submitted by Congress to other tribunals for investigation, and reserved to itself for final approval or rejection.
The case of Kissell v. Public Schools, is very much relied on to establish the conclusiveness of this certificate. That was a contest between the public schools and a person claiming under the pre-emption laws. The court, in discussing the effect of a certificate of survey in favor of the schools, precisely like the one in the present case, said that, as to the public schools, they were bound by it, and so was the government. “ The parties interested,” says the court, “ have agreed that this land was a school lot, and here the matter must rest, unless some third person can show a better title.” The court held, in that case, that Kissell did not show a better title, by a common entry and purchase as pre-emptor, because the land, being within the limits of the town of St. Louis, was reserved from sale. The clear implication here is, that when there is a better title, the certificate of survey is not conclusive against that title.
Judgment affirmed.