Case details
Bluebook Citation
Norris v. Jackson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 125
Full caption
Norris v. Jackson.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Norris v. Jackson.
1. The 4th section of the act of March 5th, 1865, establishes the mode in which parties may submit cases to the court without a jury, and the manner in which a review of the law of such cases may be had in this court.
2. The special finding of the facts mentioned in that statute is not a mere report of the evidence, but a finding of those ultimate facts on which the law must determine the rights of the parties.
3. If the finding of facts be general, only such rulings of the court, in the progress of the trial, can be reversed as are presented by a fyill of exception.
4. In such cases a bill of exceptions cannot be used to bring up the whole testimony for review, any more than in a trial by jury.
, 5. Objections to the admission or rejection of evidence, or to such rulings or propositions of law as may be submitted to the court, must be shown by bill of exceptions.
6. If the parties desire a review of the law of the case, they must ask the court to make a special finding which raises the question, or get the court to rule on the legal propositions which they present.
7. In an action of ejectment, where the plaintiff’s title is that of a voluntary purchaser under an execution void because the lien of the judgment had expired, and the title of the defendant is that of a bond fide purchaser from the debtor during the continuance of the lien, it is not competent for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant promised the creditor, under whose execution the land was sold, to pay the judgment, and that he did not do so; in consequence of which the lien was suffered to expire. The fact, if proved, would not extend the lien of the judgment.
In error to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the case being this:
By section 4 of the act of March 3d, 1865,* it is provided t ,at parties may submit the issues of fact in civil cases, to e tried and determined by the court, without the intervention of a jury; and it declares what the effect of such finding 8 a be, and how and under what circumstances there may e a review of such judgments. The language of the section on this subject is thus:
be ^ucling of the court upon the facts, which finding shall general or special, shall have the same effect as the verdict
*13 Stat, at Large, 501.
of a jury. The rulings of the court in the cause, in the progress of the trial., when excepted to at the time, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, or upon appeal, provided the rulings be duly presented by a bill of exceptions. When the finding is special, the review may also extend to the determination of the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment.”
With this statute in force, Norris brought ejectment in the court below against Jackson, submitting the case to the court without the intervention of a jury. Both parties derived title from one Woodruff; the plaintiff by judicial sale, the defendant as tenant of one Gitchell, to whom Woodruff had sold the lands bond fide some time before the judicial sale. This judicial sale, under jvhich the plaintiff claimed, was made eleven days after the lien of the judgment on which the execution issued had expired, and this fact made it, under the statutes of Illinois, as the defendant contended, a nullity.
To counteract the effect of this too long delay, the plaintiff in the progress of the trial offered to prove that after the levy of the execution on the land in question, Gitchell, the landlord of the defendant Jackson, and the real party in interest, had agreed to pay the judgment, and had requested and obtained, from the attorney holding the same for collection, a delay of the sale of the land so levied on for fifteen or more days, when he refused to make payment as he had agree to do, whereby the marshal’s sale of said land was necessarily deferred till eleven days after the lien had expired.
The court rejected the evidence, and judgment having been given for the defendant, the plaintiff brought the case here. On its coming up, the transcript showed a long, i of exceptions, embracing all the evidence, which consists of judgments, executions, deeds, depositions, admissions, an agreements of the parties, at the close of which it was sai that “ the foregoing was all the cause, and the couit tieie upon found the issues and rendered judgment for t e. fendant, to which decision and ruling of the court, the p am tiff then and there excepted.”
Mr. A. F. Miller, for the plaintiff, both below and here, insisting particularly as error upon the rejection of the evidence which had been offered to show the cause of the delay, rested his case in part upon other matter embraced in the bill of exceptions.
Mr. S. TT. Faller, contra, argued that the attention of the court was confined to a single point.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The first thing to be observed in the enactment made by the 4th section of the act of 3d March, 1865, allowing parties to submit issues of fact in civil cases to be tried and determined by the court, is that it provides for two kinds of findings in regard to the facts, to wit, general and special. This is in perfect analogy to the findings by a jury, for which the court is in such cases substituted by the consent of the parties. In other words, the court finds a general verdict on all the issues for plaintiff or defendant, or it finds a special verdict.
This special finding has often been considered and described by this court. It is* not a mere report of the evidence, but a statement of the ultimate facts on which the aw of the case must determine the rights of the parties; a nding of the propositions of fact which the evidence estqbishes, and not the evidence on which those ultimate facts are supposed to rest.*
The next thing to be observed is, that whether the finding e general or special, it shall have the same effect as the ver. ct of a jury; that is to say, it is conclusive as to the facts so ound. In the case of a general verdict, which includes 01generally does, mixed questions of law an act, it concludes both, except so far as they may be save by some exception which the party has taken to the ruling of the court on the law.
In the case of a special verdict, the question is presented
Burr®. Des Moines Co., 1 Wallace, 99; Graham v. Bayne, 18 Howard, 62. [p. 128] as it would be if tried by a jury, whether the facts thus found require a judgment for plaintiff or defendant; and this being matter of law, the ruling of the court on it can be reviewed in this court on that record. If there were such special verdict here, we could examine its sufficiency to sustain the judgment. But there is none. The bill of exceptions, while professing to detail all the evidence, is no special finding of the facts.
The judgment of the court, then, must be affirmed, unless the bill of exceptions presents some erroneous ruling of the court in the progress of the trial.
The only ruling in the progress of the trial to which exception was taken by plaintiff, was to the refusal of the court to permit him to prove that Gitchell, the landlord of defendant, had promised to pay the judgment under which the land was sold to plaintiff*.
We do not see that this was a matter of which plaintiff, a volunteer purchaser, had any right to complain. It could not extend the lien of the judgment beyond the time fixed by law, which seems to be the purpose for which it was offered.
We have taken some painS to comment on the mode in which cases tried by the court, which are properly triable by a jury, may be reviewed here. Attention was called to the statute of 1865, in the case of Insurance Co. v. Tweed,* and we condense here the results of an examination of that statute.
1. If the verdict be a general verdict, only such rulings of the court, in the progress of the trial, can be reviewed as are presented by bill of exceptions, or as may arise on the pleadings.
