Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339
Full caption
Bigelow v. Forrest.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Bigelow v. Forrest.
1. The act of March 23d, 1863, “ relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases,” applies only to suits for acts done or omitted to be done during the rebellion.
2. It does not apply to actions of ejectment.
3. The act of July 17th, 1862, “ to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,” and the joint resolution of the same date explanatory of it, are to be construed together.
4. Under the two thus construed all that could be sold by virtue of a decree of condemnation and order of sale under the act was a right to the property seized, terminating with the life of the person for whose offence it had been seized.
5. The fact that such person owned the estate in fee simple, and that the libel was against all the right, title, interest, and estate of such person, and that the sale and marshal’s deed professed to convey as much, does not change the result.
Error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, the case being this:
Congress, by an act commonly called the Confiscation Act, passed July 17th, 1862,* dyring the late rebellion, “to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,” after enacting that treason should be punished with death, provides:
Section 5. That to insure the speedy termination of the pi esent rebellion, it shall be the duty of the President of the mted States to cause the seizure of all the estate and property • • • of the persons hereinafter named, and to apply and use e same, and the proceeds thereof, for the support of the army the United States.”
This 5th section proceeded to name six classes of persons thenT Pr°Perty 8bould be liable to seizure, and first among
Any person hereafter acting as an officer of the army or
* 12 Stat, at Large, 589.
navy of the rebels in arms against the government of the United States.* ’
And the last clause of it enacts that
“ It shall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such person for the possession or use of such property, ... to allege and prove that he is one of the persons described in this section.”
The act proceeds:
“ Section 1. That to secure the condemnation and sale of any such property, after the same shall have been seized, so that it shall be made available for the purpose aforesaid, proceedings in rem shall be instituted in the name of the United States, in any District Court thereof, or any Territorial court, within which the . . . property above described may be found;.. . which proceedings shall conform, as nearly as may be, to proceedings in admiralty or revenue cases; and if said property . . . shall be found to have belonged to a person engaged in rebellion, . . . the same shall be condemned as enemies’ property, and become the property of the United States, and may be disposed of as the court shall decree, and the proceeds thereof paid into the treasury of the United States for the purposes aforesaid.
“ Section 8. That the several counts aforesaid shall have power to make such orders, establish such forms of decree and sale, and direct such deeds and conveyances to be executed and delivered by the marshals thereof, where real estate shall be the subject of sale, as ^hall fitly and efficiently effect the purposes of this act, and vest in the purchasers of such property good and valid titles thereto.
“ Section 14. That the courts of the United States shall have full power to institute proceedings, make orders, and do all other things necessary to carry this act into effect.
By the latter clause of a ‘‘joint resolution explanatory ”* of this act, passed on the same day with it, it was reso ve by Congress that no punishment or proceedings un er act should be “ so construed as to work a forfeiture of t e real estate of the offender beyond his natural life.
It was a part of the history of this legislation of July 17tj,
* 12 Stat, at Large, 627.
1862. that the then President, Mr. Lincoln, immediately after the passage of the act by both houses of Congress, had prepared the draft of a message objecting to provisions that might result “ in the divesting of title forever,” and suggesting or showing that the bill, as Congress had passed it, was in conflict with that clause of the Constitution, which ordains that “no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted;”* that before his message was presented to Congress, the joint resolution, above quoted, was passed to remove his objections; and that the President, in a message of July 17th, 1862, mentioned, that before he was informed of the resolution, he had prepared the draft of a message, stating objections to the bill becoming a law; a copy of which draft he submitted; and also mentioned that, considering the act of Congress, and the joint resolution explanatory thereof, as substantially one, he approved and signed both.
Under this act, above quoted, as appeared by a case agreed on and stated, in the nature of a special verdict, the istrict Attorney of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, in September, 1863, caused a tract of land m the eastern part of Virginia, of which a certain French oriest (a person acting as an officer of the navy of the so-
Confederate States, from July 1st, 1862, to April, tio 'an<^ ^lus one the persons described in the 5th sec-ion of the above quoted act), was seized and possessed in fee, y ® seized. A libel was afterwards, on the 9th November e same year, filed on behalf of the United States, in cor ance with the act, in the District Court of the district .8 nanie^i “ against all the right, title, and interest, and estate The6 ^renc^1 Forrest, in and to the said tract of land” the lib0! Proceeded to judgment in accordance with dem^ On ^ie ^th of November, 1863, an order of con-creed^ha11 ma^e ^ie cour^ Uy which it was de_____ at t e clerk should issue a venditioni exponas to the p. 342marshal, and that the property described in the libel be sold by the marshal of the district, for cash, to the highest bidder, and that he execute a deed to the purchaser for the
*
Art. 8, g 8, clause 2.
same.
In pursuance of the decree the land was publicly sold, and knocked off' on the 10th July, 1864, to one Buntley, to whom the marshal made a deed reciting the venditioni. Buntley’s rights under the sale became afterwards vested in a certain Bigelow. Forrest died intestate November 24th, 1866, and his only child and heir-at-law, Douglass Forrest—whom the cases agreed on stated was “ one of the persons described in said section 5th, that is to say, who acted as an officer of the army and navy of the so-called Confederate States, from and after the passage of the said act till April, 1865,”—brought an action of ejectment, on the 1st of April following, in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, one of the State courts of Virginia, against Bigelow, to recover the land, averring seizure in himself on the 1st of January, 1867.
The defendant having pleaded to issue, on the 8th day of November, 1867, filed his petition for the removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States, under the provisions of the 5th section of the act of Congress of March 3d, 1863,* entitled “An act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases.”
This act thus provides:
“ Section 4. That any order of the President or under his authority, made at any time during the existence of thepresent rebellion, shall be a defence in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, pending or to be commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest or imprisonment made, done, or committed, or acts omitte to be done under and by virtue of such order or under color o any law of Congress. . . .
« Section 5. That if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or shall be commenced in any State court against any officer, civil or military, or against any other person or a y arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wrongs one
— * 12 Stat, at Large, 755.
committed, or any act omitted to be done at any time during the present rebellion, by virtue or under color of any authority derived from or exercised by or under the President of the United States, or any act of Congress; and the defendant shall.............. in the court in which such suit or prosecution is pending file a petition, stating the fact verified by affidavit, for the removal of the cause for trial at the next Circuit Court of the United States, to be holden in the district where the suit is pending, and offer good and sufficient surety for his filing in such court, on the first day of its session, copies of such process and other proceedings against him, &c., .... it shall then be the duty of the State court to accept the surety and proceed no further in the cause or prosecution. . -. . . And copies being filed, as aforesaid, in such court of the United States, the cause shall proceed therein in the same manner as if it had been brought in said court by original process.”
Bigelow’s petition for removal complied with the requisitions of this statute, respecting the form of procedure for removal.
The prayer of the petition was, however, denied, and, by agreement of the parties, the case already set forth, was stated in the nature of a special verdict, upon which the court gave judgment for the plaintiff. A petition was then presented to the District Court of Appeals praying for a writ °f supersedeas to the judgment, and assigning as errors that t e Circuit Court denied the motion to remove the cause into c Circuit Court of the United States upon the petition ic had been filed for such removal, and also that the U gment was not warranted by the facts found in the agreement made in lieu of a special verdict, and that it was against
6 aw and the evidence. The District Court of Appeals, owever, being of opinion that no error had been committed the 6 CaUSe ^le Circuit Court of Fairfax County, refused fe .8u^erse^eas* A petition was then presented by the depla ^Ie ®uPreme Court of Appeals of the State, comprad'ngf^ ac^on ^ie district Court of Appeals, and the^lng °l a Wr^ suPer8e(^eas to the judgment, assigning same errors which he had assigned in his petition to the
District Court. The application to the Supreme Court was unsuccessful. The supersedeas was denied, and thereupon the present writ of error was sued out. There were two questions, therefore, presented by the record:
1st. The question whether there was error in the refusal of the State Circuit Court to allow a removal of the cause into the Federal court; for if there was not, then obviously there was no ground for complaint that the Court of Appeals had refused a supersedeas to the judgment because such removal had not been allowed.
2d. The question whether there was error in the judgment of the court upon the merits of the case.
Messrs. Poland and 'Willoughby, for Bigelow, the plaintiff in error:
1. The court erred in denying the motion to remove the cause, for the action asserted a trespass or wrong to have been committed, and so fell within the act of March 3d, 1863.
The act on which the ejectment was founded was at least committed under color of an act of Congress, and also under color of an order given by authority of the President of the United States.
2. The decree of the District Court of the United States condemning and confiscating all the right, title, and interest of the original owner, under the act of July 17th, 1862, or Confiscation Act, is binding upon all but appellate courts. Such decree cannot be collaterally assailed, especially by a State court, except by showing that such District Court did not have jurisdiction.
It is agreed that the land was seized under the act. Proceedings were had “ in accordance with said act.” The act prescribes that the u proceedings shall conform as nearly as may be to proceedings in admiralty or revenue cases. Regularity in all that was done is of course to be inferred.
By the act all the property is to be seized. No other seizure would have been proper under the act. A life-estate could not have been seized, for the act did not direct it, nor did the owner have a life-estate. The officei cou no p. 345make a seizure of separate interests. He is to take the property belonging to the person.
3. Douglass Forrest, plaintiff below, is admitted to have been, like his father was, one of the persons described in the fifth section of the Confiscation Act. The latter part of that section declares that “ it shall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such person for the possession or the use of such property, or any of it, to allege and prove that he is one of the persons described in this section.” No amount of argument could show more clearly that Douglass Forrest cannot maintain this action, than this statement in the law itself. It is decisive of this whole case.