2. In such cases, a bill of exceptions cannot be used to bring up the whole testimony for review any more than in a trial by jury. ,
3. That if the parties desire a review of the law invo ve in the case, they must either get the court to find a specia verdict, which raises the legal propositions, or they mus
* 7 Wallace, 44.
present to the court their propositions of law, and require the court to rule on them.
4. That objection terthe admission or exclusion of evidence, or to such ruling on the propositions of law.as the party may ask, must appear by bill of exceptions.
As the only ruling of the court in this case that we can examine seems to have been correct, the judgment is
Affirmed.
The Grapeshot.
1. When, during the late civil war, portions of the insurgent territory were occupied by the National forces, it was within the constitutional au-
thority of the President, as commander-in-chief, to establish therein
provisional courts for the hearing and determination of all causes arising
under the laws of the State or of the United States, and the Provisional
Court for the State of Louisiana, organized under the proclamation of
October 20th, 1862, was, therefore, rightfully authorized to exercise
. such jurisdiction.
2. When, upon the close of the war, and the consequent dissolution of the court thus established, Congress, in the exercise of its general authority in relation to the National courts, directed that causes pending in the Provisional Court, and judgments, orders, and decrees rendered by it, which, under ordinary circumstances, would have been proper for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States, should be transferred to that court and have effect as if originally brought, or rendered therein, a decree in admiralty rendered in the Provisional Court, as upon appeal from the District Court, becam^at once, upon transfer, the decree of the Circuit Court; and an appeal was properly taken from it to this court. \3. Liens for repairs and supplies, whether implied or express, can be enorced in admiralty only upon proof made by the creditor that the repairs or supplies were necessary, or believed, upon due inquiry and credible 4 he necessary in a foreign port.
ere proof is made of necessity for the repairs or supplies, or for funds raised to pay for them by the master, and of credit given to the ship, a presumption will arise, conclusive in the absence of evidence to the contrary, of necessity for credit. The cases of Pratt v. Reed and Thomas v. Osborn explained. Necessity for repairs and supplies is proved where such circumstances of exigency are shown as would induce a prudent owner, if present, to
180 The Grapeshot. [Sup. Ct
General statement.
order them, or to provide funds for the cost of them on the security of the ship.
6. The ordering by the master of supplies and repairs on the credit of the ship is sufficient proof of such necessity to support an implied hypothecation in favor of the material-man, or of the ordinary lender of money to meet the wants of the ship, who acts in good faith.
7. To support hypothecation by bottomry, evidence of actual necessity for repairs and supplies is required, and, if the fact of such necessity be left unproved, evidence is required of due inquiry and of reasonable grounds of belief that the necessity was real and exigent.
This case, which in its original form, was a libel in the District Court of Louisiana, on a bottomry bond, and, as such, involved nothing but the correct presentation of the principles of maritime law relating to that matter, and the
• examination of a good deal of contradictory evidence, to • see how far the particular case came within them, presented subsequently, and in consequence of the rebellion and the occupation by our army of the mere city of New Orleans, while the region surrounding it generally was still held by the Confederate powers and troops, a great question of constitutional law, the question namely, how far, with that clause of the Constitution in force which declares that—
“ The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,"—
the President could establish a Provisional Court, and how far Congress, on the suppression of the rebellion, could, by its enactment, validate the doings of such a court, transfer its judgments, and make them judgments of the now re-established former and proper Federal courts, from one of which, the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, the cause purported to be brought here.
The case—which in this court consisted accordingly of three parts—to wit:
1. The matter of jurisdiction,
2. That of the principles of maritime law7 in regaid to bottomry bonds,
Statement in the opinion of the first point.
3. The one of their application to the particular case, on the evidence, is all stated in the opinion of the court, not all consecutively in the opening of it, but all completely enough and with distinctness from the opinion itself, in three different parts, as the three respective topics arise to be treated of.
Mr. C. Cushing, for the owners of the ship, appellants; Mr. T. J. Durant, contra.
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question to be examined in this case is one of jurisdiction.
The suit, shown by the record, was originally instituted in the District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, where a decree was rendered for the libellant. From this decree an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court, where the case was pending, when, in 1861, the proceedings of the court were interrupted by the civil war. Louisiana had become involved in the rebellion, and the courts and officers of the United States were excluded from its limits. In 1862, however, the National authority had been partially re-established in the State, though still liable to be overthrown by the vicissitudes of war. The troops of the Union occupied New Orleans, and held military possession of the city and such other portions of the State as had submitted to the General government. The nature of this occupation and possession was fully explained in the case of The Venice*
Whilst it continued, on the 20th of October, 1862, President Lincoln, by proclamation, instituted a Provisional Court or t e State of Louisiana, with authority, among other P wers, to hear, try, and determine all causes in admiralty, consent of parties, this cause was trans-he'16] 1111° ^1G ■^>rov^ona^ Court thus constituted, and was lant ’ n a deCree WaS again reildered in favor of the Hbel_ Pon the restoration of civil authority in the State,
* 2 Wallace, 259.
Opinion of the court on the first point.
the Provisional Court, limited in duration, according to the terms of the proclamation, by that event, ceased to exist.
On the 28th of July, 1866, Congress enacted that all suits, causes, and proceedings in the Provisional Court, proper for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, should be transferred to that court, and heard and determined therein; and that all judgments, orders, and decrees of the Provisional Court in causes transferred to the Circuit Court should at once become the orders, judgments, and decrees of that court, and might be enforced, pleaded, and proved accordingly.*
It is questioned upon these facts whether the establishment by the President of a Provisional Court was warranted by the Constitution.
That the late rebellion, when it assumed the character of civil war, was attended by the general incidents of a regular war, has been so frequently declared here that nothing further need be said on that point.
The object of the National government, indeed, was neither conquest nor subjugation, but the overthrow of the insurgent organization, the suppression of insurrection, and the re-establishment of legitimate authority. But in the attainment of these ends, through military force, it became the duty of the National government, wherever the insurgent power was overthrown, and the territory which had been dominated by it was occupied by the National forces, to provide as far as possible, so long as the war continued, for the security of persons and property, and for the administration of justice.