4. The decree of the District Court, confiscating all the righty title, and interest of the original owner, was authorized by the law. This is not a proceeding in the nature of a bill of attainder. The clause of the Constitution concerning this subject had reference to bills of attainder which were common to the English Parliament, and had often been resorted to by several of the colonial legislatures during the revolution, by which it often happened that the estates of persons were confiscated after their death, and without conviction or trial, and often when such estates had passed into the hands of innocent holders. The true construction of this clause is that no attainder of treason should work a forfeiture except wing the life of the person attainted; that is, that it should e done during his life. But this limitation upon bills of attainder does not apply to proceedings in courts, in individ-Ua cases, where there are regular trials and formal proceed-in which the individual has full opportunity to defend, e last clause of the joint resolution, explanatory of the on scation Act, was passed out of superfluous caution to ^eep t e act within the limits of the Constitution. It em-word h-Ver^ lanSuage of the Constitution, except in one hur’W have been inserted inadvertently in the upon\htten(^n£ Passin£> many resolutions with this, of th 6 a session. It was inserted because desi 6 su£ge8ti°n of the President, and because of his great 0 eep within the bounds of the Constitution. But p. 346neither the President nor Congress had fully considered the effect of the clause of the Constitution.
Any other construction of the real intention of Congress than that which we give it, would defeat the object of the bill, which was to raise money for the support of the army. The life of a traitor, liable to be executed for his crime, especially if the government could get him into custody, might be supposed to be very short. In any event the tenure of a mere life-estate would be so uncertain, that but very little money could be raised upon it. Such estates would not be improved, and instead of building up the country with loyal men upon these estates, as was contemplated, the tendency would be to destroy and impoverish it. Such a construction should not be given to an act of Congress if it is possible to give any other reasonable view of its intention.
Again, the act has at least equal force with the joint resolution. Both were approved by the President on the same day, and became a law at the same time. But the act says that all the property shall be seized, and the same shall be condemned. If the construction contended for by the defendant in error be allowed, then one exactly contradicts the other. If this be so we must give effect to that part of the bill which will be most consistent with its whole object. The word forfeiture is always spoken of as referring to all the interest a man has in property. It is one of the modes of absolute conveyance of real estate, and the word is never used in any other legal sense.*
If any other construction is given to the word forfeiture than that for which we contend, both in the Constitution and the act, and which is the universal legal construction of the word, we shall be led into difficulties which cannot be solved by any known rules of law. Can it be said to affect only the life-estate ? But the interest of the owner is not that of a life-estate. He holds in fee. Can the legislature determine that an estate in fee shall be a life-estate, or that
* 2 Blackstone’s Commentaries, 267.
it can be divided into one estate for life and some other interest? If it does make this separation there must be a remainder. Who is the holder of this? not his heirs, for there can be no heirs of the living. Besides a remainder must pass from the grantor at the same time with the creation of the particular estate, and must be supported by such particular estate, and if this fails the remainder falls with it. Can there be any inheritance from the estate which is left in the original owner? What kind of an estate is it that he has left which can descend to heirs? What is there left upon which an inheritance can be built, and what would be the name of such estate? The first, rule of inheritance is, that the inheritance must be from a person who dies seized of the estate.
-Mr. Conway Robinson, contra.
Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question presented by the record for our consideration is whether there was error in the refusal of the State Circuit Court to allow a removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States; for if there was not, there is no ground for complaint that the Supreme Court of Appeals had denied a supersedeas to the judgment because the removal prayed for had not been allowed.
The act of Congress of March 3d, 1863, under which the Og t to remove the cause was claimed, and under which the ’ight existed, if it existed at all, enacted, in its fifth section, ia if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, had been or s. be commenced in any State court against any officer, i or military, or against any other person, for any arrest r imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wrongs done duf0111111^6^’ °r any act to be done, at any time uring the then existing rebellion, by virtue or under color p anJ authority derived from or exercised by or under the def^ °f.tbe United States, or any act of Congress, the cuit C effect the removal of the cause into the Circuit of the United States holden in the district where p. 348the suit might be pending. The act prescribed the course to be pursued in order to stay the proceedings in the State court and transfer the cause into the Federal tribunal. It must be conceded that the plaintiff in error complied with the requisitions of the statute and its supplements respecting the form of procedure for a removal of his cause. It remains, therefore, only to inquire whether the action was one which, under the act of Congress, could be removed. It was an action of ejectment, commenced on the 1st of April, 1867, in which the plaintiff averred seizin in himself on the 1st day of January, 1867, and an entry by the defendant upon the land on the same day, and a withholding of the possession. It might, perhaps, be sufficient to say that the act complained of, for w’hich the suit was brought, was not, as described by the statute,.“an arrest or imprisonment made,” or “ other trespass or wrong done or committed,” or “an act omitted to be done during the rebellion.” It is to suits for acts done or omitted to be done during the rebellion exclusively that the statute is applicable, and prior to January 1st, 1867, the rebellion had ceased to exist.
But we do not rest our judgment upon so narrow ground. In our opinion, the statute was not intended to apply to actions of ejectment. It is manifest to us that Congress had in view only personal actions for wrongs done under authority or color of authority of the President of the United States, or of some act of Congress. The fourth section made any order of the President, or under his authority, a defence in all courts to any action, civil or criminal, pending or to be commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment made, done, or committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by virtue of such order, or under color of any law of Congress. The description of the causes of action mentioned in the fifth section is slightly different, not quite so detailed and specific, but it is evident that they were intended to be the same in both sections, as well as in the seventh, w'hich pie scribed a statutory limitation to suits and prosecutions. The specification, which all of these sections contain, of arrests and imprisonments, or, as in the fourth section, of searc es, p. 349seizures, arrests, and imprisonments, followed by more general words, justifies the inference that the other trespasses and wrongs mentioned are trespasses and wrongs ejusdem generis, or of the same nature as those which had been previously specified. This construction is fortified by the consideration that the mischief against which the statute was intended to guard was manifestly the excitement and prejudice so likely, in times of intense popular feeling, to attend suits in local courts for personal wrongs; excitement and prejudice which might render a fair trial difficult, and which might, indeed, greatly embarrass the government. The same mischiefs, in the same degree, could hardly have been expected to attend the trial of possessory actions for real estate. The action of ejectment is not a personal action, and it appears to us not to be embraced in any of the classes mentioned in the fourth, fifth, and seventh sections of the act.
It follows that there was no error in disallowing the removal of this case into the Circuit Court of the United States.
We proceed next to inquire whether there was error in the judgment of the court upon the merits of the case. The
plaintift below claimed the land as the sole heir of his father, reach Forrest, who had been the owner down to September st, 1863, and who died intestate on the 24th day of Novem,er’ 866. The defendant claimed as a purchaser under a eeree of confiscation made by the District Court of the States for the Eastern District of Virginia, on the th ^ovem^er> 1863. French Forrest, the father of e p aintiff, was an officer in the navy of the Confederate
8^rOm 1862, until April, 1865. In September, as th Up^er ac^ Congress of July 17th, 1862, known „ , .e 0n^sca^0n Act, the land in controversy was seized St f18 Pr°Perty’ libelled in the District Court of the United cree 8f °U ^0VGmber next following, a de-to be Wa8 en^ere(l> and land was ordered Jonas ' the marshaL Whether there was a venditioni from th188Ue<^’ as was or<lered by the court, does not appear case stated (to which alone we can look for the p. 350facts), except that the marshal’s deed recites its issue. We may assume that there was. The property was sold at the marshal’s sale and a deed was made to the purchasers. Subsequently, and before the institution of this suit, the entire interest acquired by the purchase became vested in Bigelow, the defendant. But what was that interest ?
The fifth section of the Confiscation Act of July 17th, 1862, enacted that it should be the duty of the President of the United States to cause the seizure of all the estate and property, moneys, stocks, credit, and effects, of certain persons described in six classes, and to apply and use the same and the proceeds thereof for the support of the army. To one or more of these classes French Forrest belonged. That it was not intended the mere act of seizure should vest the property seized in the United States is plain from the provisions of the seventh section, which enacted that to secure the condemnation and sale of any such property, after the same shall have been seized, proceeedings in rem should be instituted in a District Court, and that if it should be found to have belonged to a person engaged in rebellion, or who had given aid or comfort thereto, it should be condemned as enemy’s property, and become the property of the United States, and that it might be disposed of as the court might decree. Concurrently with the passage of this act, Congress also adopted a joint resolution explanatory of it, whereby it was resolved that no punishment or proceedings under the act should be so construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life. It is a wel - known fact in our political history that this resolution was adopted in consequence of doubts which the President entertained respecting the power of Congress to prescribe a forfeiture of longer duration than the life of the offender. e this as it may, the act and the resolution are to be construe! together, and they admit of no doubt that all which cou, under the law, become the property of the United States, oi could be sold by virtue of a decree of condemnation and order of sale, was a right to the property seized, terminating wit the life of the person for whose act it had been seized. It io - p. 351lows, then, that the estate acquired by the purchaser at the marshal’s sale expired on the 24th day of November, 1866, when French Forrest died.