The duty of the National government, in this respect, was no other than that which devolves upon the government of a regular belligerent occupying, during war, the territory o another belligerent. It was a military duty, to be performe by the President as commander-in-chief, and intrusted as such with the direction of the military force by which the occupation was held.
* 15 Stat, at Large, 366.
Statement in the opinion of the second point.
What that duty is, when the territory occupied by the National forces is foreign territory, has been declared by this court in several cases arising from such occupation during the late war with Mexico. In the case of Leitensdorfer v. We66,* the authority of the officer holding possession for the United States to establish a provisional government was sustained; and the reasons by which that judgment was supported, apply directly to the establishment of the Provisional Court in Louisiana. The cases of Jecker v. Montgomery and Cross v. Harrison,$ may also be cited in illustration of the principles applicable to military occupation.
We have no doubt that the Provisional Court of Louisiana was properly established by the President in the exercise of his constitutional authority during war; or that Congress had power, upon the close of the war, and the dissolution of the Provisional Court, to provide for the transfer of cases pending in that court, and of its judgments and decrees, to the proper courts of the United States.
The case then being regularly here, we will proceed to dispose of it.
The object of the original suit was the enforcement of a lien upon the bark Grapeshot, created by a bottomry bond, executed by her master, one Joseph S. Clark, in favor of Wallerstein, Massett & Co., at Rio Janeiro, upon the 15th of April, 1858.
The libel, filed by Wallerstein, Massett & Co., on the 3d of July, 1858, alleged that the bark Grapeshot, lying in the port of Rio, during the month of April, 1858, was in great need of reparation, provisions, and other necessaries to render her fit and capable of proceeding thence on her intended voyage to the port of New Orleans; and Joseph S.
ark, the master of the bark, not having any funds or credit ore, and the owner of the said bark not residing in Rio, an having no funds or credit there, that the libellants, at
t 16 ™°Ward’ 176’ t 13 Id. 498, and 18 Id. 110.
„ Lk-;d'J64; see also United States v. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246: and Texas White, 7 Wallace, 700.
Statement in the opinion of the second point.
the request of Clark, advanced and lent to him $9767.40, on the bottomry and hypothecation of the bark, at the rate of 19| per cent, maritime interest; that Clark, as master, did really expend the sum borrowed for the repairing, victualling, and manning of the bark in order to enable her to proceed to New Orleans; that the bark could not possibly have proceeded with safety upon her voyage without such repairs, and other necessary expenses attending the refitting of her; that she sailed and arrived safe at New Orleans on or about the 7th of June, 1858; and, that the bond was, at the proper time, presented for payment to Clark, ■who refused to discharge it.
Upon this libel, process was issued, and the vessel and her freight were seized. Subsequently the vessel was sold under an order of the court, and the proceeds, together with the freight-money, amounting, in the whole, to $13,805.85, were deposited in the registry on the 2d of September, 1858.
On the 1st of November, 1858, George Law, the claimant of the vessel and freight, filed his answer, denying the necessity of the repairs and supplies, alleged to have been paid for by the money raised upon the bottomry bond, and alleging fraudulent collusion between the master and the lenders, to the prejudice of the claimant. The answer set out at large the history of the Grapeshot, from the time she left New York, on or about the 9th of February, 1857, to the date of her arrival in New Orleans, on or about the 7th of June, 1858. It represented that the bark, when she left New York, was stout and staunch, well fitted, and supplied for her then intended voyage to Constantinople, and for the return voyage to New York; that, instead of returning from Constantinople to New York, the master, Clark, embezzled the freight earned in the voyage out, and engaged the vessel in voyages for his own benefit, until he caused her to be stripped at Rio of her copper, which was replaced by second-hand and indifferent metal, owned by Clark, and put on her in fraud of the claimant; that the dishonest practices of C ar were well known at Rio, and that the libellants were u y cognizant of them. The answer further denied the charge [p. 135] of the libel that the claimant had no funds or credit at Rio, and averred that he had credit to procure and obtain the necessary funds, and that the master was under no necessity to resort to the bottomry upon the vessel. The answer further alleged that there was no inspection or survey of the vessel with reference to the necessity for repairs; and that the alleged expenses for repairs and provisions far exceeded the sums’actually expended, of all which the libellants had notice.
Before proceeding to examine the evidence, taken under these pleadings, it will be proper to consider the principles of maritime law applicable to the case. A bottomry bond is an obligation, executed, generally, in a foreign port, by the master of a vessel for repayment of advances to supply the necessities of the ship, together with such interest as may be agreed on; which bond creates a lien on the ship, which may be enforced in admiralty in case of her safe arrival at the port of destination; but becomes absolutely void and of no effect in case of her loss before
arrival.*
Such a bond carries usually a very high rate of interest, * to cover the risk of loss of the ship as well as a liberal indemnity for other risks and for the use of the money, and will bind the ship only where the necessity for supplies and repairs, in order to the performance of a contemplated voyage, is a real necessity, and neither the master nor owners have funds or credit available to meet the wants of the vessel.
Sometimes bonds, bearing only the ordinary rate of interes, or executed under circumstances more or less different rom those just stated, are called bottomry bonds, and are enfoi cédas such;f but the general description just given embraces most instruments known under that name, and is su 'ciently accurate for the case presented by the record.
Carrington v. Pratt, 18 Howard, 67 ; The Atlas, 2 Haggard, 57-8. ratio rident 1 W. Robinson, 29; Brig Draco, 2 Sumner, 157 ; 1 Par-80ns °n Shipping, ng, 120.
There is no question in this case as to the character of the bond; nor as to the safe arrival of the ship; nor as to the validity of the bond if the lien can be held valid. The controversy turns on the question of necessity for repairs and supplies, and for credit.
We are to consider, therefore, what degree of necessity for supplies or repairs, and what degree of necessity for credit in that form, will warrant a master in borrowing upon bottomry.
Where the claim of the material-man is against the owner only, and no privilege is given upon the vessel, no necessity need be shown affirmatively. The master, in the absence of known fraud, is fully authorized to represent the owners in all matters relating to the ship; and it will always be presumed that supplies and repairs, ordered by the master, were reasonably fit and proper, unless there is clear proof to the contrary, and also proof of collusion by the material-man.