It is argued, however, on behalf of the plaintiff in error, that the decree of confiscation in the District Court of the United States is conclusive that the entire right, title, interest, and estate of French Forrest was condemned and ordered to be sold, and that as his interest was a fee simple, that entire fee was confiscated and sold. Doubtless a decree of a court, having jurisdiction to make the decree, cannot be impeached collaterally; but, under the act of Congress, the District Court had no power to order a sale which should confer upon the purchaser rights outlasting the life of French Forrest. Had it done so it would have transcended its jurisdiction. And it attempted no such thing. The decree made has not that meaning. It is true, the cause in the District Court was entitled, “United States against all the right, title, interest, and estate of French Forrest in and to all that certain piece, parcel, or lot of land (describing it); but all this is descriptive, not of quantity of estate, but of the subject of seizure, and that was and. The proceeding was required by the act of Congress to be in rem, and the decree condemned, not the estate of rench Forrest, but, using its own words, “ the real property mentioned and described in the libel.” The marshal was ordered to sell the said property, the boundaries of w ich were given in the title to the decree. Had the purasers looked at that decree (and knowledge of it must be n uted to them), they would have seen that it was a de-ee o confiscation of the land, and they were bound to tbatth^8 e^ec^ Tf is, therefore, a mistake to argue all th below was permitted to impeach collatertbatth ^cree under which the marshal’s sale was made, or The 6 Udgment °F bhe court in this case impeaches it. decrear^fl,LeD^aS8-llme8 W^at cann°b be admitted, that the hiff ho ° a Court established a confiscation reach-land uf°n t n6 -^rencb Forrest, for whose offence the was condemned and sold.
It has been further argued on behalf of the plaintiff in error, that the plaintiff below was barred against maintaining his suit by the latter clause of the fifth section of the act of 1862, which enacted that it shall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such person for the possession or use of such property or any of it, to allege and prove that he is one of the persons described in the section. The agreed statement of facts, in lieu of a special verdict, finds that the plaintiff is one of the persons described in said section fifth; but it immediately explains this by adding, “that is to say, he acted as an officer of the army and navy of the so-called Confederate States from and after the passage of said act until April, 1865.” Was he, therefore, barred from maintaining the ejectment ? The land was not seized or condemned for any act of his. He had no interest in it when it was declared forfeited. He could not have been heard in opposition to the decree of forfeiture. That proceeding was wholly inter alias partes. If, therefore, he is not at liberty to assert his claim, he is denied the right to his property without trial, without any procedure in due course of law, and the practical effect of the bar is to assure to the purchaser at the marshal’s sale the enjoyment of the property after his right has expired, and to give him by estoppel a greater estate than he purchased. No construction of the act of Congress that works such results can be accepted. It is plainly against the true meaning of the act. We have already remarked that the act and the contemporaneous resolution must be construed together. The latter declares that the act shall not be construed to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life. It can do this neither directly nor indirectly. The punishment inflicted upon him is not to descend to his children. His heritable blood is not corrupted. It is, of course, necessaiy to give such an interpretation to the words of the statute that they shall not contravene the declared intent of Congress. And this may be done and effect given to every pait, y holding that the persons described in the fifth section, who are barred from bringing a suit for the possession or use o p. 353such property, are those, and those only, whose property the President has caused to be seized. Such we think is the meaning of the clause barring suits.
This is all that need be said of the case. It is enough to show that, in our opinion, none of the errors assigned have any real existence. We do not care to speculate upon the anomalies presented by the forfeiture of lands of which the offender was seized in fee, during his life and no longer, without any corruption of his heritable blood; or to inquire how, in such a case, descent can be east upon his heir, notwithstanding he had no seizin at his death. Such speculations may be curious, but they are not practical, and they can give no aid in ascertaining the meaning of the statute.
Judgment affirmed.
National Bank v. Commonwealth.
*2 TlT States to tax the shares of the National banks reaffirmed, e statute of Kentucky (set forth in the statement of the ease), taxing ank stock, levies a tax on the shares of the stockholders, as distin-3 Th'‘1S^e<^ ^r°m th0 caP^a^ the bank invested in Federal securities.
is is true, although the tax is collected of the bank instead of the individual stockholders. he doctrine which exempts the instrumentalities of the Federal government from the influence of State legislation, is not founded on any xpress provision of the Constitution, but in the implied necessity for 5 It 6 U}>e SUCh *ns^rumen^s by tbe Federal government.
not’ ere/°re’ bmited by the principle that State legislation, which does mpair the usefulness or capability of such instruments to serve that 6. A StT?6111’ nOt within the rule of prohibition. fulf i* re<1Uiring ^ati°naI banks to pay the tax which is righty ai on the shares of its stock is valid under this limitation of the doctrine. whink * error a State court no question will be considered here was not called to the attention of the State court.
being^this^ ^0Ur* -^PPeals of Kentucky; the case
VOL. IX.
The act of Congress establishing the National banks,* enacts:
“ Section 40. That the president and cashier of every such association shall cause to be kept a correct list of the names and residences of all the shareholders in the association, and the number of shares held by each, and such list shall be open to the inspection of the officers authorized to collect taxes under State authority.
“ Section 41. Provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations held by any person, from being included in the valuation of the personalty of such person, in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under State authority, at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhereJ but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State. Provided further, that the tax so imposed, under’ the laws of any State, upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act, shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares of any of the banks organized under authority of the State where such association is located.”
Under the act of Congress which makes these provisions, the First National Bank of Louisville was established.
A statute of Kentucky,f relating to revenue and taxation, lays a tax as follows:
“ On bank stock, or stock in any moneyed corporation of loan or discount, fifty cents on each share thereof equal to one hundred dollars, or on each one hundred dollars of stock therein owned by individuals, corporations, or societies.”
And the same statute goes on to enact:
“The cashier of a bank, whose stock is taxed, shall, on the first day in July of each year, pay into the treasury the amount of tax due. If such tax be not paid, the cashier and his sureties shall be liable for the same, and twenty per cent, upon the
*13 Stat, at Large, 111. f Revised Statutes of Kentucky, vol. ii, pp. 239, 266.
amount; and the said bank or corporation shall thereby forfeit the privileges of its charter.”
Acting in professed pursuance of the State statute, the Commonwealth of Kentucky demanded payment from, the said bank of $4000, with interest, the sum which a tax of fifty cents per share on the shares of the bank gave. Payment being declined the State sued.
The suit was brought in one of the State courts, and according to the practice of the courts of Kentucky by a petition, setting forth the amount of the tax and claiming a judgment for the same. The answer by the same mode of practice, set up four distinct defences to the action. These were:
1. That the bank was not organized under the law of the State, but under the bank act of the United States, and wras, therefore, not subject to State taxation.
2. That it had been selected and wTas acting as a depositary and financial agent of the government of the United States, an, therefore, was not liable to any tax whatever, either on the bank, its capital, or its shares.
• That its entire capital was invested in securities of the government of the United States, and that its shares of stock represented but an interest in the said securities, and were t eiefore not subject to State taxation. • ^he shares of the stock were the property of the ividual shareholders, and that the bank could not be a e responsible for a tax levied on those shares, and could e compelled to collect and pay such tax to the State.
a inc]6 Cornn]on.wea^hi demurred; and the case resulting in gment 'n favor in the Court of Appeals, this writ of r°rwas Prosecuted by the bank.
a britf °f Messrs. Pirtle and Caruth, for the pmnlij} in error.
shares in un(^er recent decisions of this court ational banks may be taxed in the hands of the
•Argument against the tax.
stockholders.* But this tax is laid, not on shares in the hands of stockholders, but on the capital of the bank itself.
Under the statute of Kentucky the amount of the tax is calculated by charging fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of stock, exacted in solido from the bank itself, under penalty of twenty per cent, damages in addition against the cashier and forfeiture of the charter. This is not a tax upon the shares but on the bank. The shareholder is neither named nor known in the transaction. It is a matter between the State and the bank. The shares of one hundred dollars are used simply as a means of computing the amount of tax on the capital stock. Without this, or some similar contrivance for estimating, a tax could not be levied on capital stock. There is not a word said about requiring the bank to pay for the shareholder as a convenience, but it directly, in terms, applies to stock of the banks. What stock does the bank own except the capital stock, which is identical with itself? The law requires the cashier of a bank whose stock is taxed, on the first day in July in each year, to pay the amount due. The amount due upon what? Clearly upon the capital stock. The capital of State banks in Kentucky is not always divided into shares of one hundred dollars each; on the contrary, some of the State banks now in operation, as ex. gr., The Merchants’ Bank of Kentucky, are divided into shares of only twenty-five dollars each, and one, The Western Financial Corporation, into shares of five hundred dollars each.
Now, these two banks are taxed annually under the statute, because in Kentucky there are no other laws upon the subject. The language is “fifty cents on each share thereof equal to one hundred dollars of stock.” If that means a tax upon the share, as the Court of Appeals holds, the shares in the said banks being respectively twenty-five and five hun dred dollars, and the law providing only for a tax on shares equal to one hundred dollars, nothing can be clearer than that no tax at all is levied on their shares.
*
Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wallace, 578; Bradley v. The People, 4 Id. 459.
II. A lax on the capital stock of the bank cannot be collected.
1. Because of its investment in government bonds.*
2. Because of its character as an agency and instrument of the powers of the Federal government.! If there be any one principle of constitutional law now universally acquiesced in, it is that the powers, agents, and means employed by Congress to carry into effect the powers vested by the Constitution in the Federal government must be free from State taxation and control. Taxation would impede, burden, and perhaps destroy the constitutional laws of Congress, and hostile legislation revolutionize our National economy. Such protection is necessary to uphold the nation’s credit and preserve the nation’s life. The tax imposed in this case upon the plaintiff in error is, in substance and in fact, a tax upon the operations of the bank itself.