But something more is required when the claim is against the ship itself. Such a claim can be asserted only as a hen or privilege upon the vessel. And the rule is that such a lien for supplies and materials, or for money advanced for the ship, since it is created and exists without record, or other public notice, can only be established upon circumstances of actual necessity.
Proof of absolute and indispensable necessity, however, is not required in order to the establishment of such a hen, where supplies and materials are furnished on the credit of the ship, or of the ship and owners, in a foreign port. In such cases, courts of admiralty do not scrutinize narrowly the account against the ship. They will reject, undoubtedly, all unwarranted* charges; but upon proof that the furnishing was in good faith, on the order of the master, and really necessary, or honestly and reasonably believed by the furnisher to be necessary for the ship while lying in port, or to fit er for an intended voyage, the lien will be supported ;f un ess [p. 137] it is made to appear affirmatively that the credit to the ship was unnecessary, either by reason of the master having funds in his possession applicable to the expenses incurred, or credit of his own or of his owners, upon which funds could be raised by the use of reasonable diligence; and that the material-man knew, or could, by proper inquiry, have readily informed himself of the facts.*
*
The Cognac, 2 Haggard, 387. f The General Smith, 4 Wheaton, 443; Peyroux v. Howara, i * 324; Brig Nestor, 1 Sumner, 73.
It has been supposed that a more stringent rule than that just stated was sanctioned by this court, at the December Term, 1856, in the case of The Sultana, reported under the title of Pratt v. Peed.~\
In that case, coal for generating steam was supplied to the Sultana, of Buffalo, in New York, at Erie, in Pennsylvania. The master was sole owner, and known as such by the furnisher of the coal. The supplies were furnished from time to time during a period of nearly two years, and formed the subject of a running account of debit and credit extending through that time. The evidence warranted the impression, confirmed by the fact of sole ownership in the master, that the credit was given to the master and not to the ship. It was held that no lien attached to the steamer for the supplies thus furnished. -
We have no doubt that the case was rightly decided, mere are, however, expressions in the opinion which, separated from the case, appear to sanction the doctrine that, in order to the creation of a lien on the vessel, express proof is necessary of an unforeseen emergency creating a necessity for supplies, and also of the existence of a necessity for credit on the ship.
ut that it was not intended by the court to establish any other rule than that previously recognized, sufficiently appears from an opinion pronounced in the case of The Never-by the learned judge who delivered its judgment in e case of The Sultana. What was said in the former case 8U ciently shows that the latter judgment was intended only
+ qhe+f°rtltUde’ 8 Sumner, 246-7. f 19 Howard, 359. + southern District of New York, November, 1867.
to affirm that there must be an apparent necessity for the credit as well as an actual necessity for the supplies, and that in the case before the court there was, in fact, no such necessity as was essential to the creation of a lien upon the steamer. It was not intended to deny that this apparent necessity might be presumed from the necessity for supplies, from the general authority of the master, and from general good faith in the particular transaction.
It has been supposed also that the judgment of this court in the case of The Bark Laura, reported as Thomas v. Osborn,* required affirmative proof of the necessity of credit to the ship, in order to the creation of a lien on the vessel. The court said, that “ the limitation of the authority of the master to cases of necessity, not only of repairs and supplies, but of credit to obtain them, and the requirement that the lender or furnisher should see to it that apparently such a case of necessity exists, are as ancient and well established as the authority itself.” There is nothing in the language which necessarily denies that proved necessity for repairs may be received as presumptive evidence, sufficient, in the absence of other information, to establish a case of apparent necessity upon which the lender or furnisher may safely act. And the citations from the Digest and the Consolato del Mare, made to^ show the antiquity of the doctrine, seem to have reference only to the condition of the ship, and not to the condition of the credit of the owners or master.
We are satisfied that neither of the two cases just referre to, when properly considered in connection with the proofs before the court, can be regarded as in conflict with the rule we have stated, which, prior to these decisions, had been undoubtedly received upon the general consent of authori ties as the true rule on the subject of implied hypothecation for repairs and supplies, or for advances having the same re lation to the ship. •'rd
We have been induced to state this doctrine of inlP ie hypothecation somewhat fully, not only because it seeme
Dec. 1869.] The Grapeshot. 189
desirable to correct a common misunderstanding of these cases; but because of the close analogy in origin, effect, and incidents between implied hypothecation and express hypothecation by bottomry.
It is, indeed, difficult to trace, either in reason or in the authorities, any marked line of discrimination between them. In the case of The Aurora, decided in 1816, this court said: “ To make a bottomry bond, executed by the master, a valid hypothecation, it must be shown by the creditor that the master acted within the scope of his authority, or, in other words, that the advances were made for repairs or supplies necessary for effecting the objects of the voyage, or the safety and security of the ship. And no presumption should arise in the case that such repairs or supplies could be procured on reasonable terms with the credit of the owner, independent of such hypothecation.”*
And it was further said, in the same case, that “ it is incumbent on the creditor who claims an hypothecation to prove the actual existence of those things which gave rise to his demand; and if it appear on his own showing, or otherwise, that he has funds of the owners in his possession which might have been applied to the demand, and he has neglected or refused to do so, he must fail in his claim.”f
And this, undoubtedly, is the general rule also in respect to implied hypothecation. The principles on which it rests were fully explained and illustrated by Mr. Justice Story, in 1838, in the case of The Fortitude.^
It has been thought that a distinction between the lien for repairs and supplies, or ordinary advances to pay for them, and the lien of bottomry, may be found in that “superadded necessity” of which the learned judge speaks, in the case last cited, as distinguishing the former from the latter.
ere must, he said in substance, not only be a necessity or t e repairs, but a necessity for resorting to a bottomry oan.§ But this ruling must be taken with the qualiiicalon previously established by this court in the case of The
* 96, t lb- 105- t 3 Sumner, 232. i he Fortitude, 3 Sumner, 234.
Virgin,* where it was held that “the necessity of the supplies and repairs being once made out, it is incumbent on the owners, who assert that they could have been obtained upon their personal credit without bottomry, to establish that fact by competent proofs, unless it is apparent from the circumstances of the case.” It is only when such competent proofs have been adduced, or the practicability of raising funds on credit has been made to appear from circumstances, that the lender is held responsible for failing to make due inquiry.