III. Can the law be enforced as a tax on shares ?
The shares in the hands of the shareholders are, under the act of Congress, to be included in the assessment of their personal estate; and, in order that the State officers may ave every facility to arrive at the exact number of shares held by each person, the bank is required to keep, at all tunes, a list of names of stockholder!’, number of shares e d by each, &c. If the means of collecting the tax be nothing, why is Congress careful to insert the foregoing provision ? If the States can coerce the bank itself to pay the tax in solido for its stockholders, whence the necessity of the ist of stockholders to be open for the inspection of the taxing officers of the State? It was with a view to jprevent ings such as this one that Congress particularly pre-was t ^ie m0<^ collecti™ as well as the extent of it. It va ° these organizations from being made the sern s an agents of the States in the collection of taxes; to
Commissi^ V Charleston, 2 Peters, 449 ; Bank of Commerce ».
t McCull^h 2 QlaCk’ 620 ’ The PeoPle v- Commissioners, 4 Wallace, 244.
the United St ^ar^an<^> 4 Wheaton, 316 ; Osborn v. Bank of 485. eS’ 9 Wheaton, 738 ; Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Peters, p. 358do which would be to clothe the State with an authority not justified by the constitution, and denied by this court. Without remuneration, and without right, the commonwealth of Kentucky is undertaking to force the plaintiff in error, in its corporate capacity, to collect this tax from its shareholders, and pay the same into the State treasury. Not only so, but penalties of a grave and serious character are imposed upon the bank and its officers in the event of neglect or refusal. Can this burden be imposed ? Is it in accordance with the provisions of the act of Congress and the decisions of this court ? With great propriety the bank may say to the State: “You have your assessing officers; send them to the bank; they will there find a list of all stockholders, let them assess for themselves the shares of stock for taxation; but you shall not transform our National agency into a State servant, and compel it to perform a burdensome duty, not enjoined by its charter.”
IV. A concession of the right as claimed carries with it means for its enforcement.
This right, if conceded, may, and actually does, involve the destruction of these National agencies.
“ If such tax be ftot paid,” says the statute, “ the cashier and his securities shall be liable for the same, and twenty per cent, upon the amount; and the said bank or corporation shall thereby forfeit the privileges of its charter.” Such is the law upon which this proceeding is based.
V. The rate of taxation is higher than allowed by Congress.
[The learned counsel then went into an exhibition of facts and figures to show this.]
Mr. Albert Pike, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
In the several recent decisions concerning the taxation the shares of the National banks, as regulated by reetion« forty and forty-one of the act of Congress of June dd,
Opinion of the court. .
it has been established as the law governing this court that the property or interest of a stockholder in an incorporated bank, commonly called a share, the shares in their aggregate totality being called sometimes the capital stock of the bank, is a different thing from the moneyed capital of the hank held and owned by the corporation. This capital may consist of cash, or of bills and notes discounted, or of real estate combined with these. The whole of it may be invested in bonds of the government, or in bonds of the States, or in bonds and mortgages. In whatever it may be invested it is owned by the bank as a corporate entity, and not by the stockholders. A tax upon this capital is a tax upon the bank, and we have held that when that capital was invested m the securities of the government it could not be taxed, nor could the corporation be taxed as the owner of such securities.
On, the other hand, we have held that the shareholders, or stockholders, by which is meant the same thing, may be taxed by the States on stock or shares so held by them, although all the capital of the bank be invested in Federal securities, provided the taxation does not violate the rule prescribed by the act of 1864.
It is not intended, here to enter again into the argument y which this distinction is maintained, but to give a clear s atement of the prepositions that w’e have decided, that we ni&y apply them to the case before us.
h then, the tax for which the State of Kentucky recovjudgment in this case is a tax upon the shares of the oc of the bank, and is not a tax upon the capital of the an owne(l by the corporation, the first, second, and third grounds of defence must fail.
here are, then, but two questions to be considered in the case before us:
clai* Kentucky> nn<ler which this tax is lmP°se a tax upon the shares of the bank, or upon bonds?1^ bank> which is all invested in government
2 If *t ‘ #
1 is found to be a tax on the shares, can the bank
• Opinion of the court.
be compelled to pay the tax thus levied on the shares by the State ?
The revenue law of Kentucky imposes a tax “ on bank stock, or stock in any moneyed corporation of loan and discount, of fifty cents on each share thereof, equal to one hundred dollars of stock therein, owned by individuals, corporations, or societies.”
We entertain no doubt that this provision was intended to tax the shares of the stockholders, and that if no other provision had been made, the amount of the tax would have been primarily collectible of the individual or corporation owning such shares, in the same manner as other taxes are collected from individuals. It is clear that it is the shares owned or held by individuals in the banking corporation which are to be taxed, and the measure of the tax is fifty cents per share of one hundred dollars. These shares may, in the market, be worth a great deal more or a great deal less than, their par or nominal value, as its capital may have been increased or diminished by gains or losses, but the tax is the same in each case. This shows that it is the share which is intended to be taxed, and not the cash or other actual capital of the bank.
It is said that there may be, or that there really are, banks in Kentucky whose stock is not divided into shares of one hundred dollars each, but into shares of fifty dollars or other amounts, and that this shows that the legislature did not intend a tax of fifty cents on the share, but a tax on the capital. But the argument is of little weight. What the legislature intended to say was, that we impose a.tax on the shares held by individuals or other corporations in banks in this State. The tax shall be at the rate of fifty cents per share ot stock equal to one hundred dollars. If the shares are only equa to fifty dollars it will be twenty-five cents on each of sue shares. If they are equal to five hundred dollars it will e two dollars and fifty cents per share. The rate is regulate so as to be equal to fifty cents on each share of one bundie dollars.