In the absence of such proofs or circumstances, an apparent necessity for credit by bottomry must be regarded as established when the necessity for repairs is proved.
A more substantial distinction between the implied and the express hypothecation may, perhaps, be found in the greater diligence required of the lender on bottomry than of the material-man in inquiry concerning the necessity for repairs. The authorities on this subject are not easily reconciled; but they may be best harmonized, perhaps, in the proposition that if no necessity for repairs is established a bottomry bond will not be supported in the absence of proof that the lender, after using reasonable diligence to ascertain the facts, had good reason to believe, and did believe, that the necessity really existed. And this is warranted by good ’ reason. The maritime law seeks equally the general promotion of commercial intercourse and the most complete security in private transactions; and neither can well e reconciled with the support of hypothecations which paita e largely of the nature of hazard, made where the owner can not be consulted, at extraordinary rates of interest, agree upon by the master and the lender, and under circumstances favorable to collusion and fraud, unless the lender be ie to reasonable diligence in inquiring as to the existence o the facts of distress and necessity for repairs, which alone warrant such transactions.
The doctrine on the subject of maritime hypothecation, so far as it seems useful to consider it in this case, may summed up, we think, in these propositions:
Statement in the opinion of the third point. I ------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Liens for repairs and supplies, whether implied or express, can be enforced in admiralty only upon proof made by the creditor that the repairs or supplies were necessary, or believed, upon due inquiry and credible representation, to be necessary.
2. Where proof is made of necessity for the repairs or supplies, or for funds raised to pay for them by the master, and of credit given to the ship, a presumption will arise, conclusive, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, of necessity for credit.
3. Necessity for repairs and supplies is proved where such circumstances of exigency are shown as would induce a prudent owner, if present, to order them, or to provide funds for the cost of them on the security of the ship.
4. The ordering, by the master, of supplies or repairs upon the credit of the ship, is sufficient proof of such necessity to support an implied hypothecation in favor of the material-man, or of the ordinary lender of money, to meet the wants of the ship, who acts in good faith.
5. To support hypothecation by bottomry, evidence of actual necessity for repairs and supplies is required, and, if the fact of necessity be left unproved, evidence is also required of due inquiry and of reasonable grounds of belief that the necessity was real and exigent.
These principles are now to be applied to the case before us. I he pleadings make distinct issues upon the necessity or repairs, the necessity for credit, and exercise of due diligence in inquiry by the lender.
On examining the proofs we find great contrariety in evience, but we think it sufficiently established that Clark, the Piaster ot the Grapeshot, if not guilty of actual fraud, was W negligent of his duties as master.
is alleged in the answer, and the allegation is supported y credible testimony, that the voyage for which she was destined was from New York to Constantinople,
1857 bark sailed from New York in February,
’ aud the voyage to Constantinople was accomplished
Statement in tbe opinion of the third point.
in due time; but, instead of obtaining a return freight for New York, the master engaged the bark in a new voyage. He purchased a cargo of salt, partly at Ivica and partly at the Isle de Sal, one of the Cape de Verde Islands, and carried it to Rio, where he lay for some time, then returned to the islands for another cargo of salt, with which he arrived at Rio early in January, 1858, and remained there until April, when he finally took a cargo for the United States; not then, however, for New York, but for New Orleans.
There is some evidence that the new voyages were for purposes of private speculation by the master, and this theory receives partial confirmation from a letter written by him to the owner from Constantinople, in which he admits that he could obtain a paying freight for New York, but states that he had determined to seek more profitable employment for the vessel, in a voyage to Rio with salt. On the other hand, it appears that nothing was kept secret from the owner, unless it be the fact t)f private speculation, for the letters of the master show that he was advised from time to time of all the movements of the vessel.
These transactions are adverted to only because, though having no direct bearing upon the case, they cast some light upon the subsequent conduct of the master.
The liabilities, except those charged under date of October 31st, 1857, which form the basis of the bottomry bond, were incurred, if incurred at all, while the ship remained at Rio, from January 2d to April 19th, 1858. They consist of charges for supplies and repairs.
As to the necessity7 for repairs, the libellants have put in the depositions of Clark, the master, and of the furnishers at Rio. The respondent, on his side, has put in the depositions of several seamen who made part of the crew of the Grapeshot.
The evidence of these witnesses cannot be reconcile. The witnesses for the libellants are positively contradicte y the witnesses for the respondent. Clark, for example, says that on the last voyage to the Cape de Verde Islands an back .to Rio, the Grapeshot leaked badly, and that she os
Opinion of the court on the third point.
nine hundred bushels of salt by the water from the leaking. And, as to the leaking, his testimony is, to some extent, corroborated by that of the repairer. But three of the crew, examined on this point, testify positively that there was no damage from leaking. As to injuries to the bottom of the vessel, and the necessity for recoppering, Clark says nothing in his deposition; he merely states that the accounts of the material-men are just and correct, and they testify that the repairs and supplies were necessary. On the other hand, some of the crew testify that the repairs were quite unnecessary, that the copper put upon her was inferior to the copper taken off, and that the vessel when nominally repaired was less staunch than before. There is more to the same effect.
It is said that the evidence of the seamen is unworthy of credit. It was certainly taken in a very loose and unsatisfactory way. But this was the fault of the commissioner, and not of the witnesses. On the main points at issue their testimony is clear and distinct enough, and we perceive no reason for discrediting it.
We have examined it with care, and, taken in connection with the whole evidence on both sides, it has satisfied us that we cannot hold the necessity for repairs as established.
And this view is confirmed by the absence of any survey or examination by public authority, or by competent and isinterested persons for the purpose of ascertaining the necessity for repairs. In the case of The Cognac the bottomry ond was authorized by the French Tribunal of Commerce at the port of repair, and also by the British vice-consul ere, and yet the British Court of Admiralty disallowed item8 covere<^ by the bond.* And in the case o e Fortitude the bottomry bond was supported by evience of a. survey, called by the master and conducted by persons skilled in nautical affairs.. This was, as the learned Se observed, “what every prudent master ought to do under the like circumstances.”
* 2 Haggard, 377, 387.
Opinion of the court on the third point.
We do not say that such a survey is indispensable. No doubt proof of the necessity and of the extent of the necessity may be otherwise made. But where the repairs alleged to be made are extensive, and the necessity otherwise left in doubt, the absence of such an examination will go far to warrant the conclusion that no real necessity existed.
The evidence in respect to the bills for supplies covered by the bottomry bond is not so strong as to the absence of necessity for them. But there are some items included in these bills, and particularly a very considerable item stated as a general balance found due on a former account of the consignee of the ship, which can hardly be regarded as subjects of bottomry.
Under these circumstances, if there were any proof affecting the lenders with actual knowledge of the facts, it would be our duty to pronounce the bottomry wholly invalid. For there is no evidence that they made any inquiry whatever, and the maritime law holds them to reasonable diligence m this respect.
But mere omission to make inquiry will not invalidate the bond altogether. It may be good in part and void in part. And where, as in this case, part of the repairs and supplies have been shown to be necessary, and there is no reason to impute fraud or collusion to the lenders, the bond, though void as to the items of which the necessity is disproved 01 not shown, may properly be held valid as to those items t e necessity of which is shown.
Under the view which we have taken of this case it is not necessary to consider the evidence as to the necessity for credit. It may be of use, however, to observe that whi e there is evidence to show7 that the respondent, Law, was a man of large means, and known as such by some persons m Rio, the proof does not satisfy us that the sum named in t e bond could have been raised on his credit at rates moie a vantageous than were actually obtained, much less that t e lenders in this case could by any diligence of inquiry ave learned that this might be done. It is matter of history, of whi»ch the court will take notice, that the year 1857 vvas [p. 145] a year of financial revulsion and distress throughout the greater part, if not the whole, of the commercial world, the effects of which were still felt in the spring of 1858. In such a time proof of the practicability of obtaining funds, in a port so remote, upon the credit of the owner, should be clear indeed in order to affect a lender upon bottomry with the duty of inquiry.
On the whole the decree of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the cause must be remanded to that court with directions to refer the accounts for repairs and supplies to one or more commissioners experienced in commerce and of known intelligence and probity, to ascertain, under the instructions of the court, what portion of the repairs and supplies, actually furnished to the ship, were really necessary, and for the amount thus ascertained and approved by
the court to enter
Decree for the libellants.
Latham’s and Deming’s Appeals.
An appellant has a right to have his appeal dismissed notwithstanding the opposition of the other side.
These were two appeals from the Court of Claims, in suits against the United States. They had been passed at former
terms, and early at this one. It being alleged by Mr. Hoar,
Attorney-General, that they involved a question of public
interest to wit, the legal tender question—which he de-
sired, for some reasons which he stated, to have passed on
anew, he asked the court to fix a day at this term for argu-
ment upon them, it being stated by him that it was, in his
opinion, most desirable that the matter should not be post-
to the next term. After opposition and some delays
wii and Merryman, for the appellants respectively •>
in th en*eCl any question of legal tender was presented
had b reC°r<^8’ and assorted that the cases, whenever called,
een passed, on an understanding by themselves, the
V°L. IX.
counsel of the government, and the court, that if any such question were properly in them it should abide the decision to be made in Hepburn v. Griswold* then under consideration by the court—a day was fixed for the hearing of the cases. When the day arrived the cases were postponed, owing to another case being before the court. Being finally called, Mr. L. S. Chatfield, with whom was Mr. Merryman, for the appellants respectively, offered a stipulation signed by them in behalf of their clients, and moved to dismiss the appeals. The Attorney-General opposed the motion; stating that it was a surprise to him; that he was now prepared to argue the cases, and desired to do so.
After some conference on the bench, where the judges did not seem to be entirely unanimous, the court withdrew for consultation. On their return, the CHIEF JUSTICE announced it as the unanimous judgment of the court that the appellants had a right to have their appeals dismissed, and they were both dismissed accordingly.
The Johnson.
Steamers navigating in crowded channels and in the vicinity of wharves, must be run and managed with great caution, and with a strict regard to the established rules of navigation, including that one which requires them, when approaching from opposite directions, to put their helms o port. If they are about to attempt any manœuvre not usual and clearly safe, such as running in under the bows of another vessel in motion, they must not only sound their whistle or give the other proper signa, but before attempting the manœuvre must be certain also that the signa was heard and understood by the approaching vessel.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, in a case of collision, the case being this:
All steamers navigating the crowded waters of the New York harbor, were bound in 1863 to obey the following Rules of Navigation, prescribed originally for the conduct of passenger steamers, but adopted by other vessels.
The Legal Tender Case, 8 Wallace, 603.
“Rule 1. When steamers meet ‘head and head/ it shall be the duty of each to pass to the right, or on the larboard side of the other, and either pilot, upon determining to pursue this course, shall give as a signal of his intention one short and distinct blast of his steam-whistle, which the other shall answer promptly by a similar blast of the whistle. ' But if the course of each steamer is so far on the starboard of the other as not to be considered by the rules as meeting ‘ head and head,’ or if the vessels are approachingin such a manner, that passing to the right (as above directed), is unsafe, or contrary to rule, by the pilot of either vessel, the pilot so deciding shall immediately give two short and distinct blasts of his steam-whistle, which the other pilot shall answer by two similar blasts of his whistle, and they shall pass to the left, or on the starboard side of each other.
“ Rule 2. When steamers are approaching each other in an oblique direction, they will pass to the right, as if meeting ‘head and head,’ and the signal by whistle shall be given and answered promptly, as in that case specified.
“ Rule 3. If, when steamers are approaching each other, the pilot of either vessel fails to understand the course or intention of the other, whether from the signals being given or answered erroneously, or from other cause, the pilot so in doubt shall immediately signify the same by giving several short and rapid blasts of the steam-whistle, and if the vessels shall have approached within half a mile of each other, both shall be immediately slowed to a speed barely sufficient for steerage-way, until tbe proper signals are given, answered, and understood, or until the vessels shall have passed each other. >
‘Rule 4. The signals, by blowing of the steam-whistle, shall e S'ven and answered by pilots, in compliance wTith these rules, not only when meeting ‘ head and head,’ or nearly so, but at all times when passing or meeting, at a distance within half a mile
« °^er> and whether passing to the starboard or larboard.