But it is strongly urged that it is to be deemed a tax on p. 361the capital of the bank, because the law requires the officers of the bank to pay this tax on the shares of its stockholders. Whether the State has the right to do this we will presently consider, but the fact that it has attempted to do it does not prove that the tax is anything else than a tax on these shares. It has been the practice of many of the States for a long time to require of its corporations, thus to pay the tax levied on their shareholders. It is the common, if not the only, mode of doing this in all the New England States, and in several of them the portion of this tax which should properly go as the shareholder’s contribution to local or municipal taxation is thus collected by the State of the bank and paid over to the local municipal authorities. In the case of shareholders not residing in the State, it is the only mode in which the State can reach their shares for taxation. We are, therefore, of opinion that the law of Kentucky is a tax upon the shares of the stockholder. If the State cannot require of the bank to pay the tax on the shares of its stock it must be because the Constitution of the United States, or some act of Congress, forbids it. There is certainly no express provision of the Constitution on the subject.
But it is argued that the banks, being instrumentalities of the Federal government, by which some of its important operations are conducted, cannot be subjected to such State legislation. It is certainly true that the Bank of the United States and its capital were held to be exempt from State taxation on the ground here stated, and this principle, laid own in the case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, has een repeatedly affirmed by the court. But the doctrine has its foundation in the proposition, that the right of taxation be so used in such cases as to destroy the instrumenta ities by which the government proposes to effect its lawful purposes in the States, and it certainly cannot be maintained at banks or other corporations or instrumentalities of the government are to be wholly withdrawn from the operation P ta^e legislation. The most important agents of the
^overnnaen^ are if® officers, but no one will contend a when a man becomes an officer of the government he p. 362ceases to be subject to the laws of the State. The principle we are discussing has its limitation, a limitation growing out of the necessity on which the principle itself is founded. That limitation is, that the agencies of the Federal government are only exempted from State legislation, so far as that legislation may interfere with, or impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed to serve that government. Any other rule would convert a principle founded alone in the necessity of securing to the government of the United States the means of exercising its legitimate powers, into an unauthorized and unjustifiable invasion of the rights of the States. The salary of a Federal officer may not be taxed; he may be exempted from any personal service which interferes with the discharge of his official duties, because those exemptions are essential to enable him to perform those duties. But he is subject to all the laws of the State which affect his family or social relations, or his property, and he is liable to punishment for crime, though that punishment be imprisonment or death. So of the banks. They are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is only when the State law incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitutional. We do not see the remotest probability of this, in their being required to pay the tax which their stockholders owe to the State for the shares of their capital stock, when the law of the Federal government authorizes the tax.
If the State of Kentucky had a claim against a stockholder of the bank who was a non-resident of the State, it coul undoubtedly collect the claim by legal proceeding, in whic the bank could be attached or garnisheed, and made to paj the debt out of the means of its shareholder under its coy trol. This is, in effect, what the law of Kentucky does in regard to the tax of the State on the bank shares. It ig n0 p. 363greater interference with the functions of the bank than any other legal proceeding to which its business operations may subject it, and it in no manner hinders it from performing all the duties of financial agent of the government.
A very nice criticism of the proviso to the 41st section of the National Bank Act, which permits the States to tax the shares of such bank, is made to us to show that the tax must be collected of the shareholder directly, and that the mode we have been considering is by implication forbidden. But we are of opinion that while Congress intended to limit State taxation to the shares of the bank, as distinguished from its Capital, and to provide against a discrimination in taxing such bank shares unfavorable to them, as compared with the shares of other corporations, and with other moneyed capital, it did not intend to prescribe to the States the mode in which the tax should be collected. The mode under consideration is the one which Congress itself has adopted in collecting its tax on dividends, and on the income arising from bonds of corporations. It is the only mode which, certainly and without loss, secures the payment of the tax on all. the shares, resident or non-resident; and, as we have already stated, it is the mode which experience has justified in the New England States as the most convenient and proper, in regard to the numerous wealthy corporations of those States. It is not to be readily inferred, therefore, that Congress intended to prohibit this mode of collecting a tax which they expressly permitted the States to levy.
It is said here in argument that the tax is void because it is greater than the tax laid by the State of Kentucky on other moneyed capital in that State. This proposition is not raised among the very distinct and separate grounds of deenee set up by the bank in the pleading. Nor is there any icason to suppose that it was ever called to the attention of e Court of Appeals, whose judgment we are reviewing, e have so often of late decided, that when a case is brought efore us by writ of error to a State court, we can only con-81 er such alleged errors as are involved in the record, and ac ually received the consideration of the State court, that p. 364it is only necessary to state the proposition now. As the question thus sought to be raised here was not raised in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, we cannot consider it.
Judgment affirmed.