• • The foregoing rules are to be complied with in all cases, except when steamers are navigating in a crowded channel ers 6 V1Clnity wharves; under these circumstances steamwhistl^ rUU an^ manaSed with great caution, sounding the as may be necessary, to guard against collisions or other accidents.” 6
With these rules in force, the Burden, a small propeller [p. 148] tug, was towing up the East River from Atlantic Dock, Brooklyn, the canal boat Kate McCord, heavily loaded with wheat, she being fastened to the larboard side of the propeller. The propeller with her tow was on her way from the Atlantic Dock, on the Brooklyn side of the East River, to Pier 44, on the New York side of it, and in a direct line from the dock to the pier. The tide was the middle of the ebb, running strongly down. In consequence of the shape of the land from Catharine Ferry to Atlantic Dock, there is a strong eddy tide which runs up along the Brooklyn shore to the upper side of the Fulton Ferry slip, when the tide is running ebb, and tugs bound up seek that eddy tide for the double reason that they get the aid of the eddy tide instead of the opposition of the ebb tide, and they avoid vessels bound down, leaving to them the advantage of the ebb tide and the breadth of the river. The propeller was, accordingly, going slowly up in that eddy tide 100 to 150 feet from the Brooklyn piers, and when she had nearly reached the ferry slip she saw the Scranton, a large side-wheel steamer, with an empty barge on each side, coming rapidly down the river, out towards the middle of the river just, above the Fulton Ferry.
The Scranton, when about opposite the upper part of the Fulton Ferry slip, starboarded her helm, and at a rapid rate swept in, in a curve toward the Brooklyn shore, with the purpose of running in under the bow of the propeller, and picking up a boat lying on the lower side of the lower pier of the Fulton Ferry slip.
The propeller, seeing the steamer thus coming dangerously towards her, blew one whistle, which is the regulation signal to indicate that she intended to keep to the right, an those on the steamer testified that she blew two whistles, which is the regulation signal that would have indicated t a she was going to the left; but the men on the propeller di not hear the two whistles, and of course gave no answering signal. Indeed, had they heard them, the men on the piopeller, as it rather seemed, could not at that time have done anything to prevent the collision, situated as the prope er [p. 149] Diagram of the East River. [p. 150] was. The result was that the steamer ran directly into the canal boat, which was lashed to the propeller, and did her and her cargo serious injury; also injuring herself.
The owners of the canal boat libelled both the steamer and the propeller to recover her damage by the collision, alleging a joint or several negligence; and the owners of the steamer libelled the propeller to recover her damage by the collision, alleging negligence of the propeller alone.
The District Court held that both steamers were in fault, and decreed against them jointly for the whole loss. The claimants of both vessels appealed to the Circuit Court. That court reversed the decree of the District Court so far as it affected the propeller, and charged the whole loss upon the steamer, on the ground she was wholly in fault.
From this decree the claimant of the steamer appealed to this court, and the libellants did likewise. The evidence was somewhat voluminous, but not very conflicting on the material points.
Mr. Fithian, for the steamer; Mr. Benedict, for the propeller; Mr. Van Santvoord, for the canal boat.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Damages were claimed in this case on account of a collision which occurred in East River, on the ninth of December, 1863, between the canal boat Kate McCord, and the steamboat Joseph Johnson, whereby the canal boat and her cargo, consisting of seven thousand bushels of wheat, were greatly injured.
Prior to the commencement of her trip, the canal boat was lying in the Atlantic basin at Brooklyn, and the proofs show that she was heavily laden, and that she was taken in tow there by the steam propeller William F. Burden, to be towe up the river to pier forty-four, on the New York side of t e river, for the purpose of discharging her cargo and deliver ing the same on board of the ship Whampoa, then lying a that pier. She was lashed to the port side of the propeller, and when the collision occurred, the propeller with the cana [p. 151] boat in tow was proceeding up the river to the place where her cargo was to be transshipped.
Loss was sustained by the owner of the canal boat and by the owners of her cargo, and they joined in the same libel, claiming damages, as well of the propeller to which the canal boat was lashed as of the steamboat Joseph Johnson, which collided with the canal boat, and which was the immediate cause of the injury both to the canal boat and her cargo.
Lashed to the propeller as the canal boat was, she was as entirely under the control of the propeller as if she had been a part of that vessel. When they were proceeding on their course up the river, the Johnson, with two unladen canal barges in tow, one on each side, started from Cor]ear’s Hook, on the New York side, on a trip down the river, inclining, however, towards the Fulton Ferry dock, on the Brooklyn side, to a point just below the lower slip of that dock, where she intended to take another boat in tow. When the boats started on their respective trips it was about eleven o’clock in the forenoon, and the tide at that time was half ebb, with a strong current in the channel of three miles an hour.
Vessels of that description proceeding up the river on that side, in that state of the tide, usually keep close to the shore, as they by that means avoid the downward current in the stream, and get the aid of ♦he eddy or reflex tide near the shore, which facilitates their progress, and the evidence shows that the propeller, with the canal boat in tow, was proceeding up the river along that shore in the track usually pursued by steamtugs in performing towage service under those circumstances.
Boats descending the river at ebb tide usually select the middle of the channel, as their speed is much aided by the curient, and the witnesses generally concur that the Johnson, until just prior to the collision, was proceeding down the river in a course much nearer the centre of the stream than t e ascending boat with her tow lashed to her port side.
ided by the current the speed of the descending boat was sexen miles an hour; but the propeller with the canal boat [p. 152] in tow was not able, in ascending the river, to make more than three or four miles an hour.
Whatever may have been the cause, it is admitted by the master of the Johnson that he did not see the propeller until she was opposite the slip next above the ferry slip, and he also states that the propeller, at that time, was about the same distance below the ferry that the Johnson was above that point, and of course they were not far distant from each other.
They were approaching at a combined speed of ten or eleven miles an hour, but not exactly from opposite directions nor on lines precisely parallel, as the Johnson was nearer to the centre of the stream than the propeller, and her course was inclining towards the Brooklyn shore. Strong doubts, however, are entertained whether the vessels would have collided if both had kept their course, but it is not necessary to decide that point, as it is conceded that the helms of both were changed before the collision occurred.
Appearance was regularly entered by the owners of the steamers, and the claimants of each steamer filed separate answers, denying that their vessel was liable for the injury, but the District Court held that both vessels were in fault, and entered a joint decree for the libellants in conformity with the allegations of the libel. Dissatisfied with the decree the claimants of the respective steamers appealed to the Circuit Court, where all the parties were again heard, an the Circuit Court affirmed the decree of the District Court as against the Johnson, but reversed it as against the pro peller, holding that the Johnson was wholly in fault for t e collision. Whereupon the claimants of the Johnson appea e to this court, and the libellants also appealed from so muc of the decree as held that the propeller was not in fau t.
All persons engaged in navigating vessels upon naviga waters, whether upon the seas or in rivers or haibors, ar^ bound to observe the rules of navigation recognize a
. approved by the courts in the management of their ^®s>se on approaching a point where there is danger of co [p. 153] Such rules are ordained and administered to prevent collision and to afford security to life and property exposed to such dangers, and experience shows that if they are seasonably observed and strictly followed such disasters would seldom occur.*
Rules of navigation are obligatory upon vessels approaching each other from the time the necessity for precaution begins, and they continue to be obligatory as the vessels advance, so long as the means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain. They are not strictly applied to a vessel which is otherwise without fault in cases where the proximity of the vessels is so close that the collision is inevitable, and they are wholly inapplicable when the vessels are so distant from each other that measures of precaution have not become necessary to prevent a collision. But precautions, in order to be effectual, must be seasonable; an<| if they are not so, and a collision ensues because they were not adopted earlier, it is no defence to show that they were adopted as soon as the necessity for the precaution was perceived, nor to prove that at the moment of the collision it was too late to render such a precaution of any service. Unless precautions are seasonable they are of little or no use, as it will seldom or never happen that a collision could be avoided at the time when it occurred."}-
Steam vessels, independently of the sailing rules enacted by Congress, are regarded in the light of vessels navigating with a fair wind, and are always under obligations to do whatever a sailing vessel going free or with a fair wind would be required to do under similar circumstances.^
rior to the passage of the act of Congress prescribing sailing rules, as well as since that time, steam vessels approaching each other from opposite directions, so as to inVo ve of collision, were required to put their helms to port so that each may pass on the port side of the other, and e court is of the opinion that that rule is applicable in this [p. 154] case, although the collision occurred before that act of Congress went into operation.*
Suppose it to be true that these vessels were approaching each other on intersecting lines, so that they would have collided if they had not changed their course, then it is clear in view of the circumstances that each was bound to port their helm and pass to the right, as there was nothing to prevent them from complying with that well-known rule of navigation. They were navigating in the daytime and in good weather, and they had an unobstructed view of what was before them; but the Johnson, instead of complying with that rule of navigation, put her helm to starboard for the purpose of crossing to the Brooklyn side and taking another boat in tow, which was lying in the dock, just below the lower slip of the Fulton Ferry. Descending the river, as the Johnson was, at the rate of seven miles an hour, she obeyed her helm readily, and aided by the reflex tide as she left the stream she came round quickly so as to head towards the shore, and as she advanced on her new course she struck the canal boat on her port side and caused the injury described in the libel.
Complaint is made by the appellant that the propeller was in fault, but the court is of the opinion that what t e propeller did was correct, and that she left nothing undone which, under the circumstances, was required of her by the rules of navigation. When the master of the propellei saw that the Johnson was heading directly towards the canal boat, he ported her helm, which was all he could do at that time, as the collision was inevitable. Some benefit, no dou t, resulted from the movement, as it doubtless diminished t e force of the blow and lessened somewhat the injury to t e canal boat and her cargo.
Unexplained, the appellant concedes that the attempt o the steamboat to cross the track of the propeller before s >e passed up, would not be warranted by the rules of naviga tion, but he alleges in argument that the Johnson, e o [p. 155] she starboarded her helm, gave notice to the propeller, by blowing her steam-whistle twice, that she intended to make that change in her course and go to the left, but the weight of the evidence is the other way, and the theory of the defence is expressly contradicted by the answer, which must be regarded as alleging the true state of the case.
*
The Sussex, 1 Robinson, 275; The Niagara, 8 Blackford, 37.
Whether tested by the pleadings or the evidence, the case shows that the helm of the steamboat was put to starboard when, if changed at all, it should have been put to port, and that the steamboat was put upon a course heading towards the Brooklyn shore, across the track of the propeller, before the steamboat blew her whistle, as alleged by the appellant.
Even supposing it were otherwise, and that the theory of fact assumed by the appellant could be sustained* still the court is of the opinion that it would constitute no valid defence in this case, for several reasons, which will be briefly explained: (l.)> Because the respective vessels, as they approached each other, were in such close proximity that the steamboat had no right to insist upon any departure from the ordinary rules of navigation. (2.) Because any such departure from the rules of navigation as that contemplated by the steamboat, necessarily involved danger of collision, as the propeller was nearer to the shore than the steamboat. (3.) Because the steamboat, even if she did blow her whistle before she starboarded her helm, still she had no right to c ange her course until it was certain that the signal was ieard and understood by the approaching vessel. (4.) Because the signal, even if given before the order to starboard, was nevertheless too late to justify the steamboat in attempting to cross the. bows of the propeller; but the court is satise that the signal, if given as alleged by the appellant, was not understood by those in charge of the propeller, and that was culpable rashness, in view of the circumstances, for e steamboat to attempt to cross the bows of the propeller e ore leceiving any signal that the propeller was willing to operate in the proposed change of course.
ose on board the steamboat received no answer to their S a, and it is reasonable to suppose that if they were [p. 156] attentive to their duties they must have known that those in charge of the propeller did not understand their signal, and consequently if they made the proposed change in the course of their steamer, a collision would follow, and if they did not so understand the matter, it was their own fault.
Viewed in any light, the propeller was not at fault, and the responsibility must rest on the steamboat. Ourconclusion is, that the Johnson is liable for the whole damage, and that the decree of the Circuit Court should be in all things affirmed.
Appeal was taken by the libellants from so much of the decree as exonerated the propeller, but their claim, in the view of this court, is against the colliding steamboat, and not against the propeller.
Decree in each case affirmed.
